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Targets, Casualties, and Weapons of Conflict How Non-State Actors Instrumentalize Water Resources and Infrastructures As Part of Military Tactics and Strategies

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Targets, Casualties, and Weapons of Conflict How Non-State Actors Instrumentalize Water Resources and Infrastructures as Part of Military Tactics and Strategies Femke Remmits Crisis and Security Management (MSc) Supervisor: Dr. Graig Klein 10-1-2021 Word count: 21.892 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 4 1.1 The Instrumentalization of Water Resources and Infrastructures ................................................. 4 1.2 Problem Definition and Research Question .................................................................................. 7 1.3 Academic and Social Relevance ................................................................................................... 8 1.4 Research Structure ....................................................................................................................... 10 2. Body of Knowledge and Theoretical Framework: Reviewing the Water-Conflict Literature .......... 11 2.1 Linking Renewable Environmental Resources and Conflict ....................................................... 12 2.1.1 Renewable Environmental Resource Scarcities as a Source for Violence ........................... 12 2.1.2 Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Resource Scarcity ................................. 14 2.2 Water Resources as Causes of Tension and Dispute ................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Water Wars ........................................................................................................................... 17 2.2.2 The Relationship between Water and Intra-State Violence and Conflict ............................. 20 2.3 Water as a Military Instrument and Strategy of Warfare ............................................................ 22 2.3.1 The Weaponization of Water ................................................................................................ 23 2.3.2 A Weapon, a Target, a Casualty: The Water-Related Tactics of Non-State Actors ............. 25 3. Research Design and Methodology ................................................................................................... 27 3.1 Case Study Design ....................................................................................................................... 28 3.2 Case Selection ............................................................................................................................. 30 3.3 Data and Sources ......................................................................................................................... 32 3.4 Operationalization ....................................................................................................................... 32 4. Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 2013-2020 ........................................................................................ 34 4.1 Introduction to the Context .......................................................................................................... 34 4.2 Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 38 4.2.1 Water as a Target of Conflict ............................................................................................... 39 4.2.2 Water as a Weapon of Conflict ............................................................................................ 43 4.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 49 5. The Houthis in Yemen 2014-2020 .................................................................................................... 51 5.1 Introduction to the Context .......................................................................................................... 52 5.2 Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 53 5.2.1 Water as a Target of Conflict ............................................................................................... 54 5.2.2 Water as a Weapon of Conflict ............................................................................................ 58 5.3 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 61 6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 62 6.1 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 63 6.2 Limitations................................................................................................................................... 65 2 7. Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 67 7.1 Academic Implications ................................................................................................................ 67 7.2 Practical Implications ............................................................................................................ 68 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 70 Appendix 1: Water as a Target or Weapon of Conflict for IS in Iraq & Syria ...................................... 78 Appendix 2: Water as a Target or Weapon of Conflict for the Houthis in Yemen ............................... 82 3 1. Introduction 1.1 The Instrumentalization of Water Resources and Infrastructures From 2013 when the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State (IS, ISIS, or ISIL) started conquering large parts of Syrian territory to the peak of its expansion in late 2014, IS confiscated major dams along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.1 By conquering these dams, the group gained control over substantial amounts of crucial water resources in both Syria and Iraq, conferring the group with the power to manipulate the region’s water supplies. In both Iraq and Syria, IS used this power – among other tactics – to disrupt downstream water flows, either by withholding or diverting water or by releasing a wall of floodwater, to swamp adjacent towns and farmland or preclude them from critical water supplies. These tactics produced substantial destructive and lethal consequences.2 In April 2014, IS used its control of Nuaimiyah Dam near Fallujah, Iraq, to flood almost 200 square kilometres of inhabited and fertile agricultural land, displacing more than 60,000 people from the area. Moreover, IS’ control over this major dam on the Euphrates River caused that millions of people were left without (secure) water supplies in the cities of Karbala, Najaf and Babil.3 Capturing Iraq’s large dams at Fallujah, Mosul, Samarra, and Ramadi as well as the Tishrin, Euphrates, and Baath Dams in Syria – in addition to many other smaller dams – formed part of IS’s greater strategy to instrumentalize water as a means to achieve its objective of military expansionism and regional statehood.4 1 Islamic State is an extremist Islamic organisation that developed out of a violent Islamic insurgent group that altered its name several times in line with its geographical objectives. Previously, the group has operated under the names ‘Islamic State in Iraq’ (ISI); ‘Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham’ (or ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ – ISIS); ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL); and, more recently, ‘Daesh’ from the Arabic phrase al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham). In this thesis, the group will be referred to as Islamic State (henceforth IS). Shelly Culbertson and Linda Robinson, “Making Victory Count After Defeating ISIS: Stabilization Challenges in Mosul and Beyond” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), 6; Francis Gaffney, “Islamic State,” in Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, ed. Andrew Silke (London: Routledge, 2018), 315; Seth G. Jones et al., “Rolling Back the Islamic State” (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), ix–xi, 98–99; Tobias von Lossow, “The Rebirth of Water as a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq,” The International Spectator 51, no. 3 (2016): 82; Strategic Foresight Group, “Water and Violence: Crisis of Survival in the Middle East” (Mumbai: Strategi Foresight Group, 2014), 17–20. 2 Fred Pearce, “Mideast Water Wars: In Iraq, A Battle for Control of Water,” Yale Environment 360, August 25, 2014, https://e360.yale.edu/features/mideast_water_wars_in_iraq_a_battle_for_control_of_water; Lossow, “The Rebirth of Water as a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq,” 87–89. 3 Financial Action Task Force, “Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)” (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2015), 16; Lossow, “The Rebirth of Water as a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq,” 88; Tobias von Lossow, “Water as Weapon: IS on the Euphrates and Tigris. The Systematic Instrumentalisation of Water Entails Conflicting IS Objectives” (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2016), 2. 4 Financial Action Task Force, “Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” 16, 30; Aysegül Kibaroglu and Tugba Evrim Maden, “An
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