292
PRISONER AND WAR NEGOTIATIONS:
THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE AND LESSON
Harry P. Ball
INTRODUCTION \\ hile ca~lIalti('s arc hein~ suffered on the halllcfield, and mcn c()ntinu(! to . From April through September of languish in prisoner-of-war camps. We 1953, over 3,700 Americans were re must learn from the experience of leased to U.S. control from the pris Korea. lL is hoped that this papcr will oner-of-war camps in North Korea. contribute to that learning. Its pur Today several hundred Americans are pose is simply to draw upon our ex estimated to he held prisoner in North perience in both negotiating for the Vietnam and in the jungle strongholds repatriation of prisoners of war ancl of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. in administering prisoners of war in As will be demonstrated, the fate of Korea. Lessons wiII be sought that these prisoners will depend, as did have application to negotiations over the fate of those in Korea, on the out prisoners of war in Vietnam. come of negotiations. To ~atisf)' this purpose requires, The United States lIJust be prepan-d first. a hrit'f (,oll1pari~nJl of the pnlitical fllr thl's(' nl'~otiations. It ~hould Ilot arlll military situatioJl ill 1\.111"(-:\ ill again allow talks to dra~ on for 2 1951-5:~ with that in Vietnam ill )%B years, serving COlllmunist purpos('~, ill order to appreciate the similarities 293 and dilTen'nces of Ihe Iwo l'ellin~s. nlllnil't prisons (If j\ lIwriean soldi('rs, Our purpose Ihen ill\·olves the accom sailors, and airmen. As in Korea, the plishment of Ihree lasks. The first is Unilcd Stales has chosen to limit its to make a detailed study of Ihe Korean application of military power. F ur prisoner-of-war negotiations with Ihe ther, it proposes to bring an end to object of isolating mistakes that were the fighting. through negotiations. made and delermining whether the There is no assurance that negotia agreement finally reached will have an tions will be the method through which impact on Vietnam negotiations. The the fighting in Vietnam is brought to second is an examination of the cur a close. Combat could quite logically rent prisoner-oC-war situation on bOlh gradually decrease in intensity, as did sides in Vietnam and its possible in the guerrilla war in Greece in 19-1-8, fluence on negotiations. The third and until the war is simply no longer being final task is to recommend procedures fought.:! But Ihe United States has a and courses of action that, if astutely solemn obligation to its captured per implemented, will assist our negotia sonnel. Their repatriation can only tors in insuring the early ~epatriation be accomplished through negotiation of American prisoners of war. with those that hold them. The alter native to negotiating their release is to abandon them. I - KOREA AND VIETNAM: It does not follow, of course, that A COMPARISON these negotiations will necessarily be of the same format and protocol as Thc RC(IUiremcnt for Ncgotia those in Korea. Possible forms of these tions in Vietnam. On 27 July 1953 negotiations range from a full-blown the commander of the United Nations international conference, where the ex Command in Korea,l the commander change of prisoners of war is but one of tl\(' [Norlh] Korean People's Army, agenda ilem, to quiet dialog in a and Ihe commander of the Chinese neulral country, or mere clandestine People's Volunteer Army signed Ihe meetings in a jungle clearing. They mililary armistice bringing a cease-fire could also be conducted by third par to Ihe Korean war. This cloGumcnt lies rcprescnlinp; onc or bOlh sides. was Ihe rl'5ull of 2 p'ars of n("~olia Bill IdJaI("vI~r form III(' 1II·~oliali()IIS tions between representatives of the lake, they wiH be a reflcction of,the polit commanders on each side. It ended ical and military situation in Vietnam the first conflict since 1812 in which at the time. Accordingly, the applica the mililary situation did not allow tion of the Korean negotiating experi the United States either to force con ence to Vietnam depends upon the com cessions or dictate terms. The last 1·1- parability of the two settings. months of the negotiations were ("011- cm·ned wilh the only unresolved issue Similarities. Both conflicts between the two parties: the repatria stemmed from a confrontation between tion of prisoners of war. Communist expansion into the periph At this writing, just short of 15 ery of Asia and the U.S. determination years after the signing of the Korean to contain that expansion. Both re armislice, U.S. forces are again locked yolve around a single nalion which in comhal wilh a c'olllnlllllist 1'1\(,1ll)" jwcall\(' Iwo slales dil'idl,t! hy a lilH', on an Asian peninsula. On(·e a~aill lIlt' :lBlh paralld ill Kon'a, Ilw 171h ill the misforlunes of war have resuilrc! Vielnam, which oslensibly was 10 haye in Ihe caplure anc! confinelllent in Com- been temporary. In e;ch case Ihe 294
ComllluJlist-<:oJltrollcd Jlorth_ honh'riJl~ While stall'nlatl' does not ,w('uralt,l) on Communist China, attempted to describe either the situation in Korea seize the southern portion through the at the time armistice negotiatioJls he· use of force. In Korea the seizure was gan or the situation in Vietnam toda) , attempted through invasion hy con the two situations can be depicted as ventional forces supported to a de ones in which victory in a military gree hy a guerrilla force, in Vietnam sense cannot be quickly achieved by through armed insurgency and guer either side with the force levels de rilla warfare supported to a degree by ployed. In Korea a realistic estimate com'entional military formations infil of the military situation led the Com trated into the south. Communist ob munists to propose truce talks - a pro jectives were identical in hoth in posal accepted eagerly by the United stances: to unify the nation hy force States. In Vietnam the Communist under a Communist regime. estimate has not yet led them to a In each case the U.S.-supported similar conclusion. forces in the south pro\-ed to be inade In the meantime, hattles in Vietnam quate to the task of defense. Ameri have resulted in over 6,000 Commu can armed forces were intr<~d.!lced at nists being interned in prisoner-of-war the last moment, just in time to save camps in the south:! as were 169,000 Pusan in 1950, just in time to save Comll1unists at the time of the Korean Saigon in 1965. The American mili negotiations.4 As of August 1967 there tary commitment took similar forms; were approximately 650 American piecemeal introduction of ground military personnel who were classified forces to secure critical areas in the as either missing or as prisoners of south, coupled with an air campai~n war in North'and South Vietnam. The against the 'north, with all military Unitefl States believed that :;ome 200 action heing limited to the geographical of these men were being held as pris area of the contested nation. Limited oners of war. Also held as prisoners as the commitment was in each case, of war were an unknown number of military initiative ultimately passed to _soldiers of the Army of the Republic the U.S. forces. Intervention occurred of Vietnam (ARVN).r. This compares at just that time when the Communists to ;~,746 American, 8,:'.21 personn('1 of must IUH'e begun to think of yie!ory the Ht'Jluhlic of Korl'a A nlly (HOKA). parades. and 1,377 personnel from other na The Communist reaction to Ameri tional contingents of the United Nations can intervention was similar in both Commallfl who were held in North events. To salvage the situation in Korea.r. While the weight of prisoners Korea, major formations of the Chinese on both sides is smaller, a larger num Communist Army were committed. In ber is again held hy the side allied with an attempt to regain the initiative in the United Slates. Vietnam, major formations of the The U.S. Government cannot turn North Vietnamese Army entered the its hack on the Americans in enemy struggle. Communist military suc hands. It is ohlil!ated by the funda cesses, at first relatively cheap, had mental heliefs underlying the American been made extremely expensive. Pros political system to do all it can to peets of a('hie\'ing their ohjeetin' obtain th(, release of its citizt'n!'. Till' throu~h military action dimllled. Vi,· Coil" of Contluct pronllllgall'tl in I (I;';' tl)ry. OIH"l' appearing hut Illonths pr for Ihl' guitlance of U.S. l;l'r\"i('('1l1l'1l weeks away, receded into the future, made e\-cn more explicit this ohli~atioJ\ if possible at all. of the U.S. Go\'ernment.; 295
The code formally illlpO~CS ohli~a c\'ents in Europe or e1~ewhcre on the tions on the individual members of the international scene. J Lwould be equally Armed Forces of the United States, unrealistic to ~ely on American adions but it is the last sentence of the last outside of Asia innuencing events in article which is pertinent to this paper_. Vietnam. The leverage of hoth the It reads, "I will trust in my God and United States and the U.S.S.R. is there the United States of America." The fore considerably reduced in Vietnam Department of Defense has stated in as compared to Korea. its training instructions, As in Korea, the Communists in Vietnam find it advantageous to cam Ju~t as you ha\"l' a Tc!'pon!'ihility 10 ounage the identity of their partici your country under the Code of Con pants in the fighting. In the Korean duct, the Unitl'd Slatcs Govcrnnwnl hag ca~e the Comlllunists profcsscd that a matchin~ rr!'pou~ihilily - alway~ In North Korea was their only bclligercnt, !'Iand hrhind c\'cry Amcrican fi~hlin~ man. An individual unfol'luna\(' ('Il
thm India. trl'atnll'nt theH~ relllrnl'Cs had n'("('i\'ed Phase V ( February-J uly ] 95:{ ) : at the hands of thl' Communists.:! The Agreement reached_ Sick and wounded hUlllanitarian aspect of the UNC posi prisoners exchan~ed. Armistice agree tion therefore had greaL appeal.·1 menL si~ned. In NO\'emher, General Ridgeway suhmilled to Lhe JCS his plan on pris Each of Lhe above phases will be dis oner-of-war negotiations. lIe proposed cussed in turn, with emphasis on Lhe to aUempt a one-for-one exchange. If reasoning behind the actions taken by the Communists agreed, the UNC could each side. retain or release prisoners who did not wanL to relurn since it held man}' more Determining the UNC Position. prisoners than did the Communists. If The UNC position, iniLially termcd the Communists insisted upon an alI "voluntary repatrialion," was in full for-all exchangl'_ Ridgeway was pre accord with Western liheral Lenets hold pared to agrce.:; The JCS approved ing that each man has a voice in his thc.<;e proposals but suggested that own destin)". It was not a position Ridgeway try to geL Communist agree that was assumed automatically by the ments to a scheme wherehy a joint U.S. Go\·ernment. IL was taken some UNC-Comlllunist t('am would serc('n whaL reluctantly. The initial insLruc prisoners prior to their release. Those tions to Gcneral Ridgeway on the pris who indicaLed they did nol desire reo oner-of-war question were' in the patriation would remain with their contexL of confining the negotiati0l1s captor,:.'; When Rear Adm. Ruthven solely to military matters. The armis E. Lihhy entered negotiations on ] 1 tice was to insure that the Communists December ] 95] as head of the UNC did not profit militarily hy a cease-fire. subdelegation on Item Four, he did The UNC negotiators were to insist on not haye a firm mandate. He was to no reinforcement of troops except a ~eek a!!rcement on a one·for-one ex one-for-one replacement and prisoners rhan!!c' therehy insuring the prinl'iple of war were to be exchanged like\\ ise of \'oluntary repatriation. He was not on a one-for-one hasis. If agreement to insisl on such an exchange, how on these points could he obtained, no e\'er, to the jeopardy of the speedy re manpower increase on one side would turn of Communist-held prisoners. result that was not to he enjoyed by the other.1 Negotiations Begin. The first Armistice negotiations hegan on 10 a;.!reemcnL hetween Admiral Lihhy and July 1951. Both sides agreed without his Communist counterpart was to ex dispute to include as Item Four of the chan;.!e rosLers of the prisoners of war agenda, "Arrangements relating to held hy each side. The Communists' prisoners of war." In late August the rosters indicated they held only 7,142 JCS informed General Ridgeway that of the 88,000 South Korean soldiers he could de\'e1op for planning purposes carried as missing. They admitted to a negotiating position based on volun holding only 3.198 of the 7.1·12 U.S. tary repatriation.:! At the end of \Yorld persollnel listed as missing. 0 r the War II U.S. leader~hip had been 188.000 personnel li,:ted by the Com shocked at the reaction of former 50- muni,:ts as mi,:sin~. the UNC could "iet and Eastern European personnel pro\'id(' th(' nam('s of 1 ( 1)_000 captiws. who hall to Ill' fOITl'd to n'turn tn tlu'ir As had 11('1'11 fpan'd_ Ihl' COlllllllllli~ts Comllluni::t honll'lanlk TIH.'Y hall been ill"i"tt'd on an all· for-all ('xl"han!!l'. The e\'en mon' scwrely sllllrkcd by thl' Comnl\lIIi~l~ thl'rl'hy would he ~x- 298 (·han;.dni! onl\- ~onlC I 0.000 pri~oner~ Similarly. those, \\ho )'('fll~ed )'('patria for o\'er 100.000. An equi\'alent of tion \\mdd not hl~ allO\\ecl to take up some 10 divisions would he added to arllls a~ain~t the othcr side. The UNC tht' Communist for('e. Admiral T,ihh~ had not only adopted "volunllll") rc objected to thi~ inequity and furthcr 1Ie patriation," it had at the ~allle time cused the Communists of not reportin)!. retreated from its original position of all the pri~oners they held. a pure one-for-one exchange, substitut In explaining the discrepancy he· ing therefore an unenforceable parole tween the number of pri~oners the system.'! Communists had hoastcd as h:l\'ini! Negotiations on the 2' January pro· captured during the fightinp: and the p[)~al cont inll('d for the next 3 months. numher on thc ro~ters they suhmilled During the C()lIr~e of these negotiations to the UNC negotiators, the Commu the UNC completely dropped the phrase nists claimed that the lists were small "one-for-one" and "equal numbers" hecause, from the repatriation principles. The hasic demand of the UNC became "no , •• Wl' allowed Iho~,' who wanl,·d III forced repatriation" in lieu of "volun p:o ha('k hOllle and did not wanl to join a war ap:ain$t their Ilwn counlry (Kol' tary repatriation." The Communists, ,'an5) 10 p:1l hal'k and liw a IlI'acdlll on their side, conceded that natives of life at IlIInll', And we direell}, 1'I,!t'a,,('!1 South Korea held prisoner by the UNC at Ihe front Ihu$\! for('ip:n Ilri~on('r$ (If might have an option, but that Chinese war (non·Kor('an~) who did nol wanl 10 join Ihe ,Val' 'al!ain~t IH'"pl(' ,din fip:ht and North Korean prisoners must he fill' Iheir n-al indl'j1(,ll(l"nce, who lip:hl returned.!I This was an apparent re for th('ir own people, These mca5urC5 treat from their previous "all-for-all" of ours an' III·rf",·tl}' rip:hl •..• demand. This claim \\ll~, in cs~en('e. a ~tatcl!lent A~I-C(,Jl1Cl1t to Poll PI'i!'lonc'I'!'I. [hat the Comllluni!:"ts had allowed their On I April the lINC pl'llll()~ed that ('apt in's a choice. They had aln'ad~ "tlll' rl'll'a~(' and l'l'p:ltriatilln (If ~lll'h pral'ticed \'oluntar), rt'patriation. prisoner~ of \\ al' ~hall Ill' ('ITI,(,tl'd (In The UNC presented its first substan the basis of li~ts whieh shall he dll~l'k('d ti\'e proposal on prisoners of war on 2 by and shall be mutually acceptable lCI January. It was a crueial point in thc hoth sides prior to the signing of the nei!otiations, hel'au~c it wa~ thi~ pro Arllli~ti!:e Agn',mH'III." Thl' liNe posal which Iirst ollieially linked the added two understandings, ho\\'e\'er, UNC to the concept of "voluntary re which clearly held there would he 1111 patriation." Admiral Libby stated that forced repatriation stating that, "tho~r the UNC would accept the concept that who could not be repatriated without had been practiced by the Commu the application of force shall be re· nists_ It would relea~e prisoners who leased by the detaining power and upon their release could exerci!:"e in resettled ... in a location of their own di\'idual option as to \\hether to return choosing ...." 10 to their 0\\ n army or join the c1lptur In discussi!l,!! thi~ proposal the COlli' ing ~idl'. It was proposed that tIll' In Illuni~ts in~istl'd on brin~ flll'llishrd a t('rnational Hed Cros~ supen'ise the round figure on the numbers of Jlri~IlII' exerci~e of the choice. To alleviate any ers the UNC might return to the COlli' military ach'antage, Lihhy IJI'oposed l11uni~t side. They were told 116,000, that pri!'lln('r,; of \\ar in ('X('e~~ of a a fii!uJ'(' admill(,llIy ha:·wd on ~t)(':;:;\\'()rk olll'-for-Olll' cx('han~e II(' paroled. not hilt a :;in(,l't'(' e~tilllat" that the Far Ea~t to fi:.rht a~ain a:.rain5t their l·aptor~. COlllllland had furnished the Depart. 299 ment IIf tl\l' Arlll)" in III id-Fl'1!1'IIary_ huth wen' ill opposition tu IIIe' fir~l. To obtain more accurate information The second objective the United States it was a~reed that the prisoners would was willing to roncede, but not the have to he polled_ Once a~ain, the third. Once puhlie opinion was mar Communists appeared to move from shaled behind the principle of no their "all-for-all" position_ General forced repatriation, the UNC negotia Ridgeway had prl'\'iously objected to tors' flexibility was lost. It is one thing his superiors in Washington on con to compromise to gain agreement; it durtin1! the prisoner poll, believing that is quite another to compromise on a one of his strongest points was that the humanitarian principle. prisoner's ehoice would he expressed At this stage of the negotiations the at the exchange point in the presence United States cannot be accused of of representatives of both sides and merely atlempting to score a psycho neutral observers.11 logiral victory by demonstrating that many prisoners wcre not desirous of Analysis of Motives. As we have returning to the good life of a Com categorized the negotiations, the initial munist socicty. Thc prisoners had not phase terminated with the agreement heen polled to determine their views, to poll the prisoners. Drfore proccrc\ anel whilc thc UNC may have suspected ing to the next phase, the motives bc that many would not want to return, hind the actions taken to date by cach they did not know how many would side should he examined_ On the U_S_ refuse. It can only be concluded that side four objectives can be considered: the U.S. purpose was essentially hu 1. To obtain the speedy and com manitarian. plete relcase of U.S_ prisoners in Com The objectives behind the Commu munist camps. nist position are more difficult to deter 2. To prevent a manpower advantage mine, and we must, to a degree. specu from accruinl! to the Communists. late on their suhstanGe. Fir~t. til(' lIl0re 3. To a\'oid forring anti-Communist than I 00.000 pri~olll'rs in" UNC ('amps prisoners back into Communist con rl'pn'sl'ntell a consillerable military as trol. set that the Communists undoubtedly 4·. To achievc a psychological victory would have preferred to recover. Sec O\'er the Cllnnl1unists by iIIustrat in~ ond, the Comlllllllists prohahlr lll! that a substantial numhrr of their lil'vl'd, anel not mistakenly, that any soldirrs did not drsire to return til the pri~olll'rs that wer(' not returned to Comlllunist Promised Lane\. tlwm would he reh'ased to serve Chian1! The first ohjectivc was o\'erriding, Kai-shck and Syngman Hhee. Third, and in order to achieve it HIC sccond the Communists may have suspected ohjective had been abandoned early that many of their personnel would with the substitution of thc unenforce refuse rcpatriation. They knew full ahle parole feature for the initial "one well that the Chinese soldiers were not for-one" position. In compromising \'oluntcrrs, that lllany of the Chincse on the one-for-one principle, howevrr. prisoners were ex-soldiers of the Na it became more difficult to achie\'e the tionalist armies and many of the Ko third objcetive without forcing a loss reans ex-soldicrs of the Army of South of faee on thr Communisls and thrrchy KorC'a. i\lass refusal to he rqmtriatrc\ rau~(' a IHlnll'ning IIf Il\I'ir po~itilln and "ollid ('un~lilul!' a llIajor ps~ I'holo~i(·:t1 a SUhSI'I\UI'nt faillll't, til ~ain tile' lir~1 IIt'fl"al. ohjel'tin" ,'rhill' Ihl' second ohjC'ctiw All of the r('a~on" outlined ilbon' then was eompatihlr with the third. lllay han' plap'd a part in the dl'eision 300 of the COllllllllllis(:< to h!' ohstillalP (III tion insurcd an opportunity to!!O It 0 III!' til<' mailer of prisoncr exchan;!l'. What hut did not ne~alt' the right of a state apppars e\'pn more likely, hOln'Yer. is to I!rant political a!'ylul1l to an incli that thp Comlllu:lists eOllsitien,d till' vidual II"l1l'n it S(~"'(:ted to C\O so. The U.S. prisIlller5 in their hands to hc all UNC r;olltenclecl that the spirit of the asset ,,"hidl should not he pxpended GOllYcntion, to protec:t the individual prl'maturriy. A~rcement had not )'Pt ri~hts of prisoners of war, clearly hef'n rpached on other issU('s of tl}(~ would be violated by forcible return. I:1 armistice. Hefusing- to ag-ree on pris. The UNC was correct in that the oner repatriation, the Communists 1'1" drafters of the convention had not tained har~aininf! power that they could envisaged a detaining power having apply to ~ain concessions on other is to usc force to return a prisoner of sues, not only in the Korean ne;!otia war to his homeland. Article 118 had tions hut, if required, elsewhere in the heen wriuen under the assumption that cold lrar. The Comlllunists may hm'e the great majority would desire re looked to a future wl1(>n puhlir pa· patriation, so that the guarantee of this tience within the United States and its right was of primary importance. An allies would ;r1"01I' thin. The a~itation amendment hy Austria had actually to stop the war, to 1"('('O\"('r prisllllers, propo!<('d provisions for voluntary reo ('olllcl cause deeJl dissention within thc patriation but had been rejected on United States and hctween the United the grounds that such provision might States and --its 'allies. Unfellered hI', be used to the detriment of the prisoner any hUlllanitarian roncern for their of war and allow undue coercion hy Oil II personnel or for the prisoners they the detaining power.14 held, the COlllmunists refused to ~in' The UNC argument, however, was up their ~reall'st ne;;otiatin~ asset. not uniYersally convincing. After the Whatpn'r motin's lIlay ha\"(~ ;!uidl'd conclusion of the armistice, Adlll. C. the partips in the ne!!otiations. mlll"h TUrllPr .loy. senior llNC dl'ie~ate, ex of the dis('ussioll lias characterized h~ press('d I"('sel"\'ations, stilting that "the lpp:al arp:ulllellts on the interpn'tatioll prin('ipln of voluntary repatriatioll was of the GpncI' TIll' apJleal of the Conlll1uni~ts to to h,n-e it reduced to 70,OOOY They the Geneva Conventions was entirely Celt they had been duped and led into cynical. Aclmi ral Libby had pointed a propa~an"tla trap. They had certainly out to them that ther themselves had fallen into a trap; hut the UNC, in its already practiced voluntary repatria ignorance of the true extent of the tion. They violated repeatedly other prisoners' feelings, had not known it articles of the convention, such as the self of the trap's existence. requirement of furnishing rosters of prisoners to the International Red The Package Proposal. The next Cross, allowing' inspection by that move by the UNC, and one long in hody, and the proper marking of pris preparation in the event that the Com· oner-oC-war camps - not to mention munists did not accept the results of their maltreatment of prisoners, as the prisoner poll, was to present a was revealed later. package proposal that the UNC hoped would resolve all outstanding issues. The three issues remaining were: III - KOREA: THE DEADLOCK 1. Repatriation of prisoners of war. 2. Whether the Communists were to The Polling of Prisoners. On he allowed to rehabilitate airfields in 8 April screening of prisoners of war North Korea that had been destroyed commenced in the UNC camps. No by U.S. bombings. effort was made by the UNC to in 3. Whether the U.S.S.R. could serve fluence prisoners to refuse repatriation. as a member of the Neutral Nations Quite the reverse was true. The UNC Supervisory Commission. leaned over backwards to encourage The UNC proposal conceded the air prisoners to choose repatriation. At fields issue in exchange for a conces UNC insistence the Communist nego sion on naming the U.S.S.R. to the tiators had provided an amnesty state commiSSIOn. The UNC position on ment that was read to all prisoners "no forced repatriation" was substan prior to the screening.! The screening tially unchanged, however. Admiral was completed on the 15th. The re Joy presented this proposal in execu sults were as shocking to the UNC as tive plenary session on 28 April. The to the Communists. Communists, still smarting Crom the On 19 April the Communist negotia results of the camp screening, rejected tor was inCormed that of the 170,000 it, but the only unresolved issue now military and civilian prisoners in UNC remaining was the repatriation of pris hands, only about 70,000 would re oners of war. The negotiations were turn to the Communists without the in complete deadlock as the UNC had use of force: 7,200 civilian internees; officially taken its "final and irrevoca 3,800 South Koreans; 53,900 North ble position." 3 Koreans; and 5,100 Chinese. What ever reason the Communists initially War in the PW Camps. Com had for wanting an all-for-aIl exchange munist efforts now turned to a massive was now submerged in their need to and worldwide propaganda campaign overcome the psychological blow and to discredit the screening of prisoners propa~anda oeCeat causrd by over onl' that hao rcsuheo in over half of their half of tlll'ir pl'rslllllwl rl'fusin~ to rt' eaptnrt'd Jlt'n;olllll'l rdll~in~ to rl'lul'll turn hOllle. TIl(' CunJlllunists felt tht')" to the COllllllunist side. In this dImt had been d~liberately deceh'ed by be· they exploited thoroughly the incred ing furnished the U6,OOO figure only ibly bad administration and lack of 302 control in th!' pri~()n('r-()f-war ealllp~ ('\"~. 1\('ld insidl' tl\(' e(llllp(llInd for :~ of the U_N_ Command_ The U_N_ au days, and tried by a prisoner court. thorities in charge of the camps did He was released after the new com not know at the start of the negotia mander signed what amounted to ad tions exactly how many prisoners they mission of U.S. brutality in carrying held, who they were, or what their out the the Communists indicated for a third 11 psychological defeat before the world time that they might be willing to audience and a loss of face that they compromise on their position. While would not accept. considering in executive plenary ses When the UNC agreed to the Com sion the prisoner-of-war article of the munist suggestion that the prisoners draft armistice, the senior Communist be polled and when the results became delegate frankly told General Harri known, both sides found themselves son, now UNC senior delegate, that the suddenly in a position from which only UNC must come up with a figure ap surrender rather than negotiation was proximating 110,000 repatriates and possible. The objectives of both sides that this figure must include all Chi had, in the end, been determined by nese prisoners.; General Harrison then the sum of the individual desires of released to them the 83,000 figure ob· 14,000 captured Chinese soldiers. tained in the latest screening. The Communists rejected the UNC list once Unilateral Release. Late in June again. The UNC had held firm to "no the UNC began the release of 27,000 forced repatriation." Korean civilian internees. This was On 23 September General Harrison the first unilateral release of prisoners proposed to the Communists three op· by the UNC, and even though they tions which it was hoped would save were classified as civilian internees Communist face. All three choices re rather than prisoners of war, the Com tained the prihciple of no forced re munists objected bitterly. They were patriation and provided for transport informed that the release was an in ing nonrepatriates to a demilitarized ternal affair of the South Korean Gov zone. The options varied as to how ernment and the UNC negotiators reo further determination of the nonre fused to discuss it further.!! General patriates' status was to be made, such Harrison suggested at this time that if determination being either obsen'ed the Communists failed to accept the or conducted by combinations' of In revised screening figures (83,071 re ternational Red Cross and joint mili patriates'), the UNC should unilaterally tan' commissions. On 8 October the release the nonrepatriates, presenting CO~lmunists rejected this proposal, and the Communists with a fait accompli. the Iw~otiations recessed on the initia Sneh a SdlClllC might have pel'lnilled tive of the UNC.!! the Communists to save face and The recess of the negotiations closes thereby speed agreement. Harrison's our third phase of the negotiations. superiors did not approve.10 The allempt by the UNC to trade a Actually, the idea of unilateral re concession on airfield rehabilitation lease of -nonrepatriates had been sug for a concession on repatriation had gested to General Ridgeway as early as failed. The Communist concessions Fehruary 1952 by Secretary of the had narrowed the controversy to Chi Army Earl D. 10hnson and Vice Chief nese captives who did not desire to of Staff for the Army General 10hn E. return to the volunteer army, but the Hull, during a visit to Tokyo. Ridge deadlock seemed permanent. The UNC way had feared then that if the UNC coulcl not alter its position without followed such a plan it would not only either renouncing a moral principle or o(1l'n ilself to charges of dl'ceit hut admill iug that its screening pro!'l'ss would ('llI!;\IIger Ih(· !iYl's of prisol\('rs was as {lishulll'st as the Communist in Communist hands.lI propaganda claimed it to ht'. The Com In October the lINC reclassified munists, on the other hand, had suffered 11,000 South Koreans from "prisoner 304 of war" to "civilian internee" and he tl\(' prisone."!; tlll'ir ri~hts, and all pris gan to release them_ The Communist oners who had not chosen repatriation protests were again ignored_ Once after 90 days would be referred to the again General Harrison suggested that politiral conference proYided for in the if the Communists persisted in de armistice agreement. If this conference manding forced repatriation, the UNC did not settle the nonrepatriates' fate should release all the nonrepatriates. within ;>,0 days, the prisoners would Gen. Mark W. Clark, the new U.N. be turned o\,er to the United Nations Commander, like General Ridgeway for disposition,H before him, was not ready to accept The U.S.S.R. and the Communist this suggestion.12 hloc were adamant against the resolu tion. It was roundly denounced by The General Assemhly Dehates. SO\'iet Foreign Minister Vishinsky and Until the breakdown of the talks in Oil 28 NO\'ember flatly rejected by October 1952, the United Nations Gen Chou EII-Iai. On 3 December a eral Assembly had taken no part in U.S.S.R. counterresolution calling for the negotiations. Partly to counter forcible repatriation was voted down Communist propaganda and partly to and the Indian resolution adopted 54 put the weight of the General Assembly to 5, only the Communist bloc oppos· behind the principle of no forced re ing. patriation, the Secretary of State de While there was little chance of the li\'ered in the U.N. Political Committee Communists accepting the resolution, a 3-hour review of the history of the it did demonstrate to the Communists Korean question. In his speech Dean that world opinion as represented in Acheson pointed out that the U.S.S.R. the General Assembly was still on the had accepted the principle of voluntary side of voluntary repatriation despite repatriation in the Treaty of Brest the Communist propaganda and con Liton.k in 1918 and that twice during triwd disorders in the prisoner-of-war World War II the Russians had ofTered camps. what amounted to \'oluntary n'pat ria As till' Cenl'ral Ass(·mhly (·Oll('llllh·t! tion to German soldiers at Stalingrad its ddmtes. the Presidcnt-eieet of till' and Budapest. He also stated that the United States. General Eis(>nhowl'l" conflict oY(>r repatriation had hl'en II as \'isi t ing Korea. 1I is d(·(·larat ion "wholly unexpected" and "surprising" at the end of his \'isit on G J)eceml)('r to the U.N. CommandP characterized as ill-founded any hope India took the initiative in ofTering the Communists might have heltl that on 17 Novemher a resolution to the the incoming administration would ill' General Assembly. This resolution, af Il"iIIing to compromise on voluntary ter discussion and amendment, ap rcpatriationYi After the Republican pro\'ed repatriation of all prisoners of administration took officc, the schemc war following the signing of the armis of unilateral releasc of the nonrepa tice. All prisoners of war would be triates was once ap-ain recollllllcIUll·d. turned over to a 'Neutral Nations Re this time by Gcneral Clark. III Ewnt:;. patriation Commission in a demilitar howe\·cr, soon ovcrcame further di~· ized zone. The Commission would cllssion of the concept and its implc. make en'ry efTort to facilitate their mentation. return hut, "forre shall not 11(> uSC'cl 1'h(> fOllrth pilasC' of the ncg(}tiatiun~ a)!ainst prisoners of war to pn'\,('nt or carried 11<1 ('hang(' in till' "asi,' \lu:;itiCln efTect their return to their homelands." of each side. 1£ mcasured by fon'ill;! Each side would be free to explain to the UNC to compromise on the prill' 305 o ciple of no forced repatriation and hy o 0 • ~I\IIIII" !lAdertake III rcpatriah illlo o persuading other nations to ahandon flIcdialt ly aft,or tl ... c:c:s~ation (If hostili li,o" all of thos" pri,CII"o"" of war in thc:ir the lINC position, the COllllllunists' cuslody 11'110 i1lo,io'/ IIpOIl repa/riatiOIl propa~anda campaign and its support [italics added] and to hand over the re· ing disorders in the prisoner-of-war flIaininl!: prisoners of war to a neutral eamps had been a failure. The U.S. "laIc ~o as to ensure a just solution to presidential election had been com the 'Iuestiun of their repatriation." pleted, and a new administration was Negotiations Resume. While in oflice. There was no indication, Chou's statement olTered much promise, however, of a weakening of U.S. policy Ihere were still many questions to be in the Far East. ans\\ ered and clari lied. lL was agreed to resume plenary sessions on the mat ter on 26 April. The long recess was IV - KOREA: AGREEMENT at an end. Initial negotiations were based on a Communist proposal, and The Key Concession. On 22 Feb· it quickly became evident that there ruary 195:1 General Clark proposed were three major areas of disagree to the CommunisLs an immediate ex ment. Two concerned the explanations change of all sick and wounded pris Ihat were to he made to the no moe oners of war. The Communist reply of patriates, where they were to he held 28 March agreed to the UNC proposal. and how long would he allowed for Liaison officers met on 7 April, and them. The CommunisLs wanted 6 on 9 April the exchange of sick and months in a neutral state, the UNC wounded prisoners of war was agreed wanted 60 days in Korea. The third upon. The exchange, dubbed "LiLLIe was Ihe selection of the neutral state. Switch," took place from 21 through At this point General Harrison threat 26 April. On the UNC side 5,19·1 ened that if the talks broke down again, Korealls, 1,030 Chinese, and 4-16 ciYi Ihe liNe would unilalerally release all lian internees - a total of 6,670- prisoners who did not desire repatria were returned to the Communists in tion.:! exchange for 68·J. prisoners of war, in On 7 May a new Communist pro cluding 1·19 U.S. personnel. Each side posal was tabled. In it the question of had rdea:;ed approximately 5 percent tran~porlin~ J\()J\!"!'patriates physic-ally of the prisoners it held. out of Korea was conceded and a Neu As gratifying as the exchange of tral Nations Repatriation Commission sick and wounded prisoners was to suggested. Poland, Czechoslovakia, the UNC, even more promlsmg was Switzerland, Sweden, and India were the hint of a break in the Communist the proposed members of the commis position contained in their reply of sion; each was to furnish an equal 23l\larch. In it the Communists stated number of armed personnel and to "seulement of the question of exchang share in the task of maintaining cus ing sick and injured persons on both tody of the nonrepatriates in their orig sides during the period of hostilities inal places of delention. This plan should be made to lead to the smooth bore a close resemblance to that con seLLlement of the entire question of tained in the General Assembly resolu prisoners of war . . . ." 1 This was tion and was hrlieved hy the UNC to fnllll\\('d h~ a statl'nlt'nl on :W i\lar("h pro\" ide' a hasis for III'1~Clt ia ling 1111 1lC' by Chou En-Iai whi("h appeared 10 (°l'Jltahll' armistice. contain the key concession. Chou stated The U.S. Government desired that that both sides, four conditions he added to the pro- 306 posa!. Firsl, unanimily should Iw IIII' l'I~ga rds sp,'c'i fic'" (I y thc: a1-\I'I'c'/llI'nt on basis of business conducted hy the Re handling prisoners of war, RI1l'C in patrialion Commission_ Second, a time sisted that no Inclian troops would he limit of ?,O days should he imposed allowed on the territory of the Repuhlic upon the political conference for set of Korea, that Communists explainers tling the nonrepatriates' future_ Third, would not be allowed in his rear India alone should furnish all the areas, and, finally, that no Korean armed forces and operating personnel. prisoners would be turned over to Finally, not more than 90 days could troops of India, a nation Rhee consid be allowed for the Communist explana ered as having Communist inclina tions to the nonrepatriates_ These four tions." conditions were put to the Communists How far Rhee was willing to go to in a counterproposal on 13 May_ The upset the approaching armistice could conditions were not accepted_4 only be p.lIessed hy U.S. offic:'ials. On On 25 May the UNC suhmitted a 18 .June thei r fears were confirmed. revised proposal. In it the UNC con Bctween midnight and dawn that clay, tinued to insist that all armed forces with the collusion of South Korean and operating personnel he Indian. It seeurity troops, approximately 25,000 also held out for a maximum of 90 anti-Communist North Korean prison days for explanations. The unanimity ers of war escaped. By the end of June issue was conceded; majority rule for only 8,600 Korean nonrepatriates re the commission as desired by the Com mained of the some 35,400 confined on munists was accepted. The UNC would 17 June. Syngman Rhee had carried agree either to tum disposition of the out what had heen practiced previously nonrepatriates over to a political con by the Communists and what had often ference with a 30-day time limit and been considered by U.S. officials: he then release them, or alternatively let had unilaterally released prisoners of the U.N. General Assembly determine war who did not desire to he rC'pa 5 their disposition. I ria I l'cl. While the UNC had ronsidl'red On .f. June the COllllllunists accepted sueh a lllC'aSIlI'C as a possihle means of the l.!NC conditions, and by 3 J lInc expediting an armistice, Rhee had used stafT officers of both sides agreed on it as a means by which he hoped to the final delails of tlw terms of rder forestall an armistice. ence for handling prisoners of war. The UNC was 1I0W faced with 11l'~O As the third anniversary of the start tiating on two fronts. There was the of hostilities and the second anniver task of gelling Rhee's acceptance of sary of the start of negotiations ap the armistice alld the task of persuad proached, it appeared that an armistice in~ the Communists to continue nego was finally in sight. tiations despite Rhee's release of pris oners. The first task was accomplished Syngman Rhee Ohjects. The by Mr. Waller Robertson, Assistant UNC and the Communists had agreed, Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af but the Government of South Korea fairs, who in long conYel'sations with led by the doughty Syngman Rhee was Rhee between 2.J. June and 11 July re not yet to he reconciled. Rhee's ob affirmed once again that no anti-Com jections to the armistice stemmed from lllunist prisoners would be reluJ'Jlrd his lifelong and ('ontinuing ohjI'd i\'(' 10 the COllllllunist sicle ancl won Hlll'l:'S of a free unifil'l] Korl'a, an ohjl'('\i\'(~ I'oopl'ralion with tlw arlllistic','. that the United Statcs and its U.N. allies had long since abandoned. As Agreement and Repatriation. 307 The task of continuing negotiations no prisoner of war would be fon·ell with the Communists proved less dif to return to the side from which he ficult than winning the reluctant co was eapturell From Ihat dale it is operation of Syngman Hhee. The apparent IIOW that the Communists de negoti'atipns had been interrupted O!l sired to end the Korean situation. The 20 June as' a result of the unilateral final agreement on the disposition of prisoner release, plenary sessions not the nonrepatriates was not fundament resuming until 10 July. By 19 July ally difTerent from General Clark's pro the Communists indicated a willingness posals to the Communists of 28 Sep to go ahead with an armistice. A sup temher 1~52 or from the General plementary agreement on prisoners of Assembly Resolution of 3 December war was then completed, providing that 1952. alI nonrepatriated prisoners of war We can only speculate as to the would be delivered to the Neutral Na motiYes behind Ihe Communist deci tions Repatriation Commission in the sion to con('ccle on the repatrialion is demilitarized zone. Rhee's conditions sue and conclude an armistice agree of having neither Indian troops nor ment. The concession was, however, a Communist explainers on South Ko significant item of the "peace ofTensive" rean soil were thus satisfied. The Ar that followed the death of Stalin on 5 mistice Agreement was signed by the March 1953. The reasons behind this respective commanders on 27 July "peace ofTensive" were undoubtedly 1953. . val"ied and may have been quite un On 23 September the UNC turned related to tIte prisoner-of-war issue or over more than 22,000 nonrepatriates even to the Korean situation.; The to the Neutral Nations Repatriation concession on repatriation at this time Commission. Of the 14·,701 Chinese does demonstrate, nevertheless, that nonrepatriates turned over, II-W elected prisoners of war in Ihe Communist to rl'turn to COlUmunist control, 12 view are to be used to faeililatc politi went to India with the custodial force, cal maneuverings and to serve political and 1.1·,235 returned to UNC control. objectives. Of the 7,900 Korean nonrepatriates, 183 returned to the Communists, 7·1. went to Imlia, and 7,()() I. were relurned v - LEGACY ANn LESSONS 10 UNC control. By JI) Fehruary 1!J5 I. the ·Chinese under UNC conlrol had The Negotiations in Retrospect. been moved to Taiwan and the Koreans A striking feature of these long negotia released. In alI exchanges, including tions was that the only true negotiating, Ihose of Ihe sick and wounded in in the sense of give and take, occurred April, m,121 UNC-captured prisoners between December 1951 and April were rl'patriated, some 27,000 short of 1952. Once the UNC had made its what Ihe Communists had indicated "final and irrevocable" offer, its prin willingness to settle for in July of the ciple of voluntary repatriation was 1I0t previous year. negotiahle. From December unlil April The last phase of the prisoner of the UNC had moved from a "one-for war negotiations was marked by Ihe one" position to that of "no forced complete ('apilulalion by the Commu repatriation," and the Communists had nisls on the principle of nonforeihle Illoycd frolll "ali-for-aIl" to ali apparl'nt r('palrialion. Whcn Choll En-Iai 1lI.\(It, willillgnel Tlw ICRe ha~ a~~unll'd till' humani Anlllll~ till' COlllnlllni~t Jlri~lIlll'r~ of tarian funelions of the "Protc<'Ijll~ war. three I~ PI'S arc found: the North PowC'r" under article 1 0 of the con VietlHlIllC'sc solcli£'r, the South Viet vention. It periodically visits eamps, IHlIlwse who moved to the Communist inspC"~tin~ conditions and inten-ie\\'in~ North after the Fre-nch-Viet Minh c£'ase prisoners of its own choice without lire (If I C)51· and latC'r was infiltrated witnC'sl'es. Additionally, the JCRC back into the south to join the insur visits hospitals wher£' si('k and wounded p:ent mO\'ement, 3nd the Viet Con~, prisoners of war are confined as well \\ ho Illay he a Incal guerrilla or mem as the temporary detention facilities her of a main force unit but who has operated by U.S_, AltVN, and allied nen-r left South Vietnam. Each poses forces. The ICRC has visited prisons a different prohlem concerninp; his and jails in South Vietnam where pris eventual rei case and repatriation. oners of war were located prior to One further faelor, which thou~h not construction of. the prisOll£'r-of-war part of the tr(, (,l'~~ 10 Norlh Vil'lnalll. "arlil,tlladr ('aplut"t'd ll.S. soldi,'rs as a n'Jlri~al for di~t'()lIra~ing is Hanoi's refusal to pro lit(' execution of Viet Con~ 1('(TorisIH yide rosters" of prisoners and the lack hy the authorities of the Sai~on re of a regular mail sen·ice. Hanoi, in {!ime.1i" The Viel Cong have furni~lJ('d elTeet, is holding these prisoners in no informalion on the idenlity, loea communicado, and the U.S. aUlhorities lion, or numher of prisoners II;at Ihey will not know with certainty how many hold. Vict Cong confinement areas prisoners are being held and who they on~rrun hy U.S. forces are grim lesli are. monials of starvation conditions anci On 6 July 1966 captured American of prisoners hein~ murdered en mas~c airmen were paraded throll~h the hefore Iheir guards fled. III streets of Hanoi, and the North Viet nmnese announced that they \l"OlIld he Repatriations to Date. Th!' Ge· tried as war criminals. This action neva Convention provides for I'(·palri". set ofT a wave of protest which in lion of prisoners of war durin:.t ho~tili. cluded an appeal from 18 "do\'ish" lies, and Ihe Unitect States ha~ U.S. Senators, a request from the Secre repeatedly allempled through varioll~ tary General of the United Nalions for channels to eflect sueh exchanges. On Hanoi to "exercise restraint." and an 8 Drcemher ]C)oo Ihe JeRe annolll\('(,11 appeal from Pope Paul reqlle~lil1~ Ihat Norlh Vietnam had rejct:ll'cl a pr\l· Ireatment of prisoners "aceordil1~ 10 posal hy President Johnson for a ("Oil' internalional norms."].1 Realizill~ per ferenc:c undcr Heel Cross atl~pjcc~~ 10 haps Ihat Ire hac! gone too far, thai Gow;ider Ihe possibility of rcleasill{! or carrying through with a trial would exchanging prisoners held hy holh more likely alienate world opinion to sides.1l1 In August 1967 the U.S. Ill" ward his re,gime than win sympathy for parlmenL of State summarized its efT()rl~ it, and would tend to unify Ihe people 10 arrange a prisoner of war exehall;!1' of the Uniled Slal!'s. setlin~ 01T \\"ithin as follows: the United States a demand for reprisal (a ]lossihility the Scnator warned \'i'1' han' ('olltartc·d hnth Nnrth Vic,tnmn against). ITo Chi l\Iinh annollnGf'<1 on allll tIl<" Natillnal 1.i1l1'ration «'rullt. ,Ii· r<"("tly mill through illtc·l"ml'(liaric' •• ttl 27 .luly ]966 that an I I-memhcr com prlll'ogp digcug~ion~ of rc'patriatillll, ('~. mission had h!'en pstahlish("c! 10 ill .. han:!" or 11th"," malt .. ",; 1"'rtilll"llt til Yestip:ale U.S. war crimes Imt that IIIl pri"'lln"r~ of war. On .J Illy 20, 11)(,(, trials were "in "iew." 1;; Hanoi has not Prc~idl'lIt Johllson publicly "l'rJ:"",,,1 yet seen fit to r("cognize Ihe applica our willinp;negg to meet with Hanlli I!"'"' ernnJ('nt on tll<"~(' mailers at a ("lIlf"n'Il"" hilil)' of thc Gencva Convention, ho\\ tahl,' und .. r ~pongor~hifl of tIll" 11111'1"' ever, or 10 implemcnt fully its pro national Red Crlls,; Committcl', '1'1 ... In· \'i5ions. ternational Red CroSg, national H",I The National Liheralion Fronl in Crogs societies, p;overnm"nts mill pri' yatc ppr~on. have appralpd to ilitll th Soulh Vielnam has adopled an allilu Iilus of Aml'rican aggression who only ('amJl~ would be an equally sorry desire to be left alone to settle their breach of faith. The best approach for problems. Mistreatment of American the United States is to avoid heing prisoners of war or recalcitrance in placed in a position where voluntary releasing them would he counterpro repatriation can become an issue. ductive to the external image they are Avoiding such a position can best attempting to portray. This is particu be achieved hy not holding in prisoner larly true of the influence of such be of-war camps any personnel who do havior upon the image they are trying not desire to he repatriated. The Chieu to project within the United States it Hoi program represents the first step self. in achieving this goal, for it provides a The repatriation of prisoners of war means for screening out anti-Commu in Korea was eventually elIected nists and disillusioned rebels before Ihrough the use of the Neutral Nations they are categorized as prisoners of Hepatriation Commission. It will be war. Since these returnees are pro more difficult for the United States to vided treatment superior to that they find parties that would represent its would receive in the prisoner-of-war view ~n such a commission today and camps, there is no ohjection from the stilI be acceptable to the Communists. lel{C. Since they are, in elIcct, seek There is, however, hetter contact be ing political asylum, which any sover tween Washington and Hanoi today eign nation has the right to grant at than there ever was between Washing its discretion, the procedure is fully ton and the North Koreans and the in accord with the norms of inter Communist Chinese. The fact that an national law. This same right to grant American citizen can go to Harioi and political asylum can be applied to pris participate in a prisoner release without oners of war, thereby remoying from being entirely discredited in his home the prisoner-of-war camps on a con land is indicative of this contact. tinuinp: basis those prisoners who would hayc to be forced to go back Voluntary Repatriation versus to Communist controJ.1 Code of Conduct. AILhough, as has To avoid renegotiating the principle been pointed out, the issue of voluntary of volnntary repalrialion obviously re repatriation may never he raiscd, it !Jllin's a d"plh of ('ontml and I'IJi"il'n('Y cannot he discounted. The flexibility in the administration of the prisoner of the Communist position in Korea of-war program that was lacking in must be remembered. If the principle Korea. The political orientation (or of voluntary repatriation must be re lack of orientation) of the prisoners negotiated in Vietnam, it wiII set up must be known, and the prisoners must a definite connict for the United States be free of coercion from other prisoners with that other legacy of Korea, the of any political persuasion. lVlore ba Code of Conduct. The United States sically, what is required is prior plan is comll1illed to both yoluntary· repatri ning for the negotiations. ation and the Code of Conduct. To abandon the principle of voluntary re Preparation for Negotiations. patriation would be to hreak faith with The lack of an agreed position on pris those Americans who sulIered and died oner repatriation and lack of prepara to estahlish it in 11)52-5:t To fail to lion for th()~(' 1H'p:olialion~. !loth al the meet it~ ohli~ations unlier Ihe' Code p()il\t~ of d"ri:;ion and at the len'l nl of Conduct to its llIen now in Viet \1 hi('h camp administration policy was Con~ or Norlh Vietnamese prison ('~tablished. worked to the serious detri- 318 llIellt of (lur 1J('~otiators throu;!hout tIll' II ill rt'lt'ast' 0111' prisoners \I ithollt lIIak Korean armistice talks. Hoperull)' the in;.\' liS pay for thl'lll. Korl'a indil'ates al'l'ointml'nt of Amhassador at Larl!,c ot\wrwisl'. \VI~ llIust hI' prepnrl'eI to W. I\H~rd! Harriman to provide gen make I:OIII'I'Ssions in retllrn and not era! supervision of all Department of eX[led that a 1111're exchange of 0111' State aelions (:olll'ernin~ prisonC'J's held pl'isoncrs for theirs will rcsult ill fruit hy hoth sides and the formation of a ful ncgotiations. We must sellle the Department of Defense Commillee Oil prisoner-of-war issue while we still have Prisoner of War Policy chaired hy the sOll1cthin~ to concede that, while not Assistant Serretary of Dcfem;e (Inter vital to us, is of importance to thc national Se(:urity Allain,) will provide other sidt'o the Goor ne~olialion~. They will bclie\'c that in Conclusion. On any occasion when order to get back our prisoner~ of war, the Uni~ed Statc~ ner:otiates with the somethin~ that bclonr:s to us, we will Communists it su/Tcrs from one funda bargain away- somethin~ that h~lon~s mental di~advantar:e: the United Siaies to the Republic of Vietnam. We should, mu~t consider indi\'idual ri~hts and hu of course, make every effort to estah man dignity. The Communists con lish fully mutual confidence and under sidcr only the power position resulting standing and allempt to bring them to from the outcome of the negotiations. our point of \'iC\\". Such thin1!~ a~ the This funoamental disadvantage i~ par homhin1! of North Virtnam. a hloekadr lieu larly se\'ere in prisonrr-o f -wa r of North Vietnam (if ~ueh i~ l'~tah· ncgr against us, rceluc not prepared to liberate him by force, ing our flexihility in negotiations with you must be prepared to ransom him at the Communists. some political cost. FOOTNOTES I--KOREA AND VIETNAM: A COMPARISON 1. The United Nations Command controlled those forces contributed by members of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war in Korea. General Matthcw B. Ridgway, United States Army, was the Commander in Chief, Unitcd Nations Command at the start of the armistice talks and was also Commander in Chief of the U.S. Far East Command. In the latter role he commandcd U.S. anned forces in Korea and military units of the Rcpublic of Korca. 2. Dean Achcson, "Achcson on Negotiations," Tile Reporter, 23 December 1961, p. 23. 3. "Prisoners of War," Vietnam Information Notes no. 9, August 1967, U.S. Dept. of State Publication S275, p. 3. 4. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Anny, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 141. 5. "Prisoners of War," p. 4. 6. Hennes, p. 514. 7. U.S. Officc of Armcd Forccs Information and Education, Codc of tile U.S. Fightillg Mall DOD GEN·ll (Washington: Deccmber 196·t), pa..sim. S.Ibid., p. 2-3. 9. RVNAF is undcr control of its national commandcrs. U.S. units opcrating outside of South Victnam arc under the control of Commandcr in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC). II-KOREA: THE INITIAL NEGOTIATIONS 1. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Matthew B. Ridgway, JCS 95354, Washington: 30 June 1951. 2. Message from U.S. Dept. of thc Anny to Commander in Chief, Far East Command, "Policy on Rcpatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners," DA 99024, Washington: 15 August 1951. 3. Boris Shub, The Choice (New York: Ducll, Sloan and Pearec, 1950)"p, 36-47 is one account of Russian prisoncrs repatriatcd to the U.S.S.R. after World War n. ' - ~ 320 4. That humanitarian considerations were overriding was not a unanimous opinion among U.S. officials. For a diseussion of the views on voluntary repatriation held by senior officers in the Department of the Army, see Hennes, p.136-138. 5. Messagc from General Matthew B. Ridgway to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, DA-IN 3785, Tokyo: 28 November 1951. 6. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, l"ar East Command, JCS 89172, Washington: 10 December 1951. 7. United Nations Command, Korean Armistice Negotiations: Subdelegation on Agenda item 4, Summary of Proceedings (Pan Mun Jom Meetings: Session 1, 11 December 1951, through Session 71, 15 March 1952), Sessions 10 through 17, 23-30 December 1951. 8. Ibid., Sessions 19 and 20,1-2 January 1952.' 9. United Nations Command, Korean Armistice Negotiations: Staff Officers' Meetings on Agenda Item 4 (Pan MunJom: 23 January-10 May 1952), 36th Meeting, 29 March 1952. 10. Ibid., 3Uth Meeting, 1 April 1952. 11. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Far East Command, JCS 92059, Washington: 15 January 1952. 12. Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of Intemational Conventions for the Protection of Prisoners of War, The Geneva Convention$ of August 12, 1949, 2d rev. cd. (Geneva: 1950), p. 79, 123. 13. Dean Acheson, "The Prisoner Question and Peace in Korea," The Department of State Bulletin, 10 November 1952, p. 746-747. 14.Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict (New York: Rinchart, 1954), p. 280-28l. 15. C. 'fumer Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 150.15!. 16. J aro Mayda, "The Korean Repatriation Problem and Intemational Law," American Journal of International Law, July 1953, p. 431. III-KOREA: THE DEADLOCK 1. United Nations Command, Staff Officers' Meetings on Agenda Item 4, 40th and 41st Meetings, 2 and 4 April 1952. 2. Ibid., 43rd Meeting, 20 April 1952. 3. United Nations Command, Korean Armistice Negotiations: Military Armistice Con· ferences, Record of Events and Transcript of Proceedings (Pan Mun J om Meetings 1-132: Session 27,25 October 1951, through Session 158, 19 July 1953), Session 44, 28 April 1952. 4. "The Communist War in POW Camps," The Department of State Bulletin, 16 February 1953, p. 273. 5. Hermes, p. 233-260 for description of PW camp disorders. 6. Ibid., p. 262. 7. United Nations Command, Military Armistice Conferences, Sessions 104 and 195, 13 and 18July 1952. 8. Ibid., Session 122,8 October 1952. 9. Ibid., Session 88, 23 June 1952. 10. William II. Vatclwr, Jr., I'tllllllllnjom: lilt' Story of tile Kan'/III Mililary Armi.~lic(' Negotialions (New York: l'racgl~r, 195U), p. 157-15U. 11. Henncs, p. 150. 12. Ibid., p. 278. 13. Acheson, "The Prisoner Qucstion and Peace in Korc~a," p. 745. 14. Unitcd Nations, Gencral Assembly, "Text of Rcsolution 011 Prisoners of War," The Department of State Bulletin, 8 December 1952, p. 916-917. 15. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Ike Tells What He Saw in Korea," U.S. News & World Report, 12 Dceember 1952, p. 44. 16. Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 262. JV--KOREA: AGREEMENT 1. United Nations Command, Korean Armistice Negotiations: Liaison Officers' Meetings (Pan Mun Jom: 10 October 1951-29 July 1953), Letter from Marshal Kim II Sung and Gencral Peng Teh-huai to General Mark W. Clark, 28 March 1953, Enclosure to Memorandum for the Record, Meeting 28 March 1953. 321 2. Ibid., Statement of Chou En.lai, 30 March 1953, Enclosure to Memorandum for the Record Meeting, 2 April 1953. 3. United Nations Command, Military Armistice Conferences, Sessions 126 and 127, 29 and 30 April 1953. 4. Ibid., Sessions 138 and 139, 13 and 14 May 1953. 5:Ibid., Session 142, 25 May 1953. 6. Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960), p. 163; Clark, p. 264.265. 7. John F. Dulles, "The First 90 Days," The Department of State Bulletin, 27 April 1953; p. 603-608, for view of reasons behind peace offensive. V--LEGACY AND LESSONS 1. Joy, p. 152. 2. Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The American Concept of Education," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 June 1954, p. 516. Note that altllOugh the UNC has argued that voluntary repatriation was in accord WitIl tile Geneva Conventions of 1949, Eisenhower refers to it as a new principle. 3.Joy, p.177. VI--VIETNAI\l: THE PR.ISONER. OF WAR SITUATION 1. Diplomatic Conference for the EsLablishment of InternaLional Conventions for the Protection of Prisoners of War, p. 75. 2. Ibid., p. 76·77. 3. International COlllmittee of the Hed Cross, "Exh!rnal Affairs: VieLnalll," IlitarliatimUtI Review of tile nell Cross, April 19(,7, p. 11111. 4. Dean Rusk, "U.S. Continues to Abide by Geneva ConvenLions of 1949 in VieL-Nalll," The Department of State Bulletin, 13 September ·1965, p. 447; "Application of Geneva Conventions in Vietnam: Summary of Reply of the Republic of Viet-Nam," International Legal Materials, November 1965, p. 1174. . 5. "U.S. and South Vietnamese Leaders Meet at Honolulu," The Department of State Bulletin, 28 February 1966, p. 304-305. 6. R.W. Apple, Jr., "U.S. Alters Policy to Safeguard Enemy Captives," The New York Times, 1 July 1966, p. 6:4. 7. Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions, p. 81. 8. Larry G. Parks, "Enforcement of the Laws of War," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 4 October 1967 (,vitll permission). 9. International Committee of tile Red Cross, p. 125. 10. "3,200 of Foe Hcld in 4 Vietnam Camps," The New York Times, 13 April 1967, p. 5:3. 11. Parks. 12. "National Reconciliation in Sou til Vietnam," Vietnam Information Notes, no. 8, July 1967, p. 2-4. 13. Victor Lu~inchi, "U.S. Calls on Hed Cross to Study Hanoi Charges," Tha Nl!lv York Times, 30 Srptcmbrr 1965, p. 1:6·7, :1:3·5; Tran 'I'll llinh, North Vil'lnaml'S(! Amhas,;;u!or to Communist China, qlloted in "Opinion aL Home and Abroad," 1'I1I! NelV }'ork 'J'illleS, 24 JIlly 1966, p. E11:6. ]tJ·.I\1:1X I"rankd, "III SI!n;ILI' 'Doves' lI~e IIllllnj SPllTI! C:lptllrt'C! Pilots," TIll' Nt'lII l'orfr 1'ime.~, .16 Jllly 1966, p. 1:1; Sam 1'. Brewer, ",/,ll:InL IIids lIanoi Spare II.S. Fliers," 'I'he New York Times, 17 July 1966, p. 8:3; Robert C. Doty, "Pope Asks Hanoi to Spare Pilots," The New Yorfe Tillles, 21 July 1966, p. 12:8. 15. Hobert E. Dallos, "No Trial in View for U.S. CapLivC5," The New York Times, 25 July 1966, p. 1:8. 16. "Prisoners of War," Vietnam Information Notes, no. 9, Dept. of State Publication 8275, August 1967, p. 1-2. 17. Neil Sheehan, "Reds' Execution of 2 Americans Assailed by U.S.," The New York Times, 28 September 1965, p. 1:1. 18. "GI's Rescue 51 Vietnamese from Jungle Prison," The New York Times, 11 February 1967, p. 3:2. 19. "U.S. Call on P.O.W.'s Rejected by Hanoi," The New York Times, 9 December 1966, p. 23:6. 322 20. "Prisoners of WaI," p. 8. 21. Ibid. 22. Tillman Durdin, "Mystery Clouds Release of 3 Gl's by the Vietcong," The New York Times, 12 November 1967, p. 1:4. 23. Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Secretary General of Vietnam Peace Committee, quoted in "North Vietnam Frees 3 American Pilots," The Washington Post, 17 February 1968, p. 1:3. 24. Benjamin Welles, "U.S. Asserts Hanoi Mistreats Fliers," The New York Times, 15 October 1967, p. 3:1, for account of sale of East German films of American prisoners to National Broadcasting Company and Life magazine. 25. Two of the three soldiers released to the antiwar activists in Cambodia have since reenlisted in the U.S. Army. VII-NEGOTIATING WITH COMMUNISTS 1. Manuel R. Garcia·Mora, International Law and Asylum as a Human Right (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 103-116. 2. "Mr. Harriman to Supervise U.S. Actions on POW's in Vict-Nam," The Department of State Bulletin, 6 Junc 1966, p. 888; "Journal Memo," The Journal of the Armed Forces, 16 Septcmbcr 1967, p. 4. BIBLIOGRAPHY Acheson, Dean. "Acheson on Negotiations." The Reporter, 28 Decembcr 1967, p. 28-29. Acheson, Dean. "Thc Prisoncr Question and Peace in Korea." The Department of State Bulletin, 10 November 1952, p. 744-751. Allen, RichaId C. Korea's Syngman Rhea. Rutland, VI.: Tuttll', 1960. Appil', R.W., Jr. "U.S. Altersl'olky to Safl'guard 1':IIl'IIIY Cilptivl's." 'J'he N(!w }'arl, '/'j/lle.~, l.1uly 1966, p. 6:·1- "Application of Geneva Conventions in Viet-Naill: SUlIlmary of Reply to the Republic of Viet-Nam." International Legalll1aterials. November 1965, p. 1174. Baxter, Richard R. "Asylum to Prisoners of WaI." British Yearbook of International Law, 1953. London: Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 489-498. Baxter, RichaId R. "The Geneva Conventions of 194.9." Lceture. U.S. Naval WaI Collegc, Ncwport, R.I.: 16 September 1955. Brewcr, Sam P. "Than! Bids Hanoi Spare U.S. Fliers." The New York Times, 17 July 1966, p. 1:7. Buckley, Tom. "Saigon. Improves Care of Captives." The New York Times, 25 January 1967, p. 1:l. ClaIk,l\Iark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. New York: Harpcr, 1954. . "The Communist WaI in POW Camps." The Department of State Bul/etin, 16 February 1953, p. 273-275. Dallos, Robert E. "No Trial in View for U.S. Captives." The New York Times, 25 July 11)6C" p. 1:8. Denno, IlrYl'c F. "'I'll(' Fate of Anlt'ril';m POW's in Vil'lnalll," ..1ir {,'OTl'(' 111111 SPII/'(' f)jJ.,~'sl. )o'('bmary 1%1\, p. ·1ll-·t5. Diplomatit' Conf('n'II('(' for thl' Estilb1i~hllll'nl of IIIh'rnatillllal Clll\\'I'II!iIlIlS fllr till' Pmh'l'Iiun of Prisoners of W;lr. Th(' Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1(H9. 2d rev. cd. G(!IIl!va: 1950. Doty, Robcrt C. "Pope Asks Hanoi to Spare Pilots," The New York '/'imes, 21 July 11)66, p. 12:B. Draper, Gcrald A. The Red Cross Conventions, New York: Praeger, 19!iB. Dullcs, John F, "The First 90 Days." The Department of State /Julletin, 27 April 1953, p. 603-60B. Durdin, Tillman. "Mystcry Clouds Release of 3 Gl's by the Victeong." 7'he New York Times, 12 November 1967, p. 1:4. Eisenhower, Dwight D. "The American Concept of Education." Vital Speeches of tile Day, 15 June 1954, p. 514-517. Eisenhower, Dwight D. "Ike Tells What He Saw in Korea." U.S. News & World Report, 12 December 1952, p. 44. Fehrcnbach, Theodore R. This Kind of War. New York: Macmillan, 1963. Finney, John W. "Vietcong Pledge on Captives Given." The New York Times, 28 July 1966, p. 1:7. 323 "Foe Begins Truce but Allies Report Attack on Post." Thc New York Timcs, 27 January 1968, p. 1:4. "Foe Hands 3 GI's to Antiwar Group." The New York Times, 11 November 1967, p. 6:5. "Fourteen South Vietnamese Released by.Enemy." The New York Times, 29 January 1968, p. 4:4. Frankel, Max. "18 Senate 'Doves' Urge Hanoi Spare Captured Pilots." The New York Timcs, 16 July 1966, p. 1:1. Garcia-Mora, Manuel R. International Law and Asylum as a Human Right. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956. "GI's Reseuc 51 Vietnamese from Junglc Prison." Thc New York Timcs, 11 February 1967, p. 3:2. Gutteridge, J.A.C. "The Repatriation of Prisoners of War." International and Comparative Law Quarterly, April 1953, p. 207-216. "Hanoi Appoinfs Panel to Study U.S_ War Crimes." The Ncw York Times, 24 July 1966, p.1:1. Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Army. Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. International Committee of the Red Cross. "External Affairs: Vietnam." International Review of thc Rcd Cross, April 1967, p. 125-126, 188-189, 246. "Journal Memo." 7'h-eJournal ofthc Armcd Forccs, 16 September 1967, p. 4. Joy, C. Turner. How Communists Negotiatc. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Kunz,.Josef L. "The Laws of War." American Journal of Intcrnational Law, April 1956, p. 313-337. Levie, Howard S. "Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power." American Journal of Intcrnational Law, April 1961, p. 374-397_ Lusinehi, Vietor. "U.S. Calls on Red Cross to Study Hanoi Charges." Thc New York Times, 30 September 1965, p. 1:6-7. Lyons, William 1'. "Prisoncrs of War and the Cod,: of Conducl." NmJIII War Colil'KI! /{I'r>il!w, Dccember 1967, p. 60-96. Mayda, Jero. "The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law." American Journal of Intcrnational Law, July 1953, pAl4-438. Message from General Matthew B. Ridgway to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. DA-IN 3785. Tokyo: 28 November 1951. Message from U.S. Dept. of the Army to Commander in Chief, Far East Command. "Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North Korean Prisoners_" DA 99024. Washington: 15 August 1951. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Far East Command. JCS 89172. Washington: 10 December 1951. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Far East Command, JCS 92059. Washington: 15 January 1952. Message from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Matthew B. Ridgway, JCS 95354. Washington: 30 June 1951. "Mr. Harriman to Supervise U.S. Actions on POW's in Viet-Nam." 7'he Departmcnt of Statc lJullctin, 6 June 1966, p. 888_ Murray, J.C. "The Prisonrr Ts."Ile in thl! Korl'an Armistice NI:j:(olialiolll"" JlTaril/1! Corps Ga:I'UI!, Angnst 1955. p. :12 .. Hl; H('plmnIH:r 1955. p. :W-:15. "National H('cont:ililltioll in Ronlh Virlnllm." nt'llllllll I"formali,," Noles. no. n, July J 9b7, Dept. of Slate Publication 8260. "North Vietnam Frees Three American Pilots." Thc Washington Post, 17 February 1968, p. 1:3'- "Opinion at Home and Abroad: Threat by \I.moi." The Nl!w York l';lIW.~, 24 Jnly 1966, p. E11:5-6. Parks, Larry G. "Enforeement of the Laws of War." Leeture. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.T.: 4 October 1967. "The President's News Conference of July 20, 1966." Weekly Compilation of Prcsidcntial Documcnts, 25 July 1966, p. 959-963. "Prisoners of War." Victnam Information Notcs, no. 9, August 1967, Dept. of State Publication 8275. "Prisoners: Three Who Came Baek." Thc New York Timcs, 25 February 1968, p. E-2:6-7. Ridgway, Matthew B. The Korean War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967. Ridgway, Matthew B. Solllicr. New York: Harper, 1956. Rusk, Dean. "U.S. Continues to Abide by Geneva Conventions of 1949 in Viet-Nam." Thc Department of Statc Bulletin, 13 September 1965, p. 447. 324 "Saigon Frees 3 Vietcong in Return for Release of 3." The New York Times, 24 January 1967, p. 3:1. Sheehan, Neil. "Reds' Execution of 2 Americans Assailed by U.S." The New York Times, 28 September 1965, p. 1:1. Shub, Boris. The Choice. New York: Ducll, Sloan and Pearce, 1950. Stonc, J utius. Legal Controls of International Conflict. New York: Rinehart, 1954. "SVN Releases 39 Sick and Wounded PW's in Move to Persuade NVN to Reciprocate." The New York Times, 13 June 1967, p. 3:1. "3,200 of Foe Held in 4 Vietnam Camps." The New York Times, 13 April 1967, p. 5:3. "22 Prisoners of Vietcong Reported Freed by G.I.'s." The New York Times, 21 July 1967, p. 2:8. "Two Captured Americans are Freed by Vietcong." The New York Times, 25 January 1968, p. 13:1. United Nations. General Assembly. "Text of Resolution on Prisoners of War." The Department of State Bulldtin, 8 December 1952, p. 916·917. United Nations Command. Korean Armistice Negotiations: Liaison Officers'Meetings. Pan Mun Jom: 10 October 1951·29 July 1953. United Nations Command. Korean Armistice Negotiations: Military Armistice Conferences. Record of Events and Transcript of Proceedings. Pan Mun J om Meetings 1-132: Session 27 _ (25 October 1951) through Session 158 (19 July 1953). United Nations Command. Korean Armistice Negotiations: Staff Officers' Meetings on Agenda Item 4. Pan Mun J om: 23 J anuary-l0 May 1952. United Nations Command. Korean Armistice Negotiations: Subdelegation on Agenda Item 4. Summary of Proceedings. Pan Mun Jom Meetings: Session 1 (11 December 1951) through Session 71 (15 March 1952). "U.S. and South Vietnamese Leaders Meet at Honolulu." The Department of State Bulletin, 28 February 1966, p. 302-309. "U.S. Calion P.O.W.'s Rejected by Hanoi." The NelV York Times, 9 Del:l:mbcr J966, p. 2:1:6. u.S. Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War. POW, the Fight Continucs aftcr tile Battlc. The Report of the Secretary of Defcnse's Advisory Committee on Prisoncrs of War. Washington: u.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1955. U.S. Office of Armed Forces Information and Education. Code of the. U.S. Fighting Man. DOD Gen.-H. Washington: 1964. "U.S. Renews Drive on POW Exchange." The New York Times, 12 May 1967, p. 4:7. Vateher, William H., Jr. Panmunjom: the Story of the Korean Armistice Negotiations. New York: Praeger, 1958. Welles, Benjamin. "U.S. Asserts Hanoi Mistreats Fliers." The New York Times, 15 October 1967, p.3:1. "White House Statement on Prisoners of War in Vietnam" The New York Timcs, 18 July 1967, p.2:4. Yingling, Raymund T. and Ginnane, Robert W. "The Geneva Conventions of 1949." American Journal of International Law, July 1952, p. 393-427. ----'f1----