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Roots of Ontological Relativity American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 48, Number 3, July 2011 ROOTS OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY Thomas Ricketts Quine’s discussions of ontological relativ- as a reductio ad absurdum of the demand that ity have long puzzled many admirers of Word leads to it.”2 and Object (1960), for ontological relativity This essay develops an interpretation of seems somehow to undermine the compel- Quine that makes sense of an asymmetry ling view of ontology that Quine presents in between reference and truth in the home the last chapter of that book. Hilary Putnam language and alien languages. The ontologi- expresses this puzzlement when he says, cal relativity associated with this point is not Quine holds that Tarski has rehabilitated the an incidental feature of Quine’s philosophy, notion of truth (and of reference). He also holds one that can be easily detached from Quine’s that there is no fact of the matter as to what the system and put to one side. Quite the contrary. truth conditions of a sentence in an arbitrary Indeed, the sources of ontological relativity “alien language” are. How can he reconcile emerge early in Quine’s thought. Two aspects these views? This is the most subtle question of Quine’s view will prove central here. The 1 in the whole of Quinian philosophy. first is Quine’s view that logic is concerned Putnam himself has argued that there is no with sentences, and so sentences of lan- reconciliation to be found within Quine’s guages, where Quine conceives of languages views. Something has to go. In one telling naturalistically as behavioral phenomena. objection, Putnam converts Quine’s modus The second is Quine’s reliance on instances ponens into a modus tollens: of the disquotational paradigms to elucidate Quine’s demands for [precise criteria for syn- truth and reference. The balance between onymy] lead him to reject not only the existence these two aspects grounds the asymmetrical of an objective relation of synonymy, but also attitude from which Putnam recoils. the existence of a fact of the matter as to whether or not two terms (in another language) are the I same or different in reference. To avoid hav- Logic is concerned with relations like ing to abandon the notion of reference as he implication and contradiction that hold over has abandoned the notion of synonymy, Quine what is true or false, over the bearers of truth must then claim that in his “home language” and falsity. According to a tradition in modern the situation is different. One can be a “robust logic going back to Frege and Russell, the realist” with respect to one’s home language and give a nonrealist or antirealist account of bearers of truth and falsity are nonlinguistic, the functioning of every other language. Most nonmental items, which Russell called propo- philosophers would regard such an outcome sitions. Various sentences in the same or dif- ©2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 288 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY ferent languages express or signify the same cally speaking, can have different meanings propositions. The science of logic is a theory in different languages. The upshot is that of logical relations of propositions; it only Quine’s sentence-based account of proposi- derivatively concerns sentences.3 For Quine, tions brings with it its own obscure posits. however, it is unclear what propositions are Quine concedes that the notions of sentence supposed to be and, more importantly, how and language he deploys are “idealizations they are distinguished from each other.4 or schematizations” of language “in the Accordingly, he finds the bald assumption more direct empirical sense studied by field of propositions an unacceptably obscure linguists,” adding that starting point for logic. For Quine, then, it language in the direct empirical sense last al- is sentences, or utterances of sentences, that luded to is, I should say, the pattern of actual and are true or false and stand in logical relations. potential linguistic behavior of one individual Logic thus concerns sentences. But how does at one stage of his development.8 Quine conceive of sentences and languages? Quine’s article, “The Problem of Mean- This issue strikingly surfaces in a 1943 ing in Linguistics” (1951), fleshes out the correspondence between Quine and Alonzo kind of idealization or abstraction that he Church. Quine had suggested that proposi- thinks discussions about language require. tions might be identified with classes of We imagine a population of individuals who 5 synonymous sentences. Church demurs, converse fluently with each other over a wide noting that pursuit of Quine’s approach would range of circumstances. These conversations involve consist of utterances of series of phonemes, the perhaps impossible task of defining in each such utterance bounded by unenforced general terms the notion of translation between silences. Some series of phonemes are uttered arbitrary languages under the restriction that in fluent communication, whereas utterance the notion of proposition shall not be used in of other series of phonemes elicits the charac- 6 the definition. teristic reactions of blank incomprehension. Here Church is thinking of sentences and As a first approximation, a grammar for the language in the formal terms familiar from group’s language is a formal demarcation Carnap’s work. To characterize synonymy that includes all those series of phonemes for such a formal language, one will have that could occur in fluent communication to employ semantics of a very strong sort while excluding those that would elicit blank for formalisms. Church is skeptical whether incomprehension. As there is no sharp, non- any account short of Carnap’s posit of inten- arbitrary upper bound to the length of the sions as semantic primitives has a chance of expressions that can occur in fluent conversa- success. In reply, Quine expresses a hope tions, the grammar will use recursive devices that Church’s challenge could be met by “an to specify an infinite class of expressions. empirical definition of synonymy as applied Here is one dimension of idealization: most to natural languages.”7 Church, now recog- grammatical expressions will be too long to nizing that Quine’s approach is not based occur in normal speech. Moreover, a grammar on “an abstract notion of language,” raises for a language should be manageably simple. a series of difficulties in characterizing what This is a second dimension of idealization. On natural languages are—in effect, difficul- grounds of simplicity, a grammar may include ties in stating individuation conditions for some expressions whose utterance would natural languages. Some such account is meet incomprehension—Quine gives familiar needed, because the same sentence, syntacti- examples like Russell’s “Quadruplicity drinks ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 289 procrastination.” Equally, the grammar may explication of the semantical notions of truth exclude solecisms that do not disrupt com- and designation.10 In a 1943 letter to Carnap, munication.9 Quine thus explains the concepts Quine did indeed hold open the prospect of a of a group’s language and of an utterance- pragmatic explication of “designation”: type’s being a meaningful expression of the The problem remains, of course, to explain this language in terms of fluency of conversation basic synonymity relation. This is a relation within the group and grammar construction whose full specification, like that of designa- with its empirical controls grounded in dis- tion, would be the business of pragmatics (not positions to linguistic behavior. In the final that this excuses us from it!).11 two sections of “Problem of Meaning,” Quine In Quine’s next letter, however, allusions to a urges that there is no explication of same- pragmatic explication of “designation” drop ness of meaning, of synonymy, comparable out. There, Quine says, to the one he has provided for language and significance. Let me explain how I intend “designation.” I can’t define it, any more than “object,” but Quine’s concepts of a language and shar- must try to explain it indirectly and through ing a language are loose and flexible. For examples. The lunar concept . can be desig- example, a bilingual who speaks English and nated, in my sense, and so can the moon itself, Chinese has a language that overlaps mine and so can any other entity. However, the as regards the English, but not the Chinese. designatum (in my sense) of “moon” is not the Furthermore, standards for fluency in the use lunar concept, but the moon itself. The lunar of some terminology may vary, depending on concept, on the other hand, is the designatum group and circumstance. A lay person’s use of (if any) of “the lunar concept.” . Again, the scientific terminology may pass muster in ca- designatum of “9” is the number 9, and the sual conversations among readers of Scientific designatum of “the number of planets” is that American, but not among physicists at work. same number 9 (for there are no two numbers Finally, sometimes Quine is concerned with one of which is 9 and the other the number of planets).12 only a part of our language, for example, just with our language for science, or some branch Here Quine explains “designation” by means of science, or an envisioned formalization in a of instances of the disquotational paradigm: predicate calculus of some branch of science. “_______” designates _______, where both This relaxed, behaviorally grounded concept blanks are replaced by an English singular of a language shows how little weight Quine’s term, noting that the direct object position is philosophy places on such concepts as the referentially transparent. concept of understanding a word, sentence, Quine elaborates this view of reference in or language. His unspecific talk of the home “Notes on the Theory of Reference.” There language reflects this relaxed concept of a he observes the “peculiar clarity” possessed language.
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