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Curriculum Vitae Anil K. Gupta

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Curriculum Vitae Anil K. Gupta Education: University of London: B. Sc. (Honors) 1969 University of Pittsburgh: M. A. 1973 Ph.D. 1977 Awards: Humanities Research Grants, 1977-78, 1978-79, 1981-82 Educational-Development Grant, 1981 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Leave Fellowship, 1982-83 (declined) Short Research Leave, University of Illinois, Spring 1984 Fellow, Institute for the Humanities, University of Illinois, Chicago, 1985-86 A. C. L. S. Fellowship, 1988-89 (declined) N. E. H. Fellowship for University Teachers, 1988-89 Summer Faculty Fellowship, Indiana University, 1994 N. E. H. Fellowship for University Teachers, 1995-96 Fellowship at the National Humanities Center (NC), 1995-96 (declined) Teaching Excellence Recognition Award, Indiana University, 1998 Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 1998-99 N. E. H. Fellowship for University Teachers, 2003-4 A. C. L. S. Fellowship, 2003-4 Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2006- N. E. H. Fellowship for University Teachers, 2010 Nelson Philosopher-in-Residence, Univ. of Michigan, September 2010 Recipient, 225th Anniversary Medallion of the University of Pittsburgh, 2013 Employment: Assistant Professor, McGill University, 1975-80 Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh, Winter Term 1979-80 Associate Professor, McGill University, 1980-82 Associate Professor, University of Illinois at Chicago, 1982-89 Visiting Professor, University of Padua, Italy, June 1985 Professor, Indiana University, 1989-95 Rudy Professor, Indiana University, 1995-2000 Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2001- Alan Ross Anderson Chair, University of Pittsburgh, 2013- Updated: April 2019 Anil Gupta CV--Page 2 Professional and Service Activities (a partial list): Editor, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016- Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2012-2015 Advisory Board, Episteme, 2010- Editorial Board, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2008- Editorial Board, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2001- Editorial Board, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1991-2011 Board of Consultants, The Philosophical Gourmet Report, 2002- Member, Advisory Committee to the Program Committee, Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, 2010- Member, Board of Advisors, Center for Philosophy and Foundations of Science, New Delhi, 1998- Editor, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1991-1994 Nominating Committee, Central Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1995 Program Committee, 1995 Annual Meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association Oversight Committee, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1994-95; Chair, 1995 Executive Committee, Association for Symbolic Logic, 1991-1994 Program Committee, Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, 1992-93 Program Committee, Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK IV) Reviewer for The MIT Press, Harvard University Press, Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Analysis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Noûs, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Linguistics and Philosophy, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Mind, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophy of Science, Journal of the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics, Review of Symbolic Logic, Synthese, Canadian Philosophical Association, Society for Exact Philosophy, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada), Workshop on Logic, Language Information and Computation. External Referee for several promotion and tenure cases Patten Lectures Committee, Indiana University, 1991-1994 College of Arts and Sciences Promotions Committee, Indiana University, 1994-95, 1996- 98 Director of Graduate Studies, Philosophy, Indiana University, 1997-98 Associate Director, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2004-6 Anil Gupta CV--Page 3 Publications: “Modal Logic and Truth,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 7, 1978, pp. 441-72. C Revised version, with a new section IV, is reprinted in The Logic of Common Nouns. “A Theory of Conditionals in the Context of Branching Time” (written with Richmond Thomason), The Philosophical Review 89, 1980, pp. 65-90. C Reprinted in William Harper, Robert Stalnaker, and Glenn Pearce (eds.), Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. The Logic of Common Nouns, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, 142 pp. “A Consecution Calculus for Positive Relevant Implication with Necessity” (written with Nuel Belnap and J. Michael Dunn), Journal of Philosophical Logic 9, 1980, pp. 343-62. C Revised version is reprinted in Alan Anderson, Nuel Belnap, and J. Michael Dunn, Entailment (Vol. II), Princeton University Press, 1992. “Truth and Paradox” (abstract), Journal of Philosophy 78, 1981, pp. 735-36. “Truth and Paradox,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 11, 1982, pp. 1-60. C Revised version with a brief “Postscript 1983” is reprinted in Robert L. Martin (ed.), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford University Press, 1984. Review of Baruch A. Brody’s Identity and Essence, Journal of Philosophy 79, 1982, pp. 518-22. “A Fixed Point Theorem for the Weak Kleene Valuation Scheme” (written with Robert L. Martin), Journal of Philosophical Logic 13, 1984, pp. 131-35. A correction to this paper appears in Journal of Philosophical Logic 14, 1985, p. 229. Review of David Wiggins’s Sameness and Substance, International Studies in Philosophy 17, 1985, pp. 109-11. Review of Greg N. Carlson’s “Generic Terms and Generic Sentences” (written with Leah Savion), Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 1985, pp. 858-59. “A Note on Extension, Intension, and Truth” (written with Nuel Belnap), Journal of Philosophy 84, 1987, pp. 168-74. Anil Gupta CV--Page 4 Publications (contd.) “The Meaning of Truth,” in Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics, Academic Press, 1987, pp. 453-80. “Semantics of Propositional Attitudes: A Critical Study of Cresswell’s Structured Meanings” (written with Leah Savion), Journal of Philosophical Logic 16, 1987, pp. 395-410. “Remarks on Definitions and the Concept of Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89, 1988-89, pp. 227-46. C Reprinted in Patrick Grim, Gary Mar, and Peter Williams (eds.), The Philosopher’s Annual 12, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1991, pp. 67-86. C Also reprinted in my Truth, Meaning, Experience, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 73-94. Critical Notice of Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy’s The Liar, Philosophy of Science 56, 1989, pp. 697-709. Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, (co-edited with J. Michael Dunn), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. “Two Theorems concerning Stability,” in J. Michael Dunn and Anil Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences, Kluwer Academic Press, 1990, pp. 49-60. “A Calculus for Definitions” (abstract), in Volume I of Abstracts of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, 1991. Reprinted in Journal of Symbolic Logic 58, 1993, p. 760. The Revision Theory of Truth (written with Nuel Belnap), Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993, 299 pp. “Minimalism,” in James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1993, pp. 359-369. C Reprinted in Fredrick F. Schmitt (ed.), Theories of Truth, Blackwell Publishing, 2004, pp. 295-306. “A Critique of Deflationism,” Philosophical Topics 21, 1993, pp. 57-81. C Reprinted in Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 282-307. Anil Gupta CV--Page 5 Publications (contd.) C Also reprinted in Michael Lynch (ed.), The Nature of Truth, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 527-57. C Also reprinted with a postscript, in Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth, Open Court, 2005, pp. 199-226. C Also reprinted with a postscript in my Truth, Meaning, Experience, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 9-52. C Ukrainian translation in Andriy Synytsya (ed.), Anthology of Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Litopys, 2014, pp. 155-197. C Hungarian translation in Kocsis Làszló (ed.), Az igazság elméletei, L’Harmattan, 2018, pp. 324-348. “Reply to Robert Koons” (written with Nuel Belnap), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 35, 1994, pp. 632-36. Six entries in Ted Honderich (ed.), Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1995. “The Liar Paradox,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1996, pp. 299-301. “Definition and Revision: A Response to McGee and Martin,” Philosophical Issues 8, 1997, pp. 419-43. C Also reprinted with a postscript in my Truth, Meaning, Experience, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 135-63. “Tarski’s Definition of Truth,” in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, 1998. “Meaning and Misconceptions,” in Ray Jackendoff, Paul Bloom, and Karen Wynn (eds.), Language, Logic, and Concepts: Essays in Memory of John Macnamara, The MIT Press, 1999, pp. 15-41. C Also reprinted in my Truth, Meaning, Experience, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 164-95. Circularity, Definition and Truth (co-edited with André Chapuis), New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2000. Distributed outside
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