Central Asia the Caucasus

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition VolumeISSN 1404-609122 Issue 1 ( Print2021) ISSN 2002-3839 (Online) CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

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1 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

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E d i t o r s

Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 70 232 16 55; E-mail: [email protected] Kalamkas represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Nur-Sultan) YESSIMOVA Tel./fax: (7 - 701) 7408600; E-mail: [email protected] Ainura represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) ELEBAEVA Tel./fax: (996 - 312) 61 30 36; E-mail: [email protected] Saodat OLIMOVA represents the journal in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Tel.: (992 372) 21 89 95; E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987 - 1) 225 43 22; E-mail: [email protected] Kenan represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) ALLAHVERDIEV Tel.: (+994 - 50) 325 10 50; E-mail: [email protected] David represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) PETROSYAN Tel.: (374 - 10) 56 88 10; E-mail: [email protected] Vakhtang represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) CHARAIA Тел.: +995 593 13 18 11; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332; E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in China (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088; E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146; E-mail: [email protected] Rustem represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) ZHANGUZHIN Tel.: (380 - 44) 524-79-13; E-mail: [email protected]

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E D I T O R I A L B O A R D

Vakhit AKAEV Chief Researcher, Ibragimov Integrated Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, D.Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Chechen Republic, Honored Scientist of the Chechen Republic, Expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Mariam ARUNOVA Ph.D. (History), leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Svante E. CORNELL Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Jannatkhan Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of International Relations EYVAZOV at Azerbaijan Tourism and Management University (Azerbaijan) William FIERMAN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Sergey GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of IGNATENKO the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russia) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), Assistant Professor, Head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Stephen F. JONES Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA D.Sc. (History), Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Zaynidin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Head of the Chair of International Relations, the Kyrgyz-Russian University KURMANOV (Kyrgyzstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) Alexei D.Sc. (History), Professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie MALASHENKO Moscow Center (Russia) Abbas MALEKI Doctor, Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Roger N. Research Associate, the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of McDERMOTT St. Andrews, Scotland (Great Britain) Vitaly NAUMKIN D.Sc. (History), Professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russia) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) Vladimir PARAMONOV Ph.D., Founder & Director of the Central Eurasia Analytical Group and Internet Project (Uzbekistan) Mirzokhid D.Sc. (History), Professor, Head of the Contemporary History and International Relations Department, RAKHIMOV Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) James V. WERTSCH Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington University in St. Louis (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

EDITORIAL OFFICE: CA&C Press AB, Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå, SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org © Central Asia and the Caucasus, English Edition, 2021 © CA&C Press AB, 2021

3 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

IN THIS ISSUE:

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Kanat Massabayev, Dinara Dauen, THE MAIN VECTORS OF Nurlan Seidin, GLOBALIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF Bolatbek Batyrkhan. CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM...... 7

Julia Harlamova. CHINA: GEO-ECONOMIC SCENARIO IN CENTRAL ASIA...... 22

Farrukh Usmonov, UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE SOFT POWER Fumiaki Inagaki. POLICY AND ITS FEATURE IN CENTRAL ASIA...... 29

Raikhan Zhanbulatova, Gulnar Andirzhanova, KAZAKHSTAN’S “ENERGY PLURALISM”: Miras Zhiyenbayev. LONGSTANDING AND NEW RISKS...... 38

ETHNIC RELATIONS AND MIGRATION

Sergey Ryazantsev, SOUTH CAUCASIAN ETHNIC Elena Pismennaya, COMMUNITIES IN RUSSIA: Maria Apanovich, SPECIFICS OF FORMATION AND ECONOMIC Dzerassa Dzusova. CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR HOMELANDS...... 47 4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

Irina Babich. ADAPTATION OF SOUTH CAUCASIAN IMMIGRANTS IN MODERN-DAY SWITZERLAND...... 61

Victoria Galyapina, INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN DAGESTAN: Zarina Lepshokova, THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED SECURITY, Irina Molodikova. INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS, AND MUTUAL ACCULTURATION...... 75

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

Aigerim Temirbayeva, Talgat Temirbayev, SUFI PRACTICES Ruziya Kamarova, IN CONTEMPORARY KAZAKHSTAN: Kenshilik Tyshkhan. TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS...... 91

Damira Sikhimbayeva, Lesken Shyngysbayev, FOUNDATIONS OF SECULARITY: Inkar Nurmoldina. GLOBAL EXPERIENCE AND KAZAKHSTAN...... 98

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Nartsiss Shukuralieva, ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM Artur Lipiński. IN CENTRAL ASIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS...... 106

Gulden Karimova, Serik Seydumanov, FEMALE ISLAMIC STATE RECRUITS: Olga Kutsenko. MIGRATION AND VALUES, NEEDS AND IMAGES...... 118

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FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:

 Eurasia: Politics Today

 Eurasia: Energy Policy and Energy Projects

 China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Black Sea-Caspian Region

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — all articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The articles must be submitted to the editorial staff in Russian or English. The editorial board has its team of translators whose services are paid by the authors; translations done by the authors independently or with the help of other translators will not be accepted; — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

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POLITICS AND ECONOMICS

THE MAIN VECTORS OF GLOBALIZATION AND EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.01

Kanat MASSABAYEV Ph.D. Candidate, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, R.B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Dinara DAUEN Ph.D. (Oriental Studies), Associate Professor, Dean, Faculty of Oriental Studies, Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Nurlan SEIDIN Ph.D. (Hist.), Deputy Director-General for Research, Innovation, and International Activity, Republican State Enterprise (RSE) Gylym Ordasy (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Bolatbek BATYRKHAN Ph.D., Associate Professor, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

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ABSTRACT

he purpose of this study is to examine and techniques such as scientific abstraction, the theoretical and methodological grouping, qualitative expert assessment, T foundations of globalization and the quantitative assessment, and comparative evolution of China’s political system, identify analysis and synthesis. its distinctive features and key development The article examines the process of patterns, and analyze the objective determi- globalization and China’s accession to the nants and socio-economic consequences of WTO using statistical and sociological data, globalization in the context of the emergence with a definition of China’s role in the world of a new world order. economy. The article builds on the interdisciplinary It also considers the modern political nature of the topic being studied and draws system of the People’s Republic of China on the works of Kazakh, Russian, and foreign and the stages of its socio-economic devel- authors. It uses general research methods opment.

KEYWORDS: globalization, evolution, political system, People’s Republic of China, expansion, demography, trade and economic relations, investment.

Introduction

The development of today’s world civilization shows a clear trend towards closer relations between countries and peoples and the emergence of a single economic and information space. There is a constant exchange of knowledge and technology on a planetary scale. All these processes together are known as “globalization.” At the same time, most of the numerous social problems and contradictions that have arisen in recent years are believed to be caused by globalization and international integration as they are today. As for researchers, globalization is conventionally seen as a process or phenomenon with economic, political, and cultural components. Some believe, however, that it is more than a process or phenomenon and see it as a new overarching philosophy of world order and world view. Globalization assumes that the economies of all countries will ultimately merge into a single economic system providing for the free movement of information, goods, services, and capital and for the unimpeded flow of ideas, and that this system, unlike government-controlled and regulated national markets, will be a self-regulating one. At the cultural and social level, the phenomenon of globalization and integration also implies the formation of a single universal society with common socio-cultural values. However, cultural integration processes go hand in hand with regionalization or localization processes, which help to maintain ethnocultural diversity. As understood by some statesmen and public figures, the “ideology of globalism” focuses on profit seeking as almost the only driver of development along with a significant limitation of the state’s role in the economy. They are concerned that the solution of long- term problems of crucial importance for sustainable development is replaced by an urge to maximize profit and wasteful consumption.

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A characteristic feature of the current stage of globalization is the growing interdependence of the world’s economies, although this process has slowed down, primarily because some countries want to avoid its negative consequences. As the Donald Trump administration has changed course on foreign economic policy, China has remained an advocate of globalization.

Relevance of Research

Given its economic power and its role as the “workshop of the world,” China is now a key driver of global economic growth. The impact of the “China factor” on the development of the world economy is undeniable, but economic globalization, in turn, has an increasing impact on the Chinese political system. An important point here is that China has been able to achieve significant economic successes in a short historical period without changing the foundations of its political system, confining itself to certain changes only within this system.

Literature Review

The theoretical and methodological foundations of globalization and the evolution of China’s political system have been the subject of many domestic and foreign studies. In domestic historiography, there are a number of works of particular interest in the context of this study. First and foremost, these include works on China’s political system and its foreign policy in Kazakhstan and the countries of Central Asia, such as the works of K.L. Syroyezhkin,1 N.A. Alda- bek, A.E. Serikkaliyeva, and D.B. Dauen,2 N. Mukhamedkhan,3 S.Zh. Sapanova,4 and others. In Russian historiography, of particular interest in this context are works that study “soft power” and its theoretical basis, including articles by I.V. Radikov and Ya.V. Leksyutina,5 S.V. Krivokhizh,6 E.M. Kharitonova,7 V.M. Kapitsyn,8 and M.V. Larionova,9 as well as works on the soft power of

1 See: K.L. Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, pp. 40-51; Idem, “China’s Presence in the Energy Sector of Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 20-43; Idem, “Osobennosti vneshnei politiki novogo rukovodstva KNR,” 13 March, 2013, available at [http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/03/особенности-внешней-политики-нового-руководства-кнр/fvcv]. 2 See: N.A. Aldabek, P.E. Bekturganova, A.E. Serikkaliyeva, D.B. Dauen, M.B. Asyl, Modernizatsia Kitaia i Kazakh- stan: monografiia, Kazak Universiteti, Almaty, 2014, 348 pp. 3 See: N. Mukhamedkhan, Diplomaticheskie otnosheniia i problemy sinologii: monografiia, Almaty, 2010, 204 pp. 4 See: S.Zh. Sapanova, Strategiia Kitaia v Tsentralnoi Azii v kontse XX-nachale XXI veka, Contemporary Korea Studies Institute, Hanyang University, Seoul, 2015, 257 pp.; Idem, Delimitatsiia i demarkatsiia kazakhstansko-kitaiskoi granitsy: monografiia, Kazak Universiteti, Almaty, 2016, 130 pp. 5 See: I.V. Radikov, Ya.V. Leksyutina, “Miagkaia sila kak sovremennyi atribut velikoi derzhavy,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (MEiMO), Moscow, No. 2, 2012, pp. 19-26. 6 See: S.V. Krivokhizh, “Miagkaya sila i publichnaia diplomatiia v teorii I vneshnepoliticheskoi praktike Kitaia,” Vest- nik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, Series 13, Issue 3, 2012, pp. 103-112. 7 See: E.M. Kharitonova, “Effektivnost miagkoi sily: problemy i otsenki,”MEiMO , No. 6, 2015, pp. 48-58. 8 See: V.M. Kapitsyn, “Kosmopolitizm—komponent miagkoi sily i globalnogo upravleniia,” Obozrevatel-Observer, Moscow, No. 10, 2009, pp. 70-79. 9 See: M.B. Larionova, “Miagkaya sila—resurs vneshnei politiki,” 23 February, 2015, available at [http://goo.gl/ wfuDx4].

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China, namely those of O.N. Borokh, A.V. Lomanov,10 and A.V. Boyarkina, K.F. Lykov, and V.F. Pe- cheritsa.11 In Chinese historiography, one should note the works of classics in the field of international relations: Pang Zhongying,12 Wang Huning,13 and political scientist Yan Xuetong,14 whose mono- graph on the concept of “power” in ancient Chinese thought makes it possible to trace the long history of the emergence of Chinese soft power. In addition, Yan Xuetong is one of the few researchers studying soft power who has used quantitative methods to calculate an index of soft power. Yu Xintian approaches the concept of “soft power” from the perspective of cultural studies.15 At the same time, not all problems of China’s interaction with the world economy have by now been subjected to in-depth and comprehensive study. China has recently stepped up its efforts to strengthen its position in the world economy both by expanding the scale and range of foreign economic ties and by demonstrating its ability to protect its economic interests. In particular, this refers to the increase in foreign direct investment in the Chinese economy (inward FDI) and the expansion of Chinese capital abroad (outward FDI). China’s accession to the WTO and especially the efforts to overcome the consequences of the world financial and economic crisis have triggered a search for new theoretical and practical methods of studying the problems of globalization of the world economy and China’s role and place in today’s international division of labor. China’s current position is based on the need to pursue a foreign economic policy designed to increase the role of external factors in modernizing its economy while mitigating the destructive effects of crisis phenomena in the world economy, as well as the negative aspects of economic globalization in general.

Research Methods

The study is based on fundamental and applied works by Kazakh, Russian, and foreign researchers in the field of economic theory, world economics, economics of transition, and institution- alism, as well as recent studies on various problems associated with the development of China’s economy and foreign economic relations. An important contribution to understanding the current trends in China’s economic development and different aspects of its relations with the outside world is made by the speeches of its leaders. The research methodology is based on the dialectical theory of development, the fundamentals of economic theory, and the unity of the logical and historical methods of research. In this study, we have used systems analysis methodology, which makes it possible to identify the causal relationships

10 See: O.N. Borokh, A.V. Lomanov, “Ot miagkoi sily k kulturnomu mogushchestvu,” Rossia v globalnoi politike, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2012, pp. 54-67; A.V. Lomanov, “Kitaiskaia mechta kak ideologichesky simvol rukovodstva Si Tsinpina,” in: Kitaiskaia narodnaia respublika: politika, ekonomika, kultura. K 65-letiiu KNR, Forum, Moscow, 2014, 480 pp. 11 See: A.V. Boyarkina, R.F. Lykov, V.F. Pecheritsa, “Preventivnaia diplomatia kak instrument ‘miagkoi sily’ KNR, Vestnik ZabGU, No. 9 (124), 2015, pp. 50-57. 12 See: Pang Zhongying, “The Beijing Olympics and China’s Soft Power,” 23 January, 2016, available at: [http://www. brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/09/04-olympics-pang]; Idem, “Guoji Guanxi Zhongde Ruanliliang Jiqita,” (Soft Power and Other Issues in International Relations: Talking About American Scholar Joseph Nye’s Bound to Lead), Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), No. 2, 1997, pp. 49–51. 13 See: Wang Huning, “Zuowei Guojia Shili de Wenhua: Ruan Quanli” (Culture as National Power: Soft Power), Fudan Daxue Xuebao (Journal of Fudan University), No. 3, 1993. 14 See: Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Princeton University Press, 2011, 300 pp.; Yan Xuetong, Xu Jin, “Zhongmei ruanshili bijiao,” (Comparison of Chinese and American Soft Power), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), No. 1, 2008, pp. 24-29. 15 See: Yu Xintian, “Ruanshili jianshe yu duiwai zhanlue,” (Soft Power Construction and External Strategy of China), Guoji wenti yanjiu (International Studies), No. 2, 2008, available at [http://www.aisixiang.com/data/19720.html].

10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 behind the transformation of China’s foreign economic strategy and the structure and parameters of its interaction with the world economy. The study analyzes and summarizes China’s role and place in the globalization of the world economy, making wide use of comparative analysis and statistical processing of large data sets.

Results

The growing scholarly interest in China with focus of attention on the problem of economic, socio-cultural, and demographic security appears to be very timely, considering the complicated situation with Chinese leadership in the world economic system. At present, the problem of studying not only the quantitative characteristics of globalization, but also its qualitative parameters is coming to the fore. This is of paramount importance for understanding the current development of global economic processes and for projecting scenarios of their development in the future. During the pandemic, the complex globalization processes bring the issues related to the China factor and the PRC’s political system into sharper focus. It should be especially emphasized that globalization issues are determined in large part by China’s economic growth and the nature and intensity of its foreign policy. A study of the processes of globalization and modernization of China’s political system, as well as its accession to the WTO, leads to the following general conclusions about the problems related to China’s role in the modern world: 1. China is becoming an integral structural part of globalization. The latter has expanded to include virtually all countries in the world. The structure of migration flows has changed according to the needs of the globalizing market. 2. The Chinese economy has been developing very rapidly and has a complex internal structure. China’s globalization structures and its spatial characteristics are a special feature of globalization and modernization of Chinese society. 3. China has a huge potential for migration, whose realization during market reforms and the current financial and economic crisis leads not only to internal population movements as the Chinese authorities encourage people living in the eastern provinces (mainly Han) to move to the ethnic peripheries. At the same time, these processes are accompanied by significant migration outflows from China, whose further external economic expansion will spur migration from the country. 4. There are no serious studies or publications of official data on the impact of the China globalization factor on its neighboring countries, including Kazakhstan. There is no access to information on the numbers, settlement patterns, and structure of migrant workers from China, on the problems in the migrant community, as well as on major trade, economic, and investment projects between Kazakhstan and China. These are the facts that generate the “myths” that accompany our bilateral relations and phobias regarding China. The relevance of studying the China factor in the context of globalization is determined not only by the novelty of the “Chinese economic expansion” in Kazakhstan as an under-researched economic phenomenon, but also by a lack of experience in responding to it and, consequently, by the need to build an analytical base for decision-making in this area. 5. China’s accession to the WTO has highlighted the problems associated with the China factor in the conditions of globalization and intensified the rivalry for global leadership between China and the United States.

11 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Discussion The Foundations of Globalization and International Economic Integration

Globalization is the key concept that characterizes world development processes in the 20th and early 21st centuries. The word has numerous definitions, but essentially it means that something is becoming global, worldwide. The term “globalization” was first used by Karl Marx in his letters to Friedrich Engels, where he took it to mean a purely economic process leading to the formation of a world market. Yet, some Western researchers claim that globalization began in the Middle Ages, when there was a rapid increase in trade between European countries. In its modern interpretation, globalization refers to the process of cultural, political, scientific, and technical unification and establishment of relationships between separate social objects and phenomena. Thus, globalization implies the unification of all spheres of human life and activity: political, financial, scientific, technical, religious, and cultural. Whereas in the past the globalization process was driven by the development of trade, wars, and political activity, today it has moved into the phase of unification of the world on a scientific, technological, and economic basis. From a political perspective, globalization should ideally promote the interpenetration of cultures, mutual understanding between civilizations, establishment of international legal norms, and respect for human rights with the retention of the identity of peoples and their unique mentality, without allowing any spiritual or political unification. Globalization has many other aspects that strengthen mutual ties and integration between human communities: the increasing role of transnational structures and actors in international relations (regional and non-governmental organizations), the spread of legal norms, social standards, etc. The International Monetary Fund defines globalization as the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide. Broadly speaking, this implies a worldwide system emerging as a result of the fusion of national economies. It should be based on free movement of capital, reduction of tariff barriers, liberalization of trade, and integration of information and communications. In the modern world, countries have been forming regional associations as part of the world community. The development record of international trade relations shows that the value and weight of a particular region may increase as the trends towards integration within it strengthen. Transnational economic integration is a process where regional economies integrate into a single economic union based on sustainable economic relations, convergence of national economic systems, and their adaptation to each other, a process driven by the economic interests of the economic actors and leading to an international division of labor. Today, this has become a tool for ac- celerating the development of regional economies and improving market competitiveness among the member countries of integration groupings. Economic integration also involves the interstate regulation of economic interdependence, the formation of a regional economic complex geared to meet the needs of the region as a whole, and the removal of national barriers to the free movement of financial assets, goods, services, and labor, resulting in the creation of a single internal market, higher labor productivity, and a rise in living standards in these countries. Talcott Parsons,16 the founder of structural functionalism, also outlined a concept of integration that includes two key elements: internal compatibility of the elements of the integration system and maintenance of the conditions of the distinctiveness of the system within its boundaries as something separate from its external environment.

16 See: T. Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1971, 152 pp.

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There are many definitions of the essence of economic integration, its types, models, and stages, as well as the sequence of the process itself. This is primarily because economics is a priority area of cooperation in many regional organizations. There is a complex and contradictory relationship between international economic integration and the globalization process. In broad outline, some researchers cite the definition given by Yuri Shishkov, who characterizes the relationship between the two phenomena: whereas globalization is a new quality of internationalization at the stage of its maximum possible development in breadth, integration is the highest stage of its development in depth.17 Back in the 1960s, the Hungarian economist Béla Balassa18 identified five stages of economic integration: free trade area, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union, and full economic union. However, a number of researchers disagree with this sequence of stages, sometimes adding other stages. While recognizing the existence of a free trade area, customs union, and common market, some researchers believe that the stage of a free trade area should be preceded by a preferential trade area and that the establishment of a common market is followed by the stage of an economic union and then a monetary and political union.19 According to this theory, economic union is the highest form of economic integration, which includes harmonization of the entire economy of the regional association’s member countries, including the production sector, the introduction of a common unit of account and then of a single currency, harmonization of social conditions in the region, and the pursuit of a single fiscal and foreign policy.20 Regional integration of states, as noted above, is a process of convergence and interaction of national economies with the formation of regional economic unions. Underlying this process is the growing interdependence of national economic actors. A major goal is to eliminate national barriers to mutual trade and investment cooperation and to create a level playing field for economic actors in different countries. By coordinating, unifying, and harmonizing fiscal and monetary policy, the countries involved create a single economic space. Direct international (production, scientific, technical, and technological) ties are an important component of the economic integration process, ensuring the successive integration of national economies. This is followed by the mutual adaptation of state economic, legal, fiscal, social, and other systems up to the point of a certain fusion of governance structures. The main purpose of integration is to increase the amount and widen the range of goods and services through improved economic efficiency. The concept of integration itself includes a whole range of phenomena and processes taking place in the cultural, economic, military-political, scientific-technical, technological, and other areas of activity. At the micro level, integration occurs through the interaction of capitals as private firms and enterprises enter into economic agreements with each other and establish branches abroad. At the regional level, integration takes place in the form of cooperation between regional infrastructures and creation of economic zones. At the interstate level, it takes place through the formation of economic associations of states and coordination of national policies. This results in the creation of regional economic complexes with a single currency and infrastructure, common economic proportions, and common economic governance bodies. The main prerequisites for regional integration are roughly equal levels of economic development, compatibility of economic mechanisms, and socio-economic and legal homogeneity. The key

17 See: Yu.V. Shiskov, Integratsionnye protsessy na poroge XXI veka, III Tysyacheletiye, Moscow, 2001, p. 17. 18 See: B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, London, 1962. 19 See: J.M. Biswaro, The Quest for Regional Integration in Africa, Latin America and Beyond in the Twenty First Century: Experience, Progress and Prospects, Brasilia, 2011. 20 See: G.M. Velyaminov, Mezhdunarodnoe ekonomicheskoe pravo i protsess (Akademichesky kurs), Academic Course. Textbook, Moscow, 2004.

13 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition macroeconomic indicators—GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, GDP composition by sector, inflation, unemployment, and interest rates, labor productivity and wage levels—should not differ significantly. In the case of incompatible economic parameters, the countries involved will have to travel the path of creating comparable economic conditions. The conclusion of various preferential agreements between countries or between the integration grouping and a particular country ensure a more favorable and convenient regime for the participating countries than for third countries. Preferential agreements are seen as a preparatory stage for integration. Such agreements remain in effect until economic conditions in the less developed country become comparable to those in the more developed countries. Another possible prerequisite is the complementarity of the economies of neighboring countries. It is primarily manifested in the diversity of the integrating countries’ export structures. Coun- tries that sell similar products find it very difficult to integrate. Yet another prerequisite is provided by the geographical proximity of the integrating countries, the existence of common borders, and recognition of territorial integrity and existing borders. This factor helps to minimize transport costs. The political will of the leaders who develop and implement the integration process at the state level may also be a major prerequisite. Other prerequisites may include the so-called demonstration effect, when successful integration encourages other countries to join an economic bloc. This also applies to the domino effect: the more countries join an integration grouping and increase intra-regional trade, the greater the difficulties encountered by third countries that remain outside the grouping, which induces them to integrate. For its part, integration can be both regional and global (worldwide). Global integration is based on the development of world production, the world market, and communications. Many well-known economists who support globalization say that international economic integration allows countries to gain the following advantages: — integration provides broader access to resources (financial, material, labor, technological, etc.) on the scale of an entire region and makes it possible to produce goods for the market of all countries involved in the integration process; — closer economic relations between countries create advantages for the firms of participating countries and protect them against competition from third-country firms; — the member countries can join forces to solve pressing social problems; — the deepening international division of labor (IDL) helps to reduce product prices and ensures economic efficiency; — the common economic space expands, while competition between the enterprises of the integrating countries intensifies, stimulating production and enhancing its efficiency; — a more stable situation for the development of mutual trade produces better results in the area of international trade policy; — the participating countries have an opportunity to utilize the advantages of their national economies to expand the market for their products and support their producers; — the expansion of the economic space provides conditions for attracting foreign investment; — integration creates a favorable foreign policy environment, increasing not only economic, but also political, cultural, and other cooperation; — countries overcome their “complexes” and limitations, turning into full and equal participants in the integration process.

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Along with supporters of international integration as a synonym for globalism, there are also opponents of the international integration process in its present form. One of the most popular opponents of current international integration is the anti-globalization movement. “Anti-globalist” is an umbrella term for political forces that bring together various social groups, parties, and social movements. Their main purpose is to develop integration between economies, peoples, and cultures based on social justice and respect for the separate identity of ethnocultural communities. The movement opposes the policy of establishing a new world order as pursued by transnational (multinational) corporations and associations of major world powers. According to anti-globalists, only highly developed Western countries can enjoy the benefits of this process, while the rest of the world is doomed to lag behind. In their view, the Western countries’ policy of market dictatorship leads to a decline in many national sectors of production and a destruction of traditional crafts, trades, and agricultural crops, undermining the food sovereignty of countries. Nevertheless, as a result of globalization and international economic integration, we have a world of free trade in the economy and relative stability. It is believed that the number of wars and annexations has decreased significantly since 1945. According to economists, average customs tariffs between industrialized countries are below 3%, while in the 1960s, before a new round of international trade negotiations, they were 15%.21 Although the past ten years have seen a regression in some aspects of globalization, this is explained by the fact that globalization as a phenomenon is a complex process that requires adaptation and creates serious problems and difficulties. Most countries try to control or manage this process, but do not always succeed. One of the critics of the policy of globalism is Joseph Stiglitz, a prominent American economist, winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in economics, and author of the book Globalization and Its Discontents, which has gained worldwide recognition. Many members of the Donald Trump administration obviously sought to roll back globalization. Trump openly denounced globalism and said that free trade was a way of robbing American industry. In addition, globalism poses other challenges for contemporary society, including those associated with spontaneous, uncontrolled migration, energy problems, international terrorism, and, of course, with the coronavirus pandemic, the plague of the 21st century. This is why globalization will remain a subject of the most heated debates of our time. Nevertheless, some countries, unlike others, have been able to adapt to the high pace of global integration and open up their economy to investment and trade with the rest of the world. U.N. experts believe that the pursuit of an open-economy policy in countries such as Vietnam, India, China, and Uganda has significantly reduced the scale of poverty in these countries. The reforms in China have led to an unprecedented reduction in poverty. In the period from 1978 to 1989, the number of rural poor in the country, according to U.N. data, decreased from 250 million to 34 million.22 It should be noted that the current Chinese understanding of integration is quite specific and concrete, without any ideological implications. In particular, economic integration is defined as a form of internationalization of economic life, an objective process of intertwining of national economies, and the pursuit of a coordinated interstate economic policy, although prior to the “policy of reform and opening-up” launched by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 the Chinese definition of integration also included an ideological and political component. The old definition referred to integration based on the similarity of social systems and made special note of the profound differences between capital- ist and socialist integration in terms of socio-economic nature, forms, methods, and economic and political consequences.23

21 See: I. Dyumulen, Mezhdunarodnaia torgovlia. Tarifnoe i netarifnoe regulirovanie, Textbook, Moscow, 2011, 516 pp. 22 [https://www.un.org/ru/youthink/globalization.shtml]. 23 See: Filosofsky entsiklopedichesky slovar, Sovetskaya entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1983, p. 210.

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Taking a brief look at history, we can say that globalization and economic integration are not something unfamiliar to China. The days of the Tang dynasty (7th to 10th century CE), were an age of urbanization and development of maritime trade. For example, the Tang capital Chang’an turned into one of the largest cities of the time. By 742, its population was close to two million, and a census showed that there were also 5,000 foreigners (Turks, Iranians, Hindu Indians, and others) living in the city. Trade flourished and brought increasing numbers of foreigners, foreign religions, and foreign ideas to China. Although during the following Song dynasty (10th to 12th century) China was sur- rounded by hostile states and focused on domestic trade, it still remained the center of the Silk Road and its trade routes extended to the Pacific. Trade was carried on by a large fleet of merchant ships and was defended by an imperial naval force. Long-distance routes to the Middle East, India, and the coast of Africa were easily accessible. In that period, the government tightened control of foreign trade because of threats on the northern borders. A Bureau of Merchant Shipping was established to monitor the flow of goods in international trade and collect taxes from passing merchant ships. In addition, foreign trade became less focused on cultural exchanges and was instead seen as necessary for the growth of the Chinese economy.

The Modern Political System and the Stages of Socio-Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China

In the 20th century, China’s attempts to balance the economy and socio-political issues in its modern state system resembled the bitter experience of the Qing dynasty, whose rulers were caught between the need to open up China to foreigners with a view to modernizing the country and the need to maintain national identity. This dilemma continued during the establishment of the Republic of China (1912-1949) and continues to this day. After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, a new era began in the history of China. Deng Xiaoping, who became the leader of the party and the state in the late 1970s, described the reforms launched in the country as China’s “second revolution” after 1949, but a revolution in the sense of a “revolution- ary renewal of socialism on its own basis through self-improvement” rather than one designed to break the old superstructure or directed against any social class. The “Four Modernizations” policy, adopted in the mid-1970s was aimed at reforming four areas: agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. Whereas the Four Modernizations reflected the material content of the reform, the ideological and political line was based on “Four Cardinal Principles”: upholding the socialist path, the people’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.24 In June 1981, the 6th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee passed a Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China. It officially denounced Mao Zedong’s personality cult, the “great leap forward” policy, the “cultural revolution,” and the terrorist methods used in the country at that time. However, the Plenary Session noted Mao Zedong’s services to the Party and the people and stated that “his merits are primary and his errors secondary.” Talks on settling relations with the USSR began at Deng Xiaoping’s initiative. In the mid- 1980s, the Chinese leadership developed the concept of a multipolar world where China was to have a proper place as a center of power not only in Asia, but also in the whole world. In his later years,

24 See: L.P. Delyusin, Kitai v poiskakh putei razvitia, Moscow State University (MSU) and MSU Institute of Asian and African Studies, Muravei Publishers, Moscow, 2004, 448 pp.

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Deng retired from senior positions. Nevertheless, he was officially recognized as “the architect of China’s reforms.” Democratic tendencies in Chinese society gradually increased, manifesting themselves in demands for the liberalization of the socialist political system. Following the events connected with the 1989 student protests, Jiang Zemin was elected President of the PRC as an advocate of a tougher line in domestic policy. Deng Xiaoping saw him as his real successor and gradually transferred to him all the levers of power over the party and the state. Chinese official propaganda explicitly emphasizes the outstanding role of Mao Zedong as the founder of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping as the chief ideologist of economic reforms, and Jiang Zemin as a true successor to the greatest achievements of Chinese society during the construction of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” In our opinion, Jiang Zemin’s thirteen years in office as party leader and head of state will go down in Chinese history as “a period in which China’s overall national strength has risen by a big margin, the people have received more tangible benefits than ever before, and China has enjoyed long-term social stability and solidarity and had a good government and a united people.”25 The breakup of the USSR and the confusion in the post-Soviet space removed the threat from the north and allowed China to strengthen its position in the Central Asian region. As China states in its foreign policy doctrine, the emergence of “Greater China” under the new world order refers to economic unity cemented by common ethnicity. China wants to define and assert its place in the international arena, ensure maximum security for the country, and create favorable conditions for its development, primarily by securing the role of informal leader in the region.26 The well-known Chinese political weekly Liaowang wrote in 2000 why Chinese foreign policy had to focus on neighboring border countries. First of all, the article noted, China’s interests were mainly concentrated in bordering regions. In the economic sphere, 56% of China’s export and import activities were concentrated in neighboring countries, with Southeast Asia accounting for 53.6% of the total.27 In November 2002, Jiang Zemin stepped down as general secretary of the CPC Central committee, and Hu Jintao was elected to the post. At a session of the National People’s Congress in March 2003, Hu Jintao was elected president of the PRC. The Congress also approved the appointment of Wen Jiabao as premier of the State Council of the PRC. One of the priorities in the domestic policy of the new leadership was the implementation of a strategy for the large-scale development of western China. The question about the importance of the western regions had been raised repeatedly in Chi- nese history. A policy aimed at developing China’s western regions was first officially announced at the 4th Plenary Session of the 15th CPC Central Committee on 22 September, 1999. The program for the development of these regions was primarily designed to close the gap with the coastal provinces. This was to be achieved through massive government investments, deeper market reforms, and involvement of the western regions in the pursuit of an open foreign economic policy. According to the list of regions included in the Great Development of the West (Go West) concept, their area is 6.79 million sq km, or 70.7% of Chinese territory, and their population is around 500 million.28 Another important point here is that these regions are mainly inhabited by non-Han peoples and that most of them are border regions. Each of these regions and all of them together are rich in natural resources, which are very important for the Chinese economy. Priority attention was given to the development of energy production, the chemical industry, mineral mining and processing, and the processing of specific plant and animal products so as to enable these resource-rich regions to gain economic ben-

25 Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 16th Party Congress, 8 November, 2002, available at [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ eng/topics_665678/3698_665962/t18872.shtml]. 26 See: PRC Foreign Policy Doctrine in the 21st Century, 29 July, 2005, available in Russian at [https://www.caravan. kz/articles/vneshnepoliticheskaya-doktrina-knr-v-xxi-veke-376211/]. 27 See: Chinese political weekly Liaowang, 28 September, 2000. 28 See: Ibidem.

17 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition efits from their natural resources. Since all these factors create conditions for ensuring national security, the Chinese leadership naturally had to take them into account. In the opinion of Kazakhstan experts, it was quite obvious that China’s Go West policy would also have an impact on neighboring states. The main question for us is the nature of this impact and its effect on the security of the Central Asian region in general and the Republic of Kazakhstan in particular. The arrival of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders led by Xi Jinping marked a new stage in China’s development. The key feature of this stage is the transition from short-term (five-year) planning to long-term, strategic planning for decades ahead. Under a long-term plan known as the “Chi- nese Dream,” Xi Jinping has carried out a number of reforms directly related to China’s political system. At the latest, 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, there was an expected reshuffle of the CPC Central Committee, its Politburo, the Politburo Standing Com- mittee, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC, and the Central Military Com- mission of the CPC. As expected, Xi was re-elected to the post of general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, but the main thing, in the view of experts, is that he significantly consolidated his power at that congress, securing the appointment of his loyal followers to key positions. For the first time in many years, there was no mention of a successor. Political analysts believe that Xi Jinping plans to remain the party leader even after the next congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022. All of this has been widely discussed among political experts, who differ in their assessments of the consequences of such a move: some say that it is important for the continuation of the reforms launched by Xi, while others warn that the country is moving towards dictatorship. In our opinion, this decision has been taken not because of Xi’s personal desire to strengthen his power, but because of the global political situation in general and the figure of the general secretary himself in particular, since he has credibility in the eyes of the Chinese people and enjoys massive support in the country, particularly owing to his active fight against corruption. The second-highest position in the state according to the Chinese order of precedence is held by Li Keqiang, Premier of the PRC State Council, who was re-elected for a second term in office by the 19th Congress of the CPC in 2017. Li Zhanshu, Director of the General Office of the CPC Central Com- mittee in 2012-2017, ranks third in the party hierarchy. In the 1980s, he was a CPC functionary and worked together with Xi Jinping, which is why there is every reason to regard him as one of Xi’s personal appointees. Wang Yang, Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC, who ranks fourth in terms of influence in the political field, is an associate of the previous Chinese leader Hu Jintao and, as a member of the “second Youth League faction,” naturally cannot be included among Xi’s “cronies.” The same applies to Han Zheng, First Vice Premier of the PRC, who is a representative of the “Shanghai” elites opposed to Xi. The fifth-ranking man in the party is Wang Huning, former head of the Central Policy Research Office (an institution responsible for the CPC’s ideology), who is a supporter of Xi Jinping. He has long been the leading party theorist and is believed to be the actual author of Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” Hu Jintao’s “Scientific Development Concept,” and even some parts of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” incorporated into the Constitution of the Com- munist Party of China at its 19th Congress. Zhao Leji, head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CPC, is sixth on the list of Chinese leaders. He is in charge of the fight against corruption, taking over that post from Xi’s closest associate Wang Qishan upon his retirement. Considering that Zhao entered the Politburo in 2012, at the same time as the general secretary, and comes from Xi’s home province, he is well placed to act as a liaison between the Chinese leader and a very powerful tool of influence: the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection with thousands of operatives.29 In the view of experts, the new Constitution of the CPC defines the fundamental goal of modern China’s foreign policy: building a community with a shared future for mankind and promoting reform

29 See: “Itogi XIX s’ezda KPK: epokhalnaia voina elit Kitaia,” 29 October, 2017, available at [https://regnum.ru/news/ polit/2339533.html].

18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 and development of the global governance system. According to a resolution adopted by the 19th Congress of the CPC that outlined a plan for the years ahead, China will keep to the path of peaceful development in its foreign policy and continue to foster a new type of international relations based on “mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation.”30 As an outcome of the Congress, the Communist Party of China pledged to continue its commitment to building a Xiaokang society, which means a “basically well-off” or “moderately prosperous” society. Beijing plans to achieve this goal not through extensive development of existing sectors of the economy, but by promoting new technologies. The construction of this society is to be completed in 2021. That is why the main task set by the Congress is to build a modernized innovation-driven economy with a significant green component. An environmental initiative known as “Beautiful Chi- na” has been launched for this purpose. High-technology sectors already account for 55% of economic growth in China. As noted at the Congress, China will become a modernized and innovative country by 2035 and “a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, cultur- ally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by the middle of the century.”31

The WTO and China: The Trade War and the Current Situation

In 1989, China’s population became the largest in the world, although its GDP was only the ninth-largest.32 Today, 30 years later, despite all the difficulties, China is the world’s largest economy, having surpassed the United States. This significant economic development has been achieved at the expense of an appalling increase in carbon emissions and a worsening of the overall environmental situation in the country. As a result of the one-child policy pursued until recently by the Chinese government and a steady rise in wages in the past few decades, the country lost its competitive advantages as a supplier of cheap labor. Considering the relatively low labor productivity in Chinese industry, the loss was quite significant. In order to maintain industrial and export growth, China was obliged to engage in restructuring its economy. The government announced a transition to a “new normal” (Xin Chang Tai, a concept meaning a new state of normality in economic development), focusing, among other things, on the development of advanced manufacturing technologies. A national plan called “Made in China 2025” provides for a shift from scale and rapid growth to quality and efficiency, for the development of modern competitive clusters and Chinese brands.33 Let us note that a crucial stage in China’s integration into the global economy was its accession to the WTO in 2001, after 15 years of intensive negotiations. Since then, China’s GDP has increased more than ten-fold: from $1.34 trillion in 2001 to $14.4 trillion in 2019. After joining, China carried out reforms in accordance with WTO rules and international norms and standards, says Tu Xinquan, Executive Dean of the China Institute for WTO Studies at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing. In the summer of 2018, the State Council Information Office of China published a White Paper titled “China and the World Trade Organization.” It says that the country “has made continued efforts to improve its socialist market economy system, further align its policies with

30 “V Pekine zaiavili, chto namereny priderzhivatsia mirnogo puti razvitia,” 24 October, 2017, available at [https:// forbes.kz/news/2017/10/24/newsid_157698]. 31 Xi Jinping’s Report at the 19th National Congress of the CPC, 18 October, 2017, available at [http://www.china.org. cn/china/19th_cpc_congress/node_7252339.htm]. 32 See: China Statistical Yearbook 1989, State Statistical Bureau of the People’s Republic of China, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 1990, 840 pp. 33 See: Zhu Jianhong, “Kitaiskaia ekonomika perekhodit ot zamedleniia k povysheniiu kachestva,” Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 4 March, 2017, available at [http://russian.people.com.cn/n3/2017/0304/c31518-9185668.html].

19 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition multilateral trade rules in all areas, honor its commitments on opening trade in goods and services, and strengthen intellectual property rights (IPR) protection.” After accession, China reviewed and revised 2,300 laws, regulations, and departmental rules at central government level and 190,000 policies and regulations at sub-central government levels covering trade, investment, protection of intellectual property rights, etc. By 2010, China had fulfilled all its tariff reduction commitments, reducing the average tariff level from 15.3% in 2001 to 9.8%. The average tariff rate on manufactured goods was lowered from 14.8% to 8.9%, and the average tariff rate on agricultural products from 23.2% to 15.2%, which is about one-fourth of the global average and far lower than those of the WTO’s developing members (56%) and developed members (39%).34 In addition, China has done a great deal to reduce non-tariff barriers: by 2005, it had eliminated import quotas, import licenses, specific import tendering requirements, and other non-tariff measures with regard to 424 items, such as automobiles, machinery, electronic products, and natural rubber. It has also opened up the domestic services market. According to the White Paper, “By 2007, China had honored all of its commitments on trade in services.”35 China has lowered the threshold for foreign investment in the services sector. In 2010, foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into China’s services industry exceeded the flow into manufacturing for the first time. In 2017, FDI in the services industry made up 73% of total FDI in China. Overall, FDI inflows increased from $46.88 billion in 2001 to $136.2 billion in 2017.36 According to the report of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in China for 2019, China remains a top priority for all sectors from the perspective of global investment plans for the coming years. These plans were thwarted by the long-lasting trade war that began when the administration led by Donald Trump came to office in the United States. Trade between the two countries, according to China’s Customs Administration, was $541.22 billion in 2019, down 14.6% from 2018.37 In any case, the trade war with the United States and the fight against the COVID-19 have had a very negative effect on China’s foreign trade. The two-month lockdown in early 2020 led to a decline in production, while imports increased sharply. As a result, for the first time in many years China posted a trade deficit for the two months in the amount of $7.1 billion.38 Of course, the Chinese economy has suffered huge losses, but the government’s effective and timely measures have saved the lives of many ordinary citizens. In our opinion, China took the right decision. Its economic development model keeps evolving, ensuring continuity in policy and in the very transformation of political power. Naturally, success will depend on the process of recovery of the country’s economy and the health of its population, but this process can be easily disrupted by ideological and geopolitical rivalry with the United States. If the two countries find the right balance, they will not only avoid a global trade war, but will also raise bilateral relations to a new level.

Conclusion

This study has investigated the theoretical and methodological foundations of globalization and the evolution of China’s political system, shown the role and place of China in current international

34 [https://rg.ru/2019/09/29/vstuplenie-kitaia-v-vto-stalo-faktorom-mirovogo-ekonomicheskogo-rosta.html]. 35 Ibidem. 36 See: White Paper “China and the World Trade Organization,” available at [http://english.scio.gov.cn/2018-06/28/ content_53822671.htm]. 37 See: “Coverage of Major Imports & Exports,” available at [http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statistics/Statistics? ColumnId=6]. 38 See: “Perspektivy kitaiskogo eksporta ostaiutsia mrachnymi,” 14 April, 2020, available at [https://1prime.ru/state_ regulation/20200414/831261715.html].

20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 relations, and identified the main trends in China’s economic policy in the context of its accession to the WTO. An analysis of these problems, of new theoretical and methodological approaches and current research literature, and the dynamics of globalization suggests the following conclusions: — the interdependence of globalization processes and modernization of the political system are determined by geo-economic and geopolitical factors, threats, and challenges to economic security; — different statements about China’s economic expansion are warranted because the Chinese economy has a global character; — as globalization spreads and economic growth in China continues, economic processes will undergo structural changes. The problem is not how to prevent an increase in China’s economic might, but how to regulate this process. The key purpose of such regulation should be the modernization of one’s own political and economic system along the following lines: — protection of the national economy from an unwanted influx of Chinese migrants, both in terms of numbers and quality; — solution of the most pressing problems in the field of employment in the country through the diversification of the economy; — rational use of Chinese investment in the interest of the economy; — legal opportunities to reduce population pressure from China, transparency and control of the local labor market for foreign specialists, etc.; — efficiency and modernization of the economic system in the conditions of globalization. The rising China factor in a globalizing world can often lead to immeasurable economic, social, and political costs both for Kazakhstan and for China’s neighboring countries in Central Asia and the Russian Federation. In any discussion of globalization processes and the China factor, it is necessary to take into account a whole range of issues. Since this question is an international one, the isolated development of a national strategy is unlikely to produce good results. Thus, interstate cooperation is a must for the development of globalization processes.

21 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition CHINA: GEO-ECONOMIC SCENARIO IN CENTRAL ASIA

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.02

Julia HARLAMOVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Department of Transport Law, Russian Transport University (MIIT) (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he article discusses China’s geo-eco- tries in the energy and transportation nomic presence in the Central Asian spheres. It notes the special role of Kazakh- T region and analyzes the history and stan in the realization of Belt and Road Ini- causes of this phenomenon in the form of a tiative and pays particular attention to cer- detailed discussion of the interaction be- tain aspects of China’s crediting and invest- tween China and the Central Asian coun- ment policy.

KEYWORDS: Central Asia, Belt and Road Initiative, geo-economics of China.

Introduction

For over a century, during which Central Asia was first part of the Russian Empire and later— the Soviet Union, the region was treated as a component in China’s relationships with both. The Soviet Union’s disintegration turned the region into a distinct sector of China’s foreign policy with steadily growing importance. It should be said that during the Soviet Union’s Afghan campaign of the 1980s, Beijing actively supported the mujahideen and all other opposition forces with Soviet weapons. In his book The Silk Roads: A New History of the World Peter Frankopan quotes one of the Chinese dailies as writing the following: The Soviet Union threatens peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world. Af- ghanistan is no longer the objective: the Soviets intend to use it as “a stepping stone for a southward thrust towards Pakistan and the whole subcontinent.”1 This is true: with the Central Asian and Cau- casian springboards at its disposal and the left-wing Arab regimes on its side, the Soviet Union imposed its Great Game on the geopolitical square formed by Asia Minor, the Nile, the Persian Gulf and the Pamir Mountains, incredibly rich in hydrocarbons.

1 P. Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Vintage Edition, 2017, p. 462 ff.

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Unlike the West, China was quite satisfied with the Central Asian regimes and found a common tongue with their leaders: by the beginning of the new millennium Beijing joined the Great Game on an equal footing with the others as a powerful economic center of the contemporary world. Today, China looks at the region as its traditional dominion or a protectorate, while its huge human resources allow it to actively realize its anaconda strategy in regard to raw materials. Beijing is not aggressive, it relies on its “soft leadership” (“soft hegemony”) doctrine to achieve, along with other players, the ultimate aim of this geo-economic scenario. China entails the reconfiguration of the Central Asian economic space, being one of the most active actors in this process. Multisided diplomacy and rhetoric, the two essential instruments of its non-confrontational “soft envelopment” strategy allowed Beijing to address the main problems of its national development. The methodological category of geopolitical space is being gradually replaced with the geo- economic. The post-Cold War realities have confronted political thinkers and practicing politicians with the complex task of formulating a new paradigm to identify the main sources of conflicts in the contemporary world and explain political dynamics, which is obviously beyond their potential. We can agree with one of the authors, who has stated that China had formulated a geo-economic model of its own: development of national technological platforms, which “incentivizes Beijing to take the lead in high-tech strategic industries with its digital Silk Road.”2 China’s integration in the global innovation networks was among the key strategies of radical restructuring of the Chinese economy formulated in the five-year plan for 2016-2020.

China’s Geo-Economic Scenario for Central Asia

Today, China is mostly interested in large-scale investments in non-ferrous and ferrous metal- lurgy of Central Asia, its hydraulic power production, transport infrastructure and telecommunications since hydrocarbon resources have already been significantly developed and are under control. Many experts, mainly foreign experts predict that in the future China will play a decisive role similar to that played by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively. This probably explains “the fact that in the last fifteen years a large number of publications has appeared that describe the Chinese emperors’ military inroads into the Central Asian territory as unifying.”3 According to Jack Farchy, an observer of The Financial Times, in the essay published in 2010, “Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army, called Central Asia ‘a rich piece of cake given to today’s Chinese people by heaven’.” Farchy himself called this essay a sort of manifesto of China’s expansionist policy in the region.4 Many in the expert community have pointed out that today “Chinese leaders use history to legitimate their rule”5 much more often than in the past. Today, this factor remains underestimated, to a great extent, in the intergovernmental, inter-elite and civiliza- tional respects. At the preparatory stage, China did a lot to facilitate the operation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as one of the most important elements of ensuring its interests in the region and

2 G. Diesen, “China’s Geoeconomics and the ‘New Cold War’,” Valdai Papers, No. 96, 21 November, 2018. 3 A. Khojaev, “China’s Central Asian Policy (Based on Chinese Sources),” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 38. 4 J. Farchy, “China’s Great Game: In Russia’s Backyard,” The Financial Times, 14 October, 2015. 5 J. Blanchard, K. Lin, “Contemplating Chinese Foreign Policy: Approaches to the Use of Historical Analysis,” Pacific Focus, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, 2013, p. 165.

23 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition demonstrated great skillfulness in using the entire set of economic, political, military and other instruments that it offers. It not only improved the functioning of the SCO mechanism, but put into action the vast arsenal of its bilateral relations with each of the Central Asian states. Having recognized their independence and established diplomatic relations, the PRC hastened to sign numerous agreements, promoted closer economic cooperation, opened air traffic and simplified the visa regime for its own and foreign citizens. Wholesale trade was organized in Beijing and in border towns, customs dues on exported Chinese products and imported raw materials were lowered or even annulled; transportation and delivery service was improved, highways were modernized together with delivery means. According to the IMF, trade between China and the five post-Soviet Central Asian states (Ka- zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) rose from $1.8 billion in 2000 to $50 billion in 2013; later it dropped somewhat, together with the raw material prices. In “Golden September” (to borrow the term from Chinese media) 2013, Chairman Xi Jinping paid official visits to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to sign, over 10 days, a number of highly important documents, including those that raised the relationships with these countries to the “strategic partnership” level. On 1 June, 2018, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev said in his exclusive interview to the Xinhua Agency that during the years of Kazakhstan’s independence China had invested over $16 billion in its economy. Well-known and highly successful Chinese companies CNPC, CGNPC, CITIC and over 1,200 companies with Chinese capital are operating in Kazakhstan. According to Forbes electronic publisher, since 2015 the republics have signed five agreements on cooperation clusters in transport infrastructure, trade, processing industry, construction, agriculture, etc.6 China has moved to the fore in the communication revolution unfolding in the region by promoting a system of fixed telecommunication network and a system of data transfer to promptly receive information from all corners of the world. Many of the new technologies were created by the Huawei and ZTE companies that operate in close contact with the People’s Liberation Army of China on domestic national loans from the China Development Bank. This is how the latest technologies appeared in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the resource-rich countries with which China is building long-term relations. “Concern about these telecom companies was enough to prompt U.S. congressional hearing which concluded that Huawei and ZTL ‘cannot be trusted’ on the basis that they are too close to Chi- nese ‘state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States’.”7 The U.S. National Secu- rity Agency launched a secret program Operation Shotgiant to penetrate Huawei and hack its servers.8 “Energy exports have been a major factor in the expanding economic relationship between Central Asia and China. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing has invested billions of dollars in energy-related infrastructure projects and acquisitions in the region’s energy sector. Central Asia is projected to supply 20% of China’s gas consumption by the end of 2015, and this share is expected to grow as China continues to expand its pipeline network in the region.”9 It is obvious that internationalization of resources as a basis for consolidation of national, regional and global resources to promote national and regional development and joint solution of

6 See: I. Zhukov, “Skolko Kitaia v Kazakhstane?” Forbes Kazakhstan, 10 May, 2017, available at [https://forbes.kz/ auto/skolko_kitaya_v_kazahstane], 15 September, 2018. 7 P. Frankopan, The Silk Roads: A New History of the World, Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, First Vintage Edition, 2017, p. 502. 8 Investigative Report on the US National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE. US House of Representatives Report, 8 October, 2012. 9 E. Rumer, R. Sokolsky, P. Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, available at [https://carnegieendowment. org/2016/01/25/u.s.-policy-toward-central-asia-3.0-pub-62556].

24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 tactical and strategic tasks is the central and dominant vector (axis) of geo-economic integration groups. Turkmenistan, which until the first decade of the 21st century had sent all of its extracted gas to Russia, became China’s main gas supplier. In 2009, China funded the equipment of Galkanysh, the region’s biggest group of gas fields, becoming the only foreign country permitted to use the onshore Turkmen gas fields. Today, China has already built a vast network of gas pipelines to become the biggest gas market for Turkmenistan since Russia had refused to buy its gas. Turkmenistan is actively involved in cooperation with China in the transportation sphere: under one of the contracts, it bought 66 new diesel locomotives and 64 freight and passenger cars and later 113 (mainly passenger) cars from China. Turkmenistan paid only 15% of the total sum, the rest was paid by the commercial loan from the Chinese company Capital-Longji Sci-Tech Co, Ltd for 8 years with an annual rate of 3.6%.10 In 2005, it signed a contract with Capital-Longji Sci-Tech Co, Ltd for a purchase of 48 diesel locomotives and 50 cars for a total amount of $128.6 million. The Chinese company funded 85% of the total sum, or $109 million in the form of a commercial loan. In 2008, Turkmenistan signed a contract with Capital-Longji Sci-Tech Co, Ltd on $27.5 million on 10 main- line freight diesel locomotives and spare parts, funded by the China Exim Bank.11 Prior to that, Turk- menistan had bought railway equipment from Russia. This means that China’s presence in the transportation sector of Turkmenistan is limited to diesel locomotives, freight and passenger cars and spare parts, the China Exim Bank being the main creditor. In 2018, China actively tested the transit potentials of the China-Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran route. It sent several test trains of 40-50 containers from the cities of Yiwu (the Zhejiang Province in the country’s east), Changsha, capital of Hunan Province in China’s south, Yinchuan, an autonomous region in the central part of the country) and Xi’an (also known as Sian) and Bayannur in the country’s north and discovered that the new route was three times faster than the previous one (which required shipping by sea).12 This is what happened to American company Conoco Phillips, which decided to sell its share in Kashagan, the biggest Kazakhstan project in 2013, but never contemplated China as a possible buyer. Kazakhstan’s authorities used their first refusal right. They borrowed the required amount from China to buy the share package and transferred it to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Later, an oil pipeline was built to move 20 million tons a year from Kazakhstan to China.13 As soon as the Soviet Union disappeared, China and Kazakhstan organized railway communications, in 1992-2006, the volumes of freight turnover between Alashankou and Dostyk (Friendship) increased 34 times over, from 47 to 1,625 million tons. Since 2006, the two countries have determined to further intensify their railway communications and have been working on the technical aspects of rail joining at the Khorgos border point. Since that time, the volumes of supplies of Chinese railway machinery and equipment to Kazakhstan, partly bought using Chinese loans, increased.14

10 See: “In the Last Four Years Turkmenia Bought from China 130 Diesel Locomotives and Passenger Cars,” Delovaia pressa, 15 November, 2010, available in Russian at [http://www.businesspress.ru/newspaper/article_mld_20644_ald_509953. html], 12 March, 2017. 11 See: V.V. Paramonov, A.V. Strokov, O.A. Stolpovsky, Kitayskiy ekonomicheskiy ekspress v tsentre Evrazii: novaia ugroza ili istoricheskiy shans (ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Kitaia v Tsentralnoy Azii, ed. by V.V. Paramonov, ОАО Altayskiy poligraficheskiy kombinat, Barnaul, 2010, p. 112. 12 See: “Razvitie transportnoy otrasli Turkmenistana v 2018 godu,” Kaspiyskiy vestnik, 19 February, 2019, available at [http://casp-geo.ru/razvitie-transportnoj-otrasli-turkmenistana-v-2018-godu/], 27 March 2019. 13 See: A. Mordvinova, “Ekonomicheskaia strategia Kitaia v Tsentralnoy Azii: zadachi, instrumenty, rezultaty,” Viper- son, 31 March, 2016, available at [http:// viperson.ru/articles/icheskaya-strategiya-kitaya-v-tsentralnoy-azii-zadachi-instrumenty-rezultaty], 13 February, 2019. 14 See: V.V. Paramonov, A.V. Strokov, O.A. Stolpovsky, op. cit., p. 56.

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As could be expected, in 2015, the Kazakhstan scenario attracted the biggest volume of con- tainer traffic: in 2014, freights along the China-EU-China route were shipped through the Trans-Baikal area, while in 2016 two-thirds of its volume were moved through border points in Kazakhstan.15 In China, Khorgos is the second (after Alashankou) “window” to the West that opens up routes to Almaty, Bishkek, Tashkent and other Central Asian cities and further on (Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Gulf countries). Three strategically important main gas pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbeki- stan and Kazakhstan reach China through Khorgos to provide approximately half of the volume of gas consumed by households. The transportation corridor and preferential conditions of the free-trade zone are expected to become the industrial base for the development of Khorgos. The border control point turned the Khorgos Autonomous District into an international hub of highways, railways and pipelines connected with Central Asia and Europe. A project of the main railway China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan, essential for China in the first place, has been actively discussed since 1997 on China’s initiative. Today, China has nearly completed construction of the related facilities in its territory. Kyrgyzstan, which needs this railway, does not have the funds to start construction. In 2006, Beijing offered Bishkek a $1.2 billion soft loan in exchange for access to the republic’s mineral resources, specifically, gold. This stirred up a vehement discussion in the corridors of power and the expert community of Kyrgyzstan.16 With no common borders with Uzbekistan, China is interested in it as a transit country. China was previously involved in the electrification of the Tukumachi-Aganharan railway. In 2010, according to a contract between the state joint-stock company Uzbekistan Temir Yo’llari and the Chinese Zhuzhou, China delivered diesel locomotives for a total amount of $75.53 million.17 China’s investment activities are apparent in Afghanistan as well. In 2007, Chinese corporations China Metallurgical Group Corp., Jiangxi Copper Corporation and Zijin Mining Group Company won the tender for the development of Aynak, one of the world’s biggest copper deposits near Kabul. The $3.5-billion deal is the biggest in the history of Afghanistan. China might be interested in other copper deposits, as well as in gold and iron ore mining. Moreover, there are practically undeveloped deposits of oil (about 1.6 million barrels) and natural gas (15.7 trillion cubic m) in Afghanistan.18 China invited the Central Asian states to join the New Silk Road Economic Belt and gave them a chance to “ride the Chinese train.” By that time, China had done a lot to revive “rung” as the traditional principle of Chinese diplomacy: “magnanimous and benevolent patron.” Today, Central Asian and Eurasian economies are confronted with an obvious challenge. None of them can compete with China’s non-raw material sectors on its own, which significantly limits the prospects and structures of their economies. In March 2015, the Chinese government adopted the “Vision and Action Plan for Jointly Build- ing the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” a document of highest importance prepared by the State Committee for the Development and Reforms of the PRC and by the foreign affairs and commerce ministries. This is, in fact, a framework “road map” with highly structuralized basic elements: geography, aims and tasks, principles, trends and mechanisms of realization. “The Belt and Road Initiative is more than China’s asymmetric response to the United States related to secure routes of raw material supplies. It is an important element of its own system parallel

15 See: L.B. Vardomsky, M.O. Turaeva, Razvitie transportnykh koridorov postsovetskogo prostranstva v usloviiakh sovremennykh geopoliticheskikh i ekonomicheskikh vyzovov, Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2018, p. 43. 16 See: V.V. Paramonov, A.V. Strokov, O.A. Stolpovsky, op. cit., p. 74. 17 See: I. Reshetnikov, “Namanganskaia pravda”: poezda poydut v Ferganskuiu dolinu cherez pereval Kamchik,” Tsen- trAsia: inform, 3 March, available at 2011 [http://www. centrasia.ru/news.php?st=1299133620], 20 April, 2016. 18 See: A. Bovdunov, “Novaia bolshaia igra: kak prikhod Kitaia v Afghanistan zatronet interesy Rossii i SShA,” Novo- rusmir, 27 December 2017, available at [http://novorusmir.ru/archives/35040], 15 May, 2018.

26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 to the already existing one.”19 China intended to create a single market for electric power within the EAEU program by 2019 and a single market for oil, gas and oil products by 2025. Due to many regional problems that still remain unresolved Beijing uses its cooperation with Central Asia within the New Silk Road Economic Belt and the SCO to tune up long-term partner relations with each of the countries separately. Broad and consistent access to global trade, resources and energy fuels is an absolute condition, required for a country to realize its long-term development aims. On the one hand, Beijing makes no secret of its intention to draw the Greater Central Asia into its sphere of influence; on the other, it does not make that claim on every corner. There is one important aspect that deserves a special mention: possible repercussions of undeclared yet massive investments in the regional infrastructure accompanied by wider political cooperation with the regional countries. In 2016, China offered military assistance to Afghanistan for the first time; the leaders of the latter discussed more extensive defense cooperation with the Defense Ministry of China. Kabul was interested in logistic equipment, light weapons, spare aviation equipment parts, ammunition and military uniforms. As distinct from Moscow, Beijing prefers not to demonstrate its military potentials so as not to provoke even greater irritation with China’s military-political ambitions in Central Asia in Washing- ton and Brussels. Crediting policy is one of the key instruments of China’s economic strategy in Central Asia. All in all, by the beginning of 2016, China had already provided Central Asian countries with loans totaling $30 billion, which increased the debt burden of these countries. In the past, they have borrowed money from international financial institutions; today, China has become one of the main creditors with powerful consolidating positions in the region. In 2015, the share of China in the foreign national debt of Tajikistan reached 43% ($0.9 billion), Kyrgyzstan—35% ($1.2 billion) and Kazakh- stan—8.5% ($13.3 billion). Credit terms were and remain highly specific: they are low-interest (1.5-3%) long-term (up to 20 years) loans with a grace period, which makes them highly attractive for the region’s states that have practically no access to the Western financial markets. This helps China gain political weight in Central Asia. Arina Mordvinova, an expert in Central Asian politics, has forecasted that the Chinese side will rely on crediting to a much greater extent to widen the spheres of the yuan in the region.20 Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, countries rich in natural resources, are the main objects of Chi- na’s active crediting policy. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan use Chinese money to reconstruct their power lines and roads. In Uzbekistan China is pursuing a different crediting policy. Tashkent demonstrates a determination to funnel Chinese money into the real sector, while China gives money to Uzbek enterprises under conditions of purchase of Chinese equipment.21 However, there is a problem: China refuses to regularly inform its partners about trans-border project funding on a standardized or transparent basis. The Chinese Development Bank and Exim Bank do not reveal the terms of their loans, which makes it practically impossible to assess the cost of debt of each debtor country to China.22 Chinese investments in its closest neighbors’ infrastructure are offered on soft conditions under an obligation to use Chinese materials, equipment, technologies and machines, as well as Chinese railway standards and services of qualified Chinese experts in their operation.

19 A.O. Vinogradov, “Asimmetrichny otvet, ili strategia Kitaia v globalnom mire,” Filosofskie nauki, Issue 1, 2015, pp. 116-134. 20 See: A.E. Mordvinova, “Kredity kak instrument ekonomicheskoy strategii Kitaia v Tsentralnoy Azii,” Aftershock, 22 February, 2016, available at [https://aftershock.news/?q=node/374799&full], 11 March, 2016. 21 See: A. Mordvinova, “Ekonomicheskaia strategiia Kitaia v Tsentralnoy Azii: zadachi, instrumenty, rezultaty.” 22 See: R.F. Cekuta, K. Cheriegate, E. Deahl, Y. Chen, Protection and Modernization of Critical Infrastructure—Key to Prosperity and Security, Caspian Policy Center, Washington, 2019, p. 29.

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This is amply confirmed by the relations between Tajikistan and China, wherein the latter pours money into the economy of the former, especially in precious metal mining. In 2011, this crediting activity forced Tajikistan to part with stretches of its territory to repay the debt. In 2013, Tajikistan sold part of its Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region for $500 million. In 2018, it transferred the rights to the Verkhniy Kumarg gold fields in the Sughd Region to Beijing to repay the debt incurred for the modernization of the Dushanbe-2 thermal power station.23 The New Silk Road strategy is not limited to economic partnership, it stretches into international cooperation in the academic and cultural spheres. During the next decade, 30,000 young people from the SCO countries will receive stipends to study at Chinese higher educational establishments; 40,000 Chinese students and teachers will be educated in Central Asian countries at the expense of the Confucius Institutes funded by the Chinese government. In some of the Central Asian republics CCTV, the Chinese state TV channel offers, on a regular basis, programs about China and blocks of news supplied by the state information agency Xinhua, as an important instrument of strategic penetration of China into Central Asia and consolidating its positions there.

Conclusion

Confronted with certain limitations or even obstructions in the region, the Chinese leaders abandoned any giant collective projects involving all the countries of Central Asian and concentrated on bilateral agreements according to the simple principle: some projects are successful, others are not. China prefers long-term plans; the SCO is its main instrument in the region, which helps it maintain a balance of power; and it is shifting the balance in its favor, while its growing economic and political weight forces the Central Asian leaders to visit China more often. So far, the Belt and Road Initiative is too recent to assess its future, yet it may obviously revolutionize trade in Eurasia; in fact, the process has begun, yet the rate is still slow. In the future, it may revolutionize Eurasia in many other spheres as well. It promises huge advantages and is fraught with huge challenges that may change everything, from global policies to national identities, accelerate the redistribution of global GDP from the West to the East and create very serious pressure on fresh water and food sources. As usual, everything depends on those who realize these plans and the way they are implemented.

23 See: G. Abdullaeva, “Na Shelkovom puti cherez Tsentralnuiu Aziu voznikli trudnosti,” Aftershock, 24 January, 2019, available at [https://aftershock.news/?q=node/723216&full], 20 March, 2019.

28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 UNDERSTANDING JAPANESE SOFT POWER POLICY AND ITS FEATURE IN CENTRAL ASIA

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.03

Farrukh USMONOV Ph.D. (International Studies), Senior Researcher, The Asian Population and Development Association (APDA), Secretariat of JPFP (Tokyo, Japan)

Fumiaki INAGAKI Ph.D. (Media and Governance), Lecturer, Graduate School of International Resource Sciences, Akita University (Akita, Japan)

ABSTRACT

he states of the Central Asian region in the Central Asian region. There is a posi- obtained their independence in 1991 tive attitude towards Japan and Japanese T and have been undergoing a turbu- people among the population of Central lent transition process, such as civil war, Asian countries. This work explores the fea- cross-border conflicts, revolution and socio- tures of Japanese soft power policy and its political reforms. Japan has been furthering development in Central Asia. The core of the its cooperation with the Central Asian coun- multilateral collaboration format in Japanese tries since the day diplomatic relations were Central Asian Policy is “Central Asia + Ja- established. Despite only a 25-year history pan,” which aims to promote inter-regional of cooperation, Japan has developed nu- and intra-regional cooperation among the merous and diverse patterns of involvement Central Asian states.

KEYWORDS: Japan, soft power, Central Asia, regional cooperation.

Introduction

Central Asia’s post-Soviet period attracted various international actors. The region has been subject to the socio-economic partnership and a field of various conflicts. Japan established diplo-

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP20K01519.

29 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition matic relations with five states in the early years of their independence and has been advancing them since. Japanese Prime Minister, however, visited Central Asia only twice. The first visit was by PM Koizumi Junichiro in August 2005, when he visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Ten years after Koi- zumi’s visit, PM Abe Shinzo visited Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbeki- stan on 22-28 October, 2015, and became the first Japanese PM and the political leader of G7 countries to pay a visit to all five countries. Prime Minister Abe’s speech assured of active efforts being made by Japan to resolve challenges faced by all Central Asian states1 and of its intention to contribute to the region’s development. This speech did, however, have another aim, namely to counter China, which was gaining momentum, and boost leverage with Russia.2 The Japanese government has not changed its diplomatic stance in the region since 1997. PM Hashimoto Ryutaro declared the New Silk Road Diplomacy at the meeting of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives on 24 July, 1997.3 This strategy is a part of Eurasian Diplomacy, introduced by Hashimoto Administration, which aims to involve Russia in the East Asian regional order so as to counter China’s influence. In order to further the relationship under the flag of the New Silk Road Diplomacy, Hashimoto Administration had dispatched the Obuchi Mission headed by Foreign Minister Obuchi Keizo to Russia and four Central Asia states, except Tajikistan, where a civil war was underway. The Obuchi Mission was the first visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to Central Asia and signified the launch of Japanese Central Asian policy. In this mission, however, Central Asian policy was a part of policy towards Russia and China. Hashimoto Administration had been tackling the Northern Territories issue with Russia. One of the aims of the mission was to obtain the support of or to reach an understanding with Central Asian states on the Japanese stance on the northern territorial problem. Since Obuchi succeeded Prime Minister Hashimoto in July 1998, it seemed that Central Asian diplomacy would also advance. Unfortunately, the sudden death of Obuchi in May 2000 led to a temporary loss of momentum in Japan’s Central Asian diplomacy. The second round of Central Asian diplomacy started in 2004 under the Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko. She introduced the Central Asia + Japan dialog, which influences the regional cooperation and the basic scheme of Japan’s Central Asian policy nowadays. This is an original framework of Central Asia + Advanced Country, and a first multilateral cooperation framework with Japanese participation. It answers the following questions: What is the scale of Japanese involvement in the Central Asian region? What are the tools of Japanese cooperation in the region? How has Japan been developing soft power in Central Asia?

Insights on Cooperation

Despite the progress in political dialog, the economic initiatives are comparatively modest. Timur Dadabaev believes that despite high expectations, Japanese involvement in the region remains mainly confined to ODA disbursements and various forms of economic and technical assistance.4 Japanese influence remains limited, with several directions for participation that are yet to be ex-

1 See: Speech by Prime Minister Abe on Japan’s Foreign Policy Toward Central Asia, 28 October, 2015, available at [https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/ca_c/kz/page1e_000055.html]. 2 See: “Abe Looking to Visit Five Central Asia Nations in October,” Japan Times, 14 July, 2015, available at [https:// www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/07/24/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-looking-visit-five-central-asia-nations-october/#. XY0t-y2KXOR]. 3 See: “About the Silk Road Initiative,” MOFA Japan, available at [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/yojin/arc_02/ silkroad_a.html], July 2012 (in Japanese). 4 See: T. Dadabaev, “Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policies towards Central Asia from a Comparative Perspective,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 27, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 123-145.

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 plored.5 The geographical aspects easily explain why Japan did not manage to increase its influence in this region. Even if a Japanese company is interested in Central Asia’s natural resources, importing them from this region is a challenge. Japan has a disadvantage in connectivity with Central Asia. However, Dadabaev provides a skeptical assessment of the Japanese soft power policy in the area by indicating the disparity between the Japanese-led educational programs and the almost null employment opportunities in Japan. On the other hand, he believes that Japan has been doing a lot for the promotion of cultural interaction by establishing Japan Centers and regularly holding cultural events both in Japan and Central Asia. According to Khalil-ur-Rahman Shaikh, Japan has considerable interests in the Central Asian region, associated with natural resources and the region’s geopolitical location, while the regional states need to cooperate with other countries due to recently acquired independence and weak economy. Both sides can benefit from this collaboration; however, more initiatives are required to strengthen the partnership. In reference to human relationships, the expert pointed to the history of Japanese prisoners of war in Central Asia after World War II. Their contribution to the reconstruction of the post-war development of the region led to mutual tolerance between the prisoners and the local population. The issue of Japanese POWs, as this study revealed, is often on the agenda in the meetings of various levels between Japan and Central Asian representatives. For example, Prime Minister Abe highlighted prisoners’ contribution to the reconstruction of Central Asian cities in his speech at Naz- arbayev University in Kazakhstan in 2015. He stressed that the recent peace in Japan was built upon the precious sacrifice made by these people.6 In the early 2000s, a group of experts was against any political intervention in domestic affairs of the Central Asian countries by the Japanese government, countering those who expected Japan to support the democratization process in Central Asia. Japan, unlike the U.S. and EU, which often point to the issue of human rights in the region, may act appropriately, and propose further reforms and democratization to the region.7 Democratization should not be imposed from outside, but instead be inculcated domestically as part of the political evolutionary process.8 This strategy was welcomed in the region where newly independent countries, seeking a mutual partnership with developed countries, have been attempting to develop governance that is more similar to their political culture.

Soft is Preferable to Hard

The concept of soft power, which was coined by Joseph Nye, is relatively new in modern politics. The traditional concept of power, which is generally associated with political realism (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau), defines all politics as a struggle for power.9 Adherents of neo- realism have criticized this definition. The liberal school of international relations criticized the concept of management by stressing that many important global outcomes cannot be adequately explained by power, but are better understood through the salutary presence of democracy, specific configurations of domestic interests, liberal values, economic interdependence, or international insti-

5 See: T. Dadabaev, Japan in Central Asia: Strategies, Initiatives, and Neighboring Powers, Palgrave Macmillan, U.S., 2016. 6 See: R.Sh. Khalil, “Japan’s Relations with Central Asia,” Daily Times, 26 April, 2018, available at [https://dailytimes. com.pk/232415/japans-relations-with-central-asia]. 7 See: A. Kawato, “What is Japan up to in Central Asia?” in: Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead, ed. by Ch. Len, T. Uyama, T. Hirose, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Washington, Stockholm, 2008, p. 23. 8 See: “Executive Summary,” in: Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving the Road Ahead, p. 11. 9 See: H. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.

31 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition tutions.10 The concept of soft power is defined as the use of culture, political values, and foreign policies to attract or influence, rather than coerce or induce, the behavior of others.11 It also refers to a state’s ability to shape other states’ foreign policy choices through non-coercive measures. The main criticism of this concept is that it is “too soft.”12 The concept of soft power was built upon the current popularity of American culture abroad and the opportunity to influence other countries’ government. The Japanese soft power policy, however, differs from that of the U.S. in the sense that Ja- pan’s culture is comparatively less popular, which forces the government to work on promotion of its cultural popularity in the world.

Cultural Diplomacy or Soft Power

This work examines the Japanese understanding of soft power. This concept is a tool of the Japanese foreign policy, which is consistently described as cultural diplomacy. The Japanese multi- dimensional soft power approach stirs up controversy among experts. After the end of World War II Japan was banned from using its military in international disputes. That is why it had to develop a mechanism to influence its international partners’ decision-making process, and the concept of soft power has proven essential. Japanese cultural diplomacy, anime and computer games are a few examples of the popularity of the country’s culture abroad. Seiko Yasumoto believes that in addition to ODA and other forms of cooperation with various states, Japan has made significant contributions to the domain of popular culture. She stated that the complimentary access of younger Asians to Japa- nese media could be seen as an improvement of regional cooperation, political relations and better mutual understanding.13 The Cool Japan policy, similar to Cool Britannia in the 1990s, is another example of Japanese soft power. Christine Yano believes that the efforts invested in creating the image of Cool Japan led to the transformation of Japanese popular culture into soft power.14 The Japanese Soft Power policy may prove useful to the country’s entire sphere of cooperation. Sugiura Tsutomi explained that culture as a source of soft power is also necessary for businesses. On the other hand, too much government emphasis on Cool Japan might put people off as the popularity of Japanese culture was precisely due to a lack of government control and presence of free expression.15 Agawa Naoyuki emphasized “personal soft power” as an additional source of Japanese soft power. This element of Japanese culture can be used in various aspects of international cooperation, such as among politicians, diplomats and the general public.16 This study demonstrated that despite the considerable work of experts on analyzing Japanese soft power, there are very few research studies on the subject of Japanese soft power promotion in the

10 See: M. Barnett, R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization, No. 59, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 39-75. 11 See: J. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, No. 119, Issue 2, 2004, pp. 255-270. 12 N. Ferguson, “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, No. 134, January-February 2003, pp. 18-24. 13 See: S. Yasumoto, “Impact on Soft Power of Cultural Mobility: Japan to East Asia,” Mediascape, No. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 1-13. 14 See: Ch.R. Yano, “Wink on Pink: Interpreting Japanese Cute as It Grabs the Global Headlines,” The Journal of Asian Studies, No. 68, Issue 3, 2009, pp. 681-688. 15 See: T. Sugiura, “Japan’s Creative Industries: Culture as a Source of Soft Power in the Industrial Sector,” in: Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, ed. by Y. Watanabe, D. McConnell, M.E. Sharpe, Inc, New York, 2008, pp. 128-153. 16 See: N. Agawa, “Japan Does Soft Power,” in: Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States, pp. 226-229.

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Central Asian region. Furthermore, most of the experts, especially in Japan, believe that the Japan- Central Asia cooperation model is tied entirely to energy security, the region’s geopolitical location, or its importance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Japanese Soft Power Development

Asia, particularly Southeast Asia, has been considered the primary region where Japan is heav- ily promoting its soft power and cultural policy. Japan had made a significant contribution to modernization and active development in Southeast Asia in the early years. Products made in Japan have become very popular along with its culture and traditions. The Japan Times indicated that the Japa- nese government’s export of culture, including animation, fashion and food seeks to promote Japan’s “soft power” in a PR strategy called Cool Japan.17 The Economist added that the government-initiated promotion of Cool Japan is part of the Abe Administration’ new strategy. The government of Shinzo Abe is in the process of spending some ¥90 billion ($883m) to propel Japan’s creative industries abroad.18 Japanese culture is popular in Central Asia, too. However, unlike Southeast Asia, Japanese participation in the development of Central Asia is modest. Japanese technology, economy, education, literature and anime are among the aspects well known among Central Asians. Besides, after World War II, Japan as a nation has improved its image as a peace-promoter. It has contributed to peace and stability in various countries. Nowadays, the sense of cultural and racial similarities between Japanese and the Central Asian nations is the subject of research. Japanese scholars heed particular attention to the hypothesized connection between the Japanese race and the Ural-Altaic races, which the population of some of the Central Asian countries belongs to. Japan has been attracting the younger generation from Central Asia to study and work in Japan. In this manner Japan contributes to the development of human resources in Central Asia. The number of students learning Japanese has been increasing. The youth of Central Asia are discovering manga, anime, Japanese pop music, fashion and food. All of the above components are part of the Cool Japan concept and cultural diplomacy which, in the future, may be used to enhance the implementation of soft power in the region. The government of Japan understands that Japanese manga or animation attracts the young people in Central Asia. For example, MOFA of Japan used symbolic characters for the all states that participate in the Central Asia + Japan dialogue for the promotion of the basic framework of its Central Asian policy (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, the model of Japan’s post-war recovery could be useful for some of the Central Asian states. Japan demonstrates its own model of democracy, transition to the market economy, regional cooperation and promotion of peace. In November 2006, Foreign Minister Aso Taro presented the idea of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, as a diplomatic policy of the first Abe Admin- istration (2006-2007). In his speech, Aso assured that Japan is willing to guide and support the newly independent and transitional countries.19

17 See: “Cool Japan: Exporting Culture via ‘Cool Japan’,” The Japan Times, 15 May, 2012, available at [http://www. japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/15/news/exporting-culture-via-cool-japan]. 18 See: “Japan’s Soft Power: Squaring the Cool,” The Economist, 16 June, 2014, available at [http://www.economist. com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/japans-soft-power]. 19 See: Speech by Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the Occasion of the Japan Institute of International Affairs Seminar “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”, MOFA, 30 November, 2006, available at [https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html].

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Figure 1

The Characters of Central Asia + Japan

S o u r c e: [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/europe/caj/image/wallpaper10years.jpg].

The global actions of cultural and development promotion have been implemented by Japan Centers. The Japan Centers, supported by JICA, are vital institutions that operate outside the country, aiming to highlight Japan’s ODA activities. They are hubs for training business personnel in the host countries and developing human networks, opening their doors to the locals who are interested in Japan. These centers target three main directions: business, language and the promotion of mutual understanding. Furthermore, these programs initiate the introduction of the Central Asian nations to Japanese public and vice versa. People in Japan associate Central Asia with the Great Silk Road that brought Buddhism and civilization from the west to Japan.20 Considering this historical fact, the governments of Central Asian countries are stepping up their efforts to attract more Japanese tourists. This study explored the political segment of cooperation that is capable of becoming a source of soft power enhancement. The Japan initiated the Central Asia + Japan dialog in an effort to stimulate regional cooperation. The sides frequently hold meetings in this format, promoting inter-regional cooperation and strengthening intra-regional collaboration. This initiative allowed Japan to take a stance in the region and is continuation of a former Prime Minister Hashimoto’s “Eurasian diplomacy.” This political dialog enables Japan to advocate for regional cooperation. Furthermore, this is the first real-time implementation of the Central Asia + Advanced Country format and the first multilateral cooperation framework with Japanese participation. Japanese Embassies and JICA Representatives play a significant role in the above-mentioned processes. These institutions are instructed to promote government policies abroad by engaging themselves in various projects, including the organization of cultural and traditional festivals. In fact, Ja- pan has been leveraging its presence in the region for almost 30 years. Japan also has rivals in the region, i.e., Russia, China, Korea, Turkey, Iran and EU. This study has defined the socio-political groups that are lobbying Japanese presence in the region. Japan has been increasing its presence in these countries, partially because of support provided by such groups. Most members of these groups

20 See: F. Kishida, “Kazakhstan, Japan Mark 25 Years of Diplomatic Relations,” Kazinform, Astana, 2017, available at [https://www.inform.kz/en/kazakhstan-japan-mark-25-years-of-diplomatic-relations_a3021924].

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 were either educated in Japan, employed by Japanese companies or have shared business interests with the Japanese. Some elements of the Japanese culture were introduced in Central Asia through other states. For example, the popularity of Japanese food was transmitted via Russian media and TV shows. About five million Central Asians have been working in Russia, which certainly influences their food choices and life-style. Furthermore, Japanese martial arts, such as Karate-do, Judo and Aikido became popular among ordinary citizens of the region because of Hollywood movies. This work examined Japan’s achievements in the sphere of population and sustainable development, in particular, its healthy society and active ageing have been a model of progress for many Asian countries. Kazakhstan studies the experience of Japan, particularly the adoption and implementation of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) that has covered all health care services and significantly improved the general health of the population. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with their high fertility rate, are studying the birth control and family planning options through Japanese experience. A group of Central Asian parliamentarians occasionally communicate with their Japanese colleagues on this topic regarding the adoption of related policies and programs. In this study this interest cor- relates with the soft power component, where the Japanese model prompts another state to follow it.

Kazakhstan

Japanese involvement in Kazakhstan is broader; it involves direct investment, loans, technical cooperation, import-export, cultural and innovation centers. Rich in natural resources, Kazakhstan is a potentially attractive destination for Japanese companies. The Japan Center in Kazakhstan also promotes Japanese culture by providing language classes and business seminars. The innovation centers are widely operating in various Kazakhstan institutions, such as Kazakh-Japan innovation center at the Kazakh National Agrarian University. A cultural center with a Japanese garden was opened at Nazarbayev University. Human development programs encourage students from Kazakh- stan to study in Japan. Furthermore, direct flights connecting Astana and Tokyo have been operating since 2019, which stimulates people to travel and get to know each other. The political dialog between Japan and Kazakhstan constantly deepens. After Prime Minister Abe’s Central Asian tour in 2015, the first President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev paid an official visit to Japan in 2016 and addressed the National Diet. Both countries regularly hold meetings of the Kazakh-Japanese Joint Commission of Public and Private Sectors, with a focus on economic and other development issues. At the international and global level, the two countries cooperate through UNSC on issues like nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The Japanese pavilion at EXPO 2017 in Astana, which presented various energy projects, was one of the most popular. The Japanese health care system attracts Kazakh specialists because of the ongoing health reform in Kazakhstan, including consideration of potential implementation of Universal Health Coverage.

Kyrgyzstan

Cooperation between Japan and Kyrgyzstan occurs on a comparatively lower scale.  First of all, this is because of the country’s geographical location and modest natural resources.  Secondly, it is the weakness of its economy and political instability.

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The flow of Japanese ODA to Kyrgyzstan in first and second decades of post-independence concentrated on the development of infrastructure, agriculture and human resource sectors, which eventually supported the country’s transition process. The Japan-Kyrgyzstan relationship entails cultural cooperation too. Japan Center for human development is one of the institutions that represent Japan. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz culture was introduced to the Japanese society through various programs. In 2018, the Kyrgyz filmCentaurus was released in several cinemas in Japan, while in the same year NHK, the national TV channel, was broadcasting a program about Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan

Japan is not the main trade and business partner of Tajikistan. It has been contributing to the development of Tajikistan, and many people in Tajikistan still view the Japanese as investors. There are few Japanese companies active in Tajikistan. On the other hand, the interest in Japanese culture displays a tendency to increase. The number of Tajik students enrolling at Japanese universities has been growing. In the past, the students were enrolled through programs supported by Japan, while recently the number of self-supported students have been growing. After graduation, young people are seeking internship and employment opportunities at Japanese companies. This is because of the Japanese open-door policy to foreign employees where local companies recruit international employees. Japan’s post-war recovery and maintenance of the stability and peace could be a model for Ta- jikistan, which experienced civil conflict in 1992-1997. Japan conducted certain projects that supported peace and stability in Tajikistan. Furthermore, Tajikistan is one of the main partners of Japan in matter of reconstruction of Afghanistan. This study concluded that the work of Japan in the population and sustainable development sector was studied by the Tajikistan side, which encouraged Tajikistan to set up a new institution— the National Council on Population and Development—in 2014. It aimed to address policies and programs and targeted SDGs, while consolidating all interested parties, including the civil society and NGOs. In the tourist sector, the Japanese are attracted by Tajikistan’s ancient history that descends from the Aryan civilization. It has been home to various religions, such as Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Hel- lenism and Islam, for centuries. The discovery of Buddha in Nirvana statue and the reform of the National Museum of Antiquities of Tajikistan by the Japanese demonstrates their interest in the Tajik culture.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, with its immense gas and oil reserves, is the deployment zone of several Japa- nese energy projects. It was in Turkmenistan that Japan signed the largest bilateral agreement in Central Asia totaling $18 billion during Prime Minister Abe’s visit. Japanese companies, such as Sumitomo Corporation, Kawasaki Plant System Ltd. and Sojitz Corporation have been investing in Turkmenistan’s chemical and energy sectors. Furthermore, the study shows that both sides are collaborating in matters of global and regional concern, such as supporting peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, coordination of efforts for the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the region. As far as the development of human potential is concerned, unlike other Central Asians, few Turkmen students study in Japan and the number of Turkmen public officers doing internships at

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Japanese institutions are moderate. However, the Turkmen government has invited Japan to support personnel training of Turkmen specialists within Turkmenistan. Oguz Khan University of Engineer- ing Technologies is an institution that teaches the Japanese advanced science and technology cur- riculum, including the Japanese language. Several Japanese and Turkmen universities signed agreements on academic exchange and cooperation. Since the number of Turkmen public officers trained and educated in Japan is not high, the probability of implementing soft power in this country is comparatively lower at this point, while it does not mean that Japanese involvement will be limited in the future.

Uzbekistan

Japan’s presence in Uzbekistan is rather apparent. Japan and Uzbekistan first signed the strategic partnership agreement in 2002, 2015 and expanded this partnership in 2019 after President Mirzi- yoyev’s visit to Japan. The Japanese contribution to Uzbekistan’s economy demonstrates positive dynamics by promoting import-export, direct investment, loans, grants and technical assistance. Some Japanese companies have their representative offices in Uzbekistan, while joint ventures, such as Isuzu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi and others have been active in this country. At the international level, both countries continue to support peace and stability in Afghanistan. They criticize all forms of terrorism and call for strengthening multilateral cooperation to improve counter-terrorism capabilities. This work has concluded that Japan and Uzbekistan closely collabo- rate in culture, education, tourism and academic sectors. Japanese universities established a partnership with several institutions in Uzbekistan, increasing the interest in Japanese culture and tradition. Uzbekistan-Japan Center trains specialists in business development, teaches language, familiarizes the local population with Japanese culture and provides various related information about Japan. The highest number of Japanese tourists in Central Asia has been noted in Uzbekistan, since Uzbekistan Airways was the only regional airline that offered direct flights to Japan until 2019. Japan has been contributing to the human resource development of Uzbekistan by providing internship and capacity building courses for public officers at Japanese institutions. The results of this cooperation is illustrated by the growing number of Uzbekistanis in Japan, which is over 3,000 as of December 2019.21 The chances of exercising the soft power in this country for Japan is relatively high.

Conclusion

Japanese soft power policy is a tool of the government’s foreign policy. The strategy calls for the promotion of its socio-political culture to people in various countries. The scale of Japanese presence in the region is due to the growing popularity of its culture in Central Asia, as a model of development, as well as the geopolitical location and the reserves of natural resources in Central Asia. However, considering the geographical conditions, it is a challenge to create a new corridor between Central Asia and Japan. Even if the sides aim to strengthen the relationship through trade and material exchange, the problem of connectivity, which involves China and Russia as a transit corridor, remains, while the so-called South Corridor via Afghanistan and Iran is unstable. Considering these geopolitical factors, soft power is the most effective Japanese policy in the region. This study dem-

21 See: “Japan-Uzbekistan Relations (Basic Data),” MOFA, 5 November, 2020, available at [https://www.mofa.go.jp/ region/europe/uzbekistan/data.html].

37 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition onstrated examples of criticism of soft power concept, even though this concept is a suitable instrument of Japanese foreign policy, which has limited itself in the use of traditional (hard) power. Fur- thermore, this work reveals that even though Japan’s involvement in Central Asia was moderate, there was still a soft power policy in play. However, considering Japan’s resources and comparing its en- gagement in other Asian sub-regions, such as Southeast Asia, the Japanese presence in Central Asia and its impact on local population are moderate. On the other hand, two sides have an enormous collaboration potential, which may become a platform for expansion of Japanese soft power in the region.

KAZAKHSTAN’S “ENERGY PLURALISM”: LONGSTANDING AND NEW RISKS

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.04

Raikhan ZHANBULATOVA Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

Gulnar ANDIRZHANOVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, School of Society, Technology and Ecology, NARXOZ University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Miras ZHIYENBAYEV Fellow, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

his article examines the current trends ization of Kazakhstani society. Considerable in the development of the energy sec- attention is heeded to the development risks T tor in the Republic of Kazakhstan. It is in various sectors of the fuel and energy com- a key factor in the country’s competitiveness plex that affect Kazakhstan’s multi-vector en- and a driver of the comprehensive modern- ergy policy. The urgent task of the country’s

38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 sustainable development and the creation of entails the development of “energy pluralism” a more balanced energy sector leads to the with the prospect of further diversification of conclusion that a synergetic approach is pri- the country’s energy balance and an empha- oritized in Kazakhstan’s policy. This approach sis on innovative development.

KEYWORDS: Kazakhstan, energy pluralism, energy diplomacy, hydrocarbon policy.

Introduction Target Setting. Relevance

Kazakhstan’s fuel and energy complex allowed it to become deeply integrated with the global- ized economy; it sells its products and receives income, finances itself and purchases goods, services and technologies. Today, the republic’s energy policy is assigned a key role in the successful modernization of all spheres of life in Kazakhstani society. Kazakhstan’s energy strategy has a “pluralistic” design due to the variety of types of extracted energy resources and transportation routes, and diversification of investors and consumers. It can be argued that the “energy pluralism” characteristic of Kazakhstan affects the country’s overall competitiveness under modern conditions. The fuel and energy sector accounts for 17% of Kazakhstan’s GDP and provides 44% of the republic’s budget. At the same time, it is the energy sector that is the source of main risks that can significantly affect the Kazakhstan economy, including the formation of a balanced structure of the country’s economic activity. Today, the energy policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan requires a major transformation. Over the current decade, the global economy has not been able to overcome the crisis, which in the last year was aggravated by the pandemic and led to a significant drop in both demand and world prices for energy resources. For instance, the pandemic has reduced the demand for petroleum products in the aviation industry. This has created new challenges for the country’s sustainable development. In order to understand the prospects for the development of the energy sector of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the authors attempt to identify the main development trends and risks of the energy sector of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Variety of Types of Extracted Energy Raw Materials

First, it is important to determine the state, development trends and problems of the main sectors of the Kazakh fuel and energy complex (oil and gas, nuclear, coal and electric power sectors) in the context of the leading trends in the global energy development. Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country in the world, with 2.7 million sq. km, and is one of the important sources of energy for the global economy, since it possesses 3.6% of the world’s primary energy reserves. In 2019, Kazakhstan ranked 12th in the world in terms of proven oil and gas con- densate reserves, with a production volume of 90.5 million tons of oil, exporting 72.4%. In 2019, Kazakhstan ranked 22nd in the world in terms of proven natural gas reserves; gas production in the

39 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition same year reached 56.4 billion cu m. In addition, Kazakhstan is one of the world leaders in uranium mining (2nd place), and is among the top ten countries in the world in coal mining (8th place). Today, the total volume of recoverable fuel reserves (oil, gas, coal and uranium) in Kazakhstan is about 32 billion tons of oil equivalent (toe). As mentioned above, 44% of the budget revenues in Kazakhstan depend on the cost of oil, since, despite all attempts to modernize, the dependence of the Kazakhstani economy on the fuel and energy complex has not decreased. The main increase in oil production in 2019 is associated “with stable growth in the Kashagan field (14.1 million tons), as well as in Tengiz (29.8 million tons) and Karachaganak (11.2 million tons). These three projects account for about 60% of all production in Kazakhstan.”1 The Tengiz and Kara- chaganak fields, discovered in 1979, and Kashagan, discovered in 2000, are among the largest in the world. Tengiz and Karachaganak are located on land, which facilitates the logistical and oil purifica- tion issues, while the Kashagan field is located in the offshore of the Kazakhstan sector of the Cas- pian Sea. This is the largest (Kashagan’s geological reserves are estimated at 4.8 billion tons of oil and over 1 trillion cu m of natural gas) and a very complex offshore field that requires the use of -ex pensive technologies and infrastructure. The share of the national company KazMunayGas in the development of these fields is 29% in Tengiz, 16% in Kashagan, and 10% in Karachaganak. The volatility of oil prices has become the most important problem for the national operator in recent years. In addition, the pandemic crisis is taking its toll on the oil sector. In particular, global oil demand is projected to fall by 7-9%. It should be noted that in addition to oil, the above projects also provide the bulk of gas production in the Republic: Karachaganak—49%, Tengiz—31% and Kashagan—14%.2 Gas exports play a less significant role than oil exports, accounting for only 34% of production. However, “blue fuel” is in demand on the domestic market.

Figure 1

Gas Transportation Infrastructure of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Orenburg-Novopskov

Kazakhstan-China

Central Asia-Center

Bukhara-Ural 0 2 000 4 000 6 000 Length, km

S o u r c e: “On Approval of the Concept for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030,” Information and Legal System of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available in Russian at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1400000724], 24 November, 2020.

1 R. Zhanbulatova, M. Zhiyenbayev, M. Dyusembekova, R. Nurtazina, “The Energy Vector of Kazakhstan-Russia Relations in the Context of Global Changes on the International Energy Market,” Central Asia and the Caucasus. English Edition, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2020, pp. 121-130. 2 See: “Kazakhstan zanimaet 22-e mesto v mire i 3-e mesto sredi stran SNG posle Rossii i Turkmenistana,” Central Communications Service under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at [http://www.ortcom.kz/kazahstan- zanimaet-22-mesto-v-mire-3-mesto-sredi-stran-sng-posle-rossii-turkmenistana/], 24 November, 2020.

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Today, the most pressing issues for the sustainable development of the gas industry in Kazakh- stan include:  dependence of gas production on oil field development, since it is based on the use of associated petroleum gas;  weak level of development of the country’s gas transportation infrastructure (for domestic use, for gas export and transit). Due to the transit nature of the gas transmission infrastructure, part of the territory of the Re- public of Kazakhstan remains non-gasified. The southern regions of Kazakhstan depend on gas supplies from Uzbekistan, and the northern regions on supplies from Russia. Another resource sector of Kazakhstan, nuclear energy, has good development prospects. Ka- zakhstan is the leader in the global natural uranium market, all raw materials are exported (in 2019— 22.8 tons, constituting over 40% of world uranium supplies), since the republic does not have its own nuclear power plants. The national operator AO NAC Kazatomprom is one of the leading uranium mining companies in the world and controls 55% of uranium production in Kazakhstan.3 Kazakhstan plans to ensure the industrial and innovative development of the country’s economy in the future by developing and implementing science-intensive nuclear energy technologies, and to become a country with a complete nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, the Development Strategy of AO NAC Kazatom- prom for 2015-2025 designated diversification in all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle as the priority goal.4 To achieve this goal, it is planned to produce fuel for nuclear power plants in the form of final products. In particular, since 2016, AO NAC Kazatomprom, together with the Chinese corporation CGNPC, has been building a plant for the production of fuel assemblies (FA) for use at nuclear power plants in the PRC.5 The risks of developing the nuclear industry are primarily associated with transport and logistics dependence on Russia. Uranium is transported through Russian seaports and railways, which makes Kazakhstani producers dependent on the affordability of Russian carriers’ services. Coal energy retains the leading position in Kazakhstan. Although the current global situation in the global energy markets is not in favor of coal, the share of coal energy in the country’s energy balance has not decreased. Most (more than 60%) of the extracted coal (115.4 million tons) is consumed in the domestic market. The following risks for the development of the coal industry are still relevant:  logistic problems (geographic remoteness of Kazakhstan from the largest export markets and high transport costs associated with this problem);  lack of competitiveness of Kazakhstani coal due to its physical characteristics (high ash content, low calorific value). Over 50% of attrition and annual elimination of coal mining capacities should also be taken into account.6 In addition, the current decline in coal supplies from Kazakhstan by the main importer, Russia, exacerbates the situation in this sector.

3 See: “On Approval of the Concept for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2030,” Information and Legal System of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available in Russian at [http: adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1400000724], 24 November, 2020. 4 See: “Priniata novaia strategia razvitiia AO NAK Kazatomprom na 2015-2025 gody,” Kazatomprom National Com- pany, available at [https://www.kazatomprom.kz/ru/media/view/prinyata-novaya-strategiya-razvitiya-ao-nak-kazatomprom- na-2015-2025-gody], 24 November, 2020. 5 See: “Production of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,” Kazatomprom National Company, available in Russian at [https://www. kazatomprom.kz/ru/page/produktsiya_yatts], 24 November, 2020. 6 See: “Ugol’ protiv solntsa: kakoe budushchee u energetiki Kazakhstana?” inbusiness.kz, available at [https://inbusiness.kz/ru/last/ugol-protiv-solnca-kakoe-budushee-u-energetiki-kazahstana?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=deskto], 24 November, 2020.

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As for the development of the electric power industry in the Republic of Kazakhstan, 128 power plants produced a total of 106 billion kWh of electric energy in 2019. Renewable energy sources (RES) are considered one of the promising areas in the energy industry, and Kazakhstan is a leader in the CIS region in terms of its development. It is worth emphasizing that Kazakhstan was the first in the CIS to adopt the Environmental Code in 2007, then in 2009 the Law on Supporting the Use of RES, and the Concept of Transition to a Green Economy in 2013, and subsequently launched high-tech innovative renewable energy projects. These projects include the production of photovoltaic modules and wind rotor turbines. The number of commissioned facilities began to grow. Currently, Kazakhstan has 90 renewable energy facilities with an installed capacity of over 1 GW, including 19 wind, 31 solar, 37 hydroelec- tric power plants and 3 bioelectric power plants. The renewable energy market has grown exponen- tially, with 2.4 billion kWh of green energy generated in 2019, 77.8% more than in 2018. According to preliminary data, the share of renewable energy in total electricity generation is estimated at 2.3%. In general, the economic significance of the development of renewable energy sources for Kazakhstan lies in the fact that the introduction of “green” technologies will lead to an increase in the energy efficiency of the national economy by 40-60%.7 In our view, mastering value chains of low-carbon and zero-carbon technologies is a challenge to competitiveness, economic development, energy sovereignty, and security. However, one of the current main problems in the electric power industry of Kazakhstan is associated, first and foremost, with the high wear and tear of equipment. Summarizing the analysis of the state of the fuel and energy complex, it is essential to note that Kazakhstan has a diversified energy production structure. It is necessary to clarify that 72.4% of produced oil, 34% of gas, 31% of coal and 100% of nuclear energy products are exported. However, the challenge of creating a more balanced structure in the energy sector remains relevant.

Diversification of Hydrocarbon Sales Markets

In particular, oil is exported by Kazakhstan to 35 countries in Europe and Asia. The main consumers of Kazakhstani oil are the European countries (Italy, Netherlands, France, Switzerland and others), as well as China, Russia, and Uzbekistan. More than half of the exported oil and petroleum products are sold to the European countries.

Table 1

Main Directions of Kazakhstan Oil Export (2019)

Total Export, Amount of Exported Oil, Share in Oil Export Structure, Countries $bn tons %

Italy 8.2 17,074,562 24

Netherlands 3.5 7,410,979 11

France 3.4 7,024,677 10

Switzerland 2.3 5,276,194 7

7 See: “Vyrabotka elektricheskoy energii ob’ektami VIE vyrosla na 65% (see: “Neft, benzin i VIE: Itogi 2019 goda,” FinReview, available at [http://finreview.info/ru/review/neft-benzin-i-vije-itogi-2019-goda-2/], 24 November, 2020).

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Table 1 (continued)

Total Export, Amount of Exported Oil, Share in Oil Export Structure, Countries $bn tons %

Uzbekistan 0.6 200,803 6

Russia 0.56 133,291 5

China 1.1 2,460,428 4

The main consumer of Kazakhstani raw uranium is China. It is also being exported to the Eu- ropean Union, among which France is the largest consumer, as well as to India, Japan, the U.S., and Russia. China and Russia are major consumers of Kazakhstani gas. Judging by the above list of consumers of Kazakhstani energy resources, China seems to have a significant role in the implementation of the multi-vector energy strategy outlined by Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan, which has a common 1,783-km border with China, the world’s largest energy market, this is a rather favorable opportunity. However, the global situation has led to a reduction in China’s purchases of Kazakhstani gas since March 2020.

Diversification of Foreign Investment Sources

The energy industry has been the subject of the republic’s investment activities since it has declared independence. Kazakhstan is gradually transforming according to the rules of the international market, and FDI is attracted thanks to the favorable conditions created by the country’s authorities. Investors are offered production sharing agreements, joint ventures, tax breaks and other privileges. According to the data for the last decade, about $250 billion in FDI has been attracted by Kazakhstan.8 By the end of 2019, the country totaled $24.1 billion in FDI.9 The favorable investment climate in the country has attracted investments in the oil and gas sector, i.e., from the U.S., China, Japan, Russia, France, Great Britain and other leaders of the world economy, which became the driver of economic growth. Kazakhstan took the 25th place in the 2019 annual World Bank Doing Business rating, which assesses the investment attractiveness of the economies of 190 countries.10 The innovations adopted in 2017 in the Code on Subsoil and Subsoil Use of the Republic of Kazakhstan significantly improve the investment attractiveness of the energy industry. This is due to the alignment of national legislation with the global standards of the OECD countries with regard to mechanisms that allow to stimulate private investment in geological subsoil exploration, provide guarantees of stability of subsoil use conditions, and eliminate a number of administrative barriers.11

8 See: “$250 mlrd inostrannykh investitsiy privlek Kazakhstan za poslednie 10 let,” Forbes Kazakhstan, available at [https://forbes.kz/news/2019/07/30/newsid_204748], 24 November, 2020. 9 Kazakh Invest National Company website, available in Russian at [https://invest.gov.kz/ru/], 24 November, 2020. 10 See: “Ease of Doing Business Rankings,” The World Bank, available at [https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings], 24 November, 2020. 11 See: Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art 179.3.1,2 available in Russian at [https://online. zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=31764592&mode=p&page=13], 24 November, 2020.

43 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

For investors like Russia and China, Kazakhstan’s geographical location has become one of the most important decisive factors in FDI, since it allows them to significantly reduce production and transportation costs. In addition, the Russian Federation and the PRC do not intend to exclude Ka- zakhstan from their investment portfolio in the interests of strengthening partnerships with Kazakh- stan. For Russia, this is important against the background of destabilization in other EAEU partner countries in connection with the events in Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. For China, Kazakhstan is a key country in the Belt and Road Initiative, as it is one of the shortest land corridors to Europe. Nevertheless, pessimistic economic forecasts for the post-COVID-19 period lead to a reduction in investments in oil production. A decrease in Chinese investments is anticipated due to a slowdown in economic growth in the PRC itself. In these conditions, China is minimizing foreign investments, as it prioritizes the financing of national production. The demand for resources is noticeably decreasing amid the economic downturn in the PRC. In particular, as mentioned above, China is gradually reducing purchases of Kazakhstani gas. The investment potential of the EU is important for Kazakhstan. The interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan overlap with the interests of the EU countries, whose main interests in cooperation with Kazakhstan are focused on ensuring access to energy resources and participating in the development of their reliable transportation to the EU market, which is an option for diversifying sources and routes of energy resources for the EU. At the same time, Kazakhstan is not merely significant as a source of raw materials; it is also important for the EU as a transit state for the transportation of gas from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, in turn, does not intend to limit itself exclusively to the export of hydrocarbons to Europe. The Republic of Kazakhstan aims to cooperate with the EU countries in the spheres of energy efficiency and energy saving, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and clean energy technologies. Kazakhstan’s position in the EU energy space is being consolidated with the support of a well- developed legal and institutional framework for bilateral cooperation in this area. Kazakhstan has been a party to the Energy Charter Treaty since 1994, and it also actively participates in EU infrastructure programs, such as TRACECA and INOGATE. The new Agreement on Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation between the EU and Kazakh- stan, concluded in 2015, recognizes the need for enhanced, sustainable and effective cooperation in the energy field to ensure energy security based on the principles of mutual interest, reciprocity, transparency and predictability. The factors that hinder the effective cooperation of the EU countries with Kazakhstan include geopolitical risks, underdeveloped infrastructure, limited market, inefficiency of state institutions, and weak competitiveness of the national economy. Competition for foreign investment in the energy sector has increased, motivating Kazakhstan to create a more attractive environment for potential investors. Kazakhstan is also interested in creating a variety of energy supply routes to sales markets. Traditionally, the overwhelming majority of Kazakhstani oil and gas is transported through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains the main export route,12 which carries oil from Kazakhstan to the Black Sea terminal Yuzhnaya Ozereevka (Novorossiysk, Russian Federation). The Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline provides access to markets across the Russian Federation through the oil pipeline system of PAO Transneft to the Baltic terminal of Ust-Luga and to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.13 Kazakhstan cannot directly supply its resources to Europe—even its access to the Caspian Sea does not provide an opportunity to enter the world market without using transit routes.

12 See: R. Zhanbulatova, M. Zhiyenbayev, M. Dyusembekova, R. Nurtazina, op. cit. 13 See: “Natsionalny energeticheskiy doklad Kazenergy 2019,” Kazenergy, available at [https://www.kazenergy.com/ ru/analyst/190/], 24 November, 2020.

44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

The foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan is aimed at ensuring the establishment of stable and safe routes for the energy export in various geographic directions. This issue has become an important area of economic diplomacy of the Republic of Kazakhstan following the realization that the main hydrocarbon raw material export route has a single destination. The inland location of Kazakhstan in the very center of Eurasia creates certain difficulties for the full realization of its -po tential, however, at the same time, it determines its special role in the transit of energy resources throughout the Eurasian continent. Thanks to the multi-vector strategy of export deliveries, Kazakhstan has increased its maneuvering capacity by increasing the throughput of the Chinese exports and by linking fields in the country’s western regions with the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline. At the moment, Kazakhstan is capable of exporting up to 20 million tons of oil per year to China, however, in 2019 only 50% of the throughput capacity was used. Marine oil transportation is carried out by vessels of the subsidiary of AO NC KazMunayGas- TOO NMSK Kazmortransflot. The main operating sea routes are: Aktau-Baku (Caspian Sea), Aktau- Makhachkala (Caspian Sea), routes from the Black Sea ports. In 2008, as a result of reorganization AO KazTransOil became the owner of 100% of shares of Batumi Terminals Limited (Cyprus). The latter is the company that directly owns and manages production assets in Georgia—the Batumi oil terminal and the Batumi seaport. This allows to transport oil via the Aktau-Baku-Batumi corridor.

Geopolitics as a Risk Factor in the Energy Sphere

The energy component is becoming a strategic resource in the global geopolitical scenario, for instance, the export of energy resources has become not only a driver of Kazakhstan’s economic development, but also a factor that determines its status in world politics. In particular, the Concept for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex of the Republic of Kazakhstan emphasizes the need to strengthen geopolitical influence in the region. Geopolitical and geo-economic issues related to energy policy are becoming increasingly more complex. In addition to the risks associated with the resource supply security, which remain acute, new risks associated with the competition of global and regional actors are now emerging. In this context, there are risks associated with Kazakhstan’s closest partner—Russia. They are rooted in the geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia, which are competing on a number of issues: access to energy technologies (ongoing sanctions after the Ukrainian crisis), competition in the European gas market (Nord Stream 2, export of American LNG), the development of oil pipelines and gas pipelines bypassing Russia in the Caspian region. The latter factor is especially important for Kazakhstan, since a significant part of the republic’s hydrocarbon resources are located in the Caspian oil and gas basin, which plays an important role in ensuring the supply of energy to Europe. In addition, the transit routes for these resources go through Russia, which plays a dominant role and has been in confrontation with Europe since the Ukrainian crisis. In addition, most EU countries support green track initiatives.14 In the longer term, the green reversal of the EU countries, as well as the United States and such large market players as China, Japan and South Korea (which also announced decarbonization by 2060) will inevitably lead to a slowdown in the growth of global oil demand, as well as to a revision of energy strategies. In particular, in one of his statements, Joseph Biden promises to invest $2 trillion in green energy over the next four years, subsidize the industry, increase investment in low-carbon energy technologies, and plans to tighten

14 See: “Ugol’ protiv solntsa: kakoe budushchee u energetiki Kazakhstana?”

45 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition taxation and environmental regulation in the oil and gas industry (abolish federal subsidies, restrict the issuance of new licenses, cancel the construction of new pipelines, introduce a “carbon tax”). The EU’s Green Deal was introduced in December 2019 by the European Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, who plans to tackle the transformation of the energy system. This course consists of a series of initiatives designed to ensure the implementation of EU sectoral strategies in line with the principles of sustainable development and to achieve EU climate neutrality by 2050. Today, the entire global energy sector is transforming on the basis of three rising trends—decarbonization, digitalization, and decentralization. According to the WEC’s “energy trilemma” index, which evaluates countries in terms of achieving the optimal balance between the three components of sustainable energy: energy security, energy equality and environmental sustainability, Kazakhstan ranked 42nd out of 128 countries in 2020. According to the WEC experts, Kazakhstan demonstrates improved energy security, maintains stable energy equality indicators, however, environmental sustainability has slightly decreased at present. In addition, there is a decline in the country’s innovative potential.15

Conclusion

Thus, the relevance of the problems of the Kazakhstani fuel and energy complex is increasing due to the uneven distribution of the country’s fuel and energy balance across regions, deterioration of the fixed assets of the fuel and energy complex, lagging logistics potential, weak infrastructure of the fuel and energy complex, lack of capacity, high energy intensity of the economy, lack of financial resources, and environmental problems. These risk factors, both the above-mentioned internal and external (in particular, the transit of the country’s energy resources through neighboring and third countries, the price of energy resources in foreign markets, geopolitical risks) affect the priorities of the energy policy implemented by the Republic of Kazakhstan. This policy is aimed at ensuring the balanced and sustainable development of energy resource generation, transportation, and processing. These priorities correlate with topical issues of hydrocarbon transportation route diversification and the introduction of new technologies. The main directions and priorities of Kazakhstan’s energy policy are set out in a number of documents.16 The prospects for the energy sector of the Republic of Kazakhstan are associated with the development of technologies and infrastructure for processing energy resources, manufacturing products with higher added value, reducing their cost and increasing energy efficiency. The priorities of Kazakhstan’s policy are based on the analysis of the national situation and geopolitical conditions, but, above all, the resource potential. At the same time, Kazakhstan vests an interest in combining several factors of economic growth: availability of resources, diversification of the country’s energy balance, innovative development. The energy policy of Kazakhstan, aimed at the interaction of these factors, should contribute to the country’s sustainable economic development, regardless of the global energy prices.

15 See: “WEC Trilemma,” World Energy Council, available at [https://trilemma.worldenergy.org/#!/country-profile? country=United%20Kingdom&year=2020], 24 November, 2020. 16 See: “On Approval of the Concept for the Development of the Fuel and Energy Complex of the Republic of Kazakh- stan until 2030”; “On Approval of the Strategic Development Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan Until 2025 and Invalidation of Some Decrees of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Information and Legal System of Regulatory Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available in Russian at [http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1800000636], 24 November, 2020.

46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

ETHNIC RELATIONS AND MIGRATION

SOUTH CAUCASIAN ETHNIC COMMUNITIES IN RUSSIA: SPECIFICS OF FORMATION AND ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR HOMELANDS

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.05

Sergey RYAZANTSEV D.Sc. (Econ.), Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences; Professor, Director, Institute of Demographic Studies of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IDR FCTAS RAS); Head, Department of Demography and Migration Policy, MGIMO, Foreign Ministry of Russia (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ELENA PISMENNAYA D.Sc. (Sociol.), Professor at the Department of Sociology, Financial University at the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russian Federation)

This article was prepared within the project supported by the Council of Grants at the President of the RF for State Support of Young Russian Scientists and the Leading Scientific Schools of the Russian Federation (Grant No. НШ-2631.2020.6).

47 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

Maria APANOVICH Ph.D. (Political Science), Assistant Professor, Department of Demography and Migration Policy, MGIMO, Foreign Ministry of Russia (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Dzerassa DZUSOVA Probationer, Institute for Demographic Studies of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IDR FCTAS RAS) (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

his study has been suggested by the suggested a comparative analysis of their huge importance of labor migration emergence and development. We have T for the social and economic develop- identified the typical industries preferred by ment of the South Caucasian post-Soviet representatives of each of the South Cauca- space. Confronted with an unprecedented sian states in Russia, and the documents outflow of their citizens and acutely aware of required of migrants to be employed in Rus- the problems associated with migration of sia. Conclusions related to the specifics of able-bodied population to other countries, influence and the role of the diasporas in the Russia among them, these countries have structure of their employment are contained arrived at a conclusion that their migration in the final part of our article along with the policies need reforms. The article analyzes identified patterns and trends of these pro- the trends of labor migration from the South cesses. Caucasian countries to Russia and other Today, the situation on the market is equally popular destinations. The migration unbalanced when it comes to job availability trends up to and including Russia’s regions and the positions of members of these dias- with the maximum numbers of labor mi- poras. The situation will remain the same as grants from the Southern Caucasus and the long as diasporas preserve their influence structure of their employment by industry and the migration flows, their proportions. are also analyzed. The paper contains sta- We have identified the most attractive re- tistics on the amounts of remittances sent by gions in terms of job availability, the spread labor migrants from Russia to their home- of migrants from the Southern Caucasus lands and assesses their impact on the across the regions of the Russian Federa- economies of corresponding states. The cul- tion and the rivalry between Azeris, Arme- tural and economic contacts between the nians, and Georgians for jobs in various em- diasporas and the countries of their origin ployment spheres.

KEYWORDS: Southern Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, diasporas, communities, employment, remittances.

48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 Introduction

Disintegration of the Soviet Union transformed the Soviet Transcaucasian republics into independent South Caucasian states in a region that was and remains a patchwork of peoples and cultures squeezed between the spheres of interest of Russia, Turkey and Iran throughout its history. Its geopolitical and strategic importance can hardly be overestimated. It was under Soviet authority that historical territories of ethnic communities and peoples of the Southern Caucasus were divided by political borders. The conflict potentials thus created regularly manifested in different forms up to and including open ethnic confrontations, specifically, between Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Georgia and Abkhazia. The disintegration of the unified state transformed the shape and geography of migration flows. The migration processes unfolding in the region are determined by a range of social, economic and political factors: economic crises, demography, ethnic conflicts and development of diasporas among them. The largest number of migrants prefer Russia, although Turkey, the Middle Eastern countries, the EU, the U.S., and Canada have been recently gaining popularity. The choice depends, to a great extent, on the passport and visa requirements, which makes the Eurasian Economic Union fairly important. After 2015, when the Republic of Armenia joined the organization, its citizens no longer need visas and work permits in Russia. They can remain in the territory of the Russian Federation for 90 days without registering as migrants. If and when they start working, they should be registered as migrants at the places of temporary residence within 30 days. Azeris, likewise, need no visas to enter Russia, yet they do need a patent which remains valid for twelve months and should be confirmed every month. In 2015, the Russian Federation introduced a visa regime with Georgia; this means that its citizens need a Russian visa and a Russian work permit. The same applies to Abkhazians with Georgian passports. Those who have Russian passports may freely move between Abkhazia and Russia and be employed as Russian citizens. Residents of South Ossetia who carry internal Georgian passports can stay in the territory of Russia for up to 90 days; they do not need a visa to enter Russia but they need a patent to work. They should be registered at the places of their temporary residence within seven days after arrival and for the period indicated in the arrival notice of a foreign citizen or a stateless person. We have posed ourselves with the task to discuss the trends and specifics of the migration processes, their social, economic and demographic impact on the South Caucasian countries and Russia. We have presupposed that the geography of labor migration depends on the presence of ramified migration networks and ethnic communities in any given country, and that cash remittances strongly affect the economies of the South Caucasian countries.

Sources of Information and Research Methods

We have relied on official information supplied by the statistical services and structures of the Russian Federation and the South Caucasian countries, which turned out to contain considerable differences between data supplied by the statistical services and state structures in the countries of emi- gration and the host countries due to the different methods of definition and assessment of different migrant groups. In Russia, those who arrive and receive registration for 9 or more months are classi- fied as permanent migrants; primary data are collected by the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and processed by the Federal Service for State Statistics (Ros- stat). The South Caucasian migrants, on the other hand, consider the time they are allowed to spend in Russia a less significant factor, for them the very fact of leaving the country is more important. At

49 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition the same time, migrant-related information supplied by the South Caucasian countries is much more varied and more valuable despite certain statistical flaws. We relied, in particular, on the Selective Observation of Migrant Labor carried out by Rosstat in 2019, which included 130,000 households in different Russian regions.1 In 2014, Rosstat had already carried a similar observation of households and businessmen.2 We used information supplied by Ros- stat based on registration at places of temporary or permanent residence in Russia for over 9 months. This information is collected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and published by Rosstat in its annual collections Chislennost i migratsia naselenia Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Numerical Strength and Migra- tion of the Population of the Russian Federation).3 We also relied on data of the All-Russia Population Census of 2010, which registered a portion of the number and the socio-demographic structure of the citizens of the South Caucasian countries in the Russian Federation, their main ethnic group and the extent to which their languages are used in Russia’s regions. We also relied on the data supplied by the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs, associated with registration, permit issuing and granting citizenship to foreign citizens.4 The Federal Migration Service (FMS) at the Ministry of Internal Affairs functioned in Russia until 2016. It registered migrants at the places of their temporary or permanent residence, issued work permits and dealt with other issues, including statistical data used in this article. We relied on the information supplied by the Eurasian Economic Commission, which accumulated the data supplied by national statistical services of some of the South Caucasian countries. National statistics relied on the population numbers registered in the security agencies, which denotes when people move from one place of residence to another.5 The comparative statistics method allowed us to identify the real numbers of migrants from the South Caucasian countries and their belonging to each of the South Caucasian peoples. We relied on sociological methods, i.e., polls of experts, representatives of state structures and ethnic communities of South Caucasian peoples. The correlational analysis method was applied to identify the degree to which private trans-border remittances have affected the GDP of the national South Caucasian economies using the data of the Central Bank of the Russia Federation related to trans-border remittances made by non-residents, similar information supplied by the WB, expert assessments of unofficial remittances and information supplied by the national statistics services of the South Caucasian countries on macroeconomic indices.

Ethnic Migration and Geography of Ethnic South Caucasian Communities in Russia

According to Rosstat, in 2019, 701,000 migrants arrived in Russia for different reasons: 72,000 arrived from Armenia, about 35,000, from Azerbaijan and about 7,000, from Georgia (see Table 1).

1 See: “Vyborochnoe nabliudenie truda migrantov 2019 goda,” Federal Service of State Statistics, available at [https:// gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/imigr18/index.html]. 2 See: “Vyborochnoe federalnoe statisticheskoe nabliudenie truda migrantov 2014 goda,” Federal Service of State Statistics, available at [https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/imigr/index.html]. 3 See: “Chislennost i migratsia naselenia Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Federal Service of State Statistics, available at [https:// www.gks.ru/compendium/document/13283?print=1]. 4 See: “Otdelnye pokazateli migratsionnoy situatsii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za ianvar-dekabr 2019 goda s raspredeleniem po regionam,” Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, available at [https://xn--b1aew.xn--p1ai/Deljatel- nost/statistics/migracionnaya/item/19365693/?print=1]. 5 See: “Sotsialno-demograficheskie indikatory. Statistika Evraziyskogo ekonomicheskogo soyuza. Yanvar-dekabr 2019 goda. Statistichseky biulleten,” in: Evraziyskaia ekonomicheskaia komissia, Moscow, 2020, p. 10, available at [http://www. eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makroec/dep_stat/econstat/Documents/Bulletin_SDI/SDI%202019_12.pdf].

50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 2019 6,925 34,619 71,984 701,234 113,528 617,997 Table 1 2018 6,345 79,477 26,690 46,442 565,685 510,994 2017 6,809 79,309 25,602 46,898 589,033 524,452

2016 6,511 74,549 24,109 43,929 575,158 511,773

2015 7,038 77,034 24,326 45,670 598,617 536,157 people 2014 7,756 80,691 26,367 46,568 590,824 529,448 2013 7,665 73,479 23,453 42,361 482,241 422,738 2012 7,728 66,993 22,287 36,978 in Russia 2010-2019, 417,681 363,955 Number of Migrants from the CIS Countries and 2011 7,325 62,388 22,316 32,747 356,535 310,549 the Southern Caucasus Who Came to Permanently Settle 2010 5,245 39,635 14,500 19,890 191,656 171,940

Federal Service of State Statistics of the Russian Federation. Federal Service of From Azerbaijan From Armenia From Georgia From the South the South From Caucasian countries the CIS countries From Arrived in the Russian Arrived in the Russian Federation — total Including: S o u r c e:

51 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

South Caucasian migrants comprised about 16% of the total number of migrants who came to Russia to settle permanently. The migrants who come to work and subsequently return to their countries are counted separately. Armenia is the leader when it comes to the number of migrants wishing to settle in Russia; migration has become more active in the last years of the Soviet Union, or, to be more exact, after the 1989 earthquake in Spitak. The flow of Armenian migrants did not decrease in the 1990s and 2000s; the highest numbers arrived in 2010 and 2011. In 2010, the President of the Russian Federation visited Armenia to sign an agreement on continued stationing of the Russian military base in Armenia and prolongation of the agreement on the program of long-term economic cooperation between the two countries. In 2015, Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a step that the population interpreted as an important political signal to encourage the business community and citizens of Armenia as a whole. Convinced that the relationships between Russia and Armenia were absolutely stable, Armenians moved to Russia to work, study or settle permanently; they invested in businesses, real estate and education for their children. According to the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC), during 2013-2019 Armenia has been annually losing 16,000 to 26,000 citizens, who left it to live and work in other countries. The year 2015 saw the maximal migration outflow, which amount- ed to about 26,000 people. In 2019, its lost 16 thousand of its citizens.6 According to the Selective Observation of Migrant Labor carried out by Rosstat in 2019, there were 315,000 Armenian migrants in Russia; 267,000 of them (85%) had been living in Russia for over 5 years.7 This means that a considerable number of Armenian migrants are firmly rooted in Rus- sian society. Armenian citizens prefer to live and work in the Central (Moscow, Moscow Region, Kaluga and Voronezh regions) and Southern (the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories and Rostov Region) Federal Districts. According to the Federal Migration Service, in 2014 citizens of Armenia obtained 150,000 work permits. They were mainly engaged in construction (54%), services (16%), transport and communications (10%), and trade (2%).8 According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2019, 590,000 Armenian citizens were registered at places of temporary residence, and 44,000, at places of permanent residence; 211,000 Armenian migrants were registered as labor migrants; 13,000 studied in Russia, while 83,000 arrived for personal reasons.9 According to the data supplied by the EEC, 210,000 Armenian citizens were labor migrants.10 In 2019, over 30,000 Armenian citizens already had temporary residence permits; about 12,000 Armenians received and about 61,000 already possessed permanent residency. Twenty-four thousand Armenians became citizens of the Russian Federation.11 Many of them maintain regular ties with the home country. In 2019, nearly 35,000 citizens of Azerbaijan arrived in Russia; the level of migration from Azerbaijan is, on the whole, fairly stable. The biggest number arrived in 2011 due to the favorable

6 See: “Sotsialno-demograficheskie indikatory. Statistika Evraziyskogo ekonomicheskogo soyuza.” 7 See: “Vyborochnoe nabliudenie truda migrantov 2019 goda.” 8 See: S. Ryazantsev, The Role of Labour Migration in the Development of the Economy of the Russian Federation, ESCAP, Bangkok, 2016, p. 12, available at [https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/1%20Role%20of%20Labour%20 Eng%20report%20v3-2-E.pdf]. 9 See: “Otdelnye pokazateli migratsionnoy situatsii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za ianvar-dekabr 2019 goda s raspredeleniem po regionam.” 10 See: “Svedenia o chislennosti grazhdan gosudarstv-chlenov Evraziyskogo ekonomicheskogo soiuza, v’ekhavshikh v stranu (Respublika Armenia, Respublika Belarus, Respublika Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzskaia Respublika, Rossiyskaia Federatsia) dlia osushchestvlenia trudovoy deiatelnosti za 2013-2019,” in: Evraziyskaia ekonomicheskaia komissia, available at [http:// www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/finpol/migration/tm/Documents/%D0%A1%D0%B2%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D 0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F%20%D0%BE%20%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0% BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%20%D1%82%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D1%8F%D1%89%D0%B8%D1%85%D1%81 %D1%8F%20%202013-%202019%20%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8B.pdf]. 11 See: “Otdelnye pokazateli migratsionnoy situatsii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za ianvar-dekabr 2019 goda s raspredeleniem po regionam.”

52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 political relations, intensive trade and economic contacts and improved business communications between the two countries; in 2010, Azerbaijan began to supply gas to Russia. According to the Fed- eral Migration Service of Russia, in 2014, labor migrants from Azerbaijan received 96,000 work permits, the majority of them in Moscow and Moscow Region, Daghestan, Sverdlovsk, Rostov, Sa- mara and Novosibirsk regions, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, Tatarstan, St. Petersburg and the Astrakhan Region. Labor migrants from Azerbaijan work on construction sites (34%), in services (28%), trade (5%) and transportation (5%) sectors, as well as in industrial enterprises (1%).12 Accord- ing to the results of the Selective Observation of Migrant Labor carried out by Rosstat in 2019, there were 246,000 migrants from Azerbaijan in Russia; 211,000 of them (86%) have been residing in Russia for over 5 years without leaving.13 This means that Azeris have struck root in Russia. Today, they are mostly attracted by the Central, Southern and Volga Federal districts; recently Azeri migrants, attracted by the considerably higher wages, have discovered the Far North. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2019, 648,000 citizens of Azerbaijan were registered at places of temporary and 46,000, permanent residence. Out of the total number of Azeri migrants, 196,000 were registered as labor migrants; 16,000 as students; 210,000 arrived for personal reasons. In 2019, over 40,000 citizens of Azerbaijan already possessed temporary residence permits. Azeri migrants received about 15,000 permanent residence permits, about 56,000 obtained them earlier. About 14,000 citizens of Azerbaijan became citizens of the Russian Federation.14 We have established that Azeris are less eager than Armenians to seek Russian citizenship. Georgians are the smallest of South Caucasian diasporas in Russia. In 2011, it numbered 7,300 people, in 2018, it dropped to 6,900, that is, 7 times less than the number of Armenians. Before 2000, Georgians had mostly opted for Russia in search of work; when the visa regime was introduced, Greece took Russia’s place. The August 2008 conflict delivered another blow to Georgians’ preferences; dis- continued flights, closed consulates and sanctions against Georgian businesses practically halted labor migration from Georgia. Today, Greece has moved to the fore as one of the favorite destinations of Georgian labor migrants. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of Georgians in Greece increased ten- fold to approximate 26,000. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in 2019, there were 44,000 citizens of Georgia registered at the places of temporary and 8,000, at the places of permanent residence. Some of the migrants (3,400) arrived as labor migrants; 1,500 came to study, 27,000 came for personal reasons.15 The largest number of Georgian migrants live in Moscow and the Moscow Region, the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania. According to the FMS, in 2014, 33% of Georgian citizens worked at construction sites; 17%, in the sphere of services; 12%, in transport.16 According to the Selective Observation of Migrant Labor carried out by Rosstat, in 2019, there were 143,000 migrants from Georgia (including 133,000 (93%) who permanently lived in Russia for 5 years and longer).17 This means that the Georgian diaspora in Russia has been better adjusted to Russia than the other South Caucasian diasporas. In 2019, about 7,000 Georgian citizens already held temporary residence permits in Russia. Georgian migrants received about 3,000 permanent residence permits; about 13,400 have obtained them earlier. About 2,600 citizens of Geor- gia became citizens of the Russian Federation.18

12 See: S. Ryazantsev, op. cit. 13 See: “Vyborochnoe nabliudenie truda migrantov 2019 goda.” 14 See: “Otdelnye pokazateli migratsionnoy situatsii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za ianvar-dekabr 2019 goda s raspredeleniem po regionam.” 15 See: Ibidem. 16 See: S. Ryazantsev, op. cit. 17 See: “Vyborochnoe nabliudenie truda migrantov 2019 goda.” 18 See: “Otdelnye pokazateli migratsionnoy situatsii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii za ianvar-dekabr 2019 goda s raspredeleniem po regionam.”

53 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

As mentioned above, the migration policy and the settlement regime applied to migrants from Abkhazia and South Ossetia are very different from the regimes applied to migrants from the three South Caucasian countries. According to the RF Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 2019, it registered 10,400 migrants from Abkhazia and 1,200 migrants from South Ossetia at temporary places of residence; 349 migrants from Abkhazia and 80 migrants from South Ossetia were registered at permanent places of residence. There were only 416 people from Abkhazia in the labor market of Russia and 42 people from South Ossetia.19 The majority of labor migrants from these regions arrived as Russian citizens with Russian passports. In 2019, 142 migrants from Abkhazia and 41 from South Ossetia became Russian citizens.20 Most of those who lived in these regions became Russian citizens after 1 June, 2002 according to the new law that allowed the former citizens of the U.S.S.R. who had become stateless persons to exchange their Soviet passports for Russian. Before the law was enacted, Russian citizens comprised about 30% in Abkhazia and 40% in South Ossetia. In 2008, their shares were 85 and 90%, respectively.21

Formation of South Caucasian Migrant Diasporas and Ethnic Communities in Russia

Today, economic factors have come to the fore in all studies of the diasporas; this is especially apparent in what is written about the ethnic South Caucasian diasporas: their emergence in Russia was accompanied not only by active migration, but also by the formation of sociocultural migration networks and ethnic niches in Russia’s economy and labor markets as channels of migrants’ adjustment and integration in Russian society. There are no official data related to specifically ethnic -eco nomic activities in Russia, yet the presence of ethnic entrepreneurship and business is an objective fact. Certain indirect information can be found in population censuses and sociological studies. Georgian is the oldest South Caucasian diaspora in Russia; its history goes back to the 17th century when several thousand members of Georgian nobility moved to Moscow to avoid raids and devastation. As Orthodox Christians, they promptly became part of society. In recent history, the biggest migration wave from Georgia reached Russia in the 1990s, having been raised by the nation- alists in power and the unfolding civil war. According to the all-Russia 2010 population census, there were 158,000 Georgians and 11,200 Abkhazians in Russia, their numbers being considerably smaller than the sizes of Armenian and Azeri diasporas. Georgians prefer Moscow, while Abkhazians settle in Moscow and the area of Greater Sochi. A fairly large part of the Georgian diaspora is engaged in business activities, trade in foodstuffs, catering, and trade in cars and their repair. Georgians occupy prominent places in trade in fruit, spices, wines, bread, and cheese. Georgian restaurants of all sizes from small to extensive networks are highly popular in Russia. Cross-border trade in foodstuffs is a highly profitable business in the border areas of the Krasnodar Territory and North Ossetia-Alania. Fruit, tea, spices, candy, and bay leaves are brought to the border and transferred to compatriots who live in Russia and subsequently distributed throughout the country. There are many doctors, teachers, scientists and people of creative

19 See: Ibidem. 20 See: Ibidem. 21 See: “Komu Rossia vydavala svoi pasporta,” Kommersant, No. 67, 16 April, 2019, available at [https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/3945533].

54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 professions (actors, producers, ballet dancers, artists and architects) among the members of the Geor- gian community. The Society for Protection of Monuments of History and Culture in Russia and Georgia, set up in 1986, was the first Georgian organization in Russia. It was the first to demand that the Georgian church in Moscow (which housed a technical college in Soviet times) should be returned to the church community. In 1993, the Society returned to the Church the ancient part of the Cathedral of St. George the Victorious in Gruziny. The society was subsequently liquidated; a chain of Georgian national organizations appeared and disappeared one after another. In early 2016, a new public organization Federal Georgian National-Cultural Autonomy in Russia was established to pursue cultural and educational activities and to unite the young Georgians who live in Russia. It helped organize student groups in Moscow that worked towards unification and preservation of Georgian culture. The Council of Young Leaders of Georgian Student and Youth Groups was set up as a coordination center. Together with the Federal Georgian National-Cultural Autonomy it works towards unification of young Georgians and organizes various cultural events. The Georgian diaspora, the smallest among the other South Caucasian diasporas, is well organized and maintains cooperation among all communities. The Azeri diaspora appeared in Russia in the early 19th century, when Azerbaijan became part of the Russian Empire. In Soviet times, the number of Azeris in Russian regions was gradually increasing to include students and young men demobilized from the army who remained in Russian regions. In 1960s, Azeris moved to Siberia where the recently discovered and developed oil fields needed qualified and unqualified laborers. The 1990s witnessed another wave of economic migration created by the legalization of private enterprises, wholesale and retail trade in flowers, fruit and vegetables.22 Azeris promptly moved into these niches to become highly successful businessmen thanks to the well-configured trade and production chains set up in Soviet times. According to the Russian population census of 2010, there were over 600,000 Azeris in Russia. The diaspora estimates its numerical strength as at least 2 million; 800,000 of them in Moscow.23 The social and demographic composition of the post-Soviet Azeri diaspora comprises two social groups:  The first being educated people who lived in cities (especially Baku) and migrated to Rus- sia in early 1990s. They were the technical, scientific and creative intelligentsia of different nationalities, many of them from ethnically mixed families.  The second group comprised less educated villagers from all regions of Azerbaijan, mainly agricultural labor force. The social and demographic aspects strongly affected the process of adaptation to and integration of migrants in Russian society. As could be expected, the group of intellectual migrants promptly adjusted to Russia to become outstanding figures of Russian culture. The first ethnic Azeri communities appeared in Russia in the 1980-1990s. In 1988, the Azeri community was set up in St. Petersburg; in 1990, Daiag, the Azeri cultural association was set up to preserve the Azeri ethnicity outside its historical motherland. Today, the Azeri diaspora in Russia, like the Azeri diaspora in Turkey, is well structured, highly developed and is one of the biggest.

22 See: A. Snisarenko, “Etnicheskoe predprinimatelstvo v bolshom gorode sovremennoy Rossii (na materialakh issledovania azerbaidzhanskoy obshchiny Sankt-Peterburga),” in: Neformalnaia ekonomika, ed. by T. Shanin, Moscow, 1999, pp. 148-149. 23 See: A.S. Yunusov, Migratsionnye protsessy v Azerbaidzhane, Adilogly Publishers, Baku, 2009, in: Demoskop Week- ly. Electronic version of Naselenie i obshchestvo Bulletin, No. 67, 22 March-4 April, 2010, available at [http://www.demo- scope.ru/weekly/2010/0415/biblio02.php].

55 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

Relying on its history that goes many centuries back, it set up a big network of branches and structural units across Russia. As a rule, the Azeri diasporas pay a lot of attention to national culture, its preservation and development, they encourage stronger friendship and better mutual understanding between Russians and Azeri and, for obvious reasons, do a lot to support migrants and help them adjust to Russian society. Between 2001 and 2017 there was a big All-Russia Azeri Congress. Today, the interests of the Azeris in Russia are protected by several structures: the Federal National Cultural Autonomy of the Azeris in Russia that has been functioning since 1999 and several fairly active regional organizations: the Azeri Community of Moscow, the Azeri National Cultural Autonomy Araz in the Stavropol Territory, the National-Cultural Autonomy of the Azeris Vatan (Motherland) in the Samara Region, etc. The history of the Armenian diaspora in Russia is long and complicated. According to the 2010 population census, there were 1.1 million Armenians living in Russia. By expert assessments Arme- nian migration to Russia reached its peak in 1991-1995. In these years Armenia lost over 1 million of its citizens, about 70% of whom opted for living in Russia.24 All public organizations based on ethnic and regional principles banned in the Soviet Union were legalized during the perestroika. The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh inspired new Armenian organizations: Karabakh, Barev Dzes, Iusisapayl, MTsAK-Mashtots and Vospurakan, the precursors of a united coordinating center. In 1989-1999, new ethnic Armenian organizations appeared and disappeared. In 1999, a proposal to create an all-Russia Armenian organization The Union of Armenians of Russia was made at the Armenia-Diaspora conference in Erevan.25 On the whole, Armenians are quite successful in different businesses: they own restaurants and cafes, shops and food corners, car services, construction companies. In many regions they own funeral business, shoe and clothes repair shops, shops in which keys, buttons and zippers are made, small businesses, such as bakeries, dress making and tailoring, and repair of household appliances. Many of them are engaged in transporting fruit and vegetables from the south of Russia and CIS countries to central Russia. There are fairly large Armenian communities in the south of Russia (in Krasnodar, Rostov-on-Don, Pyatigorsk and Kislovodsk), Moscow and St. Petersburg. Many of their members have successfully integrated in Russia’s society as its inalienable part and are appreciated as skillful and diligent workers and successful businessmen. Armenians figure prominently in the medical, teacher, academic and engineer communities.

Contribution of Labor Migrants and Diasporas to South Caucasian Economies

The high unemployment level and low wages force people to leave the South Caucasian countries, which are relatively weak in the economic sense. For instance, in 2000, there were 515,000 unemployed in Azerbaijan; in 2018, the number dropped to 254,000, yet unemployment remained a serious problem in the countryside and smaller towns. Georgia is in a similar trap. According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, in 2019, the unemployment level in the countryside equaled 5.5%; in cities, 17.4%.26 This makes labor migration the most obvious and the easiest way to earn

24 See: G.A. Pogosian, “Analiz migratsionnykh potokov v Armenii,” in: Tranzitnaia migratsia i tranzitnye strany: Teoria, praktika i politika regulirovania, ed. by I. Molodikova, F. Diuvel, Universitetskaia kniga, Moscow, 2009, pp. 195-213. 25 See: K.K. Tirabian, “K voprosu ob opredelenii fenomena diaspory (na primere armianskoy diaspory),” Upravlencheskoe regulirovanie, No. 2 (110), 2017, pp. 128-136. 26 See: National Statistics Office of Georgia, available at [http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_ id=146&land=eng].

56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 money; as could be expected, labor migrants prefer the countries that need guest workers and are ready to pay more than others, they rely on their compatriots in the migration networks and ethnic businesses in Russia and in other countries. Remittances of labor migrants to their home countries in the Southern Caucasus are huge: they stimulate consumption by raising family incomes. According to the World Bank “officially recorded annual remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries reached $529 billion in 2018.”27 In many cases the annual remittance flows are the only source of foreign currency which play a more important role than export earnings, foreign direct investments and other sources, including private capital.28 According to the Central Bank of Russia, in 2013, remittances by labor migrants to CIS countries and the Southern Caucasus reached their maximum: $20.8 billion to CIS countries, including $1.6 billion to Armenia and $1.2 billion in Azerbaijan. After 2014, the volumes decreased great- ly because of another financial and economic crisis in Russia (see Table 2). According to the studies carried out by Ilmir Nusratullin, the remittances from Russia shrank under the pressure of the wors- ened economic situation in Russia, devaluation of the ruble and the political crisis in Ukraine.29 All South Caucasian countries suffered the consequences: on average the volumes of official remittances dropped almost two-fold in 2014-2019. According to Azganush Migranian, “there is a direct interdependence between the remittance level and crises (in 2009, the level of migrants’ remittances dropped by 60% from Russia as a whole and by 55% to the CIS countries in comparison with the crisis year 2008), which confirmed that the labor market in Russia was an object of competitive regulation.”30 According to the Central Bank of Russia, in 2019, trans-border remittances by non-residents reached $7.5 billion; $6.1 billion of the total were transferred to CIS countries. Armenians send home more money than other labor migrants. In 2019, they sent $628 million to Armenia; remittances of Armenian labor migrants and members of the Armenian diaspora comprised 21% of the country’s GDP. Russia ensures about 76% of all private remittances from foreign countries to Armenia and is followed by the United States ($192 million), Ukraine ($76 million) and France ($34 million). On the whole, these are the countries with the largest Armenian diasporas and the largest number of Armenian labor migrants.31 Remittances of the Armenian migrants and members of the Armenian diasporas are one of the most important sources of income for the local population and an important source of the country’s economic growth. In 2019, Azerbaijan received $412 million from Azeri labor migrants and the Azeri diaspora in Russia (see Table 2);32 the average remittance equaled $305 and was made, due to the absence of offices of Russian banks in Azerbaijan, by post through Western Union and other money transfer services (mainly QIWI). According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia, in 2013, $1.4 billion were transferred to Georgia from several countries, mainly from Russia, Italy, Greece and the U.S. (see Table 3). Be- tween 2007 and 2013, the volumes of private remittances to Georgia were steadily growing (the crisis

27 Record High Remittances Sent Globally in 2018, available at [https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- release/2019/04/08/record-high-remittances-sent-globally-in-2018]. 28 See: World Economic Outlook, Vol. 2, 2012, p. 69, available at [http://www.businessforecast.by/partners/ publication/406/]. 29 See: I.V. Nusratullin, “Transgranichnye denezhnye perevody trudovykh migrantov,” Finansy Bashkortostana, No. 3, 2017, pp. 67-70. 30 A.A. Migranian, “Vliianie transgranichnykh denezhnykh perevodov trudovykh migrantov na ekonomiku Rossii,” Trud i sotsialnye otnoshenia, No. 11, 2013, p. 46. 31 See: T. Manaserian, “Voprosy ekonomicheskogo rosta i migratsii v Armenii v kontekste chlenstva v EAES,” Dialog: politika, pravo, ekonomika, No. 1 (12), 2019, pp. 51-60. 32 See: “Azerbaidzhantsy Rossii pereveli na rodinu sotni millionov dollarov,” Sputnik-Azerbaijan, 7 October, 2019, available at [https://az.sputniknews.ru/economy/20191007/421905800/russia-azerbaijan-centralnyj-bank-denezhnye-perevod. html].

57 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition 412 628 289 2019 7,541 1,329 6,096 Table 2

643 643 363 2018 9,485 1,649 7,463 531 509 331 2017 9,186 1,371 7,004 483 346 263 2016 7,336 1,092 5,596 $m 627 682 364 2015 9,719 1,673 7,978 696 2014 3,333 1,221 1,416 20,856 18,292 789 2013 3,618 1,232 1,597 23,589 20,780 733 2012 3,314 1,132 1,449 20,893 18,209 the South Caucasian Countries in 2010-2019, 669 2011 3,002 1,049 1,284 17,533 15,143 794 566 2010 2,378 1,018 12,835 11,080 The Volumes of Trans-Border Remittances Physical Persons from Russia to the CIS Countries and Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Azerbaijan Armenia Georgia To the South Caucasian To the South Caucasian countries To the CIS countries Transferred from Russia— total including: S o u r c e:

58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 year 2009 was the only exception). It was probably due to an increased outflow of labor migrants to the newly discovered target countries (Italy, Greece and the U.S.), on the one hand, and, on the other, the deteriorated relations between Georgia and Russia in 2006-2008, when Russia deported illegal Georgian migrants in great numbers. In 2006, over 4,000 migrants were deported. The series of de- portations did not noticeably decrease the number of Georgian migrants in Russia, yet forced potential migrants to think twice before going to Russia. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 2008, likewise, negatively affected the number of Georgian migrants. According to the Central Bank of Russia, private remittances of Georgian migrants and members of the Georgian diaspora reached only $289 million in 2019, three times less than in 2013 (see Table 2).

Table 3

The Volumes of Remittances of Physical Persons from Certain Countries to Georgia in 2007-2009, $m

Country 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019

Russia 544.6 555.6 801.4 394.5 428.7

Greece 26.1 103.8 198.1 124.6 192.6

Italy 32.2 76.8 110.2 123.2 239.2

The U.S. 115.3 75.4 74.9 127.7 178.3

S o u r c e: The National Statistical Office of Georgia.

Studies based on the correlational analysis methods revealed that the official transactions of physical persons and the national GDP of the South Caucasian countries were interdependent. It was maximal in the case of Armenia (correlation coefficient: r = 0.957); fairly large for Azerbaijan (r = 0.937) and Georgia (r = 0.930), which means that private remittances help households and ensure investments in small businesses, entrepreneurship, construction and new jobs in various economic branches. Unofficial remittances are equally important. According to expert assessments, labor and sea- sonal migrants who come to Russia for short periods (less than one year) take out about $3 billion in cash every year. Workers from CIS countries take out about $2.5 billion.33 According to our assessments, the share of South Caucasian migrants is about $450 million. Migrants prefer to take out their money in cash when they leave Russia; they may trust their friends with their money if they themselves stay behind. Not infrequently, cash is sent through transportation personnel. Unofficial remittances within diasporas are highly popular, mainly because the labor migrants from the South Cau- casian countries are unregistered (bank transmittances require official registration and migration card), the language barrier that makes it harder or even impossible to communicate in banks and use the transmittance systems, while the size of the commission required by banks and transmittance systems makes the procedure unpopular.

Conclusion

From time immemorial, the Southern Caucasus has been closely tied to Russia, which explains why the new integrational and disintegrational processes in the territory vacated by the Soviet Union

33 See: A.A. Migranian, op. cit.

59 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition are mainly connected with the movement of human resources. All conflicts that flared up during the periods of “economy-based friendship” were best illustrated by statistical data on human movement. The current political and economic interactions between Russia and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Geor- gia can be cited as the best illustration of the fact that migration is bound to preserve its intensity. We have written this article to present our analysis of the specifics of the influence and the roles of the diasporas in the structures of migrant employment, their regular features and trends. The studied statistics identify construction, industry, and agriculture as the branches that chiefly attract labor migrants. At the same time, different ethnicities choose different spheres of economic activities. The Armenian diaspora in Moscow is very prominent in shoe repair and shoe trade; Armenians sell jew- elry and occupy a prominent place in the funeral business. Azeris, on the other hand, are highly skillful in wholesale and retail trade in fruit and vegetables and in catering. Members of the Georgian diaspora found a niche as car dealers, in cheese and spice trade and in catering, where they promote the Georgian national cuisine. These ethnic specifics are a combination of preferences for certain types of businesses and cultural specifics and skills of each ethnicity. This helps migrants adapt to the new social and cultural milieu. An analysis of remittances from migrants to the South Caucasian countries showed that the bulk of them arrives from Russia. This means, among other things, that labor migrants prefer the Russian labor market. Armenia is the final destination of the biggest amount of money. Unofficial remittances to these countries are preferred; remittances through specialized agencies are the second preferred method followed by remittances through banks. The reasons are obvious: the cost of agency transfers is high, while many Russian banks have no branches in the South Caucasian countries. There is another important fact: today, one’s ties with the diaspora are one of the main elements of successful socialization and employment.34 The essential changes in Russian laws have already simplified the adjustment of labor migrants from the former Soviet republics, yet many of the measures suggested by the expert community still remain unrealized. It was suggested that potential migrants should be taught Russian and their future professions even before moving to Russia to shorten the time of their adaptation and integration. Another proposal stated that a system of employment of labor migrants should be established in the donor countries to bring more order to the flow of labor migrants and lower the share of illegal migrants. Private employment agencies can be licensed for this purpose and united in a single register; Russia needs a unified system of migrant registration based on the register of foreign citizens that would include information about border crossing, registration and the presence of work permits (patents).

34 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, “Integratsia migrantov v kontekste vneshney migratsionnoy politiki Rossii,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovania, No. 1, 2018, pp. 105-111.

60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 ADAPTATION OF SOUTH CAUCASIAN IMMIGRANTS IN MODERN-DAY SWITZERLAND

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.06

Irina BABICH D.Sc. (Hist.), Chief Researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he article examines the main aspects The study also addresses the prob- of the adjustment of political and work lems of the preservation of Caucasian cul- immigrants from the South Caucasus tures and languages under the conditions of T(Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan) who settled immigration and the formation of communi- in Switzerland in the 1990s and 2000s. Field cation environments for South Caucasians ethnographic materials were collected in in Switzerland. The author concludes that 2018-2019. In the course of the study, the the South Caucasian immigrants are united peculiarities of the perception of the culture, by professional and social criteria rather lifestyle, and the value system of the Swiss than ethnic kinship. The adults adapt to the were analyzed. Separately, the author ex- new conditions, and the youth integrates amined the types of immigrants’ employ- and acquires a Swiss identity. Elements of ment in the new country. The article’s main Caucasian cultures, languages and envi- focus is the age factor in the adjustment and ronment are gradually being lost in Switzer- integration processes. land.

KEYWORDS: adaptation, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, immigration, Switzerland, culture, language, traditions, Christianity.

Introduction

Switzerland is a country with a rapidly developing economy, whose financial security attracts people from all over the world. The number of people wishing to emigrate to the country exceeds its capacity. Also, Switzerland was the first European country to link the level of immigration with the need to preserve the Swiss identity, i.e. immigration should not increase to a level where foreign

Published in accordance with the research plan of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 61 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition cultures begin to “engulf” the Swiss culture. In this article, we plan to analyze the main trends in the adjustment of South Caucasians (Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis) to the Swiss culture, lifestyle, etc. The article was based on two types of sources: published (newspaper) material and field ethnographic materials collected by the author in 2018-2019. We conducted in-depth polls among 45 South Caucasians: Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and Georgians. (age: 10 to 60, approximately equal numbers of men and women). All respondents arrived in the country 10-20 years ago or more. They have official papers that allow them to reside in Switzerland, and have a job and a steady income. In addition to surveys of immigrants, we interviewed five workers of Swiss social and educational structures that are associated with immigrants, specifically, employees of the Office for Professional- Em ployment of Refugees (Neuchâtel canton) and school teachers. The Caucasian immigrant community is not the largest in Switzerland. There was a large wave of Albanian (Muslim) immigrants from Kosovo in Switzerland at one time, as well as Italians, Span- iards and Eastern Europeans (Czechs, Hungarians).1 In general, Switzerland takes the socio-economic and cultural adaptation of immigrants very seriously. Nevertheless, the South Caucasian immigration remained outside the subject of their study.2 In Switzerland, all immigrants are divided into the political and economic categories. Political immigrants constitute merely 1%, the rest are work migrants.3 Caucasian work migrants (like most Russian migrants) generally come to Switzerland through a system of educational grants for higher education or post-graduate degrees (i.e., obtaining a Ph.D. degree). Many have left the South Cauca- sian countries or Russia in the 1990s (however, there are also those who left in the 2000s). While receiving an education in Switzerland, many of the students attempt to stay and find a job.4 Similarly to the United States, Switzerland actively attracts “brains” to various spheres of its economy. As a rule, work immigrants in Switzerland are young people with excellent academic abilities (including language-learning abilities). In addition, there are rich businessmen immigrants, as well as those who work for the U.N. and other large international organizations based in Geneva. Work immigrants live where they can find employment. They move easily, and often from one canton to another.5 In addition to political and work immigrants, Switzerland has a group of medical immigrants from the Southern Caucasus who enter the country through the Red Cross (many of them are Geor- gian or Armenian).6 Finally, there is family immigration, when Caucasian women marry Swiss men.7 For example, in Basel alone, there are about 20 Azerbaijani women who married German Swiss men, whom they met on the Internet.8 There are approximately 1,000 Azerbaijanis living in Switzerland.9 According to the Georgian Ambassador to Switzerland, there are about 1,000 Georgians in the country.10 The number of Arme- nians is greater. Taking into account the “Western” Armenians, i.e. those who did not come from Armenia, but are the descendants of those who came to the country as a result of the Armenian genocide in 1915, there are approximately 5-7 thousand Armenians, of whom about 3 thousand are from Armenia (“Eastern” Armenians).11

1 Field materials collected by the author. Switzerland (hereafter — FMA), 2018. 2 Ibidem. 3 Ibidem. 4 Ibidem. 5 Ibidem. 6 FMA, 2019. 7 FMA, 2018. 8 FMA, 2019. 9 See: N. Kapone, “So Shveytsariey u nas sushchestvuet dialog na vysokom urovne,” available at [https://www.swissinfo.ch/rus]. 10 See: N. Kapone, “Gruzia blagodarna Shveytsarii za podderzhku,” 7 August, 2018, available at [ww.swissinfo.ch/rus]. 11 FMA, 2019.

62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 Peculiarities of Perception of the Swiss Culture, Lifestyle, Value System by South Caucasian Immigrants

In general, the attitude of the South Caucasians towards Switzerland, its culture and the way of life of its inhabitants is contradictory. On the one hand, Switzerland is an international country, with many immigrants who work in international companies, and on the other hand, the country has numerous intrinsic identities, i.e., Swiss, regional, cantonal, and ethnic identities. This distinguishes Switzerland from other countries, such as Germany, which is a mono-ethnic country.12 The mosaic of identities in Switzerland is clearly pronounced. There are certain traits of the Swiss lifestyle, culture and traditions that arouse rejection or which were difficult to get used to, according to our informants.13 In Switzerland, life begins early, at 6 am, and in the Southern Caucasus—at 10-12 am. The Swiss are very reserved people. In the Caucasus, neighbors living in the same house or in the same block of private houses always communicate with each other. In Switzerland, however, the neighbors only say hello to each other. An Armenian couple from Erevan, who have lived in Switzerland for over 20 years, built excellent careers in this country, and had two children, speak of Swiss reserved nature: “The Swiss are very reserved towards everyone, including their own people. Our Swiss colleagues did not invite us to their home or come to visit us. At first, we thought that we were the problem, but then we realized that it was just the way they were. We certainly feel the mental discom- fort because of this trait.” Here is an example. When their daughter had to be taken to a hospital, her mother spent all her time with her child, even though she had a job, and next to her lay a Swiss girl whose mother, who did not work, came to visit her very rarely. “According to Caucasian traditions, one should often visit the sick.”14 Azerbaijani woman A., who has lived with her German Swiss husband in Basel for over 20 years, could not get used to her husband’s closed and uncommunicative nature. As soon as their children grow up, she is planning to return to the Caucasus.15 In Switzerland, it’s not customary to call people on weekends. An Armenian woman reports: “My husband (a Swiss) has a brother, but we can’t even call him on a day off. A meeting with him has to be arranged a week in advance. Communication is different in Switzerland—their conversations are superficial and they have more acquaintances than friends. It seems that they simply do not feel the need for deeper relationships between people. From my point of view, my husband has no friends, and many acquaintances. Everyone knows him, and when we go somewhere together, people often stop him, say hello and speak a little. They always maintain a distance, even in interaction. You can’t make noise on the weekends and on weeknights after 8 pm.”16 The daily life of the Swiss is planned and organized in advance. In the Caucasus, many events and meetings take place “impromptu.” The Swiss society is more manageable than the Caucasian one. People are used to living according to a plan. In the Caucasus, you can come to visit (especially your relatives) without any arrangements at all.17 If something out of the ordinary happens in the life of a

12 FMA, 2018. 13 Ibidem. 14 Ibidem. 15 FMA, 2019. 16 FMA, 2018. 17 Ibidem.

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Swiss person, they are lost. Because of the measured life, the Swiss lack resourcefulness. Here are some examples that an Armenian woman married to an Italian Swiss man described to us: “Our suitcase handle broke. My husband decided to throw out the suitcase. I took it and fixed the suitcase myself. We still use it. Another example. There were two kinds of pasta left, one kind needed to be cooked for 8 minutes, and the other—11 minutes. They couldn’t figure out how to cook the two kinds of pasta together. You can start boiling one kind of pasta, and three minutes later, throw in the second kind, then boil everything for 8 minutes. They just can’t do that.”18 The “properness” of the Swiss. The Swiss love to obey the rules, whether it be traffic rules (pedestrians do not walk on a red light) or other established rules of life. They can “snitch” to the authorities if others do not comply. Here is an example, reported to us by F, a Udi by nationality: “I left the car for 20 minutes on the yellow line (yellow parking is for local residents only). A local resident saw this and immediately reported me to the police, writing a complaint against me. I had to pay a 120-franc fine and 50 francs for the investigation of the case.”19 The Swiss are very composed and modest in appearance. In the Caucasus, people love bright- ness, noise, exuberance.20 In Switzerland, the institution of friendship is not valuable. There are only acquaintances. In schools, the class makeup is constantly changing. As soon as the children become friends, they are immediately transferred to other classes, so that there are no close contacts between them. The Swiss society lacks the institution of mutual assistance and respect for elders, which are traditionally a given in the Caucasus.21 Certain features of the Swiss way of life, culture and traditions arouse the respect of the South Caucasians in the opinion of our informants. The Swiss work a lot, which is the foundation of the country’s stable economy. All the country’s residents live well. Everyone who is willing to work can find employment and earn money. In the Caucasus, “everything is uncertain.” Caucasians like the punctuality of the Swiss, the precise work of their transportation system, the opportunity to live and work in a country “without bribes,” the chance to achieve great success in their careers and society thanks to their work ethics and abilities. There is a “cultural urbanization” in Switzerland. The authorities do not do anything that is not accepted by the country’s population. The referendum psychology is impressive. In Switzerland, public opinion is always taken into account. Real, rather than formal, local self-government in Switzerland is significantly different from life in the Caucasus. The law prevails in Switzerland. Everything is fair and understandable. Switzerland is not centralized, and every city is self-sufficient. The country is home to many wealthy people who have no need to stand out, so all residents, including immigrants, feel comfortable. Most of the Swiss, according to our informants, are decent and honest people.22 Our informants also noted similarities that they share with the Swiss: love of freedom, efficiency and the desire to work hard, as well as a mosaic identity. History of Switzerland abounds with a rebellious spirit, which is also characteristic of Caucasian history. There are similarities between the nature of the Caucasus and Switzerland. People in both regions are engaged in winemaking.23 Some South Caucasians feel closer to the French Swiss, others to the German Swiss. F., a Udi by nationality, prefers to live among the German Swiss: he feels more similar to them. He believes that “the French who live in the French-speaking part of Switzerland are the same as in France, but the German Swiss are different from the Germans in Germany.” German Swiss are conservative,

18 Ibidem. 19 Ibidem. 20 Ibidem. 21 FMA, 2019. 22 FMA, 2018. 23 Ibidem.

64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 family values are important to them, they are reserved, they clearly express their identity. In addition, F. believes that despite their reserved nature, they are capable of selfless help.24 The majority of the Caucasian immigrants reside in Switzerland with their families. Some of the couples arrived in Switzerland together. Some women married Europeans (Czechs, Germans, etc.) and came to the country with them or, as we indicated above, married Swiss men.25 Sometimes Cau- casians manage to find spouses among fellow compatriots in the immigrant community.

Characteristics of Immigrant Employment

Work immigrants often arrive with the knowledge of one foreign language—English (most often), French or German, and then actively learn the second, and sometimes the third language. Im- migrants may obtain an education in a French canton, and find employment in a German canton. This is the norm for Switzerland. Sometimes an immigrant works at an international company, where the main language is English, and lives in a French canton. In this case, he begins to learn French. As a rule, family, political and medical migrants come to Switzerland without knowledge of foreign languages. But they begin to actively learn the language of the canton in which they live. This takes approximately two years.26 Work migrants from the South Caucasus often come to Switzerland with a higher education and continue to study in Switzerland. They often build good careers in the new country and hold steady positions in banks, international organizations and firms, in public and private schools, and universities. Family or political immigrants are usually employed in working professions (maids in hotels, employees in school administrations, security guards, tailors, beauticians, etc.).27 Sometimes the Cau- casians’ careers are connected with their former homeland, for instance, a Georgian who came to Switzerland at the age of 10 grew up and established a company that exports European automobile tires to Georgia.28 Certain people experience difficulties, for instance, V., a Georgian, worked as a journalist at home.29 Having received the status of a political immigrant in Switzerland, he could not apply for a similarly interesting job without a knowledge of foreign languages, and refused to work as a factory laborer.

Migration Policy and Swiss Identity

On the one hand, the Swiss are interested in foreign culture, ask questions, respect it and ask its bearers to tell them about it. This creates a positive impression for the immigrant. According to our informants, foreign cultures are not pushed into the background in Switzerland, and each nationality is given a place for its culture to exist in the country. Once a year, cantonal authorities hold national

24 Ibidem. 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem. 28 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem.

65 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition fairs, where different peoples living in a given canton can set up a shop to present national food, demonstrate dances and music, and tell the fair visitors about their cultural specifics. Local authorities pay 200 francs to those who set up such a shop.30 There are elements of cultural tolerance in Swiss schools as well. For instance, the mother of an Armenian boy recalled that when he first came to school, he was called to the blackboard and asked to read something in Armenian during the lesson, so that other children would listen to his language, then they asked him to write the names of other children in Armenian. The child told his mother about it at home, and she remembered this episode. In her opinion, this testifies to the “openness of the Swiss society to other cultures.”31 On the other hand, the entire Swiss society and school is aimed at ensuring that an immigrant not only adapts to the living conditions in the new country, but also integrates as much as possible. When an immigrant eventually receives the documents to obtain Swiss citizenship, specific details of his integration play an important role, for example, the participation of a person wishing to become a Swiss citizen in a volunteer movement.32 School occupies a special place in migration policy. It is through the school that the Swiss authorities actively integrate immigrant children into Swiss society.

Age, Adaptation and Integration

Despite the difficulties of adaptation, South Caucasians gradually begin to lead a Swiss lifestyle: skiing in winter and spending the summers hiking in the Alps, cycling, swimming in lakes, traveling around Europe, having lunch and dinner strictly by the clock, participating in volunteer movements, becoming more tolerant of other people and cultures, etc.33 Special seminars are held for kindergarten teachers and school teachers working in extended- day groups to teach them how to integrate immigrant children. Special “interclasses” are being created in schools, where they work with children of immigrants according to special programs.34 Cau- casian immigrants with children have informed us of these facts. V., a Georgian, has a son who came to Neuchâtel at the age of 8, without no knowledge of French, and went to a local school. Sometime later, after his son started attending school, V. met with the teachers and asked how he could help his son to adapt to life in the new country. His teachers answered: “Please don’t interfere. We will do everything ourselves.” Gradually, the boy learned the language, and was completely immersed in the Swiss environment. He had friends of different nationalities in his class: Serb, Spanish, Swiss. For children, the nationality of their friends is no longer important, while common interests are significant. Swiss schools really do everything to ensure that the children of all immigrants adapt to Swiss life. In schools where the Swiss anthem is not even taught, children are taught the norms of behavior in Swiss society (how to cross the street, how to collect garbage, etc.). And the teachers do not say: “these are Swiss rules,” rather, they say: “This is how we do it here.”35 Child psychologists in Swit- zerland do not advise parents of such children to focus their attention on their national roots, i.e., culture and language. For instance, N., a 10-year old boy born in Lausanne in a Georgian family considers himself Swiss. The boy was offered to attend Georgian language courses. The parents con- sulted with a psychologist regarding whether to send their child to these courses, and they were ad-

30 FMA, 2019. 31 FMA, 2018. 32 Ibidem. 33 Ibidem. 34 Ibidem. 35 Ibidem.

66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 vised against introducing the boy to the Georgian culture if they plan to continue living in Switzer- land.36 In our opinion, the following fact is an important indicator of the integration of South Caucasian children in Switzerland. As a rule, there are several children in an immigrant family, and they tend to speak the titular language of the canton where the family lives among themselves. This fact testifies to the success of children’s integration into Swiss society.37 In Switzerland, the children of immigrants from practically all over the world are gradually integrating into the local society and becoming Swiss, since the school does not merely teach, it also shapes a person. Moreover, immigrant parents often find it difficult to adapt, while children adapt and even integrate.38 V., a Georgian, stated that although he has a good relationship with his son, when discussing the boy’s future education and work, he is not the one who has clout with him, but the fathers of his Swiss friends, who are better integrated into Swiss life.39 The children acquire a Swiss identity. A 20-year-old Georgian, who has lived in Neuchâtel since the age of 2, considers himself Swiss, while certainly aware of Georgia and his Georgian roots. He stated the following: “I like Georgia, I feel that it’s my native culture, but the mentality is already alien to me. My impression of Georgia is that I could not live there. I feel that Georgian and Swiss mentalities are very different. I love Switzerland very much and I love Neuchâtel very much. I feel Swiss.”40 Our conversations with the parents of South Caucasian children who are successfully integrating into Swiss society, indicate that parents are aware that Switzerland is becoming a homeland for their children. The younger generation of South Caucasian immigrants, in fact, are losing the Arme- nian, Azerbaijani, Georgian and Caucasian culture. Integration is even easier for children if one of the parents is non-Caucasian.41 In multinational families, there are two languages in everyday use, i.e., Armenian and German, with English also often being used.

Problem of Caucasian Cultures and Languages

In the context of all of the above, the problem of preserving their Caucasian roots, i.e., languages, traditions and cultures becomes an important and acute problem for children of South Cau- casian immigrants integrated into Swiss society. In the course of our surveys, only one family has fully preserved the Armenian language in everyday life (both parents are Armenian). This was achieved by the enormous efforts of the parents, who constantly orient their children towards Arme- nia, the Armenian culture and language, i.e. they are involved in introducing Armenian culture, language and norms of behavior into their lives.42 As a result, their 9 and 11-year old children, felt great when visiting Armenia in 2019 (the family visits often and even thinks of returning to their homeland to help develop its economy43). According to the parents, the Armenian language spoken by their children does not differ from the Armenian language spoken by children in Armenia. But kids do have issues with reading and writing.

36 FMA, 2019. 37 FMA, 2018. 38 FMA, 2018, 2019. 39 FMA, 2018. 40 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem. 42 Ibidem. 43 In 2020, the couple did return to Armenia and began to work as economic advisors to the government.

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The children’s mother stated: “When my son was 3.5 years old, and I came to the kindergarten to get him, he asked me, “Mom, why do you speak Armenian, and not German like everyone else? Let’s speak German, like everyone else.” I explained to him who we are and what our language is. And then I taught my children a lot—they learned all the Armenian words that were required in all school subjects. Thus, they have a complete vocabulary to speak Armenian and can express their thoughts in this language. But even in this case, our children are somewhat removed from the Arme- nian culture, for instance, they cannot read Armenian literature.”44 As indicated above, Caucasian immigrant parents speak their native language at home (if both spouses are Caucasian), but their children, as a rule, quickly switch to interacting between themselves and with their parents in French and German. Therefore, the parents gladly invite their own parents to Switzerland at the earliest opportunity, so that they speak with their grandchildren in their native language. In a family where only one parent is Caucasian, native languages are present in communication, but children can only understand and speak a little. Thus, in a family where the mother is Armenian and the father is Czech, the older boy (6,5 years old) understands and speaks Armenian, while the younger children (5 and 4 years old) only understand the Armenian language. At home, the mother speaks Armenian with the children. The children speak French among themselves (the family lives in a French-speaking canton). They also use French to communicate with their father.45 In Switzerland, the state authorities are sometimes willing to pay for the courses in languages of the immigrants. For example, the Basel Department of Education offered to pay for such courses (there were about 40 languages offered).46 However, this Basel initiative is an exception rather than the rule. Usually, courses in South Caucasian languages are offered through individual initiative. Armenian language classes. In 2015, upon the initiative of a young Armenian woman R., who is married to a German Swiss man and has children, Armenian language lessons were organized for Armenian children in Lausanne. Here’s what she told us: “I wrote about it on Facebook, and people expressed an interest. The group consisted of 12-13 children, 4-6 years old. Two boys have just arrived from Russia and spoke Russian, but did not speak Armenian at all, and the rest of the students were from Armenia. My children spoke the language well, and my son even knows how to write and read a little. But many of the children knew a lot less. I first found a room at a club near my house (I had to pay for it), then I found an even cheaper one—for 10 francs per lesson (that is, the children paid 1 franc for the room rental). One-hour lessons were held on Sundays. Then the idea arose for another woman to conduct creative arts lessons with the children, make some crafts and communicate in Armenian. The lessons were free. I held out for almost 1.5 years, then I realized that there was no time. It became hard for me. Then I started looking for a replacement, but I couldn’t find one.”47 When R. realized that she herself would no longer be able to continue the Armenian language classes for children in Lausanne, she turned to the Armenian cultural center, which is located at the Armenian church in Geneva. It also offers Armenian language lessons. The church and the center belong to the so-called Western Armenians and it is attended mainly by Swiss-born people. The Armenian language of Western Armenians is somewhat different from that of Eastern Armenians.48 R. suggested that the Geneva center create a branch in Lausanne based on the classes she had organized, which would allow to pay the Armenian language teacher. But the management of the center did not support R., which, in the opinion of our informant, is due to the fact that her classes teach the

44 FMA, 2018. 45 Ibidem. 46 FMA, 2019. 47 FMA, 2018. 48 Ibidem.

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Eastern Armenian language variety.49 In Zurich, a Western Armenian, having married an Eastern Armenian, also organized Armenian language classes for adults.50 Georgian language classes. For Georgian children who grew up in Switzerland, learning the Georgian language is a must, as the language is gradually disappearing from families. N., a 20-year- old Georgian who arrived with his parents as a baby, began to study Georgian at home with his parents. He can speak his native language, but he cannot write or read. His older brother, who came to the country at the age of 10, knows Georgian well. Their younger sister has a much weaker knowledge of Georgian than the middle brother. The elder brother often visits Georgia (he has a business there), and has an opportunity to improve his Georgian language skills. At home, the children speak French to each other, and Georgian to their parents.51 Another Georgian boy, 16, who came to Neuchâtel at the age of 8, knows everyday Georgian and speaks Georgian with his parents at home (he has no brothers or sisters).52 In 2016, thanks to a private initiative, Georgian language classes for children were organized in Lausanne. P., a Georgian woman, came to Lausanne with her daughter for medical treatment. The girl missed a sense of Georgian community in Lausanne. There are about 20 Georgian families living in Lausanne. Most of them came to Switzerland for treatment. P. found Georgians who wanted to teach their children the Georgian language in a Greek Orthodox school.53 P. found a room for 50 francs a year. The classes were free and took place weekly, on Sundays. A total of 10-12 children attended the courses. The children were divided into groups by their knowledge of the Georgian language, rather than by age.54 Most of the Georgian children had some knowledge of the Georgian language. But there were two boys who were born in Lausanne and barely knew the language, except for a few words in Geor- gian. Moreover, they and their parents did not seek to learn the Georgian language. This has already been mentioned.55 The center conducts national dance training. The teacher is a young Georgian who came to Lausanne with three children to treat one of the children for autism.56 In addition to teaching the Georgian language, the center conducts celebrations, such as New Year’s and birthday parties. The last holiday was Orthodox Easter. The Ambassador of Georgia to Switzerland and a Georgian priest from the Russian Orthodox Church in Geneva attended the Easter holiday. The center hosts exhibitions. Children paint pictures of Georgia, conduct sports activities, walks in the forest and mountains. The center has an excellent selection of books in Georgian published in Georgia.57 Swiss and Russian people also come to the celebrations. Georgian language classes are also offered at the University of Zurich. Azerbaijani language classes. Azerbaijani woman A., married to a German Swiss man, tried to organize an Azerbaijani language class in Basel in 2010, but was unsuccessful. At first, there were few children, but many subsequently joined. Funds were required to rent premises and pay the teacher, since nobody wanted to teach for free.58 Recently, a decision was made to organize Azerbaijani language classes on the basis of the Karabakh school at the Azerbaijani Embassy in Bern.59 Azerbai-

49 Ibidem. 50 Ibidem. 51 Ibidem. 52 Ibidem. 53 FMA, 2019. 54 Ibidem. 55 Ibidem. 56 Ibidem. 57 Ibidem. 58 Ibidem. 59 See: N. Kapone, “So Shveytsariey u nas sushchestvuet dialog na vysokom urovne.”

69 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition jani language, history, national dances and piano will be taught at the school. The Swiss and people of any other nationality can attend the school.60 Russian language study options. The use of the Russian language by Caucasian immigrants in Switzerland has its own specifics: adult Caucasians who come to work and study in Switzerland usually know Russian well and use it (in the Russian environment, which they willingly interact with), however, their children, who were small when they arrived in Switzerland, or were born in Switzer- land, need to study so many languages that they do not have the time to study Russian. As a rule, South Caucasian children in Switzerland do not know Russian. There are exceptions, i.e., a 20-year- old Georgian who has been studying Russian as a foreign language at the University of Neuchâtel. For many immigrants from Russia, maintaining the use of the Russian language in the younger generation is a serious problem. Caucasian families in Switzerland generally remain committed to traditional food. At home they prepare their own meals. As we described above, during Basel events, many Caucasians set up their own shops with national food, i.e., Azerbaijanis make pilaf, khash and dolma.61 Georgians set up a shop with Georgian food (khachapuri) in Yverdon (Neuchâtel canton).62

Interaction Environments of South Caucasians Swiss Environment

In general, Caucasian immigrants have Swiss acquaintances, most of them colleagues. Cauca- sian immigrants communicate very little with their neighbors. They can help if needed, but it is not customary in Switzerland.63 For example, an Armenian woman living in the village of L. needed help from the neighbors, namely, to stay with her two children while she went to the hospital with another child. The neighbors responded.64 The wife of a Georgian political immigrant, a teacher of the Georgian language, a sociable person by nature, met her Swiss neighbors through her son and began to actively communicate with them.65 An Armenian family living in Zurich notes that they have many Swiss acquaintances, but few friends among them. They had one real Swiss friend who, as they were adapting to Swiss society and trying to build their careers, helped the Armenian couple a lot with advice. In their opinion, he is more the exception than the rule. It is curious that his wife is Russian, thus, he may have become more open than a typical German Swiss person due to the influence of his wife.66 Once a Swiss friend of the son of a Georgian immigrant decided to spend the night at the residence of a Georgian family. The friend’s father came to the Georgian family house to check the conditions where his son would spend the night, and only then allowed him to stay.67 There is the Society of Friends of Georgia—Vereinigung der Freunde Georgiens in Zurich, founded on 13 January, 1988. Its comprises the people interested in the Georgian language and culture, those who attend Georgian language classes at the University of Zurich; members of the Swiss

60 [https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2961612.html]. 61 FMA, 2019. 62 Ibidem. 63 FMA, 2018. 64 Ibidem. 65 Ibidem. 66 Ibidem. 67 Ibidem.

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Reformed churches, who maintained relations with the Georgian Orthodox Church, which sought connections with Central Europe; members of the anthroposophic movement who sought to encoun- ter the ancient culture and intellectual history of the Caucasus; and, finally, Georgians living in Swit- zerland.68 Note that our Georgian informants from places other than Zurich have not told us about this society and did not participate in its events.

Caucasian Environment

Georgian environment. When describing the Caucasian environment in Switzerland, the following tendency can be noted: the better the South Caucasians have adapted and the more successful their careers in the new country, the less they are drawn to their fellow countrymen. Here is the story of a Georgian from Neuchâtel: “When I first arrived in Switzerland, I began to actively communicate with Georgians who lived in the country. Basically, these were Georgians from big cities—Bern, Basel, Zurich, Geneva. I went to see them, and they came to visit me. But over the years, contacts with Geor- gians gradually began to weaken.”69 This Georgian family began to expand their connections to new social circles. Moreover, our field materials show that there is another Georgian family living in the same city. These families do not communicate, and they do not even know about each other’s existence. Sometimes Georgians are reluctant to communicate with other Georgians, since many “crimi- nally” oriented Georgians came to Switzerland during Saakashvili’s rule. In the 2010s, Swiss police arrested about 150 Georgians who were involved in theft or addicted to drugs.70 Therefore, although there is a sufficient number of Georgians in Switzerland, there is no Georgian environment as such in the country. For 9 years of his stay in the country, our Georgian informant has never been to a Geor- gian wedding.71 If immigrants have their documents in order, they gladly visit Georgia and acquaint their children with it. As a rule, this happens once a year, on vacation.72 Georgians from the Caucasus also come to visit friends or relatives. At home, they live according to Georgian traditions: have Georgian dance parties at home (young people, especially girls, can dance), prepare Georgian dishes (along with Swiss ones)—khachapuri, satsivi, badrijani.73 Georgian families in Switzerland celebrate Orthodox Christian Christmas and New Year. During family holidays, Georgian music and songs are played. Georgian youth willingly attend these holidays, but are, in fact, fans of Swiss youth bands.74 The acquaintance of Georgians with each other, in the absence of a single Georgian center, takes place at the Orthodox Church. As already pointed out above, having decided to organize Georgian language courses for children, Georgian woman P. found Georgians in Orthodox churches: the Greek church in Lausanne and the Russian church in Vevey.75 If an immigrant’s residence papers are not in order, they do not want to attract any extra attention and lead a quiet life.76 There is no Georgian Orthodox Church in Switzerland, but there is a Georgian priest who serves in the Russian Orthodox Church in Geneva.77 Therefore, if they so desire, Georgians visit Russian or

68 [https://www.freunde-georgiens.ch/ueber-uns.html]. 69 FMA, 2018. 70 Ibidem. 71 Ibidem. 72 Ibidem. 73 Ibidem. 74 Ibidem. 75 FMA, 2019. 76 Ibidem. 77 Ibidem.

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Greek Orthodox churches. There is an icon of Matrona (a canonized saint of the Russian Orthodox Church) at the home of one Georgian family. The elderly parents of a young Georgian, our informant, have been to the Russian Orthodox Church 2-3 times over the past 10 years78 Lausanne Georgians attend the Russian church in Vevey.79 Georgian youth who grew up in Switzerland look upon Swiss Catholic and Protestant churches with great approval. If the family is Caucasian-Swiss, then the child is more likely to be christened in a Catholic or Protestant Church than in the Orthodox church (based on the husband’s religious affiliation).80 But many Swiss people are not religious at all. Armenian environment. Among the South Caucasians, the Armenian immigrants who came both from Armenia (i.e., Eastern Armenians) and from Turkey (Western Armenians) are the most organized in Switzerland. Three factors contribute to this.  First of all, it is the Armenian Church of St. Hagop in Geneva, 81 which holds services not only in Geneva, but also conducts outreach masses at Catholic churches throughout Swit- zerland, for instance, in the small village of Cornaux in the Neuchâtel canton, such a mass is held every last Sunday of the month. 82 There is an Armenian church in the German part of Switzerland.83 The Armenian diaspora from different countries comes to Armenian services, while Eastern Armenian immigrants rarely attend.84 One of our informants, an East- ern Armenian, only once attended an Armenian service in Cornaux at the invitation of her neighbor, a Western Armenian. Her husband is Czech (Catholic) and the children are brought up outside of religion. However, the woman plans to baptize her children in an Armenian church while visiting Erevan. The husband is not against a baptism in the Arme- nian church. He believes that the Catholic and Armenian churches are both Christian.85  Secondly, it is the establishment of a number of Armenian organizations, clubs, centers, etc. (i.e., the Union of Armenians in Switzerland, the Armenian club in Zurich86), where concerts are held with the participation of Armenian artists (even the most famous Armenian in the world Charles Aznavour was a frequent guest of the Swiss Armenians), Armenian culinary evenings and Armenian language classes are organized, etc.  And finally, it is the fact that Armenians are the most numerous among the South Caucasian immigrants in Switzerland. It would seem that there is an Armenian environment in Switzerland, but our informants—East- ern Armenians who emigrated from Armenia in the last 20 years, report otherwise. The reasons for that are that the Armenian church and center were created by Western Armenians, who had arrived much earlier, and are mostly attended by them. Eastern Armenians rarely come to the center or the church. Western and Eastern Armenians have their own linguistic characteristics, differences in traditions and customs, as well as social differences (Western Armenians are typically wealthier). Therefore, the Eastern Armenian immigrants do not feel comfortable in the Western Armenian milieu and do not gravitate towards it. Many Eastern Armenians reported that it was difficult for them to communicate with Western Armenians.87 Eastern Armenians are oriented towards Armenia: they listen to Armenian radio and watch Armenian TV. There is no unity between Western and Eastern Armenians in Switzer-

78 FMA, 2018. 79 FMA, 2019. 80 Ibidem. 81 [http://www.centre-armenien-geneve.ch/eglise-apostolique-armenienne-saint-hagop-geneve.aspx]. 82 FMA, 2019. 83 [http://www.armenische-kirche.ch/]. 84 FMA, 2018. 85 Ibidem. 86 [http://www.hayastan.ch/ http://uasdirect.com/]. 87 FMA, 2018.

72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 land. But there are also exceptions. R., an Eastern Armenian, a 35-year-old female private school teacher, met another teacher there, a Western Armenian, who, as R. noted, “made her feel like family.”88 Eastern Armenians often meet with other Eastern Armenians in Switzerland (there are many of them in Bern, Zurich, Lausanne), but they rarely manage to establish long-term relations. Most often, their social circle comprises relatives (i.e., sisters, one of whom lives in Zurich, and the other not far from the Biel, meet once every two months).89 A family of four living in Zurich willingly interacts with the Armenians from Zurich and holds joint cultural events.90 Armenian children also interact with other Armenian children.91 Eastern Armenians have real Armenian friends in Switzerland. Our female Armenian informants cook Armenian dishes, most often pancakes, pies, khachapuri, sometimes dolma and ghapama.92 An Armenian woman, whose husband is Czech, reports: “I do many things as if I still lived in Armenia: women here do little housework, do not cook or do laundry. I do everything at home, I cook, I even made the shish kebab myself (although in Armenia men are the ones who make it). At first, when I started to cook Armenian dishes here, I did not have enough spices, then I managed to adapt. I cook Armenian dishes, and my husband likes them. But I also began to consume more natural food, without spices. A lot of spices are used in Armenia, but here people prefer the natural taste of food.”93 Armenians all over the world have relatives in Armenia who live abroad (3 million people live in Armenia, and there is a total of 10 million Armenians in the world). For Armenians, the preservation of their national roots is of great importance, and they feel and realize that the absence of the Armenian environment in Switzerland is gradually weakening them, they lose their national roots. They see frequent trips to Armenia as a way to resolve this problem.94 Azerbaijani environment. Azerbaijanis live in Zurich, Bern, Geneva (work at the U.N.). An Azer- baijani woman A. tried to organize an Azerbaijani center in Basel. She reports on what came of it: “I created the Friends of Azerbaijan center, but it did not work out, since the Azerbaijani immigrant community comprises different types of immigrants: rich work immigrants, businessmen, family (wives of Swiss men), and political immigrants (the poorest). It is difficult to integrate all of them. Work immigrants from Azerbaijan have different political views of Russia and Azerbaijan. There are those who do not want to communicate with their own people at all, since they are afraid of gossip. In order to keep the center functioning, I communicate with Azerbaijanis, with whom I would personally never communicate otherwise. Ethnic affinity is not always important in immigration. It is completely impossible to make friends with many Azerbaijanis. Azerbaijani immigrants have very different views of life.”95 A. has been in charge of the center for 10 years, and she would like to pass it on to young people, but she cannot find anyone willing to take over. Azerbaijanis who are now arriving or who have grown up in Switzerland do not want to be engaged in public affairs at all. Recently, the Azer- baijani Cultural Center was registered at the Embassy of Azerbaijan in Bern. Embassy employees actively support Azerbaijani cultural centers.96 Basel is home to about 20 Azerbaijani women who married Swiss men. They make up a kind of society, meet and cook jointly.97 Azerbaijani woman A., married to a German Swiss man, says: “I

88 Ibidem. 89 Ibidem. 90 Ibidem. 91 Ibidem. 92 Ibidem. 93 Ibidem. 94 Ibidem. 95 FMA, 2019. 96 See: N. Kapone, “So Shveytsariey u nas sushchestvuet dialog na vysokom urovne.” 97 FMA, 2019.

73 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition organize ‘Azerbaijani’ dinners at home twice a year—in winter and summer. I invite 15-20 Azerbai- jani women (not political refugees—my husband does not accept them at all). We cook Azerbaijani dishes: khash (jellied meat) from cow feet—more often in winter, and pilaf and dolma in summer. We bring grape leaves and baklava from Azerbaijan. I make pilaf with dry meat. Azerbaijani children interact with each other at these meetings.”

Other Environments

The Russian community in Switzerland is certainly more numerous than the Caucasian one. Russians engage Caucasians in their community. All the Caucasians of the older and middle generation (including 30-year-olds) who left the Caucasus, have learned Russian in their past, so in Swit- zerland they willingly communicate with Russian immigrants.98 Armenian woman A. is friends with a Russian from Krasnodar. A. believes that it is easier to communicate with Russians, one feels a common cultural past and space.99 Besides Armenians, an Armenian couple that lives in Zurich, interacts with Russians and people from Eastern Europe.100 Caucasian youth in Switzerland often does not know Russian at all.101 Sometimes Caucasians prefer to interact with immigrants from the East, for example, Georgian V. interacts with Kurds from Turkish Kurdistan, whom he considers the most friendly and sociable among the entire population.102 Azerbaijanis communicate with Brazilian immigrants.103 Many successful Caucasian immigrants work for international firms. They have many friends—their colleagues from other countries. Therefore, there is also an international environment in Switzerland.104

Conclusion

It seems to us that Switzerland, in fact, has become the first country to abandon the idea of cultural tolerance so widespread in Europe in the post-war period and today. The authorities themselves call their policy quite clearly and definitely “the zero-tolerance policy.” 105 South Caucasian immigrants are united by professional and social factors rather than ethnic kinship. Their adaptation to Swiss life is quite successful, despite the dislike for the Swiss. Moreover, their children integrate into the new society and become Swiss. The preservation of their national roots poses a problem for Caucasian immigrants, since elements of the Caucasian cultures, languages and communities in Swit- zerland are gradually being lost.

98 FMA, 2018. 99 Ibidem. 100 Ibidem. 101 Ibidem. 102 Ibidem. 103 FMA, 2019. 104 FMA, 2018. 105 T. Girko, “Prokuratura Konfederatsii zainteresovalas Tsentralnym islamskim sovetom,” Nasha gazeta, 28 Novem- ber, 2016.

74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS IN DAGESTAN: THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED SECURITY, INTERCULTURAL CONTACTS, AND MUTUAL ACCULTURATION

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.07

Victoria GALYAPINA Ph.D. (Psychol.), Associate Professor, Leading Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Psychology, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Zarina LEPSHOKOVA Ph.D. (Psychol.), Associate Professor, Leading Research Fellow, Center for Sociocultural Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Psychology, National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russian Federation)

Irina MOLODIKOVA Ph.D.(Geogr.), Leader of the Project “Migration and Security in the Post-Soviet Space,” Central European University (Vienna-Budapest); Leading Researcher, Institute for Demographic Research—Branch of the Federal Center for Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

agestan is the most multiethnic and chological compatibility of numerous peo- multilingual republic within the Rus- ples has been implemented here for centu- D sian Federation. From the viewpoint ries. It is essential for researchers to under- of interethnic relations, Dagestan is a unique stand which factors contribute to and which research platform: the model of ethnopsy- hinder the establishment of effective inter-

Research conducted with financial support from the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 19-18-00169 “Impact of Digitalization on Social Capital and Values of the Russian society”).

75 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition ethnic communication in modern Dagestan. other ethnic groups: Kumyks, Lezgins, Laks, This empirical study was conducted in the Tabasarans, Nogais, etc. (total number of context of the acculturation theory intro- respondents N = 438). duced by the Canadian cross-cultural psy- The data were analyzed both for the to- chologist John Berry. This article presents tal sample and for a sample of specific ethnic the results of researching the impact of per- groups using a Structural Equation Modeling ceived security, friendly intercultural con- (SEM) approach. MIRIPS questionnaire tacts, preference for supporting a multicul- scales were used. The results demonstrated tural ideology, ethnic tolerance, and mutual the contribution of perceived security to a integration attitude on the psychological preference for a multicultural ideology, toler- well-being of both individual ethnic groups ance, and mutual integration in the total sam- and Dagestani population as a whole. ple. The results also demonstrated that the In the course of the study, the authors intensity of friendly intercultural contacts has suggested that the higher the perceived se- no significant effect on tolerance or mutual -in curity among ethnic groups in Dagestan, the tegration in Dagestan. However, the prefer- greater the tendency towards maintaining a ence for mutual integration contributes to life multicultural ideology, tolerance, and the satisfaction and self-esteem among the in- preference for an integration strategy, and habitants of Dagestan, which confirms the the lower the preference for a separation integration hypothesis. A separation prefer- strategy (multiculturalism hypothesis). In ad- ence was positively associated with perceived dition, the authors hypothesized that the security, life satisfaction and negatively with higher the intensity of friendly intercultural friendly intercultural contacts among repre- contacts between representatives of various sentatives of certain ethnic groups of Dages- ethnic groups in Dagestan, the higher their tan. The results obtained demonstrate the level of tolerance, preference for an integra- importance of solving the problem of per- tion strategy and the lower their preference ceived security for building effective intercul- for a separation strategy (contact hypothe- tural relations in Dagestan. The formation of a sis). The authors also suggested that the national policy in matters of preserving the higher the preference for the integration cultural identity of various ethnic groups must strategy by representatives of various be adequate, since, as the study has shown, Dagestani ethnic groups, the higher their separation strategy only leads to life satisfac- self-esteem and life satisfaction (integration tion, and integration strategy is associated hypothesis). The sample included Avars, with both life satisfaction and self-esteem of Dargins, Russians and representatives of the inhabitants of Dagestan.

KEYWORDS: intercultural relations, perceived security, intercultural contacts, intercultural preference, attitudes, integration, separation, Dagestan.

Introduction The Sociocultural Context of the Republic of Dagestan

Dagestan is the most multiethnic republic of the Russian Federation. It is inhabited by representatives of 102 ethnic groups, the most numerous of them being Avars—29.4%, Dargins—17.0%,

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Kumyks—14.9%, Lezgins—13.3%, Laks—5.6%, Azerbaijanis—4.5% Tabasarans—4.1%, Rus- sians—3.6%.1 According to the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan, all ethnic groups in Dages- tan have equal status. Dagestan is a multilingual republic; its population speaks the languages of at least three language families. Thirty-six languages of the peoples of Dagestan were registered in the 2010 census.2 According to the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan, the state languages are Russian and the languages of the peoples of Dagestan.3 The Russian language is not only the state language, but the language of intercultural communication. The population of Dagestan professes three world religions (Islam—over 90% of the population, Christianity—5% and Judaism—under 1%), the Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan declared that Dagestan is a secular republic. However, researchers note that Islam plays an important role in the life of Dagestan’s population.4 From the viewpoint of interethnic relations, Dagestan is a unique research platform, where the model of ethnopsychological compatibility of numerous peoples has been implemented for centuries.5 This is largely possible due to the common Dagestan identity that is emerging. The concept of being a “Dagestani” occupies an important place in the self-consciousness of the inhabitants of Dagestan and is rooted in the experience of different ethnic groups living together within one administrative unit, in the sharing of the Russian language as the language of interethnic communication, and in a blend of Caucasian and general Russian cultural features.6 The unity of Dagestani ethnic groups is also facilitated by a common Muslim identity. The research highlights7 that the importance of Muslim religious identity in Dagestan occupies a dominant position. However, regarding its significance researchers diverge widely in assessing its significance in different regions of the republic and among different age groups. Interethnic relations in Dagestan are determined both by the intensity of expression of certain identities and by interethnic disputes.8 The Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan provides for the

1 See: All-Russia Population Census 2010, Statistical Collection / Rosstat, ISC “Statistics of Russia,” Moscow, 2011, 87 pp., available in Russian at [http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/demo/perepis2010/VPN_BR.pdf], 10 March, 2018. 2 See: “Skolko korennykh narodov prozhivaet v respublike Dagestan?” 2017, available at [http://www.internet-jurnal- russia-online.com/natsionalnyj-vopros-/narody-rossii-/narody-dagestana-/], 10 March, 2018. 3 See: The Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan [http://docs.cntd.ru/document/802018919], 12 November, 2018. 4 See: Z.M. Abdulagatov, Osobennosti sotsializatsii sovremennoy molodezhi i sotsialnye deformatsii v molodezhnoy srede (na primere Respubliki Dagestan), IIAE, Makhachkala, 2011, 206 pp.; Z.B. Arslanbekova, “Religioznaia identichnost dagestantsev: traditsionalizm i vakhkhabizm,” 2012, available at [http://www.gumilev-center.az/religioznaya-identichnost- dagestancev/], 11 March, 2018; Demograficheskie i etnicheskie problemy Severnogo Kavkaza i puti ikh reshenia, Founda- tion for Advanced Research “Bastion,” Moscow, 2012, 130 pp.; A. Buttaeva, “Islam in Polyconfessional Dagestan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2012, available at [https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2012-01-eng/05.shtml], 3 June, 2020. 5 See: A.G. Agaev, R.M. Magomedov, Dagestanskoe edinstvo, istoria i sovremennost, Daguchpedgiz, Makhachkala, 1995. 94 pp. 6 See: A.A. Yarlykapov, “Sovremenny Dagestan: aktualnye etnopoliticheskie i etnokonfessionalnye problemy,” Sotsio- dinamika, No. 3, 2012, pp. 130-153, available at [http://e-notabene.ru/pr/article_257.html], 8 August, 2017 [DOI: 10.7256/2306- 0158.2012.3.257]. 7 See: Z.B. Arslanbekova, op. cit.; Z.S. Arukhov, Religia i identichnost v Rossii: poiski etnicheskoy i religioznoy iden- tichnosti v Dagestane, Vostochnaia literatura, Moscow, 2003, pp. 177-191; S.I. Murtuzaliev, “Politika Rossii v Dagestane i na Severnom Kavkaze na rubezhe XX i XXI stoletiy glazami mestnykh zhiteley,” in: Severny Kavkaz v natsionalnoy strategii Rossii, Rosinformagrotekh, Moscow, 2008, pp. 116-128. 8 See: R.I. Abakarov, “Mezhetnicheskie otnoshenia v Respublike Dagestan (po materialam sotsiologicheskikh issledo- vaniy 2013 g.),” Bulletin of the Dagestan Scientific Center, No. 51, 2013, pp. 135-138; M.M. Shakhbanova, “Mezhnatsional- nye otnoshenia v Respublike Dagestan: sostoianie i tendentsii,” Bulletin of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnogra- phy, No. 3, 2017, pp. 152-163.

77 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition obligatory proportionate representation of all peoples of Dagestan in government bodies.9 In this regard, a more significant and politically authoritative ethnic group has shown an interest in “joining” as many ethnic groups as possible to its ethnic group or language. Until recently, representatives of small ethnic groups did not resist to being “ethnically affiliated” with the ethnic group that is the most numerous (therefore, politically more significant) and the closest to them.10 However, there is a current tendency among the members of small ethnic groups that are part of the largest Dagestan peoples to separate themselves from the larger group, acquire an independent ethnic status and develop their native language and culture.11 This, of course, serves as the basis for interethnic contradictions in the republic. Among the numerous social and political problems in the Republic of Dagestan, the constant outflow of the Russian-speaking population is topical. In 2002, 120,000 Russians lived in Dagestan, and in 2010 their number dropped to 104,000, decreasing by 13.9%.12 Russians are citing fears arising from possible ethnic and religious conflicts and the liquidation of the industry in which they were employed as the main reasons for leaving Dagestan.13 Thus, interethnic relations in the Republic of Dagestan are characterized by a certain tension. This confirms the relevance of the study of intercultural relations in Dagestan.

Theoretical Approaches

This study is based on John Berry’s acculturation theory,14 which has been verified in numerous studies of intercultural relations. The multiculturalism hypothesis says that people can accept those who are different from them only when they are convinced that their identity is not in danger. Con- versely, when people feel threatened, they develop prejudice and discriminatory attitudes towards the group that they perceive as a threat. This hypothesis was confirmed in a study of Russians in Estonia: the high level of perceived threat by Russians from Estonians hinders their successful adaptation in Estonia.15 In Russia, researchers Nadezhda Lebedeva, Alexander Tatarko, and John Berry16 studied the intercultural relations between migrants from the Caucasus and Muscovites. They found that perceived security predicts tolerance, integration, and social equality in both groups, but to a lesser extent among Muscovites. The contact hypothesis suggests that the negative attitude of one group towards another is caused by a lack of knowledge about that group. When members of both groups make positive personal contact with each other, they get to know each other, which leads to decreased prejudice. Im- portant conditions for this are: equal contact status with individuals or groups and support of contact

9 See: The Constitution of the Republic of Dagestan of 26 July, 1994, available in Russian at [http://docs.cntd.ru/ document/748300070], 15 March, 2017. 10 N. Gadzhiakhmedov, “Mnogoiazychny Dagestan: problemy bez perspektiv,” Dagestanskaia pravda, 17 July, 2002; A. Mekhtikhanov, “Luchshe gor mogut byt tolko gortsy,” Molodezh Dagestana, No. 26, 2002, p. 28. 11 See: N. Gadzhiakhmedov, op. cit. 12 See: Demograficheskie i etnicheskie problemy Severnogo Kavkaza i puti ikh reshenia. 13 See: M.M. Shakhbanova, Yu.M. Lysenko, R.M. Mamaraev, “Dagestanskie russkie o sostoianii mezhnatsionalnoy situatsii v Respublike Dagestan,” Bulletin of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography, No. 2, 2015, pp. 149-157. 14 See: Mutual Intercultural Relations, ed. by J.W. Berry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. 15 See: J. Kruusvall, R. Vetik, J.W. Berry, “The Strategies of Inter-Ethnic Adaptation of Estonian Russians,” Studies of Transition States and Societies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2009, pp. 3-24. 16 See: N.M. Lebedeva, A.N. Tatarko, J.W. Berry, “Sotsialno-psikhologicheskie osnovy multikulturalizma: prover- ka gipotez o mezhkulturnom vzaimodeystvii v rossiyskom kontekste,” Psikhologicheskiy zhurnal, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2016, pp. 92-104.

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 by the authorities.17 This assumption made by the theory of acculturation has been tested in numerous studies.18 Intercultural contacts were found to improve the attitudes towards migrants, interethnic friendship contributes to the psychological well-being of children and youth in a multiethnic context.19 The integration hypothesis suggests that when people “participate” in both cultures (their own culture and the culture of the host society), they reach a higher level of adaptation and well-being than when they “participate” only in one culture. The study, including a meta-analysis of 83 studies and over 20,000 respondents,20 showed that integration has a positive relationship with both psychological adaptation (life satisfaction, positive emotions, self-esteem) and sociocultural adaptation (academic achievement, career success, social skills). In addition, we presumed that in Dagestan, which is a multiethnic, multilingual and multicon- fessional republic with a complicated ethnic composition and a convoluted history of interethnic relations, the separation strategy in intercultural relations may play a significant role. Studies demon- strate21 that the choice of a separation strategy can predict a positive or a negative outcome of acculturation. The context of mutual acculturation of ethnic groups plays the greatest role in this process. The authors have formulated an additional hypothesis about the relationship between separation and indicators of psychological well-being with regard to the peculiarities of the sociocultural context of Dagestan. In keeping with the acculturation theory,22 and with regard to Dagestan’s sociocultural context, the authors formulated the following hypotheses: 1. Multiculturalism hypothesis: the higher the perceived security among the Dagestani ethnic groups, the higher the support for multicultural ideology, tolerance, the preference for the integration strategy, and the lower the preference for the separation strategy. 2. Contact hypothesis: the higher the intensity of friendly intercultural contacts between members of Dagestani ethnic groups, the higher the level of their tolerance, preference for the integration strategy, and the lower the preference for the separation strategy. 3. Integration hypothesis: the higher the preference for the integration strategy by the members of the ethnic groups, the higher their self-esteem and life satisfaction. 4. Additional hypothesis: the higher the preference for the separation strategy among the Dagestani ethnic groups, the higher their self-esteem and life satisfaction.

17 See: G.W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1954; T.F. Pettigrew, “Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice,”Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 23, 1997, pp. 173-185. 18 See: B.P.H. Hui, S.X. Chen, C.M. Leung, J.W. Berry, “Facilitating Adaptation and Intercultural Contact: The Role of Integration and Multicultural Ideology in Dominant and Nondominant Group,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations, Vol. 45, 2015, pp. 70-84, available at [DOI: 10.1016/j.ijintrel.2015.01.002]; T.F. Pettigrew, L.R. Tropp, When Groups Meet. The Dynamics of Intergroup Contact, Psychology Press, New York, 2011. 19 See: S.C. Bagci, A. Rutland, M. Kumashiro, P.K. Smith, H. Blumberg, “Are Minority Status Children’s Cross-Ethnic Friendships Beneficial in a Multiethnic Context?”British Journal of Developmental Psychology, Vol. 32, 2014, pp. 107-115, available at [DOI: 10.1111/bjdp.12028]. 20 See: A.-M. D. Nguyen, V. Benet-Martinez, “Biculturalism and Adjustment: A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Cross- Cultural Psychology, Vol. 44, 2013, pp. 122-159. 21 See: I. Jasinskaja-Lahti, G. Horenczyk, T. Kinunen, “Time and Context in the Relationship Between Acculturation Attitudes and Adaptation among Russian-Speaking Immigrants in Finland and Israel,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 37, No. 9, 2011, pp. 1423-1440; L. Kus-Harbord, C. Ward, “Ethnic Russians in Post-Soviet Estonia: Perceived Devaluation, Acculturation, Well-Being, and Ethnic Attitudes,” International Perspectives in Psychology: Research, Practice, Consultation, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2015, pp. 66-81. 22 See: Mutual Intercultural Relations, ed. by J.W. Berry.

79 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Methods Study Sample

The study sample included representatives of the following ethnic groups of Dagestan: Avars, Dargins, Russians, Lezgins, Kumyks, Laks, Tabasarans, Nogais, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Rutuls, Aguls, Andians, Jews. Since the representation of each ethnic group in the total sample varied, we singled out the groups that comprised ≥100 respondents, and the remaining ethnic groups were combined into an integrated group, which allowed us to subsequently conduct a comparative analysis of the selected groups. Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sample.

Table 1

Gender and Age Characteristics of the Study Sample

Gender Characteristics Age Characteristics Ethnic Groups N М (N, %) F (N, %) Min. Max. M SD

Avars 100 30 (30) 70 (70) 14 68 28.02 14.40

Dargins 116 41 (35.3) 75 (64.7) 13 65 25.02 14.41

Russians 101 19 (18.8) 82 (81.2) 13 62 34.50 12.62

Sample that includes other 121 37 (30.6) 84 (69.4) 13 66 26.87 14.51 ethnic groups in Dagestan

Total sample 438 127 (29.1) 311 (71.0) 13 68 28.44 14.43

N o t e: N—total sample size; Min.—minimum age; Max.—maximum age; M—average value; SD—standard deviation.

Research Methods

MIRIPS questionnaire scales, adapted for the Russian sample, were used in this study.23 Perceived security. The scale included 3 questions, i.e., “There is a place for a variety of languages and cultures in Dagestan (all α ≥ .49). Friendly intercultural contacts. The scale included 2 questions: “How many close friends of other nationalities do you have (list the nationalities)?” and “How often do you meet with friends of other nationalities” (all α ≥ .87). Multicultural ideology. The scale included 4 questions, i.e., “We should recognize that cultural diversity is a fundamental characteristic of Dagestan” (all α ≥ .63). Ethnic tolerance. The scale consisted of 3 questions, i.e., “We should strive for equality of all groups, regardless of racial or ethnic origin” (all α ≥ .52). Acculturation strategies: integration included 3 questions, for example, “I believe that representatives of my people living in Dagestan should both maintain their own cultural traditions and assimilate other peoples’” (all α ≥ .64); separation also included 3 questions, i.e., “I prefer to participate in events that include only members of my ethnic group” (all α ≥ .51).

23 For more details, see: N.M. Lebedeva, A.N. Tatarko, Strategii mezhkulturnogo vzaimodeystvia migrantov i prinimaiushchego naselenia Rossii, RUDN, Moscow, 2009.

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Self-esteem. The Rosenberg scale was used,24 it included 3 questions, i.e., “I can do many things as well as most other people” (all α ≥ .84). Life satisfaction. The scale included 3 questions, i.e., “I have everything I need in my life” (all α ≥ .82).25 Sociodemographic characteristics. Gender, age, education, ethnic and religious affiliation of the respondents were also recorded. Data analysis. To test the research hypotheses, a Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) approach using SPSS 22.00 and AMOS 19.00 was applied.26 Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was utilized to identify the differences between scale indicators in the three groups. Cronbach’s α was used to test the one-dimensionality of the scales.

Research Procedure

A socio-psychological survey was conducted in 2016-2017 among residents of four cities in the Republic of Dagestan: Makhachkala, Kizlyar, Izbirbash, Derbent. A snowball sampling procedure was used.

Results Results Obtained from the Total Sample

An analysis of average values presented in Table 2 shows that the residents of Dagestan have a highest value of ethnic tolerance and preference for social equality, as well as a high level of self- esteem. Perceived security, life satisfaction, and separation attitudes are the least pronounced.

Table 2

Results of Average Values of All Scales for the Total Sample (N = 438)

Variables M(SD) Perceived security 3.79 (.83) Friendly intercultural contacts 3.39 (.83) Preference for support of multicultural ideology 4.23 (.72) Preference for ethnic tolerance and social equality 4.46 (.72) Acculturation preference for mutual integration 4.34 (.83) Acculturation preference for separation 2.33(1.00) Self-esteem 4.45 (.66) Life satisfaction 3.89 (.87) N o t e: N—total sample size; М—average value; SD—standard deviation.

24 See: M. Rosenberg, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1965. 25 See: E. Diener, R.A. Emmons, R.J. Larson, S. Griffin, “The Satisfaction with Life Scale,” Journal of Personality Assessment, Vol. 49, No. 1, 1985, pp. 71-75. 26 See: J.L. Arbuckle, “IBM SPSS Amos 19 User’s Guide,” Amos Development Corporation, Crawfordville, FL, 2010.

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Path analysis was used to test our hypotheses on the total sample. Fig. 1 presents the results. The results demonstrate that for the residents of Dagestan, perceived security has a significant positive correlation with multicultural ideology, tolerance and integration, and has no significant correlation with separation. These data confirm our first hypothesis and indicate that the safer the residents of Dagestan consider the situation in the republic, the more they support the multicultural ideology, the more pronounced their tolerance and attitudes towards social equality are, and the more they prefer integration in intercultural relations (i.e., strive both to maintain their own ethnic culture and to adopt the cultures of other ethnic groups).

Figure 1

Path Model: Testing the Intercultural Relations Hypotheses on a Total Dagestani Sample

R2 = .11

Multicultural Ideology

.33***

R2 = .02

Perceived .10* Ethnic Security Tolerance .29***

.06

.05 R2 = .08 R2 = .04

.12** Life Integration Satisfaction .20***

.02 R2 = .01 R2 = .02 .10* Intercultural Separation Self-Esteem Contacts –.08 .02

Model indicators: χ2 = 28.07; df = 12; χ2/df = 2.34; p = .01; SRMR = .05; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06; PCLOSE = .34. * —the effects are significant at thep < .05; ** —the effects are significant at thep < .01; *** —the effects are significant at thep < .001.

Friendly intercultural contacts have no significant correlation with ethnic tolerance or integration and separation acculturation strategies. These data indicate that our contact hypothesis was not confirmed. The results demonstrate that the integration strategy shows a significant positive correlation with life satisfaction and self-esteem. This fully confirms the integration hypothesis: integration attitudes predict psychological well-being (self-esteem and life satisfaction).

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In addition, we found out in this research that a preference for separation (that is, for maintaining only one’s own ethnic culture) was shown to have a significant positive correlation with life satisfaction and to have no significant correlation with self-esteem. This partially confirms our additional hypothesis: the more the inhabitants of Dagestan are oriented towards separation, the more satisfied they are with their lives. The relationship between perceived security and intercultural friendships was also investigated; this relationship was found to be insignificant r( = –.02; p = .359). In general, we can say that the multiculturalism hypothesis was partially confirmed, the integration hypothesis was fully confirmed, the additional hypothesis about the relationship between the separation strategy and psychological well-being was partially confirmed. The only hypothesis that was not confirmed on the total sample is the contact hypothesis.

Results Obtained in Specific Ethnic Group Samples

Our hypotheses were subsequently tested on groups, whose population in our sample was over 100 people, namely, Avars, Dargins, and Russians. MANOVA was used to compare the average values, where perceived security, intercultural contacts, multicultural ideology, ethnic tolerance, integration strategy, separation strategy, self-esteem, life satisfaction were the dependent variables, while ethnicity was the independent variable. The results showed that the groups differ significantly among themselves according to the following variables: 2 Wilks’ Λ = .887, F (16, 947) = 1.98, p < .01, ηp = .039. ANOVA for individual variables also showed significant differences in intercultural contacts (more intensive among Russians in comparison to Dargins), multicultural ideology (significantly higher among Avars in comparison to Dargins) and tolerance (significantly higher among Russians and Avars in comparison to Dargins) (see Table 3).

Table 3

Comparison of Variables’ Average Values in the Four Groups (max. 5 points)

Avars Dargins Russians Variables (N = 100) (N = 116) (N = 101) F (4, 313) Partial η2 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)

Perceived security 3.98 (.73)a 3.84 (.83)a 3.71 (.86)a 2.81* .021

Friendly intercultural contacts 3.36 (.79)ab 3.19 (.98)a 3.61 (.65)b 4.13*** .030

Multicultural ideology 4.40 (.73)a 4.12 (.80)b 4.23 (.75) ab 2.04* .015

Tolerance 4.57 (.57)a 4.28 (.87)b 4.61 (.60)a 3.71** .027

Integration strategy 4.47 (.71)a 4.27 (.94) a 4.33 (.80) a .81 .006

Separation strategy 2.26 (.94)a 2.45 (1.00)a 2.15 (.92) a 1.58 .012

Self-esteem 3.92 (.82)a 3.96 (.95)a 3.91 (.97)a 2.05 .015

Life satisfaction 4.38 (.78)a 4.51 (.79)a 4.56 (.63)a 1.01 .008 N o t e: M—average value; SD—standard deviation; F—Fisher’s criterion; Partial η²—partial eta-square— correlation ratio or nonlinear correlation coefficient. * —the effects are significant at thep < .05 level; ** —the effects are significant at thep < .01 level; *** —the effects are significant at thep < .001 level.

83 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

Multi-group path analysis was subsequently performed. The estimated configuration invariance model for these groups did not demonstrate an acceptable global fit to the data: CFI = .937, RMSEA = .044; metric invariance: ΔCFI = .089, ΔRMSEA = .003 and scalar invariance: ΔCFI = .040, ΔRMSEA = .003. Thus, here we can say about the absence of invariance for the three groups. Ac- cordingly, the models for each group are different, therefore, each model will be described separately and compared to others. The results of testing the intercultural relations hypotheses on the sample of Avars are shown in Fig. 2.

Figure 2

Path Model: Testing the Intercultural Relations Hypotheses on the Avar Sample

R2 = .00

Multicultural Ideology

.01

R2 = .09

Perceived –.20* Ethnic Security Tolerance .00

.21*

.08 R2 = .00 R2 = .03

.11 Life Integration Satisfaction .13

.07 R2 = .05 R2 = .07 .23* Intercultural Separation Self-Esteem Contacts –.22 .10

Model indicators: χ2 = 13.90; df = 11; χ2/df = 1.26; p = .24; SRMR = .06; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .05; PCLOSE = .44. * —the effects are significant at thep < .05.

As Fig. 2 demonstrates, perceived security among the Avars shows a significant negative correlation with ethnic tolerance and has no significant correlation with multicultural ideology, integration and separation strategies. The multiculturalism hypothesis was not confirmed; on the contrary, an unexpected relationship was revealed: the more secure the Avars feel, the less tolerant and oriented towards social equality they are. The contact hypothesis was partially confirmed: intensive friendly intercultural contacts showed a significant positive correlation with tolerance and preference for social equality and a significant negative correlation with the separation strategy, while the correlation with the integration strategy was insignificant. The integration hypothesis was not confirmed

84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 on the Avar sample: the integration strategy did not show a significant correlation with self-esteem and life satisfaction (the existing relationships are positive, but at the level of a trend). An additional hypothesis was partially confirmed on a sample of Avars: a preference for the separation strategy predicts a high level of life satisfaction and has no significant correlation with self-esteem. The correlation between perceived security and intercultural friendships among Avars was insignificant r( = .05; p = .347). Next, we will consider the results of testing the intercultural relations hypotheses on a sample of Dargins. The results are shown in Fig. 3.

Figure 3

Path Model: Testing the Intercultural Relations Hypotheses on a Dargin Sample

R2 = .23

Multicultural Ideology

.48***

R2 = .17

Perceived .41*** Ethnic Security Tolerance .37**

.05

.27** R2 = .14 R2 = .08

.16* Life Integration Satisfaction .26**

R2 = .09 R2 = .05 –.05 .12 Intercultural Separation Self-Esteem Contacts –.13 .06

Model indicators: χ2 = 18.09; df = 11; χ2/df = 1.64; p = .08; SRMR = .08; CFI = .9; RMSEA = .07; PCLOSE = .23. * —the effects are significant at thep < .05; ** —the effects are significant at thep < .01; *** —the effects are significant at thep < .001.

The results show that perceived security demonstrates a significant positive correlation with multicultural ideology, tolerance, and integration strategy. This confirms the multiculturalism hypothesis. However, we obtained an unexpected result: perceived security has a significant positive correlation with the separation strategy. It turns out that the more secure the Dargins feel, the more they prefer the separation strategy. Intercultural friendships had no significant correlation with tolerance and integration and separation strategies. Thus, the contact hypothesis was not confirmed on a

85 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition sample of Dargins. The integration hypothesis was fully confirmed: the preference for the integration strategy has a significant positive correlation with self-esteem and life satisfaction. We found no significant relationship between separation strategy and self-esteem and life satisfaction. Thus, our additional hypothesis was not confirmed on the sample of Dargins. The relationship between perceived security and intercultural friendships among Dargins was insignificant r( = –.08; p = .302). The analysis of the results obtained on the sample of Russians is presented in the path model in Fig. 4.

Figure 4

Path Model: Testing the Intercultural Relations Hypotheses on a Russian Sample

R2 = .21

Multicultural Ideology

.46**

R2 = .01

Perceived .01 Ethnic Security Tolerance .47**

–.09

–.19* R2 = .25 R2 = .07

.14 Life Integration Satisfaction .22*

.15* R2 = .04 R2 = .03 –.07 Intercultural Separation Self-Esteem Contacts .01 –.12

Model indicators: χ2 = 13.19; df = 11; χ2/df = 1.20; p = .28; SRMR = .08; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .05; PCLOSE = .48. * —the effects are significant at thep < .05; **—the effects are significant at thep < .001.

The multiculturalism hypothesis was confirmed on a sample of Russians: perceived security shows a significant positive correlation with multicultural ideology and integration strategy and is significantly negatively correlated with the separation strategy. A significant positive correlation was found between intensive friendly intercultural contacts among Russians and their preference for the integration strategy, and no significant relationship between the former and the separation strategy and tolerance. These results partially support the contact hypothesis in a sample of Russians. The integration hypothesis was also partially confirmed: Russians’ preference for the integration strategy is significantly positively correlated with their self-esteem and has no significant correlation with life

86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 satisfaction. The results showed that the separation strategy was not significantly correlated with self- esteem and life satisfaction (although a negative tendency was revealed). Thus, our additional hypothesis was not confirmed in a sample of Russians. We found no significant relationship between perceived security and intercultural friendships (r = .008; p = .883).

Discussion and Conclusions

Dagestan is a unique republic of the Russian Federation. Its high ethnic diversity and the mul- ticonfessional and multilingual environment have led to a rise in the researchers’ interest in analyzing the relationships between different ethnic groups in this republic. In our study, we tested three hypotheses of intercultural relations based on Berry’s theory.27 The study also poses a hypothesis about the relationship between the separation strategy and psychological well-being and tests it with regard to the peculiarities of the republic’s sociocultural context. All hypotheses were tested both on the total sample and on specific ethnic group samples. The results demonstrated that the multiculturalism hypothesis was partially confirmed on the total sample of Dagestani population, and on the sample of two groups: Dargins and Russians. In the total and Dargin samples, the results established that the more generally secure the residents of Dages- tan and representatives of the Dargin ethnic group feel, the more they support the multicultural ideology, the more geared they are towards tolerance and social equality, and the greater their preference for mutual integration in intercultural relations. Similar results were obtained among Russians in a study conducted in Latvia:28 their perceived security contributed to the adoption of multicultural ideology, preference for tolerance, and integration preference. For Russians in Dagestan, we identified that the more secure they feel, the more pronounced their supporting of multicultural ideology, the greater their preference for the mutual integration strategy and the lesser their inclination towards the separation strategy. The multiculturalism hypothesis was not confirmed among the Avars, moreover, a negative relationship was revealed between perceived security and tolerance. This may be due to the unique situation of concurrent rivalry and mutual agreement between ethnic groups in Dagestan. A complex system of power distribution based on ethnic traditions has developed among the 14 ethnic groups of indigenous peoples with an official status in Dagestan.29 For instance, the president (head) of the republic could be either an Avar or a Dargin (i.e., a representative of one of the two largest ethnic groups). The Chairman of the People’s Assembly (Parliament) could also be a Dargin or an Avar. For Avars (they are the largest ethnic group in Dagestan, making up 29% of the total population of the republic30), security may be associated with their most recent position in power structures, rather than with social equality. Therefore, we found that the more secure the members of this group feel, the lower their preference for social equality and tolerance. Another unexpected result was the positive relationship between perceived security and preference for the separation strategy in the sample of Dargins (the second largest group in Dagestan31). This result may be explained by the existence of latent competition between the Dargins and Avars,

27 See: Mutual Intercultural Relations, ed. by J.W. Berry. 28 See: N. Lebedeva, A. Tatarko, V.N. Galyapina, “Intercultural Relations in Latvia and Azerbaijan,” in: Mutual Inter- cultural Relations, Ch. 3, pp. 59-80, available at [Doi.org/10.1017/9781316875032]. 29 See: A. Sidorenko, “Politicheskaia vlast v etnicheskikh regionakh,” in: Federalizm i etnicheskoe raznoobrazie v Ros- sii, Collection of articles, ed. by I. Busygina, A. Heinemann-Grüder, Rossiyskaia politicheskaia entsiklopedia, Moscow, 2010, pp. 94-111. 30 See: All-Russia Population Census 2010, Statistical Collection / Rosstat. 31 Ibidem.

87 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition and the desire to emphasize their ethnicity, their culture. In our opinion, this determines the desire for separation among the Dargins: they associate greater security with the separation strategy in intercultural relations. The contact hypothesis was also tested during our research. We believed that for a multicultural republic like Dagestan, contacts between representatives of different ethnic groups are an important and necessary part of everyday life.32 Hence, we supposed that the intensity of intercultural contacts would contribute to the integration of various ethnic groups and tolerant interethnic attitudes. However, the contact hypothesis was only confirmed on two groups in our study: on the sample of Russians (intensive friendly intercultural contacts of Russians determined their orientation towards integration) and on the sample of Avars (in this case, Avars’ intensive friendly intercultural contacts do not so much contribute to their integration as prevent their separation and stimulate them towards social equality). Similar conclusions were reached by Alberto Voci and Miles Hewstone,33 who found that intercultural contacts significantly improved the attitude of the host population towards migrants and ethnic minorities. This hypothesis was not confirmed on the total sample and the Dargin sample. According to Gordon Allport,34 the contact hypothesis is not confirmed when the following conditions fail to be met: parity in contact, intergroup cooperation, members of groups share common goals, institutional support for the ideas of equality of groups at the government level is available. However, in our case, we may be dealing with a different situation, since the equal status of ethnic groups is determined by law, groups are forced to interact as part of regular life, since there are many of them, there is support from the authorities available for all languages, cultural traditions and customs.35 Interethnic contacts in multicultural Dagestan, where Russian is the lingua franca for all ethnic groups, are a natural part of their life and are perceived as the normal state of things by the population, not as a contribution to the integration of ethnic groups. The Russians are an exception: they are not the titular ethnic group, and make up 3.6% of the population,36 having settled in Dagestan only at the end of the 19th century.37 In addition, they live in a different ethnic and confessional environment, hence, they may feel a greater need for intercultural contacts than representatives of other ethnic groups, which, in turn, contributes to their preference for integration. The integration hypothesis was fully confirmed in Dagestan on the total sample and the sample of Dargins: the preference for the integration strategy leads to psychological well-being. Similar results were obtained in the sample of Russians, who are an ethnic minority in Azerbaijan,38 and in the sample of an ethnic majority, namely Tajiks in Tajikistan.39 Integration preference promoted both self-esteem and life satisfaction in both of these groups. This hypothesis was partially proven on a sample of Russians: the greater their preference for the integration strategy, the higher their self-esteem. Our data are consistent with the results obtained by Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti and her colleagues40 in Finland. They found that integration preference pre-

32 See: N. Gadzhiakhmedov, op. cit.; A. Mekhtikhanov, op. cit. 33 See: A. Voci, M. Hewstone, “Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Toward Immigrants in Italy: The Mediational Role of Anxiety and the Moderational Role of Salience,” Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2003.pp. 37-54. 34 See: G.W. Allport, op. cit. 35 See: N. Gadzhiakhmedov, op. cit.; A. Mekhtikhanov, op. cit. 36 See: All-Russia Population Census 2010, Statistical Collection / Rosstat. 37 See: “Etnicheskaia demografia russkikh Dagestana,” 2011, available at [http://evrazia.org/article/1788], 11 March, 2017. 38 See: N. Lebedeva, A. Tatarko, V.N. Galyapina, op. cit. 39 See: J.W. Berry, V.N. Galyapina, N.M. Lebedeva, Z.Kh. Lepshokova, T.A. Ryabichenko, “Intercultural Relations in Georgia and Tajikistan: A Post-Conflict Model,”Psychology. Journal of the Higher School of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2019, pp. 232-249, available at [DOI: 10.17323/1813-8918-2019-2-232-249]. 40 See: I. Jasinskaja-Lahti, G. Horenczyk, T. Kinunen, op. cit.

88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 dicts the successful psychological adaptation among migrants from Russia and the former U.S.S.R. Other studies have also found that migrants’ choice of integration strategy has positive consequences for their psychological well-being.41 Interestingly, this hypothesis was not confirmed on the sample of Avars, however, an additional hypothesis was proven about a positive relationship between the separation strategy and psychological well-being in the same sample. The more Avars prefer the separation strategy in intercultural relations, the more satisfied they are with life. Also, an additional hypothesis was confirmed on the total Dagestani sample. Our results somewhat contradict the data obtained in Estonia.42 The results of the study of the acculturation of Russians in this country showed that the desire to preserve Russian culture is negatively correlated with life satisfaction. We believe that Dagestan’s cultural diversity can be perceived by ethnic groups, especially small ones, as a danger to the preservation of their own culture. Ethnic groups aim not to “dissolve” in the multitude of other cultures, rather than juxtapose their culture to others. This may be related to the determination made in our study: not only the integration strategy, but also the separation strategy are the predictors of the psychological well-being of various ethnic groups in Dagestan. Generally, perceived security plays an important role in intercultural relations for the residents of Dagestan (total sample), which predicts the preference for maintaining a multicultural ideology, preference for tolerance, social equality, and integration strategy. The psychological well-being of various Dagestani ethnic groups is facilitated by both the preference for the integration strategy and the preference for the separation strategy. Perhaps, in Dagestan, where representatives of a large number of ethnic groups are indigenous peoples, the motives for choosing a separation strategy are different from the motives that determine the choice of this strategy among migrants, and this may become the subject of further research. For Avars, intercultural contacts play the greatest role, since they are associated with the preference for tolerance and social equality and hinder the choice of the separation strategy. At the same time, the preference for the separation strategy is associated with satisfaction with the life in Avars. Perceived security is very important for Dargins; it is associated with multicultural ideology, tolerance, integration and separation strategies. The psychological well-being of the Dargins is facilitated by their preference for the integration strategy. For Russians, perceived security and friendly intercultural contacts are of great importance: the more secure Russians feel, the more support they demonstrate for a multicultural ideology, prefer integration and reject separation; intensive friendly intercultural contacts between Russians are associated with their choice of the integration strategy. This strategy is most successful for Russians, since it is related to their self-esteem. Our results demonstrate the importance of solving the perceived security problem for building effective intercultural relations in Dagestan. Studies show43 that negative multimedia messages and nationalist rhetoric do not contribute to perceived security; on the contrary, they lead to an increase in the perceived threat. Proceeding from this, the authorities should build their national, economic and social policies with regard to potential threats. Intercultural contacts also play a significant role in building effective relationships in Dagestan. At least in certain cases (i.e., Russians and Avars), they determine the preference for integration and social equality. It is important for the authorities to support interethnic contacts. Under these circum-

41 See: Mutual Intercultural Relations, ed. by J.W. Berry; J.S. Phinney, G. Horenczyk, K. Liebkind, P. Vedder, “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective,” Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 57, 2001, pp. 493-510. 42 See: L. Kus-Harbord, C. Ward, op. cit. 43 See: V. Esses, J.F. Dovidio, G. Hodson, “Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States and Canada in Response to September 11, 2001 ‘Attack on America’,” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 2, 2002, pp. 69-85.

89 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition stances, relationships will become more positive, for instance, through the growing recognition of similarities.44 In shaping national policy, the authorities should be careful to preserve the cultural identity of various ethnic groups, since, as our research has shown, the choice of the separation strategy leads only to life satisfaction, while the choice of the integration strategy is associated with both life satisfaction and self-esteem of Dagestan residents.

44 See: T.F. Pettigrew, op. cit.

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

SUFI PRACTICES IN CONTEMPORARY KAZAKHSTAN: TRADITIONS AND INNOVATIONS

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.08

Aigerim TEMIRBAYEVA Ph.D. Student, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

Talgat TEMIRBAYEV Ph.D. Student, Erciyes University (Kayseri, Turkey)

Ruziya KAMAROVA Ph.D. (Philos.), Assistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

Kenshilik TYSHKHAN Ph.D. (Philos.), Head, Department of Religious Studies, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

91 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

ABSTRACT

e deemed it necessary to write sometimes revived in the form of pseudo- about the Sufi tradition in Kazakh- Sufi teachings. W stan and its unfolding transformation Sufism is a multi-dimensional phenom- into new practices. Religious revival in Ka- enon, therefore, the forms of its revival zakhstan has made Sufism, its teaching and should be studied in depth to tap its spiritual practices very attractive. Its traditions have and moral potential for the purposes of our survived in the Soviet past and were revived country’s cultural development. No wonder in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Pilgrimage to holy that Sufism and its profound spiritual teach- places, first and foremost within Kazakhstan, ing of Islamic mysticism have stirred up a lot and veneration of saints have gained popular- of interest in both Muslim and Christian re- ity as prominent features of Sufism. The same gions in the country’s western part. process is unfolding in the neighboring The article examines the forms of re- states—in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, the North- vival, traditions and transformations of Su- ern and Southern Caucasus, and Turkey. fism in our country. In our analysis we relied In Soviet times, in Kazakhstan, how- on scientifically proven information from ever, the Sufi tradition was partly crushed by open academic sources and our field stud- repressive secularization practiced by Sovi- ies carried out using the methods of partici- et authorities, which explains why Sufism is pant observation and in-depth interviews.

KEYWORDS: Sufism in Kazakhstan, Sufi practices, new Sufis, Sufi innovations, transformations of the Sufi tradition.

Introduction The Sufi Tradition in Kazakhstan

An interest in spiritual values became especially obvious in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, which was building up and consolidating its newly acquired independence. Revival proceeded in different forms and spheres: people were interested in the doctrines, moral enjoinments and methods of Sufi brother- hoods, and Sufi teaching and practices. In Kazakhstan, Sufism is directly connected with the name of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi (Hazret Sultan) and his spiritual and educational activities. His great role in the Islamization of the peoples living to the north of Syr Darya has been studied by numerous scholars who invariably pointed out that he took into account the cultural heritage and mentality of the Turkic peoples, as well as their highly specific ideas about the world. No wonder that the forms of Islamization of the local peoples created unique national phenomena, among which the culture and ethno-confessional tradition of the Kazakhs has always occupied a special place.1 Western researcher Bruce G. Privratsky has sufficient reason to write that Sufism as a component part of the Kazakhs’ integral experience of Muslim life demonstrates its peculiar cultural dynamics that helped Islam survive the state atheism of the Soviet

1 See: А. Knysh, Musulmanskiy mistitsizm: kratkaia istoria, Dilia Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 17.

92 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 period: “The esoteric and institutional expression of Sufism was lost, but its experimental basis has been preserved strongly in the Kazakh religion. The experimental basis is a dynamic interaction and, moreover, a symbiosis of the cult of the ancestors of the Kazakh people and the Saints of the Sufi tradition, which is expressed in elementary forms of dreams, visions, experiences, which encourages the religious behavior of people at home, in the mausoleum, in holy places, and in healing practices.”2 He defines this symbiosis as the ayan-complex. The importance and efficiency of Sufism’s cultural dynamics and the ancestors’ cult are confirmed by its viability and extreme importance for the Ka- zakhs’ cultural memory embodied in the domestic cult and the fairly popular pilgrimage (ziyarat) to holy places. In this context, the ziyarat is one of the most important acquisitions of the Kazakhs’ collective memory and Sufi spirituality as one its elements. Collective memory of the Kazakhs and its religious component help our understanding of Is- lamic revival in Kazakhstan, of Sufism as its inalienable part and, in a wider context, of religious Kazakh identity. A quest for identities that is unfolding in the Central Asian post-Soviet countries as an element of their spiritual revival has led to an increased interest in the local spiritual traditions, including Sufism. In Kazakhstan this process is unfolding in a rapidly developing country that, having declared its loyalty to the national and religious traditions, remains a secular state. It is moving towards modernization, on the one hand, and reviving its national identity and spirituality, on the other. As could be expected, ethical values and moral enjoinments of Sufism are essential to the reconstruction of national identity.

The Trajectories of Sufi Revival in Contemporary Kazakhstan

As mentioned above, the forms assumed by Muslim mysticism, or Sufism, in Kazakhstan speak of its inalienable connection with Central Asian history and ethno-cultural and sociopolitical realities. Pilgrimage to holy places is one of such forms rooted in the cult of saints and the ancestor cult. Today, the cult of saints (in the form of veneration) is one of the most expressive features of Islam among the Kazakhs; it is reviving or may have even already reached the peak of its popularity among the majority of Kazakh population. The mausoleums of Khoja Ahmad Yasawi, Arystan-baba, and Uka- sha-ata, the mosques Beket-ata, Shopan-ata, and Karaman-ata, as well as the saints-founders of the Yrgyzbai-ata, Bayanbai-ata, Domalak-ana, Baidibek-ata, etc. attract crowds of worshippers. The number of holy places is steadily increasing along with the number of worshippers. Today popular holy places are restored, and much is being done to restore the burials of forgotten ancestors (Bayan- bai-ata, Yrgyzbai-aulie, etc.) that attract crowds of pilgrims. Practically in all these places pilgrims are instructed to observe ritual purity and fulfil the necessary Muslim rites such as reading namaz, keeping fast, etc. The sacral landscape of the Kazakh steppe, saints’ burial places and cemeteries revive the collective memory of the Kazakhs. Bruce Privratsky has offered the following comment: “The memory of Muslim saints sacralizes the memory of Kazakh ancestors in a simple semantic field, and the connections of the two provide a conceptual and affective basis for the Kazakh religion.”3

2 B.G. Privratsky, Muslim Turkistan. Kazak Religion and Collective Memory, Curzon Press, Richmond Surrey, 2001, pp. 187-189. 3 Ibid., p. 188.

93 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Sufi Groups in Contemporary Kazakhstan

Sufism was revived at the institutional level and in groups united by charismatic leaders. Con- temporary researcher Bakhtiyar Babajanov has pointed out that “Sufism as we know it today in the region is far removed from its earlier forms, even though it is attached to the spiritual tradition, sustained rituals and national culture to a much greater extent than to anything else.”4 Such are, for example, Jahriya, a group of Kazakhstani Sufis united around Sheikh Ismatullah. Babajanov associ- ates the revival of the Yasawian/Kadiri rituals in post-Soviet Kazakhstan with his name. He belonged to the Kazakhstani diaspora in Afghanistan, where his ancestors had emigrated after the October Revolution. Before moving to Kazakhstan, he had lived for some time in Pakistan. Today, he has a great number of murids in the cities of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Babajanov relies on his own field studies to state that Sheikh Ismatullah’s knowledge of the Yasawian tradition is not deep enough; the same applies to the entire set of dhikrs practiced in the Yasawi brotherhood. This is explained by the fact that he lived in an ethnic isolation of sorts in Afghanistan and inherited the tradition from the older generation that had brought it into exile and preserved in an oral form. Babajanov proceeds from the traditional division of Sufism into “intellectual” (written tradition) and “folk” to relate the emerging groups of Sufis, including Sheikh Ismatullah’s, to “folk” Sufism. The latter pays particular attention to the rituals and their revival.5 Sheikh Ismatullah and his followers practice a collective ritual, a combination of 3 or 4 types of dhikr “jahr” (loud dhikr). The same author relies on his field studies to describe the group’s social composition: regular people (workers, taxi drivers, unemployed, retirees, minor civil servants) for whom their membership is highly important as a form of social communication and a source of support and encouragement. Students from small provincial towns who feel lonely in big cities have found understanding and support to consciously assert their national identities in Sufi groups. The third group of followers consists of small and medium businessmen who confirm their national identity as Kazakhs and Muslims through their involvement in the life of their Sufi group and acquire a better understanding of Kazakh customs and culture. An- other group consists of religious intellectuals and scholars. They are mostly young or middle-aged journalists, scientists, post-graduate students, employees of private firms and lecturers at higher educational institutions. They consider Sufism a layer of national culture untouched by the Soviet or any other influence, the revival of which will help save the national identity challenged by globalization and spiritual degradation. People join Sufi groups for different psychological and social reasons. Girls and women constitute a special group: isolated from the male members, they take part in all rites and meetings. Some girls join Sufi groups for better self-awareness and deeper knowledge of ancient Kazakh culture, they want to overcome isolation in a big city by joining a like-minded circle. Others rely on Sheikh Is- matullah’s repeated assertions that recovery is possible through Sufi rituals and repeated requests to Allah. This explains the huge popularity of Islamized quackery. The baxs and kazy rely on the Ko- ranic ayats, aulie spirits, etc. as their healing instruments. Some of the Sufi practices, first and foremost, the dhikr in the form of meditation, have become extremely popular in other countries. Trans- formed into meditation, they have gained popularity in Western Europe and the United States. Reviving Sufism and the Sufi groups of Sheikh Ismatullah stir up very different feelings in Kazakhstan. While Privratsky has discerned no negative effects of revived Sufism in Kazakhstan, Babajanov has taken this view even further. He has positively assessed the Sufi groups of the Yas-

4 B.M. Babajanov, “Vvedenie k izdaniiu,” in: Sobranie fetw po obosnovaniiu dhikra jahr i sama, comp. by B.M. Baba- janov, S.A. Mukhammadinov, ed. by A.K. Muminov, Dayk-Press, Almaty, 2008, p. 34. 5 See: B.M. Babajanov, “Dhikr jahr u bratstv Tsentralnoy Azii: diskussii, tipologii, vozrozhdenie,” Pax Islamika, No. 1 (2), 2009, p. 115.

94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 awian tradition as far removed from politics, yet loyal to the ruler and close to the Kazakh culture. Asylbek Izbairov, on the other hand, points out that the Pir Ismatullah groups are pseudo-Sufi. Having pointed out the transformation of Naqshbandiya into a neo-Wahhabi ideology, he warned of possible negative repercussions of Sufi revival in Kazakhstan: “Today, we are watching how sham-Sufi organizations are consolidating their positions in our country: the sustained trends of activation of their destructive elements can be discerned.”6 A series of scandals connected with these Sufi groups shook the country in 2005 and later. In 2005, Sheikh Ismatullah published a book Azbuka koranicheskikh nauk (The ABC of Koranic Sciences) that forced the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kazakhstan (SAMK) to issue a fatwa that assessed his teaching as harmful to Muslims. Activities of the public movement Senim.Bіlіm.Omir (through which Pir Ismatullah realized his activities) were carefully investigated. Sheikh Ismatullah, head of the Jahrist Brotherhood, and some of his followers were sentenced to different terms in prison, but not forgotten by the media. Ismatullah was liberated in 2019; the following spring the Internet was inundated by positive posts published by common people, public figures and academics about Ismatullah, his mission, his holy ancestors, the difficult life of the oralman (repatriate), videos of concerts of the instrumental folk music group Yasawi, etc. In late March 2020, he published his video addresses to the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkey, Russia and the United States, in which he called to the reading of dhikr all over the world. While he remained in prison, his active followers continued to attract new adepts using certain methods based on Viktor Frankl psychology. The most active of them went abroad to receive a better education, others published books to encourage the widest social circles to preserve traditions and family values; they were actively using social networks to consolidate the authority of their organization and establish new contacts. Not all sources, on which the published books relied, can be verified by experts. Despite this fact, they echoed far and wide among stars of show-business, scientists and common people. So far, Sheikh Ismatullah has not yet assessed his followers’ novelties. The gradually emerging Sufi Naqshbandiya communities in Kazakhstan demonstrate more political activism than the groups of the Yasawian tradition. It should be said that in the past the Yas- awian order opposed political biases in any faith. The Naqshbandiya school is especially prominent in the country’s south, where Uzbeks (citizens of Kazakhstan and guest workers) live in compact communities. Its center is found in Uzbekistan, in the mausoleum of Bahauddin Naqshband. As could be expected, the group of about 1,500 followers is headed by an ethnic Uzbek, its members prefer loud dhikrs. The group uses their leader’s officially registered YouTube channel to propagate its teachings. Its events are attended by members of the academic community of Kazakhstan, and it is generally open to officials and researchers. The followers of the Kadiriya tariqa, in particular, a community of the Kadiriya tradition (Vis- Khoja line) functions in the Atbasar District, Akmolinsk Region. It is widespread among the local Chechens and Ingushes. Ruziya Kamarova, a scholar from Kazakhstan, who carried out field studies among the district residents (in the Krasnaya Polyana village) discovered that those deported from their Caucasian homeland had organized their own dhikr, which is carried out during religious and secular holidays, weddings and burials. The community is small, therefore its male members rely on certain Koranic surahs to allow women to be present at the ceremonies, the novelty with which Chechens from Russia and members of the traditional Islam disagree. In fact, this group has accepted their own interpretations of the Koran, its members follow Islam and are guided by their own rules. Their integration remains a problem: their rules are too rigid, their knowledge of their native and foreign tongues is inadequate, there is no access to the Internet, etc.7

6 A.K. Izbairov, “Ideyno-religioznye ustanovki v psevdosufiyskikh tarikatakh,”Shygys , No. 2, 2008, p. 22. 7 See: R.I. Kamarova, “Religia v zhiznedeiatelnosti etnokulturnykh tsentrov i biograficheskikh narrativakh,” in: Re- ligia i etnichnost v svetskom gosudarstve: materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Master Po, Astana, 2016, p. 110.

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The spiritual and intellectual Sufi trend Sukhba, one of the latest in Kazakhstan. was organized in 2015 by Murat Hakim, its current leader. Educated at the prestigious Egyptian Al-Azhar Univer- sity and experienced in civil service, he is convinced that the Russian language will open the doors to Islam: the knowledge of the native tongue among Kazakhstan intellectuals and the younger generation leaves much to be desired. This Sufi group relies on the latest technologies to attract civil servants and members of the academic community to promote its teaching with their help. The order is well-organized and gives women a chance to demonstrate their activity. Having studied the group in detail, Ruziya Kamarova detected certain destructive elements in its ideology. In 2020, however, Murat Hakim, was appointed invited theologian to the Center for the Studies of Religious Problems of the Nur-Sultan akimat. On the whole, this group deserves further academic research. The Kenesary sarbazdary Sufi group operates in the north of Kazakhstan. Its leader Ergali Ko- peev identifies himself with the Shaliliya tariqa, which has a long history in the Northern Caucasus (probably due to his marriage to a Chechen woman) and with Egyptian Sheikh Yusri Rushdi. To consolidate his positions and legitimacy, he speaks of himself as a descendant of the fifth saint aulia( ) of northern Kazakhstan and an Ishan (one of the titles of the leaders of the Sufi tariqas). In 2016, he registered the Kenesary sarbazdary channel on the YouTube platform, where he regularly publishes videos in which he assesses (mainly in Russian) much of what is going on in Kazakhstan and outside it and displays financial requisites for donations to the channel. The group is working towards the unification of all Turkic peoples and revival of the Turan army (which has a pan-Turkic nature). Ac- cording to expert Oleg Siniakov, Christians constitute a greater part of the region’s population.8 In his videos Kopeev states that he is open to discussion and invites all interested people to write to him a personal message. We invited him to a WhatsApp interview, but received no answer, which means that this Sufi group is not easy to reach or study. Turkish Sufi groups—topbashjilar, suleimanjilar, nurjular, yhlasjilar, mahmudchular—that belong to Sunni Islam are widely represented in Kazakhstan. During the initial stage of the country’s independence, they were spreading extensively through the Kazakhstan-Turkish lyceums (boarding schools) and labor migrants (mostly businessmen). In Russia and Uzbekistan these groups are banned. In Europe and America there are other well-structured Turkish tariqas. Non-members are not allowed to visit the meetings of the tariqa, whose members are obliged to attend and obey their leaders. On the whole, their activities in Kazakhstan should be studied in greater detail. The SAMK is of a negative opinion about Sufi groups. In 2016, the YouTube Dinisham channel published a video “About Ismatullah and Kurbanali,” in which Arman Kuanyshbaev, who represented the SAMK explained how the Sufi groups contradicted official Islam. Inside the SAMK there are disagreements between the imams educated in Turkey and those who received education in the Arab countries.9

Conclusion

As a comprehensive and multi-sided phenomenon, Sufism and the forms of its revival in Kazakh- stan are discussed at different levels and demand more profound scholarly studies. So far, all experts

8 See: O.V. Siniakov, “Ob informatsionno-raziasnitelnoy rabote v sfere religii v Severo-Kazakhstanskoy oblasti,” in: Materialy online kruglogo stola, 29 October, 2020, available at [http://religions-congress.org/ru/news/novosti/567], 4 Novem- ber 2020. 9 See: A. Kuanyshbaev, “About Ismatullah and Kurbanali”, Meeting with students of the Yessenov Caspian State Uni- versity of Technology and Engineering, Aktau, 4 May, 2016, available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcm9zX- bSKQ], 13 April, 2020.

96 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 have agreed that it is a fairly significant component of the spiritual and cultural heritage of the Central Asian peoples, while many of its values were and remain highly important.10 The revived Sufi tradition in Kazakhstan was transformed into new syncretic religious practices. Its adepts are expanding the range of means and methods by which they attract new followers and have mastered the educational instruments of Sufi practices to lure children and young people into their groups. Latest technologies and presentation methods help Sufi organizations move further towards new discussions, new religious constructs and new criteria of accession to dhikr sessions. This means that the academic community should pay more attention to self-identification and self- reflection of the Sufi groups in Kazakhstan. The best known of them is the Jahrist Brotherhood of Ismatullah. Over four years (from fall 2016 to May 2019) the authors carried out field studies using the participant observation method in Kayseri, Turkey, where brotherhood members study at the local university. It was established that collective dhikrs are practiced very similarly to the past (every week, on Thursdays and Fridays) by small groups of trusted people (the members are very cautious) in their residences. There are no problems with neighbors: common Turks and officials are tolerant to the collective loud dhikr as one of their historical traditions. Newcomers (students and guest workers from Kazakhstan) who seek contacts with compatriots are carefully tested before they are allowed to attend. In Kazakhstan, the Naqshbandiya Brotherhood, likewise, is rooted in historical tradition; it is present mainly in the country’s south with its predominantly ethnic Uzbek population. They demonstrated a lot of political activism at all times, which may cause religious conflicts in the future. Despite economic and social problems, the Kadiriya Brotherhood created its own tradition which is still alive among its members, the Chechens and Ingushes. Field studies among its members who live in the Krasnaya Polyana village in the north of Kazakhstan, were conducted in the form of an interview with the village head. Chechens and Ingushes, divided into clans each with its own traditions, are scattered across Kazakhstan. In this article we have concentrated on the Vis-Khoja tradition of the Krasnaya Polyana village. These three tariqas (Jahriya, Nakshbandiya and Kadiriya) are united by the loud dhikr. In the Turkish tariqas, the types of dhikr vary. As of now, we do not know much about the types of dhikr of the Sukhba tariqa, except the fact that it is conducted through social media or by radio. We have identified a new trend: tariqas prefer to attract the elite (intellectuals and well-educated people with average income). The leaders of the Kenesary sarbazdary group carefully avoid all contacts with experts and researchers, which makes it practically impossible to study this group in greater detail. Today, Sufi leaders are somewhat different from their predecessors: they have a tendency towards self-perfection, they study abroad, they learn foreign languages to get access to foreign publications and add innovations to the Sufi teaching, they create new religious constructs, introduce cardinal changes in the Sufi gender tradition and develop the educational aspects of Sufi practices. Prior to the Soviet Union, Sufism had been developed by the Central Asian institution of kho- jahs (practically destroyed by seventy years of Soviet power) and interaction with neighboring countries. In independent Kazakhstan, Islam and Sufism as a Central Asian tradition are being revived in different forms and practices partly due to the negative impact of Soviet secularism, some of them pseudo-Sufi organizations. Practically all the above-mentioned Sufi groups have violated at least some of the republic’s laws. Perhaps the patterns of development of religious organizations are such that at the beginning of their activity they are more than useful for their followers, but having accumulated authority and power, these structures begin to gradually reveal their negative sides. Official Islam and its representatives are of a very negative opinion of the Sufi groups. On the other hand,

10 See: A.K. Muminov, “From the Editor,” in: Sobranie fetw po obosnovaniiu dhikr jahr i sama, Compiled by B.M. Baba- janov, S.A. Muhamaddinova, Dyke-Press, Almaty, 2008, p. 16.

97 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition imams do not ban the dhikr practice in mosques; everybody knows in which mosques dhikr sessions are held. The state remains undecided. Today, at the outset of new discourses, Sufis are creating new religious constructs and readjust- ing the fundamental criteria of accession to dhikr. Self-identification and self-reflection of the Sufi groups in Kazakhstan should be further studied in greater detail. Those who study Sufism insist that it is an important component of the spiritual and cultural heritage of Central Asia and, specifically, of Kazakhstan. Our contemporaries treat the humanitarian, educational and other Sufi traditional values as absolutely relevant to our time.

FOUNDATIONS OF SECULARITY: GLOBAL EXPERIENCE AND KAZAKHSTAN

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.09

Damira SIKHIMBAYEVA Ph.D., Head of the Department of Science, Nur Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Lesken SHYNGYSBAYEV Ph.D. Student, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

Inkar NURMOLDINA Ph.D. Student, Nur Mubarak Egyptian University of Islamic Culture (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

ABSTRACT

he paper examines the methodologi- The concepts of secularity and secularism cal approaches and the conceptual appear and develop due to historical, social, foundations used to assess the degree economic and cultural specifics of each par- Tof secularity in Western political thought. ticular society, and different factors, social

98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 transformations and the changing role of re- and interpretations of secularism and the ligion in public space among them, revise socio-political factors that affect each of the the content of these concepts. secularity models. The paper discusses two main trajecto- The contemporary religious situation ries of such changes in the correlations be- and religious politics of Kazakhstan, as well tween religion and politics that contributed to as the political experience of identifying the the development of secularity models as principles and criteria of secularity in the re- they are known today. It offers a clear inter- public that synthesizes foreign experience pretation of the concepts of secularity, the and the specific features of interpretation of secularity principle, secularism and secular- secularity inside the country are reflected in ization and an analysis of the main models the paper.

KEYWORDS: post-secular society, desecularization, secularism, secularity, religion, principle.

Introduction

The unfolding desecularization processes and religion that returned to public space pose the democratic secular states with difficult tasks. They need to arrive at new approaches to the conceptualization of secularity and secularism and identify the place and role of religion in the world, which since the mid-20th century has been dominated by the secularization theory that predicted an inevi- table collapse of religion as a social influence factor. While developing the secularization theory, social sciences conceded that religion was marginalized and measurably pushed out from public to private space by modernization processes. Today, political and academic communities all over the world are confronted by post-secular realities of religious dynamism and a reestablishment of religion as part of politics, economy, culture and public space. Peter L. Berger, one of the prominent figures in the unfolding secularization/desecularization discussions, has written: “The world today, with few exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it was” and “Today the world is massively religious, is anything but the secularized world that had been predicted ... by so many analysts of modernity;” “...ex- periments with secularized religion have generally failed.”1 The above confirms that the secularity problem and the role and place of religion in the post- secular society is moving to the fore as one of the actively discussed issues both in social sciences and even in a wider public space. In the last three or four decades the number of studies in political science, international relations, sociology and social anthropology related to different patterns (processes) of secularity, secularism and desecularization unfolding in post-secular societies has considerably increased. Kazakhstan is trailing behind: so far, its academic community has not studied in detail the concepts of secularity, the principle of secularity, secularism, secularization, different types and models of secular states to say nothing of desecularization and post-secular society, the topical subjects actively discussed by the world academic community. This explains why the public discourse of a secular state in Kazakhstan is either superficial and one-sided or practically absent. The political elite and power prefer a narrower interpretation of the state secularity principle, an echo of the Soviet ideological understanding of the role of religion in society and an ignorance of

1 P. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in: The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, ed. by P.L. Berger, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, MI, 1999, pp. 2, 9, 4.

99 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition the variety of secular states and fundamental scholarly works on the legal and political nature of secularism. Public manifestations of religion in state structures are not encouraged or even banned, which is explained and justified by the secular nature of the state. The solutions for these problems related to religious politics can be found in a deeper comprehensive interpretation of the secularity principle, an analytical separation of the concepts of secularity, secularism and secularization and conceptualization and development of the liberal interpretation of secularism. The paper attempts to fill the gap with a more liberal approach to secularity based on an analysis of the key works on secularism and the secular state.

Main Approaches to the Interpretations of Secularity in the European and American Traditions

The secularity of state is one of the basic foundations of the majority of contemporary law- governed states, upon which they are built and continue to function.2 According to the index of the state-confessional relations modes, 12 states out of 197 are religious states; 60 are states with an established religion; 5 are antireligious states; 120 are secular states, where the secularity is established by law.3 Each of them understand and interpret the principle of secularity according to the specifics of their religious situations and public discourse of the role and place of religion in public space. Clearly, the concepts of “secularity” and “secularism” take shape and develop according to the historical, socio-political, economic and cultural specifics of any concrete society. Their content is modified by numerous factors, social transformations and the changing role of religion in public space. Over the last two centuries the world has seen numerous models and interpretations of secularism. Today, the public and academic communities are discussing the secular state and its desirable and undesirable forms. In most cases, it is these discourses that determined the nature and the course of the policy of secularism in some of the democratic states. Without going too far into the history of these concepts, the paper points out that the concepts of secularity and secularism as construed today are the products of centuries-long confrontation between the church and the state. The conceptual foundations of secularism were formed in the context of Western European socio-political realities as a result of fairly complicated relationships between these two institutions. For instance, José Casanova, a prominent sociologist, has stated that all delib- erations about a secular state should begin with an admission that “the formation of the secular is itself inextricably linked with the internal transformations of European Christianity.”4 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, another prominent scholar, has pointed out that laicism and Judeo- Christian secularism, the most influential factors of international relations are two basic trajectories, or strategies of managing the relations between religion and politics. The former belongs to the separation narrative, in which religion is banned from politics. The latter, to the accommodational narrative in which the Judeo-Christian secularism occupies a special place in public space as a unique cornerstone of secular democracy. Both forms of secularism can be described as inconsistent, since these traditions invariably change to fit any specific geocultural area. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd

2 See: N.V. Ponkin, Svetskost gosudarstva, Uchebno-nauchny tsentr dovuzovskogo obrazovania, Moscow, 2004, p. 25. 3 See: A.T. Kuru, Seсularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey, Cambridge University Press, Illustrated Edition, 2009, p. 12. 4 J. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: Global Comparative Perspective, Hedgehog Review, Critical Reflection on Contemporary Culture, 2006, p. 10.

100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 deemed it necessary to explain that each defends a certain form of separation of church and state for different reasons, in different forms and with absolutely different political effects. Laicism (from French laïcité) tends to create a neutral public space in which religious faiths, practices and institutions are deprived of any political consequence, banned from political competition or locked in the private sphere. Laicism considers the mixture of the political and the religious to be irrational and dangerous. This strategy has already become a tradition and formed an everyday perception of the relations between religious organizations and the state in certain countries, which blurs obvious limitations of this approach. As distinct from laicism, Judeo-Christian secularism, the second tradition of secularism does not strive to remove religion or, at least, Judeo-Christianity from public life. Unlike laicism, this strategy does not treat the secular and the religious as two mutually exclusive spheres. These traditions, or the two main strategies of the development of secularism, influenced different models of separation of state and religious institutions in the contemporary world to different extents. Ahmet T. Kuru, an American scholar, has written in his fundamental work Seсularism and State Policies toward Religion that state religious policy is a result of the struggle between “passive and assertive secularism,”5 which shapes religious policies and defines the place of religion in the public space. Passive secularism demands that the state should remain passive to avoid consolidation of any religion as dominant, to let religion manifest itself as a free public phenomenon. Assertive secularism, on the other hand, demands that the state should exclude religion from the public sphere and play an “assertive” role as the main actor of social engineering, which keeps religion in the private sphere. Passive secularism is a pragmatic political principle that tries to preserve state loyalty in its relations with all religions, while assertive secularism is a “comprehensive” doctrine that mainly aims to completely exclude religion from the public.6 Peter Berger, in his turn, has identified three variants of the development of secularism: “There is the moderate version, typified by the traditional American view of church-state separation. Then there is the more radical version, typified by Frenchlaïcité and more recently by the ACLU, in which religion is both confined to the private sphere and protected by legally enforced freedom of religion. And then there is, as in the Soviet case, a secularism that privatizes religion and seeks to repress it. Its adherents can be as fanatical as any religious fundamentalists.”7 According to Canadian scholars Rosalie Jukier and José Woehrling, when talking about secularism we can identify “a ‘strict’ or ‘rigid’ conception of secularism” that accords more importance to the principle of neutrality than to freedom of conscience and religion. This can be interpreted as an attempt to relegate the practice of religion to the private and communal sphere, and to keep the public sphere free of any expression of religion. On the other hand, more “flexible” or “open” secularism is based on the protection of freedom of religion, even if this requires a relaxation of the principle of neutrality. In this model, state neutrality toward religion and the separation of church and state foster respect for religious and moral equality and freedom of conscience and religion as the fundamental objectives. In open secularism, any tension or contradiction between the various constituent facets of secularism should be resolved in favor of religious freedom and equality.8 The Canadian scholars have identified the four key principles that form the basis for any model of secularism: people’s moral equality; freedom of conscience and religion; state neutrality towards

5 See: A.T. Kuru, op. cit., p. 36. 6 See: J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 162. 7 P. Berger, “Secularism Falsified,” First Things, February 2008. 8 See: J. Woehrling, R. Jukier, Religion and the Secular State in Canada: Interim National Reports. The XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, The International Center for Law and Religion Studies. Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 2010, pp. 185-198.

101 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition religion and the separation of church and state. Secularism, however, assumes different meanings according to the importance accorded to each of these four principles.9 Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor insist that we cannot define secularism through “the separation of Church and State; the neutrality of the State with respect to religions; or an absence of religious expression in the public sphere” even if these formulas are partially true.10 According to Taylor, “there is no such sets of timeless principles which can be determined, at least in the detail that must be for a given political system, by pure reason alone; and situations differ very much, and require different kinds of concrete realization of agreed general principles; so that some degree of working out is necessary in each situation.”11 And further: “...the issues concerning secularism have evolved in different Western societies in recent decades, because the faiths represented in those societies have changed. We need to alter the way in which we proceed when the range of religions or basic philosophies expands: for example, contemporary Europe or America with the arrival of substantive communities of Muslims.”12 “Comparative analysis identifies a range of types of secular states, and recognizes that the idea of the secular state is a flexible one.”13

Religions in Post-Secular Contexts

The role and place of religion in the public space have radically changed under the pressure of the modernization processes unfolding in all spheres of public life. While in many Western European countries modernization of society was accompanied by a gradual retreat of religion from collective consciousness and individual minds, in the post-Soviet societies modernization is accompanied by religious resurrection. Having analyzed the global religious upsurge unfolding in front of our eyes, Peter Berger pointed to the two mightiest global trends: “Passionate Islamic movements are on the rise throughout the Muslim world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the China Sea, and in the Muslim diaspora in the West. The rise of evangelical Protestantism has been less noticed by intellectuals, the media, and the general public in Western countries, partly because nowhere is it associated with violence and partly because it more directly challenges the assumptions of established elite opinion.”14 Upon returning to the public space, economy and politics, religion caused a reassessment of its role in society, the problem of redefinition of the post-secular has come to the fore as the most delib- erated subject in the public space. Professor of sociology José Casanova, one of the prominent figures in the discourse of secularism and secularization, has pointed out that starting in the 1980s, religious traditions around the world refused to accept an absolute public-private dichotomy to demand, often by force, a specific and important place in the public space across the world.15

9 See: J. Woehrling, R. Jukier, op. cit. 10 G. Bouchard, C. Taylor, Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, Government of Quebec, Quebec City, 2008, available at [http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/rapports/rapport-final-integral-en.pdf], 20 April, 2020. 11 Ch. Taylor, “What Does Secularism Mean?” in: Dilemmas and Connections. Selected Essays, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 310. 12 Ibidem. 13 J. Martínez-Torrón, W.C. Durham, Religion and the Secular State. Interim National Reports. XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, pp. 2-18. 14 P. Berger, “Secularism Falsified.” 15 See: J. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, University of Chicago Press, Chicago-London, 1994, p. 153.

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According to the same author, there are no compelling reasons, either democratic or liberal, to banish religion from the public sphere.16 According to Rob Warner, religion has become more contested, complex and diverse in the 21st century, while the secularization processes have profoundly changed the power and significance of religion.17 To sum up: religion has become the strongest identification marker in post-Communist societies, which explains its status of the most contradictory subject of public and political discussions.

The Main Principles and Criteria of Secularity in the Republic of Kazakhstan

Independent Kazakhstan has already acquired its national legal base that regulates the relations between the state and religion. The state religious policy should be corrected in view of all sorts of global threats to national integrity and challenges to national security: the unfolding processes of desecularization and deprivatization of religion, the growing role of public religions, contradictions between ethnic, national and Islamic identities, proliferation of radical Islamic ideology, international terrorism and extremism, religious education of the republic’s population as a whole and of the younger generations, in particular. These socially important problems cannot be resolved unilaterally; they require concerted efforts of state structures and religious associations. In Kazakhstan, this role belongs to traditional religions as an important component of the national spiritual heritage and a powerful ideological resource in national construction. The state should move aside from the old methods and methodologies used to define the place and role of religion in public space; we should clarify the main content of the secularity principle to identify the main trends in the relations between the state and confessions. This means that we should build up the state-confessional relations on a wider, more open and more liberal interpretation of secularism. The separation of church and state principle is not universal; its implementations vary depend- ing on internal socio-cultural, political and public specifics of states. We have already written that despite the existence of different models of a secular state there are two main interpretations or strategies that serve as the foundation of the relationship between the state and confessions in any secular state. The first of them, the so-called passive (open) secularism, is a pragmatic political principle that insists on state neutrality toward all religions; the second, assertive secularism, is a doctrine in its own right, spearheaded against including religion in the public sphere. In our case, taking into account the latest trends in the religious sphere, it would be wiser to adhere to the strategy of open secularism. This would allow us to realize the cooperative strategy of interaction between state and religion. The state should not try to push religion out of public life into the peripheries of national construction, otherwise it will lose the ideological struggle against numerous radical trends. Armed with assertive secularism, the state creates a marginal group of believers on the periphery of national construction that may, in the course of time, develop into a fairly large opposition group. According to its Constitution, the Republic of Kazakhstan is a democratic, secular state ruled by law; people, their lives, rights and freedoms being its highest values. Today, the state pursues a policy that contains no anti- or pro-religious intentions. Freedom of conscience and freedom of reli-

16 See: J. Casanova, Rethinking Secularization: Global Comparative Perspective. 17 See: R. Warner, Secularization and its Discontents, Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, 2010, p. 182.

103 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition gion are guaranteed, while propaganda of and agitation for the ideas that may stir up religious or any other hatred and animosity are banned.18 American scholars Cornell, Starr and Tucker have pointed out that the Kazakh “government took upon itself to regulate religion, thus gravitating toward the Skeptical/Insulating model and draw- ing on the French and Turkish experience. Going one step further, however, the Kazakhstani model differentiates between traditional and non-traditional religious communities. Government policies explicitly endorse and promote the traditional communities, and seeks to allow them to restore their position in society, while being hostile to the spread of non-traditional religious influences. That means Kazakhstan also borrows elements of the ‘Dominant Religion’ model, though with a twist: it does not privilege one particular religion, as most examples of this model do, but traditional religions at the expense of the foreign and novel interpretations.”19 The same authors are convinced that “over time, Kazakhstan has adopted increasing restrictions in the religious field, and new measures were passed following terrorist incidents in 2011 and 2016. A 2011 law prohibited foreigners from registering religious organizations, required the registration of places of worship, and prohibited the holding of religious services in private homes — a practice common to more secretive religious groups. The law also forced religious communities to re-register with the state, and required a minimum number of adult members for registration at the local, provincial, and national levels. As a result, some smaller or less established groups failed to register. The law also restricted the dissemination of religious literature, requiring approval by the Agency for Religious Affairs.”20 Furthermore, they state that the events of the past decade forced the republic’s authorities to conclude that they had underestimated the threat posed by extremist religious groups. They revised laws and policies and thus interfered in life and activities of individuals and communities they deemed extremist or nontraditional. This is one of the reasons for Western criticism of Kazakhstan. There is another, more philosophical reason behind this criticism; the West advocates full religious freedom and state neutrality toward religion, and accepts intervention against groups engaged in or inciting violence. However, the Kazakhstani authorities have embraced a fundamentally different approach: the state should regulate religious affairs to revive traditional religious communities and to ensure social stability and harmony.21 There are several other factors and trends that forced that state to tighten its policy in the sphere of religion and consolidate the republic’s secular foundations. According to the Concept of State Policy in the Religious Sphere in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2017-2020, the following trends should be amended: — Today, more frequently than before, people refuse to fulfill their constitutional and civil du- ties; they demonstrate their disrespect of laws, the republic’s state symbols and national cultural traditions, as well as commonly accepted ethical and behavioral norms; — The demand not to wear religious symbols at schools and universities is violated, non-atten- dance of educational establishments on Saturdays has become more frequent, while there are many excessively religious parents (legal representatives) who refuse to let their children study certain subjects of school curricular;

18 See: A. Ermegiiaev, K. Kazkenov, “Religioznye protsessy v Kazakhstane: neobkhodimost analiticheskogo, diskussionnogo polia, dialoga vzaimodeystviy,” in: Sbornik materialov mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Almaty, 2002, pp. 54-62. 19 S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, J. Tucker, Religion and the Secular State in Kazakhstan, Institute for Security and Develop- ment Policy, April 2018, available at [https://isdp.eu/publication/religion-secular-state-kazakhstan/], 22 April, 2020. 20 Ibidem. 21 See: Ibidem.

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— Sometimes parents refuse to vaccinate their children for religious reasons; — Men and women conclude religious marriages without registering at the corresponding state structures more and more frequently. Archaic family values that contradict the current status of women in the family, their social activity, employment and gender equality are actively promoted; — Followers of destructive religious teachings, which have nothing in common with the values of Kazakhstan and negatively affect health, psychic and material wellbeing of citizens, are highly confrontational; — Cultivated by these population groups, fundamentalism and radicalism present a real threat to state and society; they undermine the unity of the Kazakhstani people; traditional spiritual culture and traditional identity and violate the rights of members of other confessions; — Sometimes members of radical religious teachings deliberately stir up conflicts with the official clergy; — Believers may pile heaps of accusations and reproaches on those who do not share their religious ideas. The Concept has identified three main priorities of the development of state religious policies, one of them being the consolidation of the state’s secular principles. The document contains a detailed explanation of the state’s secular principles, which aims at supporting the consolidation of secular foundations of the state and the functioning of its institutions.

Conclusion

The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan declares in Part 1, Art 1 that “The Republic of Kazakhstan proclaims itself as a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are a person, his life, rights, and freedoms.” According to this thesis, there is no official religion in -Ka zakhstan, and none of the religious teachings are accepted as obligatory or preferable. The state demonstrates no preferences to any confession or denomination. All religions and confessions are equal before the law, yet the Law on Religion of 11 October, 2011 “recognizes the historical role of the Hanafi school of Islam and Orthodox Christianity in development of culture and spiritual life of people.” Kazakhstan’s secularity model gravitates towards the French and Turkish model in which religion is completely separated from politics with certain socio-political, historical and cultural specifics expected to preserve inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations.

105 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN CENTRAL ASIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.10

Nartsiss SHUKURALIEVA Dr hab. (Political Science and State Administration), Associate Professor, Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz (Bydgoszcz, Poland)

Artur LIPIŃSKI Dr hab. (Political Science and State Administration), Associate Professor, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (Poznań, Poland)

ABSTRACT

he paper examines the process of se- tions, public organizations, political parties curitization of Islam in Central Asia and security policy. The article presents the T within three sectors, namely, military, methods that were used to construe various political and societal. It argues that securiti- notions of Islam as a threat. The prerequi- zation is not merely a speech act, it also is sites of this policy are deconstructed and an associated political process that affects analyzed, along with its consequences for the adoption of laws related to traditions, the political system and the reproduction of freedom of conscience, religious associa- authoritarianism in the states under scrutiny. 106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021

The theory of securitization is presented in threaten the sovereignty of the state, its in- the beginning of the article. The second part stitutions, and the stability and sustainability examines the military sphere, where Islamic of the social order. The final part of the pa- radicalism is portrayed as a threat to the se- per focuses on the discourse and practice curity of the state, population, territorial in- within the societal sector, which touches tegrity and military potential. upon issues in which Islamic radicalism The next part examines the political threatens collective identity, language, and sphere, where Islamic radicalism is said to culture.

KEYWORDS: securitization, theory of securitization, Copenhagen School, security, Islam, terrorism, radicalization, fundamentalism, Central Asia, image of the enemy, critical studies in the security sphere.

Introduction

Most research studies in the security sphere focus on state security, examining it specifically from a (neo)realistic and sometimes (neo)liberal theoretical perspective. This paper considers the problems of Islamic extremism and terrorism in Central Asia from the perspective of the theory of securitization, which is one of the areas of critical research in the field of security within the framework of the postmodern approach. Security comes under scrutiny not as the actual state of affairs, but as a discursive practice aimed at changing the hierarchy of political priorities. The main thesis of the article is that Islam is “securitized” in the states of Central Asia, and transferred from the socio-political field to the security discourse orbit. It means that Islam is ascribed the status of an existential threat requiring extraordinary countermeasures. The securitization of Islam is not merely a speech act, but also a political process associated with it, which influences the adoption of laws concerning traditions, freedom of conscience, religious associations, public organizations, political parties and security policy. With their help, Central Asian governments have legitimized the use of extraordinary, repressive measures and methods. It is essential to note that the policy of the states in question, their perception of security in this context and their attitude to religion were not static. They underwent changes that depended on external and internal factors, which, in turn, influenced the weakening or strengthening of the securitization of Islam. The authoritarian systems of Central Asian states are not homogeneous. They differ from each other in terms of the presidency/rule of the national leader, the level of formalization of social and political relations, the degree of imitation of democratic institutions and procedures, adopted strategies for maintaining the status quo, from co-optation to repression, as well as the degree of repres- siveness of the regime itself. The presented research does not cover Turkmenistan, the most repressive and closed state in the region and the world. Uzbekistan during the rule of President Islam Karimov and Tajikistan stand out among the remaining states under consideration for their high level of securitization of Islam. The lowest level of securitization is observed in Kyrgyzstan. The main question posed in the research concerns the manner in which various notions of Islam were construed as a threat in the Central Asian countries. In an attempt to answer the question, the premises of this policy are deconstructed and analyzed along with its consequences for the political system and the reproduction of authoritarianism of the states under consideration. The sample contains legislation, reports, media materials and public speeches of the presidents in regard to Islam in contemporary Central Asian republics.

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The paper presents the securitization of Islam within three sectors: military, political and societal. An analysis of the military sector follows a brief summary of this study’s theoretical framework. This is a sphere where Islamic radicalism is presented as a threat to the security of the state, population, territorial integrity, and military potential. Next, we will consider the political sector, in which Islamic radicalism is constructed as threatening the sovereignty of the state, its institutions, as well as the stability and sustainability of the social order. The last part of the paper focuses on the discourse and practices within the societal sector, where Islamic radicalism threatens collective identity, language and culture.

Theory of Securitization

The theory of securitization, developed in the framework of the so-called Copenhagen School, seems to be particularly suitable for analyzing the process of constructing the Islamic threat in the Central Asian states. This constructivist approach presumes that certain actors and phenomena become security problems or threats through language/speech. Security is dependent on human beliefs. Rather, it is a derivative of social and political determination processes, it refers to the situations “when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object1 (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society).”2 In this sense, language specifically shapes security, and does not merely reflect the empirical state of affairs. As Ole Wæver writes: “With the help of the language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act ... by uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific (threat.—Auth.) area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.”3 Thus, language is a tool that allows to present certain actors, processes or phenomena as an existential threat to a particular community. This leads to securitization. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver define securitization as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”4 Accordingly, securitization is a process that entails several stages. First of all, the securitizing actor (e.g. state, elite, or lobby) constructs a referent object (e.g., identity, sovereignty, territorial integrity) and a discourse of existential threat to the referent object. Subsequently, he presents a narrative to the recipient (for example, public opinion, politicians, society) about the existing threat through a speech act. Referring to the necessity of survival, he points to the adoption of exceptional measures that go beyond the usual rules of the political game. This phenomenon is called a securitizing move. The final stage is the response of the recipient to the actions of the securitizing actors. If they are accepted, then securitization is considered to have been successfully completed. Thus, the securitization theory explains not only how exceptional measures are introduced through security discourses, but also how different actors mobilize their audiences for this purpose. The recipient’s consent is especially important in democratic countries. Without it, we are only dealing with securitizing moves of political actors, which does not affect the practice of state security. The purpose of the securitization theory is to identify the actors who carry out securitization, what issues are presented as threats, who or what the referent object is, and why, with what effect and under what conditions these processes

1 A referent object is a theoretical construct, introduced by Barry Buzan, which is seen to be existentially threatened. 2 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London, 1998, p. 21. 3 O. Wæver, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in: On Security, ed. by R.D. Lipschutz, New York, 1995, p. 55. 4 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge, 2003, p. 491.

108 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 occur.5 The theory presented is thus based on the following elements: speech act, securitizing actors, recipients, and favorable conditions that influence the success of securitizing moves. A variety of phenomena or actors can serve as the objects of securitization. Actors can basically attempt to securitize anything. However, in practice, their options are not unlimited. Represen- tatives of the Copenhagen School point to the favorable conditions for securitization, which are especially important in the case of authoritarian states.6 Among them, the position of the securitizing actor and specific attributes of the phenomenon itself, presented as a threat, should be highlighted. In turn, Thierry Balzacq argues that the power of a speech act depends on several factors. First of all, on the context and the position of power of the speaker, the success of the statements and, finally, the discursive strategies being used. Of course, none of them guarantees the success of securitization. Together, however, they affect the effectiveness of elite securitization initiatives.7

Securitization of Islam

The mechanism for successfully constructing a threat that legitimizes the use of extraordinary, repressive measures and methods of action was especially important for authoritarian leaders. Re- gardless of the type of political regime, officials in power seek various ways to justify measures that restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens. Repression is mainly presented as a necessity associated with a threat to public order and security, rather than as an action that requires no explanation and determined by the subjective position of the authorities.8 On the other hand, Juha Vuori notes that securitization, in addition to securing the legitimacy, can have the following functions: (1) securitization for raising an issue on the agenda, (2) securitization for deterrence, and (3) securitization for control.9 The Copenhagen School defines 5 general sectors (a term introduced by Barry Buzan) and associated types of security: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. Securitizing actors (often the state) designate the typical referent objects for each sector. In our particular case, the ways in which the various notions of Islam are construed as a threat are of particular interest. The public statements, made by the presidents and government officials of the Central Asian republics, mainly securitize the image of Islam in three sectors: military, political and societal.10

Military Sector

The arguments about Islamic radicalism as a threat to stability of the state, population, territorial integrity, or military potential were present in all the states under consideration. However, they

5 See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, op. cit., p. 32. 6 See: Ibid., p. 36. 7 See: T. Balzacq, “A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants,” in: Securitization Theory. How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, ed. by T. Balzacq, New York, 2011, p. 26. 8 See: C. Davenport, “Repression and Mobilization: Insights from Political Science and Sociology,” in: Repression and Mobilization, ed. by C. Davenport, C. Mueller, H. Johnston, Minneapolis, London, 2005, p. XV. 9 See: J.A. Vuori, “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2008, p. 76. 10 See: C. Peoples, N. Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies. An Introduction, London, New York, 2010, p. 80.

109 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition were most intensely manifested in Uzbekistan during the rule of President Islam Karimov and Ta- jikistan.11 The 11 September, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, which led to the outbreak of hostilities by the Western coalition and a modification of the global discussion on security issues, were perceived by President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov12 and President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon13 as a somewhat belated confirmation of the validity of their policy. Moreover, it allowed them to swap their former roles of incompetent students learning about democracy for that of com- petent experts on Islamic radicalism. The civil war in Tajikistan and the brutal suppression of all forms of opposition should have made Emomali Rakhmon an authority capable of resisting the threats of Islamic extremism, as well as ensuring stability and security. According to Rakhmon, “Many have not yet realized the real threat and capabilities of terrorism. Now that the international public has learned about the insidious actions of terrorism, it is necessary to take all measures to ensure the security of the entire planet. The latest course of events and the spread of international terrorism on earth today forced many countries to choose this very path.”14 This narrative, typical of regional authorities, transferred the manifestations of protest activity and political struggle in the Central Asian countries into a wider, international context. The Uzbek authorities attributed the killing of police officers in Namangan in 1997, the bombings in Tashkent in 1999,15 the bombings and terrorist attacks in Tashkent and Bukhara in 2004, the riots and massacres in Andijan in 2005, the armed attacks and killings in Ferghana valley and Tash- kent in 2009 to Islamic extremists. Mass arrests followed all of these events. Harassment, arrest, torture and other types of ill-treatment affected ordinary citizens, as well as journalists, human rights defenders, public and religious figures. People were kidnapped by special services, witnesses were intimidated, and some disappeared without a trace. Thousands of people have been found guilty and sentenced to lengthy prison terms16 for alleged illegal religious activity and acts of terrorism, in both secret and closed trials. The government brutally suppressed and intercepted the dissemination of any independent information about the above events. The official version was propagated through the efforts of state scientists, experts, officials and journalists, whose efforts, in turn, were controlled by the security forces. The 2005 Andijan events attracted the greatest attention out of the above-mentioned acts. In the era of the Internet and color revolutions, mass killings demanded clarification even in non-transparent Uzbekistan. Unlike the previous “terrorist attacks,” which were mostly swept under the rug or spar- ingly described by the state media in the past, the huge flow of contradictory information uncontrolled by the authorities now mandated more active media securitization of Islam. The main vector was de-

11 Since coming to power in 2016, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has adopted a series of reforms that change the position of religion in Uzbekistan. 12 See: I.A. Karimov, Our Main Goal is Democratization and Renewal of Society, Reforming and Modernization of the Country, Speech at a Joint Meeting of the Legislative Chamber and the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 28 January, 2005, in: I.A. Karimov, The Uzbek People will Never Depend on Anyone, Vol. 13, Tashkent, 2005, pp. 200-201 (in Uzbek). 13 See: E. Rakhmonov, Velikiy poet i vidniy obshchestvenniy deiatel, Speech at a Solemn Meeting Dedicated to the 90th Anniversary of the Birth of Ustod Mirzo Tursun-Zade, Dushanbe, 27 October, 2001, in: E. Rakhmonov, Nezavisimost Tadzhikistana i vozrozhdenie natsii, Vol. 4, Dushanbe, 2006, p. 208; idem, “Ekstremizm ne proydet,” Interview with the correspondent of the magazine Millennium, No. 10, October 2001, in: E. Rakhmonov, Nezavisimost Tadzhikistana i vozrozhdenie natsii, Vol. 4, p. 213. 14 E. Rakhmonov, Velikiy poet i vidniy obshchestvenniy deiatel, p. 208. 15 See: A. Polat, N. Butkevich, “Unraveling the Mystery of the Tashkent Bombings: Theories and Implications,” Demokratizatsia, Vol. 8, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 541-553. 16 See: Secrets and Lies: Forced Confessions under Torture in Uzbekistan, Amnesty International, 2015; Spisok lits, arestovannykh i osuzhdennykh po politicheskim i religioznym motivam v Uzbekistane (January 2004-December 2008), Human Rights Center Memorial, Moscow, 2009; Spisok lits, arestovannykh i osuzhdennykh po politicheskim i religioznym motivam v Uzbekistane (December 1997-December 2003), Human Rights Center Memorial, Moscow, 2004.

110 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 noted in the texts of President Islam Karimov: “Servicemen were shot in the most insolent manner, an unprecedented attack on a military unit was organized, dozens of machine guns were seized, the building of the regional khokimiyat was seized” and “an attempt to overthrow the constitutional power”17 was made. According to the old Soviet tradition, numerous modified versions of these theses were reproduced in articles mainly authored by common people: retirees, well-known artists, composers, employees of farms, the Children’s Sports Development Foundation, the Central Mechanical Repair Plant, etc.18 For example, in the article “What is the Purpose of These Actions?” retiree Anfim Khlyzov states that the events in Andijan were neither an uprising nor a peaceful demonstration “riddled with bullets by order of the government.”19 It was a “well-planned subversive act of terrorism,” where “armed militants, according to the developed scenario, at midnight on 13 May, should attack the police and military units, then the prisons, shooting the guards and on-duty sentries at the same time, seize a large number of machine guns and other weapons, release about 600 criminals and prisoners, take over 50 hostages, seize the regional administration building complex, surround themselves with a human shield of women, children and the elderly.”20 A less profound, but more politically pro- government analysis can be found in an article by Saidbek Adylbekov, head of the Zhangbirchi farm. He calls the events in Andijan “a very well-thought-out large-scale terrorist act,” which was “prepared outside our country, using the money of those who dislike the course chosen by Uzbekistan.” The enemies of Uzbek development “aimed at gradually building a democratic state with high social protection of the population ... were Islamic extremists who want to build a ‘caliphate.’”21 “Together with Tahir Yuldashev they were ready to invade our country,” since “it is very beneficial for them to support the hotbeds of instability in the Central Asian region.”22 Outbreaks of unauthorized manifestations and acts of political violence were interpreted as actions of international terrorists and Is- lamic extremists, presumably the supporters of the Erk party, the Birlik party,23 followers of Said Nursi or Akram Yuldashev.24 According to the above-described official discourse, covert and violent

17 I.A. Karimov, Nikto ne smozhet svernut nas s izbrannogo puti, Statement and Answers to Questions from Correspon- dents at a Press Conference for Republican and Foreign Media in Connection with the Events that Took Place in the City of Andijan, 12-13 May, 2005, in: I.A. Karimov, The Uzbek People will Never Depend on Anyone..., pp. 338-339. 18 See, for example, publications dedicated to the Andijan events of 2005 in the regional socio-political newspaper Tash- kentskaya pravda in Russian and Uzbek languages: I. Yusupov (People’s Artist of Uzbekistan), “Pozvolte ne pozvolit,” Tash- kentskaya pravda, No. 48 (11132), 15 June, 2005, p. 1; R. Abdullaev (Chairman of the Union of Composers of Uzbekistan), “V interesakh nezavisimosti i protsvetania,” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 50 (11134), 22 June, 2020, p. 2; K. Shadimetov (Chair- man of the Tashkent Regional Territorial Association of Societies for the Protection of Consumer Rights), “...I budut prekrasnye vskhody,” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 51 (11135), 25 June, 2020, p. 2; R. Tillyaev (director of the regional branch of the Chil- dren’s Sports Development Foundation of Uzbekistan), “Nuzhno byt bditelnymi,” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 49 (11133), 18 June, 2005, p. 2; N. Aynakulov (Chairman of the Trade Union Committee of the Central Mechanical Repair Plant of the AMMC), “Rabochemu cheloveku eto protivno!” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 48 (11132), 15 June, 2005, p. 1; M. Isakova (general practitioner, Angren), “Dobro silnee zla!” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 52 (11136), 29 June, 2005, p. 2; M. Bazarbaev (head of the Yangiyul City Department for Culture and Sports), “Reshenie nashey strany pravilnoye!” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 52 (11136), 29 June, 2005, p. 2; L. Mansurov (head of the District Council of the Kamolot Public Youth Movement), “Troublesome Sons Cause a Lot of Pain to the Nation,” Tashkentskaya pravda, № 53 (11.752), 2 June, 2020, p. 2 (in Uzbek); A. Khlyzov (retiree), “What is the Purpose of Spreading Lies?” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 47 (11.756), 11 June, 2020, p. 1 (in Uzbek); A. Boltaboev (student of the Academy of State and Social Construction under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan), “Glo- balization and National Development,” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 47 (11.756), 11 June, 2020, p. 2 (in Uzbek). 19 A. Khlyzov, “Dlia chego eto delaetsia?” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 47 (11131), 11 June, 2005, pp. 1-2. 20 Ibidem. 21 S. Adylbekov (head of the Zhangbirchi farm, Kuyichirchikskiy district), “A byli li druzia?” Tashkentskaya pravda, No. 49 (11133), 18 June, 2005, p. 2. 22 Ibidem. 23 See: A. Polat, N. Butkevich, op. cit. 24 See, for example: A. Ilkhamov, “‘Akromiya’: Islamic Extremism or the Islamic Brand of Social Democracy?” UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 11, May 2006, pp. 187-189; idem, “The Phenomenology of ‘Akromiya’: Separating Facts from Fic-

111 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition actions were aimed at overthrowing the authorities, undermining territorial integrity and substituting the theocracy of the caliphate for the secular nature of the state.

Political Sector

The political sector refers to spheres where Islamic radicalism threatens the sovereignty of the state, its institutions, and the stability and sustainability of the social order. One of the manifestations of this type of securitization is the serious suspicion in regard to actors who appeal to religious values in political rivalry. The legal acts adopted in the Central Asian region in regard to religion, political parties25 and public organizations were based on the principles of secularism. Local laws prohibited the creation of political parties on a religious basis, which completely excluded them from the legal political space later on. Religious organizations and their leaders had to confine themselves to the prescribed social sphere and could not interfere in political life.26 Up to 2015, Tajikistan was the only state both in the region and in the post-Soviet space where a religious party has functioned for many years.27 The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which has been operating since the time of the Soviet Union, was one of the notable organizations on the local political scene. After the civil war (1992-1997), party members occupied a number of key posts, and their armed groups became part of the security forces. The IRPT possessed a developed network of activists, exerted significant influence at the grassroots level and enjoyed popular support. The relative balance of political forces did not last long. President Emomali Rakhmon began to eliminate the existing pluralism in interpretation of Islamic values, subsequently monopolizing state power. The adoption of the 2009 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations,28 as amended in 201129 and 2018,30 played an important role in this process. It outlined the dominant role of the state in the management of the religious sphere and laid the foundations for the securitization of Islam in the political sector. Social Islamization was associated with political radicalization at the connotational and semantic level. Citing that as the reason, the government imposed severe restrictions on access to religious education, censored religious literature, controlled the number of operating mosques and the activities of the Council of Ulema. Imams, in turn, become distributors and tion,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, 2006, pp. 39-48; idem, “‘Akromiya’: ekstremistskoe dvizhenie ili predte- cha islamskoy sotsialnoy demokratii?” Rasy i narody: sovremennye etnicheskie i rasovye problemy, No. 32, 2006, pp. 116-156; idem, “Andizhan 10 let spustia,” / Ili kto takie ‘akromisty’? Posleslovie,” International Information Agency Ferghana, 11 May, 2015; B. Babadzhanov, “Ferganskaia dolina: istochnik ili zhertva islamskogo fundamentalizma?” Tsentralnaia Azia i Kavkaz, No. 5, 1999; idem, “Po tu storonu barrikad? (O sekte ‘Akromiya’ i ey podobnykh),” Rasy i narody: sovremennye etnicheskie i rasovye problemy, No. 32, 2006, pp. 42-106. 25 See, for example, the following laws with subsequent amendments and additions: Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 26 December, 1996 No. 337-I On Political Parties, Narodnoe slovo, No. 4 (1527), 7 January, 1997; Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 15 July, 2002 No. 344 On Political Parties, Kazakhstanskaya pravda, No. 156, 19 July, 2002; Law of the Kyrgyz Republic of 12 June, 1999 No. 50 On Political Parties, Free Mountains, 25 June, 1999 (in Kyrgyz). 26 See: S. Peyrouse, “Upravlenie religioznym faktorom v Tsentralnoy Azii: prodolzhenie sovetskoy kontseptualnoy skhemy i psevdovozrozhdenie,” Rasy i narody: sovremennye etnicheskie i rasovye problemy, Issue 32, 2006, pp. 9-32. 27 In 2015, Tajikistan’s only religious party, the IRPT, was banned. Amendments and additions of 2018 to the Law of 26 March, 2009 No. 489 On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations legalized the already existing informal ban on religious parties in Tajikistan. 28 See: Law of the Republic of Tajikistan dated 26 March, 2009 No. 489 On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations // Akhbori Majlisi Oli of the RT, No. 3, 2009, p. 82. 29 See: Law of the Republic of Tajikistan dated 28 June, 2011 No. 739 On Amendments to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. 30 See: Law of the Republic of Tajikistan dated 2 January, 2018 No. 1497 On Amendments and Additions to the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.

112 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 agents of the presidential ideology and receive remuneration by the state as officials. Real or alleged members of the IRPT, just as other opponents of the regime, were killed, imprisoned, went under- ground; some managed to leave the country. In 2015, President Emomali Rakhmon accused Deputy Defense Minister Abdukhalim Nazarzod of attempting a coup d’état and the IRPT—of assisting him. The IRPT was soon recognized by the Supreme Court of Tajikistan as a terrorist organization and banned throughout the republic.31 According to Rustam Alimov, the goal of the IRPT is “to build a Shari‘a state in Tajikistan ... using the territories of foreign states to conduct anti-constitutional activities against the Republic of Tajikistan.”32 Moreover, the IRPT allegedly has the support of “criminals, external and internal destructive forces,”33 which “seek to destabilize the situation, organize and finance a coup d’état (2015). The interested party spares no effort or money on such activities. Agitation, religious propaganda and moral pressure are used. Material rewards usually play a decisive role in collusion. Just like a hundred years ago, modern jihadists are pulling Muslims back into the past under the banner of Islam and ethnic independence.”34 This line of reasoning reflects the position of the authorities. Various versions of it are distributed in newspaper materials and television programs. In June 2020, Tajik state TV channels broadcast a documentary filmHiyonat (Treason).35 Through the construction of a dichotomy of friends/foes of the Tajik people, the film exposes the latter and their activities aimed at destabilizing the socio-political and economic situation. According to the film, the Islamic Revival Party, led by Muhiddin Kabi- ri, “shook the foundations of society, sowed the seeds of mistrust and suspicion between brothers, father and son, neighbors,”36 and its goal “is only to destabilize the situation in the Republic of Ta- jikistan. The question is why? Because they have foreign masters, who want to aggravate the situation in Central Asia by any means, provoking a war between people. Thus, the IRPT and its foreign masters want to fill their own pockets.”37 The content of the film was widely discussed by the public following the screening. Khushdil Rakhimjonov, deputy editor of the Bahori Ajam newspaper, com- ments on Hiyonat and the “enemies of the state and the nation” presented in it in the article “The President is Always with the People”: “Although they are well aware that the constitutional system in our country is stable and unshakable, they are still forced to follow the instructions of their masters, having defiled their name before the nation and the Government forever. Because opposing peace and tranquility in Tajikistan is true betrayal.”38 Despite the differences in political reality, discourses of the Islamic threat to the sovereignty of the state, its institutions, and the stability and sustainability of the social order were present in all states. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev and representatives of the authorities of other Central Asian republics assert that “religious extremist and radical political elements infiltrating from abroad call for the overthrow of the existing government, the establishment of archaic regimes, or the

31 See: E. Lemon, H. Thibault, “Counter-Extremism, Power and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 37, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 137-159; D.W. Montgomery, J. Heathershaw, A. Khalid, E. Lemon, T. Epkenhans, “Re- searching Islam, Security, and the State in Central Asia: A Round Table Discussion,” Review of Middle East Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 1, 2016, pp. 3-17. 32 R. Alimov, “TEO ‘PIV’—proshloe bez budushchego,” Narodnaia gazeta, 4 October, 2018. 33 Ibidem. 34 Ibidem. 35 The documentary Hiyonat was later posted on the IFSHO TV YouTube channel in Tajik [https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=lSy-ckWARus], Russian [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v = rwktT7WfW5I], English [https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4xlwqZSQvTI] and Arabic, 7 October, 2020. 36 Ibidem. 37 Ibidem. 38 Kh. Rakhimjonov (deputy editor of Bahori Ajam), “Prezident vsegda riadom s narodom,” Narodnaia gazeta, 9 July, 2020.

113 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition autonomy of certain regions of the country.” 39 According to the official discourse, the Muslim community itself can also pose an existential threat to security and stability without strict control by state bodies. Some of them could potentially be, or were already under the “influence of missionaries from foreign Islamic centers.”40 The presence of Islam in the political space is of concern in all regional states, albeit to varying degrees. As the presidents have repeatedly stated in their public speeches, the influence of foreign Islam was supposed to shape the ideology of “religious intolerance,”41 “hatred and terrorism”42 and lead to “increased tensions, causing distrust, disagreement and fear,”43 which, in turn, could “lead to disorder in society.”44 The above-mentioned securitization discourse takes Islam out of the sphere of legal political competition. Folklorization and instrumentalization of the religious factor creates favorable conditions for local authorities. On the one hand, they discredit Islam and communities that do not express an active pro-government position. On the other hand, they can emphasize the importance of Islam, use it in official rituals and ceremonies, and free up space for pro-presidential movements. This helps maintain an imitation of freedom of religion or belief, weaken the discontent with the existing order, and maintain regime stability.45

Societal Sector

Societal sector discourse touches upon the spheres in which Islamic radicalism threatens collective identity, language and culture. In the process of fighting their political opponents, the ruling presidents of the Central Asian countries sought to monopolize the interpretation of national and religious identity. In most cases, state religious policy was not exclusively implemented through bureaucratic control over religious communities and individuals. It also implied the imposition of certain norms of life, and the subsequent creation of loyal political actors. Secularized forms of religious practice and certain forms of secularism were identified with an apolitical attitude, which, in turn, was supposed to counteract the political and religious radicalization of citizens.46 Central Asian Islam, as well as other spheres of public and political life, was subject to global processes—globalization and localization. Imposing the perception of these trends on the citizens of their country (recipient) solely as an impending threat is a securitizing move. The authorities were particularly concerned about external signs of religiosity, such as wearing a beard, specific religious clothing and a hijab.47 They were perceived by local government agencies as potential indicators of radicalization. The legal norms of the Central Asian republics did not prohibit the wearing of beards

39 N. Nazarbayev, Critical Decade, Almaty, 2003, p. 59 (in Kazakh). 40 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem. 42 I.A. Karimov, Our Main Goal is Democratization..., pp. 200-201. 43 A. Atambayev, The Advantage of a Secular State Lies in its Ability to Create and Maintain a Balance of Interests of Representatives of Different Religious Communities, Believers and Non-Believers, Speech at the international conference “Islam in a Modern Secular State,” 28 September, 2017, available at [http://www.president.kg/kg/okujalar/zhanylyktar/10946_ prezident_almazbek_atambaev_svettik_mamlekettin_artikchiligi__trd_diniy_ghamaattardin_kldrnn_din_tutkandar_menen_ ech_kanday_dindi_tutpagandardin_kizikchiliktarin_te_salmakta_saktay_bilgendiginde], 10 October, 2020 (in Kyrgyz). 44 E. Rakhmonov, Sviaz vekov—preyemstvennost pokoleniy, Report in Honor of the Twelfth Anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Tajikistan and the 1000th Anniversary of the Great Tajik Poet and Thinker Nasir Khusraw, 8 September, 2003, in: E. Rakhmonov, Nezavisimost Tadzhikistana i vozrozhdeniye natsii..., p. 207. 45 See: S. Peyrouse, op. cit., pp. 9-32. 46 See: E. Lemon, H. Thibault, op. cit., pp. 137-159. 47 See: M. Miles, “Switching to Satr: An Ethnography of the Particular in Women’s Choices in Head Coverings in Tajikistan,” Central Asian Affairs, Vol. 2, Issue 4, 2015, pp. 367-387; S. Nozimova, “Hijab in a Changing Tajik Society,” Central Asian Affairs, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2016, pp. 95-116.

114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 and hijabs. However, the contradiction concurrent with the intertwining and interdependence of formal and informal politics was part of the system. It was not surprising that, on the one hand, the local officials denied the use of disciplinary sanctions in the form of forcible shaving of the beard, ripping off the headscarf or other forms of discrimination, but, on the other, these sanctions were supposed to testify to the successful implementation of the presidential policy.48 For example, makhalla committees in Uzbekistan have been the institution of extrajudicial punishment for many years. They warned against wearing a beard and fined for wearing the hijab. They demanded a written commitment from their residents not to participate in Hizb ut-Tahrir and other prohibited or untrustworthy religious movements. Makhalla committees, along with the police and the local administration, organized the so-called “hate rallies.” During these meetings, people whose piety caused suspicions and their relatives were exposed to public humiliation and condemnation.49 Unlike Uzbekistan, which has begun to soften its religious policy in recent years, in Tajikistan outward signs of religiosity are increasingly becoming the target of repression. The head of Tajiki- stan’s regional department of internal affairs, Bahrom Sharifzoda, informed that as a result of “explanatory work”50 carried out by the local police, approximately 13,000 men shaved their beards, and 2,000 women “voluntarily refused to wear the hijab” in the Khatlon region in 2015.51 Those who tried to oppose the authorities’ actions by documenting, filming or commenting on social media were subjected to severe punishments: arrests, torture and imprisonment.52 Similar campaigns to combat everything “alien and not in keeping with Tajik culture”53 were carried out systematically and usually intensified on the eve of important events. In Tajikistan, President Emomali Rakhmon took a firm stand on Islamic visual symbols. In 2017, at a meeting with activists and representatives of the public dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the Law on Streamlining Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies, he quite clearly stated: “In recent years, under the influence of Internet networks and individual groups, the propaganda of clothing alien to our culture has been expanding in our cities and regions, especially among women, which is alarming.” Tajik women and girls “dress in black and dark clothes, trampling the values of our national culture and overshadowing the spiritual space of society. Whereas the Al- mighty is cognized with the mind and worshipped with the heart, and not with clothing, satr, hijab, turban and beard. In this regard, local executive state authorities and relevant state structures need to strictly prevent these undesirable phenomena. I have stated many times and will stress again that if someone seeks to liquidate a state under the globalization conditions, they destroy its language first and subsequently its culture. We need to put an end to the shameful phenomenon of worshipping alien cultures as quickly as possible, to promote the national women’s dress, to stop short on the path of imitation, fanaticism and superficiality, to expand explanatory work among women and girls.”54

48 See, for example: “Prinuditelno borody nikto ne sbrival i sbrivat ne budet,” Main Department of Internal Affairs of the City of Tashkent, 27 August, 2019, available at [https://iibb.uz/ru/news/prinuditelno-borody-nikto-ne-sbrival-i-sbrivat-ne- budet], 10 October, 2020; M. Kholikzod, “MVD: My ne davali rasporiazheniy prinuditelno sbrivat borody,” 21 April, 2015, available at [https://rus.ozodi.org/a/26969588.html], 10 October, 2020. 49 See: Creating Enemies of the State. Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, Washington, 2004, pp. 32-33. 50 “Glava UVD Khatlona: My ne brili borodachey, my prosto veli s nimi raziasnitelnuiu rabotu,” Ozodagon, 22 January, 2016, available at [https://catoday.org/public/centrasia/glava-uvd-hatlona-my-ne-brili-borodachey-my-prosto-veli-s-nimi- razyasnitelnuyu-rabotu], 10 October, 2020. 51 See: Ibidem. 52 See: A. Sarkorova, “Tadzhikistan: god tiurmy za video i kommentariy,” BBC Russian Service, 31 May, 2016, available at [https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2016/05/160531_tajikistan_court], 10 October, 2020. 53 See: Ibidem. 54 E. Rakhmon, On the Streamlining of Traditions, Celebrations and Ceremonies in the Republic of Tajikistan, Speech at the Meeting on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan, 11 July, 2017, available in Russian at [http://www.president.tj/ru/node/15752], 10 October, 2020.

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Kyrgyz authorities were also concerned with outward signs of religiosity. According to the former Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev, foreign Islamic lifestyles threaten both the cultural diversity of the multinational community, and the resurgent Kyrgyz national identity. “In a situation where, following a religion, we gradually lose our spiritual wealth, we will gradually cease to be a nation. ...If we, the Kyrgyz, are going to Arabize, Pakistaniize [our traditions] or borrow any other, alien traditions, speak their language, wear their clothes, then we will lose our roots and cease to exist as an ethnos.”55 The attitude of Kyrgyz presidents towards Islam did not have such a strong significance for real politics as in neighboring states. However, elements of the official narrative, according to which secularism and national identity are a prerequisite for a happy life for the people and the progress in society and state security, influenced the actions and the attitude of police officers. According to the research conducted by Emil Nasritdinov, Zarina Urmanbetova, Kanatbek Murzakhalilov and Mametbek Myrzabaev, law enforcement agencies discriminate more against practicing Muslims who are distinguished by their external Islamic attributes. And this is the case in Kyrgyzstan, despite the fact that young people there believe that the situation with religious freedom and conditions for the Muslim population in the country is better than in some other states of the world.56

Conclusion

The article presents the problems of Islamic extremism and terrorism in Central Asia from the perspective of securitization theory, one of the areas of critical research in the security sphere within the postmodern approach framework. It construes security as a discursive practice aimed at changing the hierarchy of political priorities, rather than as the actual state of affairs. Researchers do not view it as merely a speech act, but also as the political process associated with it. In the authoritarian regimes under scrutiny, political repression is mainly presented as nec- cesitated by the Islamic threat to military, political and social security, and not as a self-explanatory action rooted in the personal position of the ruling president. In addition to stipulating legitimacy, the securitization of Islam provided the opportunity for raising an issue on the agenda, for control, or intimidation. The construction of various notions of Islam as a threat has influenced formal politics through the adoption of laws concerning traditions, freedom of conscience, religious associations, public organizations, political parties, and security policy. It has also shaped informal politics, such as public humiliation in “hatred rallies,” forcible beard shaving, ripping off the headscarf, fabrication of criminal cases, and the use of torture against citizens whose external Islamic attributes make them stand out. In the public statements made by the presidents and government officials of the Central Asian republics, the image of Islam is securitized mainly within three sectors: military, political, and societal.

 First of all, it involves the arguments about Islamic radicalism as a threat to the security of the state, population, territorial integrity, and military potential. They are most intensely manifested in Uzbekistan during the reign of President Islam Karimov and in Tajikistan. In

55 A. Atambayev, State Regulation in the Sphere of Religion Will Only Increase, but Taking into Account the Fundamental Principles of Freedom of Conscience and Human Rights, Speech at a Regular Meeting of the Defense Council of the Kyrgyz Republic, 3 November, 2014, Svobodnye gory, 4 November, 2014 (in Kyrgyz). 56 See: E. Nasritdinov, Z. Urmanbetova, K. Murzakhalilov, M. Myrzabayev, Uiazvimost i ustoychivost molodykh liudey v Kyrgyzstane k radikalizatsii i ekstremizmu: analiz v piati sferakh zhizni, Research Institute of Islamic Studies, Bishkek, January 2019, No. 212.

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the former case, a pattern of securitization in the military sector was apparent in the 2005 Andijan events.

 Secondly, it is the political sector, which involves the threat posed by Islamic radicalism to the sovereignty of the state, its institutions, as well as to the stability and sustainability of the social order. It is a common manifestation of serious suspicions towards actors who appeal to religious values in political competition. Securitization in the political sector is presented chiefly by the example of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan.

 Thirdly, it is the societal sector. It touches upon issues in which Islamic radicalism threatens collective identity, language, and culture. The monopolization of national and religious identity by the authorities was mainly realized not only through bureaucratic control over religious communities and individuals. It also meant the imposition of certain norms of life, and the subsequent creation of loyal political actors. Securitization in the societal sector is presented in particular by the example of external signs of religiosity, such as wearing a beard, specific religious clothing, and a hijab.

117 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition FEMALE ISLAMIC STATE RECRUITS: MIGRATION AND VALUES, NEEDS AND IMAGES

DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.21.1.11

Gulden KARIMOVA Ph.D. Student (Sociol.), L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

Serik SEYDUMANOV D.Sc. (Sociol.), Professor, Member of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan)

Olga KUTSENKO D.Sc. (Sociol.), Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Higher School of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine)

ABSTRACT

his paper presents the results of a groups, including the IS, as self-regulating study of the phenomenon of female systems with significant potential for mobili- T migration from abroad to the IS and zation and mobility, as well as the division their return. This phenomenon emerges be- and restoration of functional structures. cause the organization and female recruits Also, the characteristic features of female had to satisfy each other’s needs. A theo- migration to the IS were identified in con- retical model that allows to track the forma- junction with a system of binary oppositions tion of values and needs of female IS re- that form the habitus of radical monotheism. cruits has been developed. This model re- The article contains the results of com- flects the connections between various fac- prehensive content analysis of 189 texts pre- tors and their cumulative influence on the sented on Russian-language online resourc- formation of values and needs of female re- es and devoted to the propaganda, recruit- cruits. The feasibility of using value-oriented ment and migration of female IS recruits. The and systems approaches in the study is de- geography of the study includes 25 states termined by the specifics of Islamic radical from 5 regions (Central Asia, the Middle East,

118 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 the Caucasus, Europe and separately the images coincide with two differently directed Western Balkans). We have analyzed 167 waves of migration of female recruits: to the articles related to the IS and similar groups ranks of the organization (2013-2016) and (2013-2020), and 22 articles connected to back (2016-the present time). The first wave terrorist groups (2003-2012). Out of these, 56 of migration satisfied the organization’s articles contain interview excerpts and com- need to increase the number of highly moti- plete interviews with IS volunteer recruits, vated members, and the second one meets both male and female, as well as with their the need to preserve and relocate the IS family members and officials. contingent to other regions. The results of the study allowed to de- This work highlights the previously un- termine the relationship between the values explored aspects of the migration of female and needs of female recruits and the organi- IS recruits. The results of the study can be zation itself, as well as between military and applied in planning and improving the activi- political processes and the formation of im- ties of state and civil structures aimed at re- ages of a passionary and victimized woman ideologizing and rehabilitating the returning in the IS. The periods of distribution of these female IS recruits.

KEYWORDS: female IS recruit, values and needs, female IS migration, female IS images, passionary, victim.

Introduction

Migration of foreign female recruits of the IS (ISIS, Daesh) occurred in two differently directed waves: in and out of the IS. The first migration wave of foreign women into the ranks of the IS and other Islamist radical religious groups (RRG) coincided with the active military expansion period (2013-2016). The ideological support of this movement in the online space was accompanied by the active and large-scale exploitation of the passionary image of the female IS recruit. She was a charismatic, determined and mobile woman, ready to fight, sacrifice and die in the name of her convic- tions. She emphasized her voluntary and conscious choice to be the wife and mother of jihadists and shahids and her refusal to live a life outside militant Islam. The beginning of IS’s military defeats in 2016 coincided with the first bursts of return female migration and the transformation of the image of a passionary woman into that of a victimized one. Now the IS woman is positioned as a passive victim of the organization, propaganda, life circumstances and her husband(s). The premise of these women being misled and forced to migrate through deception and blackmail is being emphasized, and there are appeals to bring them back to their countries of origin (COO) in order to save them and their children from hardships. With the exception of Kosovo, Chechnia and Kazakhstan, and now Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, donor countries have refrained from bringing female IS recruits back home. The operations to bring the female and children’s IS contingent back,1 designated as humanitarian,2 continue to cause contro-

1 See: Special Operation Zhusan in Figures, available in Russian at [http://ctc-rk.kz/%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5% D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B6%D1%83%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BD-%D0%B2-%D1%86%D0 %B8%D1%84%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%85.html], 25 October, 2020. 2 See: “Operatsia ‘Zhusan’—ser’ezny uspekh nashikh spetssluzhb i diplomatov,” available at [https://www.tarlan.kz/ ru/article/operasyya-jusan-serezniy-uspex-nashyx-spesslujb-y-dyplomatov.html], 23 October, 2020.

119 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition versy in society.3 After all, precedents can lead to an increase in the flow of reverse migration of female recruits of the IS and other Islamist RRGs. In addition, prior to migration, female recruits often belonged to radical communities, participated in protests and even illegal activities. Accordingly, their return may be the result of a change in the needs of the RRG, rather than a change in their identity. Due to the reluctance of states to facilitate such return, there have been cases of filing applications and complaints with government agencies, human rights and humanitarian organizations, aiming to withdraw the female IS contingent through humanitarian channels.

History of Female IS Recruiting

IS recruitment of women is one of the most complex and large-scale radical Islamist projects. Its implementation brought about the migration of foreign women to the Middle East. According to the goals of the IS and other Islamist RRG set for the female participants of this movement, it was originally called sex jihad. The sex jihad phenomenon was founded on the practice of temporary marriage, which is highly controversial from the Islamic doctrinal viewpoint. The Muslim community’s determined rejection of the sex jihad brand did not lead to its complete elimination, only to its transformation into marriage jihad and female jihad brands. Simultaneously, the image of the passionary IS woman was cultivated and spread. The fatwa that legitimized the procedure and practice of sex jihad is attributed to the Saudi imam Muhammad al-Arifi.4 In a late December 2012 Twitter message, he encouraged Muslim widows and divorced women to engage in sexual relations with the militants, formalizing them as “temporary marriages.” This “marriage of intercourse” aimed to increase the resolve of the militants and promised paradise to the female participants.5 It was noted that “a marriage can last only a few hours so that one woman can satisfy as many jihadists as possible.”6 Later, al-Arifi denied his involvement in this fatwa,7 which had launched the sex jihad movement. As the movement developed, related evidence began to seep into the online space. In 2013, Tunisian Minister of Religious Affairs Noured- din al-Hadami spoke on the air of Shems FM radio about the disappearance of two girls.8 In 2014, there was evidence of women and girls from Australia, Austria, Great Britain, Malaysia9 and other countries joining the sex jihad. Kazakhstan was no exception: in July 2015, two married women left Aktobe for Syria. The abandoned husbands knew about their wives’ fascination with the idea of sex jihad. Family conflicts did not stop the women from fulfilling what they considered their religious duty. As in other cases of recruitment, the need to personally participate in a religious war and the reward in the afterlife was exploited.10

3 See: S. Saidova, “Pribyvshie iz Sirii zhenshchiny zaderzhany v Dagestane,” available at [https://ndelo.ru/novosti/ pribyvshie-iz-sirii-zhenshiny-arestovany-v-dagestane], 25 October, 2020. 4 See: “Sheykham vidnee. Seks-dzhikhad, gedonizm i drugie idei populiarnykh arabskikh blogerov,” available at [https://lenta.ru/articles/2016/03/15/arabblogers/], 26 October, 2020. 5 See: “Siriyskiy seks-dzhikhad tunisskikh devochek,” available at [https://postskriptum.org/2013/03/28/sexjiha/2/], 26 October, 2020. 6 “Siriyskiy seks-dzhikhad,” available at [http://dmirix.ru/world/sirijskij-seks-dzhixad/], 26 October, 2020. 7 See: “Muftiy Tunisa ob’iavil dzhikhad prostitutsiey,” available at [https://postskriptum.org/2013/04/21/sjihad/2/], 25 October, 2020. 8 See: “Siriyskiy seks-dzhikhad tunisskikh devochek.” 9 See: “Molodye musulmanki edut na ‘seks-dzhikhad’ v Siriiu i Irak, chtoby ublazhat boevikov ‘Islamskogo gosudarstva’,” available at [https://www.newsru.com/religy/28aug2014/dzhihad_women.html], 26 October, 2020. 10 See: “Pochemu molodye kazakhstanki edut na seks-dzhikhad,” available at [https://maxala.org/sosedstvo/34510- sploshnoy-haram-pochemu-krasivye-molodye-kazahstanki-edut-na-seks-dzhihad.html], 26 October, 2020.

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The legitimization and implementation of sex jihad was based on the practice of temporary marriage. This custom was common in the early Islamic society, but was prohibited by the founder of Islam himself.11 Abrahamic religions place a taboo on extramarital sexual relations, considering them a sin. Specifically in Islam, they are considered an act forbidden for a Muslim haram( ). At the same time, Muslim men are not prohibited from having sexual relations with slave concubines, who are their private property.12 But for a Muslim woman, sexual relations are possible only within the framework of an Islamic marriage with a Muslim husband. Islamic marriage requires compliance with a number of conditions set out in Surah 4 An-Nisa’ (Women).13 Mufti of Tunisia Sheikh Othman Battikh14 and Hamda Said15 were among the first to oppose the idea and realization of sex jihad, which contradict the norms of Islamic theology and marriage pro- ceedings. In reality, sex jihad almost completely transformed into the brand of jihad al-nikah, or marriage jihad, But as early as in July 2015, the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan voiced its protest against marriage jihad as a phenomenon that “has nothing to do with true Islam and Islamic law,” and against temporary marriage, as a manifestation of “prohibited types of marriage.”16 The resurgence of the temporary marriage practice contradicts Islamic theology: “Sunni scholars equate temporary marriage with adultery.”17 Accordingly, the female IS recruits themselves began to deny the existence of the phenomenon of sex jihad, and their participation in it. On the contrary, they began to emphasize the legitimacy of their marital status with male recruits: “No sex jihad. Ev- erything is according to the law: you go to the mayor’s office and get married. If your husband was killed, you simply marry another with the consent of your relatives and in front of witnesses.”18 Subsequently, female recruits of the IS and other Islamist RRGs denied the very fact of their voluntary enlistment in jihadist groups.

Voluntary Female IS Recruits: Typical Characteristics of Migration

The migration of female recruits from the COO to the IS was the result of the implementation of the organization’s ideological project. The specifics of this process have been formed due to the participation of women recruits, their goals, ideological rationale and migration routes: Migration destination: Areas where the organization fought a religiously motivated war. Purpose of migration: Direct or indirect participation in the war. Indirect participation means not only various professional services, but also assisting a man who takes part in hostilities, marrying

11 See: Surah 4 An-Nisa’ (Women), Ayat 24, available at [http://islamicstudies.info/reference.php?sura=4&verse=24-24], 26 October, 2020. 12 See: Ibidem. 13 See: Islam.Global, available at [https://islam.global/verouchenie/koran/sura-4-an-nisa-zhenshchiny/], 26 October, 2020. 14 See: “Muftiy Tunisa ob’iavil dzhikhad prostitutsiey.” 15 See: “Seks-dzhikhad—lovushka vakhkhabizma dlia devushek,” available at [https://operline.ru/archives/27962], 27 October, 2020. 16 T. Nurseitova, “Yershat Ongarov: Seks-dzhikhad—eto ulovki psevdosheykhov,” available at [https://www.muftyat. kz/ru/articles/islam-and-society/2015-07-04/20345-ershat-ongarov-seks-dzhihad-eto-ulovki-psevdoshejh/], 26 October, 2020. 17 See: “Pochemu molodye kazakhstanki edut na seks-dzhikhad.” 18 “‘Kogda muzha ubivaiut, prosto vykhodish za drugogo’: zheny boevikov o poriadkakh v IGIL,” available at [https:// rusnext.ru/news/1500107914], 22 October, 2020.

121 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition him, bearing his children, and the upbringing of his offspring in the traditions of jihadism and shahidism. Expected result of migration: attaining paradise for the totality of their sacrifices as a result of actions and functions within the group. The main motives behind the IS and other Islamist RRG propaganda targeting a female audience: — a woman and her hijra (religiously conditioned migration associated with the migration of the community of the first Muslims). The subject of life in a non-Shari‘a state is exploited as a set of circumstances and situations that violate the rights of members of the Islamist RRG; — a woman and jihad. The images of a religiously conditioned war and a woman joining this war to fight or to help her husband, who participates in the war directly (mujahid, shahid) are combined; — a woman and her willingness to make sacrifices. Participating in the propaganda of the IS and other Islamist RRGs, women declared their own, their partners’ and their children’s readiness to die in the jihad. Attempts have also been made to revive the image of the mujahidat—a woman-mujahid19 and the practice of temporary marriage, but they were not supported by the majority of Muslims. Ideas about the direct participation of women in jihad and sex jihad only elicited a response among non- Muslim neophytes and nominal (non-practicing or irregularly practicing) Muslims. Specific characteristics of migrating women: fertile (marriageable) age. Features of female migration: — active participation of women in the processes of propaganda, recruitment and supervision of relocating new IS recruits;20 — observance of secrecy regarding the true reasons and the final point of migration in preparation for departure and movement along the route; — disinformation: (1) Using false pretexts to leave (getting an education, usually religious, learning the Ara- bic language, tourism and recreation, business trip or labor migration); (2) Initial relocation of migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus to countries outside the Arab Middle East (the European part of Russia, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, etc.). — relocation in families, small groups and alone, often unaccompanied by men.21 Migration route: crossing several borders with checkpoints and moving over significant dis- tances and at least one transit country. People from Central Asia and the Caucasus usually used the Turkish corridor: Istanbul-a city near the Turkish-Syrian border (Gaziantep, Sanliurfa/Urfa or Kilis) or other settlements–Turkish-Syrian border–the cities of Raqqa, Aleppo or Al-Hasakah (Syria) or other settlements.

19 See: “Modzhakhedat ili Zhenskoye litso terrora,” available at [http://ctc-rk.kz/%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0% B6%D0%B0%D1%85%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82-%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%B D%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%80 %D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B0.html], 18 October, 2020. 20 See: “Zhenshchiny na sluzhbe ‘Islamskogo gosudarstva’,” available at [https://www.golosameriki.com/a/islamic- woman-isis/2429869.html], 25 October, 2020. 21 See: Ibidem.

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IS women from Kazakhstan, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus have significantly expanded their knowledge of geography regarding the routes to the Middle East. In addition to Tur- key, transit routes also included other countries, presented here in alphabetical order: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE. Drivers of migration: the values and needs of female IS recruits, combined with the values and needs of the organization and the processes in which it was involved. For more information on the migration incentives for IS women, see the section “The IS and Female Recruits: Mutual Satisfaction of Needs through Migration 2013-2016.” A detailed assessment of all of the above aspects of female migration to the IS reveals that female recruits need a conscious and active approach to the processes of preparation and relocation along such a long and complex route.

Values of the IS and Female IS Recruits

The goal of the IS was to establish a caliphate that would be governed and functioned in accordance with the Shari‘a law in its Salafi interpretation.22 The IS and other Islamist RRGs designated their mission to be the “cleansing of Islam” from innovations and the spread of their group’s ideology throughout the world. They sought to attain an uncompromising return of all Muslim movements to the ideological and social principles of the times of the founder of Islam and his companions, the so-called “righteous” caliphs. The idealization of social attitudes, structures and relationships characteristic of the first Muslim communities of the early Middle Ages is the foundation of group values and behavior patterns in the modern Islamist RRGs, the IS included. The results of the study allow us to draw a conclusion about the influence of the valuesof the IS and other Islamist RRGs on the launch of political, military, social and other processes, in which these groups are subsequently engaged. In the future, these processes and group values influence the formation of the needs of the organziation as an integral system. Accordingly, the values of female recruits of IS and other Islamist RRGs are derived from the values and needs of the organization. Values of the organization: the ideological substantiation of group norms and types of activity of the IS and other Islamist RRGs is based on concepts borrowed from the general Islamic termino- logical base. The key terms are: tawhid, paradise, jihad, iman (faith), aqida (creed), Shari‘a, Sunnah, Ummah, Muslim, mujahid, shahid, etc. The ideology of an Islamist RRG is characterized by a radical interpretation of these concepts through the exploitation of a system of binary oppositions, some of which are presented below: Tawhid is the principle of monotheism, elevated to an absolute and opposed to the concept of shirk (“endowing God with companions” or polytheism). The tawhid principle implies an understanding of the universe as a God-centered system. The worship of the one and only God is designated as the goal of human life (as a person is the creation of God and his slave) and its only possible justifica- tion. The rejection of the potential existence of other gods and the legitimacy of other religions and the denial of the right to life to their followers is the basis of the ideological content of an Islamist RRG. The significant expansion of the scope of the term shirk increases the number of ideological

22 See: M.S. Bakonina. “Ideal’ny khalifat’—salafitskaia ideologicheskaia revoliutsia,” Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seria 13. Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, politika i ekonomika stran Azii i Afriki, Issue 3, 2016, p. 125, available at [https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/idealnyy-halifat-salafitskaya-ideologicheskaya-revolyutsiya].

123 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition opponents to include representatives of not only polytheistic, but also monotheistic religions, and even other Muslim movements. The performance of historically conditioned rituals and ceremonies that form the foundation of national cultures shapes the foundation of this process. The Abrahamic systems with their cults of saints are also designated as illegitimate. In the countries of Central Asia, the Islamist RRGs demonize and equate to shirk the cult of veneration of the Aruakhs (clan ancestors), common among the Turkic-speaking peoples. The system of genealogical trees, which takes into account the totality of family ties and is characteristic of the Turkic-speaking peoples, constitutes the foundation of their members’ identity. To undermine it means to destroy the family (clan, tribal) and national identity of the Turkic-speaking peoples. Iman (faith). In the jihadist culture, correct, true, and firm iman means adherence to the principle of radical monotheism. It is expressed through recognizing the reality of a supernatural force in the only possible form, and an active approach to the propagation of group ideology through davaat and jihad. The presence of iman, its truthfulness and firmness are considered the only guarantee of salvation from punishment after death and of the very legitimacy of earthly existence, and are opposed to the state of kufr (unbelief), a crime punishable by death. Islam and the period of its establishment (both during the life of the founder of the doctrine, and at other times in other regions) is opposed to the period of Jahiliyah (from the Arabian Jahl—ignorance). Davaat (invocation) and jihad (effort). These are the two strategies of Islamist RRGs, opposing but inextricably linked strategies of soft and hard power. They are implemented as a combination of agitation, propaganda and recruiting activities (davaat) with violent actions against ideological opponents in the course of a religiously conditioned war (jihad). Shari‘a and Sunnah are a set of norms contained in the canonical text, the customs of the first Muslim community and the deeds of its members. Their interpreted content is the basis of the ideological content of the Islamist RRGs. The activities of all social structures and the social connections between them are self-regulatory within the habitus of radical monotheism. Forming the basis of the ideology of Islamist RRGs, the habitus of radical monotheism encourages their members to actively participate in davaat and jihad. The social structures and relations between them that are governed exclusively by Shari‘a law are idealized. The legitimacy of the existence and functioning of individuals, of the social structures and relations between them is determined according to their compliance with the Shari‘a norms. If there is no compliance, they are considered illegitimate and mired in kufr and shirk; enslavement, labor, sexual and fertility exploitation, and genocide are legitimized in regard to them. Halal (permitted, allowed) and haram (forbidden) are the terms that delimit the areas of permitted and forbidden actions. In the habitus of radical monotheism, they serve to justify and legitimize the totality of violent actions in the course of jihad. Ummah is a real Muslim community (parishioners of one mosque and (or) a small group of co- religionists out of the total number of parishioners) or an imaginary community in which the totality of the nth set of heterogeneous Muslim communities around the world is perceived as a single and homogeneous idealized system on the global level. One of the main motives of the jihadist RRGs is the protection of the local or global Ummah from the aggression of the non-Muslim world. Also, the idealized Ummah can be declared a quasi-family, supposedly replacing its neophyte’s family or other personal ties, which they broke off during indoctrination and recruitment. The values declared by the IS resulted in the involvement of the group in a number of social, political and other processes. Along with these processes, the organization’s values have shaped its needs. And the needs of the group itself, together with its values, gave rise to the values of a foreign voluntary female IS recruit.

124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 The IS and Female Recruits: Mutual Satisfaction of Needs Through Migration, 2013-2016

The research conducted by the authors revealed the relationship between the values and needs of the group and the female recruits themselves, as well as the their aggregated connection with the processes in which the IS was involved (see Fig. 1).

Figure 1

Theoretical Model of Value and Need Formation in Female IS Recruits

IS Values

Processes Values of IS Needs with IS Involvement Female Recruits

Needs of Female Recruits

The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) conducted a survey of 101 IS members and collaborators, which identified ten attitudes that motivated women to join violent extremist groups.23 Indeed, there is a difference between the trigger motives that push women to take the last step. However, while varying in nationality, education, age, marital status and other parameters, female Islamist RRG recruits viewed this step as a way to satisfy their own needs when they joined the group. It was only possible to meet the needs of female IS recruits within the boundaries

23 See: “10 prichin, po kotorym zapadnye zhenshchiny ishchut dzhikhad i prisoediniaiutsia k terroristicheskim grup- pam,” available at [http://center-profilaktika.ru/2019/07/04/10-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B8%D0%BD- %D0%BF%D0%BE-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8B%D0%BC-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BF %D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%89%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8B- %D0%B8/], 22 October, 2020.

125 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition of a community regulated according to group ideology. The existence of such specific needs and their strength is evidenced by the very fact of the women’s migration to war zones, which posed a threat to their health and lives. When returning or attempting to return, the IS women usually state that they were unaware of the criminal activities of the IS and their husbands. However, the IS leaders, its rank-and-file fighters and their supporters did not make their daily reality a secret. On the contrary, almost every member of the group distributed video and photographic materials depicting military operations, torture and executions, bringing the circulation of this information to an almost industrial scale. An analysis by Quilliam Foundation Senior Researcher Charlie Winter conducted between 17 July and 15 August, 2015 demonstrated that the group created 1,146 different propaganda samples in 6 languages in those 30 days.24 Even after the significant military defeats of IS, the amount of propaganda content disseminated online by its members and supporters did not immediately decrease. In 2017, the U.K. reported the removal of “about 250,000 materials and videos aimed at radicalizing certain groups targeted by jihadists.” 25 Analysts at the American George Washington University have identified 713 English-language Telegram channels that support IS. Their activities were monitored from 1 June, 2017 to August 31, 2018, and showed “69,167 photos, 25,324 files and documents, 20,497 links, 11,118 videos, 3,868 audio recordings and 974 voice messages were posted in the channels that support IS.”26 Research confirms the role of women in promoting IS content and the group’s online viability. The article by Neil Johnson and his colleagues noted that it is women who create more reliable networks and connections between the group members and act as key nodes in the spread of IS propaganda, the search for neophytes and sympathizers, as well as in restoring connections between group members after its dissolution.27 It was also noted that “the longevity of an online pro-ISIS group does indeed tend to increase with the fraction of women that are in it.”28 Volunteer IS recruits, both men and women, who returned to the COO, as well as their relatives frequently mention watching propaganda videos during the period of radicalization. The consumption of specific content allowed to distinguish the target audience with specific needs and engage it with a guarantee of their satisfaction. The most frequently articulated needs are: — attaining paradise, — participating in the establishment of the caliphate, — living in the caliphate, — educating children within the Shari‘a framework, — direct or indirect participation in jihad, — the chance to comply with the group dress code, — marrying a “true” Muslim: a mujahid and (or) a shahid. Marital relations in an Islamist RRG value system play a significant role in discourses promoting jihadism and shahidism. In the jihadist culture, the bride, wife or widow of a jihadist and/or shahid are not just images; they denote a way of life. A woman’s desire for these statuses implies that she

24 See: Ch. Winter, “‘Islamskoe gosudarstvo’: kak rabotaet ego propaganda,” available at [https://www.bbc.com/ russian/international/2015/10/151005_is_propaganda_war], 20 October, 2020. 25 Z. Adesina, “Rassledovanie Bi-bi-si: kak IG verbuet ispolniteley teraktov,” available at [https://www.bbc.com/ russian/features-41135576], 24 October, 2020. 26 Ye. Pudovkin, “Amerikanskie eksperty rasskazali o propagande IG v Telegram,” available at [https://amp.rbc.ru/ rbcnews/politics/20/09/2018/5ba28ea19a7947ce2ccf487f], 24 October, 2020. 27 See: N. Johnson et al., “Women’s Connectivity in Extreme Networks,” Science Advances, Vol. 2, No. 6, 10 June, 2016, available at [https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742]. 28 Ibidem.

126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 has certain needs that are materially and (or) ideologically conditioned. The satisfaction of these needs and the self-realization of a potential companion of a jihadist is possible only in the conditions of a religiously motivated war: “There was a famous women’s jamaat in Makhachkala, Daghestan. Girls married militants, romanticized jihad, wanted to participate in it.”29 The marital, sexual and other needs of such women were expressed in the choice of partners from among potential or actual jihadists: “there are girls ... who are very radical on their own and want to marry a mujahid from the outset. They don’t want to be the wives of regular law-abiding guys.”30 In choosing her future lifestyle, a potential jihadist woman proceeds from her needs, based on group values that do not contradict her own values. Human behavior and people’s attitude to the world, their ideas about their place in the social relations system and the nature of their needs are shaped and then adjusted according to their values.31 The fact that it is acceptable to a woman to improve her material situation through participating in a religiously motivated war characterizes her in a certain way. After all, participation in jihad, as a way of earning money, implies: — payment for the specific services of a jihadist, — material assistance to the members of the jihadist’s family, — seizure of non-Muslims’ property and women of different religions as war spoils. Potential and active members of Islamist RRGs are characterized by the belief that for them the property of the kuffars (kaffirs) is halal. In order to leave and join IS, Islamist RRG recruits took, but did not return loans.32 The desire to marry a jihadist and promote jihadist goals is the result of a combination of values and needs of female recruits of the IS and other Islamist RRGs. In an interview with the French website Atlantico, Olivier Roy notes that “many girls aspire to join IS, knowing that they are destined for the roles of wife, mother and widow; they know very well what they have to do.”33 In the Northern Caucasus, the expectations from a marriage to a jihadist in women from Islamist RRG were similar: “...a woman who married a ‘mujahid’ shares all the hardships with him: night visits by security officers, arrests and so on. Andif he becomes a martyr, then she also will also reach paradise.”34 With a clear idea of her spouse’s illegal activities, the widow of a member of the RRG supports his lifetime intentions and contributes to their implementation after his death. Women of Islamist RRGs in the Northern Caucasus took part in storing explosive devices,35 provided militants with food and belongings, and resolved their personal issues.36

29 S. Tetradze, “Nevesty i zheny dzhikhada. Chto proiskhodit so sputnitsami boevikov, voiuiushchikh v Sirii i na Kav- kaze,” available at [https://sova.news/2016/09/24/nevesty-i-zheny-dzhihada-chto-proishodit-so-sputnitsami-boevikov-voyuy- ushhih-v-sirii-i-na-kavkaze/], 18 October, 2020. 30 See: Ibidem. 31 See: L. Rykova, “The Religious Axiological Sphere in the South of Russia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2018, p. 81. 32 See: N. Jaffer, “Tayny mir nevest IGIL: ‘Vy ne dolzhny platit ni za chto, esli vy zhena muchenika’,” available at [https://center-profilaktika.ru/2019/07/02/%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%b9%d0%bd%d1%8b%d0%b9-%d0%bc%d0%b8%d1%80- %d0%bd%d0%b5%d0%b2%d0%b5%d1%81%d1%82-%d0%b8%d0%b3%d0%b8%d0%bb-%d0%b2%d1%8b- %d0%bd%d0%b5-%d0%b4%d0%be%d0%bb%d0%b6%d0%bd%d1%8b-%d0%bf%d0%bb/], 20 October, 2020. 33 Interview of Olivier Roy and Haoues Seniguer: “Jihad: The Opportunistic Ideology of the Outcast with Western Denotations,” available in Russian at [http://islamoved.ru/2016/dzhihad-konyunkturnaya-ideologiya-otverzhennyh-na-zapad- nom-detonate/], 20 October, 2020. 34 S. Tetradze, op. cit. 35 See: “Vdova boevika khranila v svoem dome v Astrakhani samodelnuiu bombu,” available at [https://aif.ru/society/ safety/1078397], 27 October, 2020. 36 See: “Chernye vdovy—‘Materi Dagestana’,” available at [http://ursa-tm.ru/forum/index.php?/topic/2461-chernye- vdovy-materi-dagestana/&gopid=64652], 28 October, 2020.

127 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Needs of the IS and the Image of a Passionary Female Recruit

The image of a passionary IS woman, characteristic of the migration period from 2013 to 2016, in fact includes two types: a neophyte woman from a non-Muslim community and a woman from the community of nominal (non-practicing) Muslims. The basis of the first type isthe idea of a kaffir who suddenly obtained an insight and comprehension of the “true religion.” The second type is based on the idea of repentance of the one who lived as an infidel, but returned to the roots and to the “true religion.” These images were widely disseminated online and through instant messengers. But their inclusion in the ideological content of the IS did not lead to a radical transformation of the image of the group itself. On the contrary, female images made it possible to popularize the militant spirit of the IS ideology and to maintain it at a high level. Foreign women expressed their need to break with their past, leaving families and countries that they characterized as infidels without compromise. Declaring their desire to be wives, they emphasized that they would only become the wives of mujahideen and martyrs. They declared their desire to be mothers, but only mothers of mujahideen and martyrs. They also expressed a passionary desire to join the IS in order to participate in the struggle, to become assistants and spouses of jihad participants. Both female images were used as a reproach to Muslim men who avoided war. The need for male militants was acute in IS, since the group was involved in the following interrelated processes in 2013-2016: — large-scale military expansion; — establishment of a regime in the occupied territories and their colonization; — control and repression of the local population, the captured and the enslaved. These processes are inextricably linked with the needs of the group: (1) legitimization of the group’s image and its actions; (2) increase in the number of highly motivated supporters; (3) encouragement of male fighters and strengthening their loyalty to the group. The combination of the group’s needs and the needs of female recruits have led to the phenomena of recruiting and migration of women to the IS (2013-2016). The image of a passionary IS female recruit began to form online. This woman was distinguished by religiosity, passion, readiness for decisive action, including participation in a religiously conditioned war, and a high degree of mobility. The promotion of this image met the following needs of the group. 1. The need of the IS to legitimize its image and actions in the eyes of Muslim communities is generated by the need to establish an image of a fully functioning state, rather than a radical, or even more so a terrorist, organization. Accordingly, the ideological content from the photos and videos of men participating in executions and hostilities was supplemented with images of the peaceful life of women and children. The image of a female recruit who left her homeland in order to join the IS, personified the declared legitimacy of the group’s religious ideas and goals. 2. Increase in the number of highly motivated members through recruitment and migration of foreigners and natural population growth. Initially, the IS and other Islamist RRGs did not target a female audience. After all, their goals were realized by combat-ready men who carried out sabotage, subversive, combat and repressive functions. As the area of the oc-

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cupied territories increased, the IS was faced with the need for militants, as well as members capable of performing administrative and managerial, controlling and repressive functions. In July 2014, the al-Hansa women’s Shari‘a police unit was formed in Raqqa, Syria.37 Ini- tially, al-Hansa was comprised of local female IS volunteers.38 Later, foreign women began joining the brigade. In addition to their main functions of control and repression of the local population, al-Hansa women recruited “Muslim girls for marriages with militants.”39 Also, the Um ar-Ryan division has been operating in Raqqa since February 2014.40 However, local women and their families often preferred migration to kinship with foreign jihadists. Under such conditions, it was impossible to launch the marriage-sex-fertility conveyor with the substantial participation of local women. The group’s need for dedicated members to control the occupied territories both in the present and in the future demanded an influx of foreign women through migration. To achieve this goal, the following set of tactics was used: — romanticizing the migration process of girls and single women of childbearing age to IS; — exploitation of the term hijra to organize the migration of families that included girls and women of fertile age. The involvement of foreign female recruits in the IS marriage conveyor made it possible to launch intensive childbearing in families of highly motivated members in the shortest possible time. Encouraging male fighters and strengthening their loyalty to the group was carried out by orga- nizing a marriage conveyor that included the automatic transfer of widowed women to their next husbands. The IS’s widow conveyor used a mechanism tested by jihadists in the Northern Caucasus in the 2000s. Widows of the local Islamist RRG members also entered the widow conveyor with a rotation of jihadist husbands: “Their husbands were killed pretty quickly, and they married others. Look—she is 23-24 years old, and she was already married three times, and the children are from different men.”41 But the IS widow conveyor worked with a greater load: “There are women who got married 5, 19 times.”42 And in the IS widow conveyor, there was a disregard for paying mahr and observing iddah—the period between widows’ marriages of 4 months and 10 days.43 To understand the IS incentive system that involved a marriage to a widow as a bonus for a fighter, it is necessary to understand the general mechanism of Islamic marriage. In Islam, marriage and sexual relations as a part of it are not available to all sexually mature men. The desire to marry is not sufficient for the conclusion of an Islamic marriage. The husband has to provide his wife with housing, and separate housing if there are several wives. It is also necessary to pay mahr, a materi-

37 See: “IG sformiruet zhenskiy batal’on na severo-vostoke Sirii,” available at [https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/ world/20160229/2263875.html], 20 October, 2020. 38 See: Akmad al-Badri, “In Raqqa, An All-Female ISIS Brigade Cracks Down on Local Women,” ed. by K. Leigh, available at [https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2014/07/15/in-raqqa-an-all-female-isis-brigade-cracks-down-on- local-women], 20 October 2020. 39 See: “IG sformiruet zhenskiy batal’on na severo-vostoke Sirii.” 40 “Islamisty sozdali v Sirii dva zhenskikh batal’ona,” available at [https://vestikavkaza.ru/news/Islamisty-sozdali-v- Sirii-dva-zhenskikh-batalona.html]. 41 S. Tetradze, op. cit. 42 “Zhenshchiny vykhodiat zamuzh po 19 raz—otkrovenia vozvrashchennoy iz Sirii kazakhstanki,” available at [https:// www.inform.kz/ru/zhenschiny-vyhodyat-zamuzh-po-19-raz-otkroveniya-vozvraschennoy-iz-sirii-kazahstanki_a3525741?fbc lid=IwAR3jkOLrZpBQiHUaap0P_zpIy5wZW5LsyEQAz-6kBLWWSHGBZzJwnTsoJKY], 24 October, 2020. 43 “Idda razvedennoy, beremennoy, poteriavshey muzha zhenshchiny. Vidy iddy,” available at [https://islam-today.ru/ zhenshhina_v_islame/idda_razvedennoj_beremennoj_poteryavshej_muzha_zhenshhiny_vidy_iddy/], 24 October, 2020; Surah Al-Baqarah (The Cow), Ayats 234-237, available at [https://azan.ru/durus/read/38-sura-al-bakara-ayatyi-234-237-3138], 22 October, 2020.

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Needs of the IS and the Image of a Victimized Female Recruit

The period of IS military defeats coincides with the cessation of the migration of foreign women to the Middle East and their outflow back to the COO. At the same time, the image of a victimized female IS recruit begins to spread with a new interpretation of her religiosity. The passionary IS woman was supposed to have comprehended the true religion. The victimized IS woman, on the other hand, is described as lost and deceived due to a lack of religious knowledge and education. The image is realized in the following contexts: IS propaganda, forced departure as a result of deception, blackmail and coercion by the husband, motherhood and suffering, the need to return to the COO in the interests of children and in order to avoid the death penalty, radicalization and disease. The following are emphasized: — citizenship in COO, — the obligations of the state in relation to all of its citizens, — alleged lack of knowledge about the activities of the group and their jihadist husbands, — desire, need and right to return to the family and country, previously characterized as kaffir.

44 See: Makhr, available at [http://islam-risalyat.ru/%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%85%D1%80/], 22 October, 2020. 45 See: Surah 4 An-Nisa’ (Women), Ayat 24. 46 See: “Zhenshchiny na sluzhbe ‘Islamskogo gosudarstva’.” 47 See: M. Bloom, Ch. Winter, “How a Woman Joins ISIS,” available at [https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-a-woman- joins-isis], 25 October 2020.

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Understanding the essence of the needs of female IS recruits at this stage requires an understanding of the interrelated processes, in which the group has been involved since 2016: — military defeat, slowdown and termination of military expansion, the transition to defensive actions; — partial or complete loss of the occupied territories with the overthrow of the IS regime. As a result, IS members faced the damage to personal well-being and threats to their life and health. Preservation and transportation of the maximum number of manpower in the shortest possible time became the vital need of the IS. Combined with the urgent need for security among its rank-and- file members, it has resulted in the return migration of female recruits, allowing the group to accom- plish the following tasks: 1. Creation of a global network with new combat-ready RRGs and lone terrorists. 2. Preservation and dissemination of the ideology of jihadism in the new social environment of “former” IS members, both women and men. 3. Upbringing of a new generation of jihadists, including IS children, in safe conditions, but within the framework of the group’s ideology and the ideas of revanchism, that is, under the control of IS mothers. The need for the IS to preserve manpower through the withdrawal of the IS members from territories already uncontrolled by the group. The following occurs under these conditions: — activation of the return migration of IS members to their COO; — separation of men and women with children into immiscible migration flows. As a result, no longer burdened with families, IS men acquired greater mobility for military maneuvers and getting out of the Middle Eastern cauldron. And the women and children’s IS contingent easily infiltrated the refugee streams without arousing suspicion. Cases of the IS contingent infiltration into Europe were noted in 2015-2016.48 The American firm Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC) in 2016 noted the arrest of 41 IS militants and two Jabhat al-Nusra militants posing as refugees.49 An activist from Hawar.Help, a Yezidi rights organization, has similar data on Germany.50

Conclusion

The propagation of the image of a passionary female IS recruit in the online space coincided in time with the first wave of female migration (2013-2016) from the COO to the ranks of the group. The reverse migration wave has not yet reached its full amplitude, but the growth trend has been noted since 2016. Both waves of female migration are accompanied by the online promotion of the ideological content of IS and similar Islamist RRGs. The two polar images of the IS woman—pas-

48 See: “SMI: bolee 4 tysiach boevikov IG pronikli v Evropu pod vidom bezhentsev,” available at [https://ria. ru/20150906/1233415388.html], 27 October, 2020. 49 See: “Dzhikhadisty pod vidom bezhentsev v Evrope,” available at [https://www.altyn-orda.kz/dzhixadisty-pod- vidom-bezhencev-v-evrope/], 27 October 2020. 50 See: “Bezhenka iz Iraka rasskazala, kak vstretila v Germanii svoego pokhititelia iz IGIL,” available at [https://rtvi. com/news/bezhenka-iz-iraka-rasskazala-kak-vstretila-v-germanii-svoego-pokhititelya-iz-igil/], 25 October, 2020.

131 Volume 22 Issue 1 2021 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition sionary and victimized—are the faces of these ideological campaigns. The formation of images of passionary and victimized IS women resulted from obligation to meet the group’s and the women recruits’ specific needs, generated by the values of the group and the processes in which it was involved. The period of the formation and propagation of the image of a passionary woman coincided with the large-scale military expansion of the IS and the need to control the occupied territories. Dur- ing this period, the group felt the need to legitimize its path and actions, increase the number of highly motivated members, encourage male jihadists and strengthen their loyalty to the group. And the transformation of the passionary image of a female IS recruit into that of a victimized one was the result of the group’s military defeats and the loss of previously guaranteed social benefits by the privileged class in the occupied territories. Since 2016, the IS has faced the need to preserve and transport its manpower. Meeting this need can lead to the expansion and strengthening of the global jihadist franchise network, by preserving and propagating the jihadist ideology, as well as educating a new generation of jihadists, including the IS offspring. Supporting the revanchist ideas will allow to revive the IS under a new brand, create small sleeper cells and combat-ready RRGs, and coordinate their actions. Presumably, despite the active and large-scale exploitation of the victimized image, the attitude of female IS recruits to group values has not undergone significant changes. The identity of the voluntary recruits of the IS and other Islamist RRGs is the result of idealizing the imaginary communities of the first Muslim collectives and the global Islamic collective, and self-identification with them. The desire to revive the social structures and social relations characteristic of the medieval community and to propagate them on a global scale is an integral part of the ideal society and world order concept. Group values are reflected in the observance of group taboos, marriage and sexual relations and the attitude to the institution of slavery and genocide of representatives of other ideological (religious) systems.

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