Presence to Self: an Essay on the Phenomenal Origins of Intentionality
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PRESENCE TO SELF: AN ESSAY ON THE PHENOMENAL ORIGINS OF INTENTIONALITY by Christopher Frey B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 2001 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2011 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY This dissertation was presented by Christopher Frey It was defended on 04/08/2011 and approved by Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh John McDowell, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Robert Brandom, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Karl Schafer, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh Christopher Hill, Professor of Philosophy, Brown University Dissertation Director: Anil Gupta, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh ii Copyright c by Christopher Frey 2011 iii PRESENCE TO SELF: AN ESSAY ON THE PHENOMENAL ORIGINS OF INTENTIONALITY Christopher Frey, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2011 My dissertation is an examination of an oft-invoked but insufficiently understood feature of perceptual experience, namely, its presentational character. We open our eyes and a world is before us. Someone strikes a tuning fork, and a sound is simply present. To experience is always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally something as other or as before one; it is always, in part, to appreciate phenomenally a manifest opposition between the self|that before which the other is present|and the other|that which is present before the self. I call this aspect of experiential phenomenality, this universally appreciable but non-sensuous sense of otherness in experience, phenomenal presence. Phenomenal presence is uniquely suited to illuminate the substantive interrelations that exist between two fundamental features of perceptual experience: intentionality and phe- nomenality. I argue that (i) the intentional features of experience, understood in isolation from experiential phenomenality, neither constitute nor explain phenomenal presence, (ii) phenomenal presence is itself the minimal realization of experiential intentionality, and (iii) the intentionality embodied in phenomenal presence is constitutively and explanatorily prior to all other forms of experiential intentionality. I then show how these conclusions can be brought to bear on the intentional status of our non-phenomenal, mental states. These discussions guide us toward an account of perceptual experience in which experi- ential phenomenality is competent to direct us intentionally beyond ourselves, independently of the contributions made by the understanding or intellect. Modeling the intentionality and self-awareness involved in perceptual experience upon the intentionality and self-awareness iv involved in belief and judgment, or insisting that the former depend on the latter obscures both the role of and the contribution made by the exercises of our perceptual capacities. This tendency to assimilate the perceptual and the intellectual realms and to privilege the intellec- tual leads inevitably to accounts of perceptual experience that either render epiphenomenal the distinctive contributions of experiential phenomenality or neglect those contributions altogether. v TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ......................................... ix 1.0 AN ARISTOTELIAN COMMENCEMENT .................1 2.0 INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENALITY ..............5 2.1 Intentionality and Representation........................ 10 2.1.1 Three Conceptions of Intentionality................... 10 2.1.2 Intentional Objects, Contents, and Relations.............. 14 2.1.3 Intentionality's Domain.......................... 16 2.1.3.1 Dispositional States and Intentionality............. 17 2.1.3.2 Representational Content and Individual Organisms...... 19 2.1.4 Intentionality Defined........................... 21 2.2 Phenomenology and Phenomenality....................... 22 2.2.1 Phenomenally Appreciable, Non-Sensuous Elements in Experience.. 23 2.2.2 Introspection, Conception, and Attention................ 27 2.3 Our Project: Statement, Orientation, and Motivation............. 31 2.3.1 Our Principal Theses........................... 31 2.3.2 Four Philosophical Movements...................... 32 2.3.2.1 Movement 1: The Exaltation of Intentionality......... 32 2.3.2.2 Movement 2: Phenomenal Intentionality and Phenomenal Con- tent................................ 35 2.3.2.3 Movement 3: Mere Sensation.................. 36 2.3.2.4 Movement 4: The Self...................... 37 2.3.2.5 A Common Theme........................ 39 vi 2.3.3 The Project in Outline.......................... 40 2.4 Appendix A: The Domain of the Phenomenally Appreciable......... 42 3.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE .......................... 44 3.1 The Purported Significance of Experiential Transparency........... 46 3.2 Core Transparency and Phenomenal Presence................. 51 3.3 The Explanatory Inadequacy of Representationalism............. 56 3.4 Phenomenal Presence and Experiential Intentionality............. 61 3.4.1 Intentionality............................... 61 3.4.2 Experiential Intentionality........................ 64 4.0 CATEGORIES | LOGICAL AND PHENOMENAL ........... 66 4.1 Concept and Object as Logical Categories................... 66 4.2 Self and Other as Phenomenal Categories................... 73 4.2.1 Five Parallels............................... 73 4.2.2 Phenomenal Categories.......................... 76 5.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND EXPERIENTIAL INTENTION- ALITY ........................................ 78 5.1 The Challenge from Sensuousness........................ 79 5.1.1 Naturalist Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality............ 79 5.1.2 Dual-Component Accounts of Perceptual Intentionality........ 82 5.1.3 Sensuous Experience and Perceptual Availability............ 84 5.2 The Challenge from Objectivity......................... 97 5.3 The Challenge from Cognition.......................... 101 5.4 Appendix B: The Sense of Ownership in Bodily Sensation.......... 106 6.0 PHENOMENAL PRESENCE AND NON-EXPERIENTIAL INTEN- TIONALITY .................................... 112 6.1 Cognitive Phenomenality............................ 112 6.2 Self-Awareness and Critical, Reflective Reasoning............... 114 6.2.1 Critical, Reflective Reasoning....................... 115 6.2.2 Presentational Self-awareness and Apperceptive Self-awareness.... 116 6.2.3 Apperceptive Self-awareness and Critical, Reflective Reasoning.... 119 vii 7.0 Bibliography ..................................... 120 viii LIST OF TABLES 1 Sentences and Thoughts.............................. 69 ix PREFACE Thanks are due to the members of my dissertation committee: Anil Gupta, John McDowell, Robert Brandom, Karl Schafer, and Christopher Hill. Each has generously and patiently provided me with guidance and support. Special thanks in this regard are due to Anil Gupta, the Platonic form of the dissertation adviser. It is difficult for me to convey how large a role Anil has played in my becoming the philosopher I am today. Whatever future success I attain would not be possible if not for his efforts. I have benefited greatly from discussing this material with others. Portions were pre- sented at Barnard College, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Chicago. The comments of those in attendance have prevented numerous errors from making their way into the final product. Also, discussions and comments by Endre Begby, Jim Conant, Anjana Jacob, Uriah Kriegel, and John Morrison have been key in helping me to understand these topics to the extent that I have. A different sort of thanks are due to my parents and sister. After the initial shock of hearing that I was going to major in philosophy, they have been supportive in a way that I did not expect. I am and will continue to be grateful for the unconditional love they provide. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Jennifer, and my three children, Sebastian, Gianna, and Thomas. They have made my life one worth living. x 1.0 AN ARISTOTELIAN COMMENCEMENT All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. (Metaph. I.1 980a22{24) In these lines, the first of his Metaphysics, Aristotle appeals to the delight we take in our senses, a love directed upon the senses themselves, as the principal evidence that a desire for knowledge is essential to man. But this delight is not as universal as Aristotle suggests. The familiar is often mistaken for the mundane and the ubiquity of experience|beginning in utero and rarely absent thereafter|deadens the sense of wonder that ought to accompany our perceptual episodes. We do not typically value perception for its own sake but for its utility. We do not typically direct our inquiries upon perception itself but upon the world perception reveals. Though the sentiments to which Aristotle appeals and the reflective orientation that underlies them fall short of the universality his argument requires, we may forgive his en- thusiasm. Aristotle is not among the unreflective and the nature and exercises of perceptual faculties are frequently the target of his inquiries. If we examine these discussions and extract the account of perception contained therein, we will find at its center the first articulation of a fundamental insight concerning perception's significance.