FROM KOJE-DO TO PANMUNJOM:

THE PROBLEM OF REPATRIATION OF

PRISONERS OF WAR DURING THE

KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

By

Joseph H. Poles

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of

The Sc hmidt College of Arts and· Humanities in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

Florida Atlantic University

Boca Raton, Florida

May 1997 Copyright by Joseph H. Poles 1 99 7

i i FROM KOJE-00 TO PANMUNJOM: THE PROBLEM OF REPATRIATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR DURING THE KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

by

Joseph H. Poles

This thesis was prepared under the direction of the candidate's thesis advisor, Dr. John O'Sullivan, Department of History and has been approved by the members of his supervisory committee. It was submitted to the faculty of The Schmidt College of Arts and Humanities and was accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

Thesis 0d't'

Chairperson:;:artment of History

The Schmidt College of Arts and Huma

iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Dr. John O'Sullivan's guidance in the preparation of this manuscript was immeasurable. His input and guidance throughout the entire phase of this project was invaluable. I would also like to thank Dr. Patricia Kollander and Dr. Tsung-1 Dow for their aid in this project. Their interest and direction were vital in completion of this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of Mrs.

Susan Leavitt who proofread this manuscript.

iv ABSTRACT

Author: Joseph H. Poles

Title: From Koje-Do to Panmunjom: The Problems of Repatriation of Prisoners of War During the Korean Armistice Negotiations

Institution: Florida Atlantic University

Thesis Advisor: Dr. John O'Sullivan

Degree: Master of Arts

Year: 1997

The repatriation of prisoners of war during the Korean Conflict presented the greatest problem to the armistice negotiators trying to end the fighting. Problems arose in the interpretation of various articles of the Geneva Convention of 1949 as it related to prisoners of war. The Communist interpreted these articles to mean that prisoners of war had to be repatriated back to their country of origin. The United Nations position was that the intent of the

Geneva Convention meant that prisoners of war had a choice. This war within a war prolonged the Korean Conflict for more than one year. As Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief UNC negotiator stated:

"Voluntary repatriation cost us over a year of war and cost us our

United Nations Command prisoners in Communist camps a year of captivity." Because of these negotiations, a precedent was set for future repatriation of POW's.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTROD UCTION.•.•.•..•....•...•....• •..••..•••.•.•.•..•....•.••...... •...•..•.•....•...•...... ••.•••...... 1

Chapter

1. EVOLUTION OF THE ARMISTICENEGOTIA TIONS •••••.••••...•••.•••.••••••....• 9

2. KOJE-DO: A WAR WITHIN A WAR •.••...•...•.•..•...•..•.•...... •.••... ..••.... 57

3. s-r-ALEMA TETO ARMISTICE•••••.••••••.••...••••...••...••.•.•...••. ••.•.••.•••.•...•...•..•. 82

4. THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AND THE AFTERMATH .•.....•...•••...••..•..... 134

CONa.lJ.SION••..••...•.•.•.•.. •••.••••••••.•••••••..••.•.•...••••.••.••.••..•...•.•....•..•••.•.••••• •••••••...••.• 160

Appendix

A. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS FROM

JUNE1, 1951 TO JULY27, 1953.•...•...... •.....••.....•...•. 170

B. PLENARY MEMBERS OF THE ARMis-r-ICE DELEGATION •...•••••..•...• 172

C. REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR ...... •...... •.....•...... •...... •...... ••. 1 74

D. NONREPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR •..•.••.••.•.•..••.•••••.•..••••••..••.••.175

E. BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE KOREAN WAR...... •..• ...... •...•.••...... ••.176

F. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND INJURED

PRISONERS OF WAR••••••••••••..••••••••. ••••..•..••.•••..••.•.••..••..•••••..•••••..••..••.1 78

G. ARMISTICE LINE JULY27, 1953 •....•...... •...... •...•...... •.••...... 181

SELECT'E.DBIBUOG RAPHY•...•••••..•..•••.• ..•.•...•.•.....•.•..•.•...•..•••.•.•..•.•..•.•••..•..•.. 182

vi INTRODUCTION

On July 27, 1953, two years and seventeen days after the beginning of negotiations to end the Korean Conflict, an armistice was signed at Panmunjom, Korea. Thus ended the fighting that brought into direct confrontation the United Nations Command,

Republic of Korea, North Korean People's Republic, the Peoples

Republic of China, and, indirectly, the U.S.S.R.1

Of the items of discussion in the armistice talks, the one that caused the most difficulty and took the longest to resolve, dealt with prisoners of war. This thesis concerns the problems of repatriation of prisoners of war and how the failure of the United

Nations Command and Communist negotiators to agree on this issue extended the Korean Conflict for over one year.

Previous research on this topic has examined the legal and humanitarian aspects of the interpretation of the Geneva Convention of 1 949 and how it was applied to the repatriation of prisoners of war. The legal position reflected the Communists' literal interpretation of Article 1 18, which stated that prisoners of war had no choice but to be repatriated to their individual countries. As

Andre Vyshinsky, United Nations delegate from the Soviet Union put it, "there is no need to look behind the words in Article 118; captor states are obligated to repatriate all prisoners of war without 2 exception. "

1 The UN armistice delegation chose not to acknowledge this position. They believed that the Geneva Convention was designed for the protection of prisoners of war and that it was written based on humanitarian principles. Citing the climate of opinion that existed after World War II, delegation members claimed the articles intended that prisoners of war had a choice on whether to be repatriated or not.

Previous research on the Korean Conflict has underplayed the

UN's emphasis on a humanitarian solution to the POW problem.

Though many books have been written about the war, surprisingly, few have dealt exclusively with the POW repatriation conflict. Most works that have appeared on this aspect of the subject are dated.

Many of these deal with the reasons for the conflict, the battles, conditions in the POW camps, the armistice negotiations, and the repatriation problem in general, but do not concentrate on how the

POW repatriation conflict extended the war for an additional year.

A dissertation by Myong Whai Kim entitled Prisoners of War as a Problem of the Korean written in 1960 focused on the question of PO�'s. Kim attempted to prove that prisoners of war should not be repatriated by force if their refusal to return to their countries is based on good faith. 3 George

Alapatt's 1958 dissertation entitled The of the

of War Prisoners in Relation to the Korean Armistice and in View of the Division of Korea examined the creation, organization and work of the Neutral Nation's Repatriation

Commission in implementing the exchange of Korean POW's. 4 A dissertation entitled The Korean Armistice by Jaroslav

2 J. Brazda submitted in 19 5 6 examined why it took nearly two years to negotiate the armistice. The author examined the political considerations, Cold War tensions and complexities caused by United

Nations involvement.5 These authors individually examined the repatriation from differing viewpoints, but with the exception of

Brazda, who argued political and Cold War reasons for the war's extension, no other author examined the war's continuation due entirely tQ the POW repatriation issue.

Pittman B. Potter's article entitled "Repatriation of Prisoners of

War" published in 1952, pointed out that particular circumstances in the Korean War had led to the possibility that some repatriated prisoners from North Korea or Communist China might be mistreated

by their governments. This article addressed the legal question regarding whether the POW's should be returned, and concluded that 6 the Korean Conflict altered previous principles of repatriation.

Jaro Mayda's 1953 article entitled "The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law, 11 traced the historiography of prisoner of war problems from the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that ended Russian participation in World War I up until to the Korean armistice talks.

Mayda examined prisoners' rights under the various articles of the

Geneva Convention of 1949 and discussed voluntary versus involuntary repatriation. He questioned the interpretation and 7 applicability of existing law as it was applied in Korea. Jeffrey E.

Rockwell's 1973 article entitled "The Right of Nonrepatriation of

Prisoners of War Captured by the United States, 11 examined the legality of the repatriation issue and discussed the reasons why various articles in the Geneva Convention of 1949 were framed. The

3 author argued that the individual had a personal right to refuse

repatriation.8 Jan P. Charmatz and Harold M. Wit, writing for The

Yale Law Journal in 1953, examined some of the same issues as

Rockwell and discuss in detail the U.S.S.R.'s interpretation of the 9 articles pertaining to prisoners of war. All of the above authors

have analyzed the question of the rights of prisoners under the

Geneva Convention concluding that legally the individual's rights

have precedent over the rights of states.

Walter G. Hermes's Truce Tent and Front written in

1966 is the official Army account of the truce negotiations held at

Kaesong and then Panmunjom between July 1 951 and July 1 953. The book detailed the offers and counteroffers of the UN negotiators and

Chinese Communists and covers the military conflict during this period. The prisoner of war issue is discussed only as part of the 1 negotiating process. 0 Books such as Stanley Weintraub's The War

in the Wards: Korea's Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-Of-War

written in 1966 and Kenneth Hansen's 1957 work entitled

Heroes Behind Barbed Wire discussed the Communist prisoners of

war and how the repatriation question affected the talks at 1 1 Panmunjom.

All of the above works touch on various aspects of the Korean

Conflict. Though they concentrate on negotiations and particular

aspects of the prisoner's life in the camps, they do not pay adequate

attention to the relationship between POW repatriation and the extension of the conflict in Korea.

Because this study examines the reasons why the POW issue extended the Korean Conflict for over a year, it adds a fresh

4 perspective to the study of the problems the UN negotiators faced during the Korean armistice negotiations. The Korean Conflict was

fought at the height of the Cold War and negotiations mirrored the

power politics that prevailed during this period. This study

examines the interpretive humanitarian position taken by the UNC which held that prisoners should not be forcibly repatriated and

analyzes the reasons why this position extended the war.

This thesis draws on many sources used by historians in the

past, and also includes new information such as the diaries of

Admiral C. Turner Joy, senior UN delegate to the peace talks from

July 8, 1951 until May 22, 1952 and Secretary of State Dean

Acheson's memoirs. Background material has also been drawn from

newly de-classified documents from the Soviet archives.

Additionally, U.S. State Congressional documents of the United States, as well as books, articles, and

periodicals relating to the armistice agreements have been utilized.

This thesis will examine the Korean armistice talks in five

parts. Chapter One will deal with the outbreak of the war, its

progression until peace negotiations started in the summer of 1 9 51 ,

the onset of Korean armistice negotiations, the actual negotiation

process and the points resolved. The chapter concludes with the

results of the screening of Communist POW's and the Communist

reaction to the results. Chapter Two delves into the Communist

reaction culminating in the Communist POW riots at Koje-do. The

capture and release of Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, and the

implications at Panmunjom are also discussed. The chapter concludes with the effects the riots had on summer negotiations.

5 Chapter Three discusses the summer peace talks after the Koje-do riots, the United Nations proposals to end the fighting, and examines the tesolution of the repatriation question. The chapter concludes with the reaction by Syngman Rhee to the proposed armistice.

Chapter Four will discuss the last minute attempt by South Korea to stop the armistice, and the terms of the armistice. It also analyzes reasons why the communists lost the propaganda war and discusses the possible effects of the repatriation settlement on future wars.

The question of why some United States POW's defected to the communist side will be examined. The thesis concludes with an analysis of why the war was prolonged.

6 NOTES

1The sixteen nations were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, Philippines, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

2Jan P. Charmatz and Harold M. Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," The Yale Law 62 (February 1953), 395.

3Myong Whai Kim, "Prisoners of War as a Major Problem of the Korean Armistice, 1953" (Ph.D diss. New York University, 1960).

4George K. Alapatt, "The Legal Implications of the Repatriation of War Prisoners in Relation to the Korean Armistice and in View of the Division of Korea" (Ph.D diss. Saint Louis University, 1958).

5Jaroslav Jan Brazda, "The Korean Armistice Agreement" (Ph.D diss. University of Florida, 1956).

6Pittman B. Potter, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War," The American Journal of International Law 46 (July 1952).

7 Jaro Mayda, "The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law," The American Journal of International Law 47 (July 1953).

8Jeffrey E. Rockwell, "The Rights of Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War Captured by the United States," The Yale Law Journal 83 (December 1973).

9 Charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention." The Yale Law Journal 62 (February 1953).

7 1 Owalter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Front (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966).

11 Stanley Weintraub, War in the Wards: Korea's Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-Of-War (San Rafael California: Presidio Press, 1976); and Kenneth K. Hansen., Colonel, Infantry, USA, Heroes Behind Wire (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957).

8 CHAPTER ONE

EVOLUTION OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

Before World War II there were few Americans who thought of or knew about Korea. Except for some missionaries, Americans had little occasion to know "the land of the morning calm" until our occupation forces landed there in the late summer of 1945.1

The future for Korea was formulated during World War n at the

Cairo Conference of November 1943. The declaration issued jointly by President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek said in part that "the aforesaid Three

Great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."2 Later at Teheran and at Yalta, the future of Korea was discussed between Roosevelt and Josef Stalin. The Soviet leader also subscribed to the pledge made at Cairo, and agreed with the United States that the 38th parallel should temporarily divide

Korea into North and South zones of responsibility until the Koreans were able to govern themselves.3 The 38th parallel had military considerations also. Its location was convenient to effect the surrender of Japanese troops. All Japanese troops north of the line would surrender to Soviet forces; all to the south would surrender to

United States forces. President Harry Truman, in his memoirs,

9 stated that "the 38th parallel as a dividing line was never the subject of international discussion. It was proposed as a practical solution when the sudden collapse of the Japanese war machine created a vacuum in Korea. "4 The collapse of the Japanese army occurred when Russian spearheads drove the Japanese troops across the Yalu River into Korea. This action continued even after the official cessation of hostilities on August 1 5, 1945.5

US policy was initially intended to present a true international presence in Korea. Between 1945 and 1950, however, due to the US­

Soviet rivalry, this policy changed. America moved from Roosevelt's more open diplomacy exemplified by the United Nations organization and the "four policemen" (the United States, USSR, Great Britain,

China) who would regulate the peace to Truman's policy of containment. Utilizing political and economic barriers as blockades against the Soviet Union, this policy would "contain" the Soviet

Union in specified areas throughout the world. The policy of containment was applied in Greece and Turkey as of 1947 and in East 6 Asia as of 1950.

On 1 0 May 1948, in South Korea, elections were held under the auspices of a UN commission. This first free election in Korean history elected a National Assembly, chose Syngman Rhee as chairman, and then proceeded to write a constitution for the 7 Republic of Korea. Meanwhile, in the North, the Russians had built up the Communist Party organization and Kim II Sung, an exiled

Korean Communist, and former guerrilla leader, took over power. On

9 September 1946, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed in Pyongyang.8

10 At the beginning of 1950, Korea was not of strategic importance to the United States. On 12 January 1950, Secretary of

State Dean Acheson gave his now famous National Press Club speech where he stated that "the U.S. West Pacific defensive perimeter would cover the Aleutians, to Japan, to the Ryukyus, and ultimately to the Philippines, excluding Taiwan and South Korea. "9 This statement would prove disastrous because it gave Kim II Sung the green light to invade South Korea.1 0

At 0400 hours local time on 24 June 1950, the North Korean

Peoples Army attacked the Republic of Korea.ll According to John

Muccio, the United States Ambassador in Seoul, North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and attacked ROK forces at several points.12 Secretary of State Dean Acheson notified by the White

House after it had received a cable from Ambassador Muccio of the attack, called President Truman vacationing at his home in

Independence, Missouri.13 Secretary Acheson instructed the U.S.

Ambassador to the United Nations to ask the Secretary General of the United Nations Trygve Lie to call the Security Council into session. On Sunday, 25 June, the Security Council was convened without the Soviet Union representative, Jacob Malik. Malik was in

Moscow boycotting the council as a protest against its refusal to seat the Peking regime instead of the Chinese Nationalists. 1 4 The resolution condemning the "armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" and calling for a cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel was adopted 9-0, with Yugoslavia abstaining.15

11 President Truman believed the conflict had been instigated by

Stalin to test US resolve, and that Stalin felt the United States would not react out of fear of starting a third world war.l 6 U.S. policy in the Far East had been to prevent domination of East Asia by a single power. During World War II, this policy was directed at containing Japan; it would have to be applied to Korea for the same reasons. Cold War policy could not allow a unification of Korea by the North that would place Communist Korea in the same sphere with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

On Tuesday, 27 June, after continuance of the attack by the

North Koreans and after an appeal by the South Korean Ambassador,

President Truman directed the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, to call General Douglas MacArthur on the scrambler phone with the following orders. General MacArthur was to use air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea but only south of the 38th parallet.17 He was also instructed to dispatch the Seventh Fleet to the Formosa Strait to prevent attacks on Chiang Kai-shek as well as keeping Chiang from attacking the mainland. The Security Council of the United Nations met again and adopted a resolution calling on all members of the U.N. to give assistance to South Korea.18 On 30

June, General MacArthur, after a reconnaissance mission to the front, returned to Tokyo and telegraphed General J. Lawton Collins,

Chief of Staff of the Army, that the South Korean army retreat was a rout, and American combat troops were necessary to stop North

Korean advances. 1 9 MacArthur's visit to Korea was prompted by the fall of Seoul on 28 June and the reported disintegration of the ROK

12 army. On 30 June President Truman ordered U.S. ground forces into

Korea.

The first U.S. troops landed in Korean on 5 July. "Task Force

Smith" composed of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry commanded by

Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Smith landed in Korea and went into

action in the area around Osan, south of Seoul. After a holding action

and forced to retreat south to the Pusan area, this small group of

soldiers were reinforced by US and ROK troops. Setting up a

defensive perimeter at an area just north of Pusan across the

Naktong River, the U.S. 8th Army and the ROK A Army dug in and held

their position. Between 5 July and 1 5 September these combined

forces experienced heavy fighting and a high casualty rate. The

heaviest fighting of the war took place between 27 August and 15

September around the Pusan perimeter area.20 On 15 September the

tide turned in favor of the UN Forces. On that date General Douglas

MacArthur landed at lnch'on Korea.

On 18 September, the Inch' on landing allowed the UN Forces to

break out of the Pusan perimeter. Seoul was recaptured on 26

September. The first phase of the Korean War ended 30 September

as ROK army units pushed north of Seoul pressing a rollback against

rapidly withdrawing North Korean forces.21 Trapped between the

anvil and the hammer not more than 2 5,000 survivors of the NKPA were able to retreat north of the 38th parallet.22

By 30 September 1950, the U.N. forces had reached the 38th parallel and it was decided to cross this artificial barrier and move into North Korean territory. This move was based on two objectives of the United Nations with regard to Korea. The first objective was

13 "to repel the armed attack" and this had been accomplished when the

UN Forces had reached the 38th parallel. The second objective was

"to restore international peace and security in the area."23 A reasonable interpretation of this troop movement was to insure that

North Korea would not invade the South again. Under these circumstances, American units of the Eighth Army moved across the parallel at Kaesong; the ROK troops had gone across days before.24

Pushing north without much opposition, UN forces captured

P'yongyang, the capital of North Korea, on 19 October and reached the

Yalu River by the end of October 1950.25 The North Korean Army was rescued by the Chinese 4th Field Army that moved across the

Yalu River and attacked the UN Forces across a broad front beginning in early November 1 9 50 forcing them south and recapturing Seoul on

4 January 1951.26 The UN Forces counterattacked, retook Seoul on

18 March, and established a firm defensive line near the 38th parallel.27

As the war swept up and down the Korean peninsula, the UN

Command had captured over 170,000 prisoners of war.28 On 6

January 1 951 , General Ridgway wrote to General MacArthur expressing his anxiety over the dislocation of resources caused by these prisoners. What concerned Ridgway was "the presence close to the fighting zone of some 140,000 prisoners of war whom we had to feed, water, guard, and care for."29 Ridgway was faced with another problem: What would the UN command do with the POW's if a withdrawal from the peninsula was necessary? In his reply,

MacArthur recommended that the prisoners be moved from Korea to the United States. Moving them to Japan was out of the question for

14 two reasons: The location of POW camps in Japan would expose that country to charges of belligerency, while the climate of enmity between Japan and Korea would enrage the Japanese population if

Korean POW's were located in any part of the country. The decision was made to remove the POW's to small islands off the coast of

Korea, south of Pusan. 30 Two islands selected were Cheju-do and

Koje-do.31 Cheju-do was eliminated because with the prisoners, their guards, and support personnel, the island's population would double.32

The American army was unprepared to guard Korean POW's. The handling of Asian POW's in general and Communists in particular required understanding the Oriental culture but in most cases inadequately trained officers and enlisted men were assigned to the task. According to Stanley Weintraub's War in the Korea's

Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of-War "the enlisted men on PW duty were often rejects of one kind or another:•33 The result was that South Korean security forces under the Republic of

Korea Provost Marshall General were assigned the task of guarding communist POW's. Since the Korean War was a civil war between the North and the South, this hatred generated problems and claims of maltreatment of POW's by ROK guards that would cause later problems for UN armistice negotiators. 34 Chinese prisoners of war would present even greater problems at the armistice table.

The entry of Communist China into the Korean conflict posed diplomatic and military problems for the United States. The UN command would be under pressure to extend the war against China by aerial and naval bombardment. If this happened, the U.S. might lose

15 support of its allies.35 President Truman met with the National

Security Council at 3:00 P.M. November 28 where it was decided not to bomb airfields in Manchuria. By the weekend of December 2-3, the options facing the Administration were grave. The danger to the

MacArthur's Korean command was so great that the United States might have to sue for an armistice, or, if forced to retreat south, might have to risk general war by bombing China's Manchurian bases.

Because of these two options, the State Department was given approval to seek a cease-fire either through General Wu, the Red

Chinese delegate at the UN, or through countries having diplomatic relations with Peking.36

On 11 January 1951, the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester

Pearson, presented a statement of five principles for cease-fire on behalf of the cease-fire group of United Nations. These proposals called for a cease-fire, a re-unification of Korea on UN principles, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the establishment of an appropriate body on which would be represented the United States, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China to settle Far Eastern problems. The final proposal, and the one that the UN hoped would sway the Chinese, was UN representation of the PRC. Acheson recommended to the President that the United States delegation vote for the resolution. On 1 3 January 19 5 1 , the General Assembly, by a vote of SO to 7, supported the resolution.37 On 17 January the PRC turned down the proposals on the grounds that "all efforts by the

United Nations to mediate the conflict were illegitimate since the rr U.N. was itself a party to the struggle in Korea. 38 This failure to

16 mediate the Korean problem would cause the war to continue for two more years, and cause casualties in the millions for both sides.

One such casualty was the commander of the Eighth Army,

General Walton H. Walker. On 23 December 1950, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident and Major General Matthew B. Ridgway was appointed to succeed him. Within a month the retreat ended, and

UN troops "started rolling forward." Except for a heavy Chinese counterattack in mid-February, the advance continued. On March 15

Seoul was retaken, never to be lost again. By 9 April the Army, under Ridgway's direction, established a defensive perimeter to withstand any communist assault.39

By the spring of 19 51 , UN forces had regained previously lost territory and the greater part of South Korea had been recaptured.

The Administration had abandoned any hopes of uniting Korea by force and was ready to seek a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

The Communist forces, having lost considerable resources in the

Spring Offensive had reached a similar conclusion. It appeared to all concerned that the war was now stalemated. 40 The Joint Chiefs of

Service (JCS) had met, acknowledged a stalemate existed, and made four recommendations. These recommendations were integrated into a new National Security Council (NSC) policy statement of American objectives and procedures to be followed in the Far East. These dictated that U.S. forces in Korea were to pursue their current military course of action until a political settlement could be reached while developing the South Korean Army as rapidly as possible. In addition, preparations were to be made immediately for action against the Chinese mainland in the event of a broadening of

17 the war by the Communists. Finally, steps were to be taken to determine Allied support for the United States if action had to be taken against mainland China.4 1 This NSC policy of 1 7 May 1 951 determined the course of action for the next two years until the armistice was signed 27 July 1953.

While General Ridgway was fighting the enemy, General

MacArthur was fighting both the Pentagon and the President.

MacArthur believed that Chinese aggression "could not be stopped by killing Chinese." Unless the enemy's war potential was opened to counter-attack, he stated publicly on 7 March 1 9 51 , the battle lines would reach a stalemate. On 1 5 March, in defiance of President

Truman's order of 6 December 1950 against giving unauthorized statements to the press, MacArthur criticized U.S. policy over conduct of the war. These statements by MacArthur led to his recall on 11 April 1 9 51 and General Matthew B. Ridgway's appointment as

Far East Commander.42 The war, from the UN perspective, would be fought with fewer internal diversions.

With Korean military and political objectives now agreed upon between the Administration and with its allies, what was needed was an indication from the Communists of their desire to start negotiations. The West could not approach the Chinese again as they had been rebuffed twice in the past. On 26 May, Lester Pearson,

Canadian Minister of External Affairs gave a radio talk in which he stated, "the object of this 'limited United Nations war' was not the kind of complete capitulation of the enemy ...but the defeat of aggression against the Republic of Korea." This was followed by

Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who stated,

18 "a cease-fire around the Parallel would fulfill the main purpose of the Security Council's resolutions of the summer of 1950."43

On 1 June 1 9 51 , Dean Acheson, told the Senate Armed Services and the Foreign Relations committees that "the objective of our military operation in Korea is to end aggression, to safeguard against its renewal, and to restore peace."44 The United States, as

Acheson described it, "cast around like a pack of hounds looking for a scent."4 5 George Kennan was approached and asked if he would contact Jacob Malik to see "how Moscow viewed the situation and what if any suggestions it might have." Kennan sent Malik a longhand note and asked to see him. A prompt reply invited him to the Soviet

Union's UN delegation summer residence on Long Island. On 5 June

Malik was able to tell Kennan "that the Soviet Government wanted peace and a peaceful solution in Korea and as rapidly as possible" but it could not take part in discussions of a cease-fire.46 On 23 June

Malik delivered a speech on a UN radio program where he stated that the Soviet Union felt the conflict in Korea could be settled and the first prerequisite must be a cease-fire and an armistice providing for withdrawal of all forces from the 38th parallel.4 7

The U.S. reaction to Malik's speech was cautious. The State

Department instructed U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Alan G.

Kirk to see Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko to ask for clarification on Mr. Malik's statement. Gromyko explained that, "in his view, the armistice should, in the first place, include a cease­ fire and, secondly, should be limited to strictly military questions without involving any political or territorial desires."48 On 25

June, China endorsed the Soviet proposal, but added that "if the

19 Americans want peace they would accept in its entirety the proposals by the Soviet Government and the Peking government. "49

There were a number of conferences between State Department and

Defense officials concerning both the Moscow and Peking replies. As a result of these conferences, a recommendation was made that a statement by General Ridgway be given offering to meet the

Communist commander. President Truman approved the text, and it was sent to the Far East commander on Friday, 29 June 1951.50 On

30 June Ridgway sent messages to both General Kim II Sung, of the

Korean Peoples Army, and Peng Teh-huai of the Chinese Peoples

Volunteers. These messages asked that a meeting be held to discuss an armistice "providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed forces in Korea." Ridgway proposed this meeting be held aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonson harbor.51 On 2 July both

Kim and Peng accepted the meeting but proposed "that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the Thirty-eighth Parallel."

They suggested that representatives meet between 10 July and 1 5

July 1951.52

The one dissenting voice to the whole subject of peace talks came from President Syngman Rhee. On 30 June Rhee stated "that he would refuse to recognize any situation that conflicts with national sovereignty or territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea." A cease-fire at the 38th parallel would be unacceptable, but Rhee's refusal was not taken seriously in Washington. South Korea would just have to go along with the truce talks.53

According to Colonel J.C. Murray, who participated as a senior staff officer in the truce negotiations from July 1 9 51 until their

20 completion July 1953, he stated that "at 0900 hours, July 8, 1951, we three, with Chinese and Korean interpreters, crossed the lmjin

River at Munsan-Ni by helicopter and set a course for enemy-held

Kaesong."54 Air Force Colonel Jack Kinney and ROK Army Colonel Lee

Soo Young accompanied Murray as part of the initial team. 55 When the helicopter landed on a field designated as a landing area highlighted by a white panel and surrounded by soldiers, the UN negotiators were met by two interpreters and taken to a former tea house not far from the landing strip that would become the site for armistice negotiations. Present at the tea house were Col. Chang,

KPA,(Korean Peoples Army), Lt.-Col. Kim, KPA, and Lt.-Col. Tsai, CPV

(Chinese Peoples Volunteers).SG When the UN negotiators entered the room, they sat down in seats around a table facing south.57

Kinney submitted a list of UNC delegates. After a three-hour recess the Communists announced their delegation, to be headed by Lt. Gen.

Nam II of the KPA. Arrangements were made to schedule the first meeting to take place on 1 0 July at which time the meeting ended.5 8

General Ridgway appointed Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy to head the United Nations delegation. The chief Communist negotiator was

Lieutenant General Nam II, Chief of Staff of the NKPA. On the

Chinese Communist side were Generals Teng Hua and Peng Teh-huai, commander of the 1 Sth Army Group of the Chinese Communist Army.

The real power, however, was General Hsieh Fang, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army.S9

The armistice negotiations began on 10 July 1951 at Kaesong.

At the opening of the meeting Admiral Joy said that the delegation of the UN had been authorized to discuss military problems and

21 would not consider political or economic subjects. He then presented a nine-point agenda drawn up by the UN Command. 60

General Nam rejected the nine-points as "unduly long and repetitious." He submitted a shorter five-point agenda that would allow the subjects to be discussed in their correct order. These included adoption of an agenda, establishment of the 38th parallel as a demarcation line, withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea, arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea, and arrangements relating to prisoners of war following the armistice. 61

Admiral Joy stated that the proper order of business should be first to establish the general subjects that both sides agree to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific agreement on which agreement could be achieved: "Such a case is that of the demilitarized zone." The delegation of the UN Command noted "that first it should be agreed that discussion of some demarcation line and some demilitarized zone is desired by and agreeable to both parties." Joy then pointed out that "once the general topic is agreed upon, later meetings can approach the question as to which particular line and zone can be agreed upon."62 The next topic discussed was the withdrawal of foreign armed forces. Joy stated:

"The various governments with armed forces in Korea operating with the United Nations Command have authorized these armed forces to be in Korea. Therefore, the withdrawal of these armed forces from

Korea must be approved by those same governments, as well as by the United Nations itself."63 This meant that the UN delegation was only authorized to make arrangements for cessation of military

22 actions of the armed forces in Korea. After an armistice had been

agreed to and military action ceased, could the matter of

withdrawal of foreign armed troops be discussed, and only by those

governments with armed forces in Korea. The conversation then

turned to the 38th parallel as a demarcation line.

The 38th parallel as a line and a demilitarized zone based upon

it would deprive the UN Command of a suitable defensive position

north of �he Han River at Seoul. Acceptance of the line would force

the UN to the south bank of the Han in order to insure the safety of

the troops. This would have meant a general withdrawal of one

hundred miles of territory the soldiers had won in combat and would

have left the northern position of the Republic of Korea

defenseless.64

At the first meeting with the Communist delegation, Admiral

Joy proposed the admission of newsmen. General Nam at first accepted the proposal but later reversed his decision stating his need to discuss this with his "Supreme Commander." General

Ridgway informed the Chinese that "our delegation would not return unless the area of the conference was truly neutral and correspondents from our side of the line could be present."65 On 15

July, the Communists agreed that the personnel of each delegation's party should not exceed 1 50, and that the composition of each party was the sole responsibility of each side.66

The City of Kaesong was in Communist hands with armed guards in control of the truce area. The appearance of the UN delegates in jeeps carrying the white flags of truce, were photographed for the

Asian press as a sign of surrender. On 13 July, Ridgway, in a letter

23 to Peng Teh-huai, insisted on a "5 mile circular area centered at

Kaesong as neutral zone and that area of site and roads thereto used

by both delegations be free of armed personnel. No hostile acts

within zone." On 15 July, the Communists agreed to this demand and 67 the talks were resumed.

On 1 5 July the UNC delegation presented its revised agenda

condensed to four points to counter the Communist support for the

38th parallel as a demarcation line. These included adoption of the

agenda, establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condition

for the cessation of hostilities in Korea, arrangements for a cease

fire and armistice that would insure against a resumption of

hostilities, and arrangements relating to prisoners of war.6 8

The Communists needed time to study this new proposal and at

the next session, 16 July, they agreed to eliminate the 38th parallel

from the agenda, but remained adamant on withdrawal of troops.6 9

However, the Communists seemed interested at arriving at an agenda

and this was accomplished on 26 July. General Ridgway issued a

statement that the delegations representing the belligerent forces

in Korea in the conference at Kaesong agreed upon an agenda for the

regulation of the military armistice conference.70

According to Admiral Joy, when the Communists face problems

in negotiations, they stage incidents. On the morning of 4 August,

the UN Command delegation was proceeding toward the tea house.

The convoy of jeeps was halted while one hundred heavily armed

Chinese troops marched across the path of the convoy. This was in

clear violation of the commitment made to General Ridgway by the

Communist commanders.71 General Ridgway, on an open radio

24 broadcast, announced suspension of the negotiations with

resumption contingent on the creation of a neutral zone around

Kaesong into which no armed personnel of either side were to be

introduced. 72 In answer to General Ridgway's statement, a message

was received from the Senior North Korean Delegate charging a

violation by UN forces. It was claimed that "at 3 p.m., August 7, a

supply truck of our delegation ...enc ountered two airplanes .... These

airplanes machine gunned the truck twice ... incapacitating the

truck."73 Although the meetings were resumed on 10 August, the UN

delegates felt that the Kaesong area was not a suitable place to hold

negotiations. The Communists could fabricate incidents whenever

they felt it was in their best interests to do so.7 4

General Ridgway was determined to remove the conference site

from Kaesong. On 6 September, he suggested that the talks be held in a more suitable place. The site agreed upon was Panmunjom,

located about five miles east of Kaesong and about fifteen miles

. west of Munsan. The meetings resumed at Panmunjom on 25 October 7 19 51. 5 When the talks resumed, the major sticking point remained the placing of the cease-fire line. The UN Command stated that the line must be in keeping with the military realities. According to

General Ridgway: "To have withdrawn our troops to the 38th parallel, placing them along a line that could not have been held, would have been indeed a surrender."76 Generals Hsieh Feng and Lee Sang Cho, departing from the principle of the 38th parallel, suggested that the battle zone extend from the vicinity of Kaesong on the east coast to

Changsan Got on the west. They referred to alleged fighting in the

Onjin and Yonan areas to prove that a battlefront existed in that

25 region. UN spokesmen Major General Henry I. Hodes and Rear Admiral

Arleigh A. Burke argued that there was no ground front in the west

and that the area the Communists wanted to trade would be a

military liability, an area that could not be defended. The UN

command refused to accept this Communist proposal.77 What was

significant was the fact the Communists had made no mention of the

38th parallel.

Negotiations over the cease-fire line continued, without

results, until 2 7 November when an agreement was reached. Over its

own and General Ridgway's objections, the United Nations Command

delegation received instructions from Washington directing the

delegation to agree to the truce line. 78 The proposal agreed upon by

both sides stated that "the current contact line should constitute

the demarcation line in the center of the demilitarized zone provided

the armistice was signed within 30 days of agreement on the

proposal." In addition, the proposal stated that "if the armistice was

not signed within this period, the demarcation line would be the

contact line when the armistice was eventually signed. "79 This

agreement accomplished two goals. First, it ended the stalemate

presented in the agenda Item 2 of 26 July 1951 and second, because

any territorial gains made during the thirty-day period would have

to be relinquished, it also stabilized the front for a month. This "de

facto" cease-fire for thirty days enabled the Communist's the time

to dig in and stabilize their battle lines. The UN negotiators felt

that military pressure exerted by their forces would give the

Communists no choice but to accept equitable armistice terms within a reasonable amount of time. Thereafter, because the

26 fighting slackened, the UN delegates lacked the essential pressure

with which to enforce a reasonable attitude towards negotiations. 80

The talks now turned to debate on Item 3, concrete

arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and armistice. The

UNC proposed that, in general, there should be no build-up of forces

after the armistice, and that a commission should be appointed with

an associated supervisory organ to see that the cease-fire was being 1 observed, and which would have free access to all parts of Korea. 8

In General Nam's opinion, Item 3 could be settled easily. Five

principles he advanced were accepted. The first was all armed

forces should cease hostilities on the day the armistice was signed.

Within three days all armed forces should be withdrawn from the

demilitarized zone and within five days all should be cleared from

the rear areas, coastal islands, and the waters on each side. Each

side would agree that there would be no armed forces or action in

the demilitarized zone and both sides would designate an equal

number of members to form an armistice commission to implement

the agreement. 82 There was no mention of free access to all parts

of Korea and so the talks became deadlocked. On 4 December the

Communist delegation accepted the UNC proposal for establishing a sub-delegation to iron out details and appointed Generals Lee and

Hsieh as members. Admiral Joy appointed Generals Turner and Hodes

to represent the UNC. By the end of the year three matters relating to ltem#3 of the 26 July agenda remained outstanding.83 It is indicative of future negotiations that it would take 1 55 days to resolve the above items. According to Admiral Joy, "the main reason it took so long to narrow the unsolved questions down to two lay in

27 the wide divergence between ourselves and the Communists in our approach to this topic of the agenda." What the Communists wanted was a simple cease-fire, as distinguished from a armistice with suitable supervision and adequate safeguards.84

The deliberations centered on means to enforce the armistice.

After weeks of discussion the Communists agreed to a limited inspection of certain specified air and sea ports of entry by personnel_ not of the opposing forces but from neutral nations. The

United Nations delegation accepted this and proposed the traditional neutrals Sweden and Switzerland. The Communists proposed

Czechoslovakia, Poland and the U.S.S.R. The UN delegation could not accept the Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations

Committee and along with the reconstruction of airfields issue; the talks on these two items ended. The talks now engaged the recommendations relating to disposition of POW's.85

The POW issue would dominate the talks until July 1953. On the surface, the problem of prisoners of war seemed simple. The

United States was a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1949, although it had not ratified the convention when the war began.

North Korea had declared shortly after the war began that it would abide by the stipulations.86 Article 1 18 of the convention states:

"Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay

after the cessation of active hostilities. "87 This declaration would

not seem to present any difficulties, yet difficulties did arise that prolonged the war for another eighteen months. The Communists insisted upon the return of all prisoners whether they wished to return or not, and pointed out that the Geneva Convention of 1 949

28 and international practice required this forcible repatriation. The

United States, however, asserted a new standard: voluntary repatriation based on humanitarian principles. 88 The United Nations position was formulated due to the treatment of prisoners of war during World War II.

How did this dispute arise? Since the Geneva Convention of

1929 had proved ine-ffective in preventing the suffering of prisoners of war during World War II, 89 the drafters of the Geneva Convention of 1 949 established the humanitarian protection of the individual prisoner. The convention was concerned with protecting the individual, not with guaranteeing the rights of states. Articles Six and Seven specifically prohibited any diminution of prisoner's individual rights, and Article Six and Nine envisaged improvement in their condition through channels outside the Convention.90 Prior to

World War II, it was assumed and insisted upon that the captor should promptly repatriate all prisoners of war at the end of hostilities with the exception of prisoners under prosecution for criminal offenses. It was not imagined that prisoners would not wish to be released and repatriated as quickly as possible. In addition, "refusal to repatriate was the chief offense of which a captor could be guilty." What happened in Korea was the UN

Command believed that some prisoners did not wish to be repatriated. In an article entitled "Repatriation of Prisoners of

War," Pittman B. Potter stated that "where some prisoners do not wish to be repatriated, humanitarian considerations and some of the ideas involved in the movement for international protection of the individual, whether a refugee or not, even against his own

29 government, have cut across pre-existing principles of repatriation. n91

At the end of 1 951 , many Chinese prisoners, who were former

supporters of Chang Kai-shek, were in UN Command prisoner of war camps. In addition, thousands of South Koreans, who at the beginning of the war had been captured and forced at gun point to serve in the Communist forces, were also held by the UNC. Large numbers of these prisoners indicated they did not want to return to

Communist controt.92 In July 1951, on the eve of negotiations, Brig.

Gen. Robert A. McClure, Army Chief of Psychological Warfare, had voiced his concern over th e possible fate of the former Nationalist soldiers when an armistice was reached. If forced to return to

Communist control, many of these prisoners would receive harsh treatment because they had surrendered to UN command. McClure presented this alternative solution, however debatable, that since these were ex-Nationalist soldiers, they would probably elect to return to Taiwan, ·an island that could be considered part of China.

This way the United States could avoid the experience of World War

II, when it had consented to the forcible repatriation of prisoners to the Soviet Union. It was suggested that no Chinese or North Korean prisoners should be forced to go back to Communist-controlled territory without their consent.93 In a public statement on May 7,

1952, President Truman expressed his feelings on repatriation when he stated: "We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.... To agree to a forced repatriation would be unthinkable."94 President Truman also declared that "we

30 must not use bayonets to force these prisoners to return to slavery and almost certain death at the hands of the communists."9 5

From the outset, the Communists had demanded the repatriation

of each and every prisoner captured by the UN forces. The U.S.S.R.,

China, and North Korea insisted that international law supported their position and attacked the UN position as a "flagrant violation

of the 1949 Geneva Convention."96 The attack on the United Nations

position and the alternative are based on literal readings of Articles

11 8 and 7 of the 1 949 Geneva convention. Article 118 stated that

detaining powers are required to release and repatriate all prisoners

of war without delay after the cessation of hostilities.

Article 7 stated that Prisoners of war may in no circumstances

renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the 7 present Convention. 9

The Communists maintained that the captor states were

obligated to repatriate all prisoners of war without exception, and

there was nothing cited in Article 118 to refute this.9 8 The issue

was whether the literal view as presented by the Communist

delegation or the interpretative version as stated by the UN

Command took precedence. The UN delegation stated that the

Convention was designed for the protection of prisoners of war and

the text states that "prisoners of war must be protected against

violence or intimidation and humanely treated at all times." They

cited the climate of opinion that existed after World War II and how

the articles of the Convention were based on humanitarian

principles.99 The Communists, however, held that "a prisoner of war

might not be able to express himself with complete freedom when he

31 was in captivity"100 They suggested that through use of intimidation by torture, a prisoner might not express his true intentions. This statement would be the basis of prisoner repatriation problems that would plague the UN negotiators until the armistice was signed in July 1953.

Deliberations on prisoners of war problems began on 11

December 19 51 . To facilitate discussions, the UN Command

proposed the establishment of a sub-committee to discuss the issue.

The Communists agreed to this proposal and appointed North Korean

General Lee Sang Cho and Colonel Tsai Cheng Wen of Communist

China. The UN selections were Rear Admiral Ruthven Libby and

Colonel George W. Hickman.l 01 On 12 December, the Communist delegates presented proposals relating to prisoners of war. These

proposals presented ideas on how the POW's would be released and who should be released first. They suggested that Panmunjom should be the place for handing over the prisoners on both sides, and how a armistice commission should be composed. In order that both sides knew the composition of prisoners, each side would exchange a list of names. 102

The delegates of the UN Command rejected this proposal, but requested that the exchange of information about the numbers of

prisoners should be carried out before the agreement on a general exchange took place and asked for entry of Red Cross workers into the POW camps.l 03 The Communists finally agreed to the exchange of lists and on 18 December submitted a list of 11 ,556 personnel held by the Communists.l 04 The delegates of the UN Command also handed over to th� Cbn-tmunists a list of 13 2,4 7 4 prisoners,

32 including 95,531 North Koreans, 20,700 Communist Chinese, and ROK 16,243. The last named were domiciled 25 June 1950 south of the 38th parallel. The ROK prisoners were apprehended by UNC forces under suspicious or hostile circumstances. While they were technically POW's, they were qualified to retain their citizenship of the ROK and were subject upon release to repatriation within the Republic of Korea.l 0� The total of UN personnel reported was immediately challenged by UN Command as being entirely disproportionate to the total number of missing in action suffered during the war and completely at variance with the information UN Command had obtained through a variety of sources.l 06 These estimates were later corrected with the explanation that approximately 50,000 ROK prisoners not accounted for had been "reeducated and released at the front where many of them joined North Korean forces... the process was so rapid that the Communist Command had no opportunity to obtain their names."l 07 According to Colonel Murray, this method of "release at the front and a system of indoctrination and training created a class of liberated privates."l 08 Rear Admiral Libby stated that "the wholesale incorporation of POW's into the army was contrary to the rules of warfare and a violation of rights of men concerned, since there is reasonable doubt that the prisoners were free from duress in making this decision."l 09 On 2 January 19 52, the UNC made a proposal that set up a formula for a man for man exchange of "prisoners who elect repatriation (the figure used was the 11,556 UNC POW's)," exchange of additional UNC prisoners who want to be repatriated, for UN and 33 ROK civilians in Communist captivity, release of all prisoners "not electing repatriation" from POW status, parole for prisoners exchanged or released under points (2) and (3), and interviews of all prisoners of war by the ICRC (International Red Cross) representatives "at the points of exchange.. .in order to insure that the choice is made without duress."11 0 The proposal was rejected by the Communist delegation stating that "1 for 1 exchange is not a trade of slaves and UNC absurd and unreasonable exchange on such barbarous and shameful basis is intolerable." The Communists insisted that after an armistice was signed, the individual prisoners should be repatriated regardless of their wishes.111

There was little progress made on the POW issue during mid­

January. It was at this stage in the negotiations that the UN made another effort to bring the fighting to and end. The major unresolved issues that remained were the reconstruction of airfields, the

U.S.S.R as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Organ, and the exchange of POW's. In an effort to break the deadlock, Admiral

Joy introduced a package, formulated by Ridgway, in which all three proposals were combined in an over-all solution. The United Nations would not force the issue against reconstruction of airfields if the

Communists would accept its reasonable and humane position with respect to war prisoners and drop the issue over the U.S.S.R. as a neutral observer. General Nam accepted dropping the issue of the

U.S.S.R. in exchange for concession on the airfields, but refused to make any compromise on the POW issue.11 2 The proposals remained unresolved.

34 During February the staff officers had met twenty-two times to

discuss the POW question, and despite their earnest efforts, the

chief bone of contention was forced versus voluntary repatriation.

By the end of February, they were no closer to an agreement than at

the beginning of the talks about the POW's in December.11 3 On 29

February, General Lee Sang Cho read a statement in which he

attacked voluntary repatriation using an incident at the Koje-do POW

camp to bolster his argument. Lee stated "that free choice

constantly advocated by your side is a free choice at the point of

guns and bayonets."114

One of the problems facing the negotiators was the UNC staff had no idea of just how many prisoners would refuse repatriation.

Early in April, Colonel Hickman, UNC staff officer, told his counterpart, Colonel Tsai, that the UN Command was reluctant to

take a poll to form a rough estimate of the number of military personnel that might desire repatriation, but about 116,000 might

. be involved in the exchange. This figure was based upon an estimate made in mid-February by General Hickey, UNC chief of staff. The

Communists became intrigued because they thought that they would recover that number of prisoners and that an armistice might be achieved without their "losing face." The Communists showed a desire to get a round figure of those who would forcibly resist repatriation in the hope that not more than 16,000 would resist. On

2 April, Colonel Tsai suggested that both sides check their lists, a process that both sides realized would involve screening prisoners.

Apparently it seemed likely that any figure over 100,000 POW's repatriated by the Communist side would probably mean an

35 armistice as the Communists would not lose too much face. On 4

April, Colonel Hickman asked if the Communists would issue an amnesty statement before screening to reassure the POW's they would not be punished when they returned. On 6 April this statement was given wide publicity throughout the POW camps before the screening to encourage as many prisoners as possible to return home.115 This amnesty promised both Korean and Chinese POW's that they would be forgiven for various acts committed during their period of captivity.

The screening process took place between the 5th and the 15th of April. During the day prior to the screening, all POW's in the custody of the UN Command in the Koje camp were informed of the screening. The prisoners were told how the interviews would be conducted and for the POW's to consider their answers in light of their own safety and that of their relatives.116

In order to reach an armistice agreement, the UN Command desired that a maximum number of POW's return to Communist control. This would not be the case. A series of questions were asked of the prisoners at Koje-do and Pusan POW camps to determine whether the prisoner desired repatriation.117 The results as of 1 3

April 1952 were as follows:

North Chinese South Koreans Communists Koreans Civilians Total Total population 95,474 20,786 16,000 37,740 170,000 Screened 51,491 17,593 14,616 21,303 105,003 To go 21,102 3,075 3,559 2,628 30,746 To stay 30,389 14,126 11,057 18,675 74,247 Not yet screened* 44,345 3,193 1,384 18,015 8 * Included 3 7,8 72 Communists who refused to be screened. 11

36 The remainder of the POW's and civilians were sent through the interviews and by 1 5 April, General Ridgway was able to report that

"of the 170,000 military and civilian prisoners in UNC hands, only

about 70,000 would return to Communists without the use of force."

Acknowledging the Communists were not going to be happy with the

figures, Ridgway proposed letting either an international neutral body or the Red ·cross to re-screen the non-repatriates if the

Communists desired.119 At the meeting of the staff officers on 1 9

April, Colonel Hickman informed his counterpart that 7,200 civilian internees, 3800 ROK prisoners, 53,900 North Koreans, and 51 00

Chinese, a total of 70,000 men would be available for repatriation.120. According to Admiral Joy: "On hearing these results the Communist delegation went through the overhead of the tent at Panmunjom. They charged the United Nations Command with every manner of crime relative to the prisoners." 1 21 The

Communist delegation requested and was given an hour recess so that Col. Tsai could regain his composure. The UNC estimate of number of POWs to be repatriated suggested that the Communist instructions did not "encompass the possibility of an estimate in this low range."1 22 These figures fell well below the range the

Communist negotiators were willing to accept.

The Communist negotiators, especially the Chinese, were disappointed with the results of the screening because of the large number of Chinese prisoners who resisted repatriation. It turned out that not more than one in five Chinese POW's wanted to go home.

Most of these prisoners claimed to be soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek forcibly inducted into the Communist army who now considered

37 3 themselves to be political refugees. 1 2 Prior to hearing the results, the Communists had agreed to the screening process but now charged the United Nations Command with the use of force to obtain results favorable to the UNC. The month of May 1952 would show the UN delegation at Panmunjom just how disappointed the

Communists were with the results of the screenings.

38 NOTES

1 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs S. vol.2, Years of Trial and (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 316.

2Truman, Memoirs S. 316; U.S. of State vol. 9 December 4, 1943 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 393; U.S. Department of State Publication�. U.S. of United States Relations With Far East Series 30 (Washington, D.C.: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1949), 519.

3Ainslie T. Embree, of Asian vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 340; Truman, Memoirs S. 316; U.S. of Relations of the United States, The Conference of Berlin Potsdam vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 310-311. U.S. of Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences of Malta and (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 360.

4Truman, Memoirs S. 31 7.

5Ernest R. Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The of from 3500 B.C. to the 2d ed. revised (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), 1188.

6Bruce Cumings, ed., Child Of Conflict: The Korean-American 1943-1 9 53 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 5-9; Bruce Cumings, The of the Korean vol. 2, The of the Cataract 1947-1950 (Princeton, New Jersey:

Princeton University Press, 1990), 408 . .

39 ?Truman, Memoirs S. 327; Hermes, Truce Tent and 8.

8Hermes, Truce Tent and 6; Embree, of Asian 340; Truman, Memoirs S. 328.

9Jian Chen, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 117.

1Orhere is not a consensus among historians on the "Green Light" theory. Until North Korean archives are open to scrutiny, there will be no definitive answer.

11D ates and times in Korea are given in Far Eastern time that is 14 hours ahead of Washington (EST). Therefore 0400 June 24, 1950 would be 1400 Eastern Standard Time (2 PM, 25 June) or Eastern Daylight Time 1500 (3 PM, June 25).

12Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: Years in the State (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969),402. The actual report received by the State Department sent by · Ambassador Muccio: According Korean army reports that partly confirmed by KMAG field advisor reports North Korean forces invaded ROK territory at several points this morning. Action was initiated about 4 A.M. Ongjin blasted by North Korean artillery fire. About 6 A.M. North Korean infantry commenced crossing parallel in Ongjin area, Kaesong area, Chunchon area, and amphibious landing was reportedly made south of Kangnung on east_ coast. Kaesong was reportedly captured at 9 A.M., with some 10 North Korean tanks participating in operation. North Korean forces, spearheaded by tanks, reportedly closing in on Chunchon. Details of fighting in

Kangnung are unclear..• .lt would appear from nature of attack and manner in which it was launched that it constitutes all out offensive against ROK. Truman, Memoirs S. 333.

13Truman, Memoirs S. 332-333.

14David Rees, Korea: The Limited (New York: St Martin's Press, 1964), 21.

40 15Acheson, Present at the 404-405.

16Truman Memoirs S. 335. Also; recently declassified documents from the Russian archives on the Korean Conflict were presented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Korean President Kim Young-Sam during the latter's visit to Moscow in June 1994. These 548 pages included documents from the 1949- 1 9 53 period that included ciphered telegrams between Moscow and Pyongyang and Moscow and Beijing. In addition Premier Khrushchev, in his memoirs, Khrushchev supports the findings that show that not only did Stalin not instigate the conflict, but tried to talk Kim II Sung out of attacking South Korea. Strobe Talbot editor and translator, Khrushchev (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970), 367-369; Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslasv V. Luchkov, editors and translators, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990), 144-147; Kathryn Weathersby, "New Findings on the Korean War", Cold War International Issue 3, (Fall 1993):14-18; Kathryn Weathersby "Korea, 1949-50: To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International Issue 5 (Spring 1995):1-9; Jian Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," Cold War International Working paper No. 1 (June 1992): 6-31; Chen, China's Road to the Korean 84-88; Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War Revisited," The China vol. 121 (March 1990): 99-105.

17Truman, Memoirs S. 337-339.

1 8Acheson, Present At The 408; U.S. House of Representatives Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1 951 -1956, vol. 28, U.S. in the Far East Part 1 U.S. in The Korean War and Peace South Asian and Related Problems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 1 1 1.

19 Acheson, Present At The 412.

20r.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind Of War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 661.

41 21 Fehrenbach, This Kind Of 661 ; Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, the Unknown (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 95.

22Fehrenbach, This Kind Of 271.

23Acheson, Present At The 448; J. Lawton Collins, War In Peacetime (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 143.

24Fehrenbach, This Kind Of 274.

251bid., 662-663.

26u.s. House of Representatives Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-1956, U.S. in the Far East Part 112. There are conflicting dates as to when Chinese forces entered the war. According to T.R. Fehrenbach in This Kind of Chinese forces entered Korea on 12 October. On 1 November they attacked the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division and moved against the ROK 6th Division east of Unsan. There were numerous contacts, but after several days fighting, Chinese forces broke contact and withdrew. On 25 November the Chinese armies, in force, attacked the U.S. Eight Army along the Ch'ongch'on River in the west and on 27 November they attacked the 1 st Marine and 7th Division at Changjin Reservoir in the East.

7 2 1bid., 112 .

28The actual prisoner count according to UNC figures was 177,474. This figure was composed of North Koreans 96,531, Chinese 20,700, ROK citizens 16,243. 38,000 were either South Koreans taken after impressment into the KPA, Communist guerrillas, or just displaced persons captured and reclassified as civilian internees. There were an additional 6,000 who died or escaped prior to the count. David Rees, Korea: The Limited 317; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur: and Disaster vol.3 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 481; Allan E. Goodman,ed., While The of Admiral C. Turner at the Korean Armistice (Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), 147; Dean G. Acheson, "The Truce Talks in Korea: A Full Report 42 to the United Nations," 206 (January 19, 1953): 24; New York 21 April 1951, p. 2.

29Matthew B: Ridgway, General, United States Army, Retired, The Korean War (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967), 205. Authors note: The difference between 170,000 POW's and the 140,000 that Ridgway mentions are 38,000 South Korean civilians impressed into the North Korean army and reclassified as non­ combatants. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), 317.

30united States Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, Discussions with Gen. Matthew B. Re Far Eastern POW and NATO Policies. 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), 17; Donald Knox, The Korean War: Uncertain (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988), 416-417; Ridgway, The Korean 205-206.

31The word "do" as in Koje-do is Korean for "island."

32Ridgway, The Korean 206.

33weintraub, War In The Wards: Korea's Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of-War 21 .

34Hansen, Heroes Behind Barbed 1 3; Demaree Bess, "The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea," Post 225 (November 1, 1952): 53.

35David Mclellan, Dean Acheson :The State Years (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1976), 295.

36tbid., 296-297.

37tbid., 305.

38Mclellan, Dean Acheson The State 306.

43 39Dean Acheson, Present At The Creation: Years in the State 512; Ridgway, The Korean 180; Maxwell D. Taylor, General U.S. Army (Retired), Swords and Plowshares (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), 136.

40u.s. House of Representatives, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1951-1 9 56, U.S. in the Far East Part 1 and The Korean War and Peace South Asian and Related Problems 1 2 7; U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, val. Ill, 82nd Cong., 1st. Sess., Cease Fire In Korea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 535.

41 J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 304-305. The four recommendations of the JCS are as follows: 1. The U.S. forces in Korea should pursue their current military course of action until a political settlement could be reach which would not jeopardize United States' positions with respect to Russia, Formosa, and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations. 2. Dependable South Korean units should be developed as rapidly as possible and in sufficient strength to take over the major burden from the United Nation forces. 3. Preparations should be made immediately for action by naval and air forces against the China mainland in the event of a broadening of the war by the Communists. 4. Urgent steps should be taken to ascertain the policies and objectives of the allies toward Korea specifically and the Far East in general to determine what support the United States could expect from them if, while continuing, the present military action in Korea, operations against mainland China were initiated by the United States.

42Harry S. Truman, Memoirs S. val. 2,�. Years of Trial and (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), 443.

430avid Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964 ), 261-262.

44 44u.s. of State vol. 24 (June 11, 1950), 924; Acheson, Present At The 531.

45Acheson, Present At The 532.

461bid., 533.

47 Hermes, Truce Tent and 15; Truman, Memoirs S. 456; House of Representatives Selected Session Hearings of the Committee, 19 51-19 56, U.S. in the Far East Part 1 U.S. in The Korean War and Peace South Asian and Related 1 52; U.S. Senate, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vol. 3, part 1, 82nd Cong., 1st. Sess., Cease Fire In 535. The Malik speech stated: The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day, the armed conflict in Korea, could also be settled. This would require the readiness of the belligerents to enter upon the path of a peaceful settlement of t the question. The Soviet peoples believe as a first prerequisite arrangements must be concluded for a cease fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.

48Acheson, 21; Collins, War in 327.

49House of Representatives Selected Sessions, 156; U.S. Senate Executive Sessions, 544.

50rruman, Memoirs S. 458; Ridgway, The Korean 182.

51 Truman, Memoirs S. 458; U.S. State vol. 25 (July 9, 1951), 43. The actual text is shown below:

45 (June 30)

As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed forces in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship (Jutlandia) in Wonson harbor.

M.B. Ridgway General, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

5 2u .S. of State vol. 25 (July 9, 1 9 51 ) , 43- 44. The Communist response is shown below.

(July 2) General Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces: Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received. We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the Thirty-eighth Parallel. If you agree, our representatives prepared to meet your representative between July 1 0 and July 15, 1951. Kim II Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean's People's Army

Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces.

46 53Rees, Korea: The Limited 284; The New York (July 1, 1951), 3.

54colonel J.C. Murray, U.S. Marine Corps, "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase," of the United States Naval (September 1953): 981.

55Murray, 981; Rees, Korea: The Limited 285; Hermes, Truce Tent and 20.

56Murray, 982; Rees, Korea: The Limited 285.

57Hermes, Truce Tent and 21; Collins, War In 329; Admiral C. Turner Joy U.S.N. (Ret.), How Communists (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955, 3-4. One aspect of the negotiating process dealt with the oriental mind. Communists, according to Admiral Joy, were concerned with even the smallest detail when "face" was involved. When the UN negotiators entered the room in the teahouse and took their seats facing south, Chinese and Korean negotiators lost face. Oriental custom has it that at a truce discussion the victor faces south and the defeated party faces north. When the main delegations met two days later, the Communists made certain that the north side of the table went to them by barring access to the UN delegation.

58Murray, 982; Hermes, Truce Tent and 21.

59collins, War in 328; Ridgway, The Korean 182; Hermes, Truce Tent and 23.

60Hermes, Truce Tent and 23-24; Allan E, Goodman, ed., While The of Admiral C. Turner at the Korean Armistice 11 .

The Nine-point agenda is as follows:

1. Adoption of agenda 2. Location of, and authority for International Red Cross Representatives to visit prisoner of war camps. 3. Limitation of discussion to purely military matters 4. Cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea

47 under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea. 5. Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea. 6. Composition, authority and functions of Military Armistice Commission. 7. Agreement on principle of inspection within Korea by military observer teams, functioning under Military Armistice Commission. 8. Composition and functions of these teams. 9. Agreements pertaining to Prisoners of War.

61 Hermes, Truce Tent and 24; Goodman, While 1 7. The five-point counter-proposal is shown below. 1. Adoption of the agenda. 2. Establishment of the 38th parallel as the demarcation line between the two sides and establishment of a defensive zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea. 3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea 4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea. 5. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war following the armistice.

62Joy, How Communists 20.

631bid., 21.

64Murray, 982.

65Ridgway, The Korean 199; Goodman, While 18.

66u.s. of State vol. 25 (July 23, 1951), 151-152.

67u.s. of State vol. 25 (July 23, 1951 ), 153-154; Goodman, While 19; Ridgway, The Korean 198.

48 68Goodman, While 20; Hermes, Truce Tent and 29.

69Goodman, While 20.

70u.s. of State vol. 25 (August 6, 1951 ), 232. The revised agenda for the conference agreed upon 26 July 1 9 51 is as follows: 1. Adoption of an agenda 2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea. 3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice. 4. Recommendations relating to prisoners of war. 5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.

71 U.S. of State vol. 25 (August 13, 1951 ), 269; Goodman, While 24; Joy, How Communists 30.

72Joy, How Communists 32.

73u.s. of State vol. 25 (August 20, 1951 ), 306. General Ridgway's rebuttal to Communist charges on violations were made in U.S. of State vol. 25, (September 3, 1 9 51 ) , 3 91 . He stated that "the flimsy nature of the so-called 'evidence' shown to the United Nations liaison officers makes it extremely doubtful that any bombings took place at all."

74u.s. of State vol. 25 (October 15, 1951 ), 633-634; Hermes, Truce Tent and 44; Ridgway, The Korean 200.

75u.s. of State vol. 26 (February 18, 1952}, 270; Goodman, While 63-64;Hermes, Truce Tent and 50; Rees, Korea: The Limited 295-296; Ridgway, The Korean 200. 49 Author's Note: From the first incident on 4 August until the move to Panmunjom, there were numerous reported incidents on both sides. Due to these incidents, armistice talks between senior representatives were suspended and only talks between subordinate liaison officers took place.

76Ridgway, The Korean 203.

77Murray, 983; Hermes, Truce Tent and 114-115; Rees, Korea: The Limited 298.

78Joy, How Communists 128-129.

79u.s. of State vol. 25 (December 24, 1951 ), 1035-1 036; Rees, Korea: The Limited 300.

80Joy, How Communists 129.

81G oodman, While 92-93; Rees, Korea: The Limited 311.

82Goodman, While 94-95; Hermes, Truce Tent and 123.

83u.s. of State vol. 26 (April 14, 1952), 594-595; Rees, Korea: The Limited 312. The three remaining items were: ( 1) Restrictions on airfield construction. (2) Adequate ground inspection by neutral teams. (3) The limits on rotation of personnel to be allowed.

84AIIan E, Goodman, ed., While The of Admiral C. Turner at the Korean Armistice 7.

85u.s. of State vol. 26 (May 5, 1952), 715- 716; Murray, 984.

86Murray, 984-985.

87Howard S. Levie, ed. International t.aw 59 Prisoners of War in International Armed (Newport, Rhode

50 Island: Naval War College Press, U.S. Naval War College, 1979), 476; Howard S. Levie, ed. Documents on Prisoners of War International Studies val. 60 (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, U.S. Naval War College, 1979), 542.

88u.s. of State vol. 26, (January 21, 1952), 105-106, 115; Bruce Cumings, ed. Child of Conflict The Korean­ American 1943-1953 , 275.

89The suffering referred to occurred in Europe in 1945 when large numbers of Soviet civilians and soldiers who had deserted to the Germans and been captured by the allies committed suicide rather than being forced to return to the Soviet Union. After the war, the Russians had retained thousands of German and Japanese prisoners, whom they held in slave labor camps repairing war damages. The problem first surfaced on the allied side when in 1 944, after the Normandy invasion, Russian soldiers in German uniforms began to fall into allied hands. Where these men, by virtue of their uniforms German soldiers entitled to the rights of prisoners-of-war or Russian traitors? The problem was exacerbated by fears that the Soviet Union would not turn over French, English, and American POW's that fell into their hands. Not only were Soviet citizens returned but 50,000 Cossacks, who had fought for the Germans and who surrendered to the British in southern Austria, were also forcibly repatriated back to the Soviet Union. So desperate were these prisoners not to return to the Soviet Union, that some committed suicide rather that be repatriated. See: Nicholas Bethel, The Last Secret-Forcible On To Russia 1944-1947 (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1974), xi-xii; Collins, War In 340; Mark R. Elliot, Pawns of Yalta (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 1-2; Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), 322-324.

90Rockwell "The Right of Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War Captured by the United States," The Yale Law Journal 83, 362.

91 Potter, Repatriation of Prisoners of War," The American Journal of International Law 46, 509.

of State vol. 26 (January 21, 1952), 1 OS; Collins, War in 340.

51 93Hermes, Truce Tent and 136-137.

94rruman, Memoirs S. 460-461.

95The New York (August 21, 1952), p.l.

96charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," The Yale Law 62, 393.

97charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," 395-396; Howard S. Levie, ed. International Law vol. 59 Prisoners of War in International Armed 435, 476. The actual articles state the following: Article 11 8: Detaining powers are required to release and repatriate all prisoners of war without delay after the cessation of hostilities. Article 7: Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured by them by the present Convention, and by the special arrangements referred to in the forgoing Article , if such there be.

98charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," 395. The Communist position stated:" there is no need to look behind the words in Article 118; captor states are obligated to repatriate all prisoners of war without exception."

991bid., 397-398.

1OO ibid., 404.

101 Goodman, While 11 5; Hermes, Truce Tent and 139.

102 Goodman, While 120. Proposals relating to the POW issue are as follows: 1. To decide upon principle that both sides shall release all prisoners of war now in custody of each side. 2. To agree that both sides shall release in groups, and the shortest period possible after signing an armistice

52 agreement, and to decide upon principle that those POW's who complete the repatriation of all POW's in their custody within are seriously wounded or sick shall have the priority of being released and repatriated in the first group. 3. To recommend that Panmunjom, Kaesong, will be the place for the handing over of POW by both sides. 4. To recommend that both sides will designate an equal number of members to form a POW Repatriation Committee under the armistice commission to be responsible for dealing with matters related to the handing over of POW in accord with above stated agreement. 5. Once above items are mutually agreed and decided upon, the lists of names of all POW held presently by each side respectively will be exchanged.

1 031bid., 1 20-1 22.

1 04Goodman, While 138. The composition of the group was as follows: U.S.: 3198 (3 reported as Japanese probably Nisei), Other: Turks 234, French 10, Netherlands 1, Philippines 40, South Africans 4, Greeks 1, UK. 919, Australians 6, Canadians 1, South Koreans 7142.

1 05Goodman, While 1 47-1 48; U.S. of State vol. 26 (April 14, 1 952), 595; Hermes, Truce Tent and 141; Murray, 985; Mayda, "The Korean Repatriation Problem in International Law," The American Journal of International Law 47, 416.

10 6u.s. of State vol. 26 (April 14, 1952), 595; Hermes, Truce Tent and 142. From intelligence reports and POW interviews, the UN Command was aware that the North Koreans and incorporated a large number of Republic of Korea army personnel into the Communist forces. In fact the North Korean radio had broadcast that the Communist forces had captured 65,000 persons during the first nine months of the war.

10 7 Acheson, 24; Mayda, The American Journal of International 41 6.

1 08Murray, 986.

53 1 09u.s. of State vol. 26 (January 21 , 1952}, 105.

11 Ou.s. of State Bulletin vol. 26, January 21 , 1952),1 06; Goodman, While 178.

111 Goodman, While 180.

112u.s. of State vol. 26 (May 19, 1952), 787-788; Hermes, Truce Tent and 150; Murray, 988.

113Goodman, While 276, Hermes, Truce Tent and 167.

11 While 284. This was the first of two outbreaks. The second POW riot occurred on 1 3 March. According to a statement from Headquarters 2nd Logistical Command, Pusan, Korea the outbreak occurred when a work party of co-operative prisoners and an attachment of ROK guards were stoned when passing an area containing a large number of unruly Communist prisoners. The guards opened fire upon the attackers killing twelve Communists prisoners and wounding twenty six. These outbreaks were used by the Communist negotiators as a propaganda tool.

115Goodman, While 343-353; Hermes, Truce Tent and 168-169; Rees, Korea: The Limited 319.

116 Kim, "Prisoners of War As A Major Problem of the Korean Armistice, 1953," 58-60 . This was the announcement made in the camps. 1. All POW's will be individually interviewed by impartial UNC personnel within the next few days. This interview is being conducted for the purpose of determining which POW's desire to be repatriated to the Korean's People's Army of to the Chinese People's Volunteers and which ones have compelling reasons which they feel would make it impossible for them to return to their own side. this determination will speed up the rate of repatriation at the time POW's are exchanged. 2. At this time I must caution you that the decision you make is a most important one, probably the most vital one you will ever 54 be called upon to make. You must carefully consider each aspect of the matter. You must make your own decision. For your own safety it is essential you do not discuss this matter with others, and above all that you let no other person, even your best friends, know what your decision will be, until you are asked for it at the interview. 3. To those POW's who will not violently oppose repatriation, the UNC will guarantee return to your authorities at the time POW's are exchanged. Your decision in this matter will be considered final. The UNC can make no guarantees whatsoever as to the ultimate fate of those who refuse to go back to their own people. 4. Before any of you, for any reason which you think may be compelling, decides irrevocably to reject repatriations, you must consider the effect of your decision on your family. The fact that you are a POW has been reported to your authorities and they know that you are alive and well. If you fail to return, the Communists will undoubtedly consider your family suspect. You may well never see your family again. You must consider this matter from every angle. 5. If your final decision is that you are violently opposed to repatriation, you may be held in custody on Koje-do for many long months. However, the UNC cannot house and feed you forever. The UNC can make no promises regarding your future. In particular, the UNC cannot and will not guarantee to send you to any certain place. This is a matter which you should consider most carefully. 6. Interviews will conducted in each compound to prepare rolls of the POW's to be repatriated. 7. Rosters by battalion have already been prepared. 8. Within a few days interview points will be established near the Sally Port in each compound. 9. At the appointed hour POW's will be formed by battalion according to roster. Unarmed UNC clerks and US MP's will enter the compound to supervise the interviews. POW's will move to the interview points when called by the clerks, where they will be asked to express their decision. They will carry their equipment and clothing with them. 1 O.Depending upon each individual's decision, he will remain in the present compound or be removed immediately. ll.After individual interviews, POW's who. are to be repatriated will be housed in compounds separate from those POW's who strongly oppose repatriation. 55 12.You are reminded that quiet and good order must be maintained within the compound during the conduct of these interviews.

117u.s. of State vol. 26 (August 11, 1952), 232; Hermes, Truce Tent and 170. An example of questions asked at Koje-do and Pusan POW camps were as follows. The prisoners were told of the Communist amnesty and asked the following questions: ( 1 ) Will you voluntarily be repatriated to North Korea (China)? (2) Would you forcibly resist repatriation? (3) Have you carefully considered the impact of such action on your family? ( 4) Do you realize that you may remain here at Koje-do long after those electing repatriation have been returned home? ( 5) Do you realize that the UNC cannot promise that you will be sent to any certain place? (6) Are you determined that you would violently resist repatriation? (7) Would you do if you were repatriated in spite of this decision? If any point the POW indicated he would accept repatriation, the questions ceased. If he mentioned suicide, fighting to the death, escape, etc. he was segregated and put in a new compound.

118Goodman, While 356.

119Hermes, Truce Tent and 171.

- 120u.s. of State vol. 26 (August 11, 1952), 232; Goodman, While 367;Hermes, Truce Tent and 171.

121Joy, How Communists 153-154.

122Goodman, While 368.

123Fehrenbach, This Kind Of 552.

56 CHAPTER TWO

KOJE-00: A WAR WITHIN A WAR

The Communist response to the estimate of repatriates was quick and predictable. On 20 April, the Communist delegates to the talks stated that the original estimate of approximately 116,000

POW's the UNC was going to repatriate was not the 70,000 submitted by UNC after the interviews. The Communist delegation stated:

"Such a self contradictory course of action can only make us gravely doubt whether you have any intention of negotiating and & settling

the question on the basis of fairness.. . .! would repeat what I said yesterday, the figure of 70,000 submitted by your side absolutely 1 cannot serve as a basis for our discussion." The UNC responded:

"The screening by the UNC was conducted with fairness and impartiality under general methods and procedures discussed in prior Item 4 meetings. "2

It was apparent to all concerned that the talks were deadlocked over the repatriation question. On 23 April, Admiral Joy met with

General Ridgway who suggested that the repatriation question be combined with the other unresolved problems and presented as a

"package deal" to the Communists. On 28 April, Admiral Joy presented to the Communists an integrated solution to the three remaining issues. The solution proposed that there would be no 57 forced repatriation and that the UNC would exchange 70,000 POW's they held for the 1 2,000 UNC personnel held by the Communists. The

UNC stated they would not contest the airfield issue and suggested the composition for the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

The three parts of the proposal would have to be accepted in total, not piecemeal, and the agreement would be contingent upon acceptance of the whole package.3 General Nam's response was immediate and delivered in the afternoon session of 28 April. He stated: "Our side fails to see how your proposal of this morning can really be of help to an overall settlement of all remaining issues."

He then called for an immediate recess. 4 On the following morning, radio news announced that Ridgway would succeed Eisenhower as

Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and General Mark Clark would take over General Ridgway's duties.

On 2 May, the Communists, came back with their "firm and final" offer. They agreed to exclude Russia from the armistice committee in exchange for the right to build airfields in North Korea during the armistice, but they held their ground on the demand that all POW's be sent back to them using force if necessary. The UNC rejected the Communist offer.S Admiral Joy suggested to General

Ridgway that the UNC should recess the plenary sessions subject to recall any time the enemy should desire to resume talks. General

Ridgway suggested "continuing the executive meetings for a least 2 more days even though sessions should be limited to mere asking if the Commies have accepted our propo$al and in the event of a negative answer, recessing." Ridgway sent this message to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff who supported the proposal. 6 On 5 May, Joy received

58 instructions from the Joint Chiefs giving him authorization to terminate the negotiations any time after 6 May subsequent to having given the Communists "adequate opportunity to consider such proposal prior to termination."?

On 6 May, Joy sent a message to Ridgway suggesting that the estimated number of POW's desiring repatriation would be approximately 80,000 to 85,000.8 Joy continued: "While we cannot estimate what effect notification of an increase of 10,000 to

15,000 potential repats (repatriates) would have upon Commie attitude toward the UNC position in the POW question, we feel that the facts should be furnished them forthwith." Ridgway notified Joy

"that until we have final decision from JCS as to which names shall be included on the rosters, it is inadvisable to furnish Commies with any number in excess of 70,000." The final decision was that no list would be given the communists until after agreement in principle was reached to the armistice terms.9 That afternoon Admiral Joy gave the following statement to the press. "After 5 days of executive meetings, it became abundantly apparent yesterday that no purpose would be served in continuing the sessions behind closed doors. Therefore the UNC yesterday proposed that the temporary agreement be terminated forthwith. The Communists agreed today .... As I told the Commies yesterday, the next move is up to them"1 0 The next day, 7 May, a riot occurred at Koje-do POW camp.

This riot, orchestrated from Panmunjom with messages sent to ranking Chinese and North Korean prisoners at Koje, would change the negotiating process at the armistice talks.11 Part of the

59 problem at Koje was the amount of Communist prisoners that had been captured during the first six months of the war.

By January 1 951 , the UN armies had captured more than

140,000 North Korean and Chinese POW's. 1 2 This caused concern to

General Ridgway, then Commander of the Eighth Army. In January

Ridgway wrote to MacArthur voicing concerns over hostile POW's

located in an area that could become another battlefield.

When the POW's were initially captured, they were sent to a

hospital that had officially opened on 1 September 1950. This

hospital was designated as the 1st POW Field Hospital (Provisional).

Its founding occurred two weeks before the breakout from the

Taegu-Pusan foothold. By the end of the year, seven thousand

disabled prisoners were crowded into the hospital. According to

Stanley Weintraub's War in the "more than ten thousand had already been treated and released, or died." By the summer of 19 5 1,

nearly seventy thousand patients had been admitted along with an

additional five thousand dead-on-arrival. 1 3 Due to overcrowding, it

was decided to transfer healthy prisoners to Koje-do. 14

Koje-do is a small, mountainous, rocky, and inhospitable island

located in the Korea Strait a few miles southeast of Pusan. The island is shaped "like a badly drawn shamrock." 15 Management of

the prison camps came under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Army,

which delegated responsibility for camp operations to the 2d

Logistical Command under Brigadier General Paul F. Yount. Yount

placed Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd in command of Koje

designated War Camp No. 1 in January 195 1. According to General _ Ridgway: "Koje-do was itself hardly the ground a sane man would

60 have chosen to erect camp sites. It was rocky and mountainous,

with almost no flat ground for construction and proper dispersal of the compounds."1 6 There are three great valleys on Koje-do and these valleys had been divided into three blocks square, each occupied by six to seven thousand POW's. Each compound was a

community distinct and separate from the others. 17 The plan was to shift 60,000 to 90,000 POW's from camps around Pusan but prisoners poured into Koje faster than accommodations could be built. By the beginning of 1952, about 170,000 prisoners were crammed into 29 sprawling compounds near the center of the island.

Stockades designed to hold a maximum of 4,500 men bulged with

more than 6,000. According to Peter Kalischer, correspondent for

"there was no attempt at a nose-count."18 In addition to the prisoners, there were hundreds of guards and other custodial personnel. In reality this was more than the island could handle.

The North Korean and Chinese POW's had expected upon capture to be tortured, then killed. Instead they were conducted to the hospitals at Pusan and when fit, sent to Koje. According to William

Worden's article in the "the fact that this was the best prisoner camp they had seen and the best living, in or out of prison, that many of them had ever known soaked in slowly."19

Bored prisoners are a source for potential unrest. An educational program was attempted in the summer of 19 51 on Koje.

Article 38 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 states that a nation holding prisoners of war "shall encourage ... intellectual, educational and recreational pursuits. "20 Because of the success of the program

61 at a holding center near Seoul, a group of officers and men was organized in Tokyo and sent to Koje to teach social studies, vocational education, physical education, and music. The instructional officers who entered the compounds won support of the POW leaders, who helped them set up their programs. In addition, prisoners who had teaching experience came forward and joined the educational staff.21 This was not enough, however, to quell potential unrest.

The first riots on Koje were mainly over food although there were other forces at work. Ridgway's headquarters revealed that "by the end of 1951, 6,600 POW's had died in UN custody. The announcements stated that the 6,600 deaths resulted primarily from the poor physical condition of the prisoners when they arrived at UN camps," but many deaths were the result of violence and that was at the core of the issue. The UN forces assigned most of the guard duty to South Koreans while encouraging anti-communist prisoners to hold positions of power. In addition, Nationalist

Chinese personnel from Taiwan were brought in and allowed to operate in positions of authority. The worst early violence was perpetrated by South Korean guards. Violence was also inflicted by anti-Communists on Communist POW's who wanted to return to the mainland.22

Although there had been several revolts on Koje before the negotiations turned to repatriation, they had been relatively minor.

On 1 8 February, when the UNC first formally suggested not returning all POW's, the major revolts started.23 According to General

Ridgway: "The Communist High Command, in the person of Nam II,

62 contrived to stage a whole series of incidents that were intended to damage the United Nations in the eyes of the people of Asia."24 To stage these incidents required communication between Panmunjom and Koje-do. This was accomplished, as UN intelligence belatedly discovered, by having 200 men and 80 women, trained months in advance at a special school in North Korea, allowing themselves to be captured just so they could get inside the UN POW camps. Their mission was to organize hard-core Communists into cells that would, through terror or propaganda, get non-repatriates to switch to the pro-Communist position.25 Not only were the POW's controlled by these cells but radio receivers smuggled into the compounds by sympathizers outside the compounds enabled

Pyongyang to contact its men on Koje.26 The Communist leaders in the camp sent messages from compound to compound and from camp to camp using every conceivable method. Orders were brought in from the High Command (Nam II) by newly surrendered prisoners.

Messages were thrown from compound to compound attached to stones. If this tactic was not successful "they could be conveyed over greater distances by chants and songs, smuggled among supplies, or conveyed by signal. Altogether the communications system was elaborate enough to overcome almost any obstacle."

Hospital wards also provided an excellent area to hold conferences among Communist leaders.27

How was this allowed to happen? Why wasn't the UNC prepared for these rebellions? According to General Clark, the U.S. experience with POW's came out of World War II: "Prisoners were people who had to be fed, housed, clothed and guarded, nothing more. Never had I

63 experienced a situation in which prisoners remained combatants and carried out orders smuggled to them from enemy high command."

This strategy, instigated by the Communist negotiators at

Panmunjom, was to make the UNC lose prestige in the eyes of the world, lose bargaining power at the armistice talks, and drain off combat troops from the front to guard the POW's.28 The Koje incident was a case in point.

At 3:1-5 PM on 7 May 1952, rioting Red prisoners of Compound 76 on Koje-do seized and held as hostage Brigadier General Francis T.

Dodd, commandant of Koje Island POW Camp. Dodd's capture was referred to by UN Commander General Mark Clark as "the biggest flap of the war." Senator Styles Bridges denounced "Dodd's stupidity."

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, senior delegate to the truce talks, stated: "I'm certainly going to take a beating over this at the conference table."29

Senator Bridges was right when he used the word "stupidity," but he was partially wrong when he attributed it to Dodd alone. An incident that occurred at Koje will make it clear that the UNC was completely unfamiliar with oriental thinking.

In the spring of 1 9 51 the compounds on Koje were not escape­ proof. If a POW was Korean, both North and South Koreans look and speak the same, he could escape to the nearest village, get rid of his uniform, put on white pantaloons and a straw hat and walk past the compound without fear of detection. In the winter, detection proved no problem as the POW green uniform would show up against a snowy landscape. But with spring approaching and the hills turning green, the POW fatigues would blend in to the surroundings.

64 For these reasons it was decided to issue red uniforms to the

POW's. Red is a favorite color with the Chinese; it's associated with good luck and health. When the uniforms were issued to the Chinese

POW's they were delighted, although surprised, that the UNC would go out of their way to give them these new uniforms. While the

Chinese accepted the uniforms, the Koreans, both Communist and anti-Communist, would not. To the last man they refused to wear the red uniforms. The camp commander was at a loss to understand their reluctance and since no Korean would explain, the order stood.

The Koreans walked around in their underwear. Finally, the camp commander went to the chaplain, who was an old Korean missionary.

The chaplain explained that during the Japanese occupation of Korea, when a criminal was condemned to death, he was issued a red uniform. This meant that the prisoner was to be shot and the Korean prisoners assumed the same thing was going to happen to them. The red uniforms were taken away, much to the dismay of the Chinese, and replaced with the old green uniforms. The Communists had learned a lesson; a united compound could defy the U.S. command and get away with it. 30

On 21 May 1 9 52, General Ridgway gave a briefing to the Senate

Committee on Armed Services regarding the Koje uprising. This was followed Monday 9 June when General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, gave a detailed testimony before a Subcommittee of the

Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives regarding the capture of General Dodd.31

On 7 May General Dodd was notified that prisoners in Compound

76, a large compound of Communists, were protesting their

65 treatment and had asked for a meeting with the camp commandant.

General Dodd, accompanied by his aide Lt. Colonel Wilbur B. Raven,

went to the enclosure gate at Compound 76 to meet with the

prisoners. A detail of "honey dippers"32 returning from their chores grabbed General Dodd and hustled him into the compound. Colonel

Raven grabbed onto a gate post and was not captured. Almost immediately the prisoners raised a sign stating they had captured

Dodd. As long as their demands were met, his safety was assured.

If anything happened in the way of brutal acts, his life would be in

danger. General Yount was immediately advised of Dodd's capture and he instructed the senior officer to try to effect Dodd's release through a senior PW officer. Accordingly, North Korean Col. Lee Hak

Koo was summoned from another compound and directed to proceed to Compound 76 to secure Dodd's release. In the meanwhile, Colonel

W.H. Craig, deputy commander of the Second Logistical Command,

General Yount's command, left Pusan to assume temporary command at Koje. He was ordered not to use firearms except as a last resort,

put the camp on full alert, and orally demand General Dodd's release.

The prisoners had put through a list of demands. Lee Hak Koo refused to broadcast an order to release General Dodd unharmed.

Around 9:50 p.m., Brigadier General Charles F. Colson arrived at

Koje and assumed command from Colonel Craig. Generals Ridgway and Clark flew to Korea from Japan and with General Van Fleet,

Eighth Army commander, conferred with Admiral Joy at Munsan. It was decided that Van Fleet would take the following actions. He would take whatever action necessary to effect Dodd's release without delay and authorize use of whatever force might be required

66 to accomplish this mission. In addition, General Van Fleet would take whatever action to establish uncontested control of all

Communist prisoners. General Yount passed these orders to General

Colson at 11 p.m. At 2:30 the morning of 9 May, General Colson, pursuant to his instructions, demanded General Dodd's release. Lee

Hak Koo said he would answer later in the morning and at 3:35 a.m.

Colson received Yount's permission to delay until daybreak sending the ultimatum threatening force until tanks could be sent from the mainland. At 9 a.m. Lee Hak Koo replied to General Colson asserting that General Dodd's' seizure was proper and that the United Nations had violated the Geneva Convention. General Colson reconnoitered the area for the forcible entry planned for 10 May. At 11:45 General

Dodd reported by telephone that he had been conferring with the prisoners and that he might be released by 5 p.m. if certain allegations of the prisoners were answered satisfactorily.

At 1 2:1 5 p.m. General Dodd reported the prisoners demand for further conferences to discuss alleged past mistreatment and issues concerning screening and repatriation. General Dodd advised against forced entry and felt agreement could be reached. Generals Van

Fleet and Yount arrived at Koje at 1:45 p.m. to discuss with Colson the tactics to be used in making a forced entry. They were notified of General Dodd's last message. Before leaving Koje, General Van

Fleet notified General Colson to demand Dodd's release at 1 0 a.m. and if this was refused, Colson was to take positive action to accomplish forced entry into the compound. In the early morning of

10 May, General Colson received from Lee Hak Koo the prisoners' first formal demands. These included demands that the UNC stop the

67 torture of Communist prisoners, stop "so-called" illegal and unreasonable voluntary repatriation, stop the screening process, and recognize the PW Representative Group (Commission) consisting of

North Korean and Chinese prisoners.33

At 10:05 a.m. General Colson read to General Yount his written reply that stated various objections to the prisoners requests. At

1 2:04 p.m. General Dodd reported to Colson various objections the prisoners had with Colson's reply. General Colson drafted his second reply and discussed it with General Yount at 12:45 p.m. This second reply created the false impression that the U.N. in the past had committed acts of violence against the prisoners by saying that in the future prisoners could expect humane treatment. It also gave the impression that in the future there would be no more forcible screening of prisoners. At 4:45 p.m. General Colson read his reply to

General Yount and with some corrections, it was approved. General

Colson dispatched this reply at 5:20 p.m. to Compound 76. Upon the prisoners insistence General Colson's second letter was rewritten.

The statement Colson finally signed secured Dodd's release.34

These changes were not cleared with General Yount. This third reply was received by the prisoners at 6:30 p.m. and accepted by them.

General Dodd was released at 9:30 that evening.

On 12 May, two days after the release of General Dodd, General

Mark Clark, who had taken over as Supreme Commander from General

Ridgway, repudiated the agreement signed by Brigadier General

Colson. Clark stated that "the reply by General Colson ... was made under great duress at a time when the life of General Dodd was at stake." Clark also stated that the Communist demands were

68 "unadulterated blackmail" and that the allegations set forth in the demands are "wholly without foundation." The charges regarding germ warfare had been repudiated by General Ridgway and Clark reiterated that "the United Nations has at no time engaged in any such illegal type of warfare." General Clark discussed the motivation of the Communists to "influence the armistice negotiations" and stated the riots had been "carefully plotted and deliberately instigated by hard-core communist leaders." Clark ended by stating that "the provisions of the Geneva Convention have been observed in the administration of UN POW Camp#1 at Koje­ cto."35

As a result of these incidents and after a board of investigation was summoned by General Clark, Generals Dodd and Colson were reduced to the rank of Colonel. These recommendations were approved by Washington.36 The same day that General Clark repudiated the Colson agreement, Brigadier General Haydon L.

Boatner was appointed to succeed Colson and took steps to implement new polices on Koje-do.37

Brigadier General Boatner, who was described as looking like a schoolteacher, replaced Colson as Koje's commander on 14 May

1952.38 He came from the 2nd Infantry Division where he had served as deputy division commander. Boatner brought with him two assets; an outstanding combat record and fluency in Chinese. He could and did dispense with the need for an interpreter.39 He quickly shook up his command by moving out most of the garrison Old Guard and 6,000 Koje civilians away from the compounds.40 He added a regiment of the 187th Airborne Combat Team and three companies

69 composed of British, Canadian, and Greek troops. On 1 June he sent troops into Compounds 60, 85, 96 and 607. Troops wearing gas masks entered those compounds that resisted, using tear gas to subdue the POW's. No shots were fired and there were no injuries. 41

On 1 0 June Boatner chose to break up the notorious Compound

76, one of the most violent and toughest in the camp. The POW's, hard-core Communists, had been celebrating their victory over Dodd and Colson for the last month and were storing weapons in order to resist attempts at removal to smaller units. At 5:45 a.m., the public address loudspeakers in the compound broadcast a message that the prisoners would be moved into new quarters and that no action would be taken against them if they cooperated. Placing two battalions around the compound along with tanks, Boatner called out

Lee Hak Koo and told him what would happen to anyone resisting.

When Lee complained , Boatner stated that resistance would be at the

Communist leader's own peril.42

At 6:15 a.m. 1 ,000 men of the 187th RCT surrounded the compound but made no move to enter the area. While combat engineers cut through the barbed wire at the rear of the compound, the paratroopers donned gas masks. Boatner didn't want any Red

"martyrs"; he wanted to attack with tear gas and concussion grenades to keep casualties at a minimum. The paratroopers advanced through the cut barbed wire and rounded up some docile

POW's. About fifteen hundred out of the approximately six thousand

POW's formed ranks and battled the UNC soldiers. By 8:45 a.m. the fighting was over. One American soldier was dead and fourteen others were wounded. The Communists lost thirty-one dead and 139

70 wounded. Witnesses stated seeing prisoners fighting among themselves and at least one dozen POW's were killed by other prisoners to keep them from surrendering to UNC personnel. 43

According to General Clark, when the compound was cleared of prisoners, an examination discovered many weapons. 44

General Boatner's handling of Compound 76 stopped resistance in the other compounds. Six thousand POW's in Compound 78 and another six thousand from Compound 77 were led to new compounds.

Boatner also moved a Korean village that had functioned as a control center for communications, away from the camp. Other measures to ensure that the problems that had faced Koje in the past would not be repeated, were implemented. These included daily searches, use of within compound intelligence, revision of the hospital setup to eliminate communications, and careful checks and segregation of newly captured POW's to keep them from the old prisoners.45 There would be some small outbreaks and one serious rebellion on 1 4

December 1 9 52 at a camp for civilian pro-Communists at Pongam

Island near Koje, but the events on Koje-do in May and June 1952 would not be repeated.46

On 22 May 1952, after ten months as chief spokesman at the peace talks, Admiral C. Turner Joy's tour of duty came to an end and he was replaced by Major General William K. Harrison. 4 7 In bidding farewell to the Communists, Admiral Joy stated: "The success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly on the good faith of the delegations present." He continued by accusing the

Communists of delaying tactics, fraudulent arguments, and artificial attitudes that had obstructed the attainment of an armistice. He

71 ended his speech by stating: "After ten months and twelve days I feel that there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further dealings with you to Major General William K. Harrison .... May God be with him." 48

On 1 9 May 1 9 52 at a hearing before the House of

Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, John M. Allison,

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was asked what the consequences of events on Koje-do would have on the peace talks. He stated: "There is no question at all but what the events on

Koje-do had a very serious effect. I do not think they had a vital

effect. I do not think they in themselves mean a breakdown in the possibility of negotiations." He stated that the military had taken the proper steps to correct the situation.49 Mr. Allison was questioned by Chairman James P. Richards, Democratic from South

Carolina, regarding the propaganda value that Koje represented to the Communists. Mr. Allison stated that he felt the Communists would keep harping on the repatriation question, utilizing Koje as a propaganda tool when they needed to make a concession to the

UNC. SO According to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the Koje debacle had implications among our European allies. "It shook our allies faith in the good judgment and competence of our command, creating doubt of our ability to furnish leadership."S 1 According to

J. Lawton Collins: "The Koje-do affair, with its attendant adverse reactions among our United Nation allies, hardened the opposition of the Communist negotiators at Parimunjom to the U.N. Command's

concept of no forcible repatriation of prisoners of war. "52

72 Acheson's judgment about the reaction of our allies was only partially correct. According to Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings in

Korea: The Unknown "Canada's participation set off a political storm at home, and the government had to sacrifice the senior officer on the spot. British participation did not provoke as much furor-largely because the truth was concealed at the time."53

General Clark asked the Department of the Army "to release a full narrative account of past incidents" but this was never granted because of the "adverse effects it was believed to have on the peace talks."54 According to Acheson, "I felt this dubiety in May when I reached Europe". We had not yet restored order in the prisoners' camps and the fury of the propaganda campaign against us... continued abated." Acheson continued: "I was to feel it again in the autumn when the return of the prisoners would become the principal question before the General Assembly."55 Koje created a propaganda plus for the Communists. As Demeree Bess of the

Post put it, "the world's attention was distracted from results of the prisoner polls, so damming to the communist regimes." By fixing attention on the treatment of prisoners of war at Koje, Communist propagandists succeeded in giving the opposite impression to the claims of lenient treatment of the prisoners. The manner in which the affair was handled by Washington "did nothing to clear up the distrust aroused among our friends and even among our own people."56 The prisoner of war issue would dominate the peace talks until July 1953.

73 NOTES

1 Allen E. Goodman, ed., While 369.

21bid., 370. Author's note: Item #4 always refers to the repatriation questions of the armistice talks.

3Goodman, While 381 -382; U.S. of State vol. 26 (May 19, 1952), 787-788; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and 1 73-1 7 4. The text of the 28 April proposal is as follows: 1 . That there shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war as the Communists have insisted. The UNC would be willing to exchange the approximately 70,000 persons who do not actually forcibly oppose repatriation for the 1 2,000 UNC personnel which the Communists stated they were holding as POW's. 2. That the UNC will not insist on prohibiting reconstruction or rehabilitation of airfield. 3. That the neutral nations supervisory commission should comprise representatives of four countries: Poland and Czechoslovakia chosen by the Communists, Sweden and Switzerland chosen by the United Nations Command.

4Goodman, While 387.

5Goodman, While 389-396; General Mark C. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 1954 ), 1 04.

6Goodman, While 395-396.

?Ibid., 399-400. The actual JCS response was as follows: 1 . In light of developments plenary sessions.... May concur with you that continuation of executive sessions is inimical to further

74 progress in negotiations. Accordingly, you are authorized to propose termination of exec. plenary sessions at any time you deem appropriate on or after 6 May. 2. In the event of the UNC proposal for termination of exec. sessions I believe it important that Commies be given adequate opportunity to consider such proposal prior to termination; one method of accomplishing this would be a UNC statement in plenary session substantially as follows: In light of events obtaining during the executive sessions on and subsequent to 2 May, I see no purpose in continuing exec. sessions. I therefore propose we recess and reconvene in open session in 20 mins. unless at that time you have different proposal.

8rhe difference between the original figure of 70,000 and the new figure of 80,000 to 85,000 POW's desiring repatriation came form an estimate of the remaining prisoners who rejected the screening process as being a violation of the Geneva Convention. See Goodman, While 356.

91bid., 40 1 . The JCS had approved the plan not to screen the Communist dominated compounds at Koje-do and directed that rosters containing the names of the unscreened POW's would not be submitted to the Communist delegation at this time. Author's note: Had the JCS allowed the figure to be given to the Communist delegation as Admiral Joy had suggested, the basis for negotiations on the POW repatriation question might have been arrived at sooner and resolution might have come before 19 53.

1 olbid., 405-406.

11 For an analysis of the transmission of orders from Panmunjom to Koje-do see Hal Vetter, on Island (Rutland Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1965), 83-89; General Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1954), 33; and Matthew B. Ridgway General, United States Army, Retired. The Korean 206-207.

12These 138,000 POW's were comprised of the following: 96,000 North Koreans, 20,000 Chinese and .16,000 ROK citizens captured while fighting with the North Koreans who retained

75 Communist sympathies. There were an additional 6,000 who died in captivity or escaped. David Rees, Korea: The Limited 31 7.

1 3Weintraub, War in the 9.

1 4Demaree Bess, "The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea," The Post 225, 53; J. Lawton Collins, War in 344; Donald Knox, The Korean War: Uncertain (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1 988), 417; Ridgway, The Korean 206.

1 5Peter Kalischer, "The Koje Snafu," Collier's 130 (September 6, 1952): 15.

1 6Ridgway, The Korean 206.

1 ?u.s. House of Representatives Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1 9 51-1 9 56, U.S. in the Far East Part 1 U.S. in The Korean War and Peace South Asian and Related Problems (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 980), 192; John S. Benben, "Education of Prisoners of War on Koje Island, Korea," The Educational Record 3 6 (April 1955): 159.

1 8Kalischer, 1 6.

1 9William L. Worden, "Our Lucky Red Prisoners," Post 224 (January 5, 1 952); 33.

201bid., 33.

21 Benben, The Educational 1 61•

22Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown (New York: Pantheon Books, 1 988), 176.

23u.s. House of Representatives, U.S. in the Far 193; Collins, War in 344; Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 1 77; Hermes, Truce Tent and 238;

76 Author's note; In David Rees, Korea: The Limited 321-322, Rees discussed the events on 18 February. Guards entered Compound 62 to find out which of the POW's there were civilians impressed into the KPA. These guards were attacked by 1,500 Communist POW's armed with iron bars, clubs, barbed wire, and other home made weapons. The guards opened fire and seventy-five inmates were killed and over one hundred wounded.

24Ridgway, The Korean 206-207.

25Kalischer, 16; Rees, Korea: The Limited 322.

26Rees, Korea: The Limited 322.

27Ridgway, The Korean 207.

28Ciark, From the Danube to the 33.

29 Vetter, on 7-8.

30Benben, The Educational 1 65; Vetter, on 119-1 22.

3 1 U.S. Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services Discussion with Gen. Matthew B. Re. Far Eastern POW NATO 82nd Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1 952),1 -13; U.S. House of Representatives Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Appropriations The Prisoner of War Situation in 82nd Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington, D.C.: United States Printing Office, 1952), 1-6; U.S. House of Representatives Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 19 51-19 56, U.S. in the Far East Part 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 1 91-193; The New York Times May 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22, 1952; The Times of May 13, 1952.

32"Honey Dippers" refer to men assigned to clean up refuse from latrines. In the orient, toilets consist of holes in floors instead of commodes with pots located at the bottom of the holes. These pots are referred to as "honey pots." In the early morning hours, honey dippers remove these pots from the latrines and using a long pole

77 with a pot balanced on each end, drop the refuse into fields where they are used as fertilizer.

33clark, From the Danube to the 42. The actual demands are as follows:

1. Immediate ceasing the barbarous behavior, insults, torture forcible protest with blood writing, threatening, confinement, mass murdering, gun and machine-gun shooting, using poison gas, germ weapons. experiment object of A-bomb, by your command. You should guarantee PW human rights and individual life with the base on international law. 2. Immediate stopping the so-called illegal and unreasonable voluntary repatriation of North Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army PW. 3. Immediate ceasing of forcible investigation (screening) which thousands of North Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer be rearmed and failed in slavery, permanently and illegally. 4. Immediate recognition of PW Representative Group (Commission) consisted of North Korean peoples Army and Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army PW and close cooperation to it by your command. This Representative Group will turn in Brig. Gen Dodd, USA, on your hand after we receive the satisfactory written declaration to resolve the above items by your command. We will wait for your warm and sincere answer.

34Kalischer, 18-19; Hermes, Truce Tent and 245-253. The actual response from Colson is as follows: 1 . With reference to your Item 1 of that message, I do admit there have been instances of bloodshed where many prisoners of war have been killed and wounded by UN Forces. I can assure you that in the future the prisoners of war can expect humane treatment in this camp according to the principles of International Law. I will do all within my power to eliminate further violence and bloodshed. If such incidents happen in the future, I will be responsible. 2. Reference your Item 2 regarding voluntary repatriation of NKPA and CPVA prisoners of war, that is a matter which is being discussed at Panmunjom. I have no control or influence over the decisions at the Peace Conference. 78 3. Regarding your Item 3 pertaining to forcible investigation (screening), I can inform you that after Gen. Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening or any rearming of prisoners of war in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal screening. 4. Reference your Item 4, we approve the organization of a PW Representative Group or Commission consisting of NKPA and CPVA prisoners of war, according to details agreed by Gen. Dodd and approved by me. I am furnishing this reply in writing over my signature as requested by you, through Gen. Dodd with the understanding that upon receipt of this reply you will release Gen. Dodd, unharmed, as soon as possible, but under no circumstances later than 8 o'clock PM, this date. Signed Charlie F. Colson, Brig. Gen USA, Commanding General.

35clark, From the Danube to the 46.

36clark, From the Danube to the 48; Collins, War in 346; U.S. House of Representatives, The Prisoner of War Situation in 6; Mark Cl ark, "The Truth About Korea," Collier's 133, 38-39.

37clark, '' The Truth About Korea," 39; New York May 14, 1952.

38u.s. of State vol. 27 (September 29, 1952), 496; Kalischer, 19.

39vetter, on 169-170.

40Hermes, Truce Tent and 259; Kalischer, 19.

41Hermes, Truce Tent and 259; Kalischer, 19; on 172.

42Kalischer, 19; Vetter, on 173.

43u.s. of State vol. 27 (October 27, 1952), 669; From the Danube to the 64; Hermes, Truce Tent and 259; Vetter, on 173-17 4. 79 44Vetter, on 174-175. The prisoners had fashioned about 3,000 spears from tent poles, 1,000 gasoline grenades, 4,500 knives and an uncounted number of clubs, hatchets, hammers and barbed wire flails. A tunnel was under construction from Compound 76 to Compound 77. Trenches surrounded each hut and connected one building to another in a network that covered the compound. In addition to weapons and entrenchments found in Compound 76, our troops discovered a document detailing complete battle plan for resistance to the breakup operation. The well disciplined prisoners had followed the plan almost to the letter in their fight against Boatner's troops.

4Sclarkl. From the Danube to the 65-66; Vetter, on 1 76.

46clark, From the Danube to the 67, Rees, Korea: The Limited 324.

47u.s. of State vol. 26 (September 29, , 952), 496.

While 436-437; Joy, How Communists 156-1 60.

49u.s. House of Representatives, U.S. in the Far East Part 174.

SOJbid., 1 75.

51 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: Years in the State 655.

2 S collins, War in 347.

53 Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 179.

4 S clark, From the Danube to the 48-49.

55Acheson, Present at the 655.

80 56oemaree Bess, "The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea," The Post 225, 55.

81 CHAPTER THREE

STALEMATE TO ARMISTICE

When General Mark W. Clark succeeded General Ridgway on 1 2

May 1952 as UN Commander, he faced armistice negotiations in complete deadlock. Militarily the UNC was in good condition.

According to General Clark, "the best estimate was that 1,200,000 the Chinese were in North Korea," but the UNC had superiority in tanks, naval units, and its air force controlled the skies. The enemy's greater manpower was equalized by the UNC's greater 1 striking force. Since the armistice was at a stalemate, General

Clark decided to hit the Communists "where it hurt" and convince them "by force that the price tag on an armistice was going up, not 2 down. " In a detailed study, Clark determined several courses of action that he submitted to Washington for approval. The military actions included bombing untouched hydroelectric complexes, in order to deprive North Korea and parts of Manchuria of much needed electricity, bomb military targets north of Pyongyang, untouched for a year, bomb the main Communist supply line from Pyongyang down towards Kaesong, and bomb innumerable small targets that would have a cumulative effect of red�cing significant amounts of war materials needed by the Communists. 3 The political actions consisted of releasing anti-Communist prisoners of war, 82 particularly Koreans. There were still some ROK civilians being held

as POW's,4 recess the armistice negotiations if they show no signs

of progress, build up the ROK into a bigger and more effective

fighting force, and introduce two divisions of Chiang Kai-shek's 5 Nationalist Chinese troops into Korea. Clark's recommendation that

Nationalist troops be introduced into Korea was not accepted. Other

recommendations would be accepted later, and he was authorized to

bomb hydroelectric plants including the Suiho Complex. On 23 June

1 9 52 most hydroelectric electric plants in North Korea were

bombed. These bombings produced an outcry from the British Labor

Party and the British press. 6 This reaction, in Britain, did not have any effect at the peace talks.

At Panmunjom, Admiral Joy was replaced by Lieutenant General

William K. Harrison who was described by General J. Lawton Collins

as "almost ideally suited for the role of final United States negotiator." According to Collins, he was "deceptively quiet and unruffled under provocation from his opposing Communist negotiators.... He could be tough and uncompromising when he had to

be."7

After Koje, the discussions in May proved fruitless. Both Joy and Harrison would have preferred to suspend the talks indefinitely until the Communists were prepared to accept the proposals of 28

April. General Clark agreed with his negotiators. Constant repetition of the UNC proposals accomplished nothing and gave the

Communists a platform to continue lambasting the UNC over the Koje

debacle.

83 A problem arose between Washington and the negotiators over the results of the re-screening that took place in early May.

According to Walter G. Hermes in Truce Tent and "it had become apparent that not 70,000 but over 80,000 prisoners and civilian internees wished to be sent back." A disadvantage to revealing the increase to the enemy was that they would probably

assume that this was another interim figure and adopt more delaying tactics. On the other hand, these figures might spur the Communists to accept the UNC offer. Joy, and later Harrison, wanted to submit these new figures, but Washington was against turning over the re­ estimates because it could strengthen the Communist allegations that the original screenings had no validity. This could weaken the support the United States received from its allies and neutral

nations.8 Because Washington refused to release the new figures to the Communists and because this tactic limited current negotiations, on 23 May, when the Communists presented Harrison with a proposal for a three-day recess, he accepted. After the recess, the release of civilians would be discussed.

The first of General Clark's May proposals involved repatriation of civilians. Some 27,000 Korean prisoners of war had been reclassified according to the Geneva Convention as civilians. They were refugees from North and South Korea who had been swept up in the advances of the first eighteen months of fighting. They had once been considered security risks but had put themselves on record "as not wanting to be delivered to the Communists in any prisoner exchange."9 Ridgway had decided to hold all civilian internees until a final settlement of the armistice was reached, but as prospects

84 for agreement receded in May, the civilian internees became less important. Since it was agreed in Washington that release of these

POW's would not affect the peace talks and as Harrison felt there was little risk that the release would break off negotiations, it was decided by Washington to effect the release. On 23 June, General

Harrison notified General Nam that the UN Command intended to free these civilians in July.l 0 By 15 August, 24,088 civilian internees had been released. 11 In July, the negotiators would concentrate solely on the POW repatriation issue.

At the beginning of July, it appeared that a break through was imminent at the peace talks. Both sides had agreed upon every article in the draft armistice proposals except Article 51 that stated: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible." 12 By the end of June, all compounds in POW camps had been screened and a new total of slightly over 83,000 repatriates segregated. The screenings showed the following results.13

Total

Totals 169,938 83,071 86,867 North Koreans 96,542 61 '169 34,373 Chinese 20,800 6,388 14,412 South Koreans 16,304 4,560 11,744 Civilian Internees 36,292 9,954 26,338

From 20,800 Chinese POW's only 6,388 desired repatriation. This

would profoundly effect the peace talks. The 34,373 North Korean

non-repatriates were not considered important to the Chinese

negotiators. On 3 July, Washington effected a compromise about

85 divulging the numbers to the Communists. They would release the new figures but only if the Communists insisted upon discussing them.

The Communists were interested because they felt in bringing this matter up, the UNC was altering its position. According to

Harrison, since the enemy desired more than 100,000 prisoners repatriated, he proposed to "juggle the figures" and permit the

Communists to save face. 83,000 POW's would be repatriated directly, 26,338 internees were then being released according to

"Operation Homecoming," and there were another 11 , 7 44 South

Koreans that would be released later.14 This would give the

Communists a total of 121,000, but only 83,000 actual repatriations to the Communist need be made.1 5 On 6 July General Nam stated that "if the UNC could come up with a figure of approximately

110,000 and including the Chinese prisoners,· an armistice could easily be concluded. n1 6

While General Harrison could juggle the figures, he would not turn over to the Chinese those 14,412 Chinese POW's who resisted repatriation. According to Colonel Murray, "willingly possibly to wink at the numbers of Korean prisoners, the Chinese could not accept the idea that all the Chinese would not be returned to their 7 control.111 When the Communists realized that the UNC would not repatriate all the Chinese POW's, they rejected the UNC's offer and offered a counter proposal. They suggested that they would compromise by retreating from the 110,000 POW figure, if the final total included all the Chinese prisoners. Apparently China was eager to end the war and was willing to sacrifice North Korean POW's, but

86 could not allow Chinese POW's to defect because the embarrassment would be devastating.18 They repeated their accusations that the prisoners had been coerced. The ensuing deadlock culminated in the

Communists calling an end to the Executive Sessions on 25 July.

Open sessions were to be resumed on 26 July 1952.

During the Executive Session on 25 July, "the Communists proposed that Staff Officers of the Delegation meet to discuss and finalize the Draft Armistice Agreement. On 26 July, the Senior

United Nations Command Delegate, in open Plenary Session, agreed that the Staff Officers would discuss the Draft Armistice

Agreement but only unimportant mechanical changes would be agreed to."19 The talks moved into the month of August.

Although many plans were offered, none of the proposals satisfied both sides due to their adamant adherence to the principles of forced versus voluntary repatriation. During the month of August, only four plenary meetings were held. Name calling by the

Communists coupled with an unsuccessful attempt by General

Harrison to drive a wedge between the North Koreans and the Chinese over the importance of the Chinese POW's produced nothing of substance during these meetings. While the meetings took place,

General Clark applied maximum air pressure against enemy targets.20 The only significant event occurred when a typhoon blew down the conference tents and the UNC accepted a Communist offer to build permanent wooden buildings at the site of the negotiations.21

In line with putting pressure on the Communists, General Clark suggested repatriating 11 ,000 South Koreans who were not released

87 during "Operation Homecoming." These prisoners represented

"doubtful cases" still held by the UNC. His judge advocate informed

him that he could take such action under Article 5 of the Geneva

Convention that stated the holding power, in this case the UNC, could

convene a "competent tribunal" to determine the status of these

prisoners. If it could be proved that they should not be classified as

POW's, they might be freed. Clark informed Harrison there were

three criteria for recommending release. These included residence

south of the 38th Parallel prior to 25 June 1950, profession of

allegiance to the Republic of Korea, and a promise not to return to

Communist control.22

Before release of the prisoners, Clark had to obtain approval

from Washington. A State Department meeting on 8 September

approved the decision and one week later, Clark was given the go

ahead, but not using the tribunal system. Instead he should

reclassify these POW's immediately as civilians and screen them as

quickly as possible. On 20 September, General Nam was notified of

the decision. The release, named "Operation Thanksgiving," was

scheduled to take place in about six weeks. General Nam protested but the release took place.23 The talks moved into September.

General Harrison saw the August negotiations following the

same pattern as all previous negotiations since June. Harrison suggested to Clark that one final package proposal be presented to the Communists. If the Communist negotiators turned down this package, the UNC could either recess the talks indefinitely or

terminate the negotiations completely. Clark was not ready to accept Harrison's proposals. He pointed out that most of the

88 proposals made since 28 April were similar to the plans rejected by the enemy. Clark suggested that Harrison, at one of the plenary sessions, stress that since most of the controversy centered around the disposition of the 14,000 Chinese POW's, Harrison should review the choices previously offered and turned down by the enemy, and then set forth other alternatives acceptable to the UNC. All these proposals were to be contingent upon signing an armistice based upon the principle of non-forcible repatriation. If the Communists refused this offer, the UNC would recess until either the enemy accepted the offer, or submitted new solutions.24 After the plan was submitted to Washington, President Truman, on 24 September, gave his approval. General Clark notified General Harrison that in presenting the new proposals to the Communists, he should "exercise care not to make a commitment that the Chinese prisoners would not be permitted to go to Taiwan."25

On 28 September, five months after the package was presented in April, Harrison opened the session with a brief restatement of previous plans brought forward by the UNC. He then delivered the package proposal dependent upon formal acceptance of an armistice.

This proposal detailed how the repatriation would be handled by Red

Cross representatives and joint military teams, the procedures for exchange of repatriates, interview procedures, and the process for expedition and delivery of POW's to a demilitarized zone.26 To give the Communists time to digest this new package proposal, Harrison proposed a ten-day recess. General Nam suggested that they meet again in an afternoon session. At this time General Nam rejected the proposal, but agreed to a ten day recess so that the UNC might

89 reconsider its basic stand.27 This recess moved the talks into

October.

The meeting on 8 October repeated the Communist rejection of the UNC offer. After Harrison delivered a speech accusing the

Communists of starting the war in Korea and obstructing the efforts to end the war, he declared that the "UN truce team would not come back to Panmunjom unless the Communists agreed to one of our solutions or offered an acceptable written counterproposal. "28

It now appeared that the prospects for an armistice was no closer than after the April proposal. As long as the UNC opposed forcible repatriation and the Communists insisted on full repatriation, especially of Chinese POW's, compromise seemed impossible without one side conceding political defeat. Neither side had sufficient military power to produce victory on the battlefield that would force the other side to capitulate. It was doubtful that UN air power and the constant bombings in North Korea would force the enemy to seek an armistice. Although North Korea was taking a beating, the

Chinese delegates to the talks would not allow Chinese POW's to defect. The UN Command had to decide how much military pressure to apply to the enemy to induce him to make concessions at the peace tables without provoking a resumption of a large scale war.29.

According to General Clark, "we either had to get an armistice, win the war, or get out of Korea. "30 The talks, now appeared deadlocked.

When the UNC chief negotiators walked out of the tent at

Panmunjom 8 October 1952, they did not know when or if they would return. Liaison officers continued to meet but the talks remained recessed. On 1 6 October Generals Kim II Sung, Supreme Commander

90 of the Korean People's Army and Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the

Chinese People's Volunteers sent a letter to General Clark,

Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. The Communists

stated that "total repatriation of war prisoners must be carried out in accordance with international practice, with the 1 949 Geneva

Convention, and with the already agreed upon draft Korean Armistice

Agreement."31 General Clark answered the Communists on 20

October and stated that "the United Nations Command will never agree to nor negotiate further on the basis of any proposal that would require the United Nations Command to use force to repatriate

prisoners to your side."32 October ended as it began; the

Communists insisted in applying the literal interpretation of the

Geneva Convention without giving any consideration to the spirit of the Convention. They based their position on the Soviet concept of the rights of the state over the rights of the individual. The UNC upheld the intention of the Geneva Convention that the principle of non-forcible repatriation of prisoners was based on the humanitarian concept of individual rights and the rights of states were secondary to the rights of the individual.33 Attempts to solve this impasse moved from the armistice talks in Korea to the tables of the United Nations in New York.

On 14 October, one week after the UNC delegates left the tents at Panmunjom, the General Assembly of the United Nations met in

New York where they hoped a settlement could be reached to end the deadlock on the prisoner of war issue. There had been a prior attempt to this to settle the issue of the POW's. On 2 September, the Mexican Ambassador, Luis Padilla Nervo, presented a proposal to

91 the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie. The plan proposed that prisoners who did not want to be repatriated should be accepted as immigrants by cooperating member nations of the UN and enumerated how this would be implemented. 34 The Mexican government believed the plan would make a contribution to the process of international law by "reaffirming the principle that prisoners of war are not to be treated as just a conglomeration of human beings whose fate the authorities may decide at will, but on the contrary, that man's inalienable right to freely work out his own destiny should prevail. n35

The United Nations sent a copy of this proposal to the UN delegate from the United States, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, who responded on 6 October with the following acceptance of the proposal. Austin stated that "the United States Government is pieased to note that this proposal is fully consistent with the basic principle of non-forcible repatriation and believes the suggestion to be very useful."36

In response to the Mexican proposal, several other proposals were forthcoming. On 17 October, the delegate from Poland suggested cessation of all hostilities, return of all prisoners of war to their homelands, and withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.

The position taken regarding the POW release expressed the same beliefs as those held by the Communist delegates. The Soviet Union supported this draft resolution but the General Assembly refused to 7 place it on its agenda. 3 A Canadian proposal that the UNC seek a cease-fire and leave the nonrepatriation problem for later was dismissed by both the Army and State Departments because "to

92 remove the threat of military compulsion would amount to a surrender of the UNC's most potent weapon... while at the same time, the Communists would keep their trump card-the UNC prisoners. "38

On 24 October, the United States delegation to the United

Nations submitted to the Political Committee a resolution supported by twenty other countries in the UN. Entitled the 21 -Nation Draft

Resolution, it called upon the "Central People's Government of the

People's Republic of China and upon the North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by having their negotiators agree to an armistice which recognizes the rights of all prisoners of war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and avoids the use of force in their repatriation."39

Dean Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, delivered a speech following the presentation of the 2 1 Nation proposal. Acheson described the start of the war, military actions, diplomatic efforts, armistice negotiations, the evolution of the agenda, and the entire history of POW repatriations during the twentieth century, and the reasons for the US position towards POW's based on events after

World War II. According to Acheson, the Geneva Convention of 1 949 was drafted because of the concern for "prisoners of war from the

Second World War, many of which, it was alleged, were being detained in the Soviet Union. That is, French prisoners, German prisoners, and Japanese prisoners were being held in the Soviet

Union and not allowed to go home. n4Q Acheson went on to state that as increasing numbers of prisoners came into United Nations hands, it began to find that more and more prisoners believed that if they were returned to Communist control, they would be executed or

93 imprisoned or treated brutally in some way. These prisoners took

the position that they did not desire repatriation and "if an attempt

was made to exchange them, they would resist by force." It was

unthinkable by the UNC that it should use force to drive these

prisoners back into Communist hands.41

On 3 November, a Peruvian Draft Resolution was submitted by

Dr. Victor A. Belaunde that provided for the establishment of a

commission that would deal with the prisoners who were unwilling

to be repatriated. The Commission would closely cooperate with the

United Nations and its performance of the task should be based on the principle of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Foreign Minister

of the Soviet Union, expressed opposition to this resolution as well

as the 21-Nation Draft Resolution because he stated it was difficult to distinguish between these two resolutions and the UNC proposals

at Panmunjom. In rejecting the Peruvian resolution, Vyshinsky stated that "his delegation could not support such a proposal any

more than it could agree with the definition of the duties of the

commission. n42

On 1 7 November the Indian delegation to the United Nations

presented its plan to end the hostilities. The plan called for a

repatriation commission composed of two Communist and two UNC nations, set up to receive POW's in a demilitarized zone. These

prisoners would be classified according to nationality and domicile,

as the Communists had wished, and the prisoner could elect to

return to his homeland if he desired. No force would be used. The prisoner would have his rights explained to him by the commission

94 and all prisoners who still had not chosen repatriation after ninety

days would be referred to a political conference recommended in the

armistice agreement. If the four members of the repatriation

committee could not agree on the interpretation of the details of

handling the POW's, an umpire would be named by the members of 43 General Assembly to break the deadlock.

The resolution was met with mixed reactions. Dean Acheson

disagreed with the provisions to turn the prisoners over to a

commission rather than the UNC. Acheson stated: "I strongly oppose this nebulous idea, which had every vice, since the Eighth Army

would have to control the prisoners and bear all of the risks of a breakdown in the armistice without any control over the 44 administration of the vital prisoner-release part of it. " The

Soviet Union also opposed the resolution. On 1 0 November,

Vyshinsky stated: ''The Soviet Government would not budge on the prisoner issue." Acheson was informed by President Truman "that the

United States Government will strongly oppose any resolution which does not clearly affirm and support the principle of non-forcible 4 repatriation." 5 It was apparent that unless some modifications were made, it was unlikely that the Indian proposal would pass.

From the early part of November until the end of the month, a committee worked on the proposal until it satisfied the United

States. On 1 December, after a Danish amendment was adopted, the

UN passed the Indian proposal by a vote of 53 to 5, with 1 46 abstention. The resolution passed affirmed rights of prisoners effected in accordance with the "Geneva Convention Relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War, dated August 12, 1949, the well-

95 established principles and practice of international law, and the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement." In addition it stated that force would not be used against prisoners of war "to prevent or effect their return to their homelands and that they shall at all time be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva convention and with the general spirit of the Convention. "4 7

The Communist bloc opposed the Indian proposal. There was little chance the Communists would pay attention to the resolution passed by the General Assembly. On 5 December Lester B. Pearson,

President of the seventh session of the General Assembly, cabled messages to Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist

Government, and Pak Hen En, North Korean Foreign Minister. These cables transmitted the text of the resolution on Korea which the

General Assembly passed. On 24 December the Chinese Communists replied to Pearson's letter rejecting the proposals. The Communists stated that "such an illegal resolution based on the so-called principle of 'voluntary repatriation' or no forcible repatriation cannot possibly settle what you describe ... as the sole remaining issue which has not been settled... cannot possibly provide for a just and reasonable basis for an agreement. n48

December 1 9 52 ended with the United Nations in the same deadlocked position that the UN delegates found themselves when they walked out of the talks at Panmunjom. The Indian proposal passed by the United Nations provided that prisoners of war should not be repatriated by force and they should be treated according to the general spirit of the Geneva Convention of 1 949 with respect to

96 the provisions relating to prisoners of war. This resolution,

according to Acheson as stated in his 24 October 1952 statement to

the United Nations, supported the position of the UNC as well as the

correct interpretation of the intentions of the Geneva Convention.

The Communist delegations at the United Nations and at the peace

talks adhered to the Soviet Union's position on repatriation.49

Contrary to the situation at year's end, the Indian resolution would

eventually play an important part in finding a solution to the

impasse to end the Korean conflict. The Communists now applied all

the means at their disposal to move public opinion over to their side

and force the UNC to soften its position on the repatriation question.

Their technique was to use propaganda to fulfill this goal.

The Communists, needed to win in the propaganda war what it could not achieve on the battlefield. In order to accomplish these

objectives and convince the world that the UNC were the aggressors in Korea, it was necessary to prove that the UNC had used weapons

of mass destruction. According to David Rees in Korea: The Limited

"the big lie ...must always in its appeal to human credulity and

irrationality, contain an element not too far removed from reality. "50 The first big lie the Communists used in their

propaganda war was that the ROK had attacked North Korea. The

second lie was more subtle. Its credibility lay in the fact that the

United Nations air power was overwhelming during the Korean

conflict and it was not inconceivable that such air power could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Since the UNC would

not use atomic weapons in Korea, Communist negotiators leveled

97 charges of bacteriological warfare. The following article is an example.

A CRIME AGAINST THE PEOPLE: BACTERIOLOGICAL WARFARE

(the UNC) . .-.these bandits in generals' uniforms, the butchers in white gloves, the bloody bigots and traders in death who have unleashed the most inhuman carnage in history, warfare with the assistance of microbes, fleas, lice and spiders... Prav da.5 1

According to General Clark: "Enemy propagandists in the Korean

War reached a new low in the use of the 'big lie' technique." The

Communist high command in Panmunjom ordered riots in the POW camps when it became apparent many Communist prisoners refused to be repatriated back to Communist control. When these riots were put down, the Communists "screamed atrocity" and blamed the UNC for mass murder of innocent Communist prisoners. This campaign paled in significance to the campaign charging the United Nations

Command with waging germ warfare. According to Clark, "this was the 'big lie' in its classic form."52

Peking radio started charging the United States with conducting germ warfare in early 1952. On 18 February 1952, Moscow Radio broadcast the following statement:

In order to dissolve the solidarity of the Korean home front, the American interventionists are sending spies and disruptive elements into North Korea for the purpose of obtaining military secrets, poisoning wells, and spreading smallpox and typhus bacteria in various places. One of the more villainous methods practiced by the American interventionists is the sending of lepers into North Korea.

98 These accusations were repeated by Pak Hen Yen, North Korean

Foreign Minister on 22 February and two days later by Chou En-lai. 53

On 27 February, General Ridgway denied these charges, followed a

week later by a denial from Dean Acheson. 54 The Western

governments called for an investigation but could not agree on who should carry it out. 55

The accusations intensified when the screening process began.

This should have been sufficient to convince non-Communist nations

of the false nature of the charges except for one factor. On 4 May

1952, in a broadcast from Radio Pyongyang, two USAF fliers,

Lieutenants John Silas Quinn and Kenneth Enoch confessed that they had dropped explosive germ bombs on North Korea during January

6 1952.5 These statements were later refuted by Enoch. In a

conversation with a French writer, Claude Roy, who visited North

Korea in June 1952, Enoch spoke to Roy alone and told him that "his

confession was a load of rubbish and that he had signed it only to make sure he got home." Quinn stood by his confession.57 According to General Clark: "The Communists continued their fabrications unabated." In February of 1953 the Communists declared that

Colonel Frank H. Schwable, Chief of Staff of the 1st Marine Air Wing, who was shot down and captured, made a statement that charged the

UNC, on order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of using germ warfare in Korea.5 8 The Communists showed scientists common houseflies claiming that these flies could not live in the frigid Korean winter and that the Americans had developed a housefly that could live in subfreezing temperatures so that germs could be spread to the most frigid parts of the earth.59

99 The stories of Quinn, Enoch and other airmen shot down over

North Korea and interrogated for germ warfare confessions are very similar to the indoctrination stories coming out of the camps after the release of the prisoners of war at the end of the conflict. These men, usually held in solitary confinement, were told that they were war criminals and would not see the United States again, but if they confessed, they would be treated leniently. Some airmen gave elaborate confessions "thinking they were playing a practical joke on the Chinese. "60

At the end of the war the issue remained open. There were strong and weak points on both sides. On 3 April 1953 the New York

Times ran an article entitled "Reds Photograph on Germ Warfare

Exposed as Fakes."61 This was followed on 20 April by another article entitled "Peking First Held Epidemics Natural" where it stated that Peking had acknowledged the natural origins of the epidemics in China. 62

The West also claimed that the Communists had used violence on captured UN personnel in their POW camps to extract confessions.

The Communists pointed out that scientists from both Communist and Western nations were shown bacteria, flies, lice, etc. and claimed this proved their point. They cited French Communist physicist Frederic Joliet-Curie's conclusions that the United States had used germ warfare in North Korea. 63

In conclusion, on 26 October 1953 Dr. Charles Mayo of the famous Mayo Clinic in Minnesota submitted to the United Nations

Political Committee sworn statements by many airmen who had confessed to waging germ warfare. These men stated they had been

100 subjected to "extreme and prolonged physical and mental torture."

Mayo went on to state that "the treatment given the airmen resembled that given in Communist countries to those from whom important political confessions are wanted."64 At Panmunjon, these charges would cause some problems for the United Nations delegates, but not as many problems as the United States 1 9 52 elections would cause the Communists.

Candidate for President of the United States, Dwight David

Eisenhower, in a campaign speech given in Detroit Michigan 24

October 19 52 stated his intent to go to Korea. Eisenhower stated that "if elected, to go to Korea before the following January and to determine for myself what the conditions were in that unhappy country."65 On 21 November, General Clark was notified that

Eisenhower was coming to Korea. On 29 November President-elect

Eisenhower accompanied by General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary designee Charles E. Wilson,

Press Secretary James Hagerty, and others flew to lwo Jima where they were joined by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CINCPAC. The group flew to Korea landing on 2 December where they met with Generals

Clark and Van Fleet.66 According to General Clark, "the question of how much it would take to win the war was never raised. It soon became apparent, in our many conversations, that he would seek an honorable truce."67 Eisenhower left Korea on 5 December and flew to Guam where he boarded the cruiser Helena sailing on to Wake

Island. He was met by his newly-appointed Cabinet and sailed for

Hawaii. It was decided that the United States could not tolerate the indefinite continuance of the Korean conflict and this government

101 would have to devise a way to break the stalemate.68 After two days of meetings in Hawaii, Eisenhower flew to New York. Upon meeting reporters the President-elect stated: "We face an enemy whom we cannot hope to impress by words, however eloquent, but only by deeds-executed under circumstances of our own choosing."69

On 2 February 1953, President Eisenhower delivered the State of the Union Address to Congress. In this speech he said that the

Seventh Fleet would no longer blockade Taiwan and serve as a screen for the Chinese Communists and prevent Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the mainland. He made it plain that "we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea." The purpose of this statement was to put the Communists on notice "that the days of stalemate were numbered; that the Korean War would either end or extend beyond Korea."70

This new approach to ending the war should be credited to

MacArthur who announced on 5 December that "he had a clear and definite solution to the war which would not start a general conflict."71 Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conferred with MacArthur shortly after they returned from the

Pacific. According to Presidential Assistant Sherman Adams, the

MacArthur solution was "a precisely stated intention to drop an atomic bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our purposes." MacArthur was convinced that the threat to use atomic power would be enough to end the war. 72 This threat, and the implied threat to turn the Nationalist Chinese loose against the mainland, was used by the Eisenhower administration in an attempt to break the deadlock. Despite the excitement generated by the

102 State of the Union Address, there was no movement by the

Nationalist Chinese forces. Other events would restart the talks at

Panmunjom.

Continued air and naval campaigns against North Korea, attacks

against irrigation dams, combined with the economic strain of the

war on Communist China combined to push Peking closer to the

bargaining tables. By the end of 1952, according to General Clark,

there were over one million Chinese troops in Korea. The Eighth

Army's own strength was estimated at 768,000 troops. 73 Two

events, in addition to the above, appeared to have influenced Peking.

On 5 March 1 953 Josef Stalin died and Communists throughout the

world had to reorient themselves to new political realities. The

second was the threat from the United States to carry the atomic

war to the Chinese mainland unless a truce was signed ending the

war.74

To this day, no one knows for sure what influence the death of

Stalin had on the change in the Communist attitude. Some analysts suggest it was substantial while others suggest that the sudden progress in negotiations was due to American threats to use nuclear weapons or the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek and the potential for the Nationalist invasion of the mainland. It would be just as reasonable to accept that the continued bombings of the North and the UNC military pressure along the front contributed to the change in Communist attitude.75 Whatever the reason, the talks would now resume.

On 13 December 1952, the Executive Committee of the League of

Red Cross Societies met in Geneva and adopted a resolution proposed

103 by the Indian delegate that sick and wounded prisoners be exchanged in advance of a truce. The resolution passed fifteen to two; only

Russia and Communist China opposed the resolution.76 On 19

February 1 9 53 General Clark was notified by the Joint Chiefs of

Staff that a similar resolution might be introduced in the General

Assembly of the United Nations. They added that the State

Department suggested that "I pick the ball in advance and put the proposition of exchanging sick and wounded POW's directly to the

Communist Commanders."?? Clark followed the suggestion and on

22 February he wrote directly to Kim II Sung and Peng Teh-huai through liaison officers. The letter asked the Communists to agree to an exchange of sick and wounded POW's in accordance to Articles

109 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.78 There was no immediate response from the Communists. This may have been attributable to

Stalin's death on 5 March. The reply came on 28 March when Kim and

Peng stated they were not only willing to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention but proposed resumption of full-dress truce negotiations suspended since October 1952. The Communists had to get the final word in the propaganda war by claiming they had been willing to repatriate sick and injured POW's long before, but since the armistice negotiations were suspended, it was not possible to do so.79

What intrigued Clark was the wording of the Communist reply.

A portion of the reply stated that the Communists wished that the exchange of sick and Injured prisoners would lead to "to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea."80

104 General Clark did not know what the Communist leaders meant by "smooth settlement" but he informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of his intention to go ahead with the arrangements for the sick and wounded POW's. He was unwilling to resume the plenary sessions until the Communists demonstrated a willingness to accept one of the previous UNC offers on non-forcible repatriation or submit one of their own.81 On 3o March, Premier Chou En-lai of Communist

China delivered a statement over New China News Agency (Radio

Peking). Chou proposed that negotiations should begin at once on the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and that after the cessation of hostilities, all prisoners who do not wish to be repatriated should be turned over to a neutral country "so as to insure a just solution to the question of their repatriation. "82 The following day Kim II Sung issued a formal statement supporting

Chou's plan. On 1 April, Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister broadcast a message over Moscow radio. Molotov stated: "This proposal allows for a fair solution of the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and for an elimination of the remaining obstacles for the realization of an armistice in Korea. "83

The reaction in Washington to Chou's statement was one of caution. Although the government felt that the statement "held promise," the U.S. leaders maintained that the Communists had to come forward with a plan for implementation of their proposal.

There were several questions that had to be answered. First, what did Chou mean by a "neutral state?" Where would the territory for the neutral state be located; in or outside of Korea? Who would make final disposition of the nonrepatriates? President Eisenhower

105 said publicly that "the United States should take every Communist offer at face value until it was proved unworthy of our confidence."84 On 5 April, Clark wrote to the Communist High

Command that the UNC liaison officers would meet with their representatives the following day to arrange for the exchange of sick and wounded and to "keep the door wide open for discussions on the whole prisoner exchange issue."85

Rear Admiral John C. Daniel of the UNC and Major General Lee

Sang Cho for the Communists led the liaison officers' groups meeting on 6 April. Admiral Daniel announced that the UNC was ready to start immediate construction of facilities necessary for the delivery and receipt of sick and wounded POW's at Panmunjom and to begin to deliver 500 prisoners a day within seven days of agreement on procedures. Daniel suggested exchanging lists of names and nationalities of the prisoners to be exchanged. Lee stated the Communists wanted to repatriate all sick and wounded under

Articles 1 00 and 11 0 of the Geneva Convention. On 7 April, Admiral

Daniel informed the Communists that the UNC were prepared to repatriate all POW's eligible under the two articles subject to the stipulation that no POW's would be repatriated against his will. The

UNC said it had 5,100 Korean and 700 Chinese sick and wounded ready to go home. The Communists' figure: 450 Koreans and 1 50 non­

Koreans. Daniel called the figure "incredibly small" and asked the

Communists to be more liberal in their classification of sick and wounded. 86 In the succeeding days the details were worked out and on 11 April 1 9 53 the agreement was signed completing the general arrangements. 8 7

106 The exchange of prisoners called .. Little Switch" began on 20

April and was completed on 3 May 1953. After the signing of the agreement on 11 April, trucks and trains began to transport the

Communist prisoners north from Koje-do and other offshore islands.

According to Hermes in Truce Tent and "on 14 April, twenty-three vehicles left the North Korean prison camps with the first contingent of UNC sick and wounded. Five days later the first train load of enemy prisoners set out from Pusan to Munsan."88 The final tally of POW deliveries showed that the UNC had relieved itself of 5,194 North Korean and 1,03 0 Chinese POW's as well as 446 civilian internees. These figures totaled 6,670. On the Communist side, they repatriated 684 assorted sick and wounded POW's. Of these, 1 49 were Americans. 89 According to General Clark, upon interviewing the returned American prisoners, "the Communists had cheated in their selection of men to come home in Little Switch.

They were not returning the worst of the sick and wounded .... Many

POW's said they were puzzled about why they had been picked when the Communists passed over ... others who were sicker than they."90

According to General Clark, although the UNC felt cheated on the number of sick and wounded POW's repatriated during "Little

Switch,.. as each man stepped down or was carried off a Communist vehicle, "I thought: Well that's one more of our own back. "91 In effect, although we did not receive back many POW's, "Little Switch•' was a prelude to better things to come. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,

United States Ambassador to the United Nations on 7 April stated:

"We hope that the progress will continue and will lead to the conclusion of an honorable armistice and peace in Korea consistent

107 with U.S. objectives."92 Although "Little Switch" was significant by

itself, it would lead to the return of the plenary sessions at

Panmunjom.

Chou's statement of 30 March had produced a mixture of hope

and caution in Washington. Although the statement appeared on the

surface to produce a way to end the war, there were questions that

had to be answered by the Communists. On 5 April, General Clark

wrote a letter to Kim II Sung and General Peng Teh-huai asking to

keep the door open on the whole prisoner of war issue.93

On 1 0 April Harrison received a response to his suggestions

from the Communists on how the exchange of all POW's might be

effected. According to Clark, "the answer was vague, merely

repeating the main points of the proposal Chou En-lai made on March

30." The two points of agreement were the concept of no forced

repatriation and the plan for a neutral state to take custody of those

POW's who did not desire to be repatriated. The Communist letter

stated that "the Communist side does not acknowledge that there

were POW's who were allegedly unwilling to be repatriated and therefore the question of so-called forced repatriation or repatriation by force does not exist at all." They suggested that

those "captured personnel of our side who ... are afraid to return home... should be handed over to a neutral state, and, through

explanations... gradually freed from apprehensions, thereby attaining

a just solution to the question of repatriation."94

On 17 April 1953, General Harrison replied to Generals Kim and

Peng that the proposal dated 1 0 April would be considered. At that time General Harrison suggested that a neutral state such as

108 Switzerland be used to effect the repatriation of POW's and that after 60 days, the neutral state would make arrangements for the peaceable disposition of those remaining in its custody. General

Harrison ended his letter with a implied threat. He stated that

"unless the meetings of the full delegations indicate that an acceptable agreement will be reached in a reasonable time, it will 5 be advisable to recess the meetings again."9

When the armistice negotiations resumed on 26 April 1 9 53, the

Communists presented a proposal consisting of six points. While agreeing with the UNC plan, the Communists proposed a 6 month period rather than 60 days.96 General Harrison objected to the failure of the proposal to name a neutral state. This proposal would force indefinite detention on POW's refusing repatriation and would require them to move from Korea to a neutral state. Harrison stated

"that such a move would afford no material advantage and would entail undesirable delays and many practical difficulties, such as time consumed in transportation, housing, and administrative accommodations." He added that "this would delay the release of prisoners by months and is a very undesirable solution." He ended by stating "that 6 months was an 'utterly exorbitant' time and that prisoners should not be held in custody for that period." General Nam stated that "six months was 'both necessary and reasonable' and

Switzerland was unsuitable as the neutral state."97

When the UNC dismissed the Communist proposal, General

Harrison, on 28 April, stressed that, "we do not intend to become involved in protracted and useless arguments... From your (the

Communist) experience in previous negotiations with us, you should

109 be well aware that we mean what we say." On the subject of

Switzerland's rejection as a neutral nation, Harrison stated: "You have cast doubt on your own intentions to bring about a speedy and honorable truce." When the Communists were asked to name a neutral state, the Communists replied they had "noted the question" and proposed a recess until the following day.98

During the session of 29 April, the Communists proposed as a substitute for Switzerland, an unnamed Asiatic country. Harrison again suggested Switzerland and stated that, "no other nation has comparable experience in this field." At the 2 May session, General

Nam offered the countries of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan as his choices for neutral nations.99 Although the UNC wanted

Switzerland or Sweden, it was willing to accept Pakistan. At the 4

May meeting, Harrison stated: "We now nominate Pakistan, an Asian nation both neutral and competent, and one of the four whose suitability you obviously implied in your question to us."1 00

Immediately after acceptance of Pakistan, General Nam stated: "Our side holds that those prisoners of war not directly repatriated should be sent to a neutral nation so that they can be completely freed from the influence of the detaining side." Nam continued: "Our side has already indicated that our side is prepared to nominate an

Asian neutral nation." The UNC countered with their previous position that the "neutral state must take custody within

demilitarized areas of Korea ..•. The transport of these many thousands of prisoners overseas is entirely unnecessary to the 10 1 purpose of the custody."

110 This back and forth, give and take lasted until 7 May when at the

133rd meeting of the delegates, the Communists made some major

concessions and submitted an eight point proposal similar to the

Indian proposal accepted by the United Nations in December 1952.

The proposal presented by General Nam suggested the following.

Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective,

both sides would hand over in groups all those prisoners of war who

insisted upon repatriation, establish a neutral nation repatriation

commission that would release those prisoners who now desire

repatriation, and hold those who at the time did not express a desire

to be repatriated. These non-repatriated prisoners would be held for four months at which time they would be turned over directly to the

neutral nations repatriation commission and their cases submitted for settlement to the political conference as provided for in

paragraph 60, Article 4 of the armistice agreement. All the expenditures of the prisoners of war during the period in the custody

. of the neutral nations repatriation would be borne by the nations to which they belong and that all these provisions would be

transmitted to all prisoners of war.102

The Communist side had made considerable concessions but

General Harrison still had unanswered questions. On 9 May the UNC informed the Communists that "their 7 May proposal provided a basis for discussion, but pointed out the many problems which joint custodianship would create." Harrison questioned "how the

Repatriation Commission decisions would be arrived at; language requirements; supply matters; how military forces would be

1 1 1 provided; and other pertinent questions... The communists noted these questions and the meeting adjourned.1 03

On 1 3 May, the UNC presented a counterproposal. Consisting of twenty-six paragraphs, the proposal suggested that after the armistice became effective, all POW's who did not refuse repatriation should be returned to their homes. According to the UNC proposal, "the repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of Article Ill of the Draft Armistice

Agreement." The UNC proposed that Sweden, Switzerland, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, and India be appointed members of a Prisoner of War

Custodial Commission that would establish its headquarters in the demilitarized zone near Panmunjom. India would lead the commission and furnish armed forces and any other personnel necessary to accomplish the task. The UNC agreed to have explanations made to the prisoners provided no force or coercion was used. The statement read: .. Prisoners of War shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific provisions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that convention." The UNC changed the four month stipulation relating to

POW's who refused to be repatriated to sixty days after which the 4 Custodial Commission would be dissolved. 1 0

According to General Clark, "General Nam blew up. He declared the proposal to release the Korean anti-Communists was 'a step backward' in the negotiations." 1 OS Not only had he not been informed of the release as had been the case in Operations

Homecoming and Thanksgiving, but these were soldiers not civilians.

This release was contrary to Item #2 of the UNC proposal of 1 3 May

, 1 2 which stated: "On the date the armistice becomes effective, all

Prisoners of War of Korean nationality who, while in the custody of the detaining powers, have elected not to avail themselves of their 06 right to be repatriated, shall be released to civilian status .... " 1

Due to the Communist reaction, General Clark informed General

Harrison to recess for four days, until 20 May to allow time to draft a new proposal. Since consultations with Washington were necessary, General Harrison needed more time. He asked and 7 received Communist approval to extend the recess until 25 May.10

On 23 May, Washington told Clark to "follow generally the terms of the Indian Resolution, insist on the principle of no forced repatriation and insure that no intimidation be used to make the anti-Communist prisoners go home." General Clark was then instructed to agree to turn over to the Neutral Nation Commission all Korean as well as Chinese repatriates. He was instructed to agree to the Communist demands "that all disputes within the

Repatriation Commission would be decided by a majority vote rather than by unanimous vote." Beyond these points, Clark was given latitude in the negotiations. He was instructed that if after this final offer the Communists rejected the proposals, he was

"authorized to break off the truce talks rather than to recess them, and carry on the war in new ways never tried in Korea. "1 08

On 25 May, General Harrison presented the new UNC proposals to the Communist delegates. Harrison asked that the meetings be conducted in closed session "to reinforce the solemn, non propaganda character of the proceedings." The Communists agreed to the suggestion.109 General Harrison discussed the new UNC proposal

113 that made some concessions to the Communist demands. The give and take that characterized the later armistice meetings held and on

8 June 1953, after one and a half years of negotiations, and after both sides had finally clarified the last remaining disagreements,

General Harrison for the UNC and General Nam II for the Communist delegation signed the agreement at Panmunjom. The chief remaining issue for the staff officers to work out was the final location of the cease-fire-line. After some negotiations and military efforts by the

Communists to improve their position, agreement was reached on the demarcation line. On 1 7 June, the plenary conference met and affirmed this agreement.110 Although it looked as if a truce could be signed, President Rhee would have the last word.

According to General Clark, "during the hectic final four months before the cease-fire in Korea, the UN Command was confronted almost literally with a crisis a day." Throughout the entire period

"President Syngman Rhee threatened to wreck any armistice we signed."111 As early as 3 April 1953, the Republic of Korea's

Foreign Minister, Pyun Yung Tai, talked to American Ambassador

Ellis 0. Briggs suggesting that the ROK might demand a price for cooperating with the armistice. General Clark informed the Joint

Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean threat. On 9 April, President

Rhee sent a letter of protest to President Eisenhower. This letter criticized the Communist offer for resumption of peace negotiations and went on to state: "If a peace agreement should be arranged that would allow the Chinese to remain in Korea, South Korea would feel justified in asking all her allies to get out of the country except

114 those who would be willing to join in a drive northward to the

Yalu."112

The UNC could sign a military armistice without the consent of the South Korean Government but there was a question of how long would this armistice last if the ROK decided to fight on alone or create a series of embarrassing incidents. This dilemma appeared to be a standoff; the ROK needed economic, military, and financial aid to recover from the war, and the United States had too much invested in South Korea to just walk away.113 The situation was serious enough for General Clark to fly from Tokyo to Seoul to see

Rhee on 27 April. According to Clark: "I tried to convince Rhee of the futility of our demanding unilateral withdrawal of Chinese forces from Korea after we had spent two and a half years in a fruitless effort to force them out at gun point." Clark emphasized that "there was neither victor or vanquished in this war and that we were in no position to make demands that could be enforced only by victory on the battlefield." Clark then asked Rhee "how serious was his threat to withdraw ROK forces form the UN Command?" Rhee promised to discuss the matter with Clark personally before withdrawing his troops.114 According to Clark, he became convinced that "Rhee didn't care what we did with the Chinese anti-Communists prisoners but was very much concerned about what might happen to Korean prisoners who refused to return to Communist North Korea. He opposed turning them over to a neutral country."11 5

Throughout April and into May Rhee complained about the truce.

Following the Communist proposals of 7 May, Clark flew to Seoul on

12 May and found Rhee more strongly opposed than ever to the truce.

115 According to General Clark, Rhee declared that "he would never let this crowd of potential spies, saboteurs, and agitators into his rear areas." Clark could not blame Rhee for his objections; he felt "these were my rear areas, too." Rhee also objected to the presence of

Indian troops on ROK soil as neutrals and stated, "he might, on his own, release the nonrepatriates in his country without involving the

UN Command. "11 6

When the UNC counter proposal to the Communists was to be made on 25 May, Clark was notified by Washington to inform Rhee of the offer at the same time. Ambassador Ellis 0. Briggs and General

Clark delivered the information along with a personal message from

President Eisenhower that outlined details of American military and economic aid that would be "forthcoming if South Korea went along with the Armistice ... The promise was a guarantee by the sixteen

United Nations to band together should the Communists violate the truce, a promise by the United States to build up the ROK army, U.S. economic aid to South Korea, and that the United States would keep troops in South Korea until peace was firmly established.11 7 In return, Rhee was asked not to remove his armed forces from UN command and to refrain from agitation against the talks and go along with any signed agreement. 118 According to Clark, 11the emotional effect of this on Rhee was profound. I never saw him so disturbed ...

Rhee insisted upon withdrawal of Chinese Communists from South

Korea.119 ''There can be no peaceful settlement without that. Your threats have no effect upon me .... we will decide our own fate."

Continuing Rhee stated: "Please tell my dear friend, President

Eisenhower, that I am not agitating against an armistice, but it is

116 the popular will of the people. The people will not accept these new

terms even if I tell them to."120 After two hours of Clark's attempt

to persuade Rhee to change his mind, Rhee finally stated: "We cannot

accept. It is entirely contrary to the views of my people. Please say

to your President, please let the Koreans fight alone if need be. It is

the only way we can survive."121 Despite Rhee's plea, Washington's

offer was to be its last concession to Rhee.

On 3 0 May, President Rhee sent a letter to President Eisenhower

stating that "the acceptance of any armistice agreement which

would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean

a death sentence for Korea without protest." 1 22 Rhee suggested a

simultaneous withdrawal of both Communist and UN forces "on

condition that a mutual defense pact between the Republic of Korea

and the United States could first be accomplished." He pointed out that Red China had military pacts with North Korea and the Soviet

Union. He asked for a increase in ROK armed forces, adequate arms,

supplies, ammunition, and general logistical materials. If these

proposals were unacceptable, he begged the United States to "allow the Koreans to continue fighting for this is the universal preference of the Korean people to any divisive armistice or peace."1 2 3

Eisenhower answered Rhee, assuring him that the United States

would not renounce its efforts to effect unification of Korea; to negotiate with him a mutual defense treaty along the lines of treaties made with Philippines and ANZUS nations; and the United

States, subject to congressional approval, would continue economic aid to the Republic of Korea to restore its devastated land. 124 In order to win formal approval from Rhee, President Eisenhower

, 17 invited him to the White House to discuss these matters but the 1 25 offer was declined. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested that since Rhee could not leave Korea at this time,

Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson should go to Korea 126 and confer with Rhee. On 17 June, Rhee agreed to see Robertson.

According to General Clark, "the following day all hell broke 127 loose". During the night, on orders from Rhee, ROK guards at anti­

Communist prison camps all over South Korea had opened the gates and some 25,000 prisoners walked out and lost themselves among 1 28 the civilian population." President Rhee had derailed the talks.

1 18 NOTES

1 Clark, From the Danube to the 68. There is a discrepancy between Clark's figures and those from other sources. According to Hermes, in Truce Tent and in mid 1952, the Communists had an estimated 422,000 Chinese 185,300 �orth Koreans, and 10,000 Soviet or satellite troops dispersed throughout North Korea who supported the front-line forces. In total the Communists had 61 7,300 troops in the immediate area plus another 290,800 troops in reserve for a total of 908,1 00 Communist soldiers in North Korea. Hermes derived his figures from HQ Eighth Army Command Reports. Hermes, Truce Tent and 283. In addition, Relations of the United 1952-1954. vol. XV, "Korea" Pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984 ), 867 shows the following: 1951 1952 North Koreans 230,000 267,000 Chinese Communist Total 502,000 947,000 It is also estimated that Chinese Communist troops in North China totaled 129,000 and in Manchuria totaled 255,000. These troops could be called up if needed. The total of Chinese either in Korea or available for mobilization totaled 1 ,064,000.

2clark, From the Danube to the 69.

3tbid., 70. According to General Clark, the reason for bombing the hydroelectric complexes was that these dams and complexes "provided much of the power to the Communist war machine in Manchuria and serviced what remained of North Korean industry." Flooding the area by destroying the dams was not a consideration.

4According to Clark, the Communists had set a precedent for this action earlier in the conflict by releasing fifty thousand captured South Koreans at the front and impressing them into

119 military service. These prisoners of war were anti-Communists that had been swept up in the initial stages of the war.

51bid., 70-71.

6u.s. of Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea" Pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984 ), 351-352; Clark, From the Danube to the 72; For Secretary of State Dean Acheson's reply to the bombings of the power plants see U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (July 14, 1952}, 60 in which he is quoted as saying: 11Shouldn't the British Government have been informed or consulted about this? To this my answer would be 'yes.... ' It was our intention to do it. It is... the result of a 'snafu' that you were not consulted;" also U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (November 17, 1952}, 798. Britain's reaction to the bombings centered around two different opinions. First, according to the Labour Party, the UNC should have consulted Britain over the bombings and cited the fact that Lord Alexander, British Minister of Defense, was in Korea on a fact finding mission just prior to the bombing, and was never consulted. In the second place, in an article in the Times entitled "Bevanites Assail Policy," the UNC was accused of an action that would, in their view, prolong the war. Debate in Parliament was between Prime Minister Churchill and the Labour Party delegates. See Times 24 to 26 June 1952. See also The New York Times 26-27 June 1952.

7 Collins, War in The and Lessons of 348.

8Hermes, Truce Tent and 267.

9clark, From the Danube to the 72.

1 ONew York Times 22,30 June 1952; Collins, War in 348; Hermes, Truce Tent and 269.

11 U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (December 29, 1952), 1035.

120 1 2AII through the negotiations there had been lower level talks between the UNC and Communist negotiators. During these negotiations all articles pertaining to the armistice had been discussed and recommendations submitted to the executive meetings. Accordingly on 1 July 1 952 the Senior UNC Delegate, General Harrison stated: "With the exception of a few minor administrative details to 62 of 63 paragraphs of the draft armistice agreement... the sole remaining disagreement concerned paragraph 51, the POW question." Harrison urged the other side to accept the paragraph as written which he believed was in "full accord with the Geneva Convention and which he maintained provided a reasonable basis for settlement." Relations of the United States 1952- 1954 vol. XV "Korea," 369; See New York Times 1 July where General Harrison is quoted as saying: "A really great deal as been accomplished .... All but a single important paragraph has been settled." In a statement made by Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, he is quoted as saying: "Only a single issue-that of the prisoners of war-stands between the negotiators and full agreement." United States of State Bulletin vol. 27 (October 13, 1 952), 562; See also United States of State Bulletin vol. 27 (December 1, 1952), 883; also United States of State Bulletin vol. 27 (December 1 8, 1952), 916 which stated: "Noting further that disagreement between the parties on one remaining issue, alone, prevents the conclusion of an armistice and that a considerable measure of agreement already exists on the principles on which this remaining issue can be resolved;" Hermes, Truce Tent and 272.

13 on 28 June 1952, General Clark sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a secret operational release stating that "the screening operation in Korea indicate that total of POW and Cis to be returned to Communists control will exceed 80,000. This increase over 70,000 can best be used to our advantage by the submission of a new figure to the Communists in open plenary session. This action should be accompanied by a full and complete explanation as to how such figure was obtained ....After statement is given to the Communists it should be released to the press immediately." U.S. of Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 364; U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (December 15, 1952), 958; Hermes, Truce Tent and 270; Rees, Korea: The Limited 325.

121 On 7 July 1952 General Clarks sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following breakdown. a. Koreans who are to be repatriated to Communist control-76,500 (62,000 NK POW's plus 4500 SK POW's who desire to go to NK plus 10,000 civilian internees who desire to go to NK); b. Koreans whose homes are in SK and who are to be released to return directly to their homes-38,100 (11 ,700 SK POW's plus 26,400 Cl's currently Cl's (civilians) currently being released); c. Chinese People's Volunteers to be repatriated to Communist control-6400. For above memo see U.S. of Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 380.

14The 26,338 internees released in Operation Homecoming were the civilians mentioned in the screening results at the end of June 1952. The 11,744 figure of South Koreans to be released later is shown in the same chart. See Truce Tent and 273.

1Su.s. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (December 15, 1952), 958; Hermes, Truce Tent and 273; Rees, Korea: The Limited 325.

16Hermes, Truce Tent and 273.

17Murray, "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase," of the United States Naval Institute 79, 987. From the start of the negotiations in 1 951 , although the fighting was conducted in Korea, the Chinese Communist delegates dominated the negotiations for the Communist side.

1 8cumings, Child of Conflict: The Korean -American 293.

19u.s. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (December 15, 1952) 959. The UNC implied that there was no reason to continue plenary sessions and that Staff Officers would continue to determine means of obtaining an Armistice. General Harrison recessed the Plenary Sessions for a seven-day period. Staff Officers met for the remainder of the period to make minor changes to the Armistice · Agreement.

20Hermes, Truce Tent and 276-277. 122 21 Rees, Korea: The Limited 325.

22Hermes, Truce Tent and 277.

23u.s. of State Bulletin ,vol. 28 (February 9, 1953}, 225-226; U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 28 (March 2, 1953}, 349; Hansen, Heroes Behind Barbed 34.

24Hermes, Truce Tent and 274-275.

251bid., 280.

26u.s. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (October 6, 1952), 549-550; U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 28 (February 9, 1953), 225; Collins, War in 349-350; Hermes, Truce Tent and 281 . The proposals stated the following: 1. All prisoners would be brought to the demilitarized zone, identified and checked off by one or a combination of Red Cross and joint military teams. They would then be considered as fully repatriated. If a prisoner stated at this time that he desired to return to the side that had detained him, he would be free to do so. In that case, he would assume civilian status and would not be employed again in acts of war in the Korean conflict. 2. All prisoners desiring repatriation would be exchanged expeditiously. All repatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups, released from military control, and then interviewed by representatives of the countries not participating in the Korean hostilities. This could be done with or without military representation and under the observation of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams, as the Communists desired. 3. All prisoners desiring repatriation would be exchanged as quickly as possible. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and freed from military control. Then, without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released would be free to go to the side of his choice. This plan also could be carried out under military or civilian observers if the Communists so wished.

123 27u.s. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (October 6, 1952), 550; U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 28 (February 9, 1953), 225.

28clark, From the Danube to the 77

29Hermes, Truce Tent and Front, 282.

30clark, From the Danube to the 117.

31For the complete text of the letter from Generals Kim and Peng Teh-Huai to General Clark see U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (November 10, 1952), 752-754.

32For the complete text of the letter from General Clark to Generals Kim and Peng Teh-Huai see U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (November 10, 1952), 754.

33charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," The Yale Law Journal vol. 62, 415; Rockwell, "The Right of Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War Captured by the United States," The Yale Law Journal vol. 83, 360- 361.

34United States of State vol. 27 (November 3, 1952), 696. The Mexican Proposal stated the following: The prisoners of war, held by either party, who may have voluntarily expressed their wish to be repatriated would be exchanged without delay. As regards the others, each member of the United Nations that signifies its approval of this plan would pledge itself to receive in its territory a number of said prisoners in the ratio that might be agreed upon with the understanding that, once in the country of temporary asylum, the corresponding authorities would grant them an immigration status that would allow them to find work so as not to become public charges. As soon as normalcy returns to said part of the Asiatic Continent, the Government of their respective countries of origin

124 would grant the prisoners the facilities and assurances that might be required for their immediate repatriation. Said Governments would proceed in a similar way in the case of those prisoners that, without the fulfillment of the condition stated above, would later express their willingness to return to their countries of origin, in which case the United Nations would afford them the necessary means to carry out their wishes.

351bid., 696.

361bid., 697.

371n addition to the proposal from Poland, other proposals included those from the Soviet Union, Peru, Indonesia, and Iraq. U.S. of Relations of the United States 1952- 1954 vol. XV "Korea," 581-582; Kim, "Prisoners of War as a Major Problem of the Korean Armistice, 1953," 105-106.

38Hermes, Truce Tent and 402.

39The 21 Nations consisted of: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. U.S. of State val. 27 (November 3, 19 52), 680. The proposal stated: Notes with approval the principle followed by the United Nations Command with regard to the question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and the numerous proposals which the United Nations Command had made to solve the questions in accordance with this humanitarian principle; Notes further that other suggestions consistent with the basic humanitarian position of the United Nations Command have been made by various Members of the United Nations. Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and upon the North Korean authorities to avert further bloodshed by having their negotiators agree to an armistice which recognizes the rights of all prisoners of war to an unrestricted opportunity to be repatriated and avoids the use of force in their repatriation; Request the President of the General Assembly to transmit 125 this resolution to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean authorities, and to make a report to the General Assembly as soon as he deems appropriate during the present session on the result of his action.

40u.s. of State vol. 27 (November 3, 1952), 680-692; U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (November 10, 1952), 744-751; Dean G. Acheson, "The Truce Talks in Korea; A Full Report to the United Nations," vol. 206, 21-31; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: Years in the State 699.

41Acheson, "The Truce Talk in Korea," vol. 206, 25.

42u.s. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (November 17, 1952), 802-803; Kim, "Prisoners ofWar,"109-110.

43u.s. of State. Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 585-586; U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 27 (December 1, 1952), 880; U.S. of State vol. 27 (December 8, 1952), 916-917; Hermes, Truce Tent and 403.

44Acheson, Present at the 700.

45Acheson, Present at the 701.

46For the adjustments made to the Indian proposal see United States Bulletin vol. 27 (December 8, 1952) 916; U.S. of State. Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 674-675; New York Times 2 December 1952 1; Kim, "Prisoners ofWar," 119; Hermes, Truce Tent and 403. The vote of 53 to 5 with 1 abstention went as follows: The Soviet Bloc voted against, Nationalist China abstained, Lebanon was absent. The balance of the Political and Security Committee voted for the proposal. New York Times 2 December 1952.

47For the complete text of the proposals see Relations of the United State 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 703-705; New York Times 2 December 1952, 3.

126 48u.s. of State vol. 28 (January 12, 1953), 76-77.

49Acheson, Present at the 705.

50Rees, Korea: The Limited 352.

51Jbid., 352.

52clark, From the Danube to the 213.

53Rees, Korea: The Limited 353.

54u.s. of State vol. 26 (March 17, 1952), 427-428.

55 New York Times 21 June 1952, 2; Times 24 June 1952, 5; Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 183.

56Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 183; Rees, Korea: The Limited 355-356.

57Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 183.

58cJark, From the Danube to the 215-216.

59cJark, From the Danube to the 216; Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 185.

60Rees, Korea: The Limited 356.

61N ew York Times 3 April 1952, 1.

62Jbid., 20 April 1952, 1.

63Jbid., 5 May 1952, 3.

64Rees, Korea: The Limited 361. The text of Dr. Mayo's speech can be found in U.S. of State vol. 29

127 (November 9, 1953) 757-758; also see U.S. State Bu lletin vol. 29 (November 30, 1953), 757-758.

65Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1963), 72.

661bid., 93.

67General Mark W. Clark, "The Truth About Korea," Collier's 133, 91.

68Eisenhower, Mandate for 96; Robert Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," Post 226 (October 17, 1953), 127.

69Eisenhower, Mandate for 97.

70Eisenhower, Mandate for 69; Sherrod, Post 226, 127.

71 Rees, Korea: The Limited 405.

721bid., 405.

731bid., 406. As noted previously, there are discrepancies between Clark's estimates of Chinese Communist strength in Korea and those cited by Eighth Army HQ estimates.

74 Rees, Korea: the Unlimited 406; Sherrod, "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce," 1 28.

75William Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," Parameters 23 (Summer 1993), 1 03. Author's note: Due to the lack of primary source material from either the PRC or North Korea, western historians can only speculate on the reasons for the change in Communist attitude.

76General Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the 240.

??clark, From the Danube to the 240; Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 93.

128 78u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 6, 1953), 494; For the actual wording of Article 109, see above 495; Clark, From the Danube to the 241.

79u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 6, 1953), 494-495; Clark, From the Danube to the 241.

80u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 6, 1953), 494. The Communist reply stated the following:

At the same time we consider that the reasonable settlement of the. question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners of war of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question_ of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea; for which peoples throughout the world are longing.

81Clark, From the Danube to the 243.

82u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 13, 1953), 526; Clark, From the Danube to the 244; For the full text of the cablegram received 31 March by Lester B. Pearson, President of the United Nations from Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of Communist China see; "How the Communists Explain Truce Proposal," US News & World 34 (April 10, 1953), 48-49.

83u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 13, 1953), 528-529. For the full text of a statement on the Korean situation made in Moscow on 1 April by Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov see; "How the Communists Explain Truce Proposal," US News & World 34, 49-50.

84clark, From the Danube to the 245-246.

85Jbid., 246.

86u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 20, 1953), 572.

87Jbid., 570-574. For text of the agreement see Appendix F. See also Levie, "Documents on Prisoners of War," Naval War International Law 626-628. 129 88Hermes, Truce Tent and 41 5.

89clark, "The Truth About Korea," 93; Hermes, Truce Tent and 418-419; Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," 1 04. The actual POW figures were: Of the 684 UNC POW's, 471 were South Korean soldiers, 149 American, 32 British, 15 Turk, and 17 from other UNC countries. The UNC turned over 6,670 POW's, of which 5,194 were North Korean, 1030 Chinese, and 446 civilians; See also U.S. of State Bulletin vol. 29 (September 28, 1953), 427.

90clark, From the Danube to the 254-255.

91Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 93.

92u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 20, 1953), 575.

93clark, From the Danube to the 246.

941bid., 246-247.

95u.s. of State vol. 28 (April 27, 1953}, 608.

96u.s. of State vol. 28 (May 11, 1953), 687. The Communist proposal stated that: (1 ) Within 2 months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides shall, without offering any hindrance, repatriate and hand over ... all these prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation .... (2) Within the time limit of 1 month after the completion of the direct repatriation, the detaining side shall be responsible for sending to a neutral state ... the remaining prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated and then release them from its military control. Such prisoners shall be received and taken into custody by authorities of the neutral state .... (3) Within 6 months after the date of arrival of such prisoners of war in the neutral state, the nations to which they belong shall have the freedom and facilities to send personnel to that neutral state to explain to all prisoners of war all matters ... and to return

130 to their homelands.... ( 4) Within 1 month after the arrival of the prisoners of war in the neutral state, and after the explanations made by the nations to which they belong, the speedy return to their fatherlands of all those prisoners of war who request repatriation shall be facilitated by the authorities of the neutral state concerned, and there should be no obstruction. ( 5) If at the expiration of the time limit of 6 months stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present proposal, there are still prisoners of war in the custody of the neutral state, their disposition shall be submitted, for settlement through consultation, to the political conference provided in paragraph 60, article IV of the armistice agreement. (6) All the expenditures of the prisoners of war during their stay in the neutral state ...shall be borne by the nations to which they belong.

97u.s. of State vol. 28 (May 11, 1953), 687-688.

98u.s. of State vol. 28 (May 11, 1953), 688.

99u.s. of State vol. 28 (May 18, 1953), 726-727.

1OO ibid., 728.

1 011bid., 728-729.

1 02For the complete text of the current Proposal for Solving the Prisoner Question see, U.S. of State vol. 28 (May 18, 1953), 727.

10 3u.s. of State vol. 29 (September 28, 1953), 427.

1 04For the complete text of the United Nations Command counter proposal see, U.S. of State vol. 28 (May 25, 1953), 755-757.

1O Sclark, From the Danube to the 266. 131 1 06u.s. of State vol. 28 (May 25, 1953), 756.

1 07Hermes, Truce Tent and 427.

1 08clark, From the Danube to the 267.

1 09Hermes, Truce Tent and 429.

11 Ocollins, War in 353; Hermes, Truce Tent and 433.

111Clark, From the Danube to the 257.

112Eisenhower, Mandate for 181.

113Hermes, Truce Tent and 436.

114Ciark, From the Danube to the 261-262.

11 5clark, From the Danube to the 262; Clark, "Truth About Korea," 45. General Clark never states why Rhee opposed turning over any Koreans to a neutral country. It can be assumed that he, Rhee, was afraid that some of these non-repatriates might somehow be forced to go to North Korea by putting pressure on their families. The armistice line was not the 38th parallel and some of these POW's families might have lived below the 38th parallel in South Korea prior to the armistice but north after the agreement on where the line was to be drawn.

116clark, From the Danube to the 264; Clark, "Truth About Korea," 46.

117clark, From the Danube to the 269. The terms were: ( 1)Early announcement by the sixteen United Nations that had fought against Communism in Korea of a joint policy which guaranteed that all sixteen nations would band together against the Reds should the Communists violate the truce in Korea. (2) Unilaterally the United States promised to build up the ROK Army to twenty divisions, with appropriate air and naval strength.

132 (3) The United States also promised Rhee economic rehabilitation of his country. ( 4) That American troops would be kept on the alert in and near Korea until peace was established firmly.

118rbid., 269.

119 Rhee did not want any Communist members of the commission and any Indians "roaming about South Korea".

120clark, From the Danube to the 269.

121 Clark, From the Danube to the 271; Clark, "Truth About Korea," 46.

122Eisenhower, Mandate for 184.

123rbid., 1 84.

124Eisenhower, Mandate for 183; Clark, From the Danube to the 273. For the complete text of the President's Letter to Syngman Rhee on the Proposed Korean Armistice see, U.S. of State vol. 28 (June 15, 1953), 835-836.

125Eisenhower, Mandate for 184; Clark, From the Danube to the 279.

126clark, From the Danube to the 279; Clark, "Truth About Korea," 46.

127clark, From the Danube to the 279.

128clark, "Truth About Korea," 46; Collins, War in 356; Taylo, Swords and 145.

133 CHAPTER FOUR

THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AND THE AFTERMATH

General Clark was awakened the morning of 18 June 1953 with the news that during the night, on orders from Rhee, ROK guards at anti-Communist prison camps all over South Korea had opened the gates and some 25,000 prisoners had escaped and lost themselves among the civilian population. In the next few nights another 2,000

POW's were released boosting the total to 27,000 in a well planned operation directed by Syngman Rhee. 1 A statement by Secretary of

State Dulles, released by the White House on 1 8 June, stated: "This action was in violation of the authority of the U.N. command to which the Republic of Korea had agreed. On behalf of the United

Nations we have conducted our negotiations for an armistice in good faith and we have acted and are acting in good faith." This was communicated to President Rhee.2

President Rhee made an announcement of his order to release the POW's in which he stated why he was releasing the prisoners.

Rhee stated: "According to the Geneva Convention ...the anti­

Communist Korean war prisoners should have been released long before this... .''3 According to Clark, "everyone concerned in the mass release was well briefed. The prisoners knew when they would go, what to take, where to shed and burn their prison garb, where to get

134 civilian clothing and where to hide." South Korean police were instructed to help the prisoners and the people of South Korea were told to "take care of the men from the prison camps. "4 General Clark notified Major General Thomas W. Herren, South Korean

Communications Zone Commander, to replace South Korean guards with U.S. troops. The exodus continued for four days while Clark tried to "scrape up enough troops from our meager battle-front reserves to hold the remaining POW's .... All but nine thousand Korean repats escaped clean." Some prisoners were wounded or killed by

UNC troops during the round-up. A few Chinese escaped but as Clark stated, "Rhee was not interested in them."5

According to President Eisenhower, the twenty-five thousand prisoners "of themselves did not constitute the real issue." The prisoners, largely non-Communist, did not pose a threat to the supply lines or to the security of the area but what Rhee had done was to "sabotage the very basis of the arguments that we had been presenting to the Chinese and North Koreans for all these many months." By accepting the non-forcible repatriation of POW's as stated by Chou En-lai 30 March 1953 and accepted by Kim II Sung the following day, the Communists had made a major concession. All this was negated by Rhee's release of the non-Communist POW's.

The Communists questioned "whether the United States was able to live up to any agreement to which the South Koreans might be a party."6 Accordingly, Eisenhower dispatched a letter to Rhee stating that Rhee, on 15 July 1950, formally advised the Commander-in­

Chief of the UNC that "in view of the joint military effort of the UN on behalf of the Republic of Korea you assigned to him and to such

135 military commanders ... authority over all land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the present state of hostilities." The dispatch continued: "Your present order and the action thereunder constitutes a clear violation of this assurance and creates an impossible situation for the UN Command." Eisenhower concluded by hoping that Rhee would correct the situation and stated that this letter would not be made public.7

Criticism of Rhee's actions came from all over the world. A planned visit by Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson to see Rhee was canceled pending clarification of Rhee's actions.

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, however, expressed the opinion that

Rhee's actions were justified and questioned why anti-Communists where kept by us in prison stockades?8 On 22 June, Secretary­

General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold transmitted a letter from Lester B. Pearson, that stated: "As President of the

General Assembly of the United Nations I have been shocked to hear of the unilateral action which you have sanctioned in bringing about the release of nonrepatriable North Korean prisoners from the United

Nations Prisoner of War Camps in Korea." He emphasized that the release was "particularly shocking in view of the progress made by the armistice negotiators in Panmunjom." Pearson stated that the

UN has "profound sympathy for the suffering of the people of Korea during the past 3 years." He ended his letter by hoping that

"cooperation will continue, not only in the immediate task of obtaining the armistice but in assuring that the armistice is thereafter faithfully observed."9

136 General Clark dispatched two letters, one to Rhee on 20 June and one to the Communists 18 June sent through General Harrison. In the letter to Rhee, Clark stated that he was "profoundly shocked by 0 this unilateral abrogation of your personal commitment. "1

The letter to the Communists stated the factual account of the release and explained that the UNC was trying to recapture the escapees which they were attempting to accomplish at the writing of this letter.1 1 On 20 June, the Communists answered Clark's letter. They asked if the UNC could control the South Korean government and army and if the armistice included the "Syngman

Rhee clique?" They also wanted the UNC to recover the 25,952 escaped prisoners and assurances that similar incidents would not 2 recur in the future.1 Neither Clark nor the Joints Chief of Staff could answer these questions and so the UNC recessed the

Panmunjom talks until they had some assurances from Rhee.

The impact of world criticism had an effect on Rhee. According to Clark, who visited him on 22 June, "he appeared nervous and under a considerable strain. He was more formal than usual, and mentioned not a word of my strong letter to him." Clark asked Rhee why he removed the South Korean troops from his command without notification. Rhee responded: "It must be obvious why I could not notify you in advance." According to Clark, Rhee's subterfuge meant that "I could have taken appropriate measures to prevent the outbreak." 13 Clark told Rhee he must reconcile himself to accepting the truce and pointed out again that the UNC could not "eject the

Chinese from Korea by force." Rhee wanted a further commitment from the United States regarding support for his government and

137 proposed a US-ROK Mutual Security Treaty. These proposals were beyond Clark's authority and had to be referred to Washington. Rhee again stated that he wanted "America to agree that if after ninety days ...there was still no concrete step toward agreement that would settle the political problems of Korea, then the Armistice would end and the war would recommence." Clark pointed out the impotence of the ROK Army without United States support. In Clark's judgment,

"the ROK Army at that date could not have withstood alone a Chinese offensive, let alone attempt to mount a campaign to drive the

Chinese out of the truly formidable underground defenses of North

Korea." 14 Circumstances dictated that the U.S. send a high government official to Korea to rectify the problem and mollify the

Communists.

President Eisenhower sent Assistant Secretary of State Walter

S. Robertson to Korea to confer with President Rhee. By the time

Robertson landed in Tokyo on 24 June, Communist rhetoric about the release had changed; no longer were the UNC charged for complicity in allowing the nonrepatriates to escape but the Communists blamed

Rhee and the ROK Government alone for the escape. According to

General Clark, "the Communists still wanted a truce, almost at any price. "15 In Tokyo, Robertson, Clark, Ambassador Briggs and General

J. Lawton Collins met and agreed that the armistice should be completed as soon as possible and that the Communists would accept it even though the U.N. command could not fully guarantee that Rhee would comply with all its provisions. Clark was given broad authority to use his judgment and conclude the armistice, as long as he did not compromise the principle of no forced repatriation

138 and did not imply that U.N. Command would force the ROK government to accept the truce terms. 1 6 There was an upside to the POW escape.

General Clark felt that the Communists could use this escape, planned and executed by Rhee, to save face and negate a possible propaganda defeat. According to Clark, the communists could claim

"that Rhee 'kidnapped' the prisoners and denied them the right to come home, a claim they made about the 27,000 who did escape."

The Communists appeared more interested in saving face than the prisoners themselves.17

Robertson arrived in Korea 25 June and after eighteen days of meeting Rhee almost daily, he was able to secure an agreement of cooperation from Rhee. The talks had progressed so satisfactorily that on 8 July, Clark was able to assure the Communists that the

ROK would observe the armistice. On 1 2 July Rhee publicly promised 8 to cooperate with the UNC.1 The quid pro quo given to Rhee promised a US-ROK Mutual Security Pact, long term economic aid, expansion of the ROK military, agreement to hold high-level

American ROK conferences on mutual objectives, and an agreement that both South Korea and the United States would withdraw from post armistice conferences after ninety days if no concrete achievements developed.19 Robertson left Korea on 1 2 July with a letter from Rhee to Eisenhower assuring the President that the ROK would not obstruct the implementation of the terms of the armistice.

Because of the Rhee-Robertson talks, Clark now had something positive to use as a response to the Communists. On 29 June Clark sent a letter to the Communist commanders that pointed out that the

139 UNC had no authority over the ROK government and added that "the

ROK had violated its commitments in issuing orders unknown to me

through other than recognized military channels to certain Korean

army units which permitted the POW's to escape." He went on to

state that the UNC would make every effort to recapture the 27,000

escapees, but that it would be almost impossible.20 On 8 July, the

Communists replied to Clark's letter that they were ready to resume

the meetings on 10 July.21 Fully aware that Rhee had threatened to

invade North Korea during his talks with Eisenhower, the

Communists had a response to the South Korean president.

Throughout the period of negotiations between the United States

and the Republic of Korea, President Rhee threatened to invade North

Korea if the Chinese were allowed to remain in Korea. Rhee wrote to

Eisenhower that South Korea would ask her allies to leave Korea

except for those who would be willing to join in a drive to the Yalu.

The United States could take its troops out of Korea if it did not want to cooperate.22 This drive north in Korean is "Puk Chin."

General Clark tried to impress the ROK command with what it would

mean if they took up Rhee's dare to "go it alone." Many of the ROK

Army leaders knew it would be suicide to attempt to invade North

Korea.23

The resumed Panmunjom meetings were to take place on 1 0

July. Twenty four hours earlier, the Chinese decided to teach the

ROK Army a lesson and show Rhee that Puk Chin was easier said than done. The first attack occurred against the ROK 5th and 8th

Divisions on the east and central front. The drive by the Communists pushed the ROK Army back four miles along a nine-mile front. The

140 second series of attacks was a six-division assault in the Kumsong­

Kumhwa area against the ROK 3rd, 5th, 6th and 8th Divisions, one

regiment of the ROK 11th Division and the American 3rd. Division.

This attack pushed the line south to a depth of seven miles along a

twenty-three mile front. A UN counterattack regained lost ground

and the final result was to reduce the penetration to a seventeen

mile wide front and five and a half miles deep.24 By 19 July the

Communists, feeling they had gained as much as they could from

these offensives, announced they were ready to conclude discussions

on the armistice.25

After the Chinese had improved their position and proclaimed

victory, they came back to the peace table. The Communist

negotiators made a list of questions, two of which would have lasting importance. These questions asked what would the UNC

response be if after the armistice, South Korean forces undertook aggressive action against the North. Clark answered that the UNC

. would still abide by the armistice. The next question asked whether

the UNC would support ROK aggression against the North. The UNC answer; we would not support aggression by the Republic of Korea.26

Both these answers were what the Communists wanted to hear.

There were still four areas that had to be agreed upon. They

included the location of the demarcation line and the demilitarized

zone, where to deliver the nonrepatriated prisoners, the inception of

activities by the various commissions established under the

armistice, and the physical arrangements for the actual signing of

the truce documents.27 On 20 July, the UNC presented its

amendment to turn over the nonrepatriates to the Neutral

141 Repatriation Commission in the Demilitarized Zone. 28 The same day

Colonel Murray for the UNC and Colonel Huang Chen-chi for the

Communists started working on the demarcation line. In many cases this was a simple procedure since there had been no action and the troop placement of both sides determined the line. In other areas where there had been recent heavy fighting, the lines had shifted and bargaining was necessary as each side wanted to retain as much territory as possible.29 After heavy negotiations, between Colonel

Murray and Colonel Huang, on 23 July, the line was determined (see

Appendix G) and the date of armistice signing was fixed for 27 July

1953.

As with all other negotiations that involved the Communists, even the signing ceremony hit a snag. The original plan called for

General Clark for the UNC and Marshall Kim and General Peng, for the

Communists to meet face to face across a table at Panmunjom to sign the armistice documents. The Communists, still trying to gain as much propaganda as possible, had built a hall behind the conference area to hold the ceremonies. On this hall they painted two peace doves. They had positioned a door on the north side for the UNC to enter. This would have meant to Orientals that the UNC were coming as suppliants for a peace. At General Clark's insistence, they painted over the peace doves, closed the door on the north side and made another door on the south side of the structure.

To avoid questions of who was victor and vanquished, tables for both delegations were placed side by side on a east-west line.3 0

At the last minute the Communists asked that the agreement be signed by the respective commanders at their own headquarters,

142 following which the copies would be returned to Panmunjom to be

signed by the truce delegates. The Communists insisted that no

South Korean attend in any capacity and that no Nationalist Chinese

newsmen would be allowed to attend the ceremony. These conditions were unacceptable to General Clark. Clark wanted a ROK

representative present. The General presented his own plan: The

documents would be signed first at Panmunjom by General Harrison

for the UNC and General Nam for the Communists. Twelve hours

after the signing, the guns would stop firing. After the signing at

Panmunjom, the documents would be delivered to the supreme

commanders at their respective headquarters where they would be

signed.31

An honor guard composed of all members of the UNC except for the Republic of Korea lined the walk to the entrance of the pagoda.

Authorized correspondents and cameramen followed the military

observers who entered the building shortly before 1 0:00 A.M. At

9:57A.M. the associate delegates of both parties entered and took

seats at the front. Precisely at 10:00 A.M. Generals Harrison and

Nam walked into the room and without a greeting or handshake took their seats. In twelve minutes the signing was over. As characterized all previous meetings between these two delegates they neither bowed, shook hands, nor spoke other than to discuss the events of the meetings. After the signing, they left the building

without acknowledging each other.32 General Harrison and his

fellow delegates boarded a helicopter and flew to Munsan-ni to give these documents over to General Clark, who at President

143 Eisenhower's request to have the documents signed on Korean soil, had flown to Korea.3 3

Exactly three hours after the signing at Panmunjom. Clark entered the camp theater at Munsan-ni that had been the his advance headquarters in South Korea and where the UNC delegation had been located for two years. The theatre was packed with officers and men including General Choi Duk Chin, the representative from the

Republic of Korea. After signing the document General Clark stated:

I cannot find it in me to exult in this hour. It is a time for prayer, that we may succeed in our difficult endeavor to turn this armistice to the advantage of mankind. If we extract hope from this occasion, it must be diluted with recognition that our salvation requires unrelaxing vigilance and effort.34

General Clark's statement reflected the attitude that the armistice was not an end to the problems that plagued Korea. The armistice was only a military agreement to end the fighting and only diplomats could negotiate a permanent settlement to Korea's problems. The general knew that the fighting in Korea was just another struggle against communism and felt that in this skirmish, communism had failed.

President Eisenhower delivered a message over radio and television at 10 P.M. 26 July, immediately after the signing of the armistice at Panmunjom. The president gave prayers of thanksgiving that the armistice was signed, recounted the cost in U.N. force lives to repel Communist aggression, and thanked those "who were called upon to lay down their lives in that far-off land to prove once again that only courage and sacrifice can keep freedom alive upon the earth." He ended his speech by quoting Abraham Lincoln: "With malice

144 toward none.. .let us strive in to finish the work we are ... to do all which we may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations. n35 After thirty seven months and over four million casualties, the Korean Conflict was over.36 The repatriation of remaining prisoners of war on both sides could begin.

Operation "Big Switch", the repatriation of those prisoners who desired repatriation, began on 5 August and ended 6 September 1953.

After the signing of the armistice there was work to be done before these prisoners could be accepted at Panmunjom. Camps had to be built to house the POW's and transportation provided to bring the prisoners from the camps to Panmunjom.37 Transportation had to be arranged for Chinese prisoners who desired repatriation to

Taiwan.38 By the time the repatriation process was completed on 6

September, the UNC turned over to the Communists 75,823 prisoners that included only 5, 640 Chinese. The balance of the sick and wounded had been repatriated prior in "Little Switch." A total of

22,604 prisoners held by the UNC refused repatriation. These included 14,704 Chinese and 7,900 North Koreans.39 The UNC received from the Communists 12,773 prisoners including 3,597

Americans, 945 Britons, 229 Turks, and 140 other UNC POW's.40 The

UNC prisoners who refused repatriation included 23 Americans, 1

Briton, and 335 South Koreans.41

Soon after "Big Switch" ended, and under the terms of the armistice agreement, all prisoners who refused repatriation were to be turned over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the demilitarized zone. They were given 120 days in which to change

145 their minds and be repatriated. After this period 2 Americans, 1 0

South Koreans, 440 Chinese, and 1 88 North Koreans changed their minds and were repatriated. The final total of non repatriated POW's was 21 Americans, 1 Briton, and 325 South Koreans. The 14,264

Chinese and 7, 712 North Korean repatriates when added to the

27,000 released by Rhee gave a final total of 46,976 Communist prisoners who chose not to return to Communism. 42

Twenty-one American prisoners refused to be repatriated.

This was the first time in American history that captives refused to return to the United States because apparently they preferred communism over democracy. The reasons why these men defected to communism has been explained under the general term of

"brainwashing." 43 While these men were the exception, their collaboration with the enemy was not unique. What was unique "was the fact that almost one out of every three American prisoners in

Korea was guilty of some sort of collaboration with the enemy."

. Some collaboration consisted of making radio broadcasts showing their captivity as being benign while other more serious offenses consisted of writing anti-American propaganda and informing on their comrades. Some POW's even behaved brutally toward their fellow prisoners. This collaboration can mitigated by the fact that

38 percent, 2,730 out of 7,190 prisoners died in captivity. This was a higher death rate than any of our other wars including the

Revolutionary War, in which 33 percent died.44

The United States was interested in why these men defected and the way they behaved in captivity. Although there were no simple explanations, several suffice to try explain this phenomenon.

146 One explaination was the technique called "brainwashing" whereby 5 prisoners were subjected to "a blend of leniency and pressure. "4

Not having been exposed to this technique, the men did not know how to react. After the cruelty they had sustained at the hands of the

North Koreans, this carrot and stick approach caused different types of behavior in the POW's.46 After much study, the Defense

Department came out with their conclusions. Lack of education, poor physical fitness, lack of religious convictions, and the privilege of living under a high standard of living contributed to softness in 7 some fighting men of the United States.4

Brainwashing and propaganda were two techniques used by the

Communists in changing the minds of some of the US POW's. In his autobiography, Turncoat: An American's 12 Years in Communist

Morris R. Wills details what made him decide to become a nonrepatriate. Communist propaganda citing the UNC was losing the war, Marxist indoctrination, germ-warfare charges by the

Communists, and the vacuum filled by the Communists in his own political thinking turned Wills into what he described as a

"turncoat."48 As we have seen, in all Communist truce meetings and their treatment of the POW's in the camps, propaganda played an important role for the Communists.

The most important result that came out of these findings and one that would have an impact on future wars in which the United

States might find itself was the promulgation of 1 7 August 1 9 55.

President Eisenhower wanted a new Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United States. This was unprecedented because never before "had a President found it necessary to clarify

147 or restate the principles of conduct for our military personnel, which had heretofore always been prescribed in regular training manuals." This new set of principles formulated by what happened in the POW camps of Korea was meant to instill a new attitude in fighting men of the United States and enable them to survive any future wars.49

Although the Communists won many propaganda battles they lost the propaganda war. The propaganda campaign by the

Communists was their attempt to cast the UNC in a bad light and gain support from non-aligned nations or at least to have some of the UN nations question U.S. proposals about the conduct of the war and the peace negotiations.

Propaganda and the POW repatriation issue were tied together from the start of the peace talks. From the original contact at

Kaesong where the UNC delegates attached white flags on their vehicles as a symbol of their mission and the Communists explained to the press that the UNC was coming to Kaesong to surrender, to the chair placed for General Nam upon his first meeting with Admiral

Joy at a higher position so he was actually looking down on Joy, the

Communist employed propaganda for their purposes to discredit the

UNC. 50 The UNC also helped the Communists in the propaganda wars.

The debacle at Koje-do highlighted by the signed confession of

General Dodd that there had been killings and implying these would not happen again was propaganda support to the charge that the

Communist POW's actually wanted to return to Communism, but were coerced into saying they refused repatriation. This came at a time when the Communists were running out of favorable propaganda. By

148 the time of the United Nations Command presented its package

proposal 28 April 1952, the Communists had accused the UNC of

training a battalion of monkeys to throw grenades at Communist 51 troops at the front lines. The Communists used propaganda and

adjusted the volume to suit the circumstances. According to

Admiral Burke, one of the UNC negotiators': "The flow of propaganda

could become a trickle if they scented a UNC concession or a 5 veritable flow if things were going badly for them. " 2

Propaganda was used by the Communists to show the world that

the Communists were not the aggressors in Korea. From the onset of

the war, North Korea had tried to show the world that South Korea

had instigated and attacked the North. Using the accusations of

germ warfare and the bombings in the North, the Communist

delegations tried to impress the world press of their good intentions. Sometimes they succeeded and sometimes they failed.

Although they won some minor battles, they lost the propaganda

war. The greatest blow to the Communist prestige was in the

number of captured prisoners of war that had fought on the

Communist side who had decided to defect from Communism. In

addition, during the war, "more than two million Koreans fled to the

south."53 While this figure can be blamed on the bombings and the

war in the north, what was more damaging and what prolonged the

armistice negotiations were the number of Communist

nonrepatriates. The following table will illustrate this fact.

149 Communists Little Switch Switch Total North Koreans 5,640 70,183 75,823 Chinese Totals 6,670 75,823 82,493

Communist (final total as of 19 February 1954) North Koreans 7,604 Chinese Totals 21,839

Out of 104,332 total Communists held by the UNC when the

screening was completed 13 April 1952, 21,839 Communist

prisoners or 21% refused to be repatriated. What was even more

damaging to Communist prestige was that 14,235 Chinese prisoners

out of 20,905 or 68% refused repatriation.54 While the Chinese negotiators could tolerate the North Korean defections, 68 percent

on Chinese Communist "Volunteers" opting to stay in the West was intolerable.

It is impossible to have an accurate count of the casualties of the war. Neither North Korea nor China supplied casualty figures but estimates are that over 2 million North Korean civilians died and additional 500,000 North Korean soldiers were killed during the fighting. It is estimated that at least 1 million Chinese soldiers died, but this figure may be too low.55 The ROK, UNC, and United

States battle casualties were also significant.56

In addition to the loss in lives, the Korean Conflict almost totally destroyed what industry was active at the start of the war in North Korea. By war's end, almost all of its cities and industry lay in ruins.57

150 For South Korea the war proved slightly less disastrous. By

wars end there were 2.5 million refugees in the South and another 5 5 million living on relief. 8

The United States gained slightly from the war. After World War

II, the armed force of the United States was greatly reduced. The

Korean Conflict checked this and showed political leaders the

fallacy of this policy. The United States was shown that it could not relax its vigilance or its capacity to fight in the future. After the armistice there was no attempt to reduce the armed forces as had been the case after World War II. The United States also gained

experience in how to fight a limited war. As Vietnam showed, the

US did not learn its lessons well.

Who was the immediate winner if there was one? North Korea lay in ruins, Communism lost heavily in lives and propaganda points,

South Korea was partially devastated, and even though Rhee boosted

his prestige by showing that South Korea was not a "puppet state" of the United States and receiving economic aid of approximately 200 million a year, he would be thrown out of office in 1960. The two

powers that gained the most, lost nothing at all during the war.

Nationalist China saw its enemy Communist China lose heavily in

men and equipment; Chiang Kai-shek accomplished this and did not have to fire a shot. The overall winner, however, was Japan. The outbreak of the war made a peace treaty between the United States

and Japan possible. In addition, Japan gained economically during

the period 1950-1953. It became a rear base for UNC troops and supplies flowing from the United States. The Korean Conflict bound

Japan securely to the West, wiping out much of the memory of its

151 participation in World War U.59 As Premier Shigeru Yoshida of

Japan proclaimed, "the war was a gift of the gods. "60

152 NOTES

1 Clark, From the Danube to the 279; Clark, "The Truth About Korea" Corlier' s 133, 46; U.S. of State val. 28 (June 29, 1952), 905.

2u.s. of State val. 28 (June 29, 1953), 905.

3For a complete text of the Rhee speech see The New York June 18, 1953, 3.

4clark, From the Danube to the 279.

5clark, From the Danube to the 280-281.

Mandate for 185.

71bid., 185-186.

8The New York Times 19 June 1953, 2.

9For the complete text of the letter from Lester B. Pearson, President of the U.N. General Assembly to President Syngman Rhee see U.S. of State val. 29 (July 6, 1953), 14-1 5.

1 Oclark, From the Danube to the 281; Clark, "The Truth About Korea, "47; U.S. of State vol. 28 (June 29, 1953), 907. Clark stated: I am profoundly shocked by this unilateral abrogation of your personal commitment. On several occasions in recent weeks you have personally assured both Ambassador Briggs and me that you would not take unilateral action with reference to ROK forces under my control until after full and frank discussion with me. Your actions today have clearly abrogated these assurances.

153 11 Due to conflicting estimates by different sources it is impossible to determine the number of anti-Communist POW's held in camps. According to David Rees there were 25,000 anti­ Communist Korean POW's in camps all over South Korea. The Communist delegates claimed that 25,952 escaped and General Clark stated that 27,000 escaped and 9,000 were captured. Clark, From the Danube to the 281, 285; David Rees, Korea: The Limited 425; U.S of State val. 28 (June 29, 1953), 907.

12u.s. of State val. 28 (June 29, 1953), 907. The letter stated the following: In view of the extremely serious consequences of this incident, we cannot but put the following questions to your side: Is the United Nations Command able to control the South Korean Government and Army? If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique? If it is not included, then your side must be responsible for recovering immediately all the 25,952 prisoners of war who are at liberty, that is, those who were released and retained under coercion and to be press-ganged into the South Korean Army, and your side must give assurance that similar incidents absolutely will not recur in the future. We are awaiting the reply of your side.

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army Kim II Sung

Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers Peng Teh-Huai

13ctark, From the Danube to the 282; Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 47.

14clark, From the Danube to the 282-283.

151bid., 284-285.

1 Gctark, From the Danube to the 289; Collins, War in 358.

154 17clark, From the Danube to the 285.

18Ciark, From the Danube to the 287.

19u.s. of State vol. 29 (July 20, 1953), 72- 73; Clark, From the Danube to the 287-288; Collins, War in 359; "Grudging Agreement by Rhee Sets Truce in Motion Again," 42 (July 20, 1953), 36. The actual agreement stated:

1. Promise of a US-ROK Mutual Security Pact after, not before, the Armistice on the assurance that Secretary Dulles had met with the Senate leaders and got a favorable reaction to the treaty. 2. Long-term economic aid .... 3. An agreement that both South Korea and the United States would withdraw from the post armistice political conference after ninety days should no concrete achievements result.... 4. Agreement ... to expand the ROK Army to cover twenty divisions, with appropriate increases in the navy and air force. 5. Agreement to hold high-level American-ROK conferences on all aspects of our joint objectives before the political conference opened.

20clark, "The Truth About Korea, 48; Clark, From the Danube to the 289.

21 U.S. of State vol. 29 (July 20, 1953), 73.

22Eisenhower, Mandate for 181-182.

23clark, From the Danube to the 290.

24Ciark, From the Danube to the 290-292; Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 48; Collins, War in 361; Taylor, Swords and 146.

25clark, From the Danube to the 292; Clark, "The Truth About Korea, " 48.

26Ciark, From the Danube to the 292.

155 27Hermes, Truce Tent and 484.

28clark, From the Danube to the 292.

29The demarcation line from its most northerly point was forty miles north of the Parallel on the Sea of Japan below Kosong. From there it curved sharply south to above the Punchbowl area before running in an east-west direction to the south of Kumsong and north of Kumhwa and Chorwon. From the western side of the Iron triangle the boundary dipped south-westwards slicing across the lmjin to Panmunjom and to the Han estuary, an area neutralized in the Armistice Agreement. (See map Appendix G). According to Walter Hermes in Truce Tent and Front "the territorial adjustments in Korea had been minor in character." Hermes, Truce Tent and 501.

30clark, From the Danube to the 294-29 5; Collins, War in 362-363.

31 Clark, From the Danube to the 293.

32Ciark, From the Danube to the 295; Collins, War in 363; New York Times 27 July 1953, 1-2.

33clark, From the Danube to the 295; Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 48; Collins, War in 364.

34Ciark, From the Danube to the 296; Clark, "The Truth About Korea," 48; New York Times 27 July 1953, 9.

35For the complete text of President Eisenhower's speech see U.S. of State vol. 29 (August 3, 1953), 1 31 ; Also: New York Times 27 July 1953, 4.

36New York Times 28 July 1953, 1-3.

37New York Times 2 August 1953, 1.

38Taylor, Swords and 149.

39see Appendix D

156 40Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," Parameters 23, 10 4; also see Appendix D.

41 Hermes, Truce Tent and 515.

42Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse,"Parameters 23,1 OS; For a complete account of the interview procedures see Major Charles Fogg, USA, "I Saw the Struggle in the Explanation Tents," Post 226, 28- 29, 70-72. For a complete breakdown of non repatriated POW's see Appendix D.

43According to Eugene Kinkead's book In War But brainwashing was described as a combination of indoctrination and interrogation. These were important techniques utilized by Communists in the POW camps especially used by the Chinese. Eugene Kinkead, In War But One (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1959),23-24.

441bid., 1 6-1 7.

451bid., 17.

46Halliday and Cumings, Korea: the Unknown 180.

4 ?Kinkead, In War But 18.

48Morris R. Wills, as told to J. Robert Moskin, Turncoat: An American's 12 Years in Communist China (Prentice Hall, 1968; Pocket Books, 1970), 58-62. For a complete description of propaganda techniques used on Wills and the reasons for his defection see the complete book above.

49For a complete text of The Code of Conduct see; Kinkead, ln. War But 20-21 .

SOvetter, on 198.

Sllbid., 198.

52Hermes, Truce Tent and 505.

157 53clark, From the Danube to the 330.

54These figures are derived from the tables found in Appendix C and D.

55Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 200.

56 Aflied battle. casualties were as follows: ROK According to a UN release on 23 October 1953, ROK casualties totaled 1 ,31 3,836 including about 1 million civilians. No definitive breakdown of the ROK military casualties has ever been reached, but the following figures are approximately correct: Killed, 4 7 ,000; wounded; 183,000; Missing and POW, 70,000; Total 300,000.

United Nations Apart from the US losses, the battle casualties of the other UN contingents of the UNC are calculated to have been as follows: Dead: 3,194 Wounded: 11 ,297 Missing and POW's: 769 Total: 1 7,260 (Source: UN release, 23 October 1 953)

United States Deaths 33,629 Wounded in Action 103,284 Missing in Action 739 Captured interned returned or refused repatriation Total casualties 142,091 (Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense)

57 A result of bombing the five dams near Pyongyang caused flash floods that extended as far as downtown Pyongyang that caused considerable to the capital city. In addition, flooding caused destruction of the rice crop as well as diversion of manpower needed for repairs. Haliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 1 94-1 95. According to David Rees, "by the time the shooting stopped ... the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with all its cities and

158 industries rubble heaps, and with normal life at an end, only existed as a state in so far as it was held together by the military operations of Communist China." Rees, Korea: The Limited 440-441 .

58Rees, Korea: The Limited 441 .

59Halliday and Cumings, Korea: The Unknown 203.

60cumings, The of the Korean War val. II The of the Cataract 1 947-1 766.

159 CONCLUSION

Why did it take from 10 July 1951 to 27 July 1953, a period of over two years, to end a war that was not winnable by either side?

Agreement on an agenda was reached as early as 26 July 1951. The agenda covered the key points that consisted of fixing a military demarcation line, concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice. In addition there were recommendations relating to prisoners of war.1 From 26 July to 23 November 1951, the area of greatest contention was where to draw the armistice line. This was finally resolved on 27 November when it was agreed that "the actual line of contact of the opposing forces would become the demarcation line, and that, when the armistice agreement was complete, both sides would withdraw two kilometers from it to form the DMZ."2

The settlement of this issue left two unresolved issues: composition of and members of the armistice organization and the prisoner of war issue.

This thesis has shown that a test of wills developed over the composition of the armistice commission and reconstruction and inspection of airfields in the North. The Communists wanted the

Soviet Union as a member of the armistice commission while the

United States rejected its nomination. President Truman felt the

160 Soviet Union was directly involved in the planning of the Korean

Conflict and therefore should not be allowed to participate as a

neutral nation. Inspections of airfields revolved around the

composition of the teams that would be required to do the actual inspections. General J. Lawton Collins, United States Army Chief of

Staff, questioned "whether inspections were necessary and wanted to drop the demand."3 After months of negotiations, on 1 July 1952, the new UNC negotiator, General Harrison, was able to state that both sides had agreed upon every article in the draft armistice proposals except Article 51 that stated: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. n4

The question of voluntary versus involuntary repatriation had been debated at Panmunjom since the start of the negotiations. It was decided to have the POW issue placed at the end of the agenda since it could prove to be an issue that might deadlock the talks. The prisoner debate started in December 19 51 with the Communists demanding nothing less than full repatriation. The UNC's position was that prisoners were to be exchanged on a voluntary basis and that each prisoner was to express his desire to return or not to return to his own side. This was the basis for voluntary repatriation. As President Truman stated: "We will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery." As far as the president was concerned' "this was not a point for 5 bargaining. "

161 Why did the UNC and the United States in particular adopt this

position? According to Admiral Joy: "Voluntary repatriation placed

the welfare of ex-Communist soldiers above that of our own United

Nations Command personnel in Communist prison camps, and above

that of our United Nations Command personnel still on the battle line

in Korea." He continued: "Voluntary repatriation cost us over a year

of war and cost us our United Nations Command prisoners in

Communist camps a year of captivity."6 General Haydon Boatner

claimed "the United Nations Command suffered at least 50,000

casualties in the continuing Korean War while we argued to protect a

lesser number of ex-communists who did not wish to return to

Communism. "7 Many senior American officials and military leaders

agreed with Joy. Secretary of Defense designate Robert A. Lovett

"cautioned against bargaining with the welfare of our own prisoners"

while J. Lawton Collins and many others of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

including Far East Commander, General Ridgway, cautioned President

Truman against following this course of action. Truman refused to

budge. The United States, he stated, would not sign any armistice that did not include voluntary repatriation. "8

Historians agree with this assessment. Walter G. Hermes wrote that "safeguarding the rights of repatriates cost over 125,000 UNC casualties during the fifteen month period while the enemy lost over

g a quarter of a million men. .. Considering that only twenty one

Americans refused repatriation at the end of the fighting, this

position has to be examined.

There are two possible reasons for the UNC position. The

Truman administration, operating during the height of the Cold War,

162 wanted to show the world that the US system of basic civil liberties

was more desirable than the Communist system of oppression.

Giving the prisoner freedom of choice would make the United States

look good expressing this view.

A second explanation concerned conditions at the end of World

War II that prompted countries to meet in Geneva Switzerland in

1949 to promulgate what is called the Geneva Convention of 1949.

With the defeat of Germany, it became important for the Soviet

Union to repatriate back to the Soviet Union all the ex-members of the Russian Army and civilians who had aided the Nazis. According to Stalin, this meant any officer, man, or civilian captured, even in the line of duty. The soldier could have been a good Russian, not a collaborator, but if he was captured he was deemed to be a traitor to the Great Patriotic War. Since Europe was in shambles it was necessary for each nation to cooperate in repatriating nationals back to their original country. These nations could not concern themselves whether Latvians, Estonians, or Lithuanians were actually Russian citizens or not. While these nations did not concern themselves with the problems of repatriates or their final disposition, the repatriates knew what was in store for them once back in Russian hands. There are stories of repatriates throwing themselves off trains, drowning themselves, even putting their heads through glass windows, cutting their throats, rather than being returned to Russia. This forced repatriation did not apply to

Russians only or members of Baltic countries and prompted the question: "What actually happened to the still missing millions of

163 German and Japanese prisoners of war held by Russia?"10 Questions such as these prompted the Geneva Convention of 1 949.

The debate between the UNC and the Communists revolved around two articles of the convention. Article 118 of the Geneva

Convention of 1 949 stated that: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities. "11

Article 7 stated that: Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce. in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by... special agreement.12 The Communists maintained a literal interpretation of Article 118 and as Andre

Vyshinsky , United Nations delegate from the Soviet Union stated:

"There is no need to look behind the words of Article 118; captor states are obligated to repatriate all prisoners of war without exception, no matter what the prevailing conditions... and that is all there is to it." Mr. Vyshinsky contended that the principle of Article

11 8 set forth a right made irrevocable by Article 7. This meant the prisoner was not entitled to waive his right to be repatriated. 13

The United Nations Command maintained that Article 11 8 did not make it mandatory for the unconditional return of prisoners but required the detaining power to provide the unhindered opportunity for prisoners who wish to return to their homeland if they desire to do so. They based their opinion that the convention was drafted in order to protect an individual's human rights as expressed in the

Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the

United Nations in 1948. This declaration provided that "everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." This interpretation entitled any prisoner the right "to

164 leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country and not to be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right 4 to change his nationality."1

In June 1952, after the results of the final screening of all captured POW's were exchanged between Communist and UNC delegates at Panmunjom, it was revealed that only 67,557 out of

117,342 POW's desired repatriation. To make matters worse, only

6,388 Chinese Volunteers desired repatriation. This could not be tolerated by the Communists.1 5

After a summer of negotiations and a final proposal submitted by the UNC to the Communist delegation, General Harrison recessed negotiations indefinitely. The UNC was not going to give any more concessions that would deliver "unwilling slaves to unwanted 1 masters." 6

There is no historical consensus as to why the Communists returned to the bargaining tables in April 1 9 53. Some historians feel Stalin's death in March changed the Soviet attitude towards the war because it was unwinnable and costly. Others feel it was the combined result of the stalemate, the bombings of the North, the economic strain on Peking, and the threat by President Eisenhower to unleash the Nationalists and use atomic weapons to end the war.

In any event, the Communists returned to Panmunjom. Little Switch, the release of sick and wounded POW's, coupled with the adoption of the Indian Proposal of the United Nations settled the prisoner of war issue and on 27 July 1953 after Syngman Rhee's attempts to derail the talks, the armistice line was established, and the armistice to end the Korean conflict was signed at Panmunjom.

165 Was the UNC correct in prolonging the war to win the POW repatriation argument? A Chinese prisoner of war who was repatriated to Taiwan rather than Communist China might argue the results were favorable. An American POW, living in a prisoner of war camp on the Yalu River and loved ones of those who died in the period from 1 July 1952 to 27 July 1953 might argue otherwise. The result of the prolonged armistice negotiations, however, provided the basis for future prisoner of war repatriation. Articles of the

Geneva Conference of 1954 that ended France's involvement in Indo­

China, stated that "all prisoners of war and civilian internees... shall be liberated within a period of thirty (30) days after the date when the cease-fire becomes effective in each theatre." It also stated that "all prisoners of war and civilian internees held by either party shall be surrendered to the appropriate authorities of the other party, who shall give them all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or zone of their choice. "1 7 The repatriation of prisoners of war hammered out at

Panmunjom had set a precedent.

The Paris Peace Talks in 1973 ending the United States involvement in the war in Vietnam followed the format set at

Panmunjom. Chapter Ill entitled "The Return of Captured Military

Personnel and Foreign Civilians and Captured and Detained

Vietnamese Civilian Personnel" used the same language as the

Geneva Convention of 1954.18 Thanks to the repatriation agreement made at the end of the Korean Conflict, individual freedom was promoted and an interpretation of the Geneva Convention as relates to prisoners of war was made in accordance with humane principles.

166 The historiography of the armistice agreement hammered out at

Panmunjom will continue to elicit debate for years to come. The question of whether this delay in the closure of the fighting with its consequent loss of life and property was justified by the precedent set for disposition of POW's in future wars, is still open to debate.

Only time can tell whether the loss of life was worth the precedent set.

167 NOTES

1 U.S. of State vol. 25 (August 6, 1951 ), 232.

2Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," Parameters 23,1 00.

3cumings, Child of Conflict: The Korean-American 272.

4Qn 1 July 1952 the Senior UNC Delegate, General Harrison stated: "With the exception of a few minor administrative details to 62 of 63 paragraphs of the draft armistice agreement ... the sole remaining disagreement concerned paragraph 51, the POW question." Harrison urged the other side to accept the paragraph as written which he believed was in "full accord with the Geneva Convention and which he maintained provided a reasonable basis for settlement. U.S. of Relations of the United States 1952-1954 vol. XV "Korea," 369.

5Truman, Memoirs S. vol. 2, Years of Trial and 460.

6Joy, How Communists 152.

7Major Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Prisoners of War for Sale, The American (August 1962), 40.

8Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," Parameters 23, 101.

9Hermes, Truce Tent and 500-501.

1 0Boatner, "Prisoners of War for Sale, 38.

168 General Boatner was referring to missing POW's held by the Soviet Union after the end of the war. This situation prompted Secretary of State Acheson to make the following statement to the United Nations on 24 October 1952. "On December 14, 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 427 (V). That resolution concerned prisoners of war from the Second World War, many of which, it was alleged, were being detained in the Soviet Union. That is French prisoners, German prisoners, and Japanese prisoners were being held in the Soviet Union and not allowed to go home." U.S. of State vol. 27 (November 10, 1952), 746.

1 1 Levie, International Law Prisoners of War in International Armed vol. 59, 476.

121bid., 435.

13 charmatz and Wit, "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention," The Yale Law 62, 395.

14 Kim, "Prisoners of War as a Major Problem of the Korean Armistice, 1 953,"199.

15 These figures are derived from tables found in U.S. of State Bulletin ,vol. 27 (December 15, 1952), 958.

16Murray, "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase," of the United States Naval Institute vol. 79, 989.

1 ?u.s of Relations of the United States Vol. XVI, "The Geneva Convention" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1981 ), 1513.

18u.s. of State vol. 68 (February 12, 1 973), 170, 174-175.

169 APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS FROM JUNE 1, 1951 TO JULY 27, 1953

1951 1 June Secretary of State Dean Acheson indicates that a cease-fire at the 38th parallel would be acceptable.

23 June Soviet U.N. Ambassador, Malik urges discussions leading towards a cease-fire.

29 June General Ridgway is instructed by the JCS to broadcast a message to the Communists to initiate cease-fire talks.

2 July Communist agree to meeting at Kaesong.

8 July Liaison officers from both sides meet at Kaesong.

10 July First meeting of full delegations.

25 October Cease-fire talks move to Panmunjom.

12 November Ridgway orders end to offensive action.

27 November Agreement reached on line of demarcation. Cease­ fire line will be line of contact when armistice signed.

1952 2 April Screening of POW's begin.

7 May General Dodd seized at Koje-do.

8 October Plenary sessions recessed due to continuing failure to reach agreement on POW issue. 170 November Indian proposal at UN for disposition of POW issue.

4 November Dwight Eisenhower elected president of US.

2-5 December Eisenhower investigates conditions in Korea.

1953 2 February President Eisenhower, in his State of the Union Address threatens to unleash Seventh Fleet. No longer will this fleet prevent Nationalist Chinese from attacking mainland.

22 February UNC again proposes exchange of sick and wounded POW's 5 March Death of Stalin.

28 March Communists agree to exchange of sick and wounded POW's.

30 March Chou-En-lai indicates Communists want to resume talks.

2 April Deadlock on POW repatriation resolved.

20 April Operation "Uttle Switch" begins. POW's exchanged at Panmunjom.

26 April Plenary sessions resume.

4 June Communists agree to UNC truce proposals.

18 June President Syngman Rhee releases Korean POW's who did not desire repatriation.

25 June Robertson begins "Little Truce Talks" with Rhee to secure his acceptance of truce.

9 July Communist forces attack ROK divisions along a broad front.

12 July Rhee agrees to cooperate with the UNC.

27 July Armistice agreement signed at Panmunjom. 171 APPENDIX B

PLENARY MEMBERS OF THE ARMISTICE DELEGATION*

United Nations Command Delegation

Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN 10 July 1951-22 May 1952 Maj. Gen. Henry I Hodes, USA 1 0 July 19 51-1 7 December 1 951 Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, USN 10 July 1 951-1 1 December 1 951 Maj. Gen. Laurence C. Craigie,USAF 10 July 1951-27 November 1951 Maj. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, ROKA 10 July 1951-24 October 1951 Maj. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, ROKA 24 October 1951-6 Feb. 1952 Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner,USAF 27 November 1951-5 July 1952 Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA 1 7 December 1 951-6 Feb. 1952 Rear Adm. Ruthven E. Libby, USN 1 1 December 1951-23 June 1952 Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr.,USA 6 February 1952-27 July 1953 Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung, ROKA 22 May 1952-26 April 1953 Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell, USA 22 May 1952-26 April 1953 Brig. Gen. Lee Han lim, ROKA 28 May 1952-26 April 1953 Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF 5 July 1952-26 April 1953 Rear Adm. John C. Daniel, USN (no dates listed) Brig. Gen. Ralph M. Osborne, USA 23 June 1952-27 July 1953 Brig. Gen. Choi Duk Chin, ROKA 26 April 1953-16 May 1953 Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, USAF 25 April 1953-20 June 1953 Brig. Gen. George M. Finch, USAF 20 June 1 953-27 July 1 953

North Korean and Chinese Communists Delegation

Lt. Gen. Nam II, KPA 10 July 1951-27 July 1953 Gen. Peng Teh-huai CCF 10 July 1951-27 July 1953 General Teng Hua, CCF 10 July 1951-24 October 1951 Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, KPA 10 July 1951-27 July 1953 Maj. Gen. Hsieh Fang, CCF 10 July 1951-26 April 1953 Maj. Gen. Chang Pyong San, KPA 10 July 1951-24 October 1951 General Pien Chang-wu, CCF 24 October 1951-26 April 1953 Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan, KPA 24 October 1951-28 April 1952 Rear Admiral Kim Won Mu, KPA 28 April 1952-11 August 1952 Maj. Gen. So Hui, KPA 1 1 August 1952-26 April 1953 172 General Ting Kuo-yu, CCF 26 April 1953-27 July 1953 Maj. Gen. Chang Chun San, KPA 26 April 1953-25 May 1953 Maj. Gen. Tsai Cheng-wen, CCF 26 April 1953-27 May 1953 Admiral Kim Won My, KPN 25 May 1953-17 June 1953 Maj. Gen. Kim Dong Hak, KPA 17 June 1953-27 July 1953

*In this appendix the tour of duty of a delegate is concluded on the date that his replacement is officially accredited in a plenary session, even though in many cases the delegate may have been relieved and reassigned while the meetings were in recess. Source: Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and 512.

Author's note: The spelling of Chinese names in this thesis is based on the Wade Giles system in effect until 1980 when it was changed over to the Pin-Yan system by the Chinese government. If a name is spelled differently it is because the source was written after 1980.

173 APPENDIX C

REPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR

Little Switch Switch Total

75,823 North Koreans...... a5,640 b70,183 Ch inese...... 1,030 c 5,640 6,670

u.s...... , 49 3,597 3,746 ROK...... 471 7,862 8,321 U.K...... 32 945 977 Turks...... 1 5 229 243 Filipinos...... 1 40 41 Canadians...... 2 30 32 Colombians...... 6 22 28 Australians...... 5 21 26

Frenchmen.•.•.....•••.•...... ••.....•...... •...... •... 12 12 1 9 South Africans...... • 8 1 2 3 Greel

174 APPENDIX D

NONREPATRIATED PRISONERS OF WAR

Held by the UNC

Disposition Total Chinese Korean

22,604 14,704 7,900 Total ......

Returned to Communist control 628 440 188 Escaped and missing 13 2 1 1 Di ed in custody of Custodial Forces of India 38 15 23 Went to India with CFI 86 12 74 Returned to UNC control* 21,839 14,235 7,604

Held by Communists

Disposition Total u.s. U.K. Korean

Total...... 359 23 1 335

Returned to Communist control...... 3 4 7 21 1 325 Went to India with CFI...... 2 2 Returned to UNC 8 control ...... 10 2 ···································

*Final action completed on 1 9 Feb. 54. Source: Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent 51 5.

175 APPENDIX E

BATTLE CASUALTIES OF THE KOREAN WAR

ROK According to an UNC release of 23 October 1953, ROK casualties in the Korean War totaled 1,313,836 including about a million civilians. No definitive breakdown of the ROK military casualties has ever been reached, but the following figures are approximately correct: Killed: 47,000; Wounded; 183,000; Missing and POW;s 70,000; Total: 300,000.

United Nations Apart from the US losses, the battle casualties of the other UN contingents of the UNC are calculated to have been as follows:

Dead: 3,194 Wounded: 11 ,297 Missing and POW: 2,769 Total: 17,260

Of this total the Commonwealth casualties killed, wounded and missing were 7 ,268.

Communist China-North Korea There is no Defense Department estimate of Communist casualties, nor is there any known Communist casualty list. In the UN release referred to above it was estimated that the CCF had lost 900,000 men, the North Koreans 520,000. A special report to the UN Secretary General by the UNC on the armistice (S/3079), dated 7 August 1953, states that 'enemy casualties are estimated at between one and a half and two million'. NK civilian casualties are estimated unofficially at about one million.

176 United States

Total USMC Air Force Total Cas ualties 142,091 109,958 2,087 28,205 1,841

Deaths 33,629 27,704 458 4,267 1,200

Killed in Action 23,300 19,344 279 3,308 379

Wounded in Action 105,785 79,526 1,599 24,281 379 Died 2,501 1,930 23 537 11 Other 103,284 77,596 1,576 23,744 368

Missing in Action 5,866 4,442 174 391 859 Died 5,127 3,778 152 391 806 Returned 715 664 13 0 38 Current Miss. 24 0 9 0 15

Captured or Interned 7,140 6,656 35 225 224 Died 2,701 2,662 4 31 4 Returned 4,418 3,973 31 194 220 Refused Rep. 21 21 0 0 0

Source: David Rees, Korea: The Limited 460-461 .

177 APPENDIX F

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE CHINESE·PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE OF SICK AND INJURED PRISONERS OF WAR (Panmunjom, Korea 11 April 19 53)

TEXT The senior member of the United Nations Command liaison group and the senior member of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers liaison group, in order to effect the repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel in accordance with provisions of article 109 of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, agree to the following: Repatriation shall be accomplished at Panmunjom. Repatriation shall commence at Panmunjom no later than 1 0 days after the signing of the agreement. a. The Korean's People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately 1 00 per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is completed. The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the United Nations Command to receive them, but delivery shall in any case be completed prior to the termination date of this agreement. b. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel at the rate of approximately 500 per day until delivery of all sick and injured captured personnel to be repatriated by the United Nations Command is completed. The number of persons actually delivered each day shall be contingent upon the ability of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers to receive them, but delivery shall in nay case be completed prior to the termination of this agreement. The United Nations Command shall deliver sick and injured captured personnel in groups of approximately twenty-five. Each 178 group shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include: (a) Name, (b) rank, (c) internment or military serial number. After each group of sick and injured captured personnel is delivered and received, a representative of the receiving side shall sign the roster of the captured personnel delivered as a receipt and shall return this to the delivering side. In order to insure that the sick and injured captured personnel of both sides are given maximum protection during the full period of repatriation, both sides agree to guarantee immunity from all attacks to all rail and motor movements carrying sick and injured captured personnel to Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, respectively, and thence t�rough presently established immunity routes to Panmunjom, subject to the following conditions: a. Movement of motor convoys to Kaesong and Munsan-Ni, respectively, shall be restricted to daylight hours, and each convoy shall consist of not less than five vehicles in close formation: except that north of Panmunjom, because of actual conditions, the latter provisions shall apply only to the route from Pyongyang to Kaesong. b. Each car in rail movements and each vehicle in motor conveys shall display clearly visible identification markings. c. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the liaison group of the other side with a detailed description of the markings utilized to identify motor convoys and rail movements. This shall include color, size, and manner in which the markings will be displayed. Each side, prior to the initial movement, shall provide the liaison group of the other side with the sites and markings of the bivouac areas and night stop-over locations for motor convoys. Each side shall inform the liaison group of the other side, twenty-four hours in advance of each movement, of the selected route, number of cars in rail movement or number of vehicles in motor movement, and the estimated time of arrival at Kaesong or Munsan-Ni. Each side shall notify the liaison group of the other side, by the most expeditious means of communication available, of the location of emergency stop-overs. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the Oct. 22, 1951, agreement between liaison officers , with the exception of the part therein provided for in Paragraph 8 of this agreement, shall continue in effect. Liaison groups of both sides and their parties shall have free movement within the Panmunjom 179 conference site areas. The composition of each liaison group and its party shall be determined by the senior member thereof: however, in order to avoid congestion in the conference site area, the number of personnel of each side in the area, including captured personnel under its control, shall not exceed 300 persons at any one time. each side shall transfer repatriated personnel out of the Panmunjom conference site as expeditiously as possible. During the period while sick and injured captured personnel are being repatriated through the Panmunjom conference site area, the armed military police of each side, who undertake to maintain order within the conference site area, shall be increased from the maximum number of fifteen, as provided in the Oct. 22, 19 51 , agreement between liaison officers, to thirty. Other administrative details shall be mutually arranged by officers designated by the senior member of the liaison group of each side. This agreement is effective when signed and will terminate twenty days after the commencement of repatriation of sick and injured captured personnel at Panmunjom.

Source: HowardS. Levie, Documents on Prisoners of 626-628.

180 APPENDIX G

ARMISTICE UNE JULY 27, 1953

MANCHURIA

Source: Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold of the 643.

181 SELECTED BIBUOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

U.S. Department of State. Relations of the United States The Conference of The Potsdam vol. 1. Washington, D.C.: The United States Government Printing Office, 1960.

Relations of the United States vol. XV, Part 1. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1 984.

--· Relations of the United States 1952- 1 vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 198 1.

--· Relations of the United The Conferences Malta and 1945. Washington, DC.: United States Government Printing Office, 1 955.

U.S. Department of State Publication. United States Relations With China. Far East Series 30. Washington,D.C.: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1949.

U.S. of State Bulletins. various issues.1 1 June 1950 to 2 February 1973. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. House of Representatives Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1 951-1956. U.S. in the Far East Part 1 U.S. and The Korean War and Peace South Asian arid Related Problems. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1 980.

182 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. The Prisoner of War Situation in Korea. 82nd. Cong. 2nd Sess.: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952. U.S. Senate Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cease-Fire in Korea vol. 3, part 1, 82nd. Cong. 1st. Sess.: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.

U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services. Discussion with General Matthew B. Re. Far Eastern POW and Nato Policies. 82nd Cong. 2nd. Sess.: Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952.

BOOKS

Acheson, Dean. Present At The Creation: Years in the State New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969.

Clark, Mark W. General. From The Danube To The Yalu. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1954.

Collins, J. Lawton. War In Peacetime: The and Lessons of Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969.

Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate For 1953-1956. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963.

Goodman, Allan E. editor. While The of Admiral C. Turner at the Korean Armistice Conference. Stanford California: Hoover Institution Press, 1978.

Hansen, Kenneth K., Colonel, Infantry, USA. Heroes Behind Barbed Wire. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957.

Joy, C. Turner. Admiral, U.S.N. (Ret.). How Communists New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 9 6 5.

Levie, Howard S., ed. International Law Studies Volume 59, Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, U.S. Naval War College, 1979.

183 .International Studies Volume 60, Documents on Prisoners of War. Newport Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1979.

Ridgway, Matthew B. General, United States Army, Retired. The Korean War. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967.

Talbot, Strobe, editor and translator. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1970.

Taylor, Maxwell, General, U.S. Army (Retired). Swords and Plowshares. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs S. Truman vol. 2, Years of Trial and Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956.

Weintraub, Stanley. War in the Wards: Korea's Unknown Battle in a Prisoner-of-War San Rafael California: Presidio Press, 1976.

Wills, Morris W. as told to Robert J. Moskin. Turncoat: An American's 12 Years in Communist China. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1968; New York: Pocket Books, 1970.

ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

Acheson, Dean G. "The Truce Talks in Korea: A Full Report to the United Nations." 206 (January 19, 1953): 21-31.

Benben, John S. "Education of Prisoners of War on Koje Island, Korea." The Educational Record 36 (April 1955): 157-173 .

Bess, Demaree. "The Prisoners Stole the Show in Korea." Post 225 (November 1, 1952): 36-37, 52-55.

Boatner, Haydon L. General, U.S. Army (Ret.). "Prisoners Of War For Sale." The American (August 1962): 14-15, 38-41.

184 Charmatz, Jan P. and Wit, Harold M. "Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention." The Yale Law Journal 62 (February 1953): 391-415.

Clark, Mark W. General. "The Truth About Korea." Collier's 133 (February 5, 1954): 34-39; 133 (February 9, 1954): 88-93; 133 (March 5, 1954): 44-49.

Fogg, Charles, USA, "I Saw the Struggle in the Explaination Tents." Post 226 (January 24, 1954):28-29, 70-72.

Murray, J.C. Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps. "The Korean Truce Talks: First Phase." of the United States Naval Institute 79 (September 1953): 981-989.

NEWSPAPERS

The New York Times. 21 April 1951; 10-15, 22 May; 21,22, 26-27, 30 June; 1 July; 22 August; 2 December 1952; 18, 22 June; 27,28 July; 2 August 1953.

Times (London). 13 May, 24-26 June 1952.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Bethel, Nicholas. The Last Secret: Forcible On To Russia. London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1974.

Chen, Jian. China's Road to the Korean War. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Cumings, Bruce, ed. Child of Conflict: The Korean-American 1 943 -1 9 53. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1 983.

,. The of the Korean War vol. 2 The of the Cataract 1947-1950. Princeton, New· Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990. 185 Elliot, Mark R. Pawns of Yalta. Urbana Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1982.

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind Of War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963.

Goulden, Joseph C. Korea: The Untold of the War New York: Times Books, a division of The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1982.

Halliday, Jon and Cumings, Bruce. Korea: The Unknown War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.

Heller, Francis H. ed. The Korean War: A 25-Year Lawrence Kansas: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1 977.

Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Front. Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1 9 6 6.

James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur: and Disaster 1945-1964 vol. 3. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.

Kinkead, Eugene. In War But One. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,1959.

Knox, Donald. The Korean War: Uncertain New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1988.

Mclellan, David S. Dean Acheson: The State Years. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1976.

Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martins Press, 1964.

Schecter, Jerold L., with Luckhov, Vyacheslav V., Editors and Translators. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glastnost Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990.

Tolstoy, Nikolai. Victims of Yalta. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

Vetter, Hal. on Island. Rutland Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle 186 Company, 19 65. ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

Chen, Jian "The Sino-Soviet Alliance And China's Entry Into The Korean War." Cold War International Working Paper No. 1. Washington, D.C. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (June 1992): 1-31.

Kalischer, Peter. "The Koje Snafu." Collier's 130 (September 6, , 952): 15-, 9.

Mayda, Jaro. "The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law." The American Journal of International Law 47 (July 1 953): 414-438.

Newsweek. "Grudging Agreement by Rhee Sets Truce in Motion Again." 42 (July 20, 1953): 36.

Potter, Pittman B. "Repatriation of Prisoners of War." The American Journal of International Law 46 (July 1 952): 508-509.

Rockwell, Jeffrey E. "The Rights of Nonrepatriation of Prisoners of War Captured by the United States. The Yale Law Journal 83 (December 1 973): 358-384.

Roskey, William. "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse." Parameters 23 (Summer 1993): 96-106.

Sherrod, Robert. "The Inside Story of the Korean Truce." Post 226 (October 17, 1 953): 26-27, 125, 127-128, 130.

Weathersby, Kathryn. "New Findings on the Korean War." Cold War International 3 (Fall 1993): 1, 14-18.

1949-50: __ . "Korea, "To Attack or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim II Sung, and the Prelude to War." Cold War International 5 (Spring 1995): 1-9.

Worden, William. "Our Lucky Red Prisoners." Post 224 (January 5, 1952): 15-17, 32-33.

U.S. News & World "How the Communists Explain the Truce 187 Proposal "34 (April 10, 1953): 48-50.

Yutan, Hao and Zhihai, Zhai. "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War Revisited." The China 121 (March 1990): 99-1 OS.

ENCYCLOPEDIAS

Dupuy, Ernst R. and Dupuy, Trevor N. The of from 3500 B.C. to the Present 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 198 6.

Embree, Ainslie T. of Asian val. 2. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988.

Johnson, Bernard, editor in chief. Collier's val. 14 New York: P.F. Collier Inc., 1992.

DISSERTATIONS

Alapatt, George K. "The Legal Implications of the Repatriation of War Prisoners in Relation to the Korean Armistice and in View of Division of Korea." Ph.D. diss., Saint Louis University, 1958.

Brazda, Jaroslav Jan. "The Korean Armistice Agreement." Ph.D diss., University of Florida, 1956.

Kim, Myong W. "Prisoners of War as a Major Problem of the Korean Armistice." Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1960.

188