The London Gazette of TUESDAY, the 2Oth of JANUARY, 1948
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IRumb. 38183 535 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the 2oth of JANUARY, 1948 Registered as a newspaper THURSDAY, 22 JANUARY, 1948 The War Office, January, 1948. OPERATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, FROM I7TH OCTOBER 1940 TO 27™ DECEMBER 1941 The following Despatch was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Archibald Wavell, British Chiefs of Staff on 2&lh May, 1942, on the methods of operating has headquarters, by AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ROBERT and especially why he found such a big expan- -BgOOKE-POPHAM, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., sion from his original staff necessary. C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C., Commander-in- At Delhi I stayed with the Viceroy, and estab- Chief in the Far East. lished contact with the Commander-in-Chief, I.—FORMATION OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, and their FAR EAST. respective staffs, and with certain civil officials. 1. This despatch, covers the period from the At Rangoon I stayed with the Governor, date of my appointment as Commander-in- Sir Archibald Cochrane, and reached agree- Chief, Far East, the iyth October, 1940, to the ment over the constitutional problems raised by date on -which I handed over to Lieutenant- the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief, Far General Sir Henry Pownall, the 27th December, East. I met the General Officer Commanding, 1941. Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Sir K. McLeod, visited various establishments, includ- My original staff consisted of seven, exclusive ing the oil refinery at Syriam, and established of my personal assistant. Of these seven, the contact with many of the civil officials. Chief .of Staff, Majpr-General Dewing, the Senior Royal Adr Force Staff Officer, Group- Instructions and General Policy. Captain Darvall, as well as any personal assis- 3. My Directive is given in Appendix A. tant, travelled out with me. On my arrival in Singapore it was agreed The Naval Liaison Officer, Captain Back, that, should I become a casualty, the Com- met me on my arrival at Singapore, and the mander-in-Chief, China Station, should take Army G.S.O.i, Colonel Fawcett, met me in Burma. my place until my successor was appointed. With reference to paragraph 2 of mj~ Before leaving England I saw the Chief of Directive, the meaning of the term " operational the Imperial General .Staff, Chief of the Air control " was explained as being higher direc- Staff and Major-General Ismay individually, tion and control as distinct from detailed opera- but did not meet the Chiefs of Staff collectively tional control. at one of their meetings. fii addition to this Directive, I had two main 2. I left London on Sunday, the 27th guides for action: first, that if was the policy October, and started 'by air from Plymouth on of 'His Majesty's Government to avoid war the 28th October. I spent two clear days in with Japan, and, secondly, that, uiitil a fleet Cairo, three in Delhi and three in Rangoon, was available; our policy 'in the Far East should arriving at Singapore on Thursday,' the 14 th be to rely primarily on .ajrjpower'in conjunction November. General Headquarters', Far East, with such naval forces "as could be made avail- started to operate on .Monday, ; the ' i8th able. The first was confirmed during 1941 in November, 1940. many telegrams, e.g., in March, " Avoidance During the journey I was able to ses the of war with Japan is basis of Far East policy working of the Headquarters of both the Army and provocation must be rigidly avoided," and Air Force in Cairo, and to consult with the. and again in September, " Our policy in the 536 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 22 JANUARY, 1948 Far East is still to avoid war with Japan." The Far East is usually examined on a small- The second was. laid down by the Chiefs of scale map, so people are rather apt to get a . Staff in August, 1940. false idea of distances. From Singapore to 4. It was pointed out to me that the require- Alor Star at the North End of Malaya is a good ments of Home Defence, the Battle of the deal further than from London to Aberdeen. Atlantic, and the Middle East, must take pre- Rangoon to Singapore direct by air is about cedence over those of the Far East; at a later i,iop miles; Singapore to Hong Kong, via date Russia also took precedence, and, at one Manila, ds 2,000 miles, about the distance from time, Iraq and Iran. Realising this, it was Gibraltar to Alexandria; and from Singapore obviously our duty to be content with the essen- to Melbourne about 4,100, which is only slightly tial minimum, to consider what we could do less than the distance from London to Aden, without rather than what we would like to have, via Malta and Cairo. and to imake the fullest use of local resources. But we always regarded the strength of 336 Size of General Headquarters Staff. •aeroplanes as an irreducible minimum. {See 7. Although it was obvious that Singapore para. 79 below.} In January, 1941, we were was a key 'position, and -therefore that tbf cautioned against over-estimate of the Japanese defence of Malaya was of the greatest impor- forces. tance, it was evident that, apart from my Direc- I was also informed that the defence organi- tive, the size of -my Staff rendered it quite sation in Malaya was apparently not working impossible to exercise any form of direct opera- smoothly or efficiently, and that this would tional control, except in the widest sense. I necessitate early investigation and action. therefore decided that, although the fact of 5. To carry out the directions outlined above, my headquarters happening to be situated at it was evident that the following steps were Singapore would naturally involve my dealing necessary: — with more details in Malaya than elsewhere, •(a) To avoid any action that might be the Commands of Hong Kong, Malaya and deemed provocative by Japan, but at the Burma must be regarded as of equal status. Each General Officer Commanding would have same time to try and convince her that our 1 strength was too great to be challenged suc- to control the operations in his own area, and cessfully; the initiative of the Air Officer Commanding, (6) To strengthen our defences in the Far Far East, must not be cramped; the operational East, and especially to build up our air forces, control of my headquarters would be limited not only by obtaining new aircraft but also mainly to the movement. of reinforcements, by making all preparations to ensure mutual principally air, within my command and to the reinforcement in the Far East area; issue of directives. (c) To ensure effective co-operation in The staff of General Headquarters, Far East, Malaya, not only between the Royal Navy, was very small for the work it had to carry- the Army and the Air Force but also between out, and immediately on its formation in them and the civil services; Singapore it was found necessary to add three (d) To stiffen the Chinese so that thev duty officers of junior rank in order to ensure could contain the maximum Japanese effort keeping a twenty-four-hour watch in the office. (see paras. 70 and 71 below); and Requests for an increase in staff at General (e) To establish as close co-operation as Headquarters were made on more than one possible with the Dutch and Americans, as occasion, and finally it was agreed by the well as with Australia and New Zealand, the Chiefs of Staff, in August, 1941, that the total' main object being to ensure that, should an establishment should be raised to the; attack be made on any part of the Far East following:— area, all the nations concerned would simul- Commander-in^Ghief: i. taneously enter the war against Japan, thus Chief of Staff: i. avoiding the risk of defeat in detail, as had Staff Officer, ist Grade: Navy i; Army 2^ happened in Europe. R.A.F. 2. 6. A very brief study of the area comprised Staff Officer, 2nd Grade: Navy i; Army 3; in the Far East Command shows that the R.A.F. 3. defence of the whole area is essentially one Staff Officer, 3rd Grade: Navy i. single problem. Burma, Siain, Indo-China, Total, 15. Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, In addition to this, there were:— Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand, Personal Assistant: i. all inter-connect and operations or preparations Cipher Officers: 2. in any one of these areas affect all the others. Signal Officer: i. In view of the above, I regarded it as one of Chief Clerk: i. my principal duties to make personal contacts in these places. During 1941 I visited Australia, Making a total in all of 20. This establish- twice, in February and October, Manila three ment was not completed by the time war broke- times and the Netherlands East Indies five out. times. I also visited Hong Kong in December, The result of the smallness of the Staff was- 1940, and April, 1941; and Burma in June and that individuals were overworked, and this, September, 1941. in conjunction with the Malayan climate, led Another point that stands out is that the to sickness. The most serious case was that, problem is (fundamentally a naval one, and of my Chief of Staff, Major-General Dewing, that, although the Army and Air Force in com- who went into (hospital on the 8th April, and1 bination may defend areas of land and repel remained there until he started for England in an enemy, his definite defeat cannot be brought May.