rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 13/07 ddigestigest

Analysis

Russia and Georgia After Empire By Erik R. Scott, Berkeley, California

Summary Th e present crisis between Russia and Georgia can best be understood by looking at the divergent views these two nations have taken of the Soviet past. Th e author examines the crisis as a post-imperial dilemma, in which tensions run high as both sides struggle to deal with the complicated legacy of a peculiar Soviet empire. Th e article stresses the role of historical memory of the Soviet past, which is present in the minds of actors on both sides of the confl ict and indeed informs many of the actions that have been taken thus far.

Th e Legacy of Empire the Georgians occupied a special place in the Soviet lthough it was avowedly anti-imperialist, many family. Th e memory of this former intimacy colors the Ahistorians now consider the Soviet Union to have current crisis in relations between the two nations, a been a peculiar form of empire. Th e term is not simply post-imperial predicament in which the strong links used in a pejorative sense (as it was when U.S. Presi- of the Soviet empire are painfully but decisively being dent Ronald Reagan referred to the Soviet Union as severed even as a resurgent Russia attempts to project an “evil empire”), but meant to denote a vast, multi- its infl uence in Georgia and combat what it sees as the ethnic polity whose boundaries roughly ran along the pernicious advances of the United States and NATO same lines as those of the Russian Empire that pre- in the region. Th e present crisis, which has involved ceded it, ruled by an exceedingly hierarchical system increasingly bellicose rhetoric, a severing of economic in which the most important political and economic and diplomatic ties, and heightened tensions sur- choices of its constituent republics were decided in rounding the unresolved confl icts in Abkhazia and Moscow. Unlike other empires, the ethnic character South Ossetia, has occasioned not only a revisiting of of the Soviet Union’s hierarchy was highly ambigu- the Soviet past in both Russia and Georgia but has ous. While central institutions were based in Russia drawn on a predominantly Soviet-era script as it has and Russian was the empire’s lingua franca, the So- unfolded. viet Union’s elite was multiethnic, with membership in the Communist Party arguably counting for more Historical Memory and Present Russian- than ethnic background. And so it was that the Soviet Georgian Tensions Union, a multiethnic empire unifi ed by powerful po- he present crisis between Russia and Georgia can litical, economic, and cultural institutions subjugated Tbe better understood by looking at the divergent to and centered in Moscow, was ruled for decades by a views these two nations have taken of the Soviet past, Georgian, Joseph Stalin. with resentment at past hierarchies and perceived in- When it existed, the Soviet Union was described justices prevalent in the Georgian post-imperial pe- in offi cial rhetoric as a family of nations linked by riphery even as nostalgia for the Soviet Union seems bonds of friendship as well as by political unity. Each to be growing in the Russian post-imperial center. In nation had its own characteristics and its own set of May 2006, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ascribed roles, which made the total of the Soviet fam- attracted international attention when he attended the ily greater than the sum of its parts. While the demise opening of the new Museum of Soviet Occupation in of the Soviet state occurred over 15 years ago, the di- Tbilisi. While the museum’s focus is on the Soviet vorce proceedings of the now separated Soviet family repression of the independent Georgian state which are still underway, as longstanding political and cul- existed from 1918 until the Red Army’s invasion in tural ties, fraught with emotional as well as economic 1921, the term “occupation” in the museum’s name meaning, are disentangled, and roles renegotiated. As emphasizes the subjugation of Georgia to Soviet pow- fellow Orthodox Christians in the predominantly er in a larger sense, an injustice that perhaps stretched Muslim Caucasus, as prominent Soviet political lead- through the entire Soviet period and one that some ers, and as entertainers famous among Russians for Georgians see contemporary Russia as attempting to their food and song, hailing from a southern land with perpetuate. Th e museum’s opening attracted scorn near mythical status as a Mecca for Soviet tourism, and ridicule in the Russian press, and was directly 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 13/07 ddigestigest

criticized by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ent in the minds of actors on both sides of the current in an online interview given in July 2006 rhetorically crisis. inquired “who occupied whom,” when under Stalin In the Soviet era, Georgians were well-known as “the entire leadership of the Soviet Union was practi- prominent artists and entertainers, and famous for cally made up of people from the Caucasus” and “all their food, the ethnic cuisine of choice in the Soviet security organs in the Caucasus headed by Georgians,” Union and one inevitably paired with Georgian wine. as well as “nearly all those [security organs] of other Another popular stereotype common in Soviet humor national republics.” and anecdotes, and one which may have, to a limited Putin’s reference to the Georgian origins of Stalin extent, refl ected reality, was that of Georgians as well- and others in his immediate circle comes at a time placed in the world of organized crime and corruption. when the Russian state is in the process of selectively Th e economic turmoil which followed the collapse of reclaiming symbolic aspects of the Soviet past, includ- the Soviet Union and the ensuing civil war which ing the music of the Soviet national anthem (albeit with engulfed Georgia in the early 1990s led thousands of new lyrics) and the Soviet-era red star for the Russian Georgians to seek work in Russian cities. With their ar- army. Foreign dignitaries on hand for the sixtieth an- rival, the number of Georgian restaurants in Moscow niversary celebration of Soviet victory in World War and St. Petersburg skyrocketed, and many Georgian II, held in Moscow in May 2006, saw marchers don artists either took up residence in Russia or toured a panoply of Soviet-era costumes, perhaps refl ecting there frequently since earning a living in Georgia be- a belief among the Putin administration that the tri- came ever more diffi cult. And, if Russian press reports umph over fascism, celebrated in Soviet times, might are to be believed, Georgians came to occupy an even be embraced as the greatest enduring achievement of more important position in Russia’s criminal under- the Soviet Union. world. Yet the prominence of Georgians in such posi- If Putin hoped the commemorations would serve tions—licit and illicit—a combination of their ethnic as a common rallying point for the independent na- distinctiveness and occupational specialization (it is tions and diverse ethnic groups which inhabit Russia common for diaspora groups to seek out professional and the other Soviet successor states, he was certainly niches) and the persistence of Soviet-era stereotypes dismayed by the absence of Estonia and Lithuania (and, perhaps, the ability of some Georgians to capi- at the celebration, for whom Soviet triumph was fol- talize on them for profi t and prestige), obscures the lowed by Soviet occupation, and by Georgian President fact that most Georgian migrants work in more mun- Saakashvili’s decision to not attend the event in pro- dane professions. test over the failure of Russia to agree to his proposed timetable for military withdrawal from Georgia. Russian Sanctions Against Georgia: Following a Soviet Script Russia’s Selective Reading of History: onetary remissions sent by Russia’s Georgian Glorifi cation of the Past Mdiaspora to friends and family members in lthough the ethnically mixed character of the Georgia are rightly seen as a major source of economic ASoviet leadership complicates Russian claims to stability for the South Caucasus nation. Interesting- the mantle of successor to the Soviet Union, selective ly, recent Russian reprisals against Georgia not only historical memory might make it possible for Russia targeted the Georgian diaspora in general terms by to ignore the less savory aspects of the Soviet past or imposing visa restrictions and enforcing tough immi- simply label them as non-Russian. By emphasizing the gration rules but have specifi cally taken aim at those Georgian character of Stalin, Lavrentii Beria, and oth- specialized roles for which Georgians were famous in ers in the security services during the Soviet Union’s the Soviet period. In pursuing this course of action, it most repressive years, Soviet excesses can be attributed is as if Russian authorities are referring to a decades- to ethnic outsiders. When Putin described the arrest old Soviet script. In spring 2006, Russia instituted a of four Russian offi cers in Georgia on spy charges in ban on Georgian wine and mineral water, allegedly September 2006 as a “sign of the political legacy of on health grounds, depriving Georgian entrepreneurs Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria,” he simultaneously associ- of their ability to deliver two of Georgia’s best known ated the Georgians with one of their most infamous products to the lucrative Russian market. In Octo- co-ethnics before an international audience while ber 2006, following the spy row between Russia and also distancing Russia from some of the most fl agrant Georgia, authorities in Moscow began targeting Geor- crimes of the Soviet past. Th is complicated past, and gian-operated businesses, amidst frequent reports on its divergent interpretations, remains remarkably pres- state television that Moscow was in danger of being 3 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 13/07 ddigestigest

overrun by the “Georgian mafi a.” In several instances, recent discussions with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran. Russian law enforcement authorities searched and Th us far, Russia’s actions have damaged the prospects inspected some of Moscow’s most popular Georgian for profi table trade with Georgia, rallied the Georgian restaurants. Georgian entertainers also came under people around a Georgian government beset in the past fi re in the Russian capital, with authorities deciding year by several domestic scandals, and attracted the to cancel a performance of the Georgian State Dance critical gaze of the international community. While Ensemble in light of new visa restrictions on Geor- future developments may yet show Russia’s strategy gians. Th e very roles ascribed for Georgians in the to be an eff ective one, for now Russia’s actions seem Soviet “family of nations” have come under attack, to reveal the legacy of a system in which commands, revealing the complex imperial legacy of interdepen- punishments, and rewards were handed down a hier- dence between the two nations that makes separation archical chain from on high in Moscow. such a diffi cult and painful process. Even as the harsh actions taken against the Russia and the Confl icts in Abkhazia and Georgian diaspora by the Russian authorities, mea- South Ossetia sures which include ethnic profi ling, harassment, and ussian involvement in breakaway Abkhazia and deportation, have drawn on Soviet-era tendencies and RSouth Ossetia, two self-proclaimed statelets stereotypes, they have also touched on a more recent which seek independence from Tbilisi, has proved to strain in Russian society of xenophobia in general and be perhaps the greatest irritant in Russian-Georgian distrust of Caucasian migrants more generally. In a relations. Russian economic activity in the two ter- way perhaps ironic to those outside the region, people ritories is essential for sustaining the de facto authori- from the Caucasus are crudely referred to as “blacks” ties there, and the incorporation of the unrecognized by racist Russians. Much as Britain and France have statelets into the Russian Federation has been dis- struggled with the arrival of migrants from their for- cussed in the Russian Duma despite Russia’s offi cial mer colonies, the years following the Soviet collapse promise to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia. have seen the arrival in Russian cities of many migrants Yet, here too Russia’s long-term goals and motivations from the Caucasus and Central Asia seeking work and seem unclear. Russia’s current ban on agricultural social betterment. Th is migration, combined with on- imports from Georgia recently prevented a large ship- going confl ict in Chechnya and a resurgent ethnic ment of tangerines originating in South Ossetia from Russian nationalism has placed renewed emphasis on entering the Russian Federation, leading to a protest the otherness of those with Caucasian heritage, even if by merchants and truckers from South Ossetia who these “blacks” were once part of the Soviet family and felt the ban should not extend to them. It remains many are in fact Russian citizens. unclear how evenly Russia will enforce the ban, but further moves like this one could build resentment Restoring an “Informal Empire”? toward the Russian authorities among residents of hile Russia’s wielding of its economic might to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In addition, while dis- Wproject its infl uence and construct what some cussion of incorporating the two breakaway territo- describe as an informal or “liberal” empire in the for- ries into the Russian Federation worries the Georgian mer Soviet space are the subject of much discussion, it authorities and causes unrest among an international remains unclear whether such a project is driven by community intent on reaching a settlement in Kosovo economic goals, political considerations, nostalgia for (a case which some Russian policymakers have likened the Soviet empire, or some combination of the three. to that of the two unrecognized statelets), the redraw- Such a lack of clarity of purpose makes Russia’s long- ing of international borders could prove unsettling term goals unclear. Russian bans on Georgian prod- for Russia, with its numerous and ethnically diverse ucts and the Russian decision to sever transport links autonomous regions and its ongoing eff orts to subdue with its southern neighbor have negatively impacted violence in Chechnya, another territory with a claim the Georgian economy in the short run, but in the on independence. long run will force Georgians to seek new markets for Yet in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, their goods outside Russia. Similarly, Russian energy the Soviet imperial legacy also weighs on Georgia. giant Gazprom’s move in December 2006 to double Although historically enjoying ties with Georgia, natural gas prices for Georgia certainly ramps up the Abkhazia was initially granted the status of a union pressure on Georgia’s government but also increases republic by the Soviet authorities until being made the incentive for the Georgian authorities to diversify an autonomous republic within Georgia by Stalin their energy supply, which they have sought to do in in 1931. Th e downgrading of the territory’s status by 4 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 13/07 ddigestigest

Stalin and the subsequent encouragement of Georgian tional tenor in which symbolic gestures and rhetoric migration to Abkhazia by Beria are decisions that may are extremely important. Cases of spying routinely have been made in the interests of Soviet state central- emerge around the world, but Georgia’s decision to ization but are seen by many Abkhaz as the nation- parade four Russian offi cers charged with spying on alist actions of Georgians who happened to occupy national television refl ected the confrontational and top Soviet positions. Th e ethnic balance in Abkhazia perhaps overconfi dent attitude of a newly indepen- and South Ossetia during the Soviet period was a dent nation asserting itself against the former imperial delicate issue, as both regions had large populations center. Th is move outraged Russian sensibilities, pro- of not only Abkhaz and Ossetes but also of Georgians, voking anger that Russian citizens could be treated in Russians, Armenians, and others. It is arguable that such a rough manner by a small former Soviet “broth- such multiethnic polities had a better chance of sur- er” republic. Russia’s response was similarly dispropor- viving in a larger empire where their existence was not tionate, revealing wounded national pride and culmi- so anomalous than within the confi nes of an inde- nating in a vengeful attempt to punish its neighbor for pendent Georgia. At the advent of Georgian indepen- courting NATO and for directly challenging Russia dence in 1991, authorities and titular ethnic groups in in such a manner. both Abkhazia and South Ossetia feared domination Emotions aside, the geopolitical factors which by Georgians in a predominantly Georgian state, an gave rise to Russian-Georgian tensions remain. Russia understandable anxiety given offi cial proclamations is understandably interested in maintaining security of exclusive Georgian nationalism in the early 1990s. at its borders and preserving its traditional sphere of Ongoing confl ict has forced many Georgians to fl ee infl uence in the Caucasus while Georgia seeks to con- the two breakaway territories. Th e remaining popula- solidate centralized control of its territory and pursue tion in the two areas, while seemingly still desirous of new opportunities in partnership with the United autonomy, has turned to Russia as the successor to the States, the European Union, and NATO. Yet past overarching Soviet state as protector of their fragile resentments, wounded pride, and a failure of these independence and most in the statelets speak Russian, nations to enter into calm, neighborly relations as sov- use the Russian ruble, and have accepted Moscow’s of- ereign states on equal footing—all part of the impe- fer of Russian citizenship. When addressing the issue rial legacy— causes emotions to run high, making the of the breakaway regions, Georgia must grapple with situation much more incendiary than it might oth- a complex past in which Soviet policies both served to erwise be. Inability to deal with the Soviet imperial incorporate Georgia into a larger Soviet empire while legacy will hinder chances at a more neutral dialogue also grouping ethnically diverse regions under the aus- between the two nations, leaving tensions to simmer pices of a Georgian republic. After empire, the territo- even as upcoming presidential elections in Russia and rial dimensions of the Georgian state remain unclear Georgia might tempt candidates in each country to and unresolved. play upon lingering resentments for political gain.

A Confl ict of Emotions inally, the post-imperial aspect of the crisis of Rus- Fsian-Georgian relations gives the situation an emo-

About the author Erik R. Scott is a Ph.D. student in History at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is writing his dissertation on the Georgian diaspora in the Soviet Union.

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