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Ter 13 - .Xncland Clba2ter 8 - 431o nef'onsivo i:i the :zao-t ChtlL-?tar12 - i?he ~'irm'lting- i3~ Force Ch~i-?ter 13 - .xncland .-7,' -3 .td.,.bts' 14 - :(?ranthe T~Ieuse.to a.e ijeine Chay=;er 15 - l~~heBasic i.,at.rof' ,;&n. :?mi;i t2is one &oul. d zo t get tile idez of' ;1 pine def elis ive on a lofi?; line. !?i?_oCoPLpSe of -t!l~'mrd~;~'f'ri:~; I~.er;zl by :~ay of Ti~or!-l-;;~al;ilu2s far as *:?sche rnolji $2 - about lBOO ki101netcrg ; tj once r?zled ox% sizch a -bhol:,*t. _"here was ::LO o Lier cli~.oicethan to eol:_dmct tile s t~aategicdcf ea.se as -.,Lie>?--- a:; possiSic as an of- fense. The task: ;.Pas made :?ucb easier bzr1 :e .;e~gra:~hic;'ow-is- Lion of 5~eSor?c~, li'oo~1.t440 kiloce ters bctxeewr :';raI;a~?.and enemies were !:resei~t i:i frnlfcia "at Frussia, jach of ';:lese separated fields o-:" oyeratioi? was still large eno~zi:?, esp~3ciall:r tile :as% ?r~.lssi6~n,'3ecause t,ic nl~~b@rof trooys Lfk2r9r~a3not in ratio to t:e size of t._e area os i;':e -,robl@r,l, 111 aaditir)r:to the strength oi" l;~c,i:lstro-:i~~:;ari.m nix?! in ~alicia,natme had providcli excellent lii~osgf defe:~se o,~tl-e ;iliestr ar:c"Lthe +,an fa3tber back, the carpnthians, Gexer:il i2o~xadToil :jotzeirdar%, bee2 siiCer :o ;iti~cutilized t',e riv:;r tuld r~o:axtaiiz positioiis on a ;31rely iicrcrisivs ;;i:~-,and to bold in rotidirisss i? ,!ester11 ,>?i.licia a at 5012y of txloops 7;L~ic;l at :i fa~orabf~nm~lel?t~ol~id 0ve~~~i3ek.i!,l:c ~i~~ssialiTT~;!I. t f?'ii~, the l~iiii!ssi:ins sbo? before ( a2proac 1c.6 j t;IC. f;ar~a%liiaxs. -;ucli d COLJB ti:?-a ttac'; of resod tr~o adva tnges; 1. ?he fli2u.k~no-~2(1 be ros'tcd orz the ",aryatbians a~ctthe :eischsel; 2, Tiere wo 11d bc 3 d,r:iice ~f se:~aratinq the ;;lussiaa am:r fyo:: its co;~Lu!?icntions, "he ddager of an irrviisio- ctf' lil;dzzar:v was 7er:; sLi;&G; tr; Fe s re one ~:~'o~lldhe obliged to sacrifice fertile ~aliciaas a battlefield and I.enberg ~.iustbe left to its fate. Since Sonradrs plm failed X ember: didn?t escape arqrhow. .\ plan of operation of thc two armies had not been agreed upon. The scant exchan~eof letters between Cowad I'oltlre had by no means exha~stedthe possibilities of operation, Tt seems that these tvo men beat around the b~shand avoided the main issues. Conrad because he was rrorried about his oi'censive - Iioltk@ bccatlse iie fcared that his pLsn in the yest mil.-ht be disturbed, i;lso, the P~rrnansfeared timt t'r~e plan mi~htnot be kept a secret. Conrad desired all earl:. r:eman offensive a airist the ijarerv to sup13ort his otm of'eusivc arid '-oltke n$~reed,d- though its feasi~ilitymas do~lb.tf-ilrrikh tlio forces at his COIL- nand, f oltliey S nain task was to protect 'ast I'russia without rislriil:; the ex3 sterice of his: amy, :'ever'thelc ss he co:~;aiided aii at$ac!: as t'-e solutiou. The arrage~ientsfor the attack were left to tho ?ori~-~ander-in-ChiefaP the 8th - General- oberst von :>rittauitz. 7on.e years beforo, ~fllcn@2unt zcklieff eil v33 chief of %:a ;enera1 staff, aad Cgdrmt ialdersee l.~.las still alive, the latter tms chosexi to be 5.~13.Connxander in the dast bccasse "craiuin; md adaptability made him especially fjtted for the psition, 1:eaneral von grittwitz !lad eiven no pro~f of strategi.~ability during peace tipliies - his activities lzad been dong 1-ines nhich had nothisg to do vith leadirlg an array. But that fact need not have caused any tror~ble,because Count schlisffen, ia years Cf study, had discovered a way to conduct the offensive in 2ast Prussia even al:ainst superior forces; his opinions mse available to the general. staff. Therc was scarcely one officer of the staff wile had not, in peace tiiilest, stildied +die problem. of the active defense of East prussia . Count schlief feu?s final report in 1898, smed up the result of' all the studies along these lines. ;;litbout going into details, we will consider the main points. Count schlieffen divides into four groups the ~ussianforces destined to attack 3asL Prussia; on the right wing by way of Tilsit 2 corps md 1 cavalry clivisi on, by way of 'yilkomi schki-suwalki 4 corps and 2 cavalry divisions, fmm the region northwards from ~jslostok2 corps ad 1 Cavdry division, from. !larsav by way of EJf%r@3W4 aorps, Reserve divisions to be fomled at Dunaburg and ;iilna, 'Thus develops the plan of tho surround in^ of 3ast Prussia i~athe Eorthj zast eubd south, so the space reniaias only toward the Baltic Sea and along the lower stretch of the .treichsel. The German forces, at first 8 divisions of infantry and 3 of B!ap cavalry, soon strengthened by 9 niore di~lsionsof infantry and 1'5 -a 1 of cavalry, are at the confluence of the iiussian streams (of soldiers) so that it would seem that they (the "vemazls) can not escape being surmunded in case they accept battle near the bor- der, The superiority of the Russian forces i~considerable although not so great as in 1914. Bow vas the situation to be judged? Lot us listen to G~unt~chlieffon: '+The C~rmanArmy, threatened on three sides, can do nothing bettar than attack and defeat; the noarest enemy and then turn against the other two. The victory must, however, be a decisive om. If the Cemms are detained Lrl doubtful battles by the ont@Russian Amy, the others will have time to Bttack 011 flaak and rear and crush ( the Gemeuls) by superior numbers, If, therefore, the Geman comander does not tniuk that he can win a complete victory, tllilan he does well to withdraw beyond the -:~eischseland give ug the fulf illmnt of his task, TO achieve a decisive victory over the riearest enemy ( the axmy corgs approaching from :irilkowisclaki and ~uivdki)as marl.rr troops as possible must be 11rough.t rl-p anCi so quickltr asseabled that interference by the arrnie s from Bjelostok aizd 'jarsaw will be i!!possible, gll of the forces on the ri&t bank of the 7:eischsel incl~udingthe min reserve f roa xonigsberg, could be axerabled with the ex- ception of the reserve divisions in Osterode, Deutsch-mlau attd Soldau which mere too far away fror~t_:e pros~ectivefield of battle, md a cavalry division which must remain at the sctuth border as a rear guard. sir~cetile an,y; from Bjelestok, could arrive izi 4 to 6 marches jdepen~iin~;on the route talcen), there was no tira to lose, perhaps there might be uncertainty as to which was the rlearest enmy. But it seemed certair~that the clioice lay between a quick op~ratiori.an Interior lines or the retreat to tho lYaichso1 - this seemcd true at the eime of' the peach problerl of' 1898 as tiell as in the war-ti?= problem of 1914. The history of wars reveals to us few cases of suc- cessful operations dorig the interior lines. Napoleon was a master at ti~atbut i~evertheless,he lost his crown ar~dhis free- d~:, during such m operation. It folloxs that it is very dif- ficult Lo defeat decisively a superior e::eqy force when threat- ened OIL three sides, AE ordinary victory, i,e., a rroutal victory is not; sufficient to save the maller army from beiug surrounded. On the otherhand, tile enemy xi11 ie at pains to protect his ol;rn flanks. The averaze general will withdraw in such a case after a froztal attack in which he endeavors to defeat or detain the enemy, Therefore one cax scarcely re- proach Ton T1rittwifz f or consideztir.tg a retreat behind tile :eich- sel. 3e~roachis due those who chose hin for oz~cof tize hardest tasks er~counteredin warfare ii: spite sf tile objections of the Chief of t+,e ;enera1 Staff. lior did tilo first march along the herder ;rake tl~ingseasier for thc conztander; at the head of tile "irst myCorps was a personality m'ilose peculiarity mnife~ted itself in striving for an independence ~ktichwould develop i,;to insubordination unlsss checked by a firm leader, Such a nil1 was necessary for the operation alone interior lines during which not several minds.must direct, but one mind. The mind was "cat of Comt schlieffen who at tile time of the operations was rotti~igin the ground. How did he plan the operatioris as he norked out the pmblern iu l898? A flank attaclr fror3 Konigsberg, crossiug the ~eirie, could have great effect, If, however, tric encay ri@t flank swerved toimrd tl,e few crossings (bridges) tken tihe operation would be liiade iii~possibl@. If, after passing by the nort:iern point of the "asurian lakes, the nussians continued their ad- vance westward, then one xni@t hope for grcater success if one attacked f ran nasterlburg the enemy left flank. But tritis by no means iniprobable that the enemy will march tovards Allen- stein to seek out enemy forces as ?{ell as to draw closer to its auxiliary amies.
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