Nazi Germany-Controlled POW Camps in the Environs of Šilutė 1939–1944

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Nazi Germany-Controlled POW Camps in the Environs of Šilutė 1939–1944 The WWII prisoner of war and Gulag camps 1939–1955 in the environs of Šilutė 19 Dr Arūnė Arbušauskaitė, Dr Arūnas Bubnys Nazi Germany-controlled POW camps in the environs of Šilutė 1939–1944 The status of prisoners of war and concentration camps in Nazi Germany The last century in Europe was marked by the fact that all generations know about war. And there are no wars without prisoners of war (POWs). Civilian refugees and prisoners of war are among those who have come to know and pay the true cost of the war. There were as many as 35 million POWs in WWII1. Both scientists and amateur researchers often try to circumvent topics that are painful and that have left deep scars in all the countries that were at war. The international legal treatment of prisoners of war and regulation of their protection dates back to the Crimean War (1853–1856), when international law codified the rules of warfare, including the treatment of POWs. The main aim was to protect POWs from reprisals and unjustifiable violence by the state in whose hands they found themselves. In the early 20th century during WWI, also known as the Great War, a great many people were taken into captivity resulting in unforeseen heavy losses and casualties. Therefore, international organisations were forced to adopt the Geneva Convention, which regula- ted the treatment of POWs captured by the forces of another country. During WWII the basic provisions regulating the treatment of POWs and their protection were based on the Third Geneva Convention (adopted on 27 July 1929). Germany was a signatory to the 1 S. Geck, Das deutsche Kriegsgefangenenwesen 1939–1945 (PDF), Masterarbeit, Universität Münster, 1998, S. 1. 20 Macikai House of Death Convention. The Geneva Convention was ratified by 41 countries. Of the large countries, the Soviet Union did not ratify the Convention and this had disastrous consequences for the fate of Soviet POWs during the 1941–1945 war between Germany and the Soviet Union. The Third Geneva Convention had 97 articles2. The main provisions of the Convention were aimed at significant improvement of the con- ditions, protection and supervision measures of POWs compared to those in WWI. This Convention gave POWs a status equivalent to the rank of soldiers of the state which cap- tured them. For example, Article 2 stated that: ‘Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or formation which captured them. They shall at all times be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, from insults and from public curiosity. Measures of reprisal against them are forbidden’3. The Convention further emphasised that ‘The detaining Power is required to provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war in its charge. Differences of treatment between pri- soners are permissible only if such differences are based on the military rank, the state of physical or mental health, the professional abilities, or the sex of those who benefit from them’ (Article 4)4. Article 10 required that ‘Prisoners of war shall be lodged in buil- dings [...]. The premises must be entirely free from damp, and adequately heated and lighted’.5 Articles 27–32 laid down the work and employment conditions of prisoners of war in detail: the types of industry and economy where prisoners of war could be used as the work force, what level of danger the work could involve and the duration of daily work; the work done by prisoners was to have no direct connection with the operations of the war and improvement of the capacity of the country at war. Prisoners of war other than officers could be employed, unless officers asked for suitable work. Prisoners of war mostly worked in agriculture, coal or salt mines, quarries, factories, sawmills, brewer- ies, railway construction and forestry operations. Prisoners of war working for private individuals or legal entities had to be paid wages. Workmen were to be allowed a rest period of twenty-four consecutive hours per week. Article 76 required that prisoners of war who died in captivity be honourably buried and that the graves bear the necessary indications6. 2 Ibid., S. 3, 4. 3 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 27 July 1929 [available from www.icrc.org, accessed 2015-01-07]. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. The WWII prisoner of war and Gulag camps 1939–1955 in the environs of Šilutė 21 The treatment of Red Army POWs It was expected a priori that Germany, as a signatory to the Geneva Convention, would adhere to the principles of the Convention. However, it was obvious to all that the prin- ciples of the Geneva Convention were more or less applied with respect to the US and British troops, whereas Poles, Frenchmen and Russians were subject to other kinds of treatment. A very specific ‘law’ was applied with respect to the Red Army soldiers. The issue as to how the Soviet Army POWs would be treated was discussed before the be- ginning of military battles. There was a problem with the treatment of political com- missars of the Red Army (Rus. politruk). It was argued that they were not soldiers, but only political, ideological officials. This resulted in the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ or ‘Guidelines regarding Commissars’ (Kommissarbefehl). Based on Hitler’s directives of 3 March 1941, on 6 June 1941 the Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) command issued a directive on the treatment of political commissars. The directive gave instructions on how to recognise political commissars and how to treat them. They were to be segre- gated at once from other POWs and liquidated summarily. The directive meant direct physical liquidation – shooting without a trial. A little later, the same segregation ap- plied with respect to soldiers who were Communist and Soviet officials and of course Jewish soldiers. Based on the Commissar Order, a total of 140,000 Soviet POWs were killed. POWs who attempted to escape were transferred to the German Security Police and shot7. In addition, Soviet POWs were deliberately subject to starvation by the Nazis by allocating reduced food rations to them. As a result, they gradually became weaker and died of starvation and diseases. Even working captives were given food rations that were too little (2,200 calories a day according to the instruction adopted by the German Army High Command [Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH] in August 1941), let alone the quality of meagre rations provided to the captives8. Due to the criminal policies of Nazi Germany in respect of the Soviet POWs, by late 1941 around two million POWs had been killed and by the end of the war this figure amounted to more than 3.3 million POWs9. 7 Ch. Dieckmann, „Karo belaisvių žudymas“, Totalitarinių režimų nusikaltimai Lietuvoje. Nacių okupacija, t. 2, Vilnius, 2005, p. 14. 8 Ibid., p. 15. 9 Ibid., p. 18. 22 Macikai House of Death Military District I POW camps During WWII the German territory and later the occupied territories were divided into military districts (Wehrkreis). There were 17 such military districts. We will focus only on the former POW camps of Military District I in Königsberg (Wehrkreis I, Königsberg). Military District I covered East Prussia and later part of occupied Poland and the Royal District of Tilsit-Gumbinnen. The district command headquarters (Wehrkreiskommando I Ostpreussen) was based in Königsberg. The POWs were under the supervision of the Wehrmacht. Institutional responsibil- ity was divided between the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehr- macht, OKW) and OKH. Hermann Reinecke, General of Infantry and the head of the General Office of the Armed Forces at OKW (Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt, AWA), who was in charge of prisoner of war affairs, was from 1 January 1942 responsible for the German Reich, the General Governorate (occupied Poland) and the German civil administration areas in the occupied countries (except for Ukraine and Norway). The heads of the POW units in 17 military districts were also under his command10. Starting from 25 September 1944, responsibility for prisoner of war affairs passed to Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. Himmler appointed SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger to be in charge of prisoner of war affairs. Initially (in 1942), Lieutenant General Hubert Gercke was in charge of prisoner of war affairs in Military District I, then he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Oskar von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg whose deputies were Major Ulrich Erdtmann and Rittmeister Perdant and Major Krugenberg was the quartermaster (intendant). Medical- sanitary affairs were handled by Captain Savage who was a medical doctor. Starting from December 1944, managerial functions were taken over by Colonel General Wilhelm von Stockenhausen. SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Rediess was in charge of general order and security within the area of Military District I and represented the special ser- vice – SD and Sipo11. Wehrmacht POW camps varied in their functions and subordination. It is important to understand this, because these differences reflect in the name and numbering of POW camps. The geographical location of the camp is usually not reflected in numbering. 10 Ibid., p. 10. 11 Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst, SD) and Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, Sipo) (1936–1945). The WWII prisoner of war and Gulag camps 1939–1955 in the environs of Šilutė 23 Types of camps Dulag (Durchgangslager) were transit camps and served as a collection point for POWs prior to their reassignment to a stationary camp. There were no set requirements for these camps, they could have been open outdoor areas of a field or other zones fenced with barbed fence with the obligatory watchtower. There were no special requirements regarding food, sanitation conditions or medical assistance to POWs in these camps12.
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