The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of Great Han Empire* - connected with Yongampo Incident -

Won-Soo Kim**1)

Preface I. 2nd Yongampo Lease Treaty and the Russo-Japanese Negotiations in 1903 II. Multilateral Foreign Policy of Great Han Empire for preventing war III. Yalu crisis and Minister Lee's diplomatic activities toward Russia Conclusion

Preface

The Yongampo Incident(용암포사건) has been known as the term “the Yalu Issue” or “Yalu Crisis” in abroad, did not occur in isolation.1) It has various accidents involved; the Seoul–Uiju(Kyoungui) railroad construction, the Yalu timber business, the lease of Yongampo, the opening of Uiju and Yongampo, Andong etc. And it is a well-known facts that this has been widely regarded by scholars as the immediate cause of the Russo-Japanese War.2)

* This paper has been presented at the International Conference on Korean-Russian Diplomatic Relations held at St. Petersburg National University on 28-30 Aug.2014. The whole was slightly modified. ** Department of Social Studies Education, Seoul National University. 1) Kim Wonsoo, Reconsidering the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War -With a special focus on the Yongampo Incident and the opening of Uiju (Ph.D. Dissertation, Hanyang University, 1997). 222 서양사학연구 제39집

Until now, It has been interested subjects like the Far Eastern policy-making of the Bezobrazov's Circles related to the Yalu timber business and in promoting issues of internal conflict. But so many studies were tend to concentrate on the Manchurian problems rather than Korean problems. Although scholars have stressed that the Yalu Crisis was the main cause of the Russo-Japanese War, The vast majority of studies have focused not on the Japanese activities in , but Russian activities in and Korea. Therefore, it has been revealed that many studies have overlooked the Korean problem. In other words, no in-depth studies on the role of Korean problem before the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War have been conducted. 3) At that time, the Great Han Empire forecasted the possibility of war and prepared the preventive measures. In fact, before the war, the Emperor, Gojong had detected that the war between Russia and Japan will occur. And he actively responded to Yongampo Incidents. It is clearly revealed that there was a crisis diplomacy of the Great Han Empire before the Russo-Japanese War In this paper, I was noted that Great Han’s Emperor Gojong, who directly or indirectly in response measures surrounding Yongampo Lease Treaty and the Yalu Crisis before the War. Especially I tried to reconsider Great Han Empire’s diplomatic activities from the view of the international relations. To do this, I focused on the background of 1 st & 2nd Yongampo

2) For a survey of recent work, please refer to Kim Wonsoo, “The Yongampo Incident and the Origin of the Russo-Japanese War,” Власть и общество в России - во время русско-японской войны и револ юции 1905–1907 (олериус пресс, 2007). 3) Kim Wonsoo, “Trends in the Study of the Russo-Japanese War in Korea and the Future Task - Third- party perspective on the Origins of the War,” International Journal of Korean History, Vol.7 (Center of Korean History, 2005). The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of Great Han Empire 223

Lease Treaty and the Yalu Crisis. And it was linked to the Russo-Japanese negotiations from September 1903 to February 1904. For the next step, dealt with the multilateral diplomatic measures of Great Han Empire in face with the crisis. Finally, in this regard, tried to recast diplomatic activities of the Great Han Empire.

I. 2nd Yongampo Lease Treaty and Russo-Japanese Negotiations in1903

On 20 July 1903, 1st Yongampo Lease Treaty had signed between the Forest Inspector, Cho Sunghyup(조성협) and the Secretary of the Russian Timber Company, Mogisco.4) Such a measure by Great Han’s imperial court was a shock to the Japanese authorities. The reason why was that If Russia had leased the land of Yongampo, Russia's military activities in Manchurian-Korean borders should make a legitimate justification and the forces to push for the expansion is secured as well. But even more shocking facts were that Inspector Lee's activity was delegated from the Great Han’s imperial court. 5) In other words, this lease treaty reflected the will of Great Han’s Emperor, Gojong might to be proved the dominant/

4) Angus Hamilton, Korea (Charles Scribner's Sons,1904), pp.201-206 ;Kim Wonsoo, “The Yongampo incident and Japan’s response,” The Japanese Aggression of Korea Before and After the Russo–Japanese War(the Korean Historical Association,1986);Kim Wonsoo, “Japan and Russia’s approaches to the negotiations over the Yongampo lease rights,” Compilation of Essays Published by Seoul National University of Education, Vol.24; Kim Soryŏng, The Taehan Empire’s Perception ofand Response to the Yongampo incident (Masters Thesis, Korea University); Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, eds., Nippon Gaiko Monjo, XXXVI, Part 1, No.463 (Hereafter cited N.G.M, No.463) 5) N.G.M, Nos.463, 469. 224 서양사학연구 제39집

aggressive actions, or the reciprocal measures between Korea and Russia. These situations made Japanese foreign policy toward Korea and Manchuria unclear. Since then, Japanese foreign minister, Komura Jutaro (小村寿太郞) had started to take more aggressive measures against Great Han Empire. As a result, International relations in Northeast Asia has begun to entered the new phase. Its turning point was the conversion of the Japanese foreign policy made by Komura. Before the 1 st Yongampo lease treaty, Komura had been an optimistic stance that Korean problems can be solved naturally after the Russian military withdrawal from Manchuria. In addition, as long as the Great Han Empire does not allow Russia’s occupation of Yongampo, he had shown that Russia's activities in North Korea might be restricted. On the other hand, Hayashi Konsuke(林权助), Japanese minister in Korea had continued to ask for Komura the opening of inland and obtaining the Kyoungui railway concession as counter measures against Russia. At that time, Japanese legation in Seoul was intended to link the opening of treaty port with obtaining Kyoungui railway concession. Thus, Hayashi repeatedly asked the daunting demands toward the Foreign Office of the Great Han Empire. But Komura has reserved Hayashi's claim. At that time, Foreign minister, Komura had considered that it was not appropriate timing to take aggressive actions. And he did not immediately answer anything at all. But now, such a situation has been changed. The reason why was that the intention of the Great Han’s imperial court were exposed. And the follow-up alternative was needed for Japanese foreign minister, Komura. For these reasons, Komura immediately telegraphed Hayashi to acquire the Kyongui railway concession. And then, he instructed to discourage the signing of the 1 st Yongampo lease treaty(7.22), and to warn the imperial court and foreign office of the Great Han Empire . On the other hand, he instructed Kurino Sinichiro(栗野愼一郞), Japanese minister in Russia, to The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of Great Han Empire 225 inquire the direct negotiation between Russia and Japan. It was not only based on the results of Murinan Conference(舞麟庵會議4/21) and Japanese Imperial Conference(御前會議), but also on the consideration of a joint cooperation with Britain and United States. Such measures were a multifaceted diplomatic action which was aware of the response of Russia and Korea as well as the United States and Britain. These measures should be noted that It has been the continuity with the basic policies of Komura diplomacy conceived in the 1st Katsura Cabinet in the autumn of 1901. 6) On August 12, According to the Komura's telegram, Kurino had talks with the Russian foreign minister, Lamsdorf(Ламздорф В.Н.). He submitted the first Japanese proposal. It was related with the respect for the territorial sovereignty and the independence of Korea & China, And that if Russia approved to accept the superiority of Japan in Korean Peninsula, Japan also had intention to be approved the special interest of Russia on the Manchurian railway. Against Japaneses Initiatives for Russo-Japanese negotiations, months later, on September 13, Russian replies were answered through the Russian minister in Japan, . It was that Russia would recognize her position south of the 39th parallel provided that the area north of it was made as outside Japan's sphere of influence and the evacuation of Russia's occupying force was not guaranteed. Russia's proposal was seemed to be a counter measure against the Japan's

6) Kim Wonsoo, “The Russo-Japanese Rivalry over the Opening of Uiju-one of the main causes of the Russo-Japanese War,” Compilation of Essays Published by Seoul National University of Education, Vol.20 (1987);Kim Wonsoo, “the Yalu Crisis and the Russo-Japanese War -Related with Global International Relations-,” Journal of Western History, vol,23 (2010), pp.119-121.