DOCSLIB.ORG

Do the Paradoxes Pose a Special Problem for Deflationism?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Do the Paradoxes Pose a Special Problem for Deflationism? Do the Paradoxes Pose a Special Problem for Deflationism? Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh The Liar and other semantic paradoxes pose a difficult problem for all theories of truth. Any theory that aims to improve our understanding of the concept of truth must, when fully stated, include an account of the paradoxes. Not only deflationism but also its competitors – for instance, correspondence and coherence – must ultimately address the paradoxes. The question that concerns me in this essay is whether it is especially urgent for deflationism to do so. Are the paradoxes a special threat, a special problem, for deflationism? I will argue that they are not.1 Deflationists can leave the paradoxes to the specialists to puzzle over. It is the specialists who will be well served if they keep some insights of deflationism firmly in view. I Deflationism rests on some claims about our ordinary concept of truth. The central one of these claims – and the one that is threatened by the paradoxes – is that sentences of the following form (T) ‘- - - -’ is true iff - - - -, 1Keith Simmons (1999) and Elke Brendel (2000) have argued that the paradoxes undermine deflationism. Bradley Armour-Garb and J. C. Beall (2001) have responded in detail to Simmons’s argument. the T-biconditionals, capture the meaning of ‘true’.2 Thus W. V. Quine calls truth a device of “disquotation.” The effect of adding ‘is true’ to the quotation name ‘‘Snow is white’’, Quine says, is to cancel the quotation marks and to yield the equivalent sentence ‘Snow is white’.3 According to Paul Horwich, the T-biconditionals implicitly define ‘true’.4 Similar ideas are expressed by other deflationists, including Hartry Field, Christopher Hill, and Michael Williams.5 Now, as is typical in philosophy, there is something very right in this central claim of the deflationists, and there is also something quite wrong. Let us try to isolate the element that is right. Let us begin by accepting that truth can, in one of its senses, be applied to sentences, and let 2This is a rough formulation of the claim. It will be sharpened a little in the following discussion. 3Quine writes in Pursuit of Truth (1992), “To ascribe truth to the sentence [‘Snow is white’] is to ascribe whiteness to snow . Ascription of truth just cancels the quotation marks. Truth is disquotation (p. 80).” A little later, Quine adds that the disquotation account is “a full account: it explicates clearly the truth or falsity of every clear sentence (p. 93).” Quine’s writings have exercised a great influence on contemporary deflationism, but we should be cautious about attributing any full and unambiguous deflationism to him. 4Meaning (1998), p. 107. Horwich’s remark is actually directed to propositional truth. But he treats the other notions of truth in a parallel way; see Horwich 1990. 5See Field 2001, Hill 1987 & 2002, and Williams 1986. There are significant differences in the positions of the various deflationists but these can be neglected for the argument of this paper. I will work with disquotationalism as a representative deflationary theory. Let me stress, though, that I am not attributing disquotationalism to all deflationists. Paradoxes and Deflationism – Page 2 us agree to focus on its application to the sentences of English. Further, let us agree to neglect the complications that indexicals, context sensitivity, and ambiguity create in any account of truth. The above rough formulation of the deflationists’ claim does not get off the ground unless we make these concessions. Moreover, as far as our present interests are concerned, the concessions are inconsequential. The deflationists’ claim contains one principle that is undoubtedly true. This is the Closure principle: The Closure principle. The following two rules of inference, TI and TE, hold for categorical affirmations: (TI) A; therefore, ‘A’ is true (TE) ‘A’ is true; therefore, A.6 Note that this principle is very weak: it licenses the interchange of A and ‘‘A’ is true’ only in categorical contexts, not in contexts of hypothetical reasoning. For example, it does not entitle one to infer ‘Snow is black’ from the supposition that ‘‘Snow is black’ is true’. On the other hand, if one flat out asserts ‘‘Snow is black’ is true’ then the Closure principle commits one to ‘Snow is black’. Because of its weakness, the Closure principle does not yield inconsistencies even in the presence of paradoxical sentences. Set ‘the Liar’ to be a name of the sentence The Liar is not true. 6Here and at many places below, quotes should be understood in the manner of Quine’s corner quotes. Paradoxes and Deflationism – Page 3 If TI and TE had unconditional validity then a contradiction would be immediate: the supposition ‘The Liar is not true’ would yield ‘The Liar is true’, and the supposition ‘The Liar is true’ would yield ‘The Liar is not true’. But such applications of TI and TE are not licensed by the Closure principle, for they occur within hypothetical contexts. The Closure principle, it is easy to show, remains consistent even when a language is enriched with all kinds of resources for expressing self- and cross-reference.7 The Closure principle is plainly correct even for paradoxical sentences. For example, a person who categorically affirms ‘The Liar is not true’ is thereby committed to ‘‘The Liar is not true’ is true’. If the person refuses to recognize the commitment, he is either confused or fails to fully grasp the meaning of ‘true’. The Closure principle ought, therefore, to be respected by all theories of truth, deflationist and non-deflationist alike. And, indeed, all the main approaches to the paradoxes validate the principle.8 7Friedman and Sheard 1987 is a rich study of the principles that can, and those that cannot, consistently be held in the context of self-referential truth. See McGee 1991 and Halbach 1994 for further illumination. 8See my paper “Truth” for a survey of the main approaches. The axiomatic theory KF articulated by Solomon Feferman (1984) does violate the Closure principle. In this theory, the inference rule “P, therefore ‘P’ is true” is not admissible: P can be a theorem, yet ‘‘P’ is true’ can fail to be one. (Actually, in KF, one can prove of some theorems that they are not true.) KF is elegant, but it is not a good account of the actual logic of truth, and Feferman has not proposed it as such. McGee 1991 contains a valuable discussion of KF. The Closure principle is not respected by the approach Horwich takes to the paradoxes (Horwich 1990, p. 42). Horwich reacts to the paradoxes by excluding some of the T- Paradoxes and Deflationism – Page 4 II Let us now turn to something stronger and more troublesome, namely, the claim that the T- biconditionals are correct. Is this claim right? Plainly, on some ways of understanding ‘true’, the claim is doubtful. It is sometimes said, following P. F. Strawson, that sentences whose presuppositions fail – e.g., ‘The king of France is bald’ – are neither true nor false. And it is also said that truth attributions to these sentences – e.g., ‘‘The king of France is bald’ is true’ – are simply false. If this is right, then the two sides of the T-biconditionals are not always equivalent, and we cannot unqualifiedly endorse the biconditionals. Nevertheless, there is a notion of truth on which the semantic value of a sentence is the same as that of its truth-attribution. On this notion, if A is neither true nor false, then ‘‘A’ is true’ is also neither true nor false. If A has a semantic value v then ‘‘A’ is true’ also has the semantic value v, and conversely. It is this notion – sometimes called the weak notion of truth (Yablo 1985) – that is of primary interest to the deflationists. Deflationists do need to give some account of the other notions of truth. But let us not pause to reflect on what they might say about them. Let us work with the weak notion and return to the question whether the T-biconditionals can now be deemed to be correct. The restriction to the weak notion ensures that the T-biconditionals of ordinary, unproblematic sentences are correct. biconditionals from the theory of truth. And he does not supplement the theory in any way to prevent the loss of Closure. The failure of Closure is, I think, a grave flaw in Horwich’s approach. One consequence of it is that Horwich’s theory fails to sustain his own claims about the concept of truth – for example, his claims about the explanatory power of his theory and about the generalization function of truth. Horwich recognizes the problem in the second edition of his book (p. 42, fn. 21), but I think he underestimates it. Paradoxes and Deflationism – Page 5 The question is whether those of paradoxical sentences such as the Liar are also correct. I suggest that we do not rush to give a definitive answer to this question. Let us recognize instead that a strong case can be made for both answers, that the T-biconditionals are not correct and that they are correct. The T-biconditional for the Liar, ‘The Liar is not true’ is true iff the Liar is not true, is equivalent, by the substitutivity of identicals, to the biconditional, The Liar is true iff the Liar is not true, which is only a few short steps removed from an explicit contradiction. Further, it appears, ‘not’ can express a concept of negation on which the semantic values of P and not-P are always distinct. If so, there are readings on which the two sides of the above biconditional have different values; hence, on such readings, the biconditional is incorrect.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kripke's Theory of Truth
    Kripke’s Theory of Truth (for the strong Kleene scheme) Presented by Christopher Gauker Version: July 26, 2006 Contemporary discussions of truth often make reference to Kripke’s theory of truth (presented by Kripke only his 1975 Journal of Philosophy paper). What Kripke did was show how to interpret a language in such a way that it contains its own truth predicate. The fact that the language he describes contains its own truth predicate is proved by means of something called a fixed-point theorem. I have written this document and posted it on the web because it is hard to find a presentation of Kripke’s theory that will be understandable even to readers who have had only a first course in logic. It is my intention that this presentation will be understandable to all readers who have been exposed to at least the following: The languages of ordinary predicate logic. Recursive definitions of truth in a structure for such languages. (Structures are also called models or interpretations.) The basic concepts and notation of set theory, such as curly brackets, membership (“∈”), inclusion (“⊆”), ordered n-tuples, relations and functions. Kripke’s theory of truth builds on a three-valued interpretation of a language. (So sentences may be neither true nor false (N) as well as (T) or false (F).) Various three- valued valuation schemes may be used. Here we will consider only the strong Kleene scheme, which is the only one most people care about. I can take no credit for this presentation. It is nothing more than a distillation from the more general presentation in Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap’s book, The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press, 1993) (who in turn acknowledge debts to Fitting and Visser).
    [Show full text]
  • A Simple Logic for Comparisons and Vagueness
    THEODORE J. EVERETT A SIMPLE LOGIC FOR COMPARISONS AND VAGUENESS ABSTRACT. I provide an intuitive, semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a “how much” value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari’s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules. I argue that CL provides a better analysis of comparisons and predicate vagueness than classical logic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory. CL provides a model for descriptions of the world in terms of comparisons only. The sorites paradox can be solved by the elimination of atomic sentences. In his recent book on vagueness, Timothy Williamson (1994) attacks accounts of vagueness arising from either fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory, both of which have well-known problems, stemming in part from their denial of classical bivalence. He then gives his own, epistemic ac- count of vagueness, according to which the vagueness of a predicate is fundamentally a matter of our not knowing whether or not it applies in every case. My main purpose in this paper is not to criticize William- son’s positive view, but to provide an alternative, non-epistemic account of predicate vagueness, based on a very simple logic for comparisons (CL), which preserves bivalence.
    [Show full text]
  • Does Informal Logic Have Anything to Learn from Fuzzy Logic?
    University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 3 May 15th, 9:00 AM - May 17th, 5:00 PM Does informal logic have anything to learn from fuzzy logic? John Woods University of British Columbia Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Woods, John, "Does informal logic have anything to learn from fuzzy logic?" (1999). OSSA Conference Archive. 62. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA3/papersandcommentaries/62 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Title: Does informal logic have anything to learn from fuzzy logic? Author: John Woods Response to this paper by: Rolf George (c)2000 John Woods 1. Motivation Since antiquity, philosophers have been challenged by the apparent vagueness of everyday thought and experience. How, these philosophers have wanted to know, are the things we say and think compatible with logical laws such as Excluded Middle?1 A kindred attraction has been the question of how truth presents itself — relatively and in degrees? in approximations? in resemblances, or in bits and pieces? F.H. Bradley is a celebrated (or as the case may be, excoriated) champion of the degrees view of truth. There are, one may say, two main views of error, the absolute and relative. According to the former view there are perfect truths, and on the other side there are sheer errors..
    [Show full text]
  • A Note on Extension, Intension, and Truth Author(S): Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap Source: the Journal of Philosophy, Vol
    Journal of Philosophy, Inc. A Note on Extension, Intension, and Truth Author(s): Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Mar., 1987), pp. 168-174 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026597 Accessed: 28/05/2009 11:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jphil. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Philosophy. http://www.jstor.org 168 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY A NOTE ON EXTENSION, INTENSION, AND TRUTH* I T is common knowledge that two predicates may coincide in extension but differ in intension and that, for any predicate, one can construct an infinity of coextensional predicates that differ in intension.
    [Show full text]
  • Intransitivity and Vagueness
    Intransitivity and Vagueness Joseph Y. Halpern∗ Cornell University Computer Science Department Ithaca, NY 14853 [email protected] http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/halpern Abstract preferences. Moreover, it is this intuition that forms the ba- sis of the partitional model for knowledge used in game the- There are many examples in the literature that suggest that indistinguishability is intransitive, despite the fact that the in- ory (see, e.g., [Aumann 1976]) and in the distributed sys- distinguishability relation is typically taken to be an equiv- tems community [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]. alence relation (and thus transitive). It is shown that if the On the other hand, besides the obvious experimental obser- uncertainty perception and the question of when an agent vations, there have been arguments going back to at least reports that two things are indistinguishable are both care- Poincare´ [1902] that the physical world is not transitive in fully modeled, the problems disappear, and indistinguishabil- this sense. In this paper, I try to reconcile our intuitions ity can indeed be taken to be an equivalence relation. More- about indistinguishability with the experimental observa- over, this model also suggests a logic of vagueness that seems tions, in a way that seems (at least to me) both intuitively to solve many of the problems related to vagueness discussed appealing and psychologically plausible. I then go on to ap- in the philosophical literature. In particular, it is shown here ply the ideas developed to the problem of vagueness. how the logic can handle the Sorites Paradox. To understand the vagueness problem, consider the well- n+1 1 Introduction known Sorites Paradox: If grains of sand make a heap, then so do n.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Relationship Between Fuzzy Autoepistemic Logic and Fuzzy Modal Logics of Belief
    JID:FSS AID:6759 /FLA [m3SC+; v1.204; Prn:31/03/2015; 9:42] P.1(1-26) Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Fuzzy Sets and Systems ••• (••••) •••–••• www.elsevier.com/locate/fss On the relationship between fuzzy autoepistemic logic and fuzzy modal logics of belief ∗ Marjon Blondeel d, ,1, Tommaso Flaminio a,2, Steven Schockaert b, Lluís Godo c,3, Martine De Cock d,e a Università dell’Insubria, Department of Theorical and Applied Science, Via Mazzini 5, 21100 Varese, Italy b Cardiff University, School of Computer Science and Informatics, 5The Parade, Cardiff, CF24 3AA, UK c Artficial Intelligence Research Institute (IIIA) – CSIC, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain d Ghent University, Department of Applied Mathematics, Computer Science and Statistics, Krijgslaan 281 (S9), 9000 Gent, Belgium e University of Washington Tacoma – Center for Web and Data Science, 1900 Commerce Street, Tacoma, WA 98402-3100, USA Received 12 February 2014; received in revised form 30 September 2014; accepted 26 February 2015 Abstract Autoepistemic logic is an important formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning originally intended to model an ideal rational agent reflecting upon his own beliefs. Fuzzy autoepistemic logic is a generalization of autoepistemic logic that allows to represent an agent’s rational beliefs on gradable propositions. It has recently been shown that, in the same way as autoepistemic logic generalizes answer set programming, fuzzy autoepistemic logic generalizes fuzzy answer set programming as well. Besides being related to answer set programming, autoepistemic logic is also closely related to several modal logics. To investigate whether a similar relationship holds in a fuzzy logical setting, we firstly generalize the main modal logics for belief to the setting of finitely-valued c Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants Łk, and secondly we relate them with fuzzy autoepistemic logics.
    [Show full text]
  • Consequence and Degrees of Truth in Many-Valued Logic
    Consequence and degrees of truth in many-valued logic Josep Maria Font Published as Chapter 6 (pp. 117–142) of: Peter Hájek on Mathematical Fuzzy Logic (F. Montagna, ed.) vol. 6 of Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Springer-Verlag, 2015 Abstract I argue that the definition of a logic by preservation of all degrees of truth is a better rendering of Bolzano’s idea of consequence as truth- preserving when “truth comes in degrees”, as is often said in many-valued contexts, than the usual scheme that preserves only one truth value. I review some results recently obtained in the investigation of this proposal by applying techniques of abstract algebraic logic in the framework of Łukasiewicz logics and in the broader framework of substructural logics, that is, logics defined by varieties of (commutative and integral) residuated lattices. I also review some scattered, early results, which have appeared since the 1970’s, and make some proposals for further research. Keywords: many-valued logic, mathematical fuzzy logic, truth val- ues, truth degrees, logics preserving degrees of truth, residuated lattices, substructural logics, abstract algebraic logic, Leibniz hierarchy, Frege hierarchy. Contents 6.1 Introduction .............................2 6.2 Some motivation and some history ...............3 6.3 The Łukasiewicz case ........................8 6.4 Widening the scope: fuzzy and substructural logics ....9 6.5 Abstract algebraic logic classification ............. 12 6.6 The Deduction Theorem ..................... 16 6.7 Axiomatizations ........................... 18 6.7.1 In the Gentzen style . 18 6.7.2 In the Hilbert style . 19 6.8 Conclusions .............................. 21 References .................................. 23 1 6.1 Introduction Let me begin by calling your attention to one of the main points made by Petr Hájek in the introductory, vindicating section of his influential book [34] (the italics are his): «Logic studies the notion(s) of consequence.
    [Show full text]
  • A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic. Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability and Statistics
    FLORENTIN SMARANDACHE A UNIFYING FIELD IN LOGICS: NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC. NEUTROSOPHY, NEUTROSOPHIC SET, NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS (fourth edition) NL(A1 A2) = ( T1 ({1}T2) T2 ({1}T1) T1T2 ({1}T1) ({1}T2), I1 ({1}I2) I2 ({1}I1) I1 I2 ({1}I1) ({1} I2), F1 ({1}F2) F2 ({1} F1) F1 F2 ({1}F1) ({1}F2) ). NL(A1 A2) = ( {1}T1T1T2, {1}I1I1I2, {1}F1F1F2 ). NL(A1 A2) = ( ({1}T1T1T2) ({1}T2T1T2), ({1} I1 I1 I2) ({1}I2 I1 I2), ({1}F1F1 F2) ({1}F2F1 F2) ). ISBN 978-1-59973-080-6 American Research Press Rehoboth 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005 FLORENTIN SMARANDACHE A UNIFYING FIELD IN LOGICS: NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC. NEUTROSOPHY, NEUTROSOPHIC SET, NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS (fourth edition) NL(A1 A2) = ( T1 ({1}T2) T2 ({1}T1) T1T2 ({1}T1) ({1}T2), I1 ({1}I2) I2 ({1}I1) I1 I2 ({1}I1) ({1} I2), F1 ({1}F2) F2 ({1} F1) F1 F2 ({1}F1) ({1}F2) ). NL(A1 A2) = ( {1}T1T1T2, {1}I1I1I2, {1}F1F1F2 ). NL(A1 A2) = ( ({1}T1T1T2) ({1}T2T1T2), ({1} I1 I1 I2) ({1}I2 I1 I2), ({1}F1F1 F2) ({1}F2F1 F2) ). ISBN 978-1-59973-080-6 American Research Press Rehoboth 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005 1 Contents: Preface by C. Le: 3 0. Introduction: 9 1. Neutrosophy - a new branch of philosophy: 15 2. Neutrosophic Logic - a unifying field in logics: 90 3. Neutrosophic Set - a unifying field in sets: 125 4. Neutrosophic Probability - a generalization of classical and imprecise probabilities - and Neutrosophic Statistics: 129 5. Addenda: Definitions derived from Neutrosophics: 133 2 Preface to Neutrosophy and Neutrosophic Logic by C.
    [Show full text]
  • Reading T. S. Eliot Reading Spinoza
    READING T. S. ELIOT READING SPINOZA A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Yoshiaki Mihara January 2013 © 2013 Yoshiaki Mihara READING T. S. ELIOT READING SPINOZA Yoshiaki Mihara, Ph. D. Cornell University 2013 “[The ordinary man] falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other” – a good reader of T. S. Eliot’s criticism probably knows this famous passage; a good researcher on Eliot’s apprenticeship in philosophy perhaps knows that he did actually read Spinoza; and yet, in the current Eliot studies, reading Eliot and reading Spinoza seem to have nothing to do with each other. In this dissertation, I attempt to reconstruct Eliot’s reading of Spinoza as faithfully and comprehensively as possible, by closely analyzing the marginalia in Eliot’s copy of Spinoza’s Opera, housed in the Archive Centre of King’s College, Cambridge. At the same time, the Spinozist context for Eliot’s apprenticeship at Harvard and Oxford (with the intermission of “a romantic year” in Paris) is also to be presented, which is, in fact, a glaring absence in the philosophical branch of Eliot studies. In addition to these positivistic contributions, I also take a theoretical approach so as to demonstrate how illuminative Eliot’s reading of Spinoza can be for understanding the characteristic style (or “ethology”) of Eliot’s reading in general (i.e., Theory), by way of extensively analyzing the unpublished as well as published materials of Eliot’s “academic philosophizing” that culminated in his doctoral dissertation on F.
    [Show full text]
  • Modality and Factivity: One Perspective on the Meaning of the English Modal Auxiliaries
    MODALITY AND FACTIVITY: ONE PERSPECTIVE ON THE MEANING OF THE ENGLISH MODAL AUXILIARIES by NICOLA M,BREWER Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of PhD The University of Leeds Department of Linguistics and Phonetics December 1987 ii ABSTRACT This study concentrates on modality as expressed by the set of modal auxiliaries and seeks to establish that these verbs share semantic as well as syntactic properties by identifying a single core meaning which they share. The relationship between modality and factivity is examined with the aim of gaining an insight into the former, more complex concept. When viewed from this perspective, the defining characteristic of all the modal auxiliary verbs in almost all of their uses is found to be nonfactivity. The meanings expressed by this set of verbs are classified according to a framework derived from modal logic consisting of three basic types of modality each of which relates to a different set of laws or principles; the relative factivity associated with the modal auxiliaries is seen to vary with the nature of modality as defined and classified by this framework. Within each of the three types of modality, a semantic scale is identified and modality is described as a gradable concept for which scalar analysis is appropriate, both within and beyond these three scales. Relative factivity is also shown to vary according to the degree of modality expressed by each of the modal verbs. The nature and degree of modality expressed interact with features of the linguistic (and pragmatic) context to determine the particular factive or a contrafactive interpretation conveyed by a given modal auxiliary token.
    [Show full text]
  • Gupta Comment
    Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience” The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Byrne, Alex et al. "Discussion of Anil Gupta's “Outline of an Account of Experience”." Analytic Philosophy 59, 1 (March 2018): 75-88 © 1999-2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. As Published http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12121 Publisher Wiley Version Author's final manuscript Citable link https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/123434 Terms of Use Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike Detailed Terms http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Comments on Gupta Alex Byrne 1. Transitions Fundamental to Gupta’s picture is the idea of a “rational transition”. The role of experience, he thinks, “is not to provide the subject knowledge of anything or to bestow a rational or justificatory status on…beliefs or judgments”, but to “render rational certain transitions, including transitions from views to judgments”. His central non-perceptual example of a rational transition involves modus-ponens reasoning from the two premises, B and if B then C, to the conclusion C. And that does indeed seem to be rational or reasonable, in some sense of these elastic terms. Something is going right if someone reasons in this way—at least it’s better than affirming the consequent. Since valid reasoning, as Gupta emphasizes, implies nothing about whether the premises are true, or justifiably believed, or known, this example might seem to suggest that the rationality of transitions and the rationality of beliefs are quite different matters.
    [Show full text]
  • M.A. Philosophy Programme Is a Two Year Course Divided Into Four-Semester
    UNIVERSITY OF DELHI MASTER OF ARTS (Acronym for the Course) (Effective from Academic year 2018-19) PROGRAMME BROCHURE (M.A.) Department of Philosophy Faculty of Arts University of Delhi Delhi-110007 2 University of Delhi Examination Branch Date: 18 June 2018 Courses: M. A. in Philosophy Check List of new Course evaluation for AC Consideration S.No. Parameters Status 1. About the Department 2 Introduction to CBCS 3. Programme Structure 4. Codification of Papers 5. Scheme of Examinations 6. Pass Percentage 7. Promotion Criteria 8. Division Criteria 9. Qualifying Papers 10. Span Period 11. Attendance Requirements 12. Course content for each Paper 13. List of Readings 2 3 I ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT Faculty of Arts, North Campus, Delhi University The History and Profile of the Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi. Located in the heart of the main Humanities Block of the Arts Faculty, North Cam- pus, facing an inner quadrangle garden, the Department of Philosophy is one of the oldest in the University of Delhi. This building constructed in the early part of the twentieth century is well known for its red brick colonial structure. This Department began as a combined Department of Philosophy and Psychology in the year 1953. The Department of Psychology became independent in 1962. Since then the Department of Philosophy is an Autonomous Department. Various distinguished scholars who have either taught or been associated with the Department of Philosophy, Delhi University include N.V. Banerjee, S.S Barlingay, R. C. Pandeya, Margaret Chatterjee, S.K. Saxena, Ram Chandra Gandhi and Mrinal Miri. A large number of eminent philosophers from India and abroad have lectured in the De- partment.
    [Show full text]