Charles Goldhaber

Philosophy Dept., 1017 CL, 4200 Fifth Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 (510) 684-4890 / [email protected] / cgoldhaber.com

Appointments Wuhan University International Postdoctoral Research Fellowship 2021–

Education University of Pittsburgh Dec 2020 PhD in Philosophy

University of California, Berkeley Aug 2011 BA in Philosophy and Japanese Language, summa cum laude

AOS Modern Philosophy, Epistemology, Kant

AOC Perception, Ethics, Bioethics, Existentialism

Dissertation Talking to Skeptics Many philosophers now favor a modest response to external world skepticism: one that can satisfy non-skeptics, even if it begs the question against the skeptic. I argue that a more ambitious response is necessary, viable, and theoretically illuminating. We can change the skeptic’s mind by showing her that the best skeptical arguments all share an inadequately supported tacit premise—namely, that perception can never guarantee that things are as we seem to perceive them to be. My treatment of skepticism draws heavily on the works of Hume and Kant, whose often obscure attitudes toward skepticism the treatment helps bring into focus.

Committee: John McDowell (chair), Stephen Engstrom, James Shaw, Karl Schafer (UT Austin)

Publications “The Humors in Hume’s Skepticism,” forthcoming in Ergo.

Review of Peter S. Fosl’s Hume’s Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic, forth- coming in Hume Studies

“How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume,” forthcoming in Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress ‘The Court of Reason’ (Oslo, 6-9 August 2019). Ed. Camilla Serck-Hanssen and Beatrix Himmelmann. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter.

“Does Perceptual Psychology Rule Out Disjunctivism in the Theory of Per- ception?” Synthese, Vol. 198 No. 8, 2021, pp. 7025–47. Discussion of John McDowell’s ‘Perceptual Experience and Empirical Ratio- nality,’ Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2018, p. 102.

Discussion of Anil Gupta’s ‘Outline of an Account of Experience,’ Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 1, 2018, pp. 80–81.

Selected “Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist” Papers I argue that Kant tries to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist by offering, rather than compelling, an alternative conception of our knowledge, and that his offer can appeal because of an instability inherent to the skeptic’s position.

“Transcendental Cures for Skepticism” Kantian ‘transcendental’ arguments argue that an anti-skeptical state of affairs is a precondition on thought or experience. Yet they struggle to convince skeptics. I argue that a weakened Kantian argument, together with a plausible “ought implies can” principle, constitutes a cure that can reach many skeptics.

“The Groundlessness of Skepticism” I offer a three-part cure for external world skepticism. First, I argue that influential skeptical arguments rely on a shared, tacit premise about the nature of perception. Next, I argue that the best arguments for this premise are circular. Last, I offer an alternative view of perception that avoids skepticism.

Awards Delta Alpha Pi 2021 & Honors North American Kant Society, Best Grad Student Paper Award 2020 Dean’s Tuition Scholarship 2020 Elizabeth Baranger Excellence in Teaching Award 2019 Early Modern Worlds Biennial Graduate Student Prize 2019 Nicholas Rescher Dissertation Completion Fellowship 2019 Hume Society Conference Graduate Student Travel Stipend 2019 APA Graduate Student Travel Stipends 2018, 2019 New Crop Prize in Philosophy, UC Berkeley, 1st place 2011 Phi Beta Kappa Junior 2010 Golden Key Society 2010

Talks “The Explanatory Reading of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” APA Central Division Meeting Feb 2022

“Hume’s Real Riches” Princeton-Bucharest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy Oct 2021

“Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist” North American Kant Society Biennial, Binghamton June 2020 13th International Kant Congress, Oslo Aug 2019 Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference Oct 2018 “The Groundlessness of Skepticism” RecaPITTulate, University of Pittsburgh Reunion Conference 2020* APA Pacific Division Meeting, Society for Skeptical Studies Apr 2019 MindGrad: ‘Perception and Perceptual Knowledge,’ Warwick Dec 2018 *cancelled due to COVID-19

“How and Why to Include Practical Philosophy in Early Modern Survey Courses” APA Pacific Division Meeting, Teaching Hub Apr 2019

“Transcendental Cures for Skepticism” APA Eastern Division Meeting Jan 2019

“The Humors in Hume’s Skepticism” Galen and the Early Moderns, Venice, Italy Oct 2018 U of Toronto Grad Conference: Philosophy Meets Psychology May 2018 Disorder: A Grad Student Conference, Temple University Apr 2018

“‘Melancholy,’ ‘Spleen’ and the Other ‘Humours’ in the Conclusion to the Treatise’s First Book” APA Central Division Meeting Feb 2018

“Does Kant Try to Refute Humean Skepticism?” Pittsburgh Area Philosophy Colloquium Sep 2016 Northwest Philosophy Conference Oct 2015

“Why Aristotle Compares Practical Wisdom with Political Expertise” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress Aug 2015

“The Intended Scope of Anscombe’s Use of Aquinas’s Formula about Practical Knowledge” Shapiro Graduate Philosophy Conference, Brown University Nov 2014

“An Account of Practical Wisdom Needs an Account of Intuitive Intelligence” University of Georgia, Athens Philosophy Conference Mar 2013 New Crop Prize Ceremony, 1st place award in philosophy Apr 2011

Invited Author TBA, “The Truth-Sensitivity of Hume’s Naturalistic Comments Epistemology” APA Eastern Division Meeting Jan 2022

Dario Perinetti, “The Nature of Humean Perceptions” APA Eastern Division Meeting Jan 2022 Hyoung Sung Kim, “Teleology and Kantian Animal Ethics” APA Central Division Meeting Feb 2021

Saniye Vatanseve, “Kant’s Two Conceptions of the Highest Good” APA Eastern Division Meeting Jan 2020

Commentator at large Penn Reasons and Foundations of Epistemology Conference Nov 2019

Jonathan Cottrell, “What is Humean Reasoning?” 46th International Hume Society Conference, Reno, NV July 2019

Anil Gupta, “Outline of an Account of Experience” Perceptual Experience and Empirical Reason, U of Pittsburgh Oct 2016

Justin Weinberg, “What We Want to Hear” Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress Aug 2015

Kevin Busch, “Reason, Induction, and the Humean Objection to Kant” U of Pittsburgh/Carnegie Mellon Graduate Conference Mar 2014

Service Referee for Erkenntnis, Hume Studies 2020–21 Editor and organizer for Philosophers for Sustainability 2019–21 Leader, workshop on sustainable practices in Philosophy 2020 Undergraduate mentor 2018–20 Office manager 2018–19 Epistemology reading group organizer 2017–20 Incoming graduate student mentor 2016–18 Prospective graduate student visit organizer 2012–16 Pitt Works-in-Progress colloquia organizer 2013–15 Practical wisdom and action reading group organizer 2014

Teaching As primary instructor Philosophy and Public Issues spring 2019 Biomedical Ethics fall 2018

As teaching assistant History of Modern Philosophy, Humphreys* spring 2017 Introduction to Philosophical Problems, Marushak* fall 2016 Political Philosophy, Milburn spring 2016 Hume, Stroud (UC Berkeley) fall 2015 Introduction to Existentialism, Strom spring 2014 Philosophy and Public Issues, Kessler fall 2013 Existentialism in Lit. and Film, Dreyfus (UC Berkeley) spring 2012

* indicates teaching of an additional weekly writing practicum Graduate M&E Coursework Philosophy of Language: Deontic Modals, Caie & Shaw* fall 2016 Rationality, Schafer fall 2014 Perception and Cog. Psychology, Chirimuuta & Machery spring 2014 Experience and Judgment, Gupta fall 2013 Epistemology of Perception, McDowell spring 2013 Advanced Logic, Gupta spring 2013 Metaphysics and Epistemology, Wilson fall 2012 Philosophy of Language, Brandom* fall 2012 Judgment, Stroud (UC Berkeley)* spring 2012

History Hegel, McDowell* spring 2015 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: Book VI, Whiting spring 2015 Presocratics, Hoenig* spring 2014 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Engstrom fall 2013 Kant’s Ethics, Engstrom* fall 2012 Kant’s Critique of Judgment, Chignell fall 2012 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Frede (UC Berkeley) fall 2011

Practical Philosophy Directed Study on practical wisdom and action, McDowell fall 2014 Philosophy of Action, McDowell spring 2014 Kantian Political Philosophy, Kessler & Pallikkathayil* fall 2013 Reasons in Ethics, Setiya spring 2013

* indicates audited courses

Languages English, German, Japanese

Misc. Skills LATEX, website design, tea (sommelier, ceremony, imports)

References John McDowell Stephen Engstrom University of Pittsburgh University of Pittsburgh [email protected] [email protected]

James Shaw Karl Schafer University of Pittsburgh University of Texas, Austin [email protected] [email protected]

Japa Pallikkathayil (teaching reference) University of Pittsburgh [email protected] Dissertation Abstract: Talking to Skeptics

Skeptics argue that we can know almost nothing at all. In doing so, they threaten our understand- ing of ourselves and the world we live in. Many philosophers now think there is no use in talking to skeptics—that no argument can change their minds, thereby curing them of their skepticism. These philosophers opt for a merely preventive response, aiming to convince only non-skeptics that they can resist skeptical arguments. I argue that a cure is necessary, viable, and theoretically illuminating.

First, I argue that the merely preventive response must fail. To succeed with it, I explain, we would have to understand why skeptical arguments appear compelling. We would then find out either why the arguments seem compelling, but are ultimately not, or that they are indeed compelling. In the first case, a cure would be within reach; we could explain the skeptic’s error to her. In the second, prevention would come too late; we ourselves would need a cure. It follows, I argue, that until we can show a skeptic how she has gone wrong, we cannot resist her arguments in good faith.

Second, I argue that we can in fact change a skeptic’s mind. I begin by considering influential arguments for skepticism about the external world, including the argument from closure and the classic argument formulated in Jim Pryor’s “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” I show that, despite apparent differences, all these arguments rely on a shared, tacit premise: that perception never puts us in touch with the world in a way that guarantees that things are as we seem to perceive them to be. I then argue that the best arguments for this shared premise are question-begging. This suggests that the premise is a groundless intuition, and thus that external world skepticism lacks any solid foundation. Showing this to the skeptic clears the obstacles to her accepting, on ordinary grounds, a view on which perception can straightforwardly provide us with knowledge of how things are around us. This acceptance cures the skeptic.

Third, I argue that my ambitious, curative response can help us understand the nature, signifi- cance and history of skepticism. For Hume, I explain, skepticism is primarily a temperament. As he understood it, a skeptical temperament leads to excessive questioning and even madness when overly dominant, but only carefulness and rigor when balanced with other temperaments. Tracing skepticism to a groundless intuition helps motivate Hume’s focus on temperaments and feelings. Hume’s conception of proper temperamental balance, in turn, helps us grasp the skeptic’s nature, how to diagnose skepticism, and what we can learn from the skeptic even as we cure her.

The curative response also helps us understand Kant’s views, and vice versa. Standard readings of Kant portray the central arguments of his first Critique as meant in part to expose contradictions within skeptical empiricism. On my reading, Kant’s attitude toward the skeptical empiricist is not so adversarial. Instead of refuting the skeptic, he offers her an alternative conception of the mind and its relation to the objects of knowledge—one which makes sense of our knowing much of what such a skeptic doubts. Though this conception can seem at odds with skeptical empiricism, I argue that Kant is right to expect that the skeptic would find it appealing. Kant’s portrayal of skepticism as arising out of a despair of understanding human knowledge explains why, and teaches a general lesson about how to cure skepticism: Offering the skeptic a viewpoint which makes sense of our knowledge allows her to overcome the frustration from which her skepticism first arises.

If I am right, we can and should talk to skeptics. We need not be quiet or dogmatic in their presence. We can show them the groundlessness of their views, instead of conceding the groundlessness of ours. And we can change their minds by offering a compelling, alternative conception of ourselves.