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Anil Gupta, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Biographical Bibliometric Fact Sheets

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Anil Gupta, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Biographical Bibliometric Fact Sheets Anil Gupta, Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences: Biographical Bibliometric Fact Sheets E. R. Prakasan and V. L. Kalyane Scientific Information Resource Division, Knowledge Management Group, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Trombay, Mumbai, India – 400 085 *e-mail: [email protected] Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor Logic, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology PhD, Pittsburgh, 1977 [email protected] Anil Gupta is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, professor of History and Philosophy of Science, and a fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science. He is also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Before joining the department in 2001, he taught at Indiana, Illinois at Chicago, and McGill [1]. Materials and Methods Standard bibliometric methods were used [2-70] for the analysis of the Bibliography (see Appendix) of Anil Gupta [71-117]. Results He is the author of The Logic of Common Nouns (Yale, 1980) and Empiricism and Experience (Oxford, 2006), and a co-author (with Nuel Belnap) of The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT, 1993). Gupta has received fellowships from the NEH and the ACLS, and he was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, in 1998-99. Gupta’s main research interests lie in logic, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. Topics that are of special interest to him include definitions, truth, meaning, and perception. 50 7 Number of publications 45 Cumulative Number of Publications 6 40 ations c i 35 ons ubl 5 P cati 30 of 4 25 publi mber u 20 er of 3 N b e v m 15 u N 2 10 mulati u 5 C 1 0 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 197 198 198 198 198 198 199 199 199 199 199 200 200 200 200 Publication Year Figure 1.: Chronology of publications of Anil Gupta Table 1.: Journals, in which articles of Anil Gupta are published Number Channels of communication of articles Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 Journal of Philosophy 3 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 International Studies in Philosophy 1 Journal of Symbolic Logic 1 Mind 1 Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 1 Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 1 Philosophical Issues 1 Philosophical Studies 1 Philosophical Topics 1 Philosophy of Science 1 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 The Philosophical Review 1 Table 2.: Books, and chapters in books of Anil Gupta Six entries (Ancestral, Craig's Theorem, Incomplete symbol, Metalanguage, Semantic ascent, and Unsaturated expression) in: Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 1995 (Ed. by: Ted Honderich) Two chapters in: Circularity, Definition and Truth, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2000 (Ed. by: André Chapuis and Anil Gupta) Deflationary Truth, Open Court, 2005 (Ed. by: Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, 1998 (Ed. by: Edward Craig) Empiricism and Experience, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006 Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1996 New Directions in Semantics, Academic Press, 1987 (Ed. by: Ernest LePore) Philosophical Perspectives 7: Language and Logic, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1993 (Ed. by: James Tomberlin) Deflationism and Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2006 (Ed. by: J. C. Beall and Bradley Armour-Garb) Truth or Consequences, Kluwer Academic Press, 1990 (Ed. by: J. Michael Dunn and Anil Gupta) The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell Publishers, 2001 (Ed. by: Lou Goble) Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Uppsala, Sweden, 1991: Volume I – Abstracts Language, Logic, and Concepts: Essays in Memory of John Macnamara,The MIT Press, 1999 (Ed. by: Ray Jackendoff, Paul Bloom, and Karen Wynn) What is Truth?, Walter de Guyter, 2002 (Ed. by: Richard Schantz) Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press, 2006 (Ed. by: Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne) The Logic of Common Nouns, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980 The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993 Self-Reference, CSLI Publications, 2006 (Ed. by: Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks, and Stig Andur Andersen) Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990 (co-edited with J. Michael Dunn) Table 3.: Collaborators of Anil Gupta No. of times Collaborator collaborated Nuel Belnap 4 J. Michael Dunn 2 José Martínez-Fernández 2 Leah Savion 2 André Chapuis 1 Richmond Thomason 1 Robert L. Martin 1 Table 4.: Contents of publications by Anil Gupta No. of Keyword occurrences Truth 13 Paradox 5 Deflationism 4 Calculus 2 Definition 2 Experience 2 Knowledge 2 Liar 2 . Keywords occurring only once in the titles of publications of Anil Gupta: Ancestral; Branching Time; Circular Concepts; Circularity; Common Nouns; Conditionals; Consequences; Craig's Theorem; Empiricism; Essence; Extension; Finite Circular Definitions; Fixed Point Theorem; Forms of Reasoning; Generic Sentences; Generic Terms; Horwich’s Use Theory of Meaning; Metalanguage; Identity; Incomplete symbol; Intension; Logic; Meaning; Minimalism; Misconceptions; Modal Logic; Partially Defined Predicates; Problem of Representation; Propositional Attitudes; Revision; Revision Theory; Sameness; Semantic ascent; Semantic Pathology; Semantics; Skepticism; Stability; Structured Meanings; Substance; Theory of Meaning; Thought; Unsaturated expression; Weak Kleene Valuation Scheme; and World Figure 2.: Distribution of type of publications of Anil Gupta References 1. Anil Gupta, http://www.pitt.edu/~philosop/people/gupta.html [Accessed on 5th October, 2006] 2. Prakasan, E.R.; Anil Sagar; Anil Kumar; Kalyane, V.L.; Vijai Kumar (In press) Bibliometrics on Knowledge Management, In: Perspectives in Knowledge Management, I V Malhan and Shivarama Rao (eds) 3. Prakasan, E.R.; Anil Sagar; Kalyane, V.L.; Vijai Kumar (In press) Nature and Science: A scientometric comparison based on citing articles, Proposed volume on Scientometrics 4. Prakasan, E.R.; Anil Sagar; Anil Kumar; Kalyane, V.L.; Vijai Kumar (2006) INSPEC database analysis for Knowledge Management records, http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00005737/ 5. Kademani, B.S.; Vijai Kumar; Surwase, Ganesh; Anil Sagar; Lalit Mohan; Gaderao, C.R.; Anil Kumar; Kalyane, V.L.; Prakasan, E.R. (2005) Scientometric dimensions of innovation communication productivity of the Chemistry Division at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science, 10(1): pp. 65-89. http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00005503/; http://ejum.fsktm.um.edu.my/ArticleInformation.aspx?ArticleID=316 6. Angadi, Mallikarjun; Koganuramath, M.M.; Kademani, B.S.; Kalyane, V.L.; Sen, B.K. (2004) Scientometric portrait of Nobel laureate Leland H. Hartwell, WIS-2004, International Workshop on Webometrics, Informetrics and Scientometrics, (eds.) Hildrun Kretschmer, Yogendra Singh, and Ramesh Kundra, (2-5 March, 2004), Organised by Society for Information Science, New Delhi, and Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee, India, pp. 10-30. http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00001442/ 7. Anil Kumar; Kalyane, V.L. (2004) Bibliographics for the 983 eprints in the live archives of E-LIS: trends and status report up to 7th July 2004, based on author-self-archiving metadata, http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00001927/ 8. Kalyane, V.L. (2004) Scientometric Portrait of L. L. Narayana, In: Knowledge Societies and Libraries: Papers in Honour of Prof. A.A.N. Raju, (eds.) N. Laxman Rao, S. Sudarshan Rao and T.V. Prafulla Chandra, New Delhi, Ess Ess Publishers (ISBN: 81-7000-353-9), chapter VII: 3, pp. 362-388. http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00002264/ 9. Kalyane, V.L.; Anil Sagar; Anil Kumar; Vijai Kumar; Lalit Mohan; Prakasan, E.R. (2004) Library and Information Profession in India: Reflections and Redemptions, In: Dr. P.S.G. Kumar Festschrift, Library and Information Profession in India: Reflections and Redemptions. Vol. 1, Part-I, pp. 144-159. (General Editors: C.P. Vashishth and M.P. Satija; Executive Editors: M.R. Kherde and P.B. Jain), Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation (ISBN 81-7646-466-X). http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00001039/ 10. Koganuramath, M.M.; Angadi, Mallikarjun; Kademani, B.S.; Kalyane, V.L.; Jange, Suresh (2004) Physics Nobel Laureate Wolfgang Ketterle: A Scientometric Portrait, Malaysian Journal of Library & Information Science, 9(2), pp. 35-61. http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00001058/; http://ejum.fsktm.um.edu.my/ArticleInformation.aspx?ArticleID=295 11. Parmar, Arvind Singh; Kumar, Sanghmitra A.; Prakash, Thushara; Kalyane, V.L. (2004) Highlights of Library Automation related documents in the INSPEC, http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00002525/ 12. Prakasan, E.R.; Anil Kumar; Anil Sagar; Lalit Mohan; Singh, Sanjay Kumar; Kalyane, V.L.; Vijai Kumar (2004) Analytical study of contents of LANL physics and cross-listed e-print archives, 1994-2002, Annals of Library and Information Studies, 51(2), pp. 43-51. http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00001045/ 13. Prakasan, E.R.; Kalyane, V.L. (2004) Citation analysis of LANL High-Energy Physics E-Prints through Science Citation Index (1991-2002), http://eprints.rclis.org/archive/00002200/ 14. Prakasan, E.R.; Anil Sagar; Anil Kumar; Lalit Mohan; Gaderao, C.R.; Surwase, Ganesh; Kadam, Sandeep; Kalyane, V.L.; Vijai Kumar (2004) Nuclear Theory and Nuclear Experiment E-print Archives: Science Citation Index - Based Analysis, In: Proceeding of SIS 2004, Digital Information Exchange: Pathways to Build Global Information Society, 22nd Annual Convention & Conference, Eds. Harish Chandra, P. Pichappan, and Ramesh Kundra
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