Ter 13 - .Xncland

Clba2ter 8 - 431o nef'onsivo i:i the :zao-t

ChtlL-?tar12 - i?he ~'irm'lting- i3~ Force

Ch~i-?ter 13 - .xncland

.-7,' -3 .td.,.bts' 14 - :(?ranthe T~Ieuse.to a.e ijeine

Chay=;er 15 - l~~heBasic i.,at.rof' ,;&n. :?mi;i t2is one &oul. d zo t get tile idez of' ;1 pine def elis ive on a lofi?; line. !?i?_oCoPLpSe of -t!l~'mrd~;~'f'ri:~; I~.er;zl by :~ay of

Ti~or!-l-;;~al;ilu2s far as *:?sche rnolji $2 - about lBOO ki101netcrg ; tj once r?zled ox% sizch a -bhol:,*t. _"here was ::LO o Lier cli~.oicethan

to eol:_dmct tile s t~aategicdcf ea.se as -.,Lie>?--- a:; possiSic as an of- fense. The task: ;.Pas made :?ucb easier bzr1 :e .;e~gra:~hic;'ow-is-

Lion of 5~eSor?c~, li'oo~1.t440 kiloce ters bctxeewr :';raI;a~?.and

enemies were !:resei~t i:i frnlfcia "at Frussia, jach of ';:lese separated fields o-:" oyeratioi? was still large eno~zi:?, esp~3ciall:r tile :as% ?r~.lssi6~n,'3ecause t,ic nl~~b@rof trooys Lfk2r9r~a3not in ratio to t:e size of t._e area os i;':e -,robl@r,l, 111 aaditir)r:to the strength oi" l;~c,i:lstro-:i~~:;ari.m nix?! in ~alicia,natme had providcli excellent lii~osgf defe:~se o,~tl-e ;iliestr ar:c"Lthe +,an

fa3tber back, the carpnthians, Gexer:il i2o~xadToil :jotzeirdar%,

bee2 siiCer :o ;iti~cutilized t',e riv:;r tuld r~o:axtaiiz positioiis on a ;31rely iicrcrisivs ;;i:~-,and to bold in rotidirisss i? ,!ester11

,>?i.licia a at 5012y of txloops 7;L~ic;l at :i fa~orabf~nm~lel?t~ol~id

0ve~~~i3ek.i!,l:c ~i~~ssialiTT~;!I. t f?'ii~, the l~iiii!ssi:ins sbo? before

( a2proac 1c.6 j t;IC. f;ar~a%liiaxs. -;ucli d COLJB ti:?-a ttac'; of resod tr~o adva tnges; 1. ?he fli2u.k~no-~2(1 be ros'tcd orz the ",aryatbians a~ctthe :eischsel; 2, Tiere wo 11d bc 3 d,r:iice ~f se:~aratinq the

;;lussiaa am:r fyo:: its co;~Lu!?icntions, "he ddager of an irrviisio- ctf' lil;dzzar:v was 7er:; sLi;&G; tr; Fe s re one ~:~'o~lldhe obliged to sacrifice fertile ~aliciaas a battlefield and

I.enberg ~.iustbe left to its fate. Since Sonradrs plm failed

X ember: didn?t escape arqrhow.

.\ plan of operation of thc two armies had not been agreed upon. The scant exchan~eof letters between Cowad I'oltlre had by no means exha~stedthe possibilities of operation, Tt seems that these tvo men beat around the b~shand avoided the main issues. Conrad because he was rrorried about his oi'censive - Iioltk@ bccatlse iie fcared that his pLsn in the yest mil.-ht be disturbed, i;lso, the P~rrnansfeared timt t'r~e plan mi~htnot be kept a secret. Conrad desired all earl:. r:eman offensive a airist the ijarerv to sup13ort his otm of'eusivc arid '-oltke n$~reed,d- though its feasi~ilitymas do~lb.tf-ilrrikh tlio forces at his COIL- nand, f oltliey S nain task was to protect 'ast I'russia without rislriil:; the ex3 sterice of his: amy, :'ever'thelc ss he co:~;aiided aii at$ac!: as t'-e solutiou. The arrage~ientsfor the attack were left to tho ?ori~-~ander-in-ChiefaP the 8th - General- oberst von :>rittauitz. 7on.e years beforo, ~fllcn@2unt zcklieff eil v33 chief of %:a ;enera1 staff, aad Cgdrmt ialdersee l.~.las still alive, the latter tms chosexi to be 5.~13.Connxander in the dast bccasse "craiuin; md adaptability made him especially fjtted for the psition, 1:eaneral von grittwitz !lad eiven no pro~f of strategi.~ability during peace tipliies - his activities lzad been dong 1-ines nhich had nothisg to do vith leadirlg an array.

But that fact need not have caused any tror~ble,because

Count schlisffen, ia years Cf study, had discovered a way to conduct the offensive in 2ast Prussia even al:ainst superior forces; his opinions mse available to the general. staff.

Therc was scarcely one officer of the staff wile had not, in peace tiiilest, stildied +die problem. of the active defense of East prussia . Count schlief feu?s final report in 1898, smed up the result of' all the studies along these lines. ;;litbout

going into details, we will consider the main points. Count

schlieffen divides into four groups the ~ussianforces destined

to attack 3asL Prussia; on the right wing by way of Tilsit 2

corps md 1 cavalry clivisi on, by way of 'yilkomi schki-suwalki

4 corps and 2 cavalry divisions, fmm the region northwards from

~jslostok2 corps ad 1 Cavdry division, from. !larsav by way of

EJf%r@3W4 aorps, Reserve divisions to be fomled at Dunaburg and

;iilna, 'Thus develops the plan of tho surround in^ of 3ast

Prussia i~athe Eorthj zast eubd south, so the space reniaias only

toward the Baltic Sea and along the lower stretch of the .treichsel.

The German forces, at first 8 divisions of infantry and 3 of

B!ap cavalry, soon strengthened by 9 niore di~lsionsof infantry and

1'5 -a 1 of cavalry, are at the confluence of the iiussian streams (of

soldiers) so that it would seem that they (the "vemazls) can not

escape being surmunded in case they accept battle near the bor-

der, The superiority of the Russian forces i~considerable

although not so great as in 1914. Bow vas the situation to be

judged? Lot us listen to G~unt~chlieffon: '+The C~rmanArmy,

threatened on three sides, can do nothing bettar than attack

and defeat; the noarest enemy and then turn against the other

two. The victory must, however, be a decisive om. If the

Cemms are detained Lrl doubtful battles by the ont@Russian

Amy, the others will have time to Bttack 011 flaak and rear

and crush ( the Gemeuls) by superior numbers, If, therefore,

the Geman comander does not tniuk that he can win a complete

victory, tllilan he does well to withdraw beyond the -:~eischseland

give ug the fulf illmnt of his task, TO achieve a decisive

victory over the riearest enemy ( the axmy corgs approaching from :irilkowisclaki and ~uivdki)as marl.rr troops as possible must be

11rough.t rl-p anCi so quickltr asseabled that interference by the arrnie s from Bjelostok aizd 'jarsaw will be i!!possible, gll of the forces on the ri&t bank of the 7:eischsel incl~udingthe min reserve f roa xonigsberg, could be axerabled with the ex- ception of the reserve divisions in Osterode, Deutsch-mlau attd Soldau which mere too far away fror~t_:e pros~ectivefield of battle, md a cavalry division which must remain at the sctuth border as a rear guard. sir~cetile an,y; from Bjelestok, could arrive izi 4 to 6 marches jdepen~iin~;on the route talcen), there was no tira to lose, perhaps there might be uncertainty as to which was the rlearest enmy. But it seemed certair~that the clioice lay between a quick op~ratiori.an Interior lines or the retreat to tho lYaichso1 - this seemcd true at the eime of' the peach problerl of' 1898 as tiell as in the war-ti?= problem of 1914. The history of wars reveals to us few cases of successful operations dorig the interior lines. Napoleon was a master at ti~atbut i~evertheless,he lost his crown ar~dhis free- d~:, during such m operation. It folloxs that it is very difficult Lo defeat decisively a superior e::eqy force when threatened OIL three sides, AE ordinary victory, i,e., a rroutal victory is not; sufficient to save the maller army from beiug surrounded. On the otherhand, tile enemy xi11 ie at pains to protect his ol;rn flanks. The averaze general will withdraw in such a case after a froztal attack in which he endeavors to defeat or detain the enemy, Therefore one cax scarcely re- proach Ton T1rittwifz f or consideztir.tg a retreat behind tile :eichsel. 3e~roachis due those who chose hin for oz~cof tize hardest tasks er~counteredin warfare ii: spite sf tile objections of the

Chief of t+,e ;enera1 Staff. lior did tilo first march along the herder ;rake tl~ingseasier for thc conztander; at the head of tile "irst myCorps was a personality m'ilose peculiarity mnife~ted itself in striving for an independence ~ktichwould develop i,;to insubordination unlsss checked by a firm leader,

Such a nil1 was necessary for the operation alone interior lines during which not several minds.must direct, but one mind. The mind was "cat of Comt schlieffen who at tile time of the operations was rotti~igin the ground. How did he plan the operatioris as he norked out the pmblern iu l898?

A flank attaclr fror3 Konigsberg, crossiug the ~eirie, could have great effect, If, however, tric encay ri@t flank swerved toimrd tl,e few crossings (bridges) tken tihe operation would be liiade iii~possibl@. If, after passing by the nort:iern point of the "asurian lakes, the nussians continued their advance westward, then one xni@t hope for grcater success if one attacked f ran nasterlburg the enemy left flank. But tritis by no means iniprobable that the enemy will march tovards Allen- stein to seek out enemy forces as ?{ell as to draw closer to its auxiliary amies. In that case the r,emxu:s sent out Tronl

3asten'ourg to carry out tile flanking novemen~t,muld find itself facing tae enemy front. Ta0r ~m-.:ld the establ.ishinc of forces between Rastenbrvg and the lakes r:rnasantoe surrou~ding the nussian leftwing becairse it could at orice see;; t'lc protection of (rest agzainst) the 1akes.v iis soon as tile Ixussians have crossed tse i)o~%zau-Hastenburgand are in open co a~!,ry, they cm trsafcly be attacked by mperior Geman forces cor:zing from 1:onigsberq or Prorn tile sotzti-i, fine co !ld not, ho?irever, wait that Lon$ or t:;e otller iiussiar: amies sill arrive.?* A risLy attack ~,:ust be ~riade. One caimot foresee the exact position of t::e iius~iansat 81e tim. ft is certain that in keeping their left flax& protected by tile lalres, tt~s:~rvill expose ti~cir right flank. The more ceref111 they are wit:? their left the %ore t"ey arc exposed in an attack by the forces supposed to be assa-]bled at :aniga%erg, ar! .: if tile:. protect tPLe~~se1sesagainst tLis attack, tlm tlaz ::or froril the south becmees ::iore im~inent. In assa~lnlifigthe ;',eman tt~erefore,a surrolnding o:? both f lauks w~stSc co--sidered,n &ccordir~;~ly,C01m.t schlief fen suggested the forzlation of two attack :;ror?ys - khe one near

-.jatenbur~,the other between 3araoteiil acd yoi:."au. Jt is uec- essary to ~entio~~here only one itm-:i in his 7l.aa of further operation. That is that after dsfeati ~g tile j:jema arwr he k?o~ildpwsue %hen to the bridge at Tilsit, slaughtering ns many as possible ar~dthus preventing their joioing up with the Marew

91ly then muld he turn around, the lcng pursuit nould hpro~ecoilditi ons tor a now battle . It moilld be no disadvantage far ",ermanjT for the enemy to haw approached from Wie south and for, ~:oiiigsberg to have becone effective, ?low all of our strength could be iqJp1ied.f' count _chliefien giver; up the idea of a retreat to the 'pichsel ad seeks for all his forces the support of tile ;.:oni@sberc~fortificatioi~s.

In 1914, Ton Prittwitz cotdd not nssriirle such a risk because von ;-oltke had iilsisted tliat he nust not elieanger the ex- isteuce of the amar. Because of the terrain in 3;i:ast Prussia and because of tile rclative strwgth of the t~oarrcies, a great

.sictory co::Ld i1o.l;, however, be gained without taking that risk,

Therefore, it rr.o;~ldhave been Setter for voa 7-oltke to have assumed the roaponsibility thus strengtlleniug tLe cowrage of the cui,;rnrwder to tile poilit of taking great risks. Ci course, the co~lditionsset fortir in the peace-tilie pmbl.e~!ztau not be conpared with those viiici? prevailed in 1914. The relative strength was uot as favorable Tor the ~emlmsin 1914 as von

schlieffen had hagined it $-~o:iLdbe. In 1914 supcrios strength

cot-33d not be asserifbled agaiast even one of tho Russian am'II lee.

It was all the more necessary, therefore to achieve, bp flank

rnovei-itent, a local advantage on that part of the Battlefield here

one wished to conquer, Cn the other hand, the Russ iails in 1914,

had given ui, their aci.vantai-,e ilz terrain by leaving considcrabb

forces behind to guard the capital ci* instead of bringing up

these forces also to attack xzst Prussia by \7ay of ;:i@md

~unaburginr the direction or' Tilsit. Terhaps the :-!ussians

would have been wiser to use still greater strenkyth a.~ainst

East Prussia, def eatiiig it iilost decisively ozb at least forciilg Xap its troops behind the ~:eici~selbefore at-tackinz Lne lustria- Iz 3xtgaria.n amy. latter, in -the neazltine, vuo7;ld have advanced nortl~vardbetwee11 the 'jeichsel and the 3ug - thus ofFer- ing a lonq flank to a 2ussiarl offensive starting at gown0 and

proskurow. IF, in this manner and nith :;reat strength, tile

:?ussiatis had. srlcceeded in ad-c.ancinq alo~ipt 10 Zarpathiws by

way of Lc;r,flert; azd stacislau to the upper "@ichsel , the ~ustro-

l-~ungarianamy between the 3u,3 an-; the eichsel vould hatce been

obliged to retreat ao~twardunder ~mfavorableconditions towards

Poland. !hat ~oiildthe Russians have yained by such operations?

me unified aitl strlight advance on p,ezblinof' Vneir entire army.

They would drive ahcad of them their two enemies, being carefnl

however, to cross wrer to the left bank of the oder in. ~ilesia

with as strong a force as possible.

Sf, after this ope;+ation, we trlrr~o:r thouats again to

East prussia we must emphasize a ~chlieffex~.point of view which

is blj?ortaat fran the stand~oiiltof' strategy, The first meeting lsrith the Eiussia~~stakes place on the ~lle- oi; a liee im- aginsd fro:: ;:osigaberg to the northern point of the rfasurian

lakes, ;;hat really ha~penedin 1914'1 The impatience ax~d

arbitrariness of the corn-andin;; qeneral of the First Corps

were to blame for a battle bein;; maps? near stalluponcn near

the border. Becalzse of this and because of false reports

the ~omaxider-in-chief let himself be misled into repeating the

attack at G~mlbinnen. ;hat is the basic difference betneen

the two courses of acti~n? Count ,"schliePfe;l ~rrlaxined to have

tile force along the border mdce an evasive fnoverr.e:lt ar~dstarts

the attack fro111 further back. General Boil 7rittwitz remains

near the border, aoves the rear units to the frolit line and

Pails to note that he is facing a lon,.; enemy front and can no

longer use strategy but .must sake a frontal attack.

In Count ;cUieffen's f ha1 problem of 1901, there are at tile front along the border ody a fe:.~ troops - eavally divisions at :leidenburg, "!illenberg, Coldar and ~talluponeil~

The First AMJ:; Corps is at ast ten burg, protected by the ICasu-

rian lakes. The other forces - 5 arm- coqs, 2, reserve corps

are ia position on the -ale between illeixstein aid 7iehlau. kfap pne asstulles ttiat tnere 2 :;ussiaa armies; the 1:jemen army 13-b me with 5 army corps to be followed. by 4 reserve corps, the

I.:arew -my nith 7 army corps mtild 1 reserve corps - several

divisiol~sof cavalry with each army. The fi~.~saianshave almost

tvice as rauch strength. The -newly built line of fortif ica-

tionsf? between ,Angerbtcrg aud Ortelsburg is azmed and mas~ned,

Zscept for the relative strenqth, the lay-out is t'le same as in

1914 but ~iththe difference that in tke ?@ace-time figuring

the main Gemm. "orces were held ir! readiness fartker to the

rear. Count ,jchlieffan expresses h iniself in his discussiiln

as follws: "The trend at present is towards fractal attack, In the last century cm~paigns;wre started a4ainst the enemyf s lines of comuni catioii battle s were opened with co;npletely turned front. ,& emperorTs cram was the prize of victory.

~t the be:;iming of fhis centupJ3, entirely different opiliions were held. 4 long series of nanewers, reports of trips by the staf?, .arid publications incX cate that, mid allow no doubt as to tile main idea. 3asic r-lies for handl.iu,r: an amly mere: keepin:; the troops togctiier, careful. selectioll of base, seek the enmyfs front. Satisfaction was not ex;ler- ienced until the heads of t:ie co1ur;uis have Sce?~adj13sted until the right wing is facing the mwL;ileft nix;_. arid the lert wiog the eziecy rigkt ving. Tile leadfig s.sirits are strdizi~ii.;their braiao over the probla: of nttsckiiz:;: a:ai.iist the destructiva affect of riodern 7:capons. The z7tlin motive for this rmtllod of' attack. above deseri'aed is prorgpted 53- a nattiral desire 'co escape defeat. ?his desire %ail1be r11lf illed if tlx enmy follot~s the szce s;rste~:l. Tho result, ho~rever,will be indecisive battles md low-dram1 out wars, ;here amies or" millions of soldiers are ?~sed,titat can not be erdured. g quick decision and a a~eedyend are i-,pe;.ative because of the cultural condition of the races (peoples] md t'le rea at :;ass of s~ipplies1:ecessary for SUCL~ huge asl~ies. 1t f s a qusstioxl t3?erel"ore if tile muodern thinkers can hold fast to tiie theory of frontal attack. nerr haps they nust discard it as tke *.:n.ylisS did (Boer =:ar) . The present iiio'ti~enust be replacad by az~o-bher. The desi-ro to escape defeat must be replaced 5:: tZteb~zrnisijdesire to corrquer - that slust govern the decisions.

'Phirt:: y-ars %Q, we could ml;e u, froiital at;tack, Our superior stroi~sthfiiinbled us to nivn"cor strou~;erwi:ig azainst eneriiy Flalik after mctact. I:oa wo csl: nwef count on having

st~?erior stren;;tI~, adon erlml stren~th,seldor:. Oirdinarily

:ve will Ilcive to be coi~tentroitl-i, srLdl.t:rforces. iur tactics

of' 1271 can be used by o~arerkemies but not by us. 7-ecessity , forces ris tc think of mys of co:lca_uesiu:); vitl-1 inferior streayth.

Pns tholtqh-i; se911:s reasorzable. If one is too acak to attack

all, j the ejlexny) , one attacks a gar%. ' an:7 variations of attack r2ay bbe fo~md, i_"!ie wing is a part - let 1.1s tjien attack tile nine.

That is diCEicult Whel-1 facing a coi~l?aIg, a battalion, oix detach- nxent. "acinf: a stronger force it is easier. *'he lon;exS his

lines are stretched out the longer i r; viil taka liim to co;le .to

tiie defense of his t'irnatcned flank. ';ow si-)all tile cJA;elT;r Slrulk be attacked:: I ot with oae or ti30 corps but ith one or IZOTF?

amics mci the ~riarcilmust not be dirocted at %!loi'lin?: but

a;aiiizt tlie lirie o I retreat ~ILirf~itationc;f what ~gt;.ass LO.;^ 11s

at vkri in 1807 a:i:l at sedan. It l.jads at once to disturbn~_ceof

t~eli-.,e of retreat, a::d ca:tses disorder 3nd corafusion ar~dmires yossiblc a bat ble :iii Mi re7ri:rsed fronte - a battle of destruction - a Sattle ??iAi;ha f;reat %'=eat in the eum2yts rear,~

"he ideas ;:at VOZ; ,'ehli~ffe:~exyressed in 1901 to a =!all

-zroxi> 07" s-la:'? of:ieers bmre pxlblished by him 8 years lator in

'I is clzssic work Treser. t :ay Tarfarerr a-.d cov ered in wCannaeET by mar l~isio~;~.In 1901 he gave the tollowinlj sollltion: 4 Bor~s are held read:^ for ail offcnsi~ealong t!ie chain or --as-a-ian lakes betlae@i~Lr:jo an? liastenSr:rg eastwarr! of t'lc lakes, w;iile ttie five rerlainj ni: corps fom an arc lose to t.*o riorthern point of the Lakes fro!l Zn~:cr'~urgby vay OP ':erda-;exz to "chlau. The advance of tr:e Russim anay (2Jjemen Lmyl is beinc condrleted along a broad frozt-rich% flank: via 1-rai~~?isclikinto Insterburg - left flarll-; via Graje'i~oto -mys - five co1?ps ilortfl of' the lakes - thee carps via i7ilir)wo i-a~kgrabowaad Grajewo toward tine chain of lakes. ,ill. these de 5ails are of course ~mkno~~i?.to tl-e Gernml

co:wander. He ill probably aosmlo t?mt t'?e :-ass of the OE~DW

forces -<7ill 113t a3proac'n tilo fortified line oC lalces br~t1wiL1

pass north of it, The iiussi= colicia~ciervrill be auff iciently

carcf~ilto not only protect hi~selfa;ainsi; T'onigsber; but to

keep in contact ;:i'ch t&leLine of the lakes -.xll;il they cai he pierced by simultaneous attac1.s fro froiit and rear. In viem

of that fact, the ,qermn arzy mus% be dete~-;:inedto ,yet a de-

cision to i;he zast 01" the lakes. Then after a first success

it nust, by tarning nr~trt;~,attack ia flank ad rear that part af

the ICjmen arn~~y13i11icli is fighting norti? of the I-akes. 3ecause

Gerrlarss are at tacking there also, I::?% ti.ey nu~ttalre care not

to atkc:: too soon, thus exposing their forces at ~l$;(~rbi~gto a surrounding ~ove~~eut,Van Scblieffen writes iL:?Canna%";

"1% is +,he task of the ~o~a,xr~derto shorten thz differeizce in

tiue betwoen the arrival. of one part at t.,c 2r0iit cu-d tnat of

tne other ?art at the flank or rear of the cnerriy. Eefore tile fro~talattack is started in the ?701"th, 4 L'~rri1czncorps rein-

forced b-; 2 carairy divisions which are already east of "L'ne

chain of lakes, leave the main force attacli along the

jidminnen-possasson line, wo Russian corps kvhich had approached fro? ' nrkgrabowa aud 7Tilipowo are -2artl.y destroyed arxd gartly throml bacl:, Yhe third, marchin;= via Grajei-io and ~rys, encounters farther south, the defenders of tile lit.$@of lakes,

The first sucoess east of t'ie lakes i:ls3.~rese;.~Cire success, however, bfscar~se i.11 one dayts maz'ch the 4 nrer!c.m corns T:~ill

stand a-bttlle flank of the r:ilmg n:lich Fs already ??eir?:: attacked fror~tally- in a second day's rmsch, tkey will tllreaten his rear. The harcer the zussians fizi~tnorth of the 1-akes, the greater tlae victo-xy will be i8 this one tho~lgh?:overas the COL-J -- right ving deep in .Hie eu@m:i's rear - rili troops

advancing to the rit.;ilt riith %uq?ose oi' drivinc the euemy

;iortl.zsaard to the I'je~i~en,':hethey this object will be attaiu-

ed, depends on the enemy, If he sees t danger soon enou~gh,

!I@ riay be able to escape, 'The fureier :mst he has penetrated

north OF the lakes, t'xe easier it will be for tie Gzrruans

to drive hi:: nnorthvard. To seize the cxactlg favorable

nomez~t for t:ie Ger~?~isto advance from thc chain of lakes axd attack, is tx task of the Con-;ma31dinq General - and be nust be a brilliant one, 'The ~lancan be rui~zcdby iaapatience iuld

boltmess as sell as by hesitation, To traaslate it into action

one must possess boldness and strength of will SIIC~as ~UB not

to be found in "just any cor~~aader"as the ;%~-chiveaof tke

empire expressed it.rf

BeJ'ore we take up tizc opesations of the 8th ,Ximy ~mder

vori ~rittwitzin 1914, it r,:ay be intercsti;,:;. to let volz ;gltke

spezik. Iio also tried to plan in tlieory the ogeraticins on ic-

terior lines in East Frussia, 1x1 the f'illaZ psoblax in 1907

he asstmed a case; tile ;jussians with 3 or 4 corps, advance

frm~Nje~lennorth of the lalces mhils 6 or 7 corps approach

fror~ITarem - t&ir right win? headed for Jo'Mannisbur[:: - their f Tap left for i.Teicienbug. They did not advace tovard th@ h:auer- 13-c lake --$pirding lake line, but planed a lmiting of' tlle two

armies at a goint along the middle dlls. Ton iirioltke now sup-

poses larger Gemla1 forces than were available in 1914.

P:amelg; 7* corps, 2 ca~alrydivisions (besides mar-tb gar-

risons =d TI,iulds$e%lrbrigades). The [yo-iping of these FOTC~S

is planned i;l such a way that one cavalry division between

E'auer lake and ;-'re

tween Soldau and lake spirdii~gwere on tqe flanks of the chain sf lakes, Behind "&em 3 corps apprsach k~the asterode-

~llenstein-:4ischofsb~rrgline rthilt? a fornth is being transported to :~russian sylau. Von t:oltlre wishrts to attack in a

svsroundilzg ~~~ver,:eilt,the 1eTt flan!c of the Farsw army which

he assurles is eastward of ITeidenbrwg, ?or pryose 31e

3ri~i:s up one cox;^ s Eron &lgerburg to sensenburg via ;iaston- bi~g, ii~ot'nercoq s is brought b:? train I'mm Pruasia.n-z:~J.a:1

to ~eluan-"3ylau,also he brings up the main reaerves flwr~,

Thorn and Graudenz. 'r!!sus von T-oltlrebsgir~gs together about

6 corps to f'ii2;iit tlm 6 or 7 corps of the ~iussian1:arew ardy; he leaves (in aidition to 'landuachr and cavalry) 1& corps to fight t :a yjenen array &. ich kias 3 or 4 coxps. gxcept for the

conlparative strengtli, the situation is sirililar to the one that

led to tile battle of Tamellberg iii 1914.

In -tile filial problem of 1898, voa :~chlieffenrejected

the solution .;jiiicii had the ?Tare17 am:: attacked first rat!ler tilm the 1:jerilen arliiy, lo I:oltl;e*s problem of 1907, it r.;iight have been better to dispose of t?le ieI;jemn first ad then

turn all the forces a~ai~lst:!am% amny. Tar tgeater strength could be as:;ed,?led a ;ai-ist the ETjmen army - partfg by mrchea, partly by railroad, Ton 731th-e rejected tds: "In order to achiove a sroat success, one would iav@to force %lie::jer;~en am:. a;air;st the 1-akas - i;hat is attack their north \*ling vith greatly srzperio~~stren~tln. It is no Loni;er possible though

1P;oltke doss not approve the ides of attacking both flanks of

the iTjcnen aEn:r ( swroundini.; it) as :;chlieff'en suggested in

will overfa:x?h tl1.e weal: ::enm~i forces ir.. tile soitin and advance to the i:jemn army in the north ~i1~il.ethe battle is still going on. 2Jso :le considers it possible l;~attris a-j~menanbiy

id7iJ-1not aece~tbattle hilt setire eas-l;vrard. yjut eve-i if they

hold tlrcir gr.o~;~idor~e~ust not expect a spec&;t success,

I'odem Pi4iti.n;: - above all fro:~talattack - vill be a long,

dlESicult a-id bloody struyfle. The stren~tliof Wie frorit iiii~

p;roF?m. steadily with tlie rierfee-tioa of weapons, and experience

shows i;h:lt usual-ly victory is von by elicjrcl ing onl~. 3ncir-

cling ia ::a& diff icuLG here by tlie Iregel in the ilorth and

t;ii. lakes in tile 80~th.~';'@ agree with 01th regardin:

fror~talstrei~:th, but xust observe that t'lcre was nothid? Lo hinder advancing north of the Pregel with oil@ cor;m a:iii the xain yonigsberg reswve, ar-d t11ro:ich the chain of lakes via

T otzen to wldap ::it11 2 coqs, l?5e attnck at t:~e fm art xro ~ld have tc> wait rmtil ti:v ::ad been -;aiilcd for t e encircling.

The sitrmtion was ueyr favorable for dr, .ble en~~lopr~~e~~tof the TTjW2en arnjr id'we disregarded all. =xie%:- reqardl~go::r rear. _'iloriq =pursuit of trio $emex? ani-y w li,: als(3 help nilr ciia~cesaj;aizs the :-are=ar-~y, '*?or the alz-y to ap~~oaciz,

(fror? t:~emuth) :i;ic r'or :oni.gsber-; ti, -,st i:lto action wo:tlld be a.u advatage tc, us. illl ou~s$re&-i;tLicould nos; be used.'t

The iouble eilcirclii~:; of the ?'jenexl am7 nas scarcel~a risk unJer tile ctrc~n.:s-l;~~ccs,Wsafer xw!ild be t'!e offer:sive a;aj.nst the :'ares anly,TlsaiJ vozl :'oltke,

Yon :-;chlieP?e~,in 1899, eutertnined also tL~eidea of attackiri- ac;niri at :,'ae "'arew an:y but lmdcr en tirely cliff ereat coziditions. :ietreatinh: fra_ %lie:'j onen a~ the rei~forced

?irs+,",r r h?la reached the 1i.a 1~1.~3sia~l-T~0lli3fld:iitl :oiir~.:x~ger~ la the meantime, a i",erman arny consistinf- of 4 corps and 2 cavalry divisions has retired before n superior ~ussianFaraw amly fortified along the Thorn-"arienburg line of the ~~~ichsel aaicla was occupied by 6 reserve divisions, ','he German corn-

nander-in-Chief is forccd to consider retreating beyoncl the

~eichselleavirig t;,e qirst mity Co~psii: t;lc 1-urch,

Ton zchliefferi uses this o2pnrtrni t) here offered, yap to attack (before tlie arrival of tlie J-jenen am3:,* dlich is

13-4 along tllc yirmt@x-~ecburgline three to ~'OIIT day 7 s narch

away) the r'arev! an;l;,T :AicEr is dons the :::.l~.,a:i-Eylau-strasburg-

1igino line. "Tile simplcst v~a:~to attaci: tile Liaren army is

for .I.-L.ie ?ernam forces near the 'eichsel to march straigkt at

tiie eneq. '20 insure success, t;"ir; available forces ~mstad-

vance agai:ist ax1 enemy flank. In ~iwynays it v~ouldbe ad-

vanta;:eous to attack the eaezy left flurd;, T!ut because of t11e

distrib~ltioliof forces this car? not be do:le, flowever, every-

tliil~is favorable for an attack acraiilrt tlte enemy rir,;kit

F~TLP;.F* This ~1x1be attacked :-ri t'l sr~?criorstrei~gth iP it

coiri-tinues its acl~ancctot.rard tile :eicilsel v ia I:erc. ;an-:ylau.

l?,;iileti-ier tA;isriili be the case i.3 d~iibtfl~l,It is certaii~lg

aot improbable bhat t ,e ~!ussianswill -GL~e "che forces, await

tile ai?proacfi c;f their ~t+eramj7, aid the r'eleasir~gof their

heavy artillery ber"ore a!,tkckiiiii; t-ic fortified 'ieiclisel line,

~f %:ley do not xove -tl~eirright f'laril:, if t'iey do not brinz it

up mci&further khan. i;eX%u;l-~ylau, t;zen the ;lernau plan of

operation 7~ill110% be practical, Tile encirclinl; aLi;ac! ~ould

becone a rrox:.tal attack. Tile result fo~tile ;enn=~s would be

doyibtf 1 as tile corps close together on their left flank caa

:-ot be fully eftcctlve md the Russiari left flank wiLZ be all

t'le nore eCfec.t;ire. nut even if ti;@ Tem~~ansare victorious,

the Hussians will xerel:. he dri7:en back in a straifjllt 1,i:le and

along Vie ro~test:ic:~ hzive used Tor ad~ancii:,?. ;long this

line o' retreat t'i~ey?rlill soon find protection, The Russian I:jenen amjTgill. a2pear on tile left flarll: of tile pursuing

'emrul an~ly. ifllerefore ax enc ireling ..if>~re~-ertt !.iU8 t be plamed that will s lcceed evea if 'I;% ;-:as::-ridlt uiag does not advance beyond 7errr:an-Tjilau. This i~overent:;lust be un-

iertaken with s trong forces. Tile se-garatioi~j of troops) heca-:se of lake r;::eserkch uust be considered. Cne nust also brin,.: sow.ti~the troops :fo~l.r divisions) diich are nt 7irus-

sian-~3ollandand ;ahrungen after retreati.:g frofi: the ?\sjemenarxy.~

Thus ve see how van '3chlief'fen risks %lie r~tmostto insm:e! victory in every case, AS a protection lor his rear against the 1;jenen aray he loaves only two cavalry divisions. T1hereiu. lie t~leboldness arzd dari-lr; of the stratu;ical thinking.

In all of the cases that van ~ciilfeffenpreeented, (the

I no. could c~RL)general staff trips ii-~drrar :;ones he r.ix2i.t iplied) we admire the 1o;ical way in which he tha:li::lC out the operation and how he pla~sto asscxnhle at the decisive poililt t1:e i;trlost superiority over the enemy, *uite the opposite of' Tton f oltke who hesitates to think the tl?ing fhrough :i~aassemble all possible strei:gth even if the ztrateg he plaiis is tile sfilfilleas von i:cilliel?f en?s. ::oltke~s str~teg~,ti:ereio~e, is uncertain =-id

~accillatin~;as :-re11 as discordant.

The advance in 1914 was not a masterpiece for the COP li;axldin5~officer of' the 3th i?rriy. The leaders of Hie amy evade tne responsibility by leaviu.; it to tlie Comlander-in-

Chief to solve the ?difficult problem? accordir~gto *his om best judgi2entn. They narcs this problem hardor by arrmging a scattered atlvzi~cewith ahich the Coraiander-in-Chief can accoifi:pli&i little. The loaders adrni t t1;a"ct:ie advarice shoi;ld be fn nore colzpact fcrrr~*il.tion. '-;hy did they 110% see to t;lat at once md SO ar.ri951.ce as bvas necessary for tile solution of the pr oblaar. Little Icore, kcsides co:~nonplaces, can be said about

$he leaders. ;fiil~w it stands writ ten: ttThe geuerd situation

;aust sho:a 11s to :ghat extent an of fensive can be coilducted* - that is hariding s;he Cormander-in-Chief less than alothing.

~ndiii conclusion is ti;o I'ateFizl advice: l~Z1:necessary, prussia, east of the :;ieichselm~~stbe sacrificed.~

&cording to 3chlieEl"en~sideas tile order to advarzce would '!lave read like this: "The operatiss. o:-~interior lines requires intelligence and boldness, D~ingtheir advance thro~lghthe ??asurianlakes the Iiussians will be se!_sarated.

:e will take advantage of this to defeat c:ile of their ax-~lies before the others can :et; ti.1el.e. 4th the sxal3- 11:utibcr of troops available, if;will ba easier to hri;& svl:-e-fior n:mbers againstom of the inner enally Planks tsan apainst tile outer ones. The ?:asmian Lakes of'fer ~oodprot~?cticzr~ for t'le as- sembling of the army. rhcre it ca:! lie fi nait for the first e;rerix flak that p reserits itself ,f*

~"oltkoalso calls to the leader of zlie Eighth AH31Y: ttOf fensivet of ferisivet !n ytf3ut t?le existence of the mly must not be risked,- was tile zarning he had give11 hin before that.

-:hat 1;jords of farewell rsoiild von 3cfiliefTen have given him? . . nyou have a wonderful task, ihink not of danger to your rear, but think only of victory. If you handle things ri~htand thi~i;s nevertl-ieless go wrong, then I mill take the conse- quences.* Extract Translat ion (Chapters IX, X, and XI.)

EAEILE H XALONE, Captain, Ipfantry, U,S,Army. The Cornand and General Staff School.

Note: The copyright owner has not approved this translat ion. The translator disclaims all liability for its unauthorized use.

TRA&TSLATORtS NOTES 1.

It cannot be another manifestat ion of shell- shock, for the infirmity is more ancient than gun- powder. And though polished brass may have insidious effects (See wDe Orichalco Aeterno et Mente Corrupt- ible", Jacobus Niemand, TYniv. Nirgendswo, anno 1234), i ii-cannot be woven to be as directly and exclzlsively res~onsibleas is lead, for instance, with relation to the incidence of lead poisoning among house oainters. Whatever may be the cause, there is no doubt of the fact that retired military men tend notoriously to become authors. Some are stricken I early, become authors first, and retire in consequence; these are exceot ional and are distinguished by their urge to write captiously about current pol- icies or living persons. The majority are content to write memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, text books, or letters to the editor; but write something, it seems, they must. This may not be so for ever; science, in our om day, has laid healing hands on many a trade and orofession; there may come a time when it will cease to be an automatic gesture for the retiring officer to reach for his pen with one hand while hanging up his sword with the other. 3ut, if so, the world will miss the intimate records of its great cantains, of their personalities, their driving purooses, and mental trends that now accum- ulate in service libraries. The officer who sees the story of his active years drawn to a conclusion, who looks back, perhaps, on a career long, absorbing, and threaded intricately among the important events and -personalities of his time, cannot be blamed for the impulse to hold the Translator's Notes. 2. volume onen just a moment longer while he adds a footnote here or inserts a comna there. Not every- one has been fortunate enough to have such phrases as "TTeni, vidi, vici, "no terms but unconditional surrender, or "my division does not know how to withdraw1' immortalized over his signature in official records. And it does seem unfair to leave to history nothing more suitable to declamation than "the officer of the day has nothing especial to re9ortV or '' the

2* bu. potatoes, issue, referred to in par. 5 -b, above, were destroyed for sanitary reasons." Besides, the retired officer has still a duty to his country. He is usually conscious that, in spite of all he and his contemnoraries have done, the service of late is not up to its old standards....shows signs, in fact, of deterioration at an alarming and lamentable rate. He feels that he must make one last stirring ag~eal to the troops lest the virtues of the good old days be lost.

Lieutenant General Wilhelm Groener, German Army, Retired, takes up his Fen to review in this work

( ?l~asTestament des Graffen Schlieffen, F .S .Yittler

& Sohn, !3erlin, 1927) those strategic princ i~les which Count Schlieffen believed would be of especial signif icence to Germany in the coming World War. The author contends that when the aiPar did occur, adher- ence to these princi~lesled the German armies to success on numerous occasions but that disregard of them led to disaster. He intimates that the struggle would have ended differently if the famous Schlieffen Plan had been carried through on the field of arms with the same v~isdomthat cent into*its pre~aration. He points out, in short, that the plan was conceived Translator1 Notes. 3. by a genius but apnlied by the younger Jloltke. The book is not a history. The author reviews certain historical situations that develo~edin the course of the World War but he uses these situations as illustrative problems in strategy. Nor does he confine his discussion entirely to actual occurances. His method includes the study of other plans onen to comman3ers at' various critical moments and com-oares the actual with the possible results, The historical statements are accurate; the conclusions, as in all speciaL pleading, can be judged only by the effect on the reader. Certainly the book leaves one with the feeling that history is not an inev2.tabJ.e tide but that at any given place and moment it is a trickle whose course can be changed by such trivial things as the crystal in a field radio set or by such intangibles as a commander's inborn fortitude.

There is a~pendedhereto a list of references of possible interest in connect ion with spec ific courses of the Cornand and General Staff School. Translatorls Notes. 4.

RErnRERCES

Relating to C.d G.S.S. Courses.

Note: The abbreviations designating courses are those used in current C .& G.S.S.schedules. Course . Reference. Pages .

CO. Orders. Contradictory, German XX Corps, Aug 27, 1914. 155• Delayed, German 3d Div and 37th Div, Au~27,1914. 157. German 1st Res Corps and XgII Corps, $lug 28,1914. 159

Example (hypothetical) for a group of ' armies. 169. Indefinite, German 41st Div, Aug 27, 1914. 155 German EighthArmy, Aug28,1914. 156.

CSL* Command channels faulty, German Eighth Army, Sept, 1914. 180,185. Planning in advance, German Eighth Army, Aug, 1914. 160. Relations between commander and chief of staff', Russian First Army, Sept,1914. 180,184. Troop movements. Details ?rescribed too far in advance, German I Corps after Bug 20,1914. 142. netraiment too far to rear, German 8th Cav 3iv, Sept, 1914 182. Flexible railway operat ion, German Eighth Army, after Aug 20, 1914. 143. Interference by refugee population, German I Corps after Gug 20,1914- 143. Rail and marching combined, discussion. 138. Rai'lway authorities and military staffs, discussion. 143.

Enc auragement to troops, discussion. 166. Becision, lack of. German Eighth Army, Aug, 1314 128,129, 132,135 Russian forces, Aug, 1914. 161, As to objectives, Russian Second Army, Aug, 1914. 146. Calmness. Lack of calmness and thoroughness, German XVII Corps, Aug 19-20,1914. 133.

Steadfastness. German Xighth Army at Tannen- berg, Aug, 1914. 165. Initiative, lacking in Russians, Aug, 1914. 157,161, 163. German 3d Res 3iv and 37th Div, Aug 28,1914. 157. German 41st Div, Aug 29,1914. 161-162. Firmness, discussion. 165-166.

Fixed ideas. German Eighth Amy obsessed by idea of enveloping Russian north flank, Aug, 1914. 130,132. Translator 's Notes. 5.

Intelligence. Faulty evaluation, German Eighth Army, hug, 1914. 132 Sept 8,1914. 186. Propagat ion of false intelligence, discussion. 141. Delayed intelligence, German I Corns, Aug 27,1914. 154. Failure to order reconnaissance, Russian Commander in Chief on the Northwest Front, Aug, 1914. 145 Faulty decision as result of faulty intelligence, Russian Second Army, Aug 26,1914. 147. Cerman Eighth Amy, orders to 3d Res Div, Aug 27,1914 151. Orders to 5th Landwehr Brig, and 2d Div, Aug 27,1914. 153. Failure to take advantage of situation because of faulty intelligence, Russian ,Second Amy, Aug, 1914. 150,152, 156. German Eighth Army, Aug 11,1914. 192,194. Radio interce~ts,Russian messages, Aug, 1914. 147-

Essent ial elements of enemy information, hypothetical estimate by an army group c ommand er . 169.

Estimate of the Situation* l3y army group commander (~fypothetical). 167. By German Eighth Amy, concerning Russian frontal attack on the line of the lakes, Aug, 1914. 132.

TL The army group comander?~act ions, orders, and mode of transportation, discussion. 165 et seq.

TSF. Attacks. Frontal at tack prevented by danger of counter flank attack. German Bd Res Div, hug 26, 1914 German 41st Div, Aug 28, 1914. Frontal vs flank, discussion. Forces allotted to frontal and flank, German Eighth Army, Se~t,1914.

Close envelopment, German Eighth Army, Sept, 1914. Flank at tack by German 2d Div, Aug 20, 1914. Wide flank attack to avoid danger of counter flank attack, German I Corps, 4ug 25-27,1914. Relation of frontal attack, flank attack, and reserves, discussion. Disgersion, excessive, German Eighth Army, Au~20, 1914. 133. Russian Seccnd Amy, Aug, 1914. 146. Feints and strategems, discussion* 137-138, 141. Feigned defense, German Eighth &my, Bug, 1914. 131. Radio broadcast to deceive enemy, German Eighth Army, Sept, 1914. 183

Fort ificat ions; strategic effect of KBnigs- berg, Aug, 1914. 145 Freedom of maneuver, discussion. 137 German situation on southern front of East Prussia, Bug 24,1914. 145. Restricted by details prescribed too far in advance, German I Corps, Aug 20, 1914. 142. Main effort. (See also wTSP - Unity". ) . German XVII Corps too weak for its task, Aug 20, 1914. 133. Hypothetical attack by German Eighth Army via Nordenburg - Ldtzen, after Aug 20, 1914. 139-140. Pursuit. Failure to pursue, Russian First Amy, Aug 20, 1914. 134,143, 145,160. Decision to pursue, discussion 166. German Eighth Amy, Sept 10,1914. 189-191. Extent of pursuit, discussion. 176. Conduct of pursuit, German Zighth Amy, Bug 28,1914 and thereafter . 158 et seq. Strategy of Tannenberg, discussion. 164-165 Unity. Arbitrary conduct, German I Corps, Aug 10-17,1914. 127 et seq, 132. Au~25, 1914. 147-149 Failure of Russian First and Second Armies to cooperate, Aug, 1914. 145, 160- 161. Detachments from Russian Second Army, Aug, 1914. 145-146, 153,156. German Eighth Army, Aug, 1914. 149-151, 153,154, 155,157, 159. Sept, 1914. 180,185, 186,187, 1881192- 193. German and Austro-Hungarian forces on the eastern front, 1914, dis- cuss ion. 166. Allotment of forces to offensive and defensive missions, German Eighth Army, Aug 17-20,1914. 131- Signal Corps. Radio messages intercepted by German Eighth Army, Aug, 1914. 147. Radio unavailable, Russian Second Army, Bug 28, 1914. 156. Radio messages broadcast to mislead enemy by German Eighth Army, Gept, 1914. 183. Faulty c ommunicat ions, German Eighth Army, Aug 28,1914. 159. Cavalry. Failure of Russian First Army to use available cavalry for pursuit, Bug 20,1914. 166. Artillery . ~f?ectof flanking fire, situation near Hohenstein, Bug 28, 1914. 157. Intervention by fire, situation near Neidenburg, hug 30,1914. 164. Defensive fires by Russians opposing German XX Cogps, Se?t 9, 1914. 186. THE TEST19MENT OF COUMT SCHLIEFm

World War Strategic stud lie^ by Wilhelm Greener, Lieutenant-General, Retired,

With 2 plates and 22 three-color sketohes from drafts by Major-General Flaiaehlen.

E,S.Mittler Q Son - Berlin 1927 A11 rightd under the law or June 19, 1901, reserved, including that or translation.

IN mORY OF FIELD MARSHAL COUNT ALFRED SCHLIZPEN --- Foreword ( omitted)

Contents (extract) ** **

9, Stal1upC)nela an8 Grrmbinnen Page 127, 10. The Victory of Tannenburg 144 11, At the Nfasurian Lakes 173. ** ** --- List of Diagrams and Sketches (omitted)

-*- Plates 1. Bust of Count Schlieffen Title page. 2, Count Schlieffen as a Knight of the 3lack Eagle Facing page

4. --- Bibliography (omitted) Page 127. Stallupenen and Gumbinnen . See Sketches 14 and 15.

Arbitrary General von Francois, Commanding General of the I conduct of Corps sinee 1913, believed that a new note would have the Command- to be introduced into the defense of East Prussia. He ing General, considered himself the appointed guardian of that region I Corps. against Russian inroads and "had, moreover, chosen the Sketch 14. worthy objective, in sgite of the great extent of the border, of repulsing the Rtkssians there. Accordingly he wished to come to grips with the opponent wherever the latltei showed himself; where possible, to seek him in his om c~untry.'~(National Archives). He found support for this idea, too, in the instructions for the strategic deployment which, in agreement with his own impulse, expressly recommended "short offensive raids" across the border. We find no such counsels anywhere in the writings of Count Schlieffen. The latter was con- cerned neither with temporary successes nor with the security of the border. His aim was to destroy the enemy invading East Prussia in one campaign. Everything else was to be subordinated to this end. The Corps bommander, on the other hand, was eager to display his own spirit of entdfprise and the valor of his troops out standfngly and at the -earliest possible moment Be- sides, he e~edited Eighth Army Headquarters with very little taste for adventure and honed by his own resolute- mess to be able to drag the reluctant army headquarters with him. Certainly it was the corps commander's right to uphold the point of view suited to his character and convictions. On the other hand, it was the duty of Amy Beadquarters to insure that the strategic plan was not frustrated by the self asse~tionof a subordinate leader. indeed, the army commander did, on August loth, "absolute- ly"- forbid any advcnce beyond the line: Gumbinnen - Goldap until further orders; he neglected, however, to initiate his subordinate commanders into his plans. In cansequence, the prohibit ion made no special impression on General von Francois. The generalWbeganto push forward his whole corps to the line: Goldap - Stallupdn- en for the protection of' the border. He kept back only one infantry regiment and artillery as a main body. The advance of the corps was not reported to Army Head- Page 128. quarters and became known there in its full extent only on August 17th." (National Archives). Overlooking the corps commanderts disobedience, the method of procedure was unfortunate. This 'corps could not cope single handea with the Niemen Army. Even after a successful engagement, it would have been necessary either to withdraw it without delay or for %he army comander to corn- mit his remaining forces to the rescue of the single corps. The plan of the army commander might easily have been wrecked in this way. Things would have been essent- ially different if the army comander and the corps commander had been in agreement on the plan to strike the Niemen Army with a prompt at tack immediately after it crossed the border. Even then the I Corps should not have acted alone; the attack ought to have been under- taken with a coordination of the strongest possible forces. To have obtained the requisite railway transport would have presented no difficulties; the transport used for the strategic deployment, and still underway, could have been diverted for this purpose. The military railway authorit$&s had been accustomed to such contingen- cies in time of peace. While the 1st Cavalry Division and the I Corps formed a screen near the border between the Rominte Forest and the Nieman, there could be assembled behind it by August 15th: The XBII Corps, with the RBnigsberg General Res- erve, near Gumb innen, The XX Carps near Walterkehmen, The I Reserve Corps north of Goldap, The 36 Reserve Division near Goldap, for the see- urity of the right flank. If the advanoe had been initiated on the 16th between the Rominte Forest and the Gumbinnen - Stoll- up8nsn Highway, the Russians would have been encountered on the 17th or 18th on the line: Wischtynez - Stallup6nen; that is to say, the engagement of the I Corps would have developed into battle by the whole army, with the conaeivable result that the Russians south of Stallupbnen would have been beaten while to the north thereof the German left would have been strong enough to ward pff the envelopment by the Russian right flank whioh threatened it. The outcome would probably have bean a bending baek of the front on the pivot of StallupUnen; the Germans might Bave gained a front facing more and more to the north and by keeping up the utmost pressure with &he victorious right wing might have looked forwar8 to driving the Russians against the Nieman. The threat to the Ger- man right from the south would not have become effeat- ive; because of the distance, in time to jeopardize ssueeess in the north. Essential to this end, however, would have been timely decision and firm control by Page 129. the Army Headouarters. It would have been necessary to make the attack on the chance of success; if it had been delayed for news that the Russians were stopped, it would have occurred too late. Many might be inclined to call such an offensive, into a wasp- nest, imprudent. Certainly it would have been no more so than the independent advance of the I Corps, leading iaevh%akly to withdrawal. If the entire army had been employed instead of the single corps, greater results might have been won by the gable. The plan of The Commanding General of the I Corps was lucky in his independence, lor no hard and fast plan yet the Commander, 1), existed in Army Headquarters and on August 14th the -5n-ehfef of transgortation of the XgII Corps was ordered from the ;he Eighth, southern front of East Prussia, where it had first Amy been placed in readiness near Deutsch Zylau, to the Sketch 14. vicinity of Insterburg. Thereby the general direction of the maneuver against the Nieman Army was revealed; the I Corps, incidentally, had found the necessary support for any eventuality. On August 17th, when the Russians initiated their advance on the

whole front from Suwalki *o Schillehnen and contaet occurred with the I Corps near Stallup&nen, the I Reserve Corps was near Angerburg, the XVII Corps on the railway, the 3d Reserve Division near LUtzen, the Kanigsberg General Reserve near Insterburg, the XX Corps near Ortelsburg; disregard ing Landwehr and depot troops pertaining to the fortif ications between Thorn and Neidenburg, on the line of the lakes, and near Tilsit. The Russian advance from the Narew had not yet heen discovered. Since the 14th of August, Army Headquarters had decided to try conclusions first with the Mieman Army. With this in view, the 3d Reserve Division with a Landwehr brigade was to hold the line of the lakes against the Russian frontal attack which was expected there, while the main forces were placed i~ readiness to the north thereof in readiness for the enveloping attack against the Russian right flank, as follows: The I Reserve Corps, near Angerburg,

The XgII Corps near Darkehmen whence its transportation could be routed further, partly by way of Instsrburg, The I Corps near Cumbinnen and Insterburg, The Kanigsberg General Reserve echeloned to the left near Insterburg. The formation could be completed by August 18th. wgilhile the possibility yet existed of re-arranging it in case of need, nevertheless it was &isposed directly in line with the expected advance of the Russian mass south of the Rominte Forest. It was less well adapted to an inclination further to the north of the Russian north flank or an extension thereof by newly arriving reinforcements. (National Archives) . On August 17th, Eighth Army Headquarters learned that the Russian north wing, consisting of four or five corps, extended to Wirballen; on the 18th, that it reached beyond Schir- windt. Thus, aside from the faot that the Russians first crossed the border on the 17th instead of on the 14th as the Germans supqosed, the situation was radic- ally altered "with respect to space and timew. had become doubtful whether the envelo~nentof the Russian north flank might now be accomplished and whether there would be time enough to reaeh a decision with the Nieman Army before the advance of the Marew Army mad.e that impossible. To what extent the Army Headquarters was then aware of this change in the situation cannot now be determined. At least its decisions, as far as known, were not influenced thereby. (National Archives ). Study: En- On the evening of the 17th, after the engagement selopment of near Stallupthen, what still could be done by the Bsaz-

p, 8,,r;* , 8< ;<# r the Russian mm4b~-fn-@hi:ef in spite of the change .in the situation? north flank, It was natural to think of concentrating the army to- Sketeh 14. ward one flmk. Hight the independent action of the. I dorps, by this means, be turned to the amnyts account after all by gaining the for and screening a redispos- ition of the forces? But where were the forces to be concentrated; toward the north or south, toward the left or right flank? Heretofore, Army Headquarters had foeused all its batention on an envelopment of the , Russian north flank; a sudden reorientation for an envelopment of the south flank could not be expeetea of it. Moreover the distance was too great to permit a timely massing of th6 forces east of L6tzen and near Angerburg. It was best, therefore, for Army Headquarters to hold to its original ~once~tionof enveloping the Russiamn north flank and concern itself only with in- suring that there was no lack of strength for this purpose. The disposition of the army on the evening of August 17th was not suitable for an envelopment in the north; besides, if the XVII Corps rnnd the I Reserve Corps were moved closer to the I Corps on the line: Daxkehmen - Gabinnen, there could be no certhinty of being superior to the Russians at any point. Apparantly a way out presented itself, however: it was possible to make a left turn with all available units and move at once to the north in order to plaie strong forces in readiness for an attack north of the Insterburg - Gw- binnen highway. The German right wing would be obliged

to give Bp all thought of the attack and dig in behind the Angerapp. There it might let the Russians come. The marches were to be conducted by night and sd rsgul- ated as to be prepared for a change of direction to the east on the 19th or even on the 18th i@case the enmy attacked sooner than was expected. The last elements of the eombat troops of the XVII Corps, re- lieved fLlsm border secu~ity,were on hand on the Page 131, evening of the 18th. A German attack north of Gumbin- nsn ~ouldnot possibly be carried out before the ZOth, perhaps not before the 218%; in any ease, not until the Russiag advance, had been stopped. The I Corps I '<' {oi: had to Bake up the--.$ ~ a tn+Ey and withdraw on Gumb innen. It was possible to have ready on the evening of the 19th: %he 3d Reserve Division near Darkehmen, The I Reserve Corps with one division near Hemmersdorf, the other northwest of Gumbinnen, The Kdnigsberg General Rsserve between Nemersdorf and Gumb innen, The XVII Corps near Mallwisdhken and Kraup- isehken, This corps might have been detrained east and north of Insterburg, nearer the eoncentration area. In %his way, there were available for: the attack north of Gumbinnen: the whole XVII Corps, one division ~f the I Reserve Corps, and a part sf the I Corps to be taken at the right time from the front in the region north ef Gumbinnen, as well as the 1st Cavalry Div- ision. Two divisions held the Darkehmen - Gumbinnen front; (one division of the I ~eslerveCorps and the 3d Reserve ~ivision); beyond them were the KUnigtsberg General Reserve and part of the I Corps. The weak place was the right flank near Darkehmen which might have been enveloped by the Russians as soon as they ob- served that the Angerapp was-not defended between Dar- kehmen and Mauer Lake. Orders were given to keep up the appearance of a defense there. It was also possible to hove, if not the whole XX Corps, at least one division of it from the southern front of East Prussia toward Angerburg, where the first troop trains arrived on the 19th. In this way Army Headquarters would have dbne everything possible to insure the execution of its plan. If the Russians, who were exvected to continue the advance against the line: Mallwischken - Gumbinnen - Angerapp, hesitated about their attack, nothing remained far the German Headquarters but to attack,itself by the 21st at the latest and that, on the whole front. It was only necessary for the right flank to hold back somewhat and take care not to run into a hostil'e envelop- asent. Aside from the fact that the Russians might have interrupted the p~o~osedchange of formation prematurely, the plan, on the faee of it, was not satisfactory because of the division of strength into offensive and defensive halves and the destruction of tactical unity. Clear channels of command, too, are factors in success. Certainly it would have been better if the three acti~e corps oould have been placed north of Cumbinnen and the reserve troops to the south. But both time and railroads were lacking for that; such a deployment could only have been ao~omplishedby earlier action. The t,, ,, 1 Page 132. danger that the front might be breached in the ~Qddle could be met by reserves at the threatened point. Today we know that the plan would have sueceeded. Solution The National Archives have shorn how Amy Headquar- according to ters came to^ the opinion that the Russiam Nieman Army Count wmld attack with its principal forces south of the Sohlieffen's Rominte Forest against $he line:@ the lakes. But these ideas. are still reasons for wondering why the safe conclusion was not deduoed f'ram the Russian railway' situation that in any'case strong Russsian forces would approach froa Wirballen and, further, why it was taken for granted that the Russians chose to force the line of the lakes fro$tally. According to all military rules, that was

, unlikely. The idea of thereby being closer to the Narew Army and cooperating directly with it can soarcely elaim serious attention for in that case the Russian maneuver would no doubt have had a different aspect from the beginning. Under such circumstances %he advance of a stronger Narew Amy preswiably would have preceded that of the Wieman Army an% the latter, echeloned to the right rear for the seclirity sf the flank and rear of the Narew Apmy wanld have had every reason for holding back its right flank, whether it might be at Lyck or Markgrabdwa, at least until the Marew Army orossed the German border. In fact, the Russian advance oceurred exactly to fit the solution in Caunt SchlieBf- en1s mind. He would have respond@&by sending the XVII Corps on August 14th not to the vicinity of Insterburg but towara Rastenburg and by bringing the XX Corps by marching, toward Rhein. Thus three and one-half oorps would have been favorably disposed to attack the left flank of the Nieman Army east of the lakes. But above all it would have been made $lear to the I Corps that it was not to dance any special numbers but to fit itself into the strategic plan by withdrawing before the Russian advance on a broad front until behind the Angerapp. Where the Russian gig left flank was weak south of the Rominte Forest, the German attack could have been made fro= the line: LOtzen - Angerburg with more than double superiority of strength an4 the ~wiita- /*lab ,$, , /t- -pe-%g~~would in all probability have resultea in driving the whole Russian to the north against the Niemaa. The fortune of war stretched out its hand to the Germans; Army Readquarters did not understand how

to grasp it;. Progress of How let us consider how affairs develoned after the cam~aign August 17th. We find Amy Headquarters uncertain about after August attacking. Sinee the Russians did not pursue after the 17, 1914. engagement at Stallupthen, the I Corps succeeded in Sketch 14. again establishing its fron* east of Gwnbinnen and in placing the 28 Infantry Division as a reserve behind the expo'sed left flank. On the 18th, Army Headquarters Page 133. was willing for the Russians to attack along the Anger- aqp but they did not appear, as they were resuming the advanoe, espec ially near Stallug8aen, only slowly. Neither did a Russian attack occur on the 19th. Mean- while the Russian Narew Army had completed its de~loy- ment and it began the advance toward the Geman border. It was therefore time for the Germans to have recourse to the offensive near Gmbinnen. Eighth Army Head- quarters couated on a strong hostile force near Gumbin-

nsn whiah appeared to be separated from the hostile 601- umns atlvmcing farther to the south. It was impracticable to remain in the present formation, for the advanced I Corps was threatened with a double envelopment. It was neoessary either to withdraw the I Corps or to attack with the army. In this predicament Army Headquarters was made aware that it had not adopt& a decisive plan early enough. On the afternoon of the 19th, ~enerilvon Prittwitz decided to attack on the 20th. An advanoe of the XVII Corps by way of' Walterkehrnen promised to be especially effective against the envelopment threatening the 1 Corm from the south. Security of Dhe right flank fell automatical1.y to the lot of the I Reserve Corps and the 38 Reserve Division through an advanee in echelon in a northeasterly direction, the 3d Reserve Division on Goldap, the I Reserve Corps on Gawaiten, northwest sf Goldap. The XVII Corps was to effect the decision. The attaok of this corps failed, since the troops, even before the attack, w&~pready to drop with fatigue as a result of severe marehea. Also the development of the corps for the attaak manifestly was not attended to 1 with suffiafent calmness and thoroughness. The exterior left column was soon drawn to the north by the insist- ence sf the I Corps while the sther columns encountered hostile forces of strength equal to their own. A certain impatienae to attack in order to relieve the I Corns as soon as possible apnears to have prevailea, too. Looking back, it can be said that Amy Headquarters had allowed the concentration of the army to be delayed about one day too long; further, that the decisive attack by way of Walterkehmen required strong forces / 1 . whk~e-zone division of the I Reserve Corps should have been attaahed at the proper time to the XVII Corps; and, thirdly, that the attack itself should have been better organized. Nothing muah could have apgroached from the direction of Galdap in view of the Russian distribution of strength. If the Russian forces there moved at once to the north in order to enter the battle south of Guinbinnen, it would have been possible to take them in rear provided the other division of the I Reserve Corps and the 3d Reserve Division were not too far away. The chief danger to the Germans lay in ex- esssive dispersion; it did not turn out to be disaster- ous because when the XVII Corps began to give way the

Page 134 Russians did not bring it to complete collapse by Wv-p'T fp pursuit. The eorps, oonsequently, was able to rs~rganize behind the Rominte Forest. Northwest of Goldap the I Reserve Corps, engage8 in marching to the northeast toward the battle field of the XVII Corps, was suddenly attacked from the direction of Goldap bpt succeeded in repulsing the Russians. The 36 Reserve Division was still too far away to be able to participate in this eombat . In the vicinity of the I Corps, the 2d Infantry Division, by a wiae envelopment, struck the Russian right flank north of Brfallwischken in a most telliqg direction an8 threw it back. The left flank of the lrert Division which7with its front toward the northThad been in positian adjacent to the 2d, with a wheel to the rigbt joined in the attack of the 26 Division but; suffered a regulse. On the front east of Gurnbinnen,part of the 1st Infahtrg Division and the K8nigsberg General Reserve held their ground unshaken; indeed an attempted attaok along the Gumbinnen - Stallupenen Highway was frustrated. On the- whole, the combat had gone favorably with the I Corps until afternoon; gradually, however, the force of the attaok-even of the 2d Infantry

Division,1 was spent. The Comand ing General theref ore refrained fro= pushing the attack further and at about four o'clock in the afternoon ordered a cessation of fighting for his corps. The 1st Cavalry Division was pushed to Pillkallen, far to the enemy's rear. The superior Russian cavalry apter its lack of success against the 1st Cavalry Divisian on the 19th, had remained away from the battle field on the 20th and was located in %he region southwest sf Rautenburg (along the Tilsit - Pillkallen road). Nothing was known of this nor of the whereabouts sf the 1st Cavalry Division by Arw Headquarters when it was faced with the necess- ity for decision as to whether the attack &~dldbe resumea on the 21st. The -prospects for such action were not unfavorable, either on the north flank, with respect to the I Corys, nor on the south, with respect to the I Reserve Corps and 3d Reserve Division. It was true that the WTTII Corps had suffered considerable damage. There was little doubt that the Rus- sians had been placed in a bad situation by the con- verging advance of the two German flanks. But the commander of the Eighth Army saw matters differently. The news from the south front of East Prussia sounded ominous. The a&vance of the Narew Amy - five corps and a cavalry division - was in full progress, and with its left flank inclining much farther out toward the Vistula than had been expected. The XX Corps a.nd fortress troops were too weak to keep the Page 135. Warew Arw back, even though Headquarters XX Corps was not counting on any support but cherished the hope, nWe will hold here, without doubt. Victory at Gumbinnen would furnish the key to the situation. The army commander and his chief of staff aoubted the possibility of such a victory but the deputy chief of staff, the senior general staff officer, and the Com- manding General, I Corps, were i@favor of continuing the attack. In this psychological moment, the resolu- tion of the army commander and of his ehief of staff was shaken by the admonition of General von Moltke, not to risk the existance of the army. "The ability to base the army on the Vistula was placed in question. It might have been driven toward KOnig~berg.~There- fore it seemed to be high time to break off the struggle at Gumb innen and begin retirement . The army, e ommander was sustained in this opinion by intelligence suggest- ing that an additional oorps had appeared to reinf orse the Harew Amy. The idea that the recbk~%$ag already begun with the Nieman Array ought to be carried through to a final settlement might not havelappealed .- &. ',a< "t,) i with convincing force to the ~oma$&e~-i-n- f and his chief-of-gtaff because, for one thing, they no longer were confident of victory and, for another, were beset with anxie%y abou* being surrounded in East

i J L

in the disaster to the Nieman Army, had advanced until in front of LUtzen ad east of ~ngerbur~.The Faren Army on the 21st had crossed the German border on a wide front between Friedrichahof and Mlawa. The German XX Corps is retiring before it, the 41s% Ilivision on Osterode, the 37th on Allenstein; the fortress troops withdrawing behind the Drewenz. The I and DII Corps, I Reserve Coras, and 34 Reserve Division are free by "J dJ , this time to move against the Narew Army but are in urgent need of reeO after the exertions of the preced- ing days. To require strenuous marehea, of the troops so soon again is not to be thought of. If the Narew Army continues to advance towar4 East Prussia, haste is not necessary; the further the Narew Army, west of the ehain of lakes, moves to the north, the more favorable the strategio situation will become for the Germans. That the Narew Argr will choose a direo'tion toward the lower Vfstula is quite inprobable. Rather is it to be

expected that, impresses by the disaster to the Niemen Army, it will halt and wait for reinforcements. xf it does so, it will properly ohooss an area suitable for 'i defense and endeavor to find support in# points for its flanks. Sp2fding Lake, with the small lakes grouped about it, is available for the right flank; as a rest- ing plaee for the left flank, there are numerous favorable localities in the lake district on both siaes of the 09erland Canal. To be sure, the threat to the flanks and rear from the direction of the Vistula still exists. An echelonment of sBrong forces to the left is necessary an that account. Since the front from Spird- ing Lake to Delhtsch Eylau measures 140 kilometres, it can safely be assumed that the mass of the Narew Army will be concentrated either in the eastern area, perhaps in the region of Ortelsburg - Hohenstein, or in the west between Hohenstein and Deutseh Eylau. If the Russians feel strong enough to resae the offensive, they can either keep close to the Masurian Lakes and advance against the line: Rastenburg - Heilsburg or adopt a more westerly direction, with the lef$ flank

d P -p&At&-&r t&& Wormditt. Attack on The German Eighth Army must seek out the Nares the left Army after the victory over the Nieman Army in order to flank of the defeat it also. If it is accepted as the German estimate Jarew Army that the Narew Army will halt approximately on the line: Spirding Lake - peutsch Eglau, the idea suggests itself of sending the mass of the Eighth Army by rail via Marienburg and partly to the left of the Vistula Via Stras- via Graudenz to the line: Briesen - Riesenburg for an burg - Deutsch attack against the line: Strasburg - Deutsch Eylau. Eylau. It will scarcely be possible in this way to inflict a Sketch 15 a. destructive defeat on the Russians. The Russians will withdraw their left flank on Gilgenburg and Lautenburg and the Germans will be unable to prevent their retirement toward the easO. This pharn perhaps resembles the conception which emerged in the headquarters of the Eighth Amy afier combat was broken off at Gumbin- nen, exce~tthat there clearness as to method was lacking. If it is doubtf'ul whether the left flank of the Marew Army can be envelopetl even in this way if it Page 137. 4tands fast, suoh a thing is not to be expected at all Via Bischof's- if an attack is made frm the line: Bischofswerder - jrder - Deutsch Eylau - Osterode. In this ea$e the additional Deutsch Eylau difficulty must be considered that the lake and wood I- - Osterode. covered terrain on both sides of the Oyerland Canal Sketch 15 b. does not favor a coordinated attack. If the Narew Amy continues its advance with &he left flank east of t, the Olerland Canal, a German offensive west thereof, with a strow turning movement toward the east, can of eourse accomplish important results if it succeeds in so reversing the front that the Russians will be obliged to fight with their baeks toward the fortified line of the Masurian Lakes. Whether they will pea&## that to hap~enor will retire in time toward the south cannot be determined. Indeed the farther the Russians - 17 - penetrate toward the north, the more difficult for them will be a change in plan if they learn that they are threatened in flank sr rear* Therefore it will not accord with the German interests to join battle with the Narew Army in the viainity of the southern border of Xast Prussia. The strategic advantage offered by the theatre of operations with its ohain of lakes Ifra the Tistula to the Pregel must not be relinquished. After the Nieman Arq has disappeared fron the field no further danger will exist of the Germans being squeezed from two sides. So it is desirable from the Geman point of view to have the Russians Gross the ehain of lakeo from the south and enter the historic battle ground between Allenstein and Kenigsberg. The Evacuation Germans would do well to avoid hindering the enemy in of the entrance or even to facilitate that by abandoning the southern lake aad woods region west of the Masurian Lakes. A border of somewhat sinilar idea is involved here to the surrend- East Prussia. er of Alsace-Lorraine in the west. Uany will consider it to be extremely difficult, ,sfifnot impracticable, to *seduoew the enemy by strategy into a predetermined course of action such ae, in this instance, beginning his advetnee toward the north* Since, however, exper- iense shows that many blunders are made in war, especially from psychologioal ~easons,one should never in his process of study and decision neglsat to smooth the enemy's way along suoh lines as will bring us strategic advantages* Of course we must guard against building with eonfiaence on the success of such arOi- fices and, in consequence, considering the enemy information with prejudice. As painful as the population must find a oourse of action by which they see broad -otp.ipo of territory abandoned to the enemyf e advance without fighting or with only a pretense of fighting, - 18 - still it would be entirely wrong from the standpoint of strategy to offer resiatanae on sentimental grounds where the surrender of territory In itself insures the possibility of decisive success elsewhere. If we proeeed in our broad discusgion from this assumption, that the XX Corps, in position on the seuth- ern boundary sf East Prussia, will give way before the %?n%~Arm - in what direction we shall see later -, we may not e~pectthe Warew &my to rush after it in haste whether it be east of the Alle en on both sides af that stream. The Russians will restrain themselves very carefully and follow only with hesitation and in this they w%ll not aeserve to be called faint hearted for,they will know well enough that they will be liable to surprise on either side, from the fortified line of the lakes or the fortified line of' the Viatula. They must gain a certain confidence for their advance. On this account nothing would be more bluadering than a Ger- man course of action too easily seen through. If the Germans at first use restraint, the Russians will gain more confidence in their situation. An adroit screening of troop displacements and especially of rail movements can contribute greatly to success. Landwehr and Landkturm troops belong in such cases not behind but in front and at the head of rail movements. Re-arrange- In order to place the mass of the German foroes in ment of the position for an attaak against the lefB flank of the German Narew Army, the railroads should be used to the utmost. farces by The cagaaity of the linea and of the entraining and de- ~eansof training facilities was aaequate. Two corps could be Wailways. moved simultaneously from the StallupUnen - Gumbinnen region rith from 24 to 30 trains daily via Kdnigsberg in the direct ion of Marfenburg; another corPs or the 3d Reserve Division from the vicinity of Darkehmen via Insterburg in the direction of Allenstein. With fore- thought and some prearrangement, the movement could be regulated, too, in such a way that on the route through

K8nigsberg the infantry of three corps would be transported ahead while the mounted troops, columns, and trains would march later and be inserted into the movement in accordhnge with tactical needs and the relative foeation of way stations. The method first mentioned would be simple and reliable; by the second, more attention could be given to the comfort of the troops; it would demand, however, a faultless cooperat ion of the military railway authorities and staff authorities. Aceording to a rough calculation - the exact place has no effeet on the transportation-time since the dist-

ances are all short - the concentrat ic;slah oft the principal forces could be accom~lishedwithin a week by means of the railroad. The commencement of the new campaign,

then, using railway transport, WMI not to be counted Page 139. on before August 29th. This would occasion no strategic disadvantage. Advance an If the Warew Army marched north between the Mas- :he front: urian lakes and the Alle, for instance against the line: Wohrun~en- Rastenburg - Heilsburg, the stage could be set for a Womditt - flank attack by an advance of the German forces on the Preuszlsch front: Mohrungen - Womditt - Preuszisch Eylau, But if Xyitau. the enemy turned to the left soon enough he would find Sketch 13 c a favorable position for defense behind the Alle between Allenstein and Schfppenbeil. The left flank of the position would rest, not unfavorably, on the lakes

near Allenstein. If the Geman attack failed, the , danger would impend of being driven against the Frisches Haff. In order to keep the enemy advancing in a north- erly direction, the reinforced XX Corps, to which the 36 Reserve Division could still be transported, wczuld have to retire between the Masurian Lakes and the Alle, ipe~h$:ps on the line: Schip~enbeil- Rastenburg. The German forces then would occupy two lines meeting at right angles and be in position, after stopping the enemy, to envelop one flank or the other. Of course this strategic! plan, aside from &he weakness of the eastern wing, has one disadvantage whieh should not be underestimated: the wide dispersion raises doubt as to whether coordination in the attack is possible. Attack In order to obviate this, to keep the entire aray against the in hand, and to be equal in strength to any possible kight flank development, still another strategie plancomes to of the mind +hioh aims at proceeding by short marches, without Nar ew Army. extensive use of the railroad, against the Narew Amy Sketch 15 d. by the host direct routs, ready at any time to unite the strongest *ossible forces against its right flank. The XX Corps should then retire to the west of the hlle, pephtqp on Wormditt, and attempt to draw the enemy after it. It could be reinforced by the KBnigsberg Geheral Reserve (by rail, toward Heilsburg). In case the RUSS ians changed direct ion, the corps should follow and attack wherever the appbrtunfty occurred to do so without exposing itself to envelonment. If, eon- trary to expectation, the Russians turned toward the , < !! lower Vistula, the cords, continue its withdrawal on Womditt. The fortress troops in position on the southern border of East Prussia would fill baok on Graudenz. &%arch toward The forces in position near Wirballen would move at the line: once, with long m~rches, toward the line: mopdenburg - Ik3rdenbmg - Angerburg - L8t zen. It is not likely that the Ruraicta Angerburg - I1 Corps (see page 135) would be caught by this move- LOtzen. ment. That corps would not wait for the approach of the Germans but would withdraw toward the south in order

th wotect'the right flank and rear 0% the Narew Amy Page 140. either east or west of the lakes. The security of the rear of the Eighth Army against Kovna would be taken over by the 1st Cavalry Division with the 2d Laddwehr Brigade. The 6th Landwehr Brigade would secure the exit from the pass from LItzen toward the west. As the distance from Wirballen to L6tzen totals about 100 kilometres, if allowance is mads Por one rest day and the marches are not to exceed 20 kilometres daily, the line: Nordenburg - LBtzen will scarcely be reached before the 28th. Where will the right flank of the Narew Army be found om this day? That is a serious question that cannot be answered in advance. The ane- wer will only be revealed in the course of the opera- t ion; the German movements must conform to the behav- ior of the enemy. It is conceivable that the Russians will rest their right wing closely on the Masurian Lakes with considerable depth to the formation. In that ease the left flank 'will be weak. But they may, on the

contrary, make their left I&&strong because of the threat from KEJnigsberg. The Germans certainly would find it desirable to be able to provide strong forees on the Maaurian Lakes and south of KUnigsberg as well. It would, indeed, be possible to transport the 36 Res- erve Bivision to the vicinity of Bartenstein but then the eastern wing would scarcely be strong enough for a decisive attack against the hostile right flank. The German left wing must be made as strong as possible if it is to sueced in foreing the Russians westward against the ~idschesHaf'P. The available Gswan forces are clearly too weak to make both flanks strong; the situation must be accepted* In addition there is the likely possibility that one or two Russian columns will advance east of the lakes or that the Russian,:right wing will occupy the line of the lakes and make full use of its advantages for flank protection. mether the Germans in this case will be obliged likewise to employ stronger forces east of the lakes cannot be gre- dieted. Only one point is certain: that where the decision is sought, it is impossible to be $@aoa&:cny enough. Probably it will be better, therefore, not to relinquish the KUnigsberg General Reserve definitely to the support of the XX Corps but to move without delay to the line: Nordenburg - L8tzen with all elements available at Wirballen except the Cavalry Division and a Landwehr brigade, and especially to make strong the columns narching on LBtzen. Also the Gerrnans must guard against lettkng ' their attack separate into two parts respecSively east and westi af the lakes. Let there be abundant regard for Bhe strength of the left flank! Finally, there is also the possibility to be rechned with that the Rarew Army may change direction when it discovers its aanger. In that case the Germans would push forward to the south on both sides of the lakes in order Oo drive the enemy as far as possible from the Harew and force him against the Vistula. Altogether the Germans number five corps against at least six of the Russians without considering that

Russian reinforcements from the upper Tieman and fran ' Bobr could materially alter the situation to the discom- fiture of the Germans. Such gossibilities, however, must not discredit the project of driving the Russians from east to west. The ideal development for the Germans .would result if the Narew Army pushed on to the line: Korschsn - t Mohrungen; in that event the Germans on the line: Wordenburg - Lbtzen would be situated most favorably for attack. But that cannot be depended upon. In case the Narew Army eommits itself at all to a penetra- tion of East Prussia, it will proceed with caution as long as it believes strong German forces to be in the northeastern part of the country. Strategem, in its widest range, shoul: be employed to deoeive and reassure it. The campaign of deception should begin with the abandonment of the southern border and would have to be carried on with just as much foresight and planning as any other operation. Frederick the Great an4 Napoleon were masters of this practice. The former says,-There are so many kinds of strategem that it woula be difficult to specify them all."? Napoleon, by nature, had at his command every expedient of deception. Especially in connection with the maneuver on interior lines would it become of decisive signifieence whether the Russians could be deceived suecesafully.as to our true purposes. The practioal 'conduct of the deceptive maneuver would have to inolutls the propag- t ation of false intelligence; for example, troop trans- ation port/by sea from Pillau, rail transportation toward the west and toward Galicia, undertakings north of the Niernan in hostile territory, and whatever else could be thought of* Even utterly foolish strategems may succeed. Did we not ourselves onee upon a time be- lieve it possible that 80,000 Russians were being transported from Archangle to England!! The int;eibligence was considered seriously at Great Headquarters in spite of its insanity from the viewpoint of transport technique. It did not occur to anyone that the in- telligenae might eoncern eggs, referred to simply as TIRussiansnin a commercial telegram. The idea of a campaign against the right flank of the Narew Army rnay seem reckless to many because it entails operating with a reversed f'ront and risks, if it does not entirely abandon, the line of comunica- tions on Henigsherg. Certainly a retirement behind the Vistula could be assured only by victory. But in spite of all the apprehensions which naturally would arise from the consciousness of being cut off from the Page 142. interior of the country, the German Eighth Amy and its leader caul6 experience sensations of pride and strength in being about to oonsummate an achievement of the highest order in a strategic field which, though small geograghically, would not laok advantageous possibilities. The campaign would in no wise be resk- less after the disappearance of the ??%emanArmy. - Whether or not it would have the suecesg sought for is obviously unpred iotable. It posoesses, however, ' some J P of the characteristics d&ehmake for suocess: it is simple, it can be initiated fro= the positions oceup- ied at the moment by the uhits near Wirballen, it leads direetly toward the hostile flank we wish to attack, its conduct keebs the troops well in hand and makes the mavement readily adaptable to the progress of the enemy. Decision of' Recalling the admonition of General von Moltke, the Commander-. the Commander-in-Chief of' the Eighth Amny is not to be in-Chief of blamed so very mueh if, fron his estimate of the situ- the Xighth ation on the afternoon of August 20th, the faulty eon- Army, on the clusisn was reached to evade by a timely ret iremsnt afternoon of the dmger involved in protracted delay near Gumbinnen. August 20th, The news of this decision burst upon the supreme coa- to retire. mand like a bomb and led to the summary recall of the

i Gemmande~bin-Chief and his chief of staff. In the light of the National Archives, the retirement ought to have been made only if the opponent pushed things more or less to a concdusion; that is to say, if the Mienen Army took up the pursuit without delay and declined to allow itself to be diverted by the fortress of K6nigsberg. Rowever it is hardly fair to form the opinion that Eener- a1 Ton Prittwitz, as early as the evening of' August 20th, had specified withdrawal behind the Vistula as his in- tention. He had no other recourse, however, after he ordered the rail movement of the I Corps from the front to a position behind the stream, as did occur. That was certainly not necessary; the place of detrainment and subsequent movements might have been left unspecified until the head of the transport movement approached the Vistula. There were further grounds for consider-

ing the latter procedure more appropriate; it was impossible to foresee whether the situation of the XX Corps might not require the re-routing of the transport movement from Marienburg on Deutsch Eylau. More- over the possibility of having to fight to accomplish the retirement over the Bistula was not excluded. In that case it would have been far batter to fight with the whole army than with anly a part, which probably would have to be left in the lureh. The first instructions to the XVII Carps, to marah back on the Vistula, Iii "Keeping as fak to the north as possiblew, were at least unfortunate. They might have created the impression that the army was endeavoring to sneak past the Page 143. enemy in some way. If the army commander, because of the general situatioyi. in East Prusrsia, considered retirement behind the Vistula unavoidable, it was prescribed in any ease that strong foroea be assembled near Gasslershausen and Deutsch Eylau for a possible attack on the laft flank of the Narew Army. He was at liberty to emnlay the railroads for this purpose and to transport possibly two eorps, the I and 111, thereto. Two lines, both double tracked and efficient, could be made available at their highest capacity by merely freeing them immediately and ruthlessly of' all other traff ice There could be no lack of rolling stock as the first reauirements were within reach at the time in the Kbnigsberg distrfat and the adjacent districts could produce enough for all requirements. If, later, with the departure of the I Corps, stoppages of traffic did occur which were attributed to the laok of rolling stock, that, like the usual @omplaints in time of peace, involved a confusion of cause aad effect. Be- cause the railroads were not fluid on account of the general evacuation and the congestion by the refugee population, the rolling sOock could not reach the entraining points at the moper time. Whether these were selected in effdtct ive eongruity with the rail situation remains uncertain. Experience not only in the east but in the west in conneetion with the earliest troop movements by rail has shown that cooperation between headquarters staffs and the military railway authorities was hindered by a scanty appreciation an the part of the headquarters of' the essential elements of fluid railway operation. The aim of assuring good cooperation between headquarters staffs and military railway authorities in war by simple studies in time of peaee failed of realization. Who won at Gumbinnen? Certainly not the Russians although they remained masters of the battle field for they used two days in reorganization before they were ready, to cautiously follow the Germans. As they thereby lost contact,, Gurnbfnnen eventually becamepa victory for the Germans.