Repatriation to Turkey's “Safe Zone” in Northeast Syria

NO. 1 JANUARY 2020 Introduction

Repatriation to Turkey’s “Safe Zone” in Northeast Syria Ankara’s Goals and European Concerns Sinem Adar

Following the US decision to withdraw troops from Northeast Syria and upon sepa- rate agreements with the US and Russia, Ankara established what it calls a safe zone in the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. Even if spanning a smaller territory than envisaged, Turkey aims with its safe zone to impede Kurdish autonomy in North- ern Syria, on the one hand, and to return refugees who have increasingly become a domestic policy challenge for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP there- after), on the other hand. Turkey’s plan for repatriation signals that its interests align with European interests in refugee return. Given concerns about the safety of refugees, voluntary nature of return, and Ankara’s attempts at demographic engineering, Europeans should not support a Turkey-led repatriation to Syria without conditions.

Since the eruption of the Syrian war in fight against IS, and later, the involvement 2011, Turkey has been adamantly advocat- of Russia in 2015 in favour of the Assad ing for the establishment of a “safe zone” in regime, Turkey’s priorities in establishing a Northern Syria. Its motivations have, how- safe zone increasingly moved towards ever, changed over time in line with its impeding a strong YPG/PYD presence in political priorities. Between 2011 and 2014, Northern Syria. The aim to curtail YPG/PYD Ankara’s main concern in pushing for a became even more severe as YPG advances safe zone in Northern Syria (including a no- between 2014 and 2016 led to the founda- fly zone) was to topple Assad regime, and tion of the so-called self-administration relatedly, to create a safe haven for its cantons in Afrin, Al-Jazeera, and Kobani preferred anti-Assad rebels. The proposal (Ayn al-Arab). This together with the col- remained during this time a matter of dis- lapse of the Peace Process in Turkey and agreement between Turkey and the US. the renewal of the civil war with the PKK Upon the US decision in 2014 to cooperate in 2015 turned Northern Syria, for Turkey, with the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the into a security threat. military wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) – an offshoot of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) – in the

Humanitarian narratives refugees in the areas of education, health, security, shelter and food supply. Despite its shifting motivations in establish- Ankara has since then increasingly con- ing a safe zone, Ankara has been consistent tinued to play the refugee card towards two in cloaking its political ambitions under a ends. The first has been the exclusion of humanitarian cover. In the early years of YPG/PYD from the political process in Syria, the war, Turkey argued that a safe zone in which has since 2017 been primarily shaped Northern Syria would help settling inter- via the Astana talks led by Russia, Iran and nally displaced people. Reaching the limits Turkey. For instance, then Prime Minister of its institutional capacity to accommodate Binali Yıldırım suggested in November a high number of Syrian refugees that 2017 during his visit to London that Turkey amounted to around 1.5 million by the end could renege on the EU-Turkey Statement if of 2014, Ankara earlier in March 2015 Kurdish forces in Syria were given a role in partially closed the Syrian border, moving the UN-sponsored peace talks. Secondly, away from its open-door policy that had refugees were also increasingly instrumen- been in implementation since the eruption talized by Turkey to gain international of the war. It also launched a 764-kilo- support for its reconstruction efforts in meters concrete wall project alongside its Northern Syria. Speaking in early Septem- 911-kilometers long Syrian border. In the ber 2019 at a meeting of the AKP’s pro- wake of the death of the three-year-old vincial heads, Turkey’s president Recep Syrian boy Aylan Kurdi in the Aegean Sea, Tayyip Erdoğan threatened to reopen a then Prime Minister Ahmed Davutoglu route for Syrian refugees to enter Europe if criticized the international community in a the EU did not provide adequate logistical speech he delivered on September 4 2015 in and financial support to restructure the Ankara at a B20 (an integral part of the G20 proposed safe zone for refugee return. process representing the business community) meeting for turning a blind eye to Turkey’s earlier calls for the establishment Particular features of Turkey’s of a safe zone, and asked for cooperation safe zone proposal towards humanitarian ends. Amid the high number of refugees trying Neither conflating humanitarian action to reach Europe in the fall of 2015 via the with political strategy in establishing a safe Aegean Sea and the human catastrophe zone nor repatriation attempt is unique to that ensued, Turkey and Europe agreed on Turkey. Both of these practices have in fact the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 been common since the 1990s. Historical (preceded by the Joint Action Plan in examples such as Rwanda and Northern November 2015), outlining the details of Iraq demonstrate that the establishment of their co-operation over migration control such zones often involved the overriding and border security. According to the State- of states’ military and strategic interests ment, Turkey agreed to prevent irregular over humanitarian goals. There is, however, migration to Europe, and for every Syrian something particular in Turkey’s proposal, refugee returned from Greece to Turkey, a especially since its first direct military in- Syrian refugee in Turkey would be resettled cursion in 2016 into Northern Syria. Con- in Europe. In return, the EU agreed to grant trary to previous cases elsewhere, Turkey’s visa liberalization for Turkish citizens current efforts do not intend to offer urgent under a number of preconditions including and temporary humanitarian relief to civil- complying with the EU’s data protection ians trapped in conflict. For instance, a safe and antiterrorism laws; renewing accession zone was established in Northern Iraq upon talks; new negotiations on the customs a joint initiative by Britain, France, and the union; and financial aid amounting to 3+3 US, citing UN Security Council Resolution billion euros to address the urgent needs of 688, because Turkey closed its Iraqi border

SWP Comment 1 January 2020

2 in 1991 to prevent the entry of Iraqi Kurds under that of the Syrian regime. In the case fleeing the war. Similarly, the French mili- of the latter, existing practices of political tary, authorized by the UN Security Council suppression by the Assad regime over re- Resolution 929, intervened in 1995 to carve turnees is perturbing. Thirdly, supposedly out a safe zone to protect the Tutsis and voluntary nature of the return is also prevent a rapid influx of people into Zaire subject to suspicion. Even though Turkish (now known as the Democratic Republic of authorities have expressed their commit- the Congo). Unlike these earlier cases, Tur- ment to the voluntary return of the refu- key’s efforts to build a so-called safe zone in gees, humanitarian organizations claim Northern Syria are based on the assumption that Turkey has been deporting refugees of permanent refugee return from Turkey. to Syria on illegal grounds. In this respect, Ankara’s plan to build in Today approximately 3.6 million Syrian Northern Syria cities and towns with com- refugees live in Turkey under temporary plete infrastructure including hospitals, protection status. Amidst the deepening schools, mosques, homes, other facilities, economic crisis, hostilities within Turkish and even plots of land to be distributed to society against Syrians have been on the the returnees gives its repatriation efforts a rise, forcing the ruling AKP to move away distinct character. The initial Turkish draft from its earlier policies of hospitality. Not plan for a reconstruction project, which too long after the re-run of the Istanbul Mr. Erdoğan announced during his visit at municipal elections in 23 June 2019, for the UN General Assembly in September instance, Süleyman Soylu, the Minister of 2019, to settle around one million Syrian Interior, announced that those Syrian refu- refugees in a safe zone with a length of 480 gees with temporary protection status who kilometres would cost around 151 billion were registered in other Turkish districts Turkish liras (24 billion Euros). According had to leave Istanbul by 30 October back to to the agreement reached by Turkey and the provinces in which they were regis- Russia in Sochi on October 22, Ankara now tered, and those without papers were to be plans to resettle refugees, the exact number transferred to temporary refugee camps in of which is unknown, in the 120 km-long order to be registered. Syrian refugees are strips of land controlled by Turkey and its reportedly forced to sign declarations of proxies between the towns of Ras al-Ayn “voluntary” departure and face deportation and Tal Abyad. Article 8 of the agreement to Syria under inhumane conditions, in- envisages Turkey and Russia to jointly cluding refusal of food. According to the launch efforts to facilitate safe and volun- UNHCR statistics, there has been a total of tary return of refugees. 50,422 self-organized refugee returns to Syria from Turkey during 2016–2018. In addition to the doubts about safety Safety, voluntariness and and voluntariness, Northern Syria’s demo- demographic engineering graphic composition is another issue for concern. For Ankara, a safe zone to resettle There is however enough to be worried refugees seems to be synonymous with about a Turkey-led repatriation. Firstly, creating an “ethnic belt” in order to contain allegations of human rights violations by a strong YPG/PYD presence at its Syrian Turkish proxies, and potential future con- border. Even though Turkish authorities flict between the Turkish army and Kurdish and pro-government think tanks argue that forces cast doubt in the short-term on the Turkey does not have any nation-building security of such a zone under Turkish ambitions in Northern Syria, existing control. Safety remains a concern in the evidence about the governance practices in medium-term as well given that it is un- Turkey-controlled areas such as Jarablus, clear at the moment whether the zone will Al-Bab and Afrin raise suspicion. Four types remain under the control of Turkey or fall of activity seem to dominate Turkey’s

SWP Comment 1 January 2020

3 governance practices in these areas: i) the being unclear. Moreover, Assad regime formation of an Ankara-aligned political seems determined to punish returnees elite composed of Arabs, Turkmens, and whom it perceives as disloyal or threats to anti-PYD Kurdish factions, ii) unequal its survival. Under these circumstances, EU political representation at the local coun- should continue investing in strengthening cils, iii) demographic engineering efforts social and economic participation of refu- particularly via settling Arabs and Turk- gees in Turkey. To ensure an effective and mens, and last, but not least, iv) setting up efficient implementation of this goal, local social and bureaucratic infrastructure, in- actors such as municipalities and NGOs cluding even issuing ID cards to residents. should be supported especially in areas of © Stiftung Wissenschaft These existing practices invoke serious education and labour market participation. und Politik, 2020 questions, in the case of a Turkey-led re- Continuing its financial and logistical All rights reserved patriation to the area between Tal Abyad support for social and economic participa- and Ras al-Ayn, about who would return tion of refugees in Turkey could increase This Comment reflects where, and by whom and how the process EU’s leverage given Ankara’s recent warn- the author’s views. would be overseen so that at the minimum ings to terminate the EU-Turkey Statement The online version of safety of returnees and voluntariness of the due to the current situation in Idlib. It is this publication contains return are ensured. The Ministers of Foreign important that the EU firmly implement functioning links to other Affairs of Iran, Russia, and Turkey stressed political conditionality and remind Turkey SWP texts and other relevant in their joint statement issued on 29 Octo- that the continuation of the Statement is sources. ber 2019 that refugees would return volun- dependent on Turkey’s commitment to the SWP Comments are subject tarily to their original places of residence in non-refoulement principle under internation- to internal peer review, fact- Syria. Given its political aspirations for al law. To this end, the EU should consider checking and copy-editing. demographic and social engineering, how- taking an active role in supporting coopera- For further information on ever, to what extent Turkey will keep its tion with UNHCR and human rights organi- our quality control pro- promise remains ambiguous. zations in monitoring the deportation al- cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- legations against Turkey. berlin.org/en/about-swp/ Relatedly, a coordinated European politi- quality-management-for- Challenges and options for the EU cal engagement with Turkey should also swp-publications/ continue to prevent repatriation from be- Turkey’s pressure on the EU for financial coming demographic engineering in the SWP contribution to resettle refugees in a Tur- medium-term. This is, however, not an easy Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik key-controlled safe zone will continue as task given the diverging interests and German Institute for the recent statements from Ankara demon- understandings of Turkey and the EU about International and strate. Given the changing dynamics on the refugee return and reconstruction. The EU Security Affairs ground especially after Turkey’s October should insist on safeguards to ensure that 2019 military assault, Europe should con- Turkey (and Russia) fulfil their joint com- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin sider leveraging its financial, logistical and mitment to voluntary return to original Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 diplomatic support to Turkey to ensure that places of residence. These include involving Fax +49 30 880 07-100 repatriation happens on the basis of rights UNHCR to monitor the safety of people www.swp-berlin.org and protection. This, first and foremost, once they have returned, and to ensure that [email protected] means, especially for the short term, that they return to their places of origin. EU should not support a Turkey-led refugee ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2020C01 return to Syria. Even if the political climate in Turkey but also in Europe appears to be favourable to the idea of refugee return, Northern Syria remains fragile and conflict- ridden, with mid- to long-term perspective

Dr Sinem Adar is an Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP.

The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SWP Comment 1

January 2020