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Home , Anil Gupta (philosopher)

American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 48, Number 3, July 2011

ROOTS OF ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY

Thomas Ricketts

Quine’s discussions of ontological relativ- as a reductio ad absurdum of the demand that ity have long puzzled many admirers of Word leads to it.”2 and Object (1960), for ontological relativity This essay develops an interpretation of seems somehow to undermine the compel- Quine that makes sense of an asymmetry ling view of ontology that Quine presents in between and in the home the last chapter of that book. language and alien languages. The ontologi- expresses this puzzlement when he says, cal relativity associated with this point is not Quine holds that Tarski has rehabilitated the an incidental feature of Quine’s philosophy, notion of truth (and of reference). He also holds one that can be easily detached from Quine’s that there is no fact of the matter as to what the system and put to one side. Quite the contrary. truth conditions of a sentence in an arbitrary Indeed, the sources of ontological relativity “alien language” are. How can he reconcile emerge early in Quine’s thought. Two aspects these views? This is the most subtle question of Quine’s view will prove central here. The 1 in the whole of Quinian philosophy. first is Quine’s view that is concerned Putnam himself has argued that there is no with sentences, and so sentences of lan- reconciliation to be found within Quine’s guages, where Quine conceives of languages views. Something has to go. In one telling naturalistically as behavioral phenomena. objection, Putnam converts Quine’s modus The second is Quine’s reliance on instances ponens into a modus tollens: of the disquotational paradigms to elucidate Quine’s demands for [precise criteria for syn- truth and reference. The balance between onymy] lead him to reject not only the existence these two aspects grounds the asymmetrical of an objective relation of synonymy, but also attitude from which Putnam recoils. the existence of a fact of the matter as to whether or not two terms (in another language) are the I same or different in reference. To avoid hav- Logic is concerned with relations like ing to abandon the notion of reference as he implication and that hold over has abandoned the notion of synonymy, Quine what is true or false, over the bearers of truth must then claim that in his “home language” and falsity. According to a tradition in modern the situation is different. One can be a “robust logic going back to Frege and Russell, the realist” with respect to one’s home language and give a nonrealist or antirealist account of bearers of truth and falsity are nonlinguistic, the functioning of every other language. Most nonmental items, which Russell called propo- would regard such an outcome sitions. Various sentences in the same or dif-

©2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 288 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY ferent languages express or signify the same cally speaking, can have different meanings . The science of logic is a theory in different languages. The upshot is that of logical relations of propositions; it only Quine’s sentence-based account of proposi- derivatively concerns sentences.3 For Quine, tions brings with it its own obscure posits. however, it is unclear what propositions are Quine concedes that the notions of sentence supposed to be and, more importantly, how and language he deploys are “idealizations they are distinguished from each other.4 or schematizations” of language “in the Accordingly, he finds the bald assumption more direct empirical sense studied by field of propositions an unacceptably obscure linguists,” adding that starting point for logic. For Quine, then, it language in the direct empirical sense last al- is sentences, or utterances of sentences, that luded to is, I should say, the pattern of actual and are true or false and stand in logical relations. potential linguistic behavior of one individual Logic thus concerns sentences. But how does at one stage of his development.8 Quine conceive of sentences and languages? Quine’s article, “The Problem of Mean- This issue strikingly surfaces in a 1943 ing in Linguistics” (1951), fleshes out the correspondence between Quine and Alonzo kind of idealization or abstraction that he Church. Quine had suggested that proposi- thinks discussions about language require. tions might be identified with classes of We imagine a population of individuals who 5 synonymous sentences. Church demurs, converse fluently with each other over a wide noting that pursuit of Quine’s approach would range of circumstances. These conversations involve consist of utterances of series of phonemes, the perhaps impossible task of defining in each such utterance bounded by unenforced general terms the notion of translation between silences. Some series of phonemes are uttered arbitrary languages under the restriction that in fluent communication, whereas utterance the notion of shall not be used in of other series of phonemes elicits the charac- 6 the . teristic reactions of blank incomprehension. Here Church is thinking of sentences and As a first approximation, a grammar for the language in the formal terms familiar from group’s language is a formal demarcation Carnap’s work. To characterize synonymy that includes all those series of phonemes for such a formal language, one will have that could occur in fluent communication to employ of a very strong sort while excluding those that would elicit blank for formalisms. Church is skeptical whether incomprehension. As there is no sharp, non- any account short of Carnap’s posit of inten- arbitrary upper bound to the length of the sions as semantic primitives has a chance of expressions that can occur in fluent conversa- success. In reply, Quine expresses a hope tions, the grammar will use recursive devices that Church’s challenge could be met by “an to specify an infinite class of expressions. empirical definition of synonymy as applied Here is one dimension of idealization: most to natural languages.”7 Church, now recog- grammatical expressions will be too long to nizing that Quine’s approach is not based occur in normal speech. Moreover, a grammar on “an abstract notion of language,” raises for a language should be manageably simple. a series of difficulties in characterizing what This is a second dimension of idealization. On natural languages are—in effect, difficul- grounds of , a grammar may include ties in stating individuation conditions for some expressions whose utterance would natural languages. Some such account is meet incomprehension—Quine gives familiar needed, because the same sentence, syntacti- examples like Russell’s “Quadruplicity drinks ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 289

procrastination.” Equally, the grammar may explication of the semantical notions of truth exclude solecisms that do not disrupt com- and designation.10 In a 1943 letter to Carnap, munication.9 Quine thus explains the concepts Quine did indeed hold open the prospect of a of a group’s language and of an utterance- pragmatic explication of “designation”: type’s being a meaningful expression of the The problem remains, of course, to explain this language in terms of fluency of conversation basic synonymity relation. This is a relation within the group and grammar construction whose full specification, like that of designa- with its empirical controls grounded in dis- tion, would be the business of pragmatics (not positions to linguistic behavior. In the final that this excuses us from it!).11 two sections of “Problem of Meaning,” Quine In Quine’s next letter, however, allusions to a urges that there is no explication of same- pragmatic explication of “designation” drop ness of meaning, of synonymy, comparable out. There, Quine says, to the one he has provided for language and significance. Let me explain how I intend “designation.” I can’t define it, any more than “object,” but Quine’s concepts of a language and shar- must try to explain it indirectly and through ing a language are loose and flexible. For examples. The lunar concept . . . can be desig- example, a bilingual who speaks English and nated, in my sense, and so can the moon itself, Chinese has a language that overlaps mine and so can any other entity. . . . However, the as regards the English, but not the Chinese. designatum (in my sense) of “moon” is not the Furthermore, standards for fluency in the use lunar concept, but the moon itself. The lunar of some terminology may vary, depending on concept, on the other hand, is the designatum group and circumstance. A lay person’s use of (if any) of “the lunar concept.” . . . Again, the scientific terminology may pass muster in ca- designatum of “9” is the number 9, and the sual conversations among readers of Scientific designatum of “the number of planets” is that American, but not among physicists at work. same number 9 (for there are no two numbers Finally, sometimes Quine is concerned with one of which is 9 and the other the number of planets).12 only a part of our language, for example, just with our language for science, or some branch Here Quine explains “designation” by means of science, or an envisioned formalization in a of instances of the disquotational paradigm: predicate calculus of some branch of science. “______” designates ______, where both This relaxed, behaviorally grounded concept blanks are replaced by an English singular of a language shows how little weight Quine’s term, noting that the direct object position is philosophy places on such concepts as the referentially transparent. concept of understanding a word, sentence, Quine elaborates this view of reference in or language. His unspecific talk of the home “Notes on the Theory of Reference.” There language reflects this relaxed concept of a he observes the “peculiar clarity” possessed language. by the instances of the three paradigms So much for significance and synonymy. “______” is true ______, How do the concepts of reference and truth “______” is true of every ______thing and relate to Quine’s view of languages? Carnap nothing else, takes Quine’s objection to analyticity to boil “______” ______and nothing else, down to a demand for a “pragmatic” expli- when any one fills the two blanks cation of analyticity, that is, an explication in the first paradigm, any one general term in terms of the use of sentences or speaker (in adjective form or omitting “thing” in attitudes toward sentences. He notes that substantive form) in the second one, and any Quine never makes a similar demand for 290 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY one nonvacuous completes the third out what the theory implies as regards obser- paradigm.13 These substitutions transform the vationally ascertainable conditions, and then paradigms themselves into uncontroversial, checking whether the implied conditions do well-entrenched statements, each of which obtain. We want, then, as a part of science, is as clear as the statement, general term, or an account of implication that does justice to name to which it is applied.14 The clarity of these appeals. instances of these paradigms suggests that the Quine thinks of logical notation, with its semantic vocabulary the paradigms feature quantifiers, variables, truth-functional connec- requires no explication in terms of linguistic tives, and parentheses, as an addition to col- behavior. This vocabulary thus contrasts with loquial language. Implication for this notation talk of synonymy and analyticity. supplemented by various predicates can be The semantic raise complica- characterized in terms of , and validity tions. Quine does not take these paradoxes in terms of truth and form. A sentence is valid to impugn the clarity of these notions in their if every sentence of the same form is true.17 predicative applications to specific vocabu- The truth-value of these sentences is fixed by lary, and he proposes to ban the impredicative the of their predicates (the things use of the semantic vocabulary at issue.15 their predicates are true of) and the construc- For this and others, application of tion of sentences from these predicates. This semantic notions must be, strictly speaking, idea of truth-value determination is captured relativized to a language or part of a language. in a truth theory for a predicate calculus So we have supplemented with a reference- (satisfaction-) “______” is true in L if and only if ______. predicate and a truth predicate, a truth theory that will imply the predicative instances of Quine continues: the disquotational schemata. More than these, But now it becomes necessary that L and the the truth theory implies generalizations con- language in which [the above paradigm itself cerning truth and reference. In particular, the is] couched (namely, English) be the same, or theory may be applied to establish and explain at least that they overlap to the extent of any the validity of the forms. “Logic chases truth notations to which (in the role of “______”) up the tree of grammar,” as Quine puts it.18 In 16 we propose to apply the paradigm. this way, implication is characterized in clear, We shall return to the “peculiar clarity” of extensional terms. instances of these paradigms and their use Quine urges that this notation, supplement- and mention of the same word in the same ed by the necessary predicates, is a framework language in section II. for theory: any statement from science is What is the context for Quine’s interest paraphrasable into this canonical notation so in the notions of truth and reference? What that “all traits of reality worthy of the name importance, what use, do these notions can be set down in an idiom of this austere have—do these notions have in science? Talk form if in any idiom.”19 Furthermore, the ac- of truth and reference figures centrally in one count of implication associated with Quine’s science, the science of logic. Investigators canonical notation is strong enough to forge appeal to the relation of implication in their the links between theoretical sentences and work. These appeals are prominent, of course, observation sentences that figure in theory in mathematics, but they pervade science, testing. It is in this respect that logic is not a especially in connection with theory testing. purely “a priori” science. Should our science An investigator tests a theory by first figuring develop in such a way that regimentation into ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 291

quantificational notation manifestly failed What though does justification of a trans- to capture the implications that investigators lation manual amount to? The standard of appeal to in connection with theory testing, adequacy for a translation manual is fluency the Quinean would have grounds for revising of conversations mediated by it. For vividness, her account of implication. imagine a Translator who has internalized a Two things stand out here. First, we see translation manual for an alien language into how Quine relates logical notation and talk our language, English. (Think of C3PO, the about logical notation to his behaviorally translator droid from Star Wars.) To talk with grounded conception of language. Second, an alien, I say something in my language. talk of truth and reference in application to The Translator produces an alien sentence our own language floats more or less free according to the internalized manual. The of this behavioral conception, thanks to the alien responds. The Translator produces an clarity of the instances of the disquotational English translation. I respond with an English paradigms. In this way, Quine’s conception statement. And so on. The translation manual of logic avoids the taint of psychologism. is justified to the extent that it promotes over a suitably broad range of circumstances, the II same conversational fluency that I am ac- Let us now consider Quine’s “gavagai” customed to in dealing with my Anglophone thought experiment.20 Quine imagines a interlocutors. As Quine expounds it in later linguist encountering a group that speaks writings, indeterminacy of translation is the an entirely unknown language. The linguist thesis that, given the home language and an observes that the people in the group will as- alien language, there will be distinct transla- sent to the query “Gavagai?” when a rabbit is tion manuals between Home and Alien each of conspicuously present and otherwise gener- which, if used by itself, would support fluent ally dissent. Quine notes that the translation conversation but if used in tandem, switching of “gavagai” by the English common noun back and forth between them, would lead to “rabbit” goes beyond the observed linguistic a breakdown of fluent communication.21 The behavior, for the translator could, on the role of the “gavagai” parable in the argument basis of the observed behavior, translate for indeterminacy is to suggest one pattern for “Gavagai!” equally well as “Undetached rab- constructing translation manuals that would bit parts!” or “A Rabbit-stage!” or “Rabbit- exemplify the indeterminacy thesis. fusion!” etc. The translator would be able The “gavagai” parable does more than this. to decide among these options only in light Instances of the disquotational paradigms ex- of translation into the alien language of the plicate truth and reference only in application English referential apparatus—determiners, to expressions of our home language. These pronouns, singular and plural predication, concepts gain application to alien languages expressions for identity. Quine then argues only via translation. To extend truth and that if our linguist is able to find foreign reference to an alien language, we accept counterparts for the English referential ap- instances of translational paradigms for the paratus that justify taking “gavagai” to be a alien language parallel to the disquotational predicate true of rabbits, she will also be able paradigms for the home language. to find foreign counterparts for the English “s” is true (in Alien) if and only if p referential apparatus that justify taking “ga- where “p” is replaced by an English state- vagai” to be a predicate true of undetached ment and “s” by its Alien translation. There rabbits parts or of rabbit stages, etc. 292 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY is a similar paradigm for “true of” and Alien theory of language, as Quine conceives of translations of English predicates. The “ga- language. Quine concludes that synonymy is vagai” parable makes it plausible that there a notion that has no place in serious science. are distinct, serviceable translation manuals We noted how via translation, the applica- from an alien language into English, each tion of truth and reference can be extended of which translates many of the same alien from the home language to alien languages. expressions with noncoextensive English The indeterminacy of translation makes this predicates, indeed with English predicates extension behaviorally inscrutable. What with disjoint extensions. Quine’s conclusion about home language reference? There are is that dispositions to linguistic behavior serviceable translation manuals that associate do not settle what the alien expressions the home language predicates with noncoexten- translator identifies as general terms are true sive home language predicates. Should not of. Reference in alien languages thus proves this result discredit home language refer- to be, as I shall say, behaviorally inscrutable.22 ence along with intralinguistic synonymy in Indeterminacy of translation applies, after a Quine’s eyes? fashion, to the home language. As Peter Hyl- Here is how Quine puts the worry in “On- ton has emphasized, we do not in any familiar tological Relativity”: sense translate the utterances of our interlocu- But if there is really no fact of the matter, then 23 tors when conversation flows smoothly. We the inscrutability of reference can be brought simply respond to them, to what they have even closer to home than the neighbor’s case; uttered. In these circumstances, there is no we can apply it to ourselves. If it is to make need for our Translator, except perhaps as sense to say even of oneself that one is refer- an amplifier. Nevertheless, according to the ring to rabbits . . . and not to rabbit stages . . . , indeterminacy thesis, there will be nonhomo- then it should make sense equally to say it of phonic (nonidentity) mappings of the home someone else. . . . We seem to be maneuvering language into itself that suffice for fluent ourselves into the absurd position that there is communication. We can envision an intra- no difference on any terms, interlinguistic or intralinguistic, objective or subjective, between linguistic translation manual that translates referring to rabbits and referring to rabbit parts “rabbit” by “rabbit-stage” and so, making or stages. . . . Surely this is absurd, for it would appropriate adjustments elsewhere, associ- imply that there is no difference between the ates “rabbit”-sentences with “rabbit-stage” rabbit and each of its parts or stages. . . . Refer- sentences. You say something to me about ence would seem now to become nonsense not rabbits. Rather than responding, I wait for just in radical translation but at home.25 the Translator’s “rabbit-stage” translation. Quine calls this conclusion “a quandary to I respond to the translation with a “rabbit- be resolved.” He speaks here of a quandary, stage” sentence of my own. The Translator because the notion of reference, in contrast now translates back into “rabbit” talk for you with synonymy, has a central use in seri- to respond to. It may well be that the transla- ous science. We can sharpen the quandary tion of my “rabbit-stage” remark is what I by returning to my previous remarks about would have said, had I responded directly to translation, truth, and reference. The ap- your original “rabbit” remark. Conversation plication of truth and reference to the home mediated by the nonhomophonic manual thus language is constrained by the entrenchment 24 flows smoothly along. of instances of the disquotational paradigms. If the indeterminacy thesis is correct, there The application of truth and reference to an is no explication of synonymy to be had in alien language is constrained by instances of terms of linguistic behavior, in terms of a ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 293

a translational paradigm. These two sets of constitute an individual’s language in Quine’s constraints for applying truth and reference “more direct empirical sense.” So in a conver- clash when we nontrivially translate the home sational exchange, I directly respond either language into itself. Disquotation gives us, to the home language sentence uttered or to “rabbits” is true of rabbits and nothing else. the home language sentence that translation has substituted for the uttered sentence.27 In Our imagined translation manual gives us, these two ways, then, reliance on the so-called “rabbits” is true of rabbit-stages and nothing homophonic translation manual is inescapable else. for speakers of the home language. From these two, it follows that something This inevitable reliance on homophonic is a rabbit just in case it is a rabbit-stage, a “translation” for the home language is re- manifest falsehood. Moreover, there appears flected in the “peculiar clarity” of the disquo- to be no reason to prefer the disquotational tational paradigms for “true” and “true of.” paradigm to the translational paradigm. For The acquisition of the concept of truth—i.e., when we respond directly to the sentence an the fluent use of the predicate “true”—in- interlocutor has uttered, Quine thinks of us volves learning how to transform a statement as using the trivial homophonic translation into an equivalent attribution of truth to that manual, the translation manual that maps statement. So, in becoming fluent in the use every home language expression to itself. of the predicate “true,” people will acquire The disquotational paradigms are then as- a readiness to move back and forth between sociated with a translation manual after all. statements and something like an ascription According to the indeterminacy thesis, there of truth to the statement—between “Snow are no behavioral grounds for preferring the is white” and “It’s true that snow is white.” homophonic translation manual to nonho- Something similar holds for “true of.” We mophonic ones. become fluent in the use of this predicate in To approach Quine’s quandary, let us moving back and forth between sentences think first about intralinguistic translation as like “My pet is a cat” and “It’s true of my regards the home language and then about pet that it’s a cat” or “Being a cat is true of truth and reference in the home language. my pet.” Here we find in colloquial language We saw how indeterminacy of translation the resources for introducing explicitly meta- applies to the home language. Nevertheless, linguistic concepts of truth and reference in the homophonic mapping is distinguished application to the sentences and predicates from other intralinguistic translational map- of our language for science in connection pings. First, use of the homophonic translation with logic. In particular, these conversational manual—direct response to an interlocutor’s equivalences prepare the way for our ready utterances—is built into language learning, acceptance of instances of the disquotational as Quine observes.26 Once we have reached schemata, instances that logically enshrine a mature level of fluency with those around these conversational equivalences. In this us, it would be utterly pointless to switch to a way, the disquotational features of “true” and nonhomophonic translation manual to interact “true of” are grounded in the acquisition of with the home language speakers, unless there these words. Here is the source of the clarity were a breakdown in conversational fluency. that attaches to instances of the disquotational Second, any linguistic interchange, whether paradigms.28 mediated by translation or not, still relies on These linked features of homophonic that network of behavioral dispositions that “translation” and disquotationally explicated truth and reference underlie Quine’s maxim 294 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY to resolve his quandary about reference in the neither the availability, clarity, nor utility in home language by acquiescing “in our mother logic of a disquotationally based theory of tongue, taking its words at face-value”29—a truth and reference. Here domestic refer- maxim that is both descriptive and prescrip- ence contrasts with inter- and intralinguistic tive. A person can inquire after the reference synonymy. In the face of the obscurity Quine of the predicates of a language only by use finds in the application of synonymy even in of a language, presumably the person’s home the home language and in light of his view of language. What about reference in the home language as a behavioral phenomenon, there language itself? Within the home language is nothing available in case of synonymy for we may clarify or explicate terms by speci- clarification but behavioral considerations. fying their reference nondisquotationally. Furthermore, alien reference is no clearer Quine’s paradigm here is the specification of than interlinguistic synonymy, for the ques- reference of the term “ordered pair” in terms tion of the reference of alien predicates makes of .30 This process of explication good sense only as we translate the alien must come to an end, and when it does we language into the home language. acquiesce, at least for the present, in some portion of the home language, in the primitive III language of set theory in Quine’s paradigm. The cogency of Quine’s resolution of his When we do so, we take our words at face quandary will be clearer if we think about value. For our home language (or portions of how Quine takes truth and reference to be it) comes with the canonical specifications immanent within our language or conceptual of truth-conditions and reference provided scheme. In the often-cited penultimate para- by instances of the disquotational schemata. graph of chapter one of Word and Object, These are appropriated into science and form Quine says: part of the deck of Neurath’s boat on which It is rather when we turn back into the midst of we stand when we engage in semantic ascent. an actually present theory, at least hypothetical- It is in holding to predicative instances of ly accepted, that we can and do sensibly speak the disquotational schemata that we take our of this and that sentence as true. Where it makes words at face value. The existence of alter- sense to apply “true” is to a sentence couched in native specifications of truth-conditions and the terms of a given theory and seen from within reference grounded in nonhomophonic trans- the theory, complete with its posited reality. . . . lation manuals for the home language gives To say that the statement “Brutus killed Caesar” us no reason to jettison the theory of truth is true or that “The atomic number of sodium and reference that we already have. Indeed, is 23” is true is in effect simply to say that Brutus killed Caesar or that the atomic weight we may use this theory of truth and reference of sodium is 23. That the statements are about in establishing the adequacy of some of these posited entities, are significant only in relation 31 translation manuals. Moreover, it is only to a surrounding body of theory . . . no longer with a disquotationally based theory of truth matters; for the truth attributions are made from and reference in hand that the question of the the point of view of the same surrounding body behavioral inscrutability of reference can be of theory, and are in the same boat.32 raised. The basic picture here is that we scientists Nevertheless, the possibility of nonho- have a language in use, our language for mophonic, intralinguistic translation dem- science. What is required to have a language onstrates that at home, as much as abroad, in use? On Quine’s view of language, a reference is behaviorally inscrutable. This group of individuals has a language if the behavioral inscrutability, however, impugns ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 295 individuals all have the capacity to engage What holds for “sodium” also holds for in fluent conversations with each other over truth- and reference-predicates of the home a suitably broad range of circumstances. language—“truth attributions . . . are in the Language learning is the development of this same boat.” To see how, consider the use of capacity, and it involves, among much else, a these predicates for semantic ascent. Seman- person’s acquisition of dispositions to assent tic ascent for scientific ends supposes that to or dissent from various sentences of the the enterprise of theory construction is well language. Some of these dispositions will be underway. When semantic ascent is required, practically universally shared in the group, we co-opt disquotationally explicated truth- like our disposition to assent to “That’s red,” and reference-predicates into our emerging when a conspicuous red thing is present, or language for science. Semantic ascent thus our disposition to dissent from “11 is a prime exemplifies what Charles Parsons has called number, and 11 is not a prime number.” Oth- “the priority of the use of language to seman- ers will be variously idiosyncratic to individu- tic reflection on it.”34 Here the instances of als and groups of individuals, for example, the disquotational schemata for the portion my dispositions to assent to or dissent from of language under consideration explicate the “That person is a philosophy professor” in the added truth- and reference-predicates, giving presence of various individuals or my disposi- their application to individual expressions tion to assent outright to “Constantinople was in use a clarity that suits them for employ- sacked in 1204 by Latin crusaders.” ment in semantic ascent. Their acceptance Quine tells us, is the starting point for thought about truth a man’s theory on a given subject may be and reference. This is to say, the instances conceived, nearly enough, as the class of all of the disquotational schemata play the role those sentences, with some limited vocabulary for “true” and “true of” that core general appropriate to the desired subject matter, that chemistry plays for “sodium,” “atomic num- he to be true.33 ber,” etc. Or rather, these schemata, together This is the sense of “theory” relevant to the with core general chemistry, play the role for preceding remark about truth from Word and “true” and “true of” in applications to and Object. Chemists talk about atomic numbers generalizations over expressions from the and sodium—they use these terms together language of chemistry that core chemistry with other chemical vocabulary in fluent plays for “sodium” and “atomic number.” conversations with each other. The sentences This role does not make instances of the in this vocabulary that a chemist holds true disquotational schemata sacrosanct. After all, are his chemical theory. There is very con- Quine responds to the semantical paradoxes siderable overlap between the theories of, by giving up impredicative instances of the for example, any two Anglophone chemists; disquotational paradigms. The acquisition and in this case anyway, there is a core theory of “true” and “true of” initially entrenches that most all of them hold true. This overlap instances of the disquotational schemata. The of theory sustains the stability in usage of this role that these predicates then play in logic vocabulary necessary for fluent conversation and semantic ascent generally more deeply among Anglophone chemists engaged in sci- entrenches them in our language/conceptual entific activity. This is the force of Quine’s scheme. Given especially Quine’s embrace remark that the statements about things like of first-order logic as a canonical framework sodium and atomic numbers are significant for science, humdrum instances of the dis- only in relation to a surrounding theory. quotational schemata can be displaced only by weighty theoretical considerations. It is in 296 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY the absence of any such considerations that ervations about either the plausibility of this acquiescence in the home language, with claim or the support Quine’s arguments for its truth- and reference-predicates, resolves indeterminacy give it. Quine’s explanation of Quine’s quandary. “fact of the matter” is couched in the material A sharpened articulation of this point for at mode in terms of distributions of states and least part of the home language can perhaps relations over elementary particles. Neverthe- be found in Quine’s discussion of whether less, Quine is well-known for his rejection of there is a “fact of the matter” about reference. states, properties, and relations-in-intension We have seen how specifications of reference from his favored ontology.36 Furthermore, the and of truth-conditions for alien expressions states and relations here are those posited by depend on translation. To the extent that the imagined physics. Hence, the counter- translation is indeterminate—to the extent factual distributions of them over elementary that there are satisfactory translation manu- particles that figure in Quine’s conclusion are als that translate the same alien expressions those compatible with the fundamental laws by noncoextensive home predicates—to that of physics and the mathematics that physics extent our theory of reference and truth for employs. “Compatibility” here needs to be the alien language is indeterminate. If, as understood in terms of satisfiability. So, in Quine urges, in the case of translation, this contemplating what are facts of the matter, indeterminacy means that there is “no fact of we consider redistributions of elementary the matter” about translation, then the same particles over the extensions of the predicates conclusion holds for alien reference as well. of the imagined fundamental physics, redis- Is there a fact of the matter of about reference tributions that would satisfy the fundamental in the home language? laws of that physics taken together with an Quine very briefly explains his notion of axiomatization of the mathematics the phys- factuality at the end of “Things and Their ics uses. Place in Theories” (1981): In this way, Quine’s casual material mode Thus suppose, to make things vivid, that we explanation of “facts of the matter” is go- are settling still for a physics of elementary ing proxy for a formal mode specification particles and recognizing a dozen or so basic employing semantic ascent, so that Quine’s states and relations in which they may stand. conception of facts of the matter draws on Then when I say there is no fact of the matter, a disquotationally based theory of truth and as regards, say, the two rival manuals of trans- reference for a portion of the language. It lation, what I mean is that both manuals are thus assumes instances of the disquotational compatible with all the same distributions of paradigms for that portion of the language. 35 states and relations over elementary particles. Now, it makes no sense to ask whether there The idea here is that the linguistic behavior is fact of the matter about the laws of fun- that would be exhibited under any redistribu- damental physics we refer to in specifying tion of states and relations over the elementa- the relevant redistributions of magnitudes ry particles would equally support or equally over elementary particles in characterizing discredit both translation manuals. For Quine, this notion of factuality. The same holds for it is the relation of fundamental physics to the mathematics that fundamental physics the other sciences—the fact that the other uses. Finally, the same holds for the theory sciences take fundamental physics to be ba- of truth and reference over the language sic—that makes it reasonable to characterize of fundamental physics together with the factuality in terms of the states and relations mathematics it employs. This is where the of elementary particles. Let us put aside res- parallel between the argument concerning ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 297 alien language reference and home language his rejection of inter- and intralinguistic reference breaks down. The former line of ar- synonymy. Thanks to the entrenchment of gument does not assume which use instances of the disquotational schemata in a reference predicate for the alien language. our language/conceptual scheme, matters The conclusion here is not that, in contrast to stand otherwise with truth and reference alien languages, there is a fact of the matter in the home language. The behavior-based about reference in the home language. Rather, view of language and the disquotationally because of the use of a disquotationally ex- grounded view of truth and reference in the plicated reference-predicate in characterizing home language stand together and mutually “facts of the matter,” this notion of facts of reinforce each other. At the end of Word and the matter is not applicable to home language Object, Quine again emphasizes his natural- reference, at least as regards the language of ism as regards philosophy, his view that a fundamental physics. In Quine’s words, has no vantage point “outside the there is no fact of the matter of our interpreting conceptual scheme that he takes in charge. 38 any man’s ontology in one way or . . . in another. There is no cosmic exile.” Quine’s asym- Any man’s, that is to say, except ourselves. . . . metrical attitude toward truth and reference in Factuality, like gravitation and electric charge, the home language and alien languages is an is internal to our theory of nature.37 application of this naturalism, and within his In conclusion, let us return to the Put- basic outlook, is both required and coherent. nam objection to Quine. Quine’s flexible, behavior-based view of language underlies

NOTES

This article, originally presented at the Harvard University Quine Centenary Conference, is a descen- dant of one I presented at the Quine Centennial Symposium at the University of Oslo. It has benefited from comments from Avner Baz, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Warren Goldfarb, Anil Gupta, Tyke Nuñez, James Pearson, Paul Roth, and from extensive conversations with Peter Hylton. 1. Putnam 1986, pp. 335f. 2. Putnam 1989, p. 370. 3. I intend here only to gesture toward the kind of view of logic Quine takes himself to oppose. 4. See Quine 1968b. 5. Quine 1943. 6. Quine unpublished, Alonzo Church to W. V. Quine, July 26, 1943, p. 4. 7. Ibid., W. V. Quine to Alonzo Church, August 14, 1943, p. 3. 8. Ibid., W. V. Quine to Alonzo Church, November 13, 1943, p. 2. 9. Quine emphasizes the importance of simplicity in his account in Quine 1951a, p. 54, and Quine 1986c (1970), pp. 21f. For Quine’s later views on grammar, see Quine 1986a. 10. Carnap 1963, p. 918. 11. W. V. Quine to , January 5, 1943, Quine and Carnap 1996, p. 298. Emphasis added. 298 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

12. W. V. Quine to Rudolf Carnap, May 7, 1943, Quine and Carnap 1996, p. 330. 13. See Quine 1951c, p. 134. As Quine thinks that singular terms, apart from variables, are paraphras- able away, we shall be concerned only with the first two of these paradigms in what follows. 14. Quine 1951c, p. 138. See also Quine 1986c (1970), p. 12. Quine makes this point throughout his career, beginning with Quine 1940, p. 4. 15. For a discussion of the semantical paradoxes, see Quine 1992, pp. 79–90. 16. Quine 1951c, p. 135. 17. See chapter two of Quine 1986c (1970) for more details. This characterization of yields the standard result only in the presence of a suitably rich vocabulary of predicates. 18. Quine 1986c (1970), p. 35. 19. Quine 1960, p. 228. 20. See Quine 1956, pp. 1–5; Quine 1960, pp. 51–57; Quine 1968a, pp. 33–35. 21. See Quine 1992, pp. 36–49, esp. p. 48. 22. See Quine 1960, p. 54. 23. Hylton makes this important point in Hylton 2004, p. 141. 24. The situation becomes even sillier, though not incoherent, if we contemplate my solitary use of language. I could utter a German sentence either aloud or in foro interno, and then translate it into an English sentence, carry my thinking forward with another English sentence, translate that sentence into German, continue my line of thinking with a further German sentence, translate that back into English, etc. If I can thus carry out a line of thought, switching back and forth between English and German, I could do the same switching back and forth between English body-sentences and body-stage sentences. 25. Quine 1968a, pp. 47–48. 26. Ibid., p. 46. See also Quine 1960, p. ix. 27. Here I am indebted to the discussion in Hylton 2007, p. 213. 28. On this basis even a Quinean might claim that wholesale revision of the disquotational paradigms amounts to changing the meaning of “true.” See the discussion of analyticity in Quine 1973, pp. 79–80. Perhaps because the semantic paradoxes force the revision of some instances of the disquotational paradigms, Quine himself stops just short of this position, saying, “The keynote of truth is disquotation. . . . Does disquotation give the essence of truth? I am not sure how to deal with that.” Quine 1999, p. 163. 29. Quine 1968a, p. 49. 30. For Quine’s discussion of the ordered pair as a philosophical paradigm, see Quine 1960, pp. 257–261. For Quine’s views on semantic ascent and ontological inquiry, see ibid., pp. 270–276. 31. This is the case for translation manuals based on proxy functions. For a discussion of proxy func- tions in connection with nonhomophonic translation manuals (also known as “reinterpretations” of the predicates of our theory), see Quine 1981b, pp. 16–19, and Quine 1992, pp. 31–32. 32. Quine 1960, p. 24. 33. Quine 1969c, p. 309. Section five of this piece concerns the language-theory distinction. In effect, then, we can take it that a person’s theory will be the sentences that are stimulus-analytic for the person. For discussion of stimulus-analyticity, see Quine 1960, pp. 55, 66. ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY / 299

34. Parsons 1974, p. 240n19. In this article, Parsons observes that this picture of truth- and reference- predicates as additions to a language (or sector of language) from which they were absent is a response to the semantical paradoxes. 35. Quine 1981b, p. 23. 36. See especially Quine 1960, pp. 233–248. 37. Quine 1981b, p. 23. I am unsure whether Quine here has in mind the argument I presented. In Quine 1986b, p. 430, Quine considers Burton Dreben’s query whether there is a fact of the matter about mathematics. On my interpretation, Quine should say that the question does not apply (or does not nontrivially apply) to mathematics, as mathematics will be a part of the basic physical theory assumed in Quine’s standard of factuality. This is not the response Quine gives. 38. Quine 1960, p. 275. Alexander George also made this point in his presentation at the Harvard Quine Centenary Conference.

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