Prisoner and War Negotiations
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292 PRISONER AND WAR NEGOTIATIONS: THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE AND LESSON Harry P. Ball INTRODUCTION \\ hile ca~lIalti('s arc hein~ suffered on the halllcfield, and mcn c()ntinu(! to . From April through September of languish in prisoner-of-war camps. We 1953, over 3,700 Americans were re must learn from the experience of leased to U.S. control from the pris Korea. lL is hoped that this papcr will oner-of-war camps in North Korea. contribute to that learning. Its pur Today several hundred Americans are pose is simply to draw upon our ex estimated to he held prisoner in North perience in both negotiating for the Vietnam and in the jungle strongholds repatriation of prisoners of war ancl of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. in administering prisoners of war in As will be demonstrated, the fate of Korea. Lessons wiII be sought that these prisoners will depend, as did have application to negotiations over the fate of those in Korea, on the out prisoners of war in Vietnam. come of negotiations. To ~atisf)' this purpose requires, The United States lIJust be prepan-d first. a hrit'f (,oll1pari~nJl of the pnlitical fllr thl's(' nl'~otiations. It ~hould Ilot arlll military situatioJl ill 1\.111"(-:\ ill again allow talks to dra~ on for 2 1951-5:~ with that in Vietnam ill )%B years, serving COlllmunist purpos('~, ill order to appreciate the similarities 293 and dilTen'nces of Ihe Iwo l'ellin~s. nlllnil't prisons (If j\ lIwriean soldi('rs, Our purpose Ihen ill\·olves the accom sailors, and airmen. As in Korea, the plishment of Ihree lasks. The first is Unilcd Stales has chosen to limit its to make a detailed study of Ihe Korean application of military power. F ur prisoner-of-war negotiations with Ihe ther, it proposes to bring an end to object of isolating mistakes that were the fighting. through negotiations. made and delermining whether the There is no assurance that negotia agreement finally reached will have an tions will be the method through which impact on Vietnam negotiations. The the fighting in Vietnam is brought to second is an examination of the cur a close. Combat could quite logically rent prisoner-oC-war situation on bOlh gradually decrease in intensity, as did sides in Vietnam and its possible in the guerrilla war in Greece in 19-1-8, fluence on negotiations. The third and until the war is simply no longer being final task is to recommend procedures fought.:! But Ihe United States has a and courses of action that, if astutely solemn obligation to its captured per implemented, will assist our negotia sonnel. Their repatriation can only tors in insuring the early ~epatriation be accomplished through negotiation of American prisoners of war. with those that hold them. The alter native to negotiating their release is to abandon them. I - KOREA AND VIETNAM: It does not follow, of course, that A COMPARISON these negotiations will necessarily be of the same format and protocol as Thc RC(IUiremcnt for Ncgotia those in Korea. Possible forms of these tions in Vietnam. On 27 July 1953 negotiations range from a full-blown the commander of the United Nations international conference, where the ex Command in Korea,l the commander change of prisoners of war is but one of tl\(' [Norlh] Korean People's Army, agenda ilem, to quiet dialog in a and Ihe commander of the Chinese neulral country, or mere clandestine People's Volunteer Army signed Ihe meetings in a jungle clearing. They mililary armistice bringing a cease-fire could also be conducted by third par to Ihe Korean war. This cloGumcnt lies rcprescnlinp; onc or bOlh sides. was Ihe rl'5ull of 2 p'ars of n("~olia Bill IdJaI("vI~r form III(' 1II·~oliali()IIS tions between representatives of the lake, they wiH be a reflcction of,the polit commanders on each side. It ended ical and military situation in Vietnam the first conflict since 1812 in which at the time. Accordingly, the applica the mililary situation did not allow tion of the Korean negotiating experi the United States either to force con ence to Vietnam depends upon the com cessions or dictate terms. The last 1·1- parability of the two settings. months of the negotiations were ("011- cm·ned wilh the only unresolved issue Similarities. Both conflicts between the two parties: the repatria stemmed from a confrontation between tion of prisoners of war. Communist expansion into the periph At this writing, just short of 15 ery of Asia and the U.S. determination years after the signing of the Korean to contain that expansion. Both re armislice, U.S. forces are again locked yolve around a single nalion which in comhal wilh a c'olllnlllllist 1'1\(,1ll)" jwcall\(' Iwo slales dil'idl,t! hy a lilH', on an Asian peninsula. On(·e a~aill lIlt' :lBlh paralld ill Kon'a, Ilw 171h ill the misforlunes of war have resuilrc! Vielnam, which oslensibly was 10 haye in Ihe caplure anc! confinelllent in Com- been temporary. In e;ch case Ihe 294 ComllluJlist-<:oJltrollcd Jlorth_ honh'riJl~ While stall'nlatl' does not ,w('uralt,l) on Communist China, attempted to describe either the situation in Korea seize the southern portion through the at the time armistice negotiatioJls he· use of force. In Korea the seizure was gan or the situation in Vietnam toda) , attempted through invasion hy con the two situations can be depicted as ventional forces supported to a de ones in which victory in a military gree hy a guerrilla force, in Vietnam sense cannot be quickly achieved by through armed insurgency and guer either side with the force levels de rilla warfare supported to a degree by ployed. In Korea a realistic estimate com'entional military formations infil of the military situation led the Com trated into the south. Communist ob munists to propose truce talks - a pro jectives were identical in hoth in posal accepted eagerly by the United stances: to unify the nation hy force States. In Vietnam the Communist under a Communist regime. estimate has not yet led them to a In each case the U.S.-supported similar conclusion. forces in the south pro\-ed to be inade In the meantime, hattles in Vietnam quate to the task of defense. Ameri have resulted in over 6,000 Commu can armed forces were intr<~d.!lced at nists being interned in prisoner-of-war the last moment, just in time to save camps in the south:! as were 169,000 Pusan in 1950, just in time to save Comll1unists at the time of the Korean Saigon in 1965. The American mili negotiations.4 As of August 1967 there tary commitment took similar forms; were approximately 650 American piecemeal introduction of ground military personnel who were classified forces to secure critical areas in the as either missing or as prisoners of south, coupled with an air campai~n war in North'and South Vietnam. The against the 'north, with all military Unitefl States believed that :;ome 200 action heing limited to the geographical of these men were being held as pris area of the contested nation. Limited oners of war. Also held as prisoners as the commitment was in each case, of war were an unknown number of military initiative ultimately passed to _soldiers of the Army of the Republic the U.S. forces. Intervention occurred of Vietnam (ARVN).r. This compares at just that time when the Communists to ;~,746 American, 8,:'.21 personn('1 of must IUH'e begun to think of yie!ory the Ht'Jluhlic of Korl'a A nlly (HOKA). parades. and 1,377 personnel from other na The Communist reaction to Ameri tional contingents of the United Nations can intervention was similar in both Commallfl who were held in North events. To salvage the situation in Korea.r. While the weight of prisoners Korea, major formations of the Chinese on both sides is smaller, a larger num Communist Army were committed. In ber is again held hy the side allied with an attempt to regain the initiative in the United Slates. Vietnam, major formations of the The U.S. Government cannot turn North Vietnamese Army entered the its hack on the Americans in enemy struggle. Communist military suc hands. It is ohlil!ated by the funda cesses, at first relatively cheap, had mental heliefs underlying the American been made extremely expensive. Pros political system to do all it can to peets of a('hie\'ing their ohjeetin' obtain th(, release of its citizt'n!'. Till' throu~h military action dimllled. Vi,· Coil" of Contluct pronllllgall'tl in I (I;';' tl)ry. OIH"l' appearing hut Illonths pr for Ihl' guitlance of U.S. l;l'r\"i('('1l1l'1l weeks away, receded into the future, made e\-cn more explicit this ohli~atioJ\ if possible at all. of the U.S. Go\'ernment.; 295 The code formally illlpO~CS ohli~a c\'ents in Europe or e1~ewhcre on the tions on the individual members of the international scene. J Lwould be equally Armed Forces of the United States, unrealistic to ~ely on American adions but it is the last sentence of the last outside of Asia innuencing events in article which is pertinent to this paper_. Vietnam. The leverage of hoth the It reads, "I will trust in my God and United States and the U.S.S.R. is there the United States of America." The fore considerably reduced in Vietnam Department of Defense has stated in as compared to Korea.