Côte D'ivoire (English Acronym: ECOMICI)
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CÔTE D’IVOIRE: “THE WAR IS NOT YET OVER” 28 November 2003 ICG Africa Report N°72 Freetown/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................i I. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................1 II. THE FAILURE OF THE IVORIAN MODEL ............................................................5 III. REBELLION AND RESPONSE ...................................................................................8 A. BLAISE COMPAORÉ: BIRTH AND SUSTENANCE OF THE REBELLION ......................................9 B. THE MPCI: A POLITICO-MILITARY ORGANISATION ...........................................................14 C. PRESIDENT GBAGBO’S RESPONSE .......................................................................................16 IV. THE WILD, WILD WEST ..........................................................................................18 A. CHARLES TAYLOR IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE’S WESTERN WAR ZONE ...........................................20 B. PRESIDENT GBAGBO’S LIBERIAN ALLIES ............................................................................21 C. THE END OF THE LIBERIAN ALLIANCES?.............................................................................24 D. THE GROWING CYCLE OF INTER-ETHNIC VIOLENCE ...........................................................25 V. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION .............................................................................27 A. FRENCH AMBIVALENCE ......................................................................................................28 B. THE LINAS-MARCOUSSIS PEACE TALKS .............................................................................30 C. MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT – THE MONITORING COMMITTEE AND MINUCI ......................................................................32 D. PACIFYING THE WEST .........................................................................................................33 VI. THE POLITICS OF PATRIOTISM AND RECONCILIATION............................36 A. THE PEACE ACCORDS .........................................................................................................36 B. PARTY STRATEGIES ............................................................................................................37 1. The FPI ....................................................................................................................38 2. The PDCI-RDA .......................................................................................................40 3. The RDR..................................................................................................................40 4. The Forces Nouvelles ..............................................................................................41 C. THE RISK OF NEW WAR......................................................................................................41 VII. CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................45 APPENDICES A. MAP OF CÔTE D’IVOIRE ......................................................................................................49 B. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................50 C. CHRONOLOGY.....................................................................................................................53 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................62 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS .................................................................................63 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................70 ICG Africa Report N°72 28 November 2003 CÔTE D’IVOIRE: “THE WAR IS NOT YET OVER” EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS “The war is not yet over”, an ICG mission to Côte Until recently, it appeared that some progress had d’Ivoire repeatedly heard in November 2003. There been made. On 4 July 2003, the military are ominous signs that the Côte d’Ivoire peace protagonists said the war, which began on 19 process initiated in January 2003 has broken down. September 2002, was over. The government re- If the country goes back to war, it could well take opened the border between Côte d’Ivoire and all West Africa with it, endangering even recent Burkina Faso on 10 September. The National progress in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The UN Assembly adopted an amnesty law and trade Security Council needs to take a leading role in the relations were normalised with Burkina Faso and peace process, initially by upgrading its current Mali. These steps were broadly in line with the presence to a full peacekeeping mission. This could Linas-Marcoussis peace accords, negotiated with include subsuming some 1,400 West African troops French mediation. That agreement established a under the umbrella of an expanded operation. The reconciliation government with wide executive UN should also step up cooperation between its powers, comprised of ministers from the main ongoing peace operation in Liberia and its Ivorian political parties and the insurgent groups, that is peace mission, MINUCI. meant to lead the country to general elections in 2005. The accords outlined a nine-point program The immediate concern has been instability and war on disarmament, security sector reform, human threats following the resignation from the government rights violations and media incitement to in September of ministers from former rebel groups, xenophobia and violence, the organisation and (now called the Forces Nouvelles). They acted to supervision of elections, and measures to end protest what they considered obstacles, created by divisive policies on national identification, President Laurent Gbagbo, to implementation of the citizenship, foreign nationals, land tenure and January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis peace accords, eligibility for the presidency. notably his appointment of ministers to the defence and interior portfolios in the government of national The impasse over implementation, however, has set reconciliation in contravention of agreed procedures the stage for a new phase in a struggle that goes and his unwillingness to delegate executive powers to back a decade. There are worrying signs that, the prime minister and government as stipulated by without new international initiatives, there could the accords. Gbagbo’s response was to call his soon be serious new fighting. Since late October, opponents “kids with pistols” and “houseboys turned the Economic Community of West African States rebels”. Disarmament of former rebels and other (ECOWAS) has increased its diplomatic unofficial groups failed to begin as promised on 1 interventions, but to no avail. Neither President October and is inconceivable in the current climate. A Gbagbo nor the Forces Nouvelles appear willing to declaration by the chief of army staff on 15 stop the escalation towards violence. The November that “the war could begin again at any agreement signed in January 2003 has been a moment”, in response to which the Forces Nouvelles source of discontent among hardliners in Gbagbo’s declared a state of emergency in their zone, shows Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) ruling party, but how close the peace process is to foundering. also among rebel leaders, who distrust the president’s commitment. In addition, the accords Côte d’Ivoire: “The War Is Not Yet Over” ICG Africa Report N°72, 28 November 2003 Page ii have fuelled anti-French sentiment, not least of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. A French because they were seen to have legitimated an peacekeeping force has played a leading role since armed rebellion. They were also problematic in that late 2002. The situation in Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire’s they appeared to many Ivorians to frustrate their western neighbour, which had a significant part in aspirations to reduce the pervasive influence of the the recent war and is in the early stages of its own former colonial power, France. fragile peace process, will be important in determining whether Côte d’Ivoire regains stability; Even before they began to fray so obviously, there but by the same token, peace in Liberia has little were indications that the accords were not a perfect chance unless Côte d’Ivoire is quiet. solution. Their slow, incomplete and sometimes flawed implementation created considerable Gbagbo in turn armed other Liberians, thus assisting frustration among the Forces Nouvelles. Indeed, the creation of a new anti-Taylor insurgency, the Gbagbo and many in his party lost little time in Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). creating numerous and sometimes violent obstacles Elements of a tribal militia he recruited, the Forces de to implementation. They calculated with some Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), fought beside reason that strict implementation could well result MODEL inside Liberia as Gbagbo gained tacit U.S. in their electoral defeat in 2005. Gbagbo has sought approval to pressure Taylor. Like Taylor, Gbagbo and to buy time, playing on the rebellion’s internal Compaoré have broken the arms embargo on Liberia divisions and hoping for its disintegration. And the and fuelled regional instability, making their Forces Nouvelles are indeed splintering, with governments potential targets of sanctions if they political and military leaders increasingly losing continue