February 2017

Executive Summary

January saw notable developments unfold in , with CAR witnessing a string of militia-related attacks on peacekeepers and non-combatants near Zemio and Mboki, located in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, as well as other such raids throughout the Ouham-Pende prefecture. Armed elements in likewise captured headlines in January, with the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) calling off their unilateral ceasefire with the government and other high-profile militants expressing doubt in the state’s willingness to resolve the crisis in the oil-rich Nile Delta region. Events in DRC saw notable progress in the political realm, although the Kabila government and opposition remain divided over the assignment of specific ministerial posts in forthcoming transitional government as well as the process by which the new prime minister will be appointed. January was also characterized by persistent tensions between Cameroon’s Anglophone and Francophone communities, with English speakers widely adhering to ‘Dead City’ strikes in Bamenda and Buea as the government crackdown on internet access and Anglophone civil society organizations. Of course, Islamist militancy continued to be a problem in the Lake Chad area despite security force successes, as Boko Haram conducted successful suicide attacks in Maiduguri, Nigeria, and ISWAP targeted parts of Niger, among others.

In , Kenya’s doctors persisted in their over seven-week strike, marching on Nairobi’s Employment and Labor Relations Court as their union leaders were threatened with jail sentences, while in the country’s Mandera County, al- Shabaab targeted a guest house amid persistent attempts to economically isolate the region. Al-Shabaab likewise featured in developments in Somalia, carrying out a number of large-scale, and high capacity assaults amid the ongoing electoral period in the country. Armed conflict was likewise a recurring theme in Ethiopia, with unidentified assailants in Amhara targeting businesses reportedly affiliated with the ruling government. Meanwhile, developments in South Sudan saw the country’s fluid security landscape shift amid defections to and from both the government and rebel faction, while the former worked to consolidate power with calls for National Dialogue and the creation of new administrative states. Mozambique saw a relative calm January, as a ceasefire initially enacted between the Frelimo government and rebel Renamo in December was largely adhered to. Finally, in Uganda, the flight of former M23 fighters from government cantonments back into the DRC mirrored an uptick in the group’s movement in the region, amid concerns that the movements might stir old tensions.

The past month brought a mixture of volatility and diplomacy to , principally in The Gambia, where longtime President Yahya Jammeh stepped down amid regional pressure and the initial stages of a military intervention, finally allowing democratically elected President Adana Barrow take power. Mutinous soldiers in , demanding monetary compensation from the government, brought sudden and widespread unrest to the country, with the government accidence to their demands resolving the issue, but fomenting others. January saw Burkina Faso and Mali agree to more comprehensive military cooperation regarding the militant threat along their porous border, while the latter country, in a single car-bomb attack by al-Mourabitoun, suffered a dramatic blow to its already fragile, but key security arrangement. In , the opposition in Zimbabwe showed signs of weakness as the MDC-T refused to support Zim-PF’s parliamentary candidate in the Bikita West parliamentary elections, assisting the ruling Zanu-PF to a landslide victory.

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Global Risk Map/Africa

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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.

Extreme Risk

LAKE CHAD ...... 4 CAR ...... 6 SOMALIA ...... 8 SOUTH SUDAN ...... 9 High Risk

DRC ...... 10 MALI ...... 12 NIGERIA ...... 13 Medium Risk

BURKINA FASO ...... 14 CAMEROON ...... 15 ETHIOPIA ...... 16 IVORY COAST ...... 18 KENYA ...... 19 MOZAMBIQUE ...... 20 UGANDA ...... 22 ZIMBABWE ...... 23 Low Risk

EQUATORIAL GUINEA ...... 24 THE GAMBIA ...... 25 ...... 26 Notable Dates ...... 27

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LAKE CHAD Extreme Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 10 16 20

13 fleeing suspected Five killed in fresh Boko At least two soldiers killed, seven Boko Haram militants Haram suicide attack at wounded in attack against arrested in several University of Maiduguri, military garrison in Gueskerou, Nigerian states Borno State Diffa Region, Niger

Assessments & Forecast

Fleeing Boko Haram militants unlikely to pose distinct Militant attacks continue in spite of momentum of threat outside Lake Chad Area counterinsurgency efforts Amid the ongoing operations against Boko Haram since the In spite of the counterinsurgency efforts and reported capture of Sambisa Forest, several arrests of implementation of amnesty programs as evidenced in suspected fleeing militants from Borno State have been Niger over the past months, Boko Haram still represents a recorded across Nigeria during the month of January, as prevalent threat in the region, which is further entrenched witnessed in the arrest of 13 militants including in Lagos given the porous borders allowing the transit of militants State on January 10. Such arrests have caused several across the region. Thus, we assess that additional attacks Nigerian Governors to express their concern regarding the will be recorded over the coming weeks. On the one hand, possible threat posed by fleeing militants in their states, as these will include attacks by the Shekau-led faction, which expressed by Kaduna State Governor on January 14. With are likely to take the form of suicide bombings and raids this in mind, we assess that as the counterinsurgency against soft targets, especially in Northeastern Nigeria and operations proceed, militants will continue fleeing to other Cameroon’s Extreme North Region, as witnessed at areas of Nigeria. That said, the impact of this flight on University of Maiduguri on January 16 and the neighboring areas will likely be low, especially in the Cameroonian town of Kolofata on January 12; on the other coming months, given the fact that the ability to carry out hand, attacks perpetrated by al-Barnawi’s Islamic State’s attacks in these new areas outside of Northeastern Nigeria West Africa Province (ISWAP) faction mainly against military and the Lake Chad Region as a whole is greatly reduced. positions as evidenced in Gueskerou are likely to be recorded particularly in Borno State of Nigeria and Southeastern Niger.

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CAR Extreme Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 4 5 15 19 20

Two MINUSCA troops killed 3R militants kill Bangladeshi Two Ugandan soldiers LRA attacks Gbodio One killed in attack by in Mboki, along Obo-Zemio peacekeeper in ambush on killed near Zemio; mines east of Bria, unidentified gunmen near road MINUSCA convoy in shooting recorded near pastoralist camp near Zemio Bokayai, Ouham-Pende Bouzoum, Ouham-Pende Zemio

Assessments & Forecast

Militia-related violence spikes in vicinity of Zemio in southeastern CAR  A notable spike in militia-related attacks was noted over the past month near the town of Zemio, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, located less than two km from the Mbomou River that serves as the border between CAR and the DRC. A January 4 attack on a convoy of fuel transport vehicles in Mboki that resulted in the deaths of two Moroccan peacekeepers from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) highlighted the threat posed to motorists transporting valuable cargo, across CAR’s outlying areas, especially near the country’s porous border with the DRC. At least three more attacks were recorded near the southeastern border town over the course of the month, establishing Zemio and its environs as a potential new hotbed of militia-related activity. Meanwhile other long-established areas of operation for armed groups in other parts of CAR, namely Ouham- Pende Prefecture, continued to witness militia-related violence.  In light of the spate of militia-related violence observed in the vicinity of Zemio over the past month, we assess that armed groups can be expected to continue to conduct attacks in the area against both military and civilian targets. Vehicles transporting commercial goods have been shown to be especially vulnerable to attack, even when escorted by military personnel, and will likely remain high-value targets to the various militia groups in the area, especially the Lord’s Resistance Army, that have been known to enjoy a high level of cross-border mobility. It bears mentioning that these attacks coincided with a reshuffling of MINUSCA military assets from some of the CAR’s outlying areas to population centers like Bambari. While it remains to be seen how this realignment of certain MINUSCA operations will impact the security environment in the country’s sparsely populated and highly volatile regions, it does carry the risk that areas like Zemio may be less secure and more susceptible to attack by armed groups.

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SOMALIA Extreme Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 7 25 27

Galmudug forces block Twin VBIED attack Al-Shabaab claims National Assembly from targets Mogadishu mass-casualty raid on executing no- hotel KDF in Kulbiyow confidence vote

Assessments & Forecast

Tension between Guled, National Assembly, sowing Surge in large-scale al-Shabaab attacks designed to instability, may foment future unrest in Galmudug shake confidence in election, security, liable to persist January saw notable developments in Galmudug, with January saw a notable surge in high-profile al-Shabaab the thwarted no-confidence vote nevertheless attacks in Mogadishu, its immediate environs, as well as demonstrating the regional legislature’s dissatisfaction outlying regions. These attacks are mostly consistent with with the President Abdikarim Hussein Guled’s handling recurring patterns of insecurity in Somalia, with the above of recent events, including the administration’s incidents mirrored by similar instances in the past. Still, we territorial dispute with Puntland and perceived failure to assess that this uptick was, in part, driven by the ongoing address the al-Shabaab threat. Meanwhile, Guled’s use electoral period, with the mass-casualty design of each of force in preventing this vote, coupled with his attack intended to cast a shadow over the progress subsequent decreeing of a state-of-emergency was an symbolized by recent political achievements, including last outright attempt to block what was, effectively, an month’s inauguration of Somalia’s tenth parliament and impeachment. Given that the above is unresolved, going the anticipated presidential election, slated for February 8. into February, the situation in Galmudug remains As such, going into February, al-Shabaab will likely sustain volatile. Moreover, that federal security forces involved attempts to execute high-capacity operations against themselves in the row on behalf of Guled, we assess, civilian and government facilities in line with its baseline complicates is liable to worsen the atmosphere of. As interests, but also in order to shake confidence in Somalia’s such, we assess that over the coming weeks, Guled is fledgling democratic institutions and, more broadly, liable to take the necessary means to consolidate his subvert the semblance of stability afforded by regional control, including placing more restrictions on the peacekeeping efforts. To this point, the Kulbiyow attack, autonomous administration’s institutions and with its death count hovering at 50 KDF fatalities, and potentially removing legislators he deems opponents. glaring similarities to al-Shabaab’s January 2016 assault on Going further, this internal political instability may serve El-Adde, will likely be utilized for propaganda purposes by to create a more conducive environment for al-Shabaab al-Shabaab in the coming weeks in order to broadcast a to assert itself in Galmudug’s outlying areas. More so, visage of indomitability despite the elections. said instability, should it manifest in Galkayo, may invite friction with Puntland forces, potentially undermining the January 1 ceasefire signed by the two sides.

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SOUTH SUDAN Extreme Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 5 14 17 23

Clashes between rival New borders in W. Equatoria, 11 senior SPLA-IO Kiir announces new SPLA-IO factions loyal Upper Nile created, increasing members defect to directives for National to Machar, Deng to 32 states Deng in Juba ceremony Dialogue

Assessments & Forecast

Fragmentation of opposition while Machar marginalized in exile increasing ethnic tensions raises questions of legitimacy Although defections are a common President Salva Kiir’s redrawing of Kiir’s newly detailed vision for the element of the political and military the country’s borders to expand to dialogue, in which state governors conflict in South Sudan, in recent weeks 32 states is notable given how are instructed to lead local there have been a particularly notable controversial the borders have been reconciliation efforts to be built series of announcements in which since Kiir’s October 2015 initial into regional and then national rebels have switched from the SPLA-IO creation of 28 states from the conferences, is ostensibly meant faction loyal to rebel leader Riek Machar original ten. This has raised to demonstrate the inclusive to the faction loyal to current First Vice persistent accusations that Kiir has nature of the process. However, President Taban Deng Gai. Deng’s violated the August 2015 peace the opposition is notably absent ostensible leadership of opposition agreement and gerrymandered the from the dialogue, raising forces has likely created space for some states to empower his Dinka ethnic questions as to how effective the to exit the rebellion while still group. In this context, additional national reconciliation is intended technically opposing the government. At states are likely intended to facilitate to be. Furthermore, the directive the same time, these defections have a Dinka majority in those areas, and to begin on a state level when the served to illustrate the deepening allow Kiir to consolidate his support 32-state system is disputed raises marginalization of Machar as he lingers base at the expense of other challenges regarding the in exile in South Africa. Furthermore, communities. Furthermore, the ever- legitimacy of new state governors the opposition has continued to expanding number of districts to authentically engage in fragment throughout the country. The provides opportunities for Kiir to dialogue. At the same time, creation of new rebel movements in expand his patronage network and localized peace efforts may have Equatoria as well as in-fighting between broker power to and away from the additional effect of further Shilluk opposition groups in Upper Nile different groups. Although this is splintering the national opposition State have emphasized the fault lines unlikely to significantly alter the through deals that benefit groups within the coalition against the country’s current trajectory, it or leaders individually, and as government, and further attest to the renews the grievances of other such, is another avenue through differing internal motivations of the ethnic groups, and is liable to which Kiir may effectively weaken variety of groups that constitute the increase ethnic tensions in an the national rebellion and further increasingly fractured opposition. already highly volatile environment. consolidate his power.

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DRC High Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 6 26 28 30

President Kabila renews CENCO Ruling, opposition coalition CENCO deadline New seven-day mandate to continue mediating reach agreement to divide lapses for December ultimatum issued by talks between ruling, opposition ministerial posts 31 agreement CENCO parties implementation

Assessments & Forecast

CENCO-led talks lead to progress on ministerial appointments, but coalitions stop short of implementation  While the ruling People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) and government opposition parties were able to reach an agreement on December 31, 2016 precluding the extension of President Joseph Kabila’s mandate to a third term and forcing him to relinquish power following an election to be held by the end of 2017, the agreement faced a number of obstacles at the start of the new year. Following the December 31 agreement, on January 6, Kabila renewed the mandate of the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo (CENCO) to mediate continuing talks between the DRC’s ruling and opposition parties, setting the stage for a January 26 agreement under which ministerial and vice-ministerial posts in the new transitional government were divided amongst the various political parties comprising the rival coalitions. Despite this notable step toward resolving the country’s ongoing political crisis, the majority and opposition coalitions failed to implement the agreement on December 31, deep mutual distrust between the ruling and opposition coalitions and disagreement between the two groups over the appointment of the transitional government’s prime minister remain the greatest obstacles to the peaceful transition of power in the DRC. Moreover, the individual parties comprising the opposition “Rally” coalition have each put forth different candidates for prime minister, further complicating the transition process.  While the January 26 agreement represents a milestone in ongoing transition talks between the Rally opposition coalition and the PPRD and its allies, major obstacles to its implementation remain that threaten to derail the agreement. Furthermore, the ruling and opposition coalitions have adopted competing interpretations of key aspects of the December 31 agreement. While the Rally coalition believes that the deal gives its leaders the authority to directly appoint the prime minster of the transitional government, the ruling coalition has asserted that Rally may select a pool of candidates for the role, but that President Kabila should have a final say over the appointment. Furthermore, the ruling coalition has demanded that CENCO’s mandate end upon the formation of the transitional government, while Rally maintains that CENCO should continue to mediate talks between the ruling and opposition coalitions. These barriers to the transition of power from the current administration to a provisional government remain despite the January 26 agreement, as evidenced by the coalitions’ failure to implement the terms of the December 31 accord by the January 28 deadline set by CENCO. As a result of Rally’s clear unwillingness to cede to President Kabila what it believes to be its rightful authority under the December 31 deal to unilaterally appoint the prime minister of the transitional government, as well as the ruling coalition’s demonstrated deference to President Kabila on the matter, an impasse in the transition talks has been reached that may extend well into the next month. Should this impasse lead the ongoing transition negotiations to break down over the coming weeks, public frustration over the transition process may lead to civil unrest.

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MALI High Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 18 23 26

Al-Mourabitoun claim SVBIED Ansar Dine claims mortar attack Security forces arrest two suspected attack on MINUSMA base in Gao, against MINUSMA camp in al-Mourabitoun members plotting killing 77 Malian soldiers, CMA, Aguelhok, Kidal Region, killing one to conduct suicide bombing GATIA elements peacekeeper injuring 10 targeting foreigners

Assessments & Forecast

Al-Mourabitoun SVBIED to derail Algiers Accords Arrest of militants in Bamako The al-Mourabitoun suicide vehicle borne IED (SVBIED) The presence of the al-Mourabitoun members in Bamako specifically targeting the joint patrols between the plotting to conduct an attack against foreign targets is Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) and highly notable, as Bamako, notwithstanding the November Imghad and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), in an 2015 attack on the Radisson Blu Hotel, and a 2016 foiled effort to deliver a blow to the already fragile peace attack against an EU military training headquarters, has agreement between the separatist Coordination of CMA largely remained unharmed in recent years by Islamist and the pro-government GATIA. The CMA have already militancy. Furthermore, the initial choice of targeting the suspended their participation in the 2015 Algiers Peace high profile Africa- Summit on January 13-14 is Accords, remaining solely in the joint patrols. Following daring, and the decision to postpone it portrays planning the attack, the Malian army, MINUSMA and French ahead, and assessing risks. Furthermore, it highlights the Barkhane forces have engaged in joint operations in emphasis of the al-Qaeda affiliated groups to target foreign Gao, arresting 12 suspects, in a concerted effort to actors in Mali, and desire to carry out high-profile, improve security, and instill a sense of confidence in the attention-grabbing attacks. That said, even if an attack joint patrols. The operations will likely continue in the transpired, it would have fit within the pattern of Islamist coming weeks, and more arrests are expected. That militancy in Bamako, with attacks being rare, but not said, given the lack of trust between CMA and GATIA, as unprecedented, and usually at a larger scale. Thus, the well as toward the security forces, it is unlikely that arrests are not indicative at this time of an escalation of the these patrols will be able to resolve the tensions security situation in the capital, but rather highlights the between these groups. Additionally, it is possible that underlying threat of attacks in Bamako and the risk posed greater security cooperation between the groups will to Western, and especially French, targets. make them a target for militant attacks, although MINUSMA and other foreign bases will most certainly continue to be a prime target for attacks in northern Mali.

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NIGERIA High Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation

JANUARY 1 6 10 20

MEND declares its loss of Niger Delta Avengers Peaceful IPOB protest At least one killed, 63 confidence in President (NDA) declares near Federal High Court arrested in IPOB rally in Buhari’s willingness to resumption of its in Abuja amid ongoing solidarity with Donald solve Niger Delta crisis operations trial against Nnmandi Trump in Port Harcourt

Kanu

Assessments & Forecast

Resumption of attacks likely to be witnessed, eroding prospects for peace unrest While since the aforementioned declaration of the end to In light of the start of the expected trial for treason against the ceasefire on January 6, no NDA-declared attacks have the leader of Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) Nnmandi been recorded thus far, the threat, coupled with their Kanu in Abuja on January 10, several peaceful IPOBl protest status as the most prominent militant group in the area is were recorded in the Nigerian capital denouncing the likely to produce a domino effect, with other groups also illegitimacy of the charges and demanding Kanu’s release. threatening a resumption of attacks against oil installation In contrast to the aforementioned peaceful in the region. This is highlighted by a statement issued by demonstrations in Abuja, the police crackdown including the Niger Delta Revolutionary Crusaders (NDRC) on January the use of live ammunition against the IPOB rally held in 8, publicly supporting the NDA, as well as an unaccountable the capital of Rivers State, underscores the firm stance of pipeline explosion recorded in Ughelli, Delta State on security forces vis-vis pro Biafra demonstrations. January 17. With this in mind, and in spite of Niger Delta Particularly in southeastern States of Nigeria, which form stakeholders’ efforts to maintain the peace, in view of the part of the self-proclaimed Biafra Region. In this context, entrenched mistrusts of such groups vis-a-vis the Federal while the demonstration was organized in solidarity with Government exacerbated by the standoff in the US President Donald Trump inauguration, it was likely negotiations, a resumption of attacks against both national motivated by the abovementioned trail and subsequently and internationally owned oil installations is likely to be as a tool to draw attention towards the Biafran cause. This recorded in the coming weeks. In this regard, a resumption highlights the ongoing trial against Nnmandi Kanu as a of attacks is liable to erode the already hampered focal point for unrest. Thus we assess that additional confidence between Buhari’s administration and the Niger protest with a notable risk for unrest are likely to be Delta stakeholders, significantly hindering the prospect of recorded, particularly in Abuja and Southeastern Nigeria, peace. with a distinct focus on the days surrounding the resumption of Kanu’s trial on February 10.

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BURKINA FASO Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 10 24 25

Kerboule mining site, Soum Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali agree Gunmen threaten Province, targeted by to create common security force teachers in Soum unidentified gunmen to fight militancy along their Province demanding porous borders Islamic teaching

Assessments & Forecast Prospects for regional cooperation amid continuing insecurity in Sahel Region Although no attacks by jihadist militants were reported over the past month, the restive Sahel region continues to represent a focal point for insecurity in the country, with two civilians killed near the Malian border, and a criminal raid on a mining site in Soum Province. With that said, the threats levelled by gunmen at teachers in the same province is liable to have been perpetrated by extremist elements, given their demands for Islamic teaching. Efforts to change educational practices in this remote area would represent a novel tactic for the region’s two most active groups, namely Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the recently established Ansar-ul Islam, yet remain a plausible course of action for either organization.

Furthermore, the downtick in attacks is not in and of itself an indication of a decline in the militant threat to the area emanating from Mali, and several steps have been taken over the past month in order to help bolster security in the Sahel Region, most notable the creation of a common border security force to help stabilize the Mali-Burkina-Niger tri-border area. Yet whilst the move is encouraging, there are numerous obstacles which are liable to hinder its overall efficacy. For instance, the militant elements themselves are well-entrenched within Mali’s local populace. The border force’s inherently limited scope means that it cannot hope to address the underlying drivers for militancy, and at best it may act as something of a deterrent. Without significant counterinsurgency efforts on the Malian side, including extensive security operations, regional investment to generate alternative economic opportunities, and effective de-radicalization efforts, the threat will remain. With this, the militants themselves and have developed significant institutional knowledge and combat experience over recent years, and thus represent a notable force. Secondly, the geographical extent of the terrain to be secured, coupled with the mobility of militant actors, will undermine the capacity of forces to respond to attacks. Finally, the creation of the force itself, including the establishment of hierarchies, communications, and jurisdiction is likely to be a complex process, and no precise timeline has been provided as of the time of writing. In this context, the decision is not anticipated to have a direct impact on the security situation in Burkina Faso’s Sahel region in the coming months.

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CAMEROON Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 9 10 17 18 24

‘Dead city’ strike organized One of two Anglophone Internet access Government bans President Paul Biya forms by Anglophone radio stations in Bamenda restricted in SCNC and CACSC, National Commission of consortium widely shut down by central Anglophone regions groups defy ban, call Bilingualism and adhered to in cities of government for dead city protests Multiculturalism Bamenda, Buea Assessments & Forecast

Amid the ongoing, months-long standoff between Cameroon’s central government and the country’s Anglophone civil society organizations, labor unions, and opposition groups, Cameroon witnessed repeated “dead city” protests in Bamenda, Buea, and Limbe, all located in the country’s English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions. While the Cameroonian central government at the close of 2016 appeared open to dialogue with Anglophone civil society to address the grievances of English-speaking lawyers and teachers on strike since November 2016 and concerns of the broader Anglophone self-determination movement, Yaounde appeared to adopt a decidedly more intransigent approach to the crisis over the past month. The central government’s new hardline position in the ongoing Anglophone was evidenced in January by its shuttering of one of two Anglophone radio stations in Bamenda, its restriction of internet access in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions, and its outlawing of the Southern Cameroon’s National Council (SCNC) and the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), two major Anglophone civil society groups.

Not only do the actions taken by the Cameroonian government in the past month highlight a hardline shift in its strategy, they likely presage a deepening of the crisis over the weeks to come. The SCNC and CACSC have thus far defied the government’s ban on their activities, with the former refusing altogether to acknowledge the measure on the grounds that it does not recognize the central government’s authority, and the latter announcing the opening of new offices in Europe and in the United States while calling for additional dead city protests in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions. Furthermore, the opposition Alliance of Progressive Forces (AFP) party’s reaffirmation this past month of its support of the CACSC and the cause of federalism, backed by a number of Anglophone groups, will likely embolden Anglophone civil society organizations like the SCNC and the CACSC in their defiance of the central government’s attempts to curb their influence. Finally, the impact of the National Commission of Bilingualism and Multiculturalism on the increasingly complex and deepening remains uncertain. Whilst the organization ostensibly intends to bridge the divide between Cameroon’s Anglophone and Francophone communities and civil society organizations, its formal goals, mandate, and strategy remain unclear. Furthermore, that it has been established months after the commencement of the crisis may lead members of the Anglophone reasons to regard it with a measure of animus, consequently hobbling is ability to contribute to a solution. In this context, we assess that demonstrations in Cameroon’s English-speaking regions like the multiple dead city protests observed in January in the Northwest and Southwest are likely to continue over the coming weeks.

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ETHIOPIA Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation

JANUARY Y 4 10 18

Grenade attack at hotel Grenade attack at hotel Two grenade attacks in in Bahir Dar, Amhara in Gondar, Amhara Metema, Amhara Region, Region Region one of which destroys cotton plant

Assessments & Forecast

Sporadic attacks in Amhara Region reflective of persistent anti-government sentiment Although anti-government activity in the Amhara Region has largely died down from its height in the latter half of 2016, ethnic Amharas continue to hold grievances with the government due to its perceived discriminatory policies that favor the ruling Tigray ethnic group. As such, the grenade attacks against hotels in Bahir Dar and Gondar, as well as in Metema, near the Sudanese border, are likely reflective of the persistence of anti-government sentiments among ethnic Amharas. This is underscored by reports that two of the targets were suspected to have explicit affiliations with the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, with the hotel in Bahir Dar said to be connected to government representatives and the cotton plant in Metema allegedly owned by Tigrayan elites. Such attacks are consistent with a pattern witnessed during the 2016 protests in Amhara Region’s urban centers, during which government- linked businesses were often ransacked and vandalized as symbols of the EPRDF and its anti-Amhara policies. Additionally, we assess that the hotel attacks may have been carried out with the intent to undermine the sense of stability and normality that accompanies such routine establishments, particularly given that Amhara Region generally and Bahir Dar and Gondar in particular represent well-known tourist destinations, and therefore engines of economic activity for the government. Furthermore, in addition to the stay-home protests and street demonstrations in 2016, Amhara Region has long witnessed a parallel element of violent anti-government activity, typically by armed opposition groups that include armed farmers or organized militias, some of which are based in the Gondar area. In that context, the reported skirmishes between armed locals and government forces over the past few months may have served as a precursor for the January attacks, with violence moving from outlying regions to Amhara’s major cities. However, it remains unclear to what extent the armed resistance is coordinated or led in an organized fashion. Nonetheless, we assess that there exists a risk of additional, albeit sporadic, attacks on civilian establishments or government-affiliated targets by anti-government elements over the coming weeks and months.

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IVORY COAST Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 6 9 17 23 30

Gendarmes Ex-Forces Nouvelles Start of a three week- Mutiny spreads to Civil servants’ strike blockade Gesco rebels start mutiny in long civil servants strike others elements of the suspended as five of six corridor connecting Bouake security forces across demands accepted by Youpougon to the country, two dead government in , unrest in Abidjan Assessments & Forecast

Multiple mutinies across Ivory Coast Civil servants strike disrupts country for three weeks Following a mutiny in Bouake instigated by ex-Forces While the civil servants initially touched retirement Nouvelles rebels on January 6, and the subsequent reforms, it quickly shifted towards a focus on arrears decision by the government to pay substantial arrears payments after the deal brokered by the government with to the protesting troops, several factions, notably the Bouake mutineers, further evidencing the mutiny’s soldiers reportedly affiliated with the former Defense disruptive impact. Indeed, whilst the government has and Security Forces of Ivory Coast (FDS) and gendarmes, accepted five of the six demands put forth by the civil launched their own mutinies. This series of events servants unions, the issue of arrears remains the final demonstrates that, the disarmament, demobilization point of contention, and it is plausible that the decision by and reintegration process (DDR) implemented following the authorities to pay the mutineers will embolden the the Second Ivorian Civil War in 2010-2011 has been to unions and lead them to adopt a more uncompromising some degree unsuccessful in unifying the armed forces. stance in negotiations. In this context, we assess that there Moreover, tensions yet remain regarding payments due exists the potential for the unions to resume the strike to elements of the military. This enduring fragmentation prior to the expiration of the month-long suspension and individual efforts by discrete groups within the implemented on January 30. We also note that an earlier armed forces to secure their own payments following suspension implemented on January 22 lacked widespread the governments capitulation to the Bouake mutineers adherence, and as such we assess that it is possible that points to an enduring latent volatility. No instances of dissident elements among the unions may perpetuate the unrest have been recorded since January 23, yet we strike in certain public services across the country. This, in assess that there remains an underlying potential for turn, may catalyze additional protest or unrest by protests, and potentially small-scale mutinies, given the individuals denouncing the lack of services, as witnessed at difficulties involve in reaching agreements with some Ivorian schools. Finally, the overall size of the Ivorian individual elements which meet with the approval of the public sector, and the parallel negotiations with disgruntled totality of the security forces, rather than catalyzing elements of the armed forces, may to some extent limit the additional demands. capacity of the government to satisfy the union’s demands, which in itself may result in further labor action.

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KENYA Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 12 23 26

Union leaders served Al-Shabaab targets Doctors march on month suspended Mandera guest-house Nairobi’s Employment sentence pending and Labor Relations continuation of strikes Court

Assessments & Forecast

Guest-house attack reflects focus on Christian victims The continuation of the doctors’ unions strike into its The January 23 attack on a guest house in Mandera, seventh week is emblematic of the troubled despite resulting in a single fatality, remains notable in light relationship between Kenya’s trade unions and of a similar October 25 attack targeting Christians in government. Nairobi’s counter-offer of a 40 percent Mandera. The use of multiple explosives was clearly aimed pay raise to the union’s demand for a 300 percent hike, at maximizing casualties and demonstrates al-Shabaab’s illustrates how far removed the sides are from one continued attempts at mass casualty attacks against non- another. The government’s departure from this figure, Muslim Kenyans, despite their failure to do so this time. initially based on an unfulfilled 2013 collective- Beyond blood-shed, such attacks are geared towards bargaining deal with the doctors’ union, also dovetails economically crippling the borderland by dissuading with suspicions of systematic governmental fund skilled, often Christian, laborers from the interior from working in the comparatively underdeveloped Muslim East, misallocation and broader suspicions of endemic thus creating a more conducive operating theater for the corruption. As such, going into February, this dispute jihadists. That a dusk-to-dawn curfew in Mandera County, will likely persist, potentially marked by enacted in October, was extended through January, demonstrations akin to the January 26 march. While it suggests that this strategy has yielded effects. Going into remains unclear if the suspended jail sentences will be February, given the porousness of the border and enacted, the threat has proven to engender defiance in prevailing insecurity, we assess that such establishments the union leadership, and is liable to continue doing so. will remain high on al-Shabaab’s target list, as will security Moreover, threats by the nurses’ union for a renewed force personnel and installations, which have also been strike on, amid concerns that the government will not frequently targeted in Kenya’s border area with Somalia. make good on a separate collective-bargaining deal, are likely to harden the doctors’ union resolve. That said, both will almost certainly worsen the current crises afflicting Kenyan health-care centers, whose care-giving abilities have been crippled in past weeks. To this point, the potential for an opposite effect cannot be ruled out, as deteriorating conditions may force concessions from the government, and likewise compel the union to moderate its demands.

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MOZAMBIQUE Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 3 27 28

Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama accuses government Renamo delegate announces Dhlakama announces of violating ceasefire with attacks group’s intent to participate in 60-day ceasefire on Renamo 2018 municipal elections

Assessments & Forecast

Ceasefire extended, generally upheld though Frelimo, Renamo unlikely to reach long-term peace deal In a continuation of the week-long ceasefire declared in late December 2016, Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama announced that the rebels would initiate a 60-day extension of the truce. Although there has been a sharp decline in reported attacks by both Renamo and the Frelimo government, Dhlakama has laid accusations at the Mozambican Army of continuing to attack and detain rebels and Renamo supporters. Despite these allegations, Dhlakama has expressed a commitment to maintain the ceasefire. At the same time, the government’s decision during the initial ceasefire period to deactivate the military escorts of civilian vehicles along the major highways of central Mozambique, a frequent target of Renamo in the past, indicates their confidence that Renamo will uphold the ceasefire despite the violations. That said, while the continued ceasefire is a positive development, temporary truces of this nature have been implemented in Mozambique in the past and the parties have thus far failed to come to a long-term agreement. The latest round of peace talks between Frelimo and Renamo was suspended in early December as international mediators departed from the country. Dhlakama has specifically stated that the unilateral ceasefire is intended to hasten the return of mediators, but the potential results of resuming negotiations remains in doubt. Renamo and Frelimo are as far apart as ever in stance and goals, particularly as Renamo’s primary demand is for substantial control over the six northern and central provinces it won in the last elections, and Frelimo opposes any moves to decentralize power from the government. In the context of this debate over political legitimacy and sovereignty, the ceasefire has been promoted as the sole initiative of Dhlakama, as President Felipe Nyusi’s government maintains a firm position that Renamo is the primary aggressor in the conflict and therefore an end to hostilities is dependent upon Renamo’s own actions. While this is likely to represent an additional challenge in negotiating a comprehensive peace, both parties nonetheless benefit from a continued cessation of hostilities at the present as Renamo has been weakened by the government’s counterinsurgency efforts and the government remains mired in a serious fiscal crisis, in need of diverting resources away from the war effort. Additionally, Renamo has expressed its intentions to participate in the 2018 municipal elections, and both the rebels and government have seen their popular support undermined by the persistent political violence in the country’s north and center, which has displaced locals and disrupted economic activity. A reduction in such violence would therefore be key to rebuilding their reputations. Given all of these factors, the ceasefire will likely continue to be widely upheld, albeit with intermittent violations by either party. However, given that there have been no signs of compromise on the most important political concerns, the truce may provide some momentum in starting peace talks but is unlikely to lead to resolution in the coming months, instead representing only a temporary lull in hostilities over the next month.

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UGANDA Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 14 18 19

DRC troops repel large- 100 DRC-bound ex-M23 40 ex-M23 rebels scale M23 raid at rebels detained, 270 escape military base Ishaha, near Uganda remain missing near DRC border border

Assessments & Forecast

M23 activity recorded near DRC border, but unlikely to significantly affect overall regional volatility The flight of former March 23 movement (M23) rebels from their cantonments in Uganda’s Western Region is notable given the group’s history as a source of tension between the DRC and Uganda, as well as Rwanda. This friction lies in allegations by the former that the predominantly Tutsi rebel group was backed by the latter countries between 2012-‘13, with tensions complicated by delays in the repatriation of the ex-rebels from Uganda, to whom they had surrendered in part, back to the DRC. As such, we assess that disillusioned by the lack of progress towards repatriation was the primary driver for this flight, and while the January 14 clashes may have not have directly impacted this decision, that the respective groups maintain an active link cannot be ruled out. As such, going into February, we assess that the continued movement of former M23 rebels between the two counties is plausible, especially given the proven porosity of Uganda- DRC border. This is liable to inflame existing tensions between the countries, especially if instances akin to the January 14 raid be repeated, potentially leading to a diplomatic row. Still, the overall negative impact of such developments should not be overstated. Beyond the realm of diplomacy, the influx of such limited number of fighters into the DRC’s neighboring North Kivu Province would have little effect on the already tumultuous region.

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ZIMBABWE Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 14 17 21

MDC-T refuses to support Zim- NCA candidate and his Zanu-PF candidate wins Bikita PF’s Bikita West parliamentary election agent assaulted by West by-election winning 13,156 candidate in by-elections Zanu-PF supporters votes against Zim-PF’s 2,453 Assessments & Forecast

Zim-PF loses significantly in Bikita West by-elections, hurts position in future opposition coalition  The Bikita West by-election served as the first test to measure the strength of Zimbabwe People First (Zim-PF) and its leader, former Vice President Joice Mujuru, as a challenge to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) and incumbent President Robert Mugabe, ahead of the general elections in 2018. Mujuru, regarded as one of the two main opposition groups to Mugabe, along with Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T), reportedly urged Tsvangirai to back her candidate in the by-election in order to beat the Zanu-PF one, but the latter refused after long consideration. The two parties are holding coalition talks, and a win in the by-elections would have strengthened Mujuru in such talks, especially regarding the presidential candidate should they join forces.  For Tsvangirai, the by-elections illustrated Mujuru’s strength as a potential challenge to Mugabe, and her loss is likely perceived by Tsvangirai as proof for her relative weakness compared to him. While on January 25, Tsvangirai asserted that he would like to form a coalition with Mujuru, his earlier refusal to support Zim-PF in the by-elections, even though MDC-T did not have a candidate of its own, highlights the challenges and the long way ahead of the opposition if they are to pose a true threat to Zanu-PF in the Elections. Additionally, the Bikita West by-elections come following Zanu-PF’s surprising loss in the Norton by-elections in October 2016, to an MDC-T backed independent candidate. The loss signaled to Zanu-PF that the 2018 elections will not be won as easily as previously asserted by them, and party resources were allocated to the Bikita West by-elections, in order to ensure that the party does not lose twice in a row, in what could boost the confidence of the opposition and have somewhat of a snowball effect in upcoming by- elections. Given that the opposition is working on presenting a united front, and as Zanu-PF will want to ensure success, it is likely that the next by-elections in Mwenezi East, slated to take place in March, will serve as a better indicator to the strength of the opposition in relation to Zanu-PF.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA Low Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 20

Equatorial Guinea submits application to join OPEC

Assessments & Forecast

Bid to join OPEC highlights strategic value influence On January 20, Equatorial Guinea’s Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Gabriel Mbaga Obiang, presented the country’s bid to become a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at the organization’s headquarters in Vienna. The application was submitted ahead of the Joint OPEC-Non-OPEC Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) meeting held in the Austrian capital on January 22. Equatorial Guinea is the third largest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria and Angola with an average production of 240,000 barrels per day, and has already declared its willingness to cut production in the first half of 2017, aligning with OPECs strategy to increase hydrocarbon prices in the international market. The aforementioned policy to cut production clearly evidences a gesture of goodwill by Malabo ahead of its bid to join OPEC, given that oil revenues represent almost 70 percent of the government’s revenue and almost 50 percent of its Gross Domestic product (GDP). For the Equatorial Guinea, joining OPEC would obviously strengthen its position within the hydrocarbon industry and allow it to reach additional markets, likely granting the country additional regional status and influence. However, we do not assess that this is likely to translate into a notable shift in the country’s political or economic situation over the coming months.

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THE GAMBIA Low Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

Assessments & Forecast

Jammeh resigns following threat of military intervention, mediation of favorable deal Following the events in December, the past month was tense in The Gambia, with ECOWAS forces threatening Jammeh with forcible removal from power, as the latter held on in efforts to negotiate favorable terms for his resignation, to include immunity, the rights of a former president, and continued access to his wealth in The Gambia. Indeed, we assess that Jammeh may have initially been willing to resign from power after losing the presidential elections, yet fears regarding his and his family’s future contributed significantly to his belated rejection of the results. Despite the current optimism regarding Jammeh’s resignation and departure from The Gambia, the future of the country under President Adama Barrow remains uncertain. For one, Barrow and the opposition are inexperienced and lack the connections and well-entrenched networks that Jammeh established during his rule. In this context, and given Jammeh’s strong ties to the Gambian military, Barrow’s request that ECOWAS forces to remain in the country over the coming six months may in part be indicative of lingering concerns regarding their loyalty, despite their current outwardly neutral stance. Barrow’s likely concerns are not unfounded, given the standoff at the State House in Banjul between ECOWAS and state guards on January 22. Additionally, given burgeoning anticipation among the local population, Barrow will likely need to produce results quickly in order to satisfy expectations, particularly with regard to democratic reforms and freedom, following Jammeh’s authoritarian rule. Lastly, the financial situation in the country remains weak, and Barrow will be looked upon to better it. To this end, he is likely to utilize his good relations with the ECOWAS leadership to implement much needed reforms. At the same time, ECOWAS has a vested interest in helping Barrow successfully establishing himself and his coalition during the early days of The Gambia’s new leadership.

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GHANA Low Risk NOTABLE DATES Current Situation

JANUARY 2 7 9 11

Nine injured as NDC and NPP Inauguration ceremony of NPP supporters try to seize control Four NPP supporters, one official supporters clash in Suhum, president-elect Nana Akufo- of Tema Harbor Golden Jubilee arrested for attacking, disrupting Eastern Region Addo Terminal and Accra Passport Office revenue collectors in Accra Assessments & Forecast

Alleged NPP supporters forcibly seize control of public properties previously NDC run Following the January 10 inauguration of Nana Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) as president of Ghana, after 8 years of National Democratic Congress (NDC) rule, notable unrest was witnessed as individuals claiming to be NPP members and supporters tried to seize control of various public properties and disrupted revenue collectors. There exists two potential drivers for this activity. Firstly, the incidents could, at least in part, simply be attributed to individuals attempting to use their NPP affiliation, real or otherwise, and the party’s ruling status for their own ends. Secondly, we note that a similar spate of unruly incidents were recorded in the wake of the NDC’s successful ascent to power. Additionally, numerous NPP supporters were removed from their posts following the NDC’s victory. In this context, the attacks could to some degree be regarded as a something of a reprisal, or perhaps excessively ebullient attitude following the NPP’s successful presidential bid.

With this said, we do not anticipate that this pattern of unrest will continue over the coming weeks. The incidents themselves have been universally small in scope, and often quickly contained by security forces. Furthermore, direct clashes between NPP and NDC supporters have died down, evidencing a decline in tensions between those two groups specifically. More broadly, the transition between Akufo-Addo and former president John Mahama has thus been carried out without notable incidents which could catalyze unruly behavior by their respective supporters, and the already limited potential for instability will diminish further as the government settles into power. The above incidents should consequently be regarded as a temporary blemish on Ghana’s otherwise normally calm political atmosphere, rather than indicative of any greater underlying risk.

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Notable Dates

SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT

Cameroon: Anglophone Guinea: Celebrations for Sao Tome and Angola: Liberation Day Consortium leaders Trial Alpha Conde named Principe: Martyrs’ Day Rwanda: National president Mozambique: Heroes’ Heroes’ Day Day Mauritius: Commemoration of the Abolition of Slavery

Gabon: Africa Cup of Burundi: Unity Day Somalia: Presidential Mauritius: Thaipusam Nigeria: IPOB leader : Armed Nations football elections Cavadee Nnmandi Kanu’s trial Forces Day competition Final to be held in Abuja Burundi: Unity Day

Uganda: Archbishop Zimbabwe: Tajamuka The Gambia: Janani Luwum Memorial leaders trial Independence Day, Day Ceremony to mark inauguration of Barrow Guinea: Municipal elections

Zimbabwe: President Mauritius: Maha Mugabe’s 93 birthday Shivaratri celebrations

Cape Verde, Angola: Carnival

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