Water Resources Development, Vol. 20, No. 1, 15–33, March 2004

Development and Management of the – Basin

D.AltinbilekDepartment of Civil EngineeringMiddle East Technical UniversityAnkara06531 [email protected] DOGAN ALTINBILEK International Hydropower Association and Department of Civil Engineering, Middle East Technical University, Ankara,

ABSTRACT Issues related to the development and management of the Euphrates–Tigris basin are discussed. Historical perspectives on water conflict, geography, hydrology, water and land resources development in riparian countries, namely Turkey, and , are examined. Problems and misconceptions related to water utilization are analysed with regard to water availability, water loss, water rights, the role of and reservoirs, and environmental problems of the Mesopotamian marshlands. Advantages and areas of co-operation between riparians are reviewed. Water conflict in the Euphrates–Tigris basin requires a hydro-political approach that covers legal, political, technical and economic aspects of its multi-dimensional characteristics.

Historical Perspective The Euphrates–Tigris and its tributaries served as the cradle for many civiliza- tions that evolved in , ‘the land between two ’. Historians have noted the progression of the Mesopotamian civilizations, with the oldest dating back to 10 000 BC. The well-known civilizations in Mesopotamia (Iraq) were those of the Sumerians, Acadians, Babylonians and Assyrians, who orga- nized efficient hydraulic civilizations that supported some 20 million inhabitants at their peak and were based on a well-maintained irrigation and flood control system. The history of water-related disputes in the Middle East, and especially in the Euphrates–Tigris basin, goes back 6000 years and is described in many myths, legends and historical accounts that have survived from earlier times. These disputes range from conflicts over access to adequate water supplies to intentional attacks on water supply systems during wars (Gleick, 1994). The fall of the resulted in new borders together with a new trans-boundary basin in the Middle East. The present political boundaries in the basin were established in the early 1920s with the establishment of the states of Syria, Iraq and Turkey. A number of agreements have been reached between involved parties since 1926. The rise of hydro-political problems among the riparians of the Euphrates–Tigris goes back no more than 50 years. Soon after the Second World War, the need for the development of natural resources emerged in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. However, the highly erratic flows of the rivers have greatly limited the rate of utilization. It is estimated that during the Ottoman Empire (before 1920) only one-seventh of the irrigable land of

Correspondence address: Dogan Altinbilek, Department of Civil Engineering, Middle East Technical University, 06531 Ankara, Turkey. Email: [email protected]

0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 Online/04/010015-19  2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/07900620310001635584 16 D. Altinbilek

Iraq was being irrigated (Altinbilek, 1997). So, the construction of large dams to regulate river flows and extensive irrigation works were started, making once- abundant water a scarce commodity due to the consumptive use of irrigation as well as reservoir evaporation. The most important era of the negotiations on the waters of the Euphrates– Tigris basin involved Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meetings and Joint Technical Committee (JTC) meetings. These meetings were initiated in December 1980. Although 16 JTC meetings were held between 1981 and 1992, no consensus could be achieved for the settlement of disputes. The main argument of Iraq during the negotiations was over its ‘acquired rights’ or ‘historical rights’ which stem from the existing water installations and the ancestral irrigation systems. During JTC meetings Iraq refused to discuss the Tigris waters as the Tigris was regarded as Iraq’s sovereign right. Thus, a Turkish offer to compensate for the scarcity in the Euphrates by the surplus in the Tigris was rejected. The Syrian stand was based on the codification efforts in the field of trans-boundary rivers. According to the Syrian arguments, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are ‘inter- national watercourses’ which should be classified as ‘shared resources’ and must be divided among riparian states according to a quota, on the basis of their declared demands. In fact, an agreement between Syria and Iraq was reached in 1990 on the use of Euphrates waters, stating that Iraq would receive 58% of the waters flowing in the Euphrates on the Turkish–Syrian border; Syria’s share is fixed at 42%. Since the water potential was unable to meet the declared needs of these three riparians, Turkey proposed in 1984 the ‘Three-Stage Plan for Optimum, Equi- table and Reasonable Utilization of Trans-boundary Watercourses of the Eu- phrates–Tigris Basin’, which involves: (1) compiling an inventory of water resources; (2) compiling an inventory of land resources; and (3) determining the optimum total water demands of each country for domestic, industrial and agricultural requirements. Syria and Iraq stated that the Turkish three-stage plan could not lead to an equitable and reasonable solution. They accused Turkey of trying to seize the largest portion of Euphrates waters, which should be accepted as collective property. They insisted that the Euphrates and Tigris are separate international rivers. The disagreements between Turkey and the other riparians continued during the filling of the Ataturk reservoir and the building of the Karkamis dam. From 1996 onwards, there were also some unfruitful efforts to re-start JTC meetings. The water conflict over the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was temporar- ily frozen in 2003 due to a change of president in Syria and the occupation of Iraq by the Coalition Forces which ended the rule of the Baath regime.

Geography and Hydrology of the Euphrates–Tigris Basin The Euphrates–Tigris basin is largely fed from snow precipitation over the uplands of north and eastern Turkey, Iraq and . Extending for almost 3000 km, the Euphrates is the longest river in western Asia. Arising near Mount Ararat at heights of around 4500 m near , the Euphrates drops on average 2 metres per kilometre of length in Turkey and then crosses into Syria flowing south-east (Figure 1). After travelling 680 km within Syria’s borders, the The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 17

Figure 1. General layout of the Euphrates–Tigris basin. Source: Altinbilek (1997).

Euphrates enters Iraq at Al Qaim. In Iraq, 360 km from the border, the Euphrates reaches a giant alluvial delta at Ramadi where the elevation is only 53 m above sea level. From that point on, the river traverses the deserted regions of Iraq, losing part of its waters into a series of desert depressions and distributaries, both natural and man-made. Further downstream, near Nasiriyah, the river becomes a tangle of channels, some of which drain into the shallow lake of Hammar as the remainder joins the Tigris at Qurna. The Euphrates has a very gentle gradient in Iraq. 18 D. Altinbilek

Table 1. Area of the Euphrates–Tigris drainage basin in riparian coun- tries (km2)

Tigris Euphrates Country km2 %km2 %

Turkey 121 787 21.1 53 052 14.3 Syria 95 405 16.5 948 0.2 Iran — — 175 386 47.2 Iraq 282.532 49.0 142 175 38.3 Saudi Arabia 77.090 13.4 — — Total 576.814 100.0 371 561 100.0

Source: UNEP (2001).

The River Tigris, which is the second-largest river in western Asia, originates near Lake Hazar (elevation 1150 m) in eastern Turkey. The Tigris is fed by several tributaries in Turkey. It forms the Turkish–Syrian boundary for 32 km, and crosses into Iraq. From the Iraqi border up to Mosul, the river is bordered by rolling hills on either side but is still confined to a deep valley in the Mosul area. Within Iraq, the Tigris has several tributaries which contribute significantly to the water potential of the river. The combined Euphrates and Tigris rivers are named Shatt-al-Arab, forming a river almost a kilometre wide and 190 km long. Iran is a co-riparian of the Tigris–Euphrates system by virtue of her contribution to the River Tigris via the lesser Zab, Diyalah and Kharun rivers. In addition, the River Kharkeh emanating from Iran flows into the of southern Iraq. Saudi Arabia is also a part of the drainage basin but does not have borders with or a contribution to the Euphrates. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers are considered parts of a single trans-boundary river system. They are linked by their natural course at Shatt-al-Arab, which constitutes a delta. The areas of the riparian countries in the Euphrates–Tigris basin are shown in Table 1. The estimates of mean annual natural runoff of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are given in Table 2. Although the Euphrates drains a larger surface area than does the Tigris, an overwhelming 98% of Euphrates runoff is produced in the highlands of Turkey while the remainder of its catchment is an arid region that makes little contribution. Turkey contributes an estimated 53% of the discharge of the Tigris. The rest of the Tigris’s flow is produced by tributaries descending from the of Iran and Iraq. Turkey contributes 71.4% of the Euphrates and Tigris basin’s combined natural flow. The characteristic feature that distinguishes the hydrological regime of the Euphrates–Tigris river system is the irregularity of flow both between and within years, with large floods originating from the snow-melt in spring. The annual precipitation in the Anatolian and Zagros highlands exceeds 1000 mm. About two-thirds of the precipitation occurs in winter and may remain in the form of snow for half of the year. With snow-melt in spring, periodic flooding is observed downstream. There are steep differences between maximum and minimum monthly flows, which for the Tigris are nearly 80-fold and for the The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 19

Table 2. Contribution of the riparian states to the Euphrates–Tigris basin (km3/y) (excluding River )

Total Euphrates Tigris Country km3 %km3 %km3 %

Turkey 33.1 98.5 27.2 53.4 60.3 71.4 Syria 0.5 1.5 — — 0.5 0.6 Iraq — — 20.7 40.7 20.7 24.5 Iran — — 3.0 5.9 3.0 3.5 Total 33.6 100.0 50.9 100.0 84.5 100.0

Euphrates 28-fold. The concentration of discharge over the months of April and May causes not only extensive spring flooding, inundating large areas, but also the loss of much-needed water required for irrigation and power generation purposes during the summer season. The hydrologic records (1946–1994) of average annual flow for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are shown in Figure 2. At the Turkish–Syrian border, for the Euphrates, annual discharge values range from a minimum flow of 14 km3/y (1961) to a maximum of 57 km3/y (1969). The discharge values for the Tigris

Figure 2. Average annual flow values for the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. 20 D. Altinbilek at the Turkish border dropped to 7 km3/y in 1961 and rose to 34 km3/y in 1969.

Water and Land Resources Development The development of water and land resources in the Euphrates–Tigris basin goes back as early as 4000 BC. Agricultural settlements with temples and local irrigation networks were part of the Mesopotamian landscape. The Sumerians and Babylonians brought water to their fields and cities via canals from the Euphrates. Documents from the time of Hammourabi, the Babylonian lawmaker of the early second millennium BC, refer to maintaining the irrigation systems. Flood protection, irrigation and drainage were of the utmost importance. The destruction of much of the canal system during the Mongol invasion of the 13th century led to a general neglect and abandonment of irrigation and drainage systems until recent times. During the Ottoman era, old canals were rebuilt, land was reclaimed and new systems were constructed. In the second half of the 20th century modern water storage and hydroelectric plants were built in the upper basin in Turkey and Syria on the Euphrates and in Turkey, Iraq and Iran on the Tigris (Figure 3). A list of the existing major dams in the Euphrates–Tigris basin is given in Table 3. The water and land resources development efforts of the riparian countries are summarized below.

Iraq The planning and construction of irrigation and flood control systems were started after 1950 by the Board of Development created by the . Subsequently, the Ramadi flood control reservoir, the Habbaniye dam, a regu- lator, canal systems, the Lake Tharthar project and the dam (1954) were constructed. The Tharthar project was significant because it integrated waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers via a 1100-m3/s-capacity man-made canal. The most important period of development of Iraq’s water systems was between 1972 and 1990. Many new and important hydraulic structures were completed. Among them are the Qadissiyah and Fallujah dams and the main outfall drain, which is also called the Third River. Estimates of the irrigated area in Iraq have always been contradictory (Altin- bilek, 1997; Belul, 1996; Bilen, 1994; Kliot, 1994) (Table 4). The total irrigable area is estimated to be around 4 million ha. Estimates by the US Corps of Engineers reveal that Iraq has been irrigating 1–1.3 million ha from the Euphrates and 2 million ha from the Tigris. After the Iraq–Iran wars and the , the irrigation of Iraq may have decreased to a total of 2.78 million ha for the Euphrates–Tigris basin.

Syria Agriculture has always been the most important sector in Syria’s economy. Although government policies have been favourable towards this sector, agricul- The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 21 (MW) ) 2 (km ) 3 Gross Surface 148.84 8556 ———— ———— Date of Height storage area HP completion (m) (km a Existing major dams in the Euphrates–Tigris basin Table 3. Euphrates TurkeyTurkeyTurkeyTurkeyTurkey AtaturkSyria Birecik KarakayaSyria KarkamisSyriaSyria Keban HP, IIraq HP,Iraq Baath I HP HP, Tabaqa FCIraq Upper Tishrine KhaburIraqIraq 1992 Al HP HindiyahTotal Al 2000 HP, Qadisiyah 1999 I, Ramadi-Habbaniyah 1987 FC HP, I I Fallujah HP Ramadi 166 Raazza FC FD HP, 1975 I 1988 53 48.70 158 21 1975 817 FC 1992 1.22 9.58 1999 1918(1989) 0.16 I 163 2400 1948 1984 — 268 56.3 28.4 31 1800 60 672 189 0.09 — 1951 40 11.7 — 675 1985 57 27.2 0.99 1.9 1330 610 3.3 75 8.2 — 166 1.4 800 426 500 — 26 630 — 660 1850 — Country Name of dam Use 22 D. Altinbilek (MW) ) 2 (km ) 3 Gross Surface 121.76 2797 Date of Height storage area HP completion (m) (km —Continued a Table 3. UNEP (2001). HP: hydropower; I: irrigation; FC: flood control; FD: flow division. Tigris TurkeyTurkeyTurkeyTurkeyTurkey Batman DevegecidiTurkey Cag-cagIraqIraq DicleIraq Goksu HP, Kralkizi IIraq I Derbendikhan (Diyala)Iraq HP, FD Al-AdheemIraq DibbisIraq (L. I Zab) HP, IIraq 1998 Dokan I HPIran (L. 1968 1972 HP, Zab) Diyala Hamrin I (Diyala)IranIran Samarra-Tharthar I 1997Iran Saddam 1962 71Total I 1997 33 I 1999 1991 FD 1.18 Dez Karkheh I 0.20 Karun-1 128 75 1965 HP, 49.2 I Marun 113 32.1 — 198 46 1961 3.0 0.60 1980 HP, I, 1954 — FC 1.92 1969 HP, 121 1.5 24 I 0.06 HP, 15 I 1985 57.5 HP, 116 — I — 110 2001 3.9 40 3.0 14 — 90 — 12 6.8 1962 — 126 1977 4.0 32 72.8 270 — 1998 128 2170 11.1 440 — 203 — 371 7.8 — — 200 — 165 3.46 320 — 3.14 — — 1.2 54.8 400 1000 520 25 145 Source: Country Name of dam Use a The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 23

Figure 3. Present and planned dams in the Euphrates–Tigris basin. ture cannot provide all of Syria’s needs, mostly because of the rapid population growth. The cropped area in Syria averages 4.8 million ha. The rain-fed area represents 85% of the total area cultivated. Surface irrigation has been expanding over the last decade. Wells account for 80% of the recently irrigated land. Significant drops in groundwater levels have already been documented in the Damascus, Asi and Aleppo areas (FAO, 1994). Water resources in Syria are varied: rivers, springs and groundwater potential. Apart from the Euphrates, 24 D. Altinbilek

Table 4. Irrigable lands in Turkey, Syria and Iraq

Euphrates (ha) Tigris (ha) Total (ha)

Turkey 1 777 000 650 000 2 427 000 Syria 800 000 150 000 950 000 Iraq 2 500 000 1 500 000 4 000 000 Total 5 070 000 2 300 000 7 370 000

Syria has 11.4 km3/y potential of renewable water resources (rivers 5.4 km3/y, springs 2.2 km3/y, groundwater 3.8 km3/y) (COMSTECH, 1995). The major development plan for the Euphrates in Syria consisted of the construction of three dams, namely the (1975), the Al-Baath Dam (1988) and the Tishrine Dam (1999), all of which are in operation. Syria has development plans for the Khabur river, which is a tributary of the Euphrates but treated separately from the Euphrates. Three dams will irrigate 375 000 ha, utilizing 1.6 km3/y, and produce 28 MW power. Apart from the Euphrates and Grand Khabur projects, there exists a project to tap the water of the Tigris via pumps for an irrigation project of 150 000 or possibly 375 000 ha. According to different Syrian sources, cultivable land in Syria is estimated to be around 6 million ha, of which 4.5–5.5 million ha are under cultivation. The irrigated area ranges between 530 000 and 620 000 ha according to the Syrian Statistical Abstracts 1990 (Belul, 1996). Irrigation with groundwater accounts for around 44% of the total irrigated area.

Turkey In Turkey, work on a major hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates at Keban was initiated in 1963 and brought on line in 1975. By regulating river flow patterns, the set the stage for large-scale developments in the upper Eu- phrates. In 1977, Turkey launched the Southeastern Anatolia Project, or GAP, to use its Turkish acronym, which is a large-scale and multi-sectoral regional development project. The project area lies in south-east Turkey between and around the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, covering approximately 10% of Turkey’s total population and surface area. The project area includes 41.5% of the total watersheds of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers within Turkey. The total project area is 75 358 km2,ofwhich 42.2% is cultivated. When fully developed, GAP will provide irrigation for 1.7 million ha of land, corresponding to 20% of the economically irrigable land of Turkey (Altinbilek, 1997; Southeastern Anatolian Project Regional Development Administration, 2002; State Planning Organiza- tion, 1989). GAP consists of a combination of 13 independent but related major irrigation and hydropower schemes with a total capacity of 7500 MW, which involves the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants on the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries. After full development of these projects, the irrigation projects will consume about 22.5 km3 of water per year The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 25

(including reservoir evaporation), corresponding to about 27% of the average annual virgin runoff volume of the Euphrates and Tigris branches of the Shatt-al-Arab river to the Gulf. Altogether 14 dams and seven hydropower plants, including major water control facilities such as the Keban, Karakaya, Ataturk, Birecik, Karkamis, Kralkizi, Batman and Dicle dams, are already in operation. Final designs have been completed for the Ilisu and Cizre dams. These dams are located in a series on main branches of the rivers and the potential heads are almost fully utilized. At present, 72% of the hydropower potential and 12% (or 202 000 ha) of the targeted irrigation areas are under operation. GAP is an integrated, multi-sectoral regional development project that covers all development-related sectors such as agriculture, industry, transportation, urban and rural infrastructure, health care and education. Project execution is based on a master plan and an action plan. Many innovative and water-saving approaches are being implemented for sustainable water resources development in GAP (Altinbilek et al., 1997). The project requires US$32 billion of public sector financing, half of which has already been invested.

Iran Iran completed its largest hydropower and irrigation development project, the , on a tributary of the River Karun in 1962. Within the last decade, Iran has embarked on a multi-billion-dollar water management scheme on the River Karun, which runs to the Shatt-al-Arab delta. Affecting Mesopotamian marsh- lands, the Karun river development project has ecological consequences. In 2001, Iran inaugurated its largest water reservoir on the River Karkheh, which is intended to irrigate 320 000 ha of land. Also planned is a 540-km pipeline from to supply 250 million m3 of fresh water to Kuwait annually.

Present and Future Water Development In total, there are 32 existing major dams on the Euphrates and Tigris (including the Karkheh and Karun river systems) (Table 3). Eight dams are reportedly under construction and at least 13 more are planned (Figure 3). The total storage of the existing dams on the Euphrates is 148.8 km3,orfive times the river’s average annual flow. On the Tigris, existing storage totals more than double the average annual flow of the Tigris. The total hydropower installed capacity on both rivers amounts to 11 350 MW, producing more than a billion US dollars’ worth of hydropower annually. The unprecedented level of control that riparian countries exercise on the Euphrates–Tigris flows is best illustrated by the hydrograph of the Euphrates’ flow at Hit-Husaiba in central Iraq, upstream of Ramadi dam (Figure 4). Prior to dam construction (1938–1973), the hydrograph shows a peak water flow of 2594 m3/s in May. After dam construction, the flow in May for the period 1974–1998 had dropped by more than two-thirds to 831 m3/s. The river’s flow pattern became more uniform, avoiding floods. The minimum flow of the river more than doubled, from 272 to 575 m3/s, providing much-needed irrigation water 26 D. Altinbilek

Figure 4. Comparison of the flow regimes for the Euphrates river at Hit-Husabia, Iraq. Source: UNEP (2001). during the crucial summer months. The hydropower production of the river also improved. The water budget of the Euphrates–Tigris basin for the present and for full development has been estimated by many experts. These computations are dependent on assumptions. As mentioned before, data on the extent of irrigated lands, irrigable lands and water requirements are varied and contradictory. The values given in Table 4 represent the best estimates of the extent of irrigable lands in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. At present it is estimated the irrigated areas cover 202 000 ha in south-eastern Turkey, 350 000 ha in Syria and 2.8 million ha in Iraq. Many authors have attempted a water budget analysis for 2010, which generally indicates that demand can be met. However, it may be more instruc- tive to develop a water budget analysis for a full development scenario, which may extend to 2040. While many innovations may affect the water supply and the use within the next four decades, the full development scenario indicates a water deficiency in the Euphrates basin (Table 5). The projections by various authors indicate a deficiency of 2–12 km3/y in the Euphrates at full develop- ment. It is generally agreed that there will be a surplus of 8–9.7 km3/y for the Tigris. This picture signals a water shortage that will emerge some time after 2020. In two decades the requirements of the Euphrates branch will not be met with virgin flow of that tributary alone. Although the transfer of water from the The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 27

Table 5. Summary of water budgets at full development scenario (km3/y)

US Army Corps of Altinbilek Kolars Kliot Engineers Belul (1997) (1994) (1994) (1991) (1996)

Euphrates Natural flow at Turkish– Syrian border 31.43 30.67 28.20 28.20 31.4 Net withdrawal by Turkey Ϫ 14.50 Ϫ 21.6 Ϫ 21.50 Ϫ 21.5 Ϫ 12.3 Entering Syria 16.93 9.07 6.7 6.7 19.1 Inflows in Syria 2.05 9.484 10.7 4.5 3.1 Net withdrawals by Syria Ϫ 5.5 Ϫ 11.995 Ϫ 13.4 Ϫ 4.3 Ϫ 10.5 Entering Iraq 13.48 6.559 4.0 6.9 11.7 Net withdrawal by Iraq Ϫ 15.5 Ϫ 13.0 Ϫ 16.0 Ϫ 17.6 Ϫ 19.0 Flow into Shatt- al-Arab Ϫ 2.02 Ϫ 6.441 Ϫ 12.0 Ϫ 10.7 Ϫ 7.3

Tigris Runoff in Turkey 18.87 18.5 18.5 18.500 19.3 Net withdrawal in Turkey and Syria Ϫ 8.0 Ϫ 6.7 Ϫ 7.2 Ϫ 6.7 10.2 Entering Iraq 10.87 11.8 11.3 11.8 11.5 Inflows in Iraq by tributaries 30.7 30.7 31.7 30.7 31.0 Net withdrawal in Iraq Ϫ 31.9 Ϫ 33.4 Ϫ 40.0 Ϫ 32.8 Ϫ 33.5 Flow into Shatt- al-Arab 9.67 9.1 8.0 9.7 9.0

Tigris to the Euphrates is often proposed, this may not entirely solve the water shortage in the Euphrates basin. The application of water-saving techniques in irrigation could help to save 10–20% of irrigation demand. Turkey has already started using water-saving technologies by switching to low-pressure pipe systems rather than open canals and flumes (Altinbilek et al., 1997). The use of water-saving innovations requires higher investments and necessitates education of the farmers, which may take years to progress. Nevertheless, once the full use of water is reached, water-sav- ing techniques become compulsory as part of a scarcity regime. Water pricing is one of the key issues that must be introduced if efficiency of water use is targeted. Properly applied, water pricing can not only bring about some water- saving opportunities but also provide much-needed funds for improving distri- bution systems. Conversely, a lack of water pricing would encourage waste and improper use of the water. 28 D. Altinbilek

Table 6. Average annual water availability per capita (m3)

1990 2000 2010 2020

Turkey 3223 (1611) 2703 (1351) 2326 (1163) 2002 (1000) Syria 1636 1177 880 760 Iraq 2352 1848 1435 1062

Source: Bilen (2000).

It is obvious that, in the full development of the basin, the independent undertakings of the three riparian countries may bring too many reservoirs into existence, which may cause excessive evaporation. Through full co-ordination of river system operation by the three countries, up to 7 km3/y (or 50%) of the evaporation may be saved.

Problems and Misconceptions Related to Water Utilization Almost all Middle Eastern countries are short of water to varying degrees. Satisfactory means of allocating water between neighbouring countries must be devised if the water conflict is not to result in armed conflict among the riparian states of the Middle Eastern water resources. Using modern technology, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have the potential to make agriculture flourish on a scale undreamed of in ancient times. The anticipated and declared demands of the riparian countries are greater than the total water volume of the two rivers. Water, long taken for granted, is already becoming a scarce commodity, as the 1999–2001 drought has proven. There is a need to devise an arrangement for using the waters of the Euphrates–Tigris river basin in a rational, equitable and sustainable way. Unco-ordinated and independent actions of basin countries may result in some difficult problems for which remedies cannot easily be found. With proper and co-ordinated planning and implementation, however, many of those problems may be pre-empted, eliminated or greatly minimized. Some of the important problems of water resources development and existing misconceptions are as follows.

Water Availability Numerous studies that have been published over the past decade cite Turkey as the water-rich country of the Middle East. However, this is so only in relative terms. Water use and water availability can be expressed in cubic metres per capita per year, which is total annual average runoff in a country divided by population. When water availability per capita is 500 m3/person per year or less, a country is accepted as being beyond the ‘water barrier’ of manageable capacity, which is the case for Israel, Jordan and Palestine. The limit of 1000 m3/person per year indicates chronic ‘scarcity’, while less than 1600 m3/person per year is termed as water ‘stress’. For the real water-rich countries of northern Europe and Canada, the water availability is around 10 000 m3/person per year or more. The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 29

Water availability in Turkey, Syria and Iraq is given in Table 6 (Bilen, 2000). Figures in parenthesis are calculated according to the assumption that only 50% of the Turkish total potential is technically and economically usable. Turkish water potential is calculated on the basis of total surface runoff, not just that of the Euphrates and Tigris, which constitutes only 28% of Turkey’s total water potential. From Table 6, it can be deduced that all three countries will by 2020 face more or less the same conditions in terms of water supply. The misconcep- tion that Turkey is often thought of as having a water surplus is partly due to the fact that Turkey, so far, has only developed one-third of its total water potential and has a huge unused resource, which Turkey’s economy will need in the future. Compared with Jordan, Israel and Palestine, of course, all three riparian countries of the Euphrates–Tigris basin can be considered ‘rich’ in water.

Role of Dams and Reservoirs Claims that the flow of the Euphrates to Iraq and Syria has declined are also misconceptions. The dams, on the contrary, have made a very positive impact on much-needed summertime releases. The Euphrates has been tamed and its flow is regularized. Until the dams were built, there were sharp fluctuations between different seasons and different years (Figure 2). A large proportion of the runoff results from snow-melt, and there used to be large floods in the spring followed by a drought in the summer and autumn, when average monthly natural flow on the Euphrates reduces to as little as 150 m3/s. Due to the existence of five reservoirs on the Euphrates, Turkey is able to maintain a minimum monthly average release of 500 m3/s which was committed to Syria in 1987. In practice the flow often exceeds this commitment considerably. The average annual monthly flow between 1987 and 2001 was 800 m3/s, with a minimum of 645 m3/s for September. The initial filling of the Keban Dam in 1974, which coincided with that of the Syrian Tabqa Dam, and the initial filling of the Ataturk Dam’s reservoir in 1990 created tension and caused a mounting crisis among the basin countries. During the filling of the Ataturk Dam’s reservoir, on 13 January 1990 the flow of the Euphrates was stopped for 1 month for purely technical reasons. A month before the filling process got underway, Turkey notified Syria and flow was increased to 768 m3/s. During the filling process, only 60 m3/s could be released to Syria from catchments downstream from the dam. As a result, even at a difficult stage of the filling of the Ataturk Dam, Turkey was true to its commitment. In fact, even during the worst times for its neighbours when they were under an economic embargo, and at times of drought, Turkey had more than kept its word on water release policies and had refrained from inflicting damage on its southern neighbours.

Environmental Problems—Mesopotamian Marshlands One of the more recent controversies about environmental problems was started in 2001 by a United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) report which stated that, between 1970 and 2000, 90% of the marshlands of Mesopotamia, which 30 D. Altinbilek originally covered an area of 15 000–20 000 km3, had disappeared (UNEP, 2001). A long-term recovery plan requiring an holistic river basin approach based on the ultimate goal of sustaining riverine ecology and in which all Tigris–Eu- phrates riparian countries share the rivers’ water in a co-ordinated and equitable manner was called for. Priority was to be given to allocating an adequate amount of water to the wetlands, while water releases from existing dams could be timed to mimic natural flow patterns and bring the marshlands back to life. Negotiations involving all the riparian countries and supported by international facilitation were recommended to establish an agreement on the sharing of Tigris and Euphrates waters. The warning by UNEP caught the attention of many non-government organizations who, along with Iraq and UNEP, have blamed Turkey for building large dams and damaging the ecosystems. In particular, the Ilisu Dam, which was planned but not started on the Tigris by Turkey, came under severe attack. Turkey responded by saying that although the period 1999–2001 encompassed dry years for the Euphrates, a sizeable portion of the flow of the rivers was still flowing into the Gulf unused. The main cause of the disappearance of the marshlands was the construction of drainage engineering works such as levees, drainage canals, control structures and gates built by Iraq. The voice of Turkey was not heard in the international community. The negotiations for the Ilisu Dam have failed as international companies and creditors have withdrawn one after another, partly because of these environmental attacks. The alarmist stand of UNEP was ongoing in March 2003 at the Kyoto Third Water Forum, where Mr Klause Toepfer, Executive Director of UNEP, said that one third of the remaining wetlands, (325 square kilometers) have dried out since 2000 leaving just seven per cent of the original area. Unless urgent action was taken to reverse the trend and rehabilitate the marshlands, the entire wetland would disappear in three to five years. Such urgent action was forth- coming from the Coalition Forces occupying Iraq! The UNEP web site has reported only two months after the alarmist speech of Mr Toepfer at the Kyoto Third Water Forum that:

...positive sights of environment recovery have been emerging from the parched Mesopotamian marshlands. These changes are visible in new satellite images taken in May 2003....They dramatically reveal that streams and waterways, which have ebbed and run aground over the past decade, surge back to life and drainage canals swollen by exceptional increase in water flows. Formerly dry areas have been inundated as floodgates are opened, embankments and dykes breached and dams emp- tied upstream. Heavy rains have also contributed to the rising water levels.... When control structures were opened and levees broken by mechanical diggers in April and May 2003, however, water swept through the desiccated landscape inundating some areas. (UNEP, 2003)

The Mesopotamian marshland experience has shown that it is possible to harmonize basin-wide development efforts with environmental concerns in a sustainable way if problems can be diagnosed correctly. The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 31

Water Loss Even though the presence of a reservoir may serve to augment the useful water supply, at the same time it causes water losses through evaporation from the lake surface. Such losses are a function of the depth of reservoirs and the mean annual evaporation. Deep reservoirs in a cooler climate may have less water loss per cubic metre of regulated water than shallow reservoirs in hot climates. For example, the water loss per cubic metre of active storage in the Keban and Karakaya dams in Turkey is about 50 l/y, while it may be as high as 180–240 l/y in reservoirs in Syria and Iraq. The minimization of water losses requires well co-ordinated joint reservoir operation that may save up to 6–7 km3/y.

Water Rights Historically, downstream countries which may be using virgin flows of the river water for irrigation may put forward their ‘acquired water rights claim’ to share water. There is no established and agreed international water code whatsoever to settle such claims. Furthermore, the quantity of the claims itself may require painstaking technical verifications if they are to be justified.

Advantages of Co-operation Each country in the Euphrates–Tigris basin is generally inclined to formulate its plans by considering its national possibilities, resources and objectives, with least regard for the needs of others. Usually, each country aims at self-sufficiency and security in solving its water supply problems. Furthermore, water-related problems may be heavily obstructed by inclusion of other issues and controver- sies that hinder agreement. However, there are distinct advantages if and when basin countries come together and put forward plans for co-ordinated develop- ment. Some of the areas of possible co-operation are listed below.

• The optimum plan for the basin as a whole can be formulated and imple- mented. • Seemingly conflicting demands can be harmonized within a broad master plan that may incorporate many water-supply-augmenting and efficiency-im- proving measures. • The waters of the Euphrates and Tigris can be utilized equitably and effec- tively, taking into account seasonal and yearly variations in flow due to floods and droughts. • Technical co-operation can extend to water transfers between rivers and between the reservoirs of the same river. • Conjunctive use of interconnected water and energy systems can be realized. • Basin-wide management using remote sensing, geographical information sys- tems (GIS) and optimization technologies can promote optimal use and water savings. • Joint regional research institutes, training centres and pilot farms can be developed to exchange not only engineers and technicians but also farmers. 32 D. Altinbilek

• Water-augmenting techniques such as water harvesting, conjunctive use of surface and groundwater sources, reuse of return water and, if necessary, cloud seeding, can be studied, encouraged and practised. • The Turkish experience of water user associations, which was supported by the World Bank, can be shared and exchanged with other riparian countries to increase water use efficiency and the water revenue collection rate and to save water. • Demand management plans can be developed for municipal and irrigation water supplies, especially for possible drought periods. • Co-operative action may facilitate the achievement of environmental sustain- ability. • Financing of joint and national projects from various international sources may be easier and more attractive.

Conclusion The development of the Euphrates–Tigris basin, although far from complete, has already resulted in unprecedented levels of storage, flow control, conveyance and distribution networks in the basin. Riparian states that are benefiting from present development have additional ambitious future development plans, not all of which are necessarily economic. Each country aims at self-sufficiency, security and establishing water rights in formulating its development plans, with least regard for the needs of other nations. It is obvious that the Euphrates cannot meet the projected demands of the three riparian states. Satisfactory means of allocating water between riparian countries must be devised if the water conflict is not to result in a water war among the riparian states. However, water wars in the Middle East are not a necessity. Using modern technology, the Euphrates and Tigris rivers used jointly have the potential to make agriculture flourish on a scale undreamed of in the past. Although at present no water shortage is experienced, the anticipated and declared demands of the riparian countries are greater than the total water volume of the two rivers. Thus, there is a need to limit excessive and uneconomic demands. The analyses of the water budget of the Euphrates–Tigris basin for the full development scenario by several experts under various assumptions all indicate that the Euphrates basin will experience water deficiency and the Tigris basin may have a surplus of water. It is also estimated that a possible critical water shortage may occur in a couple of decades. Since the existing water conflict is not purely a technical one, a hydro-political approach covering legal, political, technical and economic aspects is required. First, the political tension and mistrust which governed the region in the past must be resolved as many of those political tensions are also interrelated with the water issue. Second, engineering studies should be undertaken to determine basin-wide reasonable and equitable utilization rather than the ‘water rights approach’ of the past. This approach must also take into account the variability of flow between years. Ensuring equitable utilization among the riparians would require a legal approach as well as goodwill and a spirit of co-operation between riparians, realizing that voluntary agreements among riparian countries would be more balanced and longer lasting than reconciliation induced or imposed by outsiders. Finally, with regard to the management stage of the basin, economic The Euphrates–Tigris Basin 33 and technological measures must be incorporated with water saving, water pricing and marketing, and decision support systems for joint management. Water-supply-enhancing and demand-management technologies must be part of a comprehensive solution. The overall objective of a Middle East water agree- ment is to provide sustainable utilization of the region’s land and water resources for the welfare of people. The most important role in achieving hydro-co-operation in the region, rather than hydro-conflict, lies with the re- sponsibility of democratically elected governments of riparian countries.

Acknowledgement This paper was the result of a session supported by InWEnt (Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung gemeinnu¨ tzige GmbH) at the Third World Water Forum, which took place in Kyoto, Japan in March 2003. The author would like to express appreciation and gratitude to Dr Ismail Al Baz of InWEnt and Prof. Asit K. Biswas and Dr Cecilia Tortajada of the Third Word Centre for Water Management, who organized and chaired the session. Special thanks are due to Dr Sahnaz Tigrek for her valuable efforts to bring about this work.

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