WHIRLYBIRDS, U.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea

WHIRLYBIRDS U.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Retired

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series About the Author

ieutenant Colonel Ronald J. LBrown, USMCR (Ret), is a freelance writer, a high school football coach, and an educa- THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the tional consultant. The author of Korean War era, is published for the education and training of Marines by several official histories (A Brief the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of History of the 14th Marines, the 50th anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part With Marines in Operation by contributions from members of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. To plan and coordinate the Korean War commemorative events and activi- Provide Comfort, and With ties of the Sea Services, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have Marine Forces Afloat in Desert formed the Sea Services Korean War Commemoration Committee, chaired by the Director, Navy Staff. For more information about the Sea Services’ Shield and Desert Storm), he commemorative effort, please contact the Navy-Marine Corps Korean War was also a contributing essayist for the best-selling book, Commemoration Coordinator at (202) 433-4223/3085, FAX 433-7265 (DSN288-7265), E-Mail: [email protected], Website: The Marines, and was the sole author of A Few Good www.history.usmc.mil. Men: The Fighting Fifth Marines. After almost four years KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES active duty from 1968 to 1971, Brown returned to teach- DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS ing high school for the next three decades; intermittent- Colonel John W. Ripley, USMC (Ret) ly, he served as an activated reservist traveling to Korea GENERAL EDITOR, KOREAN WAR COMMEMORATIVE SERIES among other places. He is a combat veteran of both the Charles R. Smith Vietnam and Persian Gulf conflicts. He spent 20 years as EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist a reservist with Mobilization Training Unit DC 7, the Catherine A. Kerns, Visual Information Specialist Reserve unit that supports the History and Museums Division. Lieutenant Colonel Brown commanded the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center 1254 Charles Morris Street SE training unit before retiring from the Marine Corps Washington Navy Yard DC 20374-5040 Reserve in 1996. He is the author of an earlier pamphlet 2003 in this series, Counteroffensive: U.S. Marines from PCN 190 00410 500 Pohang to No Name Line.

Operations in West Korea, v. 5 (Washing- Museums Division, HQMC, 1982). Sources ton, D.C.: Historical Division, HQMC, Other books reviewed included: Cdr The most important sources used in 1972). Other official histories consulted Malcolm W. Cagle and Cdr Frank A. preparing the pamphlet are the various offi- were: Robert F. Futrell, The United States Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: cial Service histories and several mono- Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (Washing- U.S. Naval Institute, 1957); Col Robert D. graphs produced by the Marine Corps as ton, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea: The U.S. Marine well as primary documents and oral history 1983); and James A. Field, Jr., History of Corps, 1775-1962 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval interviews held by the Marine Corps United States Naval Operations: Korea Institute, 1962); Robert Jackson, Air War Historical Center located in Washington, (Washington, D.C.: Navy History Division, Korea (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks Inter- D.C. Selected secondary works were also 1962). national, 1998); Allan R. Millett, Semper used to provide context and technical infor- Monographs used included: Capt John Fidelis: The History of the United States mation. C. Chapin, Fire Brigade: U.S. Marines in the Marine Corps (New York: Macmillan, 1980); The starting point for this study of Pusan Perimeter (Washington, D.C.: History Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky (New Marine Corps helicopter operations in and Museums Division, HQMC, 2000); York: Harper and Brothers, 1954); Wayne Korea was the five volume History of U.S. LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Mutza, H-13 Sioux (Carrollton, TX: Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953 Purpose: A Developmental History of the Squadron/Signal Books, 1995); Edwin H. including: Lynn Montross and Capt U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.: Simmons, The United States Marines: The Nicholas A. Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, History and Museums Division, HQMC, First Two Hundred Years (New York: v. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, 1973); MajGen John P. Condon, Corsairs To Viking, 1974); Gordon Swanborough and G-3 Division, HQMC, 1954); Lynn Montross Panthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, The Inchon- (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Aircraft Since 1911 (London: Putnam Seoul Campaign, v. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Division, HQMC, 2002); LtCol Eugene W. Aeronautical Books, 1976); and Warren R. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, Rawlins, Marines and Helicopters, 1946- Young, The Helicopters (Alexandria, VA: 1955); Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. 1962 (Washington, D.C.: History and Time-Life Books, 1982). Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Museums Division, HQMC, 1976); LtCol History and Museums Division oral his- v. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Branch, Gary W. Parker, A History of Marine tory transcripts provided observations by: G-3 Division, HQMC, 1957); Lynn Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Wash- LtCol Clifford V. Brokaw III; Capt Norman Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and ington, D.C.: History and Museums G. Ewers; Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk; Capt Major Norman W. Hicks, The East-Central Division, HQMC, 1978); and LtCol Gary W. Andrew L. McVicars; Capt Gene W. Front, v. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Parker and Maj Frank M. Batha, Jr., A Morrison; Maj Elton Mueller; Capt Clarence Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1962); LtCol History of Marine Observation Squadron W. Parkins; 1stLt John L. Scott; and 2dLt Pat Meid and Maj James M. Yingling, Six (Washington, D.C.: History and Patrick G. Sivert. WHIRLYBIRDS U.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR (Ret)

n Sunday, 25 June protecting Kimpo Airfield near the that the Marine Corps was the last 1950, Communist South Korean capital actively American military Service to North Korea unex- engaged menacing North Korean receive helicopters, but was the pectedly invaded its planes and promptly downed three first to formulate, test, and imple- southern neighbor, of the five Soviet-built Yak fighters. ment a doctrine for the use of the American-backed Republic of Soon thereafter American military rotary-wing aircraft as an integral Korea (ROK). The poorly equip- forces operating under the aus- element in air-ground combat ped ROK Army was no match for pices of the United Nations operations. The concept of mann- the well prepared North Korean Command (UNC) were committed ed rotary-wing flight can be traced People’s Army (NKPA) whose to thwart a Communist takeover of back to Leonardo da Vinci’s armored spearheads quickly thrust South Korea. Thus, only four years Renaissance-era sketches, but across the 38th Parallel. The and nine months after V-J Day more than four centuries passed stunned world helplessly looked marked the end of World War II, before vertical takeoffs and landings on as the out-numbered and out- the United States was once again by heavier-than-air craft became a gunned South Koreans were quick- involved in a shooting war in Asia. reality. The Marines tested a ly routed. With the fall of the capi- The United Nations issued a rotary-wing aircraft in Nicaragua tal city of Seoul imminent, worldwide call to arms to halt during the Banana Wars, but that President Harry S. Truman ordered Communist aggression in Korea, experiment revealed the Pitcarin General of the Army Douglas and America’s armed forces began OP-1 autogiro was not ready for MacArthur, Commander in Chief, to mobilize. Marines were quick to military use. Autogiros used rotary Far East, in Tokyo, to immediately respond. Within three weeks a wings to remain aloft, but they did pull all American nationals in South hastily formed provisional Marine not use spinning blades to get air- Korea out of harm’s way. During brigade departed California and borne or to power the aircraft so the course of the resultant non- headed for the embattled Far East. autogiros were airplanes not heli- combatant evacuation operations Among the aviation units on board copters. Some aviation enthusiasts, an unmanned American transport the U.S. Navy task force steaming however, assert that the flight data plane was destroyed on the ground west was a helicopter detachment, accumulated and rotor technology and a flight of U.S. Air Force aircraft the first rotary-wing aviation unit developed for autogiros marked were buzzed by a North Korean Air specifically formed for combat the beginning Marine Corps heli- Force plane over the Yellow Sea operations in the history of the copter development. It was not without any shots being fired. On 27 Marine Corps. Although few real- until 1939 that the first practical July, an American combat air patrol ized it at the time, this small band of American helicopter, aircraft de- dedicated men and their primitive signer Igor I. Sikorsky’s VS-300, ON THE COVER: A Sikorsky HRS-1 flying machines were about to rad- finally moved off the drawing transport helicopter from HMR-161 ically change the face of military board and into the air. The U.S. sets down behind 1st Marine Division lines to pick up waiting Marines. aviation. Arguably, the actions of Army, Navy, and Coast Guard Department of Defense Photo these helicopter pilots in Korea each acquired helicopters during (USMC) A159970 made U.S. Marines the progenitors World War II. The bulk of them AT LEFT: Girded for battle, Marines of vertical envelopment operations, were used for pilot training, but a ride a tense 18 miles by helicopter as we know them today. few American-built helicopters before the first “airphibious” landing in participated in special combat history successfully deposited them on Helicopters in the Marine Corps operations in Burma and the a Korean hilltop. Department of Pacific. These early machines con- Defense Photo (USMC) A156716 There is great irony in the fact ducted noncombatant air-sea res-

1 ative).” This 52-page tome was the 31st school publication on amphibious operations, so it took the short title “Phib-31.” Concurrently, the Marine Corps formed a developmental helicopter squadron to test the practicality of Phib-31’s emerging theories. This formative unit, Colonel Edward C. Dyer’s Marine Heli- copter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), stood up in December 1947 and was col- located with Marine Corps Schools. The new squadron’s primary missions were to develop techniques and tactics in conjunc- tion with the ship-to-shore movement of assault troops in amphibious operations, and evaluate a small helicopter as replacement for fixed-wing observation airplanes. Among the officers assigned to HMX-1 was the Marine Corps’ first officially sanctioned helicopter pilot, Major Armond H. DeLalio, who learned to fly helicopters in 1944 and had overseen the training of the first Marine helicopter pilots as the operations officer of Navy Helicopter Develop- ment Squadron VX-3 at Lakehurst Naval Air Station, New Jersey. In February 1948, the Marine Corps took delivery of its first helicopters when a pair of Sikorsky HO3S-1s arrived at Quantico. These four-seat aircraft featured a narrow “greenhouse” cabin, an overhead three-blade rotor system, and a long-tail housing that mounted a small vertical anti- torque rotor. This basic outline cue, medical evacuation, and Marine Corps Schools at Quantico, bore such an uncanny resem- humanitarian missions during the Virginia, began to formulate a new blance to the Anisoptera sub- war as well. doctrine, eventually termed “verti- species of flying insects that the In 1946, the Marine Corps cal assault,” which relied upon British dubbed their newly pur- formed a special board headed by rotary-wing aircraft as an alternative chased Sikorsky helicopters “drag- Major General Lemuel C. Shep- to ship-to-shore movement by sur- onflies.” There was no Service or herd, Jr., to study the impact of face craft. The following year, manufacturer’s authorized nick- nuclear weapons on amphibious Marine Corps Schools issued a name for the HO3S-1, but the most operations. In accordance with the mimeographed pamphlet entitled, common unofficial American recommendations made by the “Amphibious Operations—Em- appellations of the day were Shepherd Board in early 1947, ployment of Helicopters (Tent- “whirlybirds,” “flying windmills,”

2 Pitcarin OP-1 Autogiro

he first rotary-winged aircraft used by naval avia- planes never lived up to his high expectations, de la Cierva tion was not a helicopter. It was an autogiro, an air- did develop rotor technology and recorded aerodynam- Tplane propelled by a normal front-mounted aircraft ic data later applied by helicopter designers Igor engine but kept aloft by rotating overhead wings, a phe- Sikorsky and Frank Piasecki. nomenon known as “autorotation.” Although rather The Navy purchased three Pitcarin autogiros for ungainly looking due their stubby upturned wings, large extensive field-testing and evaluation in 1931. The only tails, and drooping rotors, autogiros took well to the air. carrier tests were conducted on 23 September of that year, Their ability to “land on a dime” made them favorites at but the OP-1’s performance was virtually identical to air shows and an aggressive publicity campaign touted that of carrier-borne biplanes then in use. The Marines them as “flying autos, the transportation of the future.” took one OP-1 to Nicaragua to test it under combat con- Autogiros, however, turned out to be neither a military ditions. Again, its performance was disappointing. The nor a commercial success. pilots of VJ-6M noted it lacked both payload and range. The aircraft itself was an odd compilation of a normal The only practical use they found was evaluation of front-mounted aircraft engine used to generate thrust potential landing areas. This was not enough reason to and three overhead free-spinning blades attached to a cen- incorporate the OP-1 into the Marine inventory. Overall, ter-mounted tripod to provide lift. The fuselage includ- the OP-1 was described as “an exasperating contrap- ed a pair of stubby wings that supported the landing gear tion,” not fit for military use. Further trials of a wingless and had a semi-standard elongated tail assembly. autogiro in 1935 revealed no improvement, so director of Typical of the day, it had an open cockpit. aviation Major Roy S. Geiger recommended against Although a rotary-winged aircraft, the OP-1 was not a adoption of that aircraft type. helicopter. The engine was used to start the rotors mov- In the barnstorming days between the World Wars, ing but was then disengaged and connected to the pro- autogiros proved to be the ultimate novelty attraction. peller to deliver thrust. A speed of about 30 miles per hour Aviator Charles A. Lindbergh often put on demonstrations, was needed to generate lift and maintained for con- aviatrix Amelia Earhart set an altitude record in one, and trolled flight. The OP-1 could not hover, it required con- Secretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams flew in an ventional engine power to take off and move forward in autogiro to join President Herbert C. Hoover at an isolated the air; the plane could, however, make a vertical land- fishing camp in Virginia. The Royal Air Force actually used ing. This unique feature made the OP-1 attractive to the autogiros for convoy escort and observation during military. World War II, and the Soviet Union developed its own The specific autogiro model first tested by the Marine autogiro. Corps was the OP-1 built by Harold F. Pitcarin, who Although the OP-1 never became a mainstream would later found Eastern Airways. His company was a Marine aircraft and was not a true helicopter, some avi- licensed subsidiary of a Spanish firm. All American auto- ation enthusiasts assert that the technology and data giros were based upon designs formulated by Spanish developed by de la Cierva was crucial for rotary-winged nobleman Juan de la Cierva. His first successful flight was flight. They, therefore, make the case that the OP-1 made near Madrid in 1923. More than 500 autogiros flew should be considered the progenitor of today’s heli- worldwide during the next decade. Although his air- copters. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 528139

3 and “pinwheels.” The HO3S-1 had ed flight envelope was acceptable based HO3S led a salvage party to a cruising speed of less than 100 because these first machines were an amphibious jeep mired in a miles per hour, a range of about 80 to be used primarily for training nearby swamp. miles, could lift about 1,000 and testing. They were, however, The first Marine helicopter oper- pounds, and mounted simple sometimes called upon for practical ational deployment occurred in instrumentation that limited the missions as well. In fact, the first May 1948 when five HMX-1 “pin- HO3S to clear weather and day- operational use of a Marine heli- wheels” flying off the escort carri- light operations. This very restrict- copter occurred when a Quantico- er Palau (CVE 122) conducted 35

The Visionaries he wake of the World War II, with its ominous Marine Corps Schools located at Quantico, Virginia. specter of nuclear weapons, forced the Marine First, a board headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. TCorps to rethink existing amphibious doctrine. Hogaboom laid out what was needed in a document The conclusion was that previous methods of ship-to- titled “Military Requirements for Ship-to-Shore shore movement were no longer sufficient to ensure a suc- Movement of Troops and Cargo.” Even though no suit- cessful landing so alternative methods had to be devel- able aircraft were yet available, the thinkers at oped. Several options looked promising, but the only one Quantico came up with new doctrine published as that stood the test of time and combat was vertical Amphibious Training Manual 31, “Amphibious envelopment—the use of helicopters to move troops Operations—-Employment of Helicopters (Tentative).” and supplies. One of the drivers of this project was Lieutenant In 1946, Commandant Alexander A. Vandegrift—at Colonel Victor H. Krulak, a tough former paratrooper the urging of Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, the who had been wounded in the Pacific but was also “Gray Eagle” of Marine aviation who had just witnessed known for his high intellect and an unsurpassed abili- post-war nuclear tests—formed a special board culled ty to get things done. He was a prolific writer and a from Marine Corps headquarters to study existing tactics demanding taskmaster who kept his finger on the pulse and equipment then make recommendations for restruc- of several vital projects including helicopter develop- turing the Fleet Marine Force. Assistant Commandant ment. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., a graduate of Virginia Military Despite the nearly unlimited future potential of heli- Institute, who was arguably the Marines’ most innovative copters for assault and support of landing forces, there division commander in the Pacific, headed the board. was ingrained resistance to such a revolutionary concept. Shepherd was an excellent choice because he was both Most young pilots wanted to fly sleek jets and dogfight a traditionalist and a visionary who would later become enemy aces, not manhandle temperamental aircraft to Commandant. Other members of the board included deliver troops and supplies; experienced fliers were Major General Field Harris, the director of Marine avia- comfortable with aircraft they already knew well and tion, and Brigadier General Oliver P. Smith, the head of were reluctant to give up their trusted planes; and crit- plans and operations division. All three men would be ics claimed helicopters were too slow and vulnerable. reunited in Korea in 1950 where they would put into prac- Twining took the lead in addressing these problems tice the revolutionary doctrines they set in motion; when he pointed out the Marine Corps had far more Shepherd as the commanding general of Fleet Marine pilots than planes and noted that the wishes of the Force, Pacific, Harris as commanding general of the 1st individual were always subservient to the needs of the Marine Aircraft Wing, and Smith as commanding gener- Marine Corps. He also asserted that the speed and vul- al of the 1st Marine Division. Two colonels assigned to nerability of helicopters should not be properly com- the board secretariat were particularly influential, pared to fixed-wing aircraft but to surface landing craft Edward C. Dyer and Merrill B. Twining. Dyer, a Naval (helicopters were both faster and more agile than boats Academy graduate and decorated combat pilot, was or amphibious tractors). master of all things aeronautical while Merrill Twining, a All early helicopter advocates were highly motivated highly regarded staff officer, handled operational theory. and dedicated men. Their achievements and foresight Neither a formal member of the board nor its secretariat kept the Marine Corps’ reputation for innovation alive but keeping close tabs on what transpired was Brigadier despite severe budgetary constraints and concurrent General Gerald C. Thomas, Vandegrift’s trusted chief of inter-Service unification battles. In fact, many of the staff. Dyer eventually commanded the first Marine heli- men also played key roles in the “Chowder Society,” copter squadron and Thomas replaced Smith as 1st whose behind-the-scenes work successfully protected Marine Division commander in Korea. Marine Corps interests during the bitter “unification Doctrinal development for vertical assault was done at battles” after the World War II.

4 flights to land 66 men and several The aircraft’s unique bent fuselage hundred pounds of communica- (overlapping propeller radii meant tions equipment at Camp Lejeune, the tail rotor had to be mounted North Carolina’s Onslow Beach higher than the forward rotor) during amphibious command post gave it the nickname “Flying exercise Packard II. As the year Banana.” Unfortunately, it was a progressed, HMX-1’s aircraft com- temperamental machine consid- plement increased by six when the ered too fragile to be assigned to Marine Corps took delivery of two combat squadrons. The HRP-1 was new types of helicopters, one Bell instead relegated to use as a test HTL-2 and five Piasecki HRP-1s. bed and demonstration aircraft The Bell HTL, often called the until a more capable transport “eggbeater,” was a side-by-side helicopter could be procured. two-seat trainer that could fly at During the next two years about 85 miles per hour. It had HMX-1 conducted numerous ex- two distinctive features, a rounded periments, tests, exercises, demon- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130996 Plexiglas “fishbowl” cockpit can- strations, and public appearances. BGen Edward C. Dyer, here receiving the Legion of Merit for meritorious ser- opy and a single overhead two- Helicopters soon became crowd vice as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s bladed rotor. This model had four pleasers at air shows and were G-3 during the Inchon-Seoul cam- landing wheels and a fabric-cov- invariably the center of attention paign, was one of the most influential ered tail assembly, although later for dignitaries visiting Quantico. men involved in the adoption of the versions of the HTL mounted skids As a result of numerous tactical helicopter by the Marine Corps. A and left the tail structure bare. The tests and performance evaluations, naval aviator, he helped to bring the larger Piasecki HRP-1 was a 10- Colonel Dyer recommended that concept to reality by formulating doc- place troop transport whose tan- light helicopters should be added to trine and then commanding HMX-1 at dem-mounted rotors could push it Marine observation squadrons. Quantico, Virginia. along at about 100 miles per hour. Headquarters agreed, and it was

One of five Sikorsky HO3S-1s from HMX-1 prepares to land copter in the movement of assault troops in an amphibious on the Palau (CVE 122) during Operation Packard II in May operation. 1948. This was the first test to determine the value of the heli- Department of Defense Photo (USMC)

5 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A55366 Piasecki HRP-1 “Flying Bananas” in action during a Basic but technical constraints limited it to demonstration and School pre-graduation field problem at Quantico, Virginia. training use and no HRPs saw action in Korea. The HRP was the first Marine Corps transport helicopter, decided that an even mix of heli- American withdrawal from China remained on the agenda—notably copters and airplanes should be in February 1949; the first unit the creation of helicopter squad- adopted as soon as enough heli- deployment in support of a fleet rons for service with the Fleet copters and trained personnel exercise occurred in February Marine Force and the procurement were available. Unfortunately, 1950; and the largest single heli- of a combat-ready transport heli- teething problems grounded each copter formation to that time took copter. This was the status of the of the helicopter types at one time place when six HRPs, six HO3Ss, Marine Corps helicopter program or another, and it was apparent and one HTL flew by Quantico’s when the North Korean unexpect- more reliable aircraft with much reviewing stand in June 1950. By edly burst across the 38th Parallel. greater lift capacity would be nec- that time, Lieutenant Colonel John essary to make vertical assault a F. Carey, a Navy Cross holder who Called to Action true option in the future. Marine a dozen years later would lead the helicopter detachments participated first Marine aviation unit sent to The commitment of American in exercises Packard III (1949) and Vietnam, commanded HMX-1. combat troops to Korea on 30 June Packard IV (1950). This time peri- The squadron mustered 23 officers set off alarm bells throughout the od also featured many milestones. and 89 enlisted men; its equip- Marine Corps. Although the official Among them were the first overseas ment list showed nine HRPs, six “word” had yet to be passed, with- deployment of a Marine helicopter HO3Ss, and three HTLs. Since its in a few hours of the North Korean pilot when Captain Wallace D. inception the Marine helicopter invasion most Marines surmised it Blatt flew an HO3S-1 borrowed program had garnered many lau- would not be long before they from the U.S. Navy during the rels, but several vital items would be on their way to war.

6 Marine Helicopter Squadron 1

arine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1) is unique approach lanes. Five days later, the HO3S-1s delivered 66 in the Marine Corps because it has several dis- men and several tons of equipment to Camp Lejeune, Mtinct missions and at least three different North Carolina’s Onslow Beach during command post chains-of-command providing guidance and tasking. exercise Packard II. HMX-1 was the first Marine rotary-wing squadron. It The following year a similar exercise employed eight “stood up” at Marine Corps Airfield Quantico in Virginia HRPs, three HO3Ss, and a single HTL. During Exercise on 1 December 1947 and has been located there ever Packard III, the HRP “Flying Banana” troop transports since. Its activation was the first operational move that were carrier borne, the HTL was loaded on an LST for started a revolution in Marine aviation and tactical doc- command and control, and the HO3Ss stayed ashore as trine. rescue aircraft. The HRPs brought 230 troops and 14,000 One interesting insight into the Marines’ most unique pounds of cargo ashore even though choppy seas aircraft squadron is the frequent misunderstanding of its swamped several landing craft and seriously disrupted official designation. Although HMX-1 was initially tasked operational maneuvers. Many consider this superb per- to develop techniques and tactics in connection with formance to be the key factor in the acceptance of the the movement of assault troops by helicopter and to helicopter as a viable ship-to-shore method, thus paving evaluate a small helicopter as an observation aircraft, the the way for the integration of rotary-wing aircraft into “X” does not designate “experimental” as is often Marine aviation. inferred. The “Nighthawks” of HMX-1 do perform some In 1957, HMX-1 acquired an unexpected mission— developmental tasks, but their primary missions are to pro- transporting the President of the United States. vide helicopter transportation for the President of the Helicopters were only considered for emergency situations United States and to support Marine Corps Schools. until President Dwight D. Eisenhower used an HMX-1 The squadron, initially manned by seven officers and Sikorsky HUS Sea Horse helicopter for transportation three enlisted men, quickly grew and mustered 18 pilots from his summer home on Narragansett Bay. After that, and 81 enlisted men when the first helicopters, Sikorsky Marine helicopters were routinely used to move the HO3S-1s, arrived. These first primitive machines carried President from the White House lawn to Andrews Air only the pilot and up to three lightly armed troops, but Force Base, the home of presidential plane “Air Force they formed the basis for testing helicopter doctrine One.” That transport mission became a permanent task- described in Marine Corps Schools operational manual ing in 1976 and continues to this day. Phib-31. Eventually, HMX-1 received a mix of early Currently mustering more than 700 personnel, HMX- model helicopters with the addition of Piasecki HRP 1 is the largest Marine Corps helicopter squadron. It is transports and Bell HTL trainers to test doctrine before the divided into two sections. The “White” side flies two Korean War. unique helicopters—both specially configured Sikorsky On 8 May 1948, HMX-1 pilots flew from Quantico to executive transports, the VH-3D Sea King and the VH-60N Norfolk, Virginia, to board the escort carrier Palau (CVE Seahawk. The “Green” side provides basic helicopter 122). The fly-on operation was described by HMX-1 indoctrination training for ground troops, tests new con- commanding officer Colonel Edward C. Dyer as a “com- cepts and equipment, and assists the Marine air plete shambles [with] sailors running all over the place in weapons and tactics squadron. Unlike any other Marine mortal danger of walking into tail rotors, and the squadron, HMX-1 answers to three distinct chains-of- Marines were totally disorganized as well. It was complete command: the Marine Corps deputy chief of staff for air bedlam, there was no organization and no real system [in at Headquarters Marine Corps; the White House military place].” By the next day, however, the Navy and Marine office; and the operational test and evaluation force Corps were using the same basic ship-board flight oper- commander at Norfolk. Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 was ations procedures practiced today—circular lines delin- not only the first such Marine unit, it also currently holds eated danger areas as well as personnel staging areas and a unique place in naval aviation.

General MacArthur’s formal re- man unit included the 5th Marines in the Pacific during World War II, quest for a Marine regimental com- as its ground combat element and was “dual-hatted” as both the bat team and supporting aviation the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing brigade deputy commander and finally filtered through official (Forward Echelon) as its aviation the commander of the aviation channels on 2 July, and five days combat element. component. The 1st Brigade’s later the 1st Provisional Marine Brigadier General Thomas J. 1,358-man aviation element was Brigade was activated. Brigadier Cushman, a veteran aviator who built around Marine Aircraft Group General Edward A. Craig’s 6,534- had commanded an aircraft wing 33 (MAG-33), which included three

7 squadrons of propeller-driven naissance, artillery spotting, and seemed, fell within the capabilities Vought F4U Corsairs, two day fight- other flight operations within the of VMO-6 aircraft. He took com- er squadrons (VMF-214 and -323) capabilities of assigned aircraft in mand of VMO-6 on 3 July and was and one night fighter squadron support of ground units.” This last ordered to be ready for overseas (VMF[N]-513). The remaining avia- statement became a well-exercised deployment only four days later. tion units included headquarters, elastic clause under the innovative Marine observation squadrons ground support, and air control guidance of Major Gottschalk, an had been serving as indispensable personnel in addition to an obser- engineering graduate of the Un- components of Marine air-ground vation squadron. iversity of Michigan who saw sev- combat teams since the Banana The observation squadron as- eral years sea duty in the Pacific Wars. Marine Observation Squad- signed to the 1st Marine Brigade before earning his wings. In ac- ron 6 (then called VO-6M) was was Marine Observation Squadron tion, Gottschalk saw to it that prac- specifically formed for expedi- 6 (VMO-6) commanded by Major tically any flying task in support of tionary duty in Nicaragua in 1928, Vincent J. Gottschalk. Its mission ground units, no matter how diffi- but it was administratively trans- was to conduct “tactical air recon- cult or outrageous it initially ferred back to Quantico for duty as a training unit about six months Capt Victor A. Armstrong, at the controls of a Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopter, was later. Marine observation squad- the officer-in-charge of the VMO-6 helicopter section, the first Marine helicopter rons went by the wayside in 1933 unit formed for combat duty. Holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross for and did not re-emerge until opera- actions in the Pacific during World War II, he would attain the rank of major tions moved to the Western Pacific general and serve as the deputy chief of staff for air. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130162 during World War II. There, flying small, nimble, high-wing, two-seat, single-engined Piper OE “Grass- hoppers” and similar Stinson OY-1 “Sentinels” (often called Grass- hoppers as well), VMOs provided aerial reconnaissance and artillery- naval gunfire spotting as well as performing assorted utility duties while attached to various Marine divisions. Marine Observation Squadron 6 was reactivated in 1943, saw combat action on Okinawa in 1945, and participated in the post-war occupation of North China. Upon its return to the United States in 1947, the squadron flew in support of the 1st Marine Division located at Camp Pendleton, California. The aircraft of VMO-6 did occasional artillery spotting and sometimes supported ground maneuvers or performed administrative duties, but the main mission at Camp Pendleton was a practical one—spraying aerial insecticide. In early June 1950, VMO-6 was assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing stationed at nearby Marine Corps Air Station El Toro. With the arrival of the first warning orders, both Camp Pendleton

8 recommendations, the squadron aircraft mix would also include helicopters. Eight officers and 30 enlisted men were pulled out of HMX-1 at Quantico, Virginia, with orders to move to the West Coast immediately. Captain (later Major Gen- eral) Victor A. Armstrong was the officer-in-charge of the helicopter detachment. The other pilots included Captains George B. Farish and Eugene J. Pope, and First Lieutenants Arthur R. Bancroft, Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Robert A. Longstaff, Max N. Nebergall, and Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. The detachment’s claim to historical fame was that this was the first permanent assignment of a Marine helicopter unit to the Fleet Marine Force. Contrary to some asser- tions, this detachment was neither the first Marine combat helicopter squadron nor was it the first U.S. helicopter detachment to see combat service—a helicopter element (later designated Flight F) from the Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1280 U.S. Air Force 3d Air Rescue A Sikorsky HO3S-1 helicopter transports a passenger from one ship to another while Squadron and carrier-based U.S. the convoy carrying the VMO-6 helicopter section is enroute to Korea. Marine Navy helicopters assigned to “Whirlybirds” flying off the carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) were routinely used Utility Helicopter Squadron 1 (HU- to deliver messages and personnel between ships. 1) were already in action in Korea and Marine Corps Air Station El Major Gottschalk was originally by the time VMO-6 arrived. Toro became scenes of bedlam as told to form a four-plane, four-offi- Armstrong’s detachment made people raced around to gather cer, and 10-enlisted man detach- its way from Quantico to El Toro, materials and units speedily ment to accompany the 1st California, leaving on 8 July and absorbed new personnel. “Moth- Brigade to Korea. Although this reporting for duty on the 10th. balled” weapons and equipment detachment was far smaller than a Upon arrival, helicopter detach- were hurriedly broken out of stor- war-strength squadron, just find- ment personnel were integrated age and readied for use. Trains ing enough airplanes was not an into VMO-6, and Captain Arm- and planes brought in personnel easy task. Gottschalk decided to strong was named that squadron’s culled from posts and stations take eight well-worn OYs to executive officer. Because only the across the United States at all ensure that four of them would be personnel of the helicopter de- hours of the day and night. flyable—the rest would become tachment transferred from HMX-1, Arrivals were welcomed on board “hangar queens” until replacement aircraft had to be found. Six and sent to their new units as soon parts or new aircraft were in the HO3S-1 helicopters were obtained as the handshakes finished. Space supply pipeline. While the search from U.S. Navy sources (two each was at a premium, as was time. for planes and equipment got from Inyokern and Point Mugu, Round-the-clock work schedules under way, Gottschalk’s orders California, and two more from the were instituted, and the unofficial were modified on 7 July. The overhaul and maintenance facility at order of the day became “sleep on entire squadron would now be San Diego). Only two days after the boat!” going and, in accord with earlier reporting in, the helicopter detach-

9 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131099 Sikorsky HO3S-1

he Sikorsky HO3S-1 was the first helicopter the Pusan Perimeter, it had significant shortfalls as a assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps. The HO3S was combat aircraft. The tricycle landing gear and its high cen- Tthe naval variant of Sikorky’s model S-51 com- ter of gravity made the HO3S unstable on all but flat solid mercial helicopter. Despite its observation designation, the terrain; the aircraft could not accommodate interior HO3S was actually a utility aircraft used for a variety of stretcher loads; its lack of back-lit instrumentation pre- roles. Among the 46 conceptual uses initially listed by cluded extended night and bad weather operations; and Marine Corps Schools were the ones most used in the high engine location made aircraft maintenance dif- Korea: search and rescue; aerial reconnaissance; medical ficult. Another major drawback was that it required a great evacuation; and liaison. The U.S. Air Force flew the deal of strength and endurance to handle such a heavy same aircraft as a search and rescue helicopter designat- aircraft for an extended period without servo-controls. In ed H-5F. addition, the single main rotor and long tail assembly com- The HO3S was the lineal descendent of earlier bined with a centrally located engine mount often Sikorsky designs, the initial HNS trainer and the first des- required field expedient ballast adjustments to maintain ignated military observation helicopter (alternately in-flight stability, so it was not unusual for pilots to keep known as the HO2S in naval service and the R-5A to the several sand bags or a seabag filled with rocks in the Army). The HO3S featured a more powerful engine that cabin. gave it added lift and an increased payload. During the immediate pre-war period, the HO3S proved to be an out- Aircraft Data standing rescue craft that often utilized its winch to pull Manufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft downed pilots out of the water. Likewise, the HO3S was Corporation an excellent observation platform for artillery spotting. Power Plant: Pratt and Whitney R-985 AN-7 Wasp Jr., 9 In Korea, its primary uses were as a liaison aircraft and cylinder, 450 horsepower, radial engine as an aerial ambulance. A first-rate liaison aircraft with Dimensions: Length, 57’ 1/2”; height, 12’ 11”; rotor, 48’ good range, the HO3S had a dependable engine, and was composite construction blade rugged enough that it required relatively little maintenance Performance: Cruising speed, 85 mph; range, 260 miles when compared to other rotary-wing aircraft of the day. Lift: Pilot plus two passengers or about 500 pounds of Even though the HO3S performed yeoman service at cargo (excluding fuel)

10 ment moved to San Diego to 1950, Major Gottschalk received slowing, but the outcome of the board ship. word to begin operations at first battle for the Korean peninsula The crowded escort carrier light the next morning. was far from certain when the 1st Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) carrying Marine Observation Squadron Provisional Marine Brigade was 60 Corsairs, 8 OY Sentinels, and 6 6’s airplanes and helicopters went welcomed on board by Eighth Marine helicopters along with their ashore on 1 August. The next day Army commander Lieutenant Gen- aircrews sailed for the Far East on the Marine air elements scattered to eral Walton H. Walker, USA. 14 July. Enroute helicopters were the four winds. The day fighter At the Pusan Perimeter, the used for inter-ship supply delivery, squadrons boarded a pair of escort Marine brigade acquitted itself mail runs, and personnel transfers. carriers and then sailed for the well and showcased the combat The 1st Marine Brigade was origi- combat zone; the night fighter effectiveness of the Marine air- nally slated for a temporary lay- squadron joined an Air Force all- ground team. The Marines were over in Japan where cargo could be weather squadron at Itazuke Air used as a “fire brigade” moving sorted out then combat loaded Base on Kyushu; VMO-6 ground from place to place to stamp out and some rudimentary amphibious crews and their equipment “trans- enemy threats. They spearheaded training would be conducted shipped” to a tank landing ship the first U.N. offensive in Korea, before the Marines entered the (LST) for transportation to Korea; and then twice threw back NKPA combat zone. That was the plan and headquarters personnel penetrations of the U.N. defensive until the situation in Korea moved to Itami Air Base near lines. Marine air hit the enemy became so grave that the 5th Osaka on the island of Honshu. when Corsairs swept out of the Marines was ordered to go direct- sky on the same day that the ly to the beleaguered South Helicopters Enter Combat ground element was coming Korean port city of Pusan. The avi- ashore at Pusan harbor. The ation element was still slated to From Kobe, the helicopters of brigade then consolidated at a land in Japan, however, so the VMO-6 proceeded to Itami where temporary assembly area near ships carrying the aviation compo- two helicopters were assigned to Changwon before mounting the nent split off and headed for the MAG-33 headquarters. They first sustained United Nations Japanese port city of Kobe. would be held in Japan to provide offensive of the war. The initial As the ships of Navy Task liaison services between the wide- ground action occurred in the Group 53.7 plowed through the ly scattered aviation units and, at vicinity of Chindong-ni from 6 to 9 Pacific, Brigadier General Craig the same time, be available as August. From there the Marines and his operations officer emergency replacements if need- pressed south to Kosong before Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. ed. The other four HO3S-1s pro- turning north to the Changchon Stewart flew to Korea to attend a ceeded to Korea. They made their Pass after wiping out an enemy series of command conferences. way from Itami to Iwakuni Air motorized regiment during the On 30 July, they learned that upon Base where they stayed overnight. Kosong “Turkey Shoot.” On 13 landing the Marines would be After a detailed situation brief and August, as they neared Sachon, attached to a U.S. Army task force a hasty final maintenance inspection the Marines were abruptly ordered assigned to shore up the crum- at Ashiya Air Base on northern back to Masan to prepare to seal off bling southwest flank of the Kyushu on the morning of 2 an enemy penetration across the United Nations defense lines. August, the helicopters made the Naktong River. Hard fighting at Colonel Stewart called the aviation hop across the Tsushima Sraits. Red Slash Hill and carefully coor- advance party command post in They landed at an airfield near dinated supporting arms fires Japan to warn that combat action Pusan, the logistics keystone of threw the North Koreans back. was imminent and requested that the United Nations defensive While recuperating at an area VMO-6 and Marine Tactical Air perimeter. dubbed the Masan “Bean Patch,” Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2) be The outlook in Korea was not the Marines had to return to the sent on to Korea as quickly as pos- good when they arrived. The hard- Naktong bulge to repulse the sible. This emergency phone call pressed United Nations Command enemy one more time. Finally, on confirmed that the situation in was struggling to hold onto a 60-by- 5 September, the Marines pulled Korea was desperate. According- 90-mile area of southeast Korea out of the line and returned to ly, when the Badeong Strait made known as the Pusan Perimeter. Pusan so they could mount out to landfall on the evening of 31 July The North Korean drive south was lead MacArthur’s amphibious turn-

11 ing movement at Inchon. for shipment west to Chinhae on 6 meant that the brigade, and later the Throughout the campaign, the August. Chinhae was a South division, commander through his hard-working HO3S-1s of VMO-6 Korean naval base, as well as the air section would assign daily mis- performed a wide variety of tasks future home of the Korean Marine sions while the aircraft wing and were so indispensable that Corps, located only a short hop would provide supplies and per- Marine and Army commanders across the bay from Masan. The sonnel administration. Unfortu- were soon demanding more heli- site of a former Japanese ammuni- nately, the helicopters, which copters. tion depot with an airstrip, it was belonged partially to both, but not Upon its arrival at Pusan on 2 selected because it was close to fully to the ground or aviation August, the VMO-6’s forward ech- the action, had a 2,600-foot grass commanders, seemed to be nei- elon was temporarily billeted in a and concrete runway (already ther fish nor fowl. To use Major South Korean schoolhouse located being used by a combined US- Gottschalk’s words to describe this about 10 miles west of the port ROK Air Force training squadron), awkward command and control until the squadron support ele- and included a pair of completed system: “Observation squadrons ment caught up and a more per- hangars with a third under con- were the stepchildren of Marine manent, and less crowded, site struction. There were enough aviation.” This theoretical dichoto- could be occupied. The rear party, Quonset huts to house the men, my, however, in no way dimin- which sailed from Kobe on board provide adequate office space, ished the practical use of heli- a Japanese-manned landing ship, and warehouse supplies. This copters. They soon proved their actually arrived at Pusan on 4 facility would be VMO-6’s home worth in combat and, in fact, August but could not move out for field and base of operations until became so indispensable that vir- two more days due to the lack of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade tually every ground commander transportation. Squadron supplies was dissolved in early September. recommended additional heli- and equipment were laboriously In Korea, VMO-6 would be copters be made immediately loaded (there was no cargo han- under the operational control of available by the time the Marines dling machinery at hand) onto the the brigade but under the adminis- departed the Pusan Perimeter. dock then reloaded onto a train trative control of the wing. This The hard-working Marine heli- The commanding officer of VMO-6 holds a pre-mission pilot brief during the early copters were used for a wide vari- stages of the Korean War. From left to right are Capt George B. Farish, 1stLt Eugene ety of missions that taxed them to P. Millette, Capt Victor A. Armstrong, 1stLt Lloyd J. Engelhardt, Maj Vincent J. the limit during the month of Gottschalk, Capt Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr., 2dLt Edgar F. Gaudette, Jr., 1stLt Gustave August 1950. The most common F. Lueddeke, Jr., and enlisted pilot TSgt Robert A. Hill. uses were for command and con- Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A1991 trol, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and combat search and rescue; however, they also spotted artillery fire, dis- pensed emergency supplies, lifted individuals to remote outposts, and provided high-speed communications wire laying services as well. An operational pattern soon emerged. Each morning the two duty helicopter pilots would fly to General Craig’s command post where they would report to Major James N. Cupp, the brigade’s air officer, for tasking. At about noon, these two helicopters would be relieved on station by the other two. This aircraft rotation ensured adequate pilot rest and gave ground crews time for daily maintenance work. In addition, an ad

12 going on a reconnaissance, whether they had any rank on board, whether they were carrying the commanding general out to one of the units, or whether they were going out on an evacuation mission. . . . Since we had communications facilities and the air officer [did not] we could. . . keep [him] abreast of the situation.

Korea was a difficult arena of operations due to its rugged terrain, weather extremes, and poorly developed infrastructure as aerial observer Second Lieutenant Patrick G. Sivert recalled: “It was hot and dusty, the road network was very poor, and the country very mountainous. There was no apparent pattern of any sort to the mountains. . . no particular ranges or draws, compartments, or corri- dors.” The Marines were first greeted by sweltering heat and choking dust, but within a few months bitter cold and heavy snow brought south by the so- called “Siberian Express” would create vastly different operational challenges. The already difficult topography was exacerbated by the lack of modern hard surface roads as well as poor overland communications links. River val- leys provided the only flat space suitable for roadways, but they were susceptible to flash flooding. hoc control system evolved ing with us. The division air The lack of reliable telephone whereby the helicopter pilots officer, however, controlled communications was also a prob- would check in and out with the the helicopters. When they lem because the short-ranged MTACS-2 air control section on went out on a mission, they infantry radios of the day did not their way to and from assigned would fly by our operating function well when out of the line- missions. As air traffic control site, give us a call—a radio of-sight. The cumulative result of squadron commander Major Elton check—on our reporting-in- these disparate problems made Mueller explained: and-out net. . . . In this man- Korea an operational nightmare. ner [we] knew when [they] Luckily, helicopters provided the We maintained the same pos- went out on a mission [and] ideal technological fix. They were itive radio contact with the they would tell us what type unrestrained by the terrain, could helicopters that we did with of mission they were going act as radio relays or lay wire at all the other aircraft operat- on, i.e. whether they were high-speed, and easily flew over

13 General Craig faced many unusual fer with a battalion commander command circumstances due to leading the convoy to its new the emergency situation in Korea. assembly area. After a few minutes Hurried planning, reliance upon on the ground, Craig continued his oral orders, incomplete intelli- journey to the actual site selected to gence, poor communications, and become his forward command inadequate maps all plagued the post. Next, he flew back to Masan brigade staff. Craig turned to the to meet with the Eighth Army helicopter to help solve his prob- commander and the commanding lems. While stationed on Guam in general of the U.S. Army task force 1949, he became acquainted with slated to carry out the first United helicopters when he borrowed a Nations offensive in Korea. On the carrier-based Navy HO3S-1 to way home, Craig stopped three make command visits and observe times to inform small unit troop field training, and Craig immedi- leaders about the upcoming oper- ately put this experience to use in ation. Although this trip seems Korea. On the morning of 3 routine by modern standards, that Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130163 August 1950, he and his opera- was certainly not true in 1950. On 3 August 1950, 1stLt Gustave F. tions officer, Colonel Stewart, Marine Corps historian Lynn Lueddeke, Jr., flew the first command climbed into First Lieutenant Gus- Montross noted the uniqueness of liaison mission in Korea. In addition tave Lueddeke’s waiting HO3S, this feat and its impact on the to ferrying commanders around, he beginning the first Marine heli- future: “Only a helicopter could also logged numerous medical evacu- copter flight in an active combat have made this itinerary possible in ations and flew rescue missions zone. Craig and Stewart were air- a period of a few hours. A fixed- behind enemy lines. borne almost all of that day. The ini- wing plane could not have landed traffic jams or roadless wilderness. tial leg took them from Pusan 30 in such unlikely spots, and a jeep According to Major Gottschalk, miles west to the brigade staging could not have covered the same the use of HO3S helicopters at area at Changwon. Along the way, route before nightfall over narrow, Pusan for command liaison work Lueddeke set down amid some twisting roads choked with Army had the greatest tactical value. Korean huts to allow Craig to con- and Marine vehicles.” He further A Korean rice paddy serves as a makeshift landing pad for foreground mark the landing area and indicate wind a Marine HO3S-1 helicopter. The air panels laid out in the direction. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131089

14 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1385 The leaders of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, BGen commanding officer of VMO-6 felt that command visits Edward A. Craig, left, and his deputy, BGen Thomas J. were missions of the most tactical value during the fighting Cushman, right, wait in the shade of a Sikorsky HO3S-1. The at the Pusan Perimeter. opined: “A general and his staff only maps readily available were ground observers due to the poor could now make direct . . . contact inaccurate ones created by Jap- maps and hilly terrain that fre- with operations at the front as had anese cartographers sometime quently masked targets. never been possible before [and before World War II. Villages were Another ground support duty, this] enabled a commander to misnamed and misplaced, many one that had received much play at keep in personal touch with his roads were either not shown or Quantico, was aerial wire laying. A forward units since the helicopter were incorrectly plotted, there helicopter flying nap-of-the-earth could land virtually anywhere were no contour lines to accurate- could put down communications without asking favors of the ter- ly depict terrain features, and the wire at the rate of about a mile per rain.” complex grid system was too con- minute, far faster than a ground General Craig also said: “Time fusing to be of much value. party could do it. The heavy and was always pressing. Fortunately Although no one at Quantico had cumbersome spools presented no . . . helicopters . . . were always predicted that helicopters might problem for a helicopter, whereas available for observation, com- have to replace maps for naviga- ground-based wire layers were munications, and control. . . . tion, this is exactly what happened severely limited as to how much Without them I do not believe we in Korea. Small unit commanders wire they could carry and which would have had the success we often used helicopters to recon- terrain they could cross. An addi- did.” noiter their routes of advance or to tional bonus was that by flying In addition to command and locate good ground for defensive over tree lines or narrow defiles, control, a second valuable tactical positions. On the march heli- helicopters could keep the wire use for helicopters was visual copters shadowed ground move- overhead where it was not subject reconnaissance. A major problem ments and provided over-the-hori- to destruction by tank treads or during the attack toward Sachon zon flank security. In addition, artillery bursts. Today, wire laying was a scarcity of tactical maps, HO3Ss were used to direct artillery seems like a small thing but, in the compounded by the fact that the fire, a task made difficult for days before needed two-way radio

15 reliability, land line communica- tant in bolstering [air crew] severe heat exhaustion and in tions was vital for command and morale.” need of advanced medical atten- control. On 4 August, Marine helicopters tion were taken out by helicopter. Two missions of marginal tactical performed their first aerial medical On 8 August, the squadron con- value had a significant impact evacuation when a Marine wound- ducted a night helicopter evacua- upon morale, aerial medical evac- ed by an accidental weapon dis- tion—another first. This was a dar- uations and airborne search and charge was flown from Changwon ing feat because the HO3S did not rescue. Helicopter evacuations, to the naval hospital train at have proper instrumentation for reported Major Gottschalk: “exert a Masan. The next day helicopters night operations. Disregarding very positive effect on ground were called out to deliver water these limitations, Captain Arm- troops since they know their and rations to an infantry platoon strong flew off into the fading light chances of survival are tremen- sent to a nearby hilltop to check out to pick up a critically wounded dously in-creased. . . . A unit cut off reports of an enemy observation man and the regimental surgeon by land [could still] have its party located there. “Whirlybirds” of the 5th Marines. The nearly wounded evacuated [and] it were used because they could blind helicopter was guided back helped units by relieving them of deliver the cargo in a matter of by the light of flares and came to the necessity of caring for them minutes where it would have earth amid the glow of headlights. [thus] freeing more men for fighting. taken a carrying party hours to This dramatic flight was the first of The use of helicopters for rescue of bring up in the rugged terrain and more than 1,000 night evacuations downed pilots [was] also impor- intense heat. Five Marines suffering conducted in Korea. The first of many Marine helicopter medical evacuations ground transportation could not traverse the rugged ter- occurred when VMO-6 helicopters lifted several severe heat rain and stretcher-bearer evacuation would take too long. casualties to safety. “Whirlybirds” were often used because Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2855

16 seriously wounded and the immediate availability of helicopter-provided whole blood at forward medical stations. Unfortunately, the HO3S-1 was a civilian model aircraft adopted for use as a military machine; it was not designed to be a flying ambulance and, thus, poorly configured to be used as such. Marine ground crews in Korea quickly modified the HO3Ss to carry stretcher cases. The starboard observation window was removed and straps secured the stretcher in flight, but still a wounded man’s legs pro- truded from the cabin. This was a minor annoyance that summer, but during cold-weather operations several cases of frostbitten feet and lower legs caused by the severe airborne wind chill were National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420545 recorded. In addition, the wound- The Sikorsky HO3S-1 was a civilian model helicopter acquired for use as an observation aircraft. Unfortunately, the aircraft was poorly configured for medical ed man most often had to be evacuations, which often required Marines and Navy Corpsmen to lift patients loaded into the helicopter from a into the aircraft from odd angles. position above the heads of the stretcher-bearers, a ponderous and As helicopter pilot Captain kinds of weather, without the ben- awkward process. Inside the Norman G. Ewers later recalled: efit of proper instrumentation or cabin, the pilot had to make quick homing devices, and often disre- ballast adjustments to ensure Normally, helicopter evacua- garded enemy fire in the landing proper trim on the way home. tion missions [were] per- zones. A tribute to the helicopter Another problem was the HO3S- formed on orders from the pilots of VMO-6 was rendered by a 1’s high profile and unstable tricy- division air officer who re- ground officer: “The flying of cle landing gear; at least one HO3S lay[ed] the requests from the evacuation helicopters from jury tipped over while idling on rough medical officers of the battal- rigged and inadequate landing ground. Although all agreed that ions or regiments. Heli- sites was nothing short of miracu- the HO3S was invaluable in emer- copters [were] used to evacuate lous. . . . The pilots of the obser- gencies, there was room for only those who [were] critical- vation squadron received far less mechanical improvement. This ly wounded and require[d] credit than they deserved. They was handled in two ways. First, immediate hospital treatment. used to fly at night [into] frontline requests for immediate deploy- The helicopter [made] it possi- landing strips where I had trouble ment of an off-the-shelf medical ble not only to get the man to walking.” Frontline medical offi- evacuation helicopter, the Bell the hospital much more cers likewise credited the flying HTL trainer, were sent up the quickly, but it [provided] a skills and bravery of the medical chain-of-command. Second, Si- much easier ride than travel evacuation pilots for saving many korsky Aircraft made design modi- by roads over rough terrain lives. The mortality rate in Korea fications to its newest observation [and] this smoother ride . . . fell to a new low of only two per- helicopter, the developmental prevent[ed] hemorrhages. cent, less than half the rate of model S-52, which reached the World War II and far below the fleet as the HO5S. Medical evacuations were flown nearly 50 percent rate prior to the One mission of mercy for which without regard for difficult circum- American Civil War, due in large the HO3S was perfectly suited was stances. The pilots took off in all part to the rapid evacuation of the rescue of downed pilots.

17 Helicopters were virtually the only General Craig winched the soaked was shot down once again before means by which a downed pilot pilot up into the helicopter as the helicopter that delivered him could be snatched from behind Lueddeke hovered over the returned to action. His plane enemy lines and returned safely wreckage. Once safely inside the crashed into a rice paddy and home within hours. The HO3S’s grinning pilot slapped his benefac- flipped over when it struck the side-mounted winch was an ideal tor on the back with the words dike. Captain Moses was knocked tool for pulling an unfortunate avi- “Thanks, Mac” before he noticed unconscious as he fell from the ator from the chilly waters off the the general’s rank insignia and plane and drowned before heli- Korean coast. The pilot or his was able to render proper honors. copter pilot Captain Eugene J. crewman located the downed man The unperturbed senior officer Pope could save his life. Sadly, and then the helicopter hovered simply replied: “Glad to be of ser- Vivian Moses became the first overhead while the stricken man vice, Lieutenant.” Marine pilot to die in combat in was lifted to safety. Lieutenant Not every rescue had such a Korea. Lueddeke made the first of these happy ending. Later that same day On 7 August, the first Marine rescues on 10 August while con- Lieutenant Lueddeke was sent to helicopter came under fire when ducting a ground reconnaissance rescue another VMF-323 pilot. the commanding general’s HO3S-1 with the brigade commander on This time the downed flyer was was caught in an enemy artillery board. Second Lieutenant Doyle Captain Vivian M. Moses whose barrage. Luckily, the plane H. Cole’s Corsair was struck by plane had been hit by antiaircraft emerged undamaged after drop- ground fire during a strafing run. fire in enemy territory. Lueddeke ping General Craig off. The first Cole was unable to make it back to skillfully negotiated a low-level combat damage to a Marine heli- the Badoeng Strait, so his plane approach behind enemy lines to copter occurred a week later when plunged into the water. Luckily, he pick up the stranded pilot and an HO3S-1 lost its windshield while was able get out and inflate his life returned him to Chinhae for an evad-ing enemy antiaircraft fire. No raft before the plane sank. overnight stay. The next morning, “whirlybirds” were lost to enemy Lueddeke’s helicopter quickly Moses returned to his ship where he fire during the 580 missions flown rushed toward the sinking plane promptly volunteered to fly anoth- by the helicopter section of VMO-6 to affect an airborne rescue. er combat mission. Ironically, he during the fighting at Pusan. On 12 August, the Marine Marines refuel a VMO-6 helicopter in a rice paddy during the fighting in the Pusan advance toward Sachon was Perimeter. When a helicopter could not make it back to base, 55-gallon drums of fuel and a supply of oil had to be trucked out to the makeshift landing pad. abruptly halted due to a break- Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection through that penetrated the U.N. lines near Miryang on the Naktong River. The situation was so critical that a battalion of the 5th Marines was immediately ordered north to counterattack. Once again, the helicopter proved invaluable as a liaison vehicle. The battalion commander and the brigade operations officer mounted First Lieutenant Robert Longstaff’s HO3S-1 to rendezvous with a U.S. Army representative. They flew to the appointed place but could not locate their man. Luckily, they were able to orbit the area until they found a reconnaissance unit, which was able to contact their division headquarters. The Marines were told that instead of joining the Army unit as planned they should instead “look the situation

18 Early Naval Helicopters

he first U.S. Navy experience with rotary-wing air- copter pilot, Army Captain Hollingworth “Frank” craft was not a good one. The Pitcarin OP-1 auto- Gregory. He put his HNS through its paces by repeated- Tgiro, an airplane not a true helicopter, had been ly landing and taking off from the tanker Bunker Hill oper- tested and found wanting during the era between the ating in Long Island Sound on 7 May 1943. Coast Guard World Wars. It was not until Igor Sikorsky introduced his Lieutenant Commander Frank A. Erickson flew the initial VS-316 model helicopter on 13 January 1942 that verti- naval service helicopter mercy mission when he delivered cal takeoff and landing aircraft became feasible. two cases of blood plasma to a hospital at Sandy Hook Sikorsky had earlier flown the first practical American heli- on the New Jersey shore. Doctors credited Erickson’s time- copter, the VS-300, but that machine was only a test ly arrival with saving several lives. Other rescue missions bed. The follow-on VS-316, designated the XR-4 by the aiding both civilian and military personnel in the New U.S. Army, had a two-seat side-by-side enclosed cabin. York area soon followed. The U.S. Army and the Office A 200 horsepower Warner R-550-3 engine that ran a sin- of Strategic Services both used helicopters for special com- gle overhead main rotor and a smaller anti-torque rotor bat missions in Asia during World War II. on the tail powered the aircraft. The XR-4 prototype The Navy was satisfied enough with the HNS to order could hit a top speed of around 85 miles per hour, an additional 150 helicopters from Sikorsky, 100 HOS-1s cruised at about 70 miles per hour, and had a range of (designated R-6A by the USAAF) and 50 HO2S-1s (Army about 130. In July 1942, the Navy tested its first one; an designation R-5A) before the end of the war. The HOS- R-4 transferred from the Army and then promptly redes- 1 was more compact, more powerful, and more maneu- ignated HNS-1 by the Bureau of Aeronautics. Two more verable than its HNS predecessor. It mounted a single were requisitioned from Army stocks in March 1943. overhead main rotor, and was powered by a 240 hp The new helicopter was a success, and 22 more were pro- Franklin O-405-9 engine. Three XHOS-1s were request- cured for use as trainers beginning on 16 October 1943. ed for testing from Army R-6A stocks in late 1942 and were The HNS-1 served as the primary naval aviation helicopter accepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, which was by then run- trainer until the Bell HTL-series replaced it. ning Navy helicopter training at New York’s Floyd Several other early helicopters (the Platt LePage R-1 and Bennett Field in March 1944. After the war a second the Kellet R-2 and R-3) produced by other manufactur- batch of 36 HOS-1s were assigned to the Navy heli- ers were considered but not selected. All was not lost, copter development squadron (VX-3) after passing however, because a bright young Kellet engineer, Frank acceptance tests. The Navy also took two HO2S-1 (Army Piasecki, would later develop tandem-rotor helicopters R-5A) test models in December 1945, but opted to place that would become a mainstay of naval aviation. The Bell an order for slightly modified S-51 commercial models Aircraft Company was too busy turning out jets to enter (designated HO3S-1) which became the standard Navy, the initial helicopter competition, but that corporation’s Marine, and Coast Guard light utility helicopters in 1947. mathematician and engineer Arthur M. Young would When the Coast Guard returned to the Treasury soon revolutionize light helicopter design. Department from the Navy Department on 28 December Sikorsky Aircraft produced 133 HNS helicopters; the 1945, the U.S. Navy took over helicopter training and Navy accepted 23, the Army kept 58, and the British Royal development. Marine helicopter pilots learned their Air Force got 52. The first shipboard helicopter trials trade with VX-3 before moving on to HMX-1 at were conducted by America’s first certified military heli- Quantico, Virginia, prior to the Korean War. over and do what [they] thought returned to the Army position to way out of the area using maneu- proper [to] ensure the safety of the prepare for the rescue column’s vers not found in the pilot’s manu- 159th Field Artillery.” The Marines arrival. Concurrently, a helicopter al. Only helicopters could have had neither detailed maps of the piloted by Lieutenant Lueddeke provided such assistance. Ground area nor locating coordinates, so carrying the artillery regimental transportation would have been they took to the air to conduct a commander and his operations unable to find the misplaced units visual reconnaissance and, hope- officer located several survivors of in a timely manner, while a light fully, find the lost Army artillery- an overrun artillery battery. They observation plane could not have men. This was done, and the dropped a note of encouragement moved back and forth between Marines returned to meet the rescue then led a relief party to the spot. the supported and supporting convoy on the road. After giving an During this excursion, Lueddeke’s units with such speed and effi- estimate of the situation and further HO3S-1 came under small arms ciency. The helicopters of VMO-6 instructions, the two Marines fire and had to “buck and jerk” its saved the day.

19 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A1990 Air-sea rescue was an important mission flown by VMO-6 gratulated by his still-wet fellow VMO-6 observation pilot Capt with the first such rescue made in August. Here, Capt Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr. Eugene J. Pope, at the controls of his HO3S-1 helicopter, is con-

Two HO3S-1 helicopters, two brought in supplies, and evacuated [them] come in with a dozen bullet pilots, and five mechanics as- casualties as the Marines were holes [but] unless they are hit in a signed to headquarters squadron twice called on to throw the North vital part, they continue to fly.” in Japan were released from that Koreans back across the Naktong Still, the helicopters carried no duty and joined VMO-6 at Chinhae River. During that time the heli- armor or weapons so they were on 15 August, just in time for one copter pilots began to perfect eva- used in supporting roles except of the biggest battles for the Pusan sive maneuvers that allowed them for emergency evacuations or Perimeter. The 5th Marines had to dodge enemy ground fire. It deep search and rescue missions. been pulled back from Sachon, also became obvious that the frail The best tactic for those risky mis- hurriedly replenished, and then looking helicopters were tougher sions was to get in and out as marched north to seal off the than previously thought. Several quickly as possible while flying NKPA penetration near Miryang. were hit by enemy small arms fire nap-of-the-earth using terrain to Helicopters were used for visual but kept on flying, and others sur- mask ingress and egress routes. reconnaissance of the battle area, vived some very hard landings in The Marine defense of the conducted liaison visits, scouted rough country. As General Lemuel Pusan Perimeter ended with the the routes of advance, screened Shepherd later noted about the arrival of other elements of the 1st the flanks, spotted artillery fires, toughness of helicopters: “I saw Marine Division and the remainder

20 and willingness to put in long Airfield Designations hours. This was no small achieve- ment because helicopters required nited Nations Command airfields in Korea used letter-number des- a great deal more effort; more ignators: the letter “K” indicated a major air base; the letter “X” indi- spare parts, more man-hours, and Ucated an auxiliary landing strip; and the letter “A” indicated that the more sophisticated tools and work airfield adjoined a U.S. Army base or headquarters. During the Korean War, spaces than did the OY Sentinels. Marine helicopter squadrons operated from the following locations: On the other hand, Gottschalk Marine Observation Squadron 6 Sonjong-ni (unnamed) also noted that larger transport Chinhae (K-10) Sohung-ni (X-77) helicopters could have provided Kimpo (K-14) Sinchon (X-83) much needed services such as Wonsan (K-25) Tonggo-ri (A-9) troop lifts, resupply, and com- Yonpo (K-27) Marine Transport Squadron 161 mand liaison, which were beyond Masan (unnamed) Pusan (K-1) the capabilities of the HO3S-1. Pohang (K-3) Kangnung (K-18) General Craig, the first Marine Wonju (K-38) Chodo-ri (X-83) commander to use a helicopter as Hongchon (K-47) Yongpo-ni (A-17) a command and control aircraft Kwandae-ri (unnamed) Taejong-ni (A-33) later wrote:

of Major General Field Harris’ 1st naissance missions. Throughout Helicopters are a godsend. . . . Marine Aircraft Wing from that time helicopter availability The mountainous terrain of California in preparation for the was 100 percent. In his final report Korea presents a difficult prob- landing at Inchon. By late August, Major Gottschalk attributed this lem for security. . . . [Transport] the helicopter detachment had remarkable accomplishment to helicopters would be ideal to logged 580 sorties and 348 flight two factors: the excellent facilities [quickly] post patrols and out- hours, conducted 35 medical evac- at Chinhae and the ground sup- guards on high, dominating uations, and flew 85 aerial recon- port crew’s professionalism, skill, terrain which would [normally] A VMO-6 helicopter lands near the artillery positions of the HO3S was designated as an “observation” platform but was 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, along the Naktong River. The actually used as a light utility aircraft in Korea. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2204

21 copter. Almost any individual questioned could offer some personal story to emphasize the valuable part played by [the] HO3S planes. . . . There is no doubt the enthusiasm voiced . . . is entirely war- ranted. . . . No effort should be spared to get helicopters— larger than the HO3S if possible—to the theater at once, and on a priority higher than any other weapon. [We need] helicopters, more helicopters, and more helicopters.

The Inchon-Seoul Campaign

On 9 September, VMO-6 was placed under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Oliver P. “O. P.” Smith, and under the administrative control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The Marines’ next mission was des- tined to become a military clas- sic—the amphibious assault at Inchon, a battle that dramatically reversed the course of the Korean conflict. U.S. Army X Corps, spearheaded by the 1st Marine Division, launched a difficult daylong amphibious landing then rapidly National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130052 moved inland to secure the supply MajGen Field Harris, left, commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, depot at Ascom City and Kimpo MajGen Oliver P. Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, and BGen Airfield. The campaign culminated Thomas J. Cushman, assistant wing commander, meet in Tokyo, Japan, a week before the landing at Inchon. with the retaking of the South Korean capital of Seoul. This take hours to climb. . . . [More Gottschalk, Craig also recom- seizure cut the enemy’s main sup- helicopters] would . . . insure the mended that a transport helicopter ply routes and left the NKPA forces earlier defeat of the enemy. squadron be formed and sent to in the south isolated. By the time They should be made available Korea as quickly as possible. The the lead elements of X Corps in for use at the earliest possible Director of Marine Corps Aviation, the north and Eighth Army coming date. Brigadier General Clayton C. up from the Pusan Perimeter Jerome, made the case for addi- linked up the NKPA was in full He also noted other Service tional helicopters in a memoran- flight. That once awesome fighting interest in rotary-wing aircraft by dum to the Deputy Chief of Naval force had been completely routed stating: “The Army is enthusiastic Operations (Air): and was headed for the dubious over our ideas of employment of safety of North Korea. this type of aircraft and is going There are no superlatives To prepare for the Inchon land- ahead with the idea of employing adequate to describe the gen- ing, Major Gottschalk divided his them on a large scale.” Like Major eral reaction to the heli- squadron into forward and rear

22 echelons. The forward echelon, 10 needed a ride the generals and Although Marine helicopters officers, 48 enlisted men, and 8 colonels either used alternative played no combat role on the first helicopters, loaded on board Jap- transportation or waited until their day at Inchon, Navy helicopters anese-manned LST Q079 at “chopper” returned. The list of did spot naval gunfire during the Chinhae. During the voyage, the dignitaries using helicopter trans- preliminary bombardment. On 16 Marines and Japanese crew shared port during September 1950 September (D+1), Marine heli- mess facilities. Luckily, detach- included Fleet Marine Force, copters entered the fray flying 14 ment commander Captain Victor Pacific, commander Lieutenant missions. The landing ship-based Armstrong spoke fluent Jap- General Lemuel Shepherd, Com- Marine “whirlybirds” flew recon- anese—he had resided in Japan mandant Clifton B. Cates, and X naissance and artillery spotting for 15 years before the outbreak of Corps commander, U.S. Army missions over Wolmi-do Island, World War II. Four officers and 43 Major General Edward M. Almond. and First Lieutenant Max Nebergall enlisted men remained behind to At Inchon, just as at Pusan, the pulled a Navy pilot out of the safeguard squadron property at most often heard complaint about drink. On the afternoon of 17 Chinhae. helicopters was that there were September, ground Marines cap- Once ashore the Marine heli- not enough of them. tured Kimpo Airfield, the largest copter detachment picked up right “Whirlybird” pilots in Korea were famous for their daring feats while rescuing where it left off, but on a much downed flyers and evacuating seriously wounded men; among the very best larger scale. The main missions were 1stLts Robert A. Longstaff and Gustave F. Lueddeke, Jr. of VMO-6. remained command and liaison, Tragically, the Marine Corps lost two of it most promising pioneer helicopter pilots aerial evacuation of seriously when Longstaff was killed in action at the Chosin Reservoir and Lueddeke suc- wounded, combat search and res- cumbed to poliomyelitis not long after returning from Korea. cue of downed fliers, and visual National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130403 reconnaissance. Although the number of HO3S helicopters had doubled since August, the demands for their time continued to increase. Major General Smith, the 1st Marine Division commander and a former member of the Shepherd Board in 1946, quickly became a helicopter advocate. “The helicopter was of inestimable value to the division commander and his staff in keeping personal contact with subordinate units in a mini- mum of transit time,” he asserted. Generals Smith and Craig, now assistant division commander, depended upon helicopters to visit the front on a daily basis and unit commanders scouted proposed routes of advance, although emergency medical evacuations were given priority over liaison and reconnaissance. With as few as only four helicopters operational, however, command and liaison visits were often interrupted when the commander’s helicopter was diverted for emergency missions. When critically wounded men

23 airfield in Korea, virtually intact. The first U.S. aircraft to land there was Captain Armstrong’s HO3S, which arrived at mid-morning on 18 September as Marines searched for the remnants of the previous night’s NKPA counterattack force. Armstrong carried two early proponents of Marine helicopter operations, Lieutenant General Shep- herd and his operations officer Colonel Victor H. Krulak. On 19 September, the 1st Marine Division moved its command post from Inchon to Oeoso- ri. The next day VMO-6 moved to nearby Kimpo, which thereafter served as the squadron’s base of operations until the subsequent move north. The final phase of the Inchon turning movement—the recapture of Seoul—was about to begin, and helicopters proved to be particularly valuable when terrain obstacles separated elements of the division during the drive to retake the capital. The general operational pattern was for one helicopter to be earmarked for each regimental commander in addition to one each for the division commander and his assistant commander. The regimental helicopters were primarily used for Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130249 reconnaissance and medical evac- Capt Victor A. Armstrong, right, proudly displays the cake sent from the carrier uations, the division commander’s Philippine Sea (CV 47) as Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, VMO-6’s commanding for liaison, and the assistant division officer, looks on. Capt Armstrong made a daring behind-the-lines rescue of a Navy pilot shot down near Seoul and the cake was sent ashore as a mark of appreci- commander’s for reconnaissance; ation. any unassigned helicopters underwent maintenance while standing way. As a result of his aerial recon- difficult extraction, First Lieutenant by for emergency evacuations or naissance, Craig recommended Arthur R. Bancroft loaded his combat search and rescue. that the 5th Marines move across plane captain on board then took The major obstacle on the way to the Han at an abandoned ferry site off to make the rescue. The area Seoul was the Han River. Brig- near Haengju and then seize the was “hot,” so friendly planes main- adier General Craig used his heli- high ground overlooking Seoul. tained a rescue combat air patrol to copter to locate a suitable crossing Just as before, combat search strafe any enemy who showed area, scout key terrain, and survey and rescue was an important addi- their heads. Bancroft set his HO3S the road approaches to the South tional duty for the helicopters of down and remained at the con- Korean capital. Although few VMO-6. On 21 September 1950, trols while the helicopter idled enemy soldiers actually showed the squadron received word that a with its rotor blades slowly turning. themselves, Captain Armstrong, pilot had gone down behind The crew chief could not free the Craig’s pilot, had to dodge scat- enemy lines and was jammed encased pilot alone, so Bancroft tered small arms fire along the inside his cockpit. Anticipating a had to leave the aircraft to assist.

24 Who was the First Marine Helicopter Pilot?

here is some dispute about who the first Marine Corps helicopter pilot actually was. According to TMarine lore that honor goes to fighter ace and famed test pilot Marion E. Carl, but the official records of the naval service identify Major Armond H. DeLalio as Marine helicopter pilot number one, and Marion Carl himself proclaimed that Desmond E. Canavan was probably the first Marine to fly a helicopter. According to the Marine Corps’ official history, Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973, “Major General Marion E. Carl is generally credited with being the first Marine to learn how to fly a helicopter in July 1945 [but] it was not until some years later that he was officially designated [as such].” In his autobiography, Pushing The Envelope (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), Carl relates that he learned how to fly a Sikorsky HNS (R- 4) while a test pilot stationed at the Naval Air Test Center, Patuxent River, Maryland. He was given about three hours of instruction before he soloed. In that same mem- oir, however, he states that fellow Marine Desmond Canavan was flying helicopters in late 1944. Carl’s claim that he was helicopter pilot number one rests upon the fact that he was the first Marine to log the 40 hours required for certification even though he never applied for such certification. Neither Carl nor Canovan appear on the naval service helicopter pilot certification list prior to June 1950. Marine Corps Historian Lynn Montross, the recognized authority on early Marine helicopter operations, lists Navy Cross holder Armond DeLalio as having flown U.S. Navy helicopters at New York’s Floyd Bennett Field then under the auspices of the U.S. Coast Guard in 1944. He is officially recognized as the first Marine certified as a helicopter pilot, achieving that honor on 8 August 1946. Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection DeLalio was the operations officer for Navy helicopter LtCol Armond H. DeLalio, recipient of the Navy Cross for squadron VX-3 at that time. He was killed during a test heroism as a pilot with Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron flight in 1952 when a rocket-assisted takeoff pod mal- 241 during the battle of Midway and a Marine Corps functioned causing his HRS helicopter to catch fire and then helicopter pioneer, was honored in 1965 when an ele- crash. mentary school at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, was The Navy register of early helicopter pilots lists 250 qual- dedicated in his name. ifiers prior to the onset of the Korean War in June 1950; 33 are Marines, including three enlisted naval aviation pilots the ground] and pulled him into the cockpit. (the famous “Flying Sergeants” of the Marine Corps). [Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B.] Twining and I were While who should be recognized as the true “Gray standing by the window and watching and I said ‘Bill, Eagle” of Marine helicopter aviation remains murky, there let’s . . . quit fooling around.’ He said ‘OK! . . . He is little doubt about the specific incident that started the wrote the theory . . . principles . . . background . . . Marine Corps helicopter program. That event occurred at reasoning . . . and I wrote [an implementation] pro- Quantico, Virginia, in 1946 and was described by helicopter gram.” pioneer Edward C. Dyer: Marion Carl recalled that he specifically selected One day Marion Carl, a test pilot at Patuxent, flew Lieutenant Colonel Krulak because his small stature and a helicopter to Marine Corps Schools to demon- lightweight could be accommodated by the limited room strate it to the students. . . . He hoisted [Lieutenant and lift capability of his HOS-1 helicopter. Krulak there- Colonel Victor H.] Brute Krulak . . . about 15 feet [off after became a helicopter devotee.

25 While the two Marines busily freed crew was down in enemy territory but as Bancroft’s helicopter began the trapped pilot, the helicopter’s did not reach the division air offi- to settle it was hit by enemy fire and collective friction device worked cer until about 2100—after sunset. disintegrated in a fireball. Engel- loose and the plane tipped on its Captain Armstrong took off de- hardt called for fighter planes to side where the beating rotors spite the fact that the HO3S had survey the area. They reported destroyed the aircraft. Luckily, neither proper instrumentation nor Bancroft had been killed, and Lieutenant Robert Longstaff was landing lights for limited visibility there was no sign of the downed able to pick up the grounded trio flying. Armstrong needed both pilot. First Lieutenant Arthur R. although his overloaded HO3S arms and both feet to control the Bancroft thus became the first staggered under the excessive helicopter, so he held a flashlight Marine helicopter pilot to die in weight until it reached friendly between his knees to illuminate action. lines. Bancroft then promptly the unlit instrument panel. He Helicopters became crucial for mounted another helicopter to res- spotted the downed aircraft in the command liaison. The rugged ter- cue a second Navy flier before the glow of light cast from the burning rain, a major river, and wide dis- day ended. city of Seoul and set down on a persal of fighting units made con- Two days later, Captain Arm- nearby sandbar. The crew, a Navy trol difficult. Helicopter mobility strong recorded the longest search pilot and a Marine enlisted man, made it possible for commanders to and rescue operation yet by a swam to Armstrong’s waiting heli- scout approach routes, identify VMO-6 helicopter when he flew copter for a safe ride home. He key terrain, attend conferences in nearly 100 miles behind enemy once again had to rely upon the rear, and then quickly there- lines to rescue a downed Navy makeshift lights upon arrival at the after meet subordinate comman- pilot. On the return flight, he ran landing zone. ders face-to-face. On 28 Septem- out fuel over friendly territory, Thus far in Korea, VMO-6 had ber, Major General Smith coordi- temporarily put down, refueled, lost helicopters to operational inci- nated the defense of Seoul as he and then landed at Kimpo after dents but had suffered no fatali- visited each of his three regimental dark using a flashlight to illumi- ties. Tragically, this string of luck command posts: the 1st Marines at nate his control panel. The res- came to an end on 29 September. Seoul’s Duk Soo Palace; the 5th cued pilot turned out to be a A VMO-6 Sentinel was shot down Marines at the Seoul Women’s squadron commander from the about five miles north of Seoul. University; and the recently carrier Philippine Sea (CV 47). Reports indicated the aerial ob- arrived 7th Marines on the city’s The next day, VMO-6 received a server was killed in the crash, but western outskirts. The 1st and 5th large layer cake, compliments of the pilot was able get out. First Marines were to defend in place the U.S. Navy as a reward for Lieutenants Lloyd Engelhardt and while the 7th attacked toward Armstrong’s fine work. Converse- Arthur Bancroft, both of who pre- Uijongbu. On 3 October, Arm- ly, Lieutenant Longstaff flew the viously had logged deep search strong flew Commandant Cates on shortest rescue mission of the war and rescue missions, were at the an aerial survey of the Inchon- picking up a pair of Marines from division command post when the Seoul area and a frontline inspec- a Grumman F7F Tigercat that call for help came in. Both imme- tion tour highlighted by observation crashed after taking off from diately volunteered to go, but of an attack by the 7th Marines on Kimpo. That mission on the 25th Major James Cupp, the division air the 4th. This was the final ground took less than six minutes. The officer, ordered them to wait until combat action of the campaign, pilot was Lieutenant Colonel Max J. more detailed information became although Marine helicopters con- Volcansek, Jr., of Marine Night available. A few minutes later they tinued to fly deep rescue and med- Fighter Squadron 542, one of three learned that the OY went down ical evacuation missions from squadron commanders to go beyond the Marine frontlines near Kimpo throughout the rest of down that day. Uijongbu, an unsecured area October. Lieutenant Engelhardt A more dramatic rescue also teeming with enemy and known rescued a Marine pilot near occurred on 25 September. A Navy to be infested with antiaircraft Chunchon on 3 October and then helicopter “on loan” to the Marines guns. Bancroft, who won a coin plucked an Air Force pilot up at suffered battle damage during a flip to decide who would make Sibyon-ni on the 5th. deep rescue mission and was the rescue, took the lead with When the Inchon-Seoul cam- forced to put down near the Han Engelhardt trailing by about a half paign was officially declared over at River. Word that an American air- mile. They found the crash site, noon on 7 October 1950, VMO-6

26 U.S. Naval Aviation Designations

uring the Korean conflict, the Navy Bureau of Except for experimental or prototype helicopters, the Aeronautics used designation systems that con- first letter was an “H” indicating rotary-wing status; the Dveyed a lot of information about its squadrons and second letter indicated its primary purpose (“O” for aircraft in a concise manner. observation, “R” for transport, or “T” for trainer); a num- Squadron Designations: ber (except in the case of the first model) indicated the The Bureau recognized three aircraft squadron types: manufacturer’s sequence for producing that specific air- lighter than air (Z); heavier than air (V); and helicopter craft type; the next letter identified the manufacturer (H). In addition, Marine aircraft squadrons were identi- (“L” for Bell, “P” for Piasecki, or “S” for Sikorsky); and the fied by the insertion of the letter “M” between the aircraft number following a dash indicated a sequential modifi- type and the squadron function. In general, a three let- cation of that aircraft model. ter prefix followed by up to three numbers was used to Thus, the HO3S-1 was Sikorsky Aircraft’s third model identify individual Marine aircraft squadrons. The first let- observation helicopter with one modification; the HRP ter (a “V” or “H”) identified the primary aircraft type was Piasecki’s first transport helicopter; the HTL-4 was the used by the squadron, the second letter (“M”) identified fourth modification to Bell Aircraft’s original trainer heli- it as a Marine aviation unit, and the third (“O” indicating copter; the HO5S was Sikorsky’s fifth observation observation and “R” for transportation) identified the model; and the HRS-1 was Sikorsky’s first transport heli- squadron’s primary mission; the numbers in the suffix copter. sometimes identified the squadron’s unit affiliation and The Bureau’s system was a good one that remained in always noted its precedence order. use for four decades, but there were a few problems. Thus, VMO-6 was the sixth heavier-than-air Marine First, aircraft were often used for roles other than those observation squadron formed. The single digit indicated assigned. For example, the HO3S-1 was actually a utili- that the squadron was not specifically affiliated with a party aircraft that during field service performed many tasks ticular aircraft wing (observation squadrons were other than observation, a task that actually became a sel- attached to ground units). On the other hand, HMR-161 dom-used secondary mission in Korea. Second, the pro- was the first Marine helicopter transport squadron liferation of missions and manufacturers as time passed assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (the first “1” indi- led to confusing duplication of letters (“T” was various- cating initial assignment to the wing, numbers above ly used to indicated torpedo, trainer, and transport air- “6” were used for non-fixed wing aircraft, and the last “1” craft). Third, lack of inter-Service consistency produced signifying it was the first squadron formed). confusion (the Navy HO3S-1 was an H-5F to the Air Aircraft Designations Force and Army). The naval aircraft designation system Individual aircraft designations used a similar identi- was replaced by a joint aircraft designation system in 1962, fication system. The Bureau of Aeronautics gave each but the Bureau’s squadron designation system remains in naval aircraft a mixed letter and number designation. effect. helicopters had flown 643 mis- group commander in Korea: “The than 100 miles inland from their sions, evacuated 139 seriously farther from Washington, the less temporary base at Wonsan Harbor. wounded men, and rescued 12 air- inter-Service differences came into These were only a few of many men from behind enemy lines or play.” This dictate was borne out by times Marine helicopters rescued out of the water. Marine helicopter operations in or aided other American service- The success of VMO-6’s fledg- late October. On the 21st, Captain men in Korea. Although both the ling helicopter detachment had Gene W. Morrison made a series of U.S. Navy and Air Force were fly- wide-ranging effects that spread flights to evacuate eight seriously ing helicopters in Korea, the well beyond the theater of opera- wounded Army paratroopers from Marine success with rotary-wing tions and impacted more than just Sukchon to Pyongyang in his operations at Pusan and Inchon the Marine Corps. In the United HO3S. Three days later, Captain prodded the Air Force to attach States, military dogmatists and Wallace D. Blatt, who had provid- helicopter units specifically ear- civilian pundits complained long ed helicopter coverage for the marked for medical evacuation to and loud about lack of inter- withdrawal of U.S. forces from Army field hospitals. Likewise, a Service unity in Korea. However, in China, and First Lieutenant Charles clamor for organic transport and the words of Major General John P. C. Ward flew deep into enemy ter- observation helicopters arose from Condon, an expert in joint opera- ritory to rescue a pair of Air Force U.S. Army commanders. The utili- tions and an experienced air pilots down near Koto-ri, more ty and practicality of helicopters in

27 combat zones had been firmly craft ferried in from the United home base from then until VMO-6 established by the Marines of States on board the aircraft carrier moved to Yonpo on 3 November. VMO-6 in less than three months. Leyte (CV 32). The new aircraft The embarked surface echelon were welcome additions that finally got ashore on the 25th, and The Chosin Reservoir made nine Marine HO3S heli- the flight echelon completed its copters available. movement to Wonsan three days General MacArthur’s successful United Nations ground forces later. turning movement at Inchon dras- pressed forward against only Immediately after landing, the tically changed the course of the token resistance. A South Korean 1st Marine Division began opera- Korean War. Thereafter, the NKPA division occupied Wonsan in early tions. One regiment occupied was a broken machine with its October, but the amphibious task Wonsan and manned two battal- scattered remnants headed for the force carrying VMO-6 had to mark ion-sized outposts (Majon-ni to the protection of North Korea’s hinter- time sailing up and down the east west and Kojo to the south) while lands or a safe haven inside China. coast until the harbor could be two regiments proceeded about 50 MacArthur, sensing a chance to cleared of mines. Consequently, miles north to the port of end the conflict by trapping the members of VMO-6’s stay-behind Hungnam and the railway junction remaining North Korean forces, echelon actually set down in at Hamhung before moving out sent his United Nations Command North Korea before the advance toward the Chosin Reservoir some speeding north beyond the 38th party. On 23 October, Captain 78 miles farther inland. Although Parallel in a race for the Yalu River Blatt and Lieutenant Ward flew intelligence estimates indicated despite warnings not to do so. north from Kimpo to Wonsan. The there would be little resistance MacArthur split his forces to airfield served as the squadron’s and X Corps commander, Major hasten the pursuit. He ordered the General Edward M. Almond, want- Capt Wallace D. Blatt, a helicopter Eighth Army forward in the west ed a rapid inland movement, the pilot assigned to VMO-6 in Korea, and opted to use X Corps, includ- had been a Marine multi-engined enemy had other ideas. A night ing the 1st Marine Division, for an transport pilot at Guam and attack at Kojo caught the Ameri- amphibious landing at Wonsan in Okinawa during World War II. He cans by surprise and cut the main northeast Korea. Once again, learned to fly helicopters immediately supply route while unexpectedly VMO-6 split into forward and rear after the war and was the first Marine strong NKPA forces encircled the elements. The advance party (4 helicopter pilot deployed overseas Majon-ni outpost. With no over- officers and 70 enlisted men when he flew a borrowed Navy HO3S- land routes open, helicopters known as the “surface” echelon) 1 during the occupation of North became the only reliable link with embarked on board LST 1123 and China. both outposts. National Archives Photo (USMC) A130580 then sailed for Wonsan on 13 The 1st Marine Division was October. Most pilots, all VMO-6 alerted that the Kojo garrison was aircraft, and a skeleton ground- under attack in the early morning support crew remained at Kimpo. hours of 28 October. Emergency Fifth Air Force specifically tasked requests for medical assistance, the Marine helicopters with sup- specifically aerial evacuation heli- porting a U.S. Army parachute copters and a hospital receiving drop near Pyongyang, but the ship in addition to ground rein- Marines also would conduct com- forcements, were quickly acted bat search and rescue as needed. upon. Six HO3S helicopters were This “flight” echelon was com- dispatched. As Captain Gene posed of 17 officers and 19 enlist- Morrison later recalled, the situation ed men with Captain Armstrong as was desperate enough that he officer-in-charge. The stay-behind never shut his engine down after element was to continue opera- arriving at Wonsan on his ferry tions from Kimpo until ramp space flight from Kimpo. Instead, he at Wonsan became available. received a hurried cockpit brief Included in the helicopter flight and was on his way to Kojo with- echelon were several newly out ever leaving the aircraft. arrived pilots and replacement air- Captains Blatt and Morrison, and

28 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A134641 The hospital ship Repose (AH 17) at anchor in Inchon ship’s stern; this configuration became standard on all hos- Harbor. Note the helicopter landing pad mounted on the pital ships during the course of the Korean War.

Lieutenants Engelhardt, Lueddeke, Capt Gene W. Morrison, a helicopter The village was occupied without and Ward, collectively flew 17 seri- pilot with VMO-6, was one of the first resistance on 28 October, but with- ously wounded men from Kojo to Marine “Whirlybirds” to arrive in in a week the garrison was com- the hospital ship Repose (AH 17) at northern Korea from Kimpo Airfield to pletely surrounded and the vulner- Wonsan Harbor. Captain George support the Chosin Reservoir cam- able main supply route became B. Farish provided airborne search paign. At Yonpo Airfield, he was known as “Ambush Alley.” Radio and rescue. During a search on 29 immediately diverted to help evacuate communications between Majon- serious wounded Marines from Kojo to October, he spotted the word ni and Wonsan was uncertain the hospital ship Repose (AH 17) in “HELP” spelled out in straw about Wonsan Harbor. because intervening high ground a mile northeast of Tongchon. As National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130604 and intermittent atmospheric inter- Farish trolled the area, a lone figure ference allowed an open window emerged from cover and then of only a few hours each day, so the began waving. Farish shouted: only reliable communications links “Hey Mac, looking for a ride?” He were messages carried in and out then plucked up the first of sever- by helicopter or OY pilots. For the al lost Marines he brought in that most part, the Majon-ni strong day. During several of the rescues point was supplied by airdrop and Farish left his helicopter to assist casualty evacuation was by heli- badly wounded men to the idling copter from 2 November until the aircraft. Unfortunately, his daring siege lifted. attempt to rescue a Navy pilot The Chosin Reservoir campaign under fire late in the day came to tested the endurance of the naught when it was discovered the “whirlybirds” and the skill of their man was already dead. pilots and the fortitude of their Helicopters played an important ground crews like no other period role at Majon-ni, a vital road junc- before Chinese anti-aircraft fire tion located in a Y-shaped valley began to light up the clouded about 25 miles west of Wonsan. skies of northeast Korea. The via-

29 did not completely alleviate, cold weather-induced problems. Re- duced lift in low temperatures at high altitude and flight in windy conditions made flying in the mountainous terrain hazardous, but there was no choice when emergencies occurred. It also became apparent that ground- effect hovers would not be possible in the foreseeable future. An additional problem was the ungainly configuration of the HO3S-1, which required stretcher cases to extend outside the cabin. Sub- freezing temperatures and extreme airborne wind chill factors put already wounded men at risk for frostbite while enroute to safety. Thus, the already limited flight envelope of the HO3S-1 was further restricted by terrain and weather. On 2 November, the 1st Marine Division began its ascent toward the reservoir following a helicopter reconnaissance of the Sudong Valley. No enemy troops were located from the sky, but ground units were soon mixing it up with the first Chinese Com- munist units yet encountered. General Smith ignored the advice of the X Corps commander to speed it up and instead moved his division steadily ahead along a single-lane road, keeping all units tied in and establishing strong points along the way. His foresight and pru- dence likely saved the 1st Marine Division from annihilation when the Chinese sprang their trap a few bility of extended helicopter oper- operations was also a source of weeks later. ations at high altitude and in diffi- concern. This issue came to the Helicopters scouted hill-masked cult weather conditions was at that fore when Captain Eugene Pope flanks, reconnoitered the roadway, time still conjectural. It was had to return his HO3S after only laid communications wire, provid- believed that helicopters might not four minutes aloft because the col- ed radio relays, and brought in be able to operate safely at any lective and cyclic controls were crucial small items in addition to point beyond Chinhung-ni at the too stiff to adequately control their by-then normal jobs of com- mouth of the Funcilin Pass, about flight. Ground crews subsequently mand liaison and medical evacua- two-thirds of the way to the switched to light weight lubricants tion. Despite increasingly poor Chosin Reservoir, due to the thin air and tried to either hangar or cover weather, First Lieutenant Ward at that altitude. The effect of pro- all aircraft when not in use. These flew 115 miles from Yonpo to longed cold weather on helicopter measures compensated for, but Songjin to rescue an Air Force air-

30 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4912 Aerial evacuation of wounded and severely frostbitten Gottschalk’s squadron conducted a total of 191 helicopter Marines and soldiers from Hagaru-ri saved numerous lives. evacuations out of a total of 1,544 flights. From late November to mid-December, Maj Vincent J. borne forward air controller through the snow-covered Fun- facilities hampered helicopter whose plane had gone down near chilin Pass over the main supply maintenance. It was under these the Chosin Reservoir on 5 No- route, a treacherous, icy, winding, dire circumstances that the mettle of vember. The HO3S was badly buf- narrow, dirt road. General Smith VMO-6’s helicopter section was feted by crosswinds and strained wisely established a series of out- truly tested. to bite into the chilly thin air. posts along the way; a regimental Beginning on the night of 27 Three days later, Captain Pope’s supply base at Koto-ri just north of November, the advance elements helicopter was blown out of the the Funchilin Pass, an airstrip and of the 1st Marine Division became sky by turbulent winds while on a division headquarters at Hagaru-ri heavily engaged at Yudam-ni and resupply run. The helicopter was a on the southern tip of the reservoir, Hagaru-ri. The fierce fighting at wreck, but Pope escaped without a company-sized outpost guarded the Chosin Reservoir required an serious injury. Lieutenant Ward the Toktong Pass from Fox Hill, all-hands effort by VMO-6 when arrived to take him out but was and a jump off point manned by more than six Chinese divisions beset by a temperamental starter, so two regiments at Yudam-ni on the tried to overrun two Marine regi- both pilots spent the night at a western tip of the reservoir. ments and cut the main supply ground command post. Conditions were terrible. Swirl- route at several points. Helicopter By 26 November, the 1st Marine ing snow and sub-zero tempera- pilots Blatt and Morrison both Division was dangerously spread tures were the result of the winds, reported enemy roadblocks be- out. Little active resistance had yet which blew down from Man- tween Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, the been encountered, but veteran churia. It would be hard to imagine first official confirmation that the commanders were leery that more difficult flying conditions for 1st Marine Division was surround- things might be going too well. helicopter operations. The bitterly ed. The Marines’ abortive advance The Marines had moved upward cold, short days and lack of repair was about to become a breakout,

31 an epic of modern warfare during isolated rifle company perched which the Marines “attacked in a atop Fox Hill. As he later related: different direction” bringing out “They ran me off.” Farish limped most of their equipment and all of back to Hagaru-ri and safely land- their wounded. ed under covering fire by the Several helicopters moved for- Marines in the perimeter, but his air- ward to Hagaru-ri to save flight craft was operationally grounded time on 28 November, and all due to damage to the main rotor available aircraft flew from dawn transmission. The next day, Lieu- until dusk each day for the next tenant Engelhardt’s HO3S was hit week-and-a-half. General Smith while delivering vital radio batter- often used helicopters to visit his ies to Fox Hill. A bullet just missed scattered units during that time. the pilot, and the helicopter was so The helicopters of VMO-6 logged damaged that it had to return to 40 sorties (1 reconnaissance, 16 base for emergency repairs after transport, and 23 medical evacua- carrying out one wounded Marine. National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420288 tions) in 73.7 flight hours on the Forty-three other casualties were Helicopter pilot 1stLt Robert A. Long- 29th. Fifty seriously injured men successfully brought out that day as staff poses in front of his HO3S-1 heli- were flown out and numerous well by the HO3S-1s of VMO-6. copter decked out in flight gear after vital supplies (particularly radio Helicopters carried out 50 wound- delivering a downed Navy airman to batteries and medicine) were ed and brought in medical sup- the Sicily (CVE 118). Longstaff was brought in; General Smith visited plies, gasoline, radio batteries, and the second Marine helicopter pilot the forward command posts, and a tank parts in almost 60 hours of killed in action when his aircraft was hit by antiaircraft fire at the Chosin large group of enemy was spotted flight time on 30 November. Reservoir. by helicopter that day. Captain The Marines consolidated at Farish’s HO3S was hit several Hagaru-ri, broke out of the Chi- back toward the sea by way of an times as he delivered supplies to an nese trap at Koto-ri, and moved air dropped Treadway portable bridge that spanned the Funchilin Although operating at the extreme edge of their performance envelope, the Marine HO3S-1s of VMO-6 provided reliable service at the Chosin Reservoir. Pass. Throughout the ordeal at the During the most critical period the squadron’s helicopters and OYs provided the reservoir, helicopters were the only physical contact between units separated by enemy action. only dependable means of physical National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5398 contact between scattered units. They provided liaison, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation; whenever a “whirlybird” flew a medical supply mission, ammunition and radio batteries were part of the incoming load. These operations were not without cost. On 3 December, First Lieutenant Long- staff was killed at Toktong Pass when his helicopter was brought down by enemy fire while trying to rescue a critically wounded man. Captain Blatt played a role in a daring but ultimately tragic event. After several frustrating hours trying to start his frozen helicopter, Blatt was finally able to get his aircraft to crank up just as an emergency rescue mission came in. Blatt took off but then returned when the covering air patrol told him an ax and fire

32 extinguisher would be needed to located on board their various months the U.S. Marines would free the trapped pilot, Ensign Jesse ships and then gathered together on rest and rebuild at Masan, chase L. Brown, USN. Arriving at the board the light carrier Bataan elusive North Korean guerrillas scene, Blatt joined Navy (CVL 29) as the convoy sailed near Pohang, lead the United Lieutenant Junior Grade Thomas J. south. Unfortunately, three heli- Nations Command drive up cen- Hudner, Jr., who had purposely copters were damaged enroute by tral Korea from Wonju to the crash-landed his plane in order to high winds and heavy seas. The Hwachon Reservoir, survive the assist Brown. Despite their best four operable “whirlybirds” flew last major Chinese offensive of the efforts, they could not extract the off their host carriers to Masan on war, then once again claw their mortally wounded man before he 26 December 1950. The others way north to a rugged mountain died. The saddened men had to were off loaded at Pusan Harbor area just north of the 38th Parallel return empty handed, but Hudner and underwent repairs. where the U.N. lines would later received the Medal of Honor The return to Masan closed the remain until the end of the war. for his unselfish actions to rescue books on the Chosin Reservoir Throughout those U.N. counterof- the United States Navy’s first campaign. During the movement fensives the helicopters of VMO-6 African-American combat pilot. north and the ensuing breakout continued to provide outstanding After the 1st Marine Division between 28 October and 15 support. departed Koto-ri for Hungnam on December, Marine helicopters While the Marines in Korea 6 December, VMO-6 moved back to flew 64 reconnaissance, 421 trans- were slogging their way back from Yonpo. During the ensuing voyage port, 191 medical evacuation, 60 Chosin, several Bell HTL heli- from Hungnam some of the utility, and 11 search and rescue copters arrived in Japan. The HTL squadron’s helicopters were ear- missions; more than 200 wounded was a two-seat, single-engine aircraft marked to conduct emergency res- men were flown out, most of that was already familiar to every cues during carrier-borne air oper- whom would have died without helicopter pilot because they had ations. On 12 December, the first speedy medical assistance. All of learned to fly helicopters using elements of the squadron (includ- this, of course, could not have Bell-made trainers at Lakehurst and ing two helicopters) began to back been possible without the out- Quantico. These small “fishbowls” load on board LST Q082 for imme- standing support of the tireless (so called due to their prominent diate transportation to Hungnam, ground crews aided by Mr. Harold plexiglass bubble canopies) which would then be followed by Nachlin, the much-respected civil- mounted two evacuation pods, a seaborne redeployment to ian technical representative from one on each side of the fuselage. Pusan. Seven helicopters remained Sikorsky Aircraft. As impressive as This handy configuration made the behind until additional ship spaces these achievements were, however, Bells much better adapted for could be found. On 17 December, the Chosin campaign once again medical evacuation than the vener- three HO3Ss flew from their tem- pointed out the inadequacy of the able Sikorskys. Unfortunately, their porary home on the beach at HO3S as a military aircraft. A more relatively underpowered engines Wonsan to the battleship Missouri effective medical evacuation plat- were unsuited for high-altitude, (BB 63) and then each trans- form was desperately needed, as cold-weather operations, so they shipped to three different carriers was a viable transport helicopter. were kept in reserve until the (the Leyte [CV 32], Princeton [CV Fortunately, each of these was in Marines returned to Pusan. Most of 37], and Philippine Sea [CV 47]) for the pipeline and would soon see the older HTL-3s were assigned to duty as standby plane guards, a combat service. headquarters or maintenance fourth HO3S served the heavy squadrons while all of the newer cruiser St. Paul (CA 73). Three Pohang to the Punchbowl HTL-4s went to VMO-6. The plan additional helicopters embarked was to gradually replace the HO3S- on board the Missouri late in the The unexpected Communist 1s as HTL-4s became available. On day. Enroute, Lieutenant Colonel Winter Offensive initiated the 28 December 1950, three HTL-4s, Richard W. Wyczawski, commander longest retreat in American mili- two HTL-3s, and another HO3S-1 of Marine Fighter Squadron 212, tary history. While X Corps pulled joined the ranks of VMO-6. First was charged with overseeing the back from northeast Korea, the Lieutenant John L. Scott flew the movement of VMO-6’s “lost Eighth Army fell back more than first operational mission with an sheep” during the voyage to 600 miles before halting south of HTL-4 on 2 January 1951. As the Pusan. They were successively Seoul. During the next eight New Year dawned, VMO-6 mus-

33 VMO-6 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov52 Bell HTL

hanks to the opening credits of the long-running “goldfish bowl” cabin canopy that allowed all-round television series “M*A*S*H,” a helicopter deliver- vision. The HTL-4’s squat configuration and skids Ting wounded men to a field hospital remains one allowed it to land in rough terrain while the inclusion of of the most enduring images of the Korean conflict. The two exterior stretcher pods made it the preferred aircraft aircraft featured on that show was a Bell Model-47, the for field evacuations of seriously wounded men. same type flown by the Marines under the designation Unfortunately, it had an unreliable engine and a notori- HTL and by the Army and Air Force as the H-13. ously weak electrical system that together required The Model-47 first flew in 1946, was granted the first inordinate maintenance time while its limited fuel sup- ever U.S. commercial helicopter license in 1947, and ply severely reduced the helicopter’s combat radius. remained in production for almost 30 years. Military Several generations of naval aviators learned to fly versions saw extensive service in both Korea and using HTL trainers, and the Bureau of Aeronautics even- Vietnam, and several generations of naval aviation heli- tually purchased more than 200 HTLs, the last of which copter pilots learned to fly using HTLs. Early model were still regularly flying more than two decades after the HTL-2 trainers used at Lakehurst Naval Air Station, New first one took to the air. Advanced versions of the HTL Jersey, mounted wheels instead of skids and were cov- developed into the UH-1 Huey and AH-1 Cobra, the ered in fabric when the first Marine trainees learned to utility and attack helicopters that arm today’s Fleet fly rotary-wing aircraft. The Chief of Naval Operations Marine Forces. designated the HTL as the prospective observation helicopter in 1949. The press of combat operations in Aircraft Data Korea, particularly the need for a more suitable aerial Manufacturer: Bell Aircraft Company medical evacuation platform than the HO3S, led to a mas- Power Plant: 200 hp Franklin O-335-5 sive influx of HTL-4s to Marine Observation Squadron 6 Dimensions: Length, 41’5”; height, 9’ 2”; rotor, 35’ two at the end of 1950. blade with stabilizer The unique technical feature of all Bell helicopters was Performance: Cruising speed, 60 mph; ceiling, range, 150 a two-bladed rotor and stabilizer system that reduced fly- miles ing weight without harming performance, and the Lift: Pilot plus two passengers or two externally mount- unique visual feature of the HTL was its clear Plexiglas ed stretchers

34 also made. Concurrently, plans to meet with the new Eighth Army were being formulated for the commander, Lieutenant General Marines to move about 70 miles Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, on 30 northeast to secure the X Corps December 1950 at Kyongju. They eastern flank by conducting made it on time despite the har- antiguerrilla operations near the rowing flight conditions. On 8 coastal village of Pohang. January 1951, General Smith was Helicopters proved invaluable summoned to a commander’s con- for liaison work even before the ference at Taegu. Dense fog 1st Marine Division moved to Po- grounded all fixed-wing aircraft, hang. Unfortunately, poor weather so Smith boarded Lieutenant often hampered flying conditions. Lueddeke’s HO3S for the flight. General Smith had several hair- Lueddeke followed some dimly raising encounters en-route to visible railroad tracks at about 400 planning conferences, but he feet, twice having to suddenly National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130600 always arrived on time. Two swerve to avoid mountainsides Capt George B. Farish, a helicopter HO3S-1s were tossed about by along the way. Once, the visibility pilot with VMO-6, stands by his Bell high winds as they carried General was so reduced that Lueddeke had HTL. Farish, by late 1950, had partic- Smith’s forward command group to put the plane down in a rice ipated in more than 100 combat missions and was responsible for the One of the little noted, but important missions performed by VMO-6 helicopters evacuation of more than 55 seriously was laying telephone wire between frontline positions. Here, a squadron wounded United Nations troops. ground crewman loads wire spools onto a HTL-4 flown by Capt James R. O’Moore. tered 13 helicopters and nine OY Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131086 observation aircraft. An influx of fresh faces was a welcome sight as well because, according to Captain Gene Morrison, “the old hands . . . were . . . pretty tired” after six- months of grueling combat duty. Just as with the ground units, a significant personnel change was underway. The Regulars were giving way to recalled reservists. By the end of January 1951, the number of Reserve pilots in VMO-6 equaled the number of Regulars. The 1st Marine Division spent a month recuperating throughout the uneventful respite at the Masan Bean Patch. During that time, VMO-6 operated from an airstrip near the waterfront. A maintenance detachment including four officers and 11 enlisted men moved from Korea to Itami Air Base in Japan to prepare the growing fleet of arriving helicopters for combat service. Most helicopter missions at Masan were utility and liaison flights, although occasional aerial reconnaissance and familiarization flights were

35 paddy; Smith lit his pipe and made W. McElroy, USNR, the comman- small talk while waiting to resume der of the hospital ship Consola- his journey. Not long thereafter, tion (AH 15): “tests . . . conclusive- the pair took to the air once again; ly proved the superiority of [heli- this time using roadside telephone copters for] embarking and evacu- posts to guide them. ating patients to and from the ship. In early 1951, the 1st Marine There was less handling in that Division rooted out remnants of a patients were moved directly from North Korean division that had airstrip to ship in one short hop, infiltrated the region surrounding thereby eliminating . . . long and Pohang and threatened X Corps rough stages by boat and ambu- headquarters at Taegu. Dubbed lance [and] ‘choppers’ [could] oper- the “Pohang Guerrilla Hunt,” the ate when seas were too rough for campaign sought to secure this boat handling.” When the Con- area as it held the only usable port solation returned stateside for an on Korea’s southeastern coast, the overhaul in July, a helicopter-land- main supply route for east-central ing platform designed by Marine Korea, and three vital airfields. Major Stanley V. Titterud was The VMO-6 ground support ele- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131826 added and Marine pilots instructed ments moved from Masan to Capt Clarence W. Parkins points out the ship’s company in proper land- Pohang by air, truck convoy, and the spot where he was forced to crash ing procedures. Upon return her to land his helicopter in the water during ship beginning on 13 January Korean waters, a pair of Sikorsky H- a test flight. Parkins later became 1951. The move was complete by VMO-6’s acting commander. 19 (U.S. Air Force designation for 16 February. Pohang’s mountain- the HRS) search and rescue heli- ous and forested terrain hid the er scale in Vietnam more than a copters were stationed permanent- enemy who quickly broke up into decade later. ly on board the Consolation to small groups when the Marines The most notable helicopter carry out medical evacuation arrived. The solution was satura- incident of the guerrilla hunt flights. U.S. Army aircraft eventual- tion patrolling. The Marines sent occurred when First Lieutenant ly replaced these Air Force heli- out fire-team and squad-sized John Scott flew the first night med- copters. Operations became so patrols operating from platoon- ical evacuation by a Bell heli- smooth that it was not unusual for and company-bases to flush out copter. There were several other a litter case to be off the helicopter enemy stragglers. Helicopters were nerve-wracking experiences as and on the way to the emergency used for observation, reconnais- well. On 27 January, for example, room within a minute or less. sance, laying wire, command and an HTL-4 flown by Captain Harold Eventually, all hospital ships were control, medical evacuations, re- G. McRay caught a skid on a low- similarly outfitted with landing supply of isolated small units, and strung cable and crashed while platforms. There is no definitive transportation of fire teams to attempting to takeoff from An- tally as to how many seriously remote hilltops. The guerrillas dong. The aircraft was wrecked wounded men were saved due to were driven underground by but neither the pilot nor his pas- the swift treatment afforded by the relentless Marine pressure, but not senger, Brigadier General Lewis B. helicopters of all Services, but decisively defeated. In the words “Chesty” Puller, who had been most estimates reach well into the of the official history: “In retro- “frocked” to this rank the night hundreds. spect, had [a full] squadron of heli- before, were injured. On 1 February, Captain Gene copters been available . . . its quick The helicopters of VMO-6 evac- Morrison made a daring night lift . . . increased mobility and sur- uated 59 men, most from the 7th landing on the deck of the Con- veillance would have made quite a Marines at Topyong-dong, be- solation. The next day a similar difference in the conduct of tween 25 and 31 January. evacuation flight to the Consola- action.” Unrealized at the time, the Helicopter evacuations directly to tion almost ended in tragedy when use of helicopters at Pohang was hospital ships became routine a delirious patient became so vio- actually a foretaste of the methods operations. The advantages of this lent that Captain Clarence W. that would be used by the U.S. time-saving and life-saving method Parkins had to make an unsched- Marines and Army on a much larg- were enumerated by Captain John uled landing so he and the corps-

36 man on board could subdue and bind the man. Parkins then resumed the mercy flight. From Pohang, the Marines were tapped to lead IX Corps up the center of the peninsula during a series of limited objective attacks, Operations Killer, Ripper, and Rugged, collectively called the “Ridgway Offensives.” These successive attacks, which began in late February and continued throughout March and April, gradually pushed the Communists out of the Som River Valley and back above the Hwachon Reservoir. During that time, VMO-6 followed in trail of the advance, successively moving forward from Pohang to Chung-ju, Wonju, Hongchon, and Chungchon, only to move back again when the Chinese mounted their spring offensives. The Marines jumped off on 21 February, but traffic congestion delayed the arrival of Marine assault troops and hampered command and control. Luckily, Gen- eral Smith had the use of a helicopter and was able to communi- cate directly with his subordinates and be present to observe the initial attack. In the words of Marine Corps historian Lynn Montross: “Only the helicopter . . . enabled General Smith to solve his time and space problems prior to Operation Killer. The division was required to move 150 miles by road and rail from Pohang to the objective area near Wonju in central use during his time at IX Corps. March, two Marine helicopters Korea, with only one road being As he later explained: “at the flown by Captain Norman C. available for the last 30 miles.” Corps level the helicopter was Ewers and First Lieutenant Robert A. Three days later, Marine Gen- even more essential for command Strong were called out to conduct eral Smith was hurriedly sum- purposes than at the division a search and rescue mission for an moned to the IX Corps advanced level.” Air Force C-119 Flying Boxcar that command post to take command Just as before, although not an had gone down behind enemy after the commanding general official task for observation lines. They found the site, set died of a heart attack. This battle- squadrons, combat search and res- down, picked up three injured field promotion, however, was cue missions remained a high pri- crewmen, and recovered the body only temporary until a more senior ority. Captain Morrison picked up a of a fourth airman. The impact of Army general arrived. Smith com- Marine fighter pilot downed near helicopters on operations in Korea mandeered a Marine helicopter to Song-gol on 12 March. On 27 was such that by that time this dar-

37 ing mission that would once have change for VMO-6. Major Gotts- Philip K. Mackert took off to garnered stateside headlines, had chalk departed on the last day of search for a lost aircraft with the become routine. March and the officer-in-charge help of a flight of Marine Corsairs. Between 1 January and 30 helicopter section, Captain Clar- They were unable to locate that March, VMO-6 evacuated 539 ence W. Parkins, became the acting pilot and one of the Corsair escorts wounded Marines (60 in January, 99 squadron commander until the was shot down. O’Moore set his in February, and 370 in March). arrival of Major David W. Mc- HO3S down, then he and Mackert The helicopter section was ex- Farland who would command the rushed over to try to save the pilot tremely fortunate; it lost only two squadron for the next six months. but it was too late. Later that day, aircraft (General Puller’s HTL-4 The squadron at that time num- Captain Valdemar Schmidt, Jr.’s and an HO3S-1 lost to a takeoff bered 28 officers and 125 enlisted HO3S-1 was brought down by incident on 12 March) and suf- men with nine OY observation air- enemy fire during a rescue mission fered no one killed in action. craft, five HO3S-1s, and six HTL-4s. about 20 miles behind enemy Unfortunately, the month of April The 13th of April was a busy lines. Several hits from small arms was a tough one; three helicopters day for helicopter search and res- fire caused a loss of power and would be lost during heavy fighting. cue. First, Captain James R. control as the helicopter made its April began with a command O’Moore and Technical Sergeant final approach. He crash landed in

As commanding officer of VMO-6, Maj David W. artillery accuracy, the mere presence of an OY overhead McFarland initiated night aerial observation flights by OY would often silence enemy artillery. planes. Instead of the intended improvement in Marine National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131464

38 hilly terrain and his aircraft rolled the Naktong bulge or the Chosin uations in almost 10 hours of flying; over upon impact. Schmidt suf- Reservoir. The division suffered First Lieutenant George A. Eaton fered only minor injuries, but his about 500 casualties in three days was a close second with 16 men passenger, Corporal Robert Sarvia fighting. brought out. The next day an HTL- wrenched his leg, cut his hand, The last days of April found the 4 was lost to enemy fire when First and went into shock. American helicopters of VMO-6 busily evac- Lieutenant Robert E. Mathewson aircraft circling above kept the uating wounded men from dawn was shot out of the sky as he enemy at bay with strafing runs until dusk in an all-hands effort attempted a medical evacuation. until helicopter pilot Captain until the Marines reached the No Enemy fire hit the engine, instru- Frank E. Wilson arrived on the Name Line. At about 0600 on the ment pedestal, and tail sections scene. Wilson picked up the two 23d, all helicopters were airborne rendering Mathewson’s aircraft Marines in addition to the Air and most continued operations uncontrollable as he hovered over Force pilot they had came after throughout the day with 36 indi- the air panels set out to mark the and then made his precarious way vidual flights made (15 by HO3S-1s landing zone. Mathewson crash- back in the dark, flying an over- and 21 by HTL-4s). Fifty wounded landed but was uninjured. loaded helicopter without naviga- Marines were evacuated. Captain Lieutenant John Scott, who set a tional aids. Jeeps, trucks, and Dwain L. Redalen logged 18 evac- record with 18 evacuations in one flares lit the field for Wilson’s Capt Norman G. Ewers receives word that a helicopter is needed in the forward returning aircraft. area for a reconnaissance mission. During daylight hours VMO-6 pilots stood by Not every mission had a happy with elements of the 1st Marine Division, maintaining constant contact with tac- ending. Sometimes, despite great tical air controllers by field telephone. effort on the part of helicopter National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A131065 pilots, a rescue could not be made. On 14 April, Captain Gene Morrison made three attempts to pick up a downed pilot, but his HO3S was turned away by enemy fire each time. Captain Norman Ewers then tried, but he took so many hits he had to return to base empty handed as well. Plans were made to rig a stretcher to lift the pilot out the next morning, but inclement weather intervened. When OY aircraft flying over the target area could not locate the man, the helicopter rescue was scrubbed. On the night of 22 April, the Chinese mounted their long expected Fifth Phase Offensive. When a South Korean unit on the Marines’ left flank broke and ran, the 1st Marine Division pulled back and formed a semi-circle on the high ground to defend several vital river crossings. The bitter fighting, collectively known as the battle of Horseshoe Ridge, was marked by fierce hand-to-hand combat and several last ditch defensive stands by isolated units that equaled the combat intensity at

39 Frank E. Wilson lost control of his HTL-4 when a crewman jumped out of the hovering aircraft during an attempted rescue. Captain Frank G. Parks was credited with saving several lives by delivering whole blood in darkness on 29 August despite the fact his helicopter had no lit instrumentation, no landing lights, and no homing locator. When peace talks broke down in September, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, USA, commander of the Eighth Army since mid- April, mounted a series of limited attacks intended as much to pressure the Communists back to the peace table as to secure dominating terrain just north of the Kansas National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132015 Line. The Marine sector featured a 1stLt Joseph C. Gardiner, left, an HO3S-1 pilot with VMO-6, is awarded a Navy volcanic depression known as the Commendation Ribbon and a pair of gold stars denoting second and third Punchbowl. Its capture was a awards of the Air Medal for combat actions during the Inchon-Seoul campaign. bloody three-week slugfest fought Marine helicopters played an important role in the drive inland by providing trans- over nearly impassable roadless portation, medical evacuation, and visual reconnaissance for the 1st Marine mountain terrain, so helicopters Division. were much in demand. Marine day, tried to fly in despite the dan- Communists who were “bugging pilots were at risk as they coura- ger, but was waved off by out.” By the end of June, the geously defied enemy fire on their Mathewson who then picked up a United Nations Command was missions of mercy. The HO3 and rifle and temporarily joined the once again about to enter North HTL helicopters delivered small infantry. His crippled aircraft was Korea. At that point, the Com- loads of medicine, ammunition, destroyed by demolitions before munists called for a cessation of and radio batteries to the front and the Marines departed. Thirty-two offensive actions as a prelude to then brought out 541 severely helicopter missions were flown, peace talks. The United Nations wounded men. Another frequent and about another 50 seriously accepted this condition, and the mission was the delivery of whole wounded were evacuated by fighting forces of both sides tem- blood to forward-deployed Med- Mathewson’s fellow pilots. porarily settled down along a line ical Companies A and E of the 1st The United Nations Command not far from the original pre-war Medical Battalion. briefly regrouped behind the No border between the two Koreas. On 16 September the light heli- Name Line, repelled a second During August, VMO-6 operat- copters of VMO-6 evacuated 85 Communist offensive, then once ed from Songjong until the 28th, men. First Lieutenant Joseph again set off north—this time then moved to Sohung. The month Gardiner led the pack with 17 heading the Kansas Line along the saw several rescue missions. First medical evacuations. Major Ed- 38th Parallel. Non-stop fighting Lieutenant Joseph C. Gardiner, Jr., ward L. Barker’s HTL was hit by had exhausted the enemy and his picked up a downed Marine fight- enemy artillery as he tried to lift forces were seriously depleted er pilot on 12 August. On 28 out a pair of wounded Marines. He after suffering grievous losses in August, Major Kenneth C. Smedley escaped without injury, but one of the recently concluded spring used his HTL-4 to pull two com- his passengers succumbed to his offensive. The desperation of the munications men stranded on a wounds before reaching medical enemy was evident as unprece- small island in the middle of a sanctuary. The following day, dented numbers of them began to rapidly rising river out of harm’s Captain William G. Carter’s HTL-4 surrender. This time it was the way. That same day, Captain crashed while conducting an

40 emergency medical evacuation. the helicopter was here to stay, immediate post-war period, then Ground personnel attempting to but thus far in the war the “whirly- gained practical experience in assist the landing on rough terrain birds” had not yet been used for their use at Quantico after his grabbed the helicopter’s skids but their proposed main missions and return from China in the late inadvertently tipped the aircraft original raison d’etre: vertical en- 1940s. Both men were known causing it to crash. The aircraft velopment and assault support. throughout the Corps as innova- was lost and the pilot suffered This was due to the inadequate lift tors and visionaries, but they also non-threatening injuries. Captain of the machines currently avail- garnered reputations for thorough Gilbert R. Templeton’s HO3S-1 able, but that was about to change planning and meticulous execu- was hit by enemy fire during a as the war entered its second year. tion of those plans. In retrospect, it resupply mission on 21 Septem- was clear that HMR-161 and the ber; Templeton was able to return Arrival of HMR-161 1st Marine Division formed a per- to base for repairs, but the mission fect match. had to be scrubbed. Major Ken- Marine Transport Helicopter Plans to create transport heli- neth C. Smedley, the squadron’s Squadron 161 (HMR-161) was the copter squadrons had been on the executive officer, crashed when first transport helicopter squadron board well before the outbreak of his HO3S-1 lost hover and set in history. It was also the first full the Korean War. In fact, early post- down hard on uneven ground. helicopter squadron committed to war planners envisioned a Marine When the plane began to slip over combat. Mounted in brand new helicopter aircraft wing comprising the steep cliff, Smedley had to Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopters, HMR- 10 squadrons with 24 helicopters intentionally roll the helicopter on 161 arrived in Korea in early each. The proposed machines its side to stop its descent. Neither September 1951 and was soon should be able to carry 15-20 men he nor his passenger was injured, testing new operational methods or 4,000 pounds of cargo. This was but the helicopter was wrecked. under actual combat conditions, a no small order because that number The fighting for the Punchbowl little more than one year after of aircraft just about equaled the lasted until late September. After Brigadier General Edward Craig’s entire American helicopter pro- that, both sides settled down and original recommendation that such duction to that time and no existing began to dig in. The capture of the a squadron be sent into combat. helicopter could come close to lift- Punchbowl marked the last major The squadron’s arrival at that par- ing the specified number of troops offensive action by the Marines in ticular juncture in the war was for- or amount cargo. The main sticking Korea. tuitous because the 1st Marine points were lack of funds, a ceiling As the first year of the Korean Division, then slogging its way on aircraft procurement, and— War came to a close there could be north against stubborn Communist most importantly—lack of a suit- little doubt that the helicopter was resistance in the mountains of able aircraft. The demands of the the most important tactical innova- east-central Korea, was led by two Korean War loosened up funding tion to date. The plucky little aircraft early and very influential propo- and virtually eliminated aircraft had proven themselves adaptable, nents of helicopters—division procurement restrictions. Thus, the versatile, and survivable. The abil- commander Major General Gerald only remaining roadblock became ity of the helicopter to traverse dif- C. Thomas and his chief of staff the machines themselves. ficult terrain, to land in tight spots, Colonel Victor H. Krulak. Both Long-range plans in the late and to rapidly scout unfamiliar ter- Marines were plank holders in the 1940s called for the creation of up ritory made it the preferred mode of helicopter program; from Wash- to six transport helicopter squad- transportation for generals and ington, D.C., and Quantico, Vir- rons by the mid-1950s. This colonels; downed pilots could ginia, they pushed for adoption of leisurely pace was driven as much look forward to being hoisted out rotary-winged aircraft and created a by technology as by anything else. of the freezing water or grabbed up test-bed squadron immediately The Marines wanted a reliable, from behind enemy lines with a after the war. Krulak helped write high-performance, heavy-lift heli- certainty never before experi- initial helicopter doctrine and copter to carry cohesive tactical enced; and almost 2,000 men had drew up many of the first opera- units ashore from escort carriers been lifted to hospitals with in a tional plans used by HMX-1, while and then rapidly build up supplies few hours of being wounded, a Thomas pushed for expanded within the beachhead. The problem factor that greatly increased sur- helicopter development at Head- was the machines of the day were vival rates. There was little doubt quarters Marine Corps in the too limited in range, lift, and

41 National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-433339 Sikorsky HRS-1 he HRS transport helicopter was the military ver- HTL. The HRS also mounted a drop hook to carry exter- sion of the Sikorsky S-55 commercial aircraft. It fea- nal loads under the cabin. The main shortfalls of the HRS Ttured the familiar Sikorsky design signatures, a were that the machine was underpowered and mechan- single overhead main rotor and a small anti-torque rotor ical failures required them to be grounded on several on the tail boom. Although many of its components occasions. No Marine HRSs were lost to enemy fire, but were simply enlarged versions of similar ones found in several crashed while hovering and at least two went the HO3S, the HRS did not look much like the Marines’ down in mid-air due to engine failure. earliest observation helicopter. It was much larger, its The HRS was a great step forward, but it was not the cargo space included seats for eight passengers, the transport helicopter Marine planners envisioned. They two-seat cockpit was located high on the fuselage and set wanted an aircraft that could carry 15 or more men to farther back than the HO3S, and the engine was mount- ensure unit integrity during assaults and generating ed low on the front of the aircraft rather than high amid- enough lift to carry most division equipment. The main ships. Although initially selected as only an interim problem with the HRS was lifting power. Although rated model until a larger heavy-lift helicopter became available, for eight passengers, in the harsh reality of the Korean the Navy Department eventually purchased 235 variants mountains the HRS could only carry about six men—only of the S-55. The U.S. Army and Air Force flew similar mod- four if they were fully combat loaded. Both Igor els as H-19s, and the Coast Guard variant was the HO4S- Sikorsky and Frank Piasecki worked feverishly to deliv- 3G. er a more capable aircraft, but that advance would have The Marine Corps turned to the Sikorsky S-55 after its to wait until the development of a practical turbine heli- first choice, the Piasecki H-16, outgrew the ability to copter engine. operate from small escort carriers—foreseen as the The first batch of Marine HRS-1s included 60 transport helicopter’s primary mission. The Navy was machines and the second order of HRS-2s mustered 91, already looking at one version of the S-55; an antisub- the final version (HRS-3) included 89 more. Only the first marine variant designated the HO4S. There was no obvi- two variants saw action in Korea, but some HRS-3s were ous external difference between the HRS and the HO4S. still in the Marine inventory when their designation was This was because the main difference was each respec- changed to the CH-19E in accordance with the tive aircraft’s mission. The Marine transport helicopter did Department of Defense unified designation system in away with mine detection equipment but mounted 1962. troop seats and had self-sealing fuel tanks. The most Aircraft Data innovative feature of the S-55 was its engine placement. Manufacturer: Sikorsky Aircraft Division of United Aircraft It was set low in the helicopter’s nose. A drive shaft ran Corporation up through the back of the cockpit to provide power to Type: Transport helicopter the three-bladed overhead main rotor. The engine place- Accommodation: Ten-places (two crew and eight passengers) ment made it easy to reach, cutting maintenance time. Power Plant: One 600 hp Pratt & Whitney R-1340-57 That configuration also eliminated critical center-of- Cruising speed: 80 mph gravity problems that plagued both the HO3S and the Payload: 1,050 pounds

42 avionics. Frank Piasecki’s tandem requirements. A Marine assault assigned to the 1st Marine Aircraft rotor helicopters seemed to offer transport helicopter, designated Wing; the middle number “6” was the best potential. However, the the HRS, was created by eliminating adopted because the highest fixed- development of an improved ver- the antisubmarine warfare suites wing designator to that time had sion of the Flying Banana was tak- and then adding self-sealing fuel been “5”; and the last “1” indicated ing too long, and its projected size tanks and placing troop seats in it was the first squadron formed, was not compatible with escort the cargo bay. An initial order for 40 thus the new squadron became carrier deck space. The Marines, HRS-1s was sent to Sikorsky HMR-161. The commanding offi- therefore, reluctantly opted to go Aircraft in July 1950. The “interim” cer was Lieutenant Colonel with an interim transport heli- tag, however, may have been pre- George W. Herring, the former copter until a more capable air- mature. Every U.S. Armed Service executive officer of HMX-1. A mix craft became a reality. The and many of our allies eventually of regulars and reservists populat- machine they chose was a variant used the S-55 (designated H-19 by ed the new transport helicopter of the Sikorsky model S-55, which the Army and Air Force), and 235 squadron. Most of the pilots, like was already in naval service as the HO4S/HRS variants entered naval the squadron’s executive officer HO4S. The HO4S featured the service over the next decade. Major William P. Mitchell, had standard Sikorsky frame: a single On 15 January 1951, the first been fixed-wing pilots in the overhead rotor with a tail-mounted Marine transport squadron was Pacific. Lieutenant Colonel Her- anti-torque rotor. Many of its com- formed at Marine Corps Air Station ring, however, had received the ponents were little more than larg- El Toro. The unit tentatively was Navy Cross as a Marine raider er versions of those of the HO3S, designated HMR-1 (“H” for heli- before receiving his wings. While but a front-mounted engine great- copter, “M” for Marine, “R” for the mix of regular and reserve ly enhanced ease of maintenance transport, and “1” for first), but pilots was about equal, most of the and in-flight stability. Luckily, the that name was changed before the squadron’s enlisted personnel antisubmarine warfare HO4S heli- squadron became operational. were reservists. The squadron copter required only minor modifi- The new squadron was given the trained at the Navy’s former cations to meet Marine Corps prefix “1” because it would be lighter-than-air base located at

In July 1951, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 would be used in modern warfare as envisioned by the staged a helicopter demonstration for the press at Camp Marine Corps. Pendleton, California. Its purpose was to show how helicopters Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection

43 the efforts of Major General Thomas and Colonel Krulak who actively pushed to speed the pace of getting transport helicopters into the combat zone. Thomas and Krulak were well aware of the technical limitations of the HRS-1 and the demands of Korea’s difficult weather and rugged terrain, so they began testing its abilities slowly. The initial helicopter operations were modest ones to test the waters, carefully conducted with little risk. First came a couple of resupply efforts well shielded from enemy observation and direct fire. Next came small-scale troop lifts, eventually increasing to battalion-sized movements. Tac- tical innovations were also on the agenda: counter-guerrilla activities; a night assault; and rapid movement of rocket batteries. It was not long before a division of labor emerged. The smaller aircraft of VMO-6 concentrated on medical evacuations, reconnaissance, observation, and liaison work, while HMR-161 conducted aerial Marine Corps Historical Center Photo Collection resupply, moved troops, and A Marine Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter is loaded on board the escort car- experimented with vertical envel- rier Sitkoh Bay (CVE 86) at San Diego, California, for the journey to Korea. The opment. Although the HRS could arrival of HMR-161 and the HRS-1 would mark a new era in Marine airborne do everything its smaller kin support to ground troops. could, medical evacuations and Tustin, California, not far from control of the 1st Marine Aircraft combat search and rescue were Camp Pendleton while waiting for Wing and the operational control of secondary missions for HMR-161. its new helicopters. The squadron the 1st Marine Division, the same This was possible because of the gradually built up to its full command and control arrange- static nature of the fighting. In fact, strength of 43 officers and 244 ments used by VMO-6. Four days the combat situation eventually enlisted men flying 15 HRS-1 heli- after landing, HMR-161 moved became stable enough that it was copters before receiving orders to from airfield K-1 (Pusan East) to possible to increase emphasis on prepare to ship out for Korea in airfield K-18 (Kangnung Airdrome) amphibious training even though July 1951. in central Korea. From there, the the squadron remained in the The squadron embarked at San advance echelon moved by truck combat zone, a factor that lent ele- Diego on 16 August with the heli- and air to X-83 at Chodo-ri, an ments of realism and urgency to copters and aircrews on board the auxiliary airstrip not far from the the helicopter training program escort carrier Sitkoh Bay (CVE 86) division headquarters, already that were probably not present at and the equipment and a working hosting VMO-6. A rear echelon Quantico, Virginia, or Onslow party on board the civilian- remained at K-18 to conduct Beach, North Carolina. The stun- manned cargo ship Great Falls. advanced maintenance and make ning success in Korea of heli- The squadron arrived at Pusan on complex repairs. copters used for assault support 2 September. In Korea, HMR-161 The fact that HMR-161 was even silenced critics and converted came under the administrative in Korea was at least partially due skeptics. In the words of historian

44 Lynn Montross, with the introduc- tion. General Thomas wisely tion of HMR-161 to Korea “a new decided to use a series of cautious era of military transport had activities until both the helicopter dawned.” crews and ground units got up to The first order of business was to speed, he then pushed an aggres- conduct familiarization flights so sive agenda featuring a wide vari- the pilots could become accus- ety missions that became progres- tomed to the terrain and get a feel sively more complex and that for the tactical and operational thoroughly tested existing opera- conditions at the front. The veteran tional procedures and new theo- pilots of VMO-6’s helicopter ele- ries for helicopter employment. ment indoctrinated the new men The initial combat operation by of HMR-161 in flying conditions HMR-161 took place only two and combat procedures. Also dur- weeks after its arrival. It was ing this time various potential dubbed Operation Windmill to landing zones and flight routes honor the HRS’s unofficial nick- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156740 LtCol George W. Herring, right, com- were identified. While the pilots name, “Flying Windmill.” Mindful of manding officer of HMR-161, is wel- were busy flying, selected mem- the chaotic experiences of the first comed to Korea by LtCol Edward V. bers of the shore party battalion Packard exercise at Camp Lejeune, Finn, the 1st Marine Division’s air became familiar with helicopter North Carolina, and well aware of officer. LtCol Herring commanded the landing and loading procedures the dictates of Phib-31, Krulak and world’s first transport helicopter while planners met to prepare for Thomas ensured the new transport squadron used in combat. the squadron’s first combat opera- helicopters would be carefully MajGen Gerald C. Thomas, center, in command of the 1st and his executive officer, Maj William P. Mitchell. Thomas Marine Division, discusses plans for using the new 10-place was instrumental both in bringing helicopters into the Sikorsky HRS-1 helicopters with the leaders of HMR-161, Marine Corps and getting the first Marine helicopter trans- LtCol George W. Herring, the commanding officer, right, port squadron to Korea in 1951. National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-132027

45 673 toward Hill 749 . . . our supply and evacuation route was four miles of mountainous foot trails. The only way to keep supplies moving . . . was by using Korean Service Corps porters. . . . [They] could not keep up with the logistical demands imposed by heavy casualties and high ammunition expenditure [so] HMR-161 was called in to fill the . . . gap.”

On 12 September, the first combat helicopter support team—a platoon from 1st Shore Party Battalion—attended briefings a- bout proper loading techniques Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A156768 Vital supplies are transferred from a truck to a helicopter for delivery to front- and learned how to transmit land- line troops. Helicopters often offered the only practical way to supply positions ing signals to incoming aircraft. in the trackless mountain terrain near the Punchbowl. The next morning was devoted to arranging supplies into 800-pound integrated into a Marine air-ground formed virtually every mission bundles. The first flight consisting combat team, not just used as a envisioned under operational con- of four helicopters made its way “nice-to-have” aviation adjunct as ditions. The squadron’s main func- about seven miles and then was sometimes the case with tions, however, were to test the deposited the shore party landing VMO-6’s light helicopters. One of practicality of vertical envelop- point section to enlarge and the first steps in this process was to ment and to practice assault support improve the landing zone, direct train elements of the 1st Shore by ferrying troops and delivering landing operations using hand sig- Party Battalion for helicopter oper- supplies to units in the field. The nals, unload arriving helicopters ations. Shore parties had been latter was the most exercised mis- and collect cargo bundles, establish formed during World War II to sion while on the East-Central supply dumps, and load battle handle supplies coming ashore by Front. After moving to western casualties. In mid-afternoon, seven landing craft. The logical exten- Korea in 1952, emphasis eventual- HRS-1s began lifting off with cargo sion of this mission to landing ly shifted to vertical envelopment loads suspended from belly hooks. zones as well as landing beaches using a continuing series of The ingress and egress routes fol- eventually led to the formation of amphibious exercises. These exer- lowed a deep valley that masked specially trained helicopter sup- cises and combat operations were the helicopters from direct enemy port teams. In addition, the ener- the foundation of the sophisticated observation. A restrictive fire plan getic division chief of staff, airmobile tactics and techniques was in effect to avoid friendly fire. Colonel Krulak, held a series of still used by the U.S. Army and The landing zone was marked planning conferences with the 1st Marine Corps of today. with fluorescent panels, but the Marine Division staff even before In September 1951, Marines first incoming aircraft could only HMR-161 was in Korea to draw up were clearing the enemy from a place two of their four wheels on tentative standard operating pro- series of ridges around an extinct the landing platform, which was cedures. Ground units needed to volcano called the Punchbowl. situated on the reverse slope of a learn the intricacies of helicopter The ground battalion commander, steep hill. The first supply heli- movement and their leaders were Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. copter dropped its sling at 1610 encouraged to apply the unique Nihart described the difficult tacti- and then picked up seven battle capabilities of helicopters in tactical cal situation: casualties (two stretcher cases and situations. Before HMR-161 left five walking wounded). Opera- Korea, its helicopters had per- “We were attacking from Hill tion Windmill I comprised 28

46 flights that delivered 18,848 port mission. Spurred on the General Thomas turned to his pounds of supplies and evacuated unquestioned success of Windmill rotary-winged “mule train” for the 74 seriously wounded men. The I as well as the need for heavy for- second time in a week. The formal elapsed time was two hours and 40 tification materials such as sand request was made on the morning minutes with a total of 14.1 flight bags, timber, barbed wire, and of 19 September, approved before hours logged. Lieutenant Colonel land mines, it was decided to con- noon, and underway before night- Nihart’s final evaluation of HMR- duct a follow-on aerial supply fall. Ten HRS-1s delivered more 161’s first combat action in sup- operation, Windmill II. The need to than 12,000 pounds of cargo using port of his battalion was that “they move bulky fortification materials to 16 flights in about one hour. The . . . performed admirably.” a nearly inaccessible position same operational procedures for Continued fierce fighting in the drove operational planning. Sand Windmill I were used: an advance vicinity of the Punchbowl, particu- bags, barbed wire, land mines, helicopter support team was larly for an outcropping dubbed and timber were all too cumber- inserted to operate the landing “the Rock,” led to the second some and heavy to be moved for- zone; the helicopters used covered transport helicopter assault sup- ward by Korean laborers so and concealed routes; and material was delivered using sling- Marine transport helicopter “HR-10,” one of 15 HRS-1s assigned to HMR-161, lands loaded bundles for speed and ease to deliver supplies near the Punchbowl. Detachments from the 1st Air Delivery of handling. The major difference Platoon loaded the supplies while helicopter support teams from the 1st Shore Party was the rapid planning process, Battalion controlled the unloading at forward area landing zones. Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131993 this time preparations took only a few hours instead of several days. Once again, the helicopters of HMR-161 did within a few hours what would have taken the trail- bound South Korean porters several days. With the ability of HMR-161 to deliver supplies fully established, the next evolution was to lift human cargo. This was Operation Summit. The mission was for the 1st Marine Division reconnaissance company to replace a South Korean unit occupying Hill 884, a key observation post located atop a rugged mountain. It was estimat- ed that it would take a Marine rifle company about 15 hours to scale the roadless heights with all resupply thereafter accomplished either by foot or by helicopter. General Thomas decided instead to mount the first combat helicopter troop lift in history. Once again, careful planning and preparation were the hall- marks of this operation. Lieuten- ant Colonel Herring and Major Mitchell coordinated their tactical plans with Major Ephraim Kirby- Smith (the ground unit commander) and worked out the loading plans with First Lieutenant Richard

47 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A156727 A Sikorsky HRS-1 transport helicopter delivers supplies powered winch, and dropped by a remotely controlled hook using “sling loading” techniques. Sling loading employed that allowed helicopters to rapidly deliver vital supplies prepackaged materials that were carried in nets, lifted by a without landing. C. Higgs, representing the division September. H-hour was slated for command and control during embarkation section. Aerial recon- 1000 the next day. ground operations. naissance indicated the landing Several problems soon became Operation Summit was delayed was going to be a tight squeeze. apparent. First was the number of on the morning of 21 September by The only two available spots were troops each helicopter could carry. dense ground fog. Finally, about a located some 300 feet below the The HRS-1 was rated to carry eight half-hour later than expected, the topographical crest about a foot- combat-loaded troops but practical first wave of three helicopters at ball field length apart, and each experience in California and Korea landing field X-83 departed for the was less than 50-feet square with a quickly showed this figure to be 14-mile run to Hill 884. They sheer drop on two sides. Terrain overly optimistic. The actual safe approached their objective flying limited each landing zone to one load was six men carrying only low along a streambed between arrival at a time. Operational plan- small arms and personal equip- the ridgelines and then hovered ning was based upon the dictates of ment. A second problem was over Hill 884’s reverse slope. A Phib-31 and practical experience weather. The threat posed by high security element went hand-over- during the Windmill operations. winds and the possibility of limited hand down knotted ropes and The landing force would consist of visibility or rain influenced opera- then fanned out. Next in were two a reinforced reconnaissance com- tions. An additional problem in the landing site preparation teams. pany. Helicopter support teams mountainous region was reliable About 40 minutes later, idling heli- from the 1st Shore Party Battalion radio communications. The solu- copters at X-83 received word to would control loading and unload- tion was to earmark one helicopter begin loading. Each carried five ing. Landing serials were compiled as a radio relay aircraft, the first riflemen. Two hundred and twen- and rehearsals began on 20 use of a helicopter for air-to-air ty four men, including a heavy

48 machine gun platoon, and almost new chapter in the employment of infantry raids, manning small out- 18,000 pounds of equipment were helicopters”; and X Corps com- posts, and setting up nightly brought in using 12 helicopters mander Major General Clovis E. ambushes. The overriding tactical requiring a total elapsed time of Byers claimed: “Your imaginative concern was a penetration of the about four hours. The bulk of the experiment with this kind of heli- main line of resistance by the equipment and supplies were copter is certain to be of lasting Communists. The war in Korea delivered by suspended cargo value to all the Services.” had once again entered a new nets, which had to be released on phase; but, unlike the others, this top of the mountain because the Holding the Minnesota Line one would last from the fall of hillsides were so steep. This took 1951 until the ceasefire almost two place in full view of the enemy, In late September 1951, the years later. but no helicopters were hit by United Nations Command once The 1st Marine Division was enemy fire. The final touch was again halted offensive operations. assigned 22,800 yards of front the airborne laying of two tele- All across the trans-peninsular along the northern edge of the phone lines in about a quarter frontline troops began digging in. Punchbowl with orders “to orga- hour from Hill 884 to the ground Soon, a series of interconnected nize, construct, and defend” the command post more than eight trenchlines reminiscent of World Minnesota Line. Much of the main miles away. This would have been War I extended from the Sea of line of resistance ran through a daylong task for a wire party on Japan in the east to the Yellow Sea roadless mountains, and the re- foot. The event was headline news in the west, and the U.S. Eighth serve regiment was located almost in the States, and congratulations Army was prohibited from launch- 17 miles to the rear. With his man- from higher headquarters poured ing new attacks. Ground activities power stretched to the limit and in: General Shepherd noted were limited to conducting daily terrain and distance limiting rapid Operation Summit was “a bright foot patrols, mounting tank- overland reaction by reserve

An aerial view of auxiliary airfield X-83 located near Both helicopter squadrons (VMO-6 and HMR-161) shared this Chodo-ri, not far from 1st Marine Division headquarters. forward airfield situated near the Punchbowl. HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51

49 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132540 All veteran World War II fighter pilots, the officers of Marine front left, and the squadron’s executive officer, Maj William Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 pose with their com- P. Mitchell. manding officer, LtCol George W. Herring, kneeling in forces, General Thomas turned to time practice inserts, and night provisional helicopter support HMR-161 to help solve his time indoctrination flights were con- team. This practice lift took about and distance problems. He decided ducted. The helicopter embarka- two hours. During the march out, to test-lift a single rifle company. In tion zone was a dry riverbed however, a rifleman detonated an addition, since most Chinese southeast of Hill 702, and the land- antipersonnel mine, and subse- attacks occurred under cover of ing zone was located near the quent investigation revealed that darkness, this helicopter lift would northwest rim of the Punchbowl. the proposed route to the main take place at night. The straight-line five-mile ingress line of resistance was seeded with Once again careful planning route, however, actually became a unmarked mines. It was decided and detailed rehearsals were con- 13-mile round trip due to tactical to change the ground scheme of ducted. Fortunately, the HRS-1, considerations. maneuver but to keep the heli- unlike the light utility helicopters of A daylight rehearsal on the copter landing zone the same. VMO-6, had flight attitude instru- morning of 27 September got At 1930 on the 27th, Operation ments, albeit not the sophisticated Operation Blackbird off to an Blackbird, the first night combat instrumentation found on fixed- inauspicious start. Six helicopters helicopter troop lift in history, got wing aircraft. Daylight reconnais- lifted more than 200 men into a underway. Departing at three- sance of the operational area, day- 50-by-100-foot area cleared by a minute intervals as they shuttled

50 between the departure and arrival “Night lifts are feasible with pre- the ground and caught fire. The landing zones, each aircraft carried sent equipment [but they] should be flaming helicopter was a total five riflemen. Different altitudes limited to movements within wreck, but both pilots escaped were used for ingress and egress to friendly territory.” Although the without injury. avoid collisions, and running lights operation was a marginal success The ability to rapidly move a were switched on for two minutes that affirmed the possibility of single rifle company had been as aircraft neared the landing emergency night reinforcement established by Operations Summit zones. Only two hours and 20 and intermittent night indoctrina- and Blackbird, so Thomas and minutes were required to lift all tion flights continued, Operation Krulak were eager to see if the 223 men, a movement that would Blackbird was the only major night same principles could be applied to have required at least nine hours by helicopter troop lift conducted in a larger lift. On 9 October, a warn- foot. Korea. ing order for Operation Bumble- Unfortunately, there were many The next day, HMR-161 lost its bee, the lift of an entire rifle bat- problems. Rotor wash blew out first helicopter to an operational talion, was issued. Second Lieu- many of the flare pots that illumi- mishap. A dozen light helicopters tenant Clifford V. Brokaw III, at nated the embarkation area, bat- (HO3S-1s and HTLs) had been that time an assistant operations tery-powered lanterns in the land- previously lost to enemy fire and officer with the 7th Marines, ing zone were inadequate, wind- operational mishaps, but this was recalled that the genesis of the shield glare temporarily blinded the first HRS to go down. The operation actually occurred much the pilots, artillery flashes distract- HRS-1 piloted by Major Charles E. earlier when Colonel Krulak ed the pilots as they wormed their Cornwell and First Lieutenant inquired if helicopters could sup- way through the high mountain Frederick D. Adams came into the port a frontal attack. Colonel ridges, and many in-bound pilots landing zone too low. The heli- Herman Nickerson, the regimental needed radio assistance to find the copter struck the ground, bounced commander replied with a firm landing zone. As the squadron’s into the air, canted on its side los- “no!” While in reserve, however, after action report candidly stated: ing all lift, and then careened to the regiment was tasked to prepare an amphibious contingency HMR-161 pilots and crewmen attend a pre-mission brief for Operation plan including a helicopter lift. Blackbird, the first major night helicopter troop lift. Careful planning and Then, at Krulak’s insistence, that rehearsals were conducted to test the feasibility of night helicopter operations; after action reports noted it was possible in an emergency, but Blackbird was the only plan was adapted to provide for night helilift actually carried out. the heliborne relief of a rifle bat- HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 talion on the main line of resistance. Well aware that such a major helicopter event would become headline news, the division public relations officer asked what the operation was going to be called. Sergeant Roger Hanks, a former University of Texas football player, mindful of the many vocif- erous skeptics who questioned the viability of helicopters for combat duty, quickly piped up: “Bumble- bee because supposedly they can’t fly either.” Colonel Krulak headed the planning group that included Lieutenant Colonel Herring and Major Mitchell from HMR-161, Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards, the rifle battalion commander, and Lieutenant Colonel George G. Pafford, the shore party

51 battalion commander. Bumblebee copter, and order of embarkation and rehearsals were held on 10 was planned as if it were an and debarkation charts were dis- October. amphibious operation. Assign- tributed. Lieutenant Brokaw re- Operation Bumblebee kicked ment and loading tables were called that this time eight troops, off at 1000 on 11 October. Twelve carefully constructed, detailed carrying only small arms and limit- HRS-1 helicopters, working at arrival and departure schedules ed ammunition loads, were about 30 second intervals and fly- were prepared, and helicopter squeezed in and only one pilot ing nap of the earth 15-mile loading and unloading serials flew each helicopter to test if such routes, carried 958 passengers and were established with each person “surge loading” was practical in an more than 11 tons of supplies from assigned a specific spot in the heli- emergency. Familiarization classes airfield X-77 to Hill 702 using 156 individual flights in a total elapsed time of a little more than six hours. Two debarkation zones, Red and White, were used. In each, passenger manifests were used to control loading. The men moved from an assembly area to the “standby” box to the “ready” box and then into the helicopter. If any serial was short, additional passengers were summoned from a nearby “casual” area. At the offload spots shore party personnel “vig- orously assisted the passengers by grasping their arms and starting them away from the aircraft.” The first man out was the team leader and the last man out checked to see if any gear was adrift. Guides furnished by the ground units hurried the debarking men on their way to keep the landing zones clear for the oncoming waves. Bumblebee made the stateside headlines, but more importantly for the Marine Corps it was a giant step toward turning vertical envelopment theory into reality. Four days later, the helicopters of HMR-161 again demonstrated their flexibility by mounting Operation Wedge, a short notice lift of 10 tons of ammunition and the evacuation of two dozen seriously wounded South Korean soldiers. Upon learning that a Republic of Korea unit was surrounded and in need of ammunition and medical assistance, Major Mitchell led six HRS-1 helicopters to the rescue. Captains Albert A. Black and James T. Cotton each made four flights into the embattled landing

52 HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 Troops load on board an HRS-1 at Airfield X-77 during troop lift was actually made to test contingency plans in case Operation Bumblebee in October 1951. The Bumblebee Chinese Communist forces cracked the Minnesota Line. zone. At the end of this ad hoc using knotted ropes for debarkation unable to take such actions and operation IX Corps commander, due to rough terrain. The pilots crashed; two were lost and the Major General Claude F. Feren- had difficulty maintaining station third badly damaged its tail rotor; baugh, USA, personally thanked at the specified landing site. It was fortunately, only one man was each pilot for his effort in support virtually impossible to hover injured. The follow-on salvage of an allied nation. above the ridge because inconsis- operation became another pio- While the main focus of effort tent wind conditions sometimes neering effort. Supervised by was defense of the main line of caused the sudden loss of ground Major Edwin E. Shifflett, and led resistance, several incidents be- effect. When an aircraft is near the by Technical Sergeant Thomas M. hind the lines led to the use of surface a thick layer of air builds up McAuliffe, Marine working parties HMR-161 helicopters for antiguer- between the rotor and the surface. were able to dismantle the injured rilla activities. The first of these, This cushion is known as “ground aircraft so all usable parts and one Operation Bushbeater, used heli- effect,” and it creates additional airframe could be recovered. copter-borne teams to sweep the lift. The loss of ground effect Major Mitchell used his HRS as a Soyang River Valley in late Oc- requires quick action by the pilot, “flying crane” to lift out an entire tober. Unfortunately, the uneven who must either add power or go fuselage secured by ropes and har- terrain and lack of emergency into motion before the helicopter nessed to his cargo hook. Despite power combined to make this plummets. Most pilots were able to the initial setback, the operation operation the most costly in Korea avert a crash by gaining forward continued when more suitable in terms of aircraft lost. Three speed, making an abrupt turn, or sites were used. Forty insertions HRS-1s went down on 22 October diving into the valley. Unfortu- were made and more than 200 while trying to insert ground units nately, three helicopters were men landed. Post-crash investiga-

53 tors determined that similar opera- friendly lines of much-needed troops when an airborne automat- tions should continue but only shelter as winter approached. ic rifle team engaged an enemy after a careful study of the pro- Two helicopters each carried four- position. Although the helicopter posed terrain and evaluation of man destruction teams armed with itself was not armed, this incident existing atmospheric conditions. demolitions, flamethrowers, and was probably the forerunner of Several other heliborne anti- incendiary grenades. Initially, one the helicopter gunship. guerrilla operations followed. ship provided cover while the Operation Switch, the relief and Operation Rabbit Hunt used heli- other hovered and sprayed the tar- replacement of a full regiment at the copters for systematic patrols of get area with a flammable mixture frontlines, was the largest heli- the vast wilderness area behind prior to dropping incendiary copter effort so far. On 11 the main line of resistance. This grenades. Later, both helicopters November, nearly 2,000 combat operation was not unlike those landed and let the destruction loaded troops swapped positions mounted by the 1st Marine teams do their work from the between Hill 884 (unofficially Division to control the An Hoa ground. Operation Houseburner II dubbed “Mount Helicopter” be- Basin southwest of Da Nang in the used four helicopters to destroy cause so many helicopter lifts took Republic of Vietnam 15 years later. 113 dwellings on the last day of place there) and airfield X-83 in Operation Houseburner was the month. This action also fea- about 10 hours. Standard operating mounted on 26 October to deprive tured the first extended firefight procedures included a three-plane enemy irregulars hiding behind between helicopters and ground flight that dropped off the advanced helicopter support team to A helicopter-borne Marine destroys a potential enemy guerrilla hideout during Operation Rabbit Hunt. In addition to troops on the ground, Marine demolition supervise operations at the land- crews on board helicopters sprayed gasoline on huts serving as enemy cover and ing zone, departure teams con- then set them ablaze with phosphorus grenades. trolled operations at X-83, and HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 naval gunfire kept enemy heads down during flight operations. Operation Farewell on 19 De- cember saw the rotation of one battalion for another and marked the last flight by HMR-161 commanding officer Lieutenant Colo- nel George Herring. After that flight, he departed Korea to assume duties as commanding officer of HMX-1 at Quantico. His replacement was that unit’s previous commander, Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon. The holder of an advanced degree in aeronautical engineering, McCutcheon had been a proponent and pioneer of Marine close air support during World War II before learning to fly helicopters. Major Mitchell remained as squadron executive officer. After only two months in the combat, HMR-161 had logged more than 1,200 flight hours comprising more than 1,000 sorties to deliver 150 tons of supplies and carry out 192 medical evacuations. The “flying windmills” of HMR-161 participated in morale building as

54 HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 Col Keith B. McCutcheon, left, shakes the hand LtCol George 161. The squadron’s last troop lift under Herring was W. Herring, the departing commanding officer of HMR- dubbed “Operation Farewell” in his honor. well as tactical operations: they month as squadron commander McCutcheon’s squadron used a delivered large cakes so the front- was the most ambitious helicopter- “flying crane” technique devel- line Marines could celebrate the borne effort thus far; HMR-161 oped by Major Charles E. Cornwell Marine Corps birthday on 10 flew the most missions (820) in a whereby the HRS-1s mounted November; on Thanksgiving they single month so far and logged the underslung nets carrying about brought turkey dinners to the most combat missions (506) in a 850 pounds and controlled from front; a heavy snow storm inter- single month during the entire the cockpit to deliver cargo rather rupted plans for Christmas feasts, war. Three major efforts were than pallets as had been previous- but the arrival of several United launched in January 1952—Mule- ly done. Tentage, stoves, rations, Service Organization entertainers train, Changie-Changie, and fuel oil, and ammunition com- around the new year helped raise Mouse Trap. Each exercised a dif- prised the various loads. Four heli- morale. The New Year also saw ferent capability. Muletrain and copters, operating on a rotating implementation of an additional Changie-Changie were assault basis, were so effective that they duty that would last until the end of support (helicopter-borne resup- actually flew in more cargo than the war. After ice destroyed a ply and troop transport), while could be handled by the shore bridge spanning the Imjin River, Mouse Trap was an exploration of party during the first week of one HRS-1 and its crew were dis- tactical vertical envelopment. January; 219 loads equaling patched on a weeklong rotation to Operation Muletrain (named for a 150,730 pounds were ferried about the United Nations Command popular song of the day) called for 10 miles from the supply dump to advanced headquarters at Munsan- the complete supply of a battalion Mount Helicopter. ni to ferry United Nations peace located on the main line of resis- Operation Changie-Changie delegates to and from Panmunjom. tance for one week. The destination (pidgin Korean-English meaning Colonel McCutcheon’s first full was once again Hill 884. “exchange”) was a troop lift that

55 notable such mission occurred in early February when the Eighth Army-Fifth Air Force Joint Opera- tions Center requested help to bring back a fighter pilot and helicopter crew downed in enemy territory. Two previous attempts had been turned away by the time Major Mitchell’s HRS-1 departed X- 83 for airfield K-50 where it would pick up fighter escorts. Diverted enroute, the helicopter landed on the cruiser Rochester (CA 124) for a pre-flight brief before setting out. Fighter planes strafed the valley and surrounding ridgelines as the helicopter neared the crash site, but no activity was spotted so Mitchell reluctantly aborted the mission. The techniques used on National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A159212 this mission became standard Marines in Korea for the first time are moved into frontline positions the “mod- operating procedure even though ern way.” Instead of climbing the steep trails, and spending hours to reach the the rescue attempt had come up ridges’ crest, helicopters airlift troops in a matter of minutes. empty. began on 10 January. The essential and was so smooth that three sim- February 1952 was a harbinger of difference between this troop ilar lifts were made by the 17th. trouble on the horizon. Another movement and previous ones was For the most part, HMR-161 relief in place, Operation Rotate, that this time the helicopters flew ceded deep search and rescue was successfully conducted on into company-sized positions operations to VMO-6. The most 24th. That same day, however, located within a few hundred Hot chow is served at the HMR-161 forward operating base near the Punchbowl; yards of the frontline. In addition, after finishing their meal, Marines go through the wash line. Living and work- the 35-man 1st Air Delivery ing conditions were primitive, but the hard-working ground crews carried on. Platoon took over helicopter Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A133622 ground support operations, relieving the hard-pressed 1st Shore Party Battalion of that duty. This realignment of missions was more in line with each unit’s stated missions; First Lieutenant William A. Reavis’ 1st Air Delivery Platoon was thereafter tasked “to prepare and deliver supplies by air, whether by parachute, air freight, or helicopter.” Operation Mouse Trap, conducted from 14 to 17 Jan- uary, tested the ability of Marines to launch a counter-guerrilla reaction operation on short notice. The squadron was not notified until just after midnight to be prepared to mount a two-company lift by mid- morning on the 14th. the operation went off with only minor difficulties

56 were installed in mid-March. After the end of the fighting at the Punchbowl, VMO-6 continued to support the 1st Marine Division flying from Sinchon in the X Corps sector of the East-Central Front. Indicative of the changing roles for light utility helicopters, the squadron listed four HO3S-1s and four HTL-4s in October 1951, but only one HO3S-1 remained on the rolls by March 1952 while the number of HTL-4s had increased to 10. The wisdom of combining helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft within observation squadrons was confirmed by combat experience. A well-defined division of labor between the fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters of VMO-6 had evolved since the early days of the war. The nimble OY were best suited for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and airborne control of close air support while the helicopter niche combined combat HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jan52 search and rescue and medical The Marine metal shop was located at K-18 airdrome near Kangnung in cen- evacuation. Transportation and tral Korea. This major maintenance facility served HMR-161 which was flying from the forward strip X-83 at Chodo-ri, behind the Minnesota Line. administrative flights were divided

Captain John R. Irwin was enroute Sikorsky representative, Louis Plotkin, left, explains the intricacies of an HRS-1 from Seoul to X-83 when he aircraft engine to HMR-161 pilots. Representatives of the Bridgeport, encountered severe vibrations. Af- Connecticut, company accompanied the squadron to Korea not only to assist with ter putting down to locate the technical problems, but also to report on how the aircraft performed in combat. trouble, he was amazed to discov- HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 er the broken remnants of his tail assembly lying in the snow. Four days later, Captain Calvin G. Alston’s HRS-1 began to buck and jerk without warning. Suspecting he had been hit by enemy fire, Alston set down to inspect the damage. Like Irwin, he quickly found that a broken tail assembly was the culprit. Similar accidents outside the combat zone prompting the Chief of Naval Operations to ground all HRS-type aircraft until the problem could be isolated, analyzed, and corrected. The squadron was not able to resume normal operations until after new tail assemblies for each aircraft

57 HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Jul52 In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division moved from the base to A-17 (Yongpu-ni), while the rear echelon’s mainte- Minnesota Line located in central Korea to the Jamestown Line nance facility was moved to A-33 not far from the massive in western Korea. HMR-161 likewise relocated its forward supply base at Ascom City outside the capital of Seoul. about equally between fixed-wing March 1952 the new priorities Among them was Dr. Charles and rotary-wing aircraft. Unfortu- were: evacuation of wounded; Mayo of the famed Mayo Clinic nately, hopes for all-helicopter reconnaissance and observation; who visited units of the 1st observation squadrons still were liaison and transportation; admin- Medical Battalion. Liaison flights considered impractical. As time istrative and resupply flights; and included transportation of the passed, HTL-4s gradually replaced combat search and rescue, in that Commandant of the Marine Corps, the aging HO3s-1s, and by order. The vulnerability of heli- and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, February 1952 the one remaining copters was an early concern, but and IX Corps commanders. The Sikorsky was no longer flying this proved not to be the case as bulk of the administrative and combat missions. The helicopter few helicopters were lost and the resupply flights went for medical section’s priorities gradually number coming back with bullet support; the delivery of fresh changed to reflect the new tactical holes became all too common to whole blood or plasma, medicine, situation as well. Positional war- merit special mention. and medical records. After the fare placed more emphasis on Between October 1951 and frontlines stabilized, very few ground support and administrative March 1952, the helicopter section search and rescue missions were missions while deep combat logged 2,253 total flights (1,277 called for. Only seven such mis- search and rescue had become the combat and 976 non-combat missions were flown between 1 bailiwick of Navy and Air Force sions), including 637 medical October 1951 and 15 March 1952. helicopter detachments. In Sep- evacuations to deliver 1,096 seri- The helicopter section’s only tember 1951, medical evacuation ously wounded men. Most trans- combat casualty during that time and combat search and rescue had portation flights involved bringing occurred when Captain David T. been at the top of the list, but by distinguished visitors to the front. Gooden’s HTL-4 was shot down as

58 it wandered past friendly lines actions of the outpost war includ- of the line were dominated by the during a medical evacuation mis- ed those at “Bunker Hill” in August high ground on the far side of no- sion on 7 February. Neither the 1952, a temporary incursion of the man’s-land held by the Com- pilot nor the helicopter could be main line of resistance at the munists. To make matters worse, recovered due to their location “Hook” in October 1952, tough the Imjin River, with only four behind enemy lines. fighting for positions “Berlin” and crossing points, ran behind the “East Berlin” in early 1953, the main line of resistance. Major Defending the Jamestown Line “Nevada Cities” (Outposts Reno, waterways separated the line at Carson, and Vegas) battles in two points, and a diplomatic With both sides roughly equal March 1953, and the last fight at demilitarized “neutral corridor” in manpower and firepower on “Boulder City” just before the from Munsan-ni to Panmunjom the ground, the frontlines re- armistice in July 1953. divided the defensive zone. The mained unchanged during the Although the generally flat terrain United Kingdom’s 1st Common- winter of 1951-1952. In March, the of western Korea simplified logis- wealth Division anchored the United Nations Command decided tical challenges, the Jamestown Marine flank on the northeast at to realign its forces. The 1st Marine Line was no tactical bargain. the Samichon River, where the Division moved from its positions Terrain and diplomatic conditions 38th Parallel crossed the James- along the Minnesota Line on the prohibited defense in depth and town Line. From there the main East-Central Front to the James- severely hampered the ability of line of resistance generally traced town Line astride the Pyongyang- Marine commanders to maneuver the Imjin for about 10 miles until it Seoul corridor on the western or commit reserve forces in case intersected that river; the main line flank. This move initiated the so- of a Communist breakthrough. then followed the south bank of called “outpost war” which lasted The 35-mile Marine sector was the the Imjin estuary to where the Han from March 1952 until July 1953 longest defensive zone held by River joined the Imjin, and across during which no significant chang- any Eighth Army division. The the Han an isolated defense sector es of territory occurred. The major low-rolling hills on the Marine side was located on the Kimpo Penin- sula. The main line of resistance His predecessor, Maj William G. MacLean, right, welcomes LtCol William T. was extremely vulnerable and had Herring on board as the new commanding officer of VMO-6. A graduate of the Naval Academy, Herring served as the commanding officer of Marine Fighter to be protected by a series of com- Squadron 111 and operations officer of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing during World bat outposts scattered throughout War II. no-man’s-land. The scrub-covered, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A133046 low-lying areas that predominated the Marine sector were subject of year-round enemy observation and flooding each spring. Overall, the Jamestown Line was a tacti- cian’s nightmare. In late March, the 1st Marine Division moved 180 overland miles from the Punchbowl to Munsan-ni, an urban rail junction located near the Imjin River about 30 miles from Seoul. Lieutenant Colonel William T. Herring’s VMO- 6 and Colonel McCutcheon’s HMR- 161 began displacing from Sin- chon in mid-March and had completed their respective moves by the end of the month. Each took up residence at separate landing fields near the 1st Marine Di- vision’s command post. The VMO- 6 airstrip (A-9) was located in the

59 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A134463 A badly wounded Marine receives life-sustaining plasma and dark. Night evacuations were hazardous affairs because will be flown to an advance medical care facility in the early helicopters lacked instrumentation and back lighting. village of Tonggo-ri about three number one priority. During this in June, and they included the first miles south of the division com- time the squadron’s executive offi- routinely scheduled night evacua- mand post. The airfield was quick- cer, Major William G. MacLean, Jr., tions. The normal forward evacua- ly named Bancroft Filed to honor developed a plan to station evacu- tion echelon complement was five the first Marine helicopter pilot ation helicopters, crews, and officers, nine enlisted men, and killed in action. HMR-161’s for- maintenance personnel at the two helicopters. In addition, close ward flight echelon was located at command post of the centrally liaison with American and other Yongpu-ni’s A-17, while its rear located, frontline infantry regiment allied nations’ medical stations and echelon including advanced main- on weeklong rotations. This “for- hospital ships was maintained. tenance personnel was at airfield A- ward evacuation echelon” was on- Other missions performed by 33 (Taejong-ni, a well-developed call around-the-clock and could VMO-6’s helicopter section were airdrome that served the massive reach any part of the frontline liaison flights and visual recon- Eighth Army supply base known within a few minutes, cutting evac- naissance. The former usually as Ascom City, which should not be uation time in half thereby keeping brought important visitors to the confused with airfield K-5 located at severely injured men within what front while the latter flew com- Taejon in south-central Korea). the surgeons called “golden manders along the main line of For the most part, VMO-6 con- minute”—the period during which resistance and offered high alti- tinued flying missions as before immediate treatment could save a tude glimpses into enemy territory. with medical evacuation as its man’s life. These operations began Major General John T. Selden,

60 the commander of the 1st Marine the Han River to the Kimpo more than 115 flight hours with a Division, required that a strong Peninsula. Ironically, Operation total elapsed time of 14 hours, an defensive line be established but Pronto was both the longest dis- all-time high. After the operation, was still nervous because it would tance and the shortest notice heli- Colonel McCutcheon noted: “This be difficult to quickly reinforce the copter-borne troop lift so far. airlift . . . proved that a Marine Jamestown Line. Accordingly, two Colonel McCutcheon was not noti- transport helicopter squadron can existing “fallback” lines, Wyoming fied until about 0210 in the morn- successfully operate as an ‘on call’ and Kansas, were strengthened, ing, yet, the first helicopter lifted off tactical tool.” The operation was and a series of rapid deployment only about three-and-a half hours carried out with only minimal liai- exercises by the division reserve later. The initial wave carried spe- son between flight and ground regiment were planned. Primary cialists from the 1st Air Delivery units and virtually none of the among them were those conducted Platoon to two landing zones. detailed planning previously em- by HMR-161 in the spring and Thereafter, nine helicopters (seven ployed. Helicopter operations, summer of 1952. of them manned by pilots fresh which only a few months earlier The first test of the ability to from the United States) were used. made front-page news in the move across water obstacles was The hour-long round trips were United States, had by that time, Operation Pronto. On 5 April, a almost 60 miles because of flight become routine. 662-man battalion and about restrictions in the vicinity of the An intermittent series of troop 10,000 pounds of supplies were Panmunjom “neutral corridor.” lift exercises were interspersed transported from Munsan across The squadron logged 99 flights in with several tactical and logistical operations over the next year and a half. Pronto was promptly followed by two-day Operation Leapfrog, the helicopter-borne exchange of one South Korean Marine battalion for another on 18 and 19 April. Operation Circus, the lift of a U.S. battalion closed out the month. All operations, except for emergencies, were discontinued on 27 April after the Chief of Naval Operations grounded all HRS-1s due to structural problems. By the middle of May, HMR-161’s helicopters were back in action. Two more short notice troop lifts, Operation Butterfly and Ever Ready, were conducted in June and a third, Operation Nebraska, took place in November. The last such exercise was Operation Crossover II held the following spring. Although combat search and rescue was not a primary mission of HMR-161, one dramatic episode occurred in late May. Two helicopters were dispatched from A- 17 to look for a downed Navy pilot near Hapsu, North Korea. During the airborne search, the HRS-1 flown by Major Dwain L. Lengel and Captain Eugene V.

61 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A134367 LtCol John F. Carey, left, bids farewell to his predecessor as air support advocate in the Pacific and eventually com- commanding officer of HMR-161, Col Keith B. manded all Marines in Vietnam; later he was slated to McCutcheon; both men had previously commanded HMX- become the first active duty Marine aviator to receive a 1 at Quantico. McCutcheon made his reputation as a close fourth star but illness intervened.

Pointer with crew chief Technical Lesak, First Lieutenant Wallace test vertical envelopment concepts Sergeant Carlyle E.J. Gricks on Wessel, and Technical Sergeant as they applied to amphibious board lost flight control due a Elmer DuBrey flew the rescue mis- operations under wartime condi- combination of low speed and sion. It was a complicated pick-up tions. This was not possible at first high altitude. Flying low to the procedure. In order to keep from due to geographic restrictions earth, the helicopter was unable to repeating the previous crash, when the Marines manned the gain enough power to maneuver Captain Lesak had to keep his air- East-Central Front. The move to around a stump. The aircraft craft in motion to stay aloft. This western Korea brought the crashed and no one was seriously required the downed crew to grab Marines close to the sea, but initial injured, but the would-be rescuers a trailing rope ladder as the HRS operational tempo and subsequent now needed to be rescued. The passed overhead. Fortunately, the grounding of the HRS-1s delayed crew quickly moved to a pick up rescue was a success, if not a frus- the opportunity until June. At that location but had to wait almost trating one. time as series of Marine landing two days due to bad weather. One of the primary purposes of exercises (MarLExs) were held at a Squadron mates Captain Robert J. rushing HMR-161 to Korea was to rate of about two each month for

62 the remainder of 1952 with two main problems were the lack of an to support most MarLEx opera- more held the following year. escort carrier and helicopters. tions. In addition, the demands on Although there were minor varia- Untested Marine amphibious doc- HMR-161 prohibited the entire tions in each MarLEx, they generally trine envisioned individual trans- squadron from participating in the followed a similar pattern: a port helicopter squadrons and rifle exercises. detachment of a half dozen HRS-1s battalions embarked on board MarLEx I was held on 10 and 11 from HMR-161 would lift one bat- escort carriers during the move- June with its announced purpose to talion of the division reserve from ment to the amphibious objective gain experience in vertical envel- one small island to a larger one area. Once there, the helicopters opment as part of an amphibious during a simulated amphibious would conduct one portion of the operation. Because no escort carri- assault. The purpose of these exer- ship-to-shore movement then be er was available, the island of cises was twofold. First, tactics and on call to deliver supplies and Sung Bong-do about 40 miles techniques were perfected with evacuate casualties until the southwest of Inchon would stand in each passing exercise as lessons beachhead was secured and oper- for the missing ship. Nearby were learned and assimilated. ations could safely move ashore. Tokchok-to, a five-mile-long island Second, aircraft and ground per- The trouble was that the Navy did with two broad sandy beaches sonnel became familiar with the not have enough carriers or crews located about six miles southeast, standard operating procedures for to implement this policy, and no was selected as the objective. As helicopter-borne operations. The escort carrier was readily available was standard practice, helicopter An HRS-1 helicopter of HMR-161 approaches the escort car- assault in the many landing exercises conducted during the rier Sicily (CVE 118). The Marine transport squadron Korean War. experimented with the newly developed concept of vertical National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A134628

63 1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53 Col Harry N. Shea, right, commanding officer of the 11th Battery, Capt Edwin T. Carlton, Commanding Officer, 1st 4.5- Marines, briefs from left, 1stLt Donald L. Seller, inch Rocket Battery, and LtCol John F. Carey, Commanding Commanding Officer, 1st Air Delivery Platoon, 1stLt Officer, HMR-161, prior to a fire mission in support of William B. Fleming, Executive Officer, 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Korean Marines. support teams descended from miles from Tokchok-to, was used as Five more MarLEx operations were hovering helicopters using rope the simulated carrier. Four instead held in 1952. They were followed ladders to prepare landing zones. of seven aircraft were used to lift by a six-month break, then two Seven aircraft delivered 236 fully 235 men, and the exercise was more amphibious exercises were equipped troops the first day and deemed a success. held in the summer of 1953 before another 236 the following day. The Marines finally got to train the ceasefire took effect. Unfortunately, the exercise did not with an actual aircraft carrier in On 30 July, HMR-161 received a go well. Communications were September. The escort carrier request to launch a humanitarian unsatisfactory, and the time re- Sicily (CVE 118) was available to effort in support of the U.S. Army quired to land troops by helicopter support MarLEx VII. This exercise and South Koreans. More than 600 was “too great in comparison to offered the most realistic test of American soldiers and about 150 the time needed to land troops . . . amphibious doctrine as envisioned Korea civilians had been stranded by boat.” It was decided to use a by planners at Quantico. On 1 and by flash flooding of the Pukkan closer island the next time to 2 September, the bulk of HMR- River. Six Marine helicopters flew to reduce the strain on the heli- 161’s 12 HRS helicopters were the rescue. This spur-of-the-mo- copters and the time in the air. used to lift 964 troops from the ment evacuation was made without MarLEx II was held later that carrier deck to Landing Zones written orders or advanced sched- month. This time Soya-do, two Able and Baker on Tokchok-to. uling. The squadron mounted 182

64 flights over about three hours. The loads were rations, water, ammu- regularly scheduled replacement squadron after action report noted: nition, fortification material, and operations intended “to effect the “The average load was five men fuel. These supplies were carried relief of a unit on the MLR and and gear [but we lifted] as many as internally or suspended below the return the relieved unit to a rear nine small children complete with helicopter frame in wire baskets area as expeditiously as possible,” dogs and chickens . . . in one trip and cargo nets. The distance from using the codename “Silent Red- . . . . The Army and Air Force . . . loading zone to landing was about line.” Silent Redlines were con- marveled at the expeditious way 20 miles, depending upon which ducted at the rate of about one per our helicopters carried out the loading zone was used. The 1st month during the rest of the year, operation.” Service Battalion supplied Loading but were only intermittently used The month of August saw a Zone Able while the 1st Ordnance the following year due to tactical change of command when Lieu- Battalion did so at Loading Zone considerations (the 1st Marine tenant Colonel John F. Carey, yet Baker; air delivery platoon person- Division was either off the line or another veteran of HMX-1, re- nel supervised loading operations heavily engaged). The first of placed Colonel McCutcheon as and shore party personnel un- these began on 11 September with commanding officer of HMR-161. loaded the incoming aircraft. the lift of a Korean Marine battalion. September was the busiest month More than 350,000 pounds of Because these operations were of the war for HMR-161. The cargo and 75 passengers were lift- carried out under enemy observa- squadron flew 1,195 missions. ed despite rainy weather. This tion, if they came under direct fire Included in that total were the effort tripled the output of Opera- squadron aircraft were directed to largest aerial supply operation tion Muletrain, the previously seek landing spots in defilade and thus far, the first of many regularly biggest logistical operation. Op- maintain communications while scheduled helicopter-borne troop eration Haylift was summed up in the ground troops debarked and rotations, the only amphibious a single sentence in the squad-ron sought the best defensive terrain. exercise supported by an aircraft report: “No unusual problems Ten aircraft, each carrying six men carrier, and the tactical lift of a were encountered and the opera- or five men and a crew-served rocket artillery battery. tion progressed smoothly and con- weapon, transported 1,618 troops in The first of two large logistical tinuously throughout.” an overall time of six-and-one-half support operations took place The use of helicopters to rotate hours during Silent Redline I. from 22 to 26 September. Opera- troops between the rear and the By the summer of 1952, the tion Haylift was designed to com- front had become routine by the strategy in Korea had developed pletely support a frontline regi- summer of 1952. So much so that into positional warfare and ment for five days. Included in the the 1st Marine Division initiated artillery began to dominate tactical thinking. Unfortunately, the Chi- Two rocket battery crewmen prepare the launcher for action as an air deliver pla- nese actually began to outgun the toon signalman assigned by HMR-161 to direct incoming cargo-carrying aircraft Americans as a result of massive to the landing site loads a rocket round into the tube. 1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53 Soviet aid that furnished excellent weapons and plenty of ammunition, and in western Korea the enemy controlled the Taedok Mountain spur which gave them superior observation of the United Nations lines. The Marines coun- tered by adopting mobile artillery tactics using multiple gun positions. One innovative solution came about as the result of a cooperative effort between the pilots of HMR-161 and the ar- tillerymen of the 11th Marines. A particularly valuable weapon was the towed multiple rocket launcher. The problem was that these

65 mobile rocker launchers were vulnerable because their back blast kicked up dust and debris that was visible from the Communist side. The rapid insertion of light artillery into defiladed positions followed by a rapid withdrawal, however, would allow the Marines to land, set up, fire a barrage, and then leave before enemy counterbattery fire could pinpoint the target. Experi- ments at Quantico, Virginia, and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, proved the feasibility of lifting a 4.5-inch rocket launcher along with a skeleton crew and a small amount of ammunition in a single load. On 19 August, HMR-161 put this theory into practice during Operation Ripple. Rehearsals in Korea tested new delivery methods using a variety of external HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Dec52 Transport squadron’s “HR-69” helicopter is decked out as Santa Claus to deliv- hooks and release mechanisms, er toys and food on Christmas Day 1952. Although the visionaries at Quantico, but there was some trouble during Virginia, before the Marines received helicopters foresaw almost every possible use the initial lift of the 1st 4.5-inch for rotary-winged aircraft and made up a potential task list, it is doubtful that Rocket Battery. The problems this humanitarian mission appeared on that list. were solved that night and additional operations the following also began receiving Sikorsky XII-52, the last amphibious exer- day went much more smoothly. HRS-2 helicopters. Although a cise of the year; and Operation Colonel Carey was able to recom- newer model, the HRS-2 offered Santa Claus during which heli- mend that helicopters were suit- no significant increase in perfor- copter HR-69 was made up to look able for rocket launcher trans- mance because it used the same like jolly old Saint Nicholas as it portation, and Operation Ripple engine as the HRS-1; the main dif- delivered toys and food to about was followed by several more sim- ferences were that the HRS-2 was 100 orphans adopted by the ilar tactical operations over the about a foot shorter and a few squadron. Also during the month, next few months. These were the inches closer to the ground. Colonel Carey flew out to the only operations in which heli- Operation Nebraska, conducted newly arrived Danish hospital ship copters were directly responsible on the 13th, tested the ability of Jutlandia to test its helicopter- for putting rounds on the target. HMR-161 to move troops from one landing platform and to familiarize As such, they were the distant phase line to another. Ten heli- the crew with helicopter landing forerunners of the “fire base” con- copters lifted one rifle battalion procedures. The cold, damp cept that became a tactical mainstay and a heavy mortar platoon (820 weather and fog continued to in Vietnam. men) in only two-and-one-half interfere with flight operations, but Beginning in October, one heli- hours comprising 169 individual new hangars eased the mainte- copter and a standby crew were flights. nance burden to some degree. assigned to Marine Aircraft Group Activities in December included Although few of the shivering 12 on a rotating basis to provide air- Operations Crossover, the move- mechanics would have believed it sea rescue and administrative ment of a reserve rifle battalion at the time, conditions on the transportation. As a result of heavy from the Wyoming Line to the Jamestown Line were far superior to fighting at the Hook the squadron Kansas Line; Silent Redline III, the those encountered on the East- logged the most medical evacua- by-then standard helicopter-borne Central Front the previous year. tions that month as well, 365. rotation of a frontline battalion by January 1953 witnessed the use During the month, the squadron one from the reserve area; MarLEx of HRS helicopters as “flying squad

66 cars” as they carried members of the and thirty tons per day were HMR-161’s streak of not losing a 1st Military Police Battalion search- required to support both regi- man. On the 12th, a three-plane ing for Communist infiltrators. On ments, but this total was actually flight departed A-33 for Pusan to the 23d, fire was exchanged be- exceeded on the first day. The rendezvous with a carrier that was tween the airborne Military Police unloading time per load was less to take them to Japan. Along the and guerrillas on the ground. than one minute. On 25 February, way the HRS-1 carrying Captain Three enemy troops were killed HMR-161 brought in more than Allen W. Ruggles and Technical while the helicopter suffered only 200 tons, a record. By the third Sergeant Joe L. Brand, Jr., became minor gunfire damage. day, the supply build-up had actu- separated and crashed into the sea February hosted the largest heli- ally surpassed the ability of the about 25 miles south of Pusan. copter supply operation in Korea, ground logisticians to cope with it. The cause was believed to have Operation Haylift II. While Haylift Fortuitously, emergency requests been mechanical failure, but this I the previous September had sup- for ammunition by other units was never confirmed because ported one frontline regiment for lessened the backlog. Ground fog there were no survivors and five days, Haylift II was twice as on the last two days slowed oper- wreckage was never located. ambitious. This time, two frontline ations. Still, the final results were On 15 March, Colonel Owen A. regiments would receive heli- impressive, 1,612,406 pounds lifted Chambers took over HMR-161. copter-transported Class I (ra- without the loss of crew or aircraft. Ten days later, a second HRS-1 tions), III (fuel), IV (construction February also saw records set for went down with three crewmem- materials), and V (ammunition) the number of combat hours (765), bers on board. Major Doil R. Stitzel supplies for five days, from 23 to 27 total flight hours (1,275.5), combat was making a test hop out of February. The planning and exe- flights (575), and total flights Ascom City with mechanics Master cution of Haylift II was similar to its (1,183), and the gross lift of more Sergeant Gilbert N. Caudle, Jr., and forerunner, but on a much larger than two million pounds that Sergeant Richard L. Parsell when scale. And, this one would take month was the largest of the entire their aircraft suddenly lost power, place in much more difficult war for HMR-161. crashed, and burned. All three weather conditions. One hundred Sadly, that month also ended men were lost. Only two major operations were A helicopter from HMR-161 prepares to lift bundled supplies from the 1st Air Delivery Platoon area to frontline troops. The air delivery platoon signalman holds conducted that spring, both were the hook while the other Marine holds the net in a hook-up position. troop lifts from the reserve area to 1st Air Delivery Platoon Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Feb53 the Jamestown Line, Operation Crossover II and Silent Redline VI. On 27 March, all HRS-2 helicopters with more than 200 flight hours were grounded because of rotor blade problems. This was a pre- cautionary move due to stateside incidents, and no HRS-2s in Korea were lost to this cause. Beginning on 26 April, HMR-161 participated in Operation Little Switch, the six-day exchange of prisoners of war. The United Nations released 6,670 North Korean and Chinese prisoners while the Communists returned only 684 captives, including 15 Marines and three Navy corpsmen. From the middle of the month, HMR-161 provided transportation from Freedom Village near Munsan-ni to Panmunjom for various international delegates and

67 American negotiators. During the the Jutlandia, riding at anchor in ed a relief from the rigors of com- actual prisoner exchange, heli- Inchon harbor. Four Marines had to bat, it was not exactly a time of copters stood by to transport the be evacuated. rest and relaxation. The division seriously ill or wounded Marines In May the 1st Marine Division staff ordered HMR-161 to get busy from Panmunjom to one of three came off the line for the first time on the first Marine landing exer- hospital ships, the Consolation since the Masan interlude ended in cise of the New Year (MarLEx I- (AH 15), the Haven (AH 12), or January 1951. While this represent- 53). On 13 May, after careful plan-

VMO-6 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov52 Sikorsky HO5S he HO5S helicopter, developed from Sikorsky’s 6 helicopters were HO5Ss. Unfortunately, plans to S-52 design begun in 1948, was the purpose-built replace light airplanes with HO5S helicopters in Marine Treplacement observation helicopter for the HO3S. observation squadrons had to be put on hold due to per- The S-52 was first conceived as a compact two place formance problems and structural defects that came to the machine, but it eventually incorporated recommendations fore in Korea. It was decided that the Marine Corps need- from the fighting front under the designation S-52-2. ed a machine that offered better stability and easier in- The HO5S was more compact than its predecessor and flight control in addition to a more powerful engine. featured several new design features to overcome tech- Thus, instead of becoming the backbone of Marine nical problems identified in the HO3S. Forty-eight observation squadrons, the HO5S was actually replaced HO5S-1s were ordered for the Marine Corps in 1951 and by the Kaman HOK beginning in 1954; the later aircraft accession began in January 1952. remained in operational service for the next decade until Although its theoretical performance statistics appear was it in turn replaced by the Bell UH-1 Iroquois only marginally better than its predecessor, the HO5S was (“Huey”), which remains the designated Marine obser- actually a much-improved aircraft that addressed many of vation and utility helicopter to this day. Marine obser- the HO3S’s shortcomings. The HO5S was the first U.S. vation squadrons were equipped with fixed-wing air- helicopter fitted with all-metal blades, could mount two planes after light helicopter squadrons were created dur- stretchers internally, and was much more stable on the ing the Vietnam-era. ground due to its low center of gravity and four-wheel Aircraft Data landing gear. The most unique practical innovation was Manufacturer: Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft a hinged, two-piece, forward-mounted observation bub- Corporation ble. Opening the left seat side of the bubble allowed Power Plant: 245 hp Franklin O-425-1 engine access to the cabin interior for two stretcher-borne Dimensions: Length, 27’ 5”; height, 8’8”; rotor, three 33’ metal patients. In addition, the HO5S could carry three com- blades bat-loaded men over short distances. Performance: Cruising speed, 96 mph By the time of the armistice in 1953, almost all VMO- Lift: Pilot and three passengers or two internal stretchers

68 Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169730 A seriously wounded Marine near the Jamestown Line is falls of the HO3S-1, had become the Marines’ primary med- loaded on board a Sikorsky HO5S-1 helicopter from VMO- ical evacuation aircraft. 6. By 1953, the HO5S-1, which was designed to remedy short- ning and rehearsals, HMR-161 personnel until the ceasefire was (Bureau of Aeronautics number brought a battalion landing team declared on 27 July 1953. 124343) departed VMO-6 in April to Yongdong-ni, a beach area The Korean Conflict had finally 1952. Bell HTLs carried the load southwest of Seoul. This exercise ended, but HMR-161 was not yet throughout the spring until the was followed in June by a special homeward bound. Immediately arrival of replacement helicopters helicopter assault demonstration after the guns cooled off, HMR-161 that summer. The first of the new as part of the rehearsal for MarLEx would support a massive prisoner Sikorsky HO5S-1 helicopters ar- II-53. Similar to the previous of war exchange and then enter a rived in July. This new machine, amphibious exercise in scope and period of “watchful waiting” be- the first helicopter equipped with all purpose, MarLEx II-53 actually fore returning stateside. metal rotor blades, was a three- turned out to be the last major The intervening 16 months seat utility aircraft that mounted a amphibious exercise during the between the move to the James- three-bladed overhead main rotor Korean War. The squadron re- town Line in March 1952 and the and a two-bladed tail rotor. turned to the lines on 10 July and armistice in July 1953 were busy Powered by a 245-horsepower thereafter continued routine oper- ones for the helicopter section of Franklin engine, it could carry a ations delivering supplies to various Marine Observation Squadron 6. 750-pound load at a cruising outposts and transporting mail and The last of the venerable HO3S-1s speed of 96 miles per hour. The

69 The Innovators

he first rotary-winged flight machines were chil- vertical, anti-torque tail rotor with forward movement dren’s toys believed to have been developed in controlled by varying the main rotor’s pitch while using TChina. Just after the end of World War I a rotary- the tail rotor to determine direction. Igor Ivanovich winged airplane, the autogiro, was developed and Sikorsky developed a wide variety of helicopters that gained some popularity during the Jazz Age. True heli- became versatile aircraft equally suited for both com- copter technology, however, did not really take off mercial and military use, aircraft able to perform until just before World War II. Pre-war helicopter unique tasks on land, at sea, and in the air. After World enthusiasts in France, Italy, Spain, and Germany spread War II, Sikorsky worked closely with the U.S. Marine their gospel throughout Europe and on to the United Corps to adapt his helicopters to military use, a symbi- States. Of the early American designers, three stand otic relationship between manufacturer and user that car- out: Igor I. Sikorsky, Frank N. Piasecki, and Arthur M. ried on even after his death. Today, Igor Sikorsky is right- Young. Each of these men left an indelible mark on U.S. fully considered the “Father of American helicopters.” helicopter development, and their legacy lives on in the Although long interested in rotary-wing flight, aircraft used by current Marine aviators. Sikorsky actually first gained fame for his multiple- IGOR I. SIKORSKY engine aircraft designs. Born in Kiev, Russia, on 25 May America’s preeminent helicopter advocate, pioneer, 1889, his interest in, and aptitude for, aeronautical engi- and designer was a Russian émigré who moved to the neering became evident early in his life. He began United States to escape communism. He did not invent, experimenting with flying machines and the principles nor was he the first to fly, a helicopter. He did, howev- of aerodynamics prior to entering the Russian Naval er, formulate a solution to movement stability for Academy. After three years, Sikorsky left St. Petersburg rotary-wing flight that has since evolved into the most to study in Paris and then returned to his homeland to popular modern helicopter configuration—a single, attend Kiev Polytechnic Institute. He returned to Paris large, horizontal, overhead rotor stabilized by a small, a second time to learn more about rotary-winged flight. Inventor Igor I. Sikorsky, the father of American helicopter, one of the first two “Whirlybirds” assigned to the copters visits HMX-1 at Marine Corps Air Station U.S. Marine Corps. Quantico, Virginia. In the background is an HO3S-1 heli- National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A322389

70 He built his first helicopter, a wooden box mounting two initial free flight on 13 May 1940. Not long thereafter, the horizontal propellers powered by a 25-horsepower U.S. military became interested in helicopter develop- motorcycle engine, upon his return to Kiev in 1909. He ment. In early 1942, Sikorsky won an unofficial com- could never get this machine to fly and concluded that petition by producing the VS-316. This two-place, sin- the technology of the day was not adequate, but he also gle-main rotor helicopter was given the military desig- remained convinced that in time rotary-winged aircraft nation R-4 (R-1, -2, and -3 were competing designs by would surpass fixed-wing airplanes as flying machines. other manufacturers). It was soon followed by Sikorsky continued his experiments using engine-pow- improved versions labeled R-5 and R-6. By the end of the ered sleighs until he turned to designing multiple- war more than 400 Sikorsky helicopters had been built. engine airplanes. In 1913, he designed and built the The U.S. Navy procured its first Sikorsky helicopter, an world’s first four-engine airplane. Thus, he embarked Army R-4 given the designation HNS upon transfer in upon a new career path for the next 40 years. October 1943. Sikorsky-built helicopters have been a Driven from Russia by the Bolshevik Revolution, a mainstay of naval aviation ever since. Marines current- nearly penniless Igor Sikorsky fled to the United States ly fly the Sikorsky three-engine CH-53E heavy-lift trans- by way of France. In America he eked out a living port helicopter, one of the largest helicopters in the teaching mathematics and consulting part time. Among world. his projects was a proposed, but never adopted, tri- FRANK N. PIASECKI motor bomber for the U.S. Army. After much hardship, Frank Piasecki, the son of an immigrant Polish tailor he was able to live the American dream when he con- born in 1919, was considered the “wonder boy” of early verted a Long Island, New York chicken farm into the helicopter development. By his 21st birthday he already Sikorsky Aero Engineering Company in 1923. Six years held degrees in mechanical engineering from the later, the company joined Boeing, Pratt & Whitney, and University of Pennsylvania and aeronautical engineering Chance Vought in forming the United Aircraft and from New York University. He began working as a Transportation Corporation. These humble beginnings mechanic for Kellet Autogyro while a teenager then comprised the genesis of one of America’s most suc- became a designer with Platt-LePage after college cessful aviation enterprises. Sikorsky’s first successful U.S. before branching off on his own. Piasecki developed the design—an all-metal, twin-engine transport, the S- second successful American helicopter using castoff 29A—established his reputation for building aircraft auto parts and an outboard motor. He endeared himself noted for their ability to withstand hard landings on to Marine helicopter proponents with his theories of how rough surfaces, poor weather conditions, and continu- tandem rotors could support very large or heavy loads, ous operations with only rudimentary maintenance. By an innovation that promised to make ship-to-shore far his most successful airplane to that time was his movement of complete units and bulky equipment eight-passenger, high-wing, twin-engine S-38 amphibian. when other machines of the day could lift only a pilot Although designed for commercial use, 16 variants and one or two others. Piasecki co-founded P.V. bearing Bureau of Aeronautics “RS” designations were Engineering Forum, a consortium of aircraft designers purchased by the U.S. Navy, some of which saw service interested in rotary-wing flight and was the driving with the Marine Corps. Sikorsky next turned to large, force behind that firm’s most successful project, the PV- long-range, four-engine, transoceanic passenger 3. The PV-3 was a large, elongated, bent fuselage, tan- planes. His successive S-40, -41, and -42 models dem rotor transport helicopter; the first of a series nick- gained fame as the “American Clippers,” large flying named “Flying Bananas.” The PV-3 was unique because boats that plied their trade for Pan-American Airways in the Flying Banana was rated for eight passengers as the Carribean and across the Pacific Ocean. Economic well as a crew of two. After its first flight in 1945, the troubles forced the shutdown of United Aircraft’s Navy purchased 22 PV-3s (designated HRPs by the Sikorsky Division in 1938, but this setback fortuitously Bureau of Aeronautics). The HRPs quickly established the once again whetted his long-standing interest in rotary- practicality of tandem rotors for heavy lift, and orders for winged aircraft. improved models quickly poured in. Piasecki’s notable Heartened by technological progress and spurred early success was the famous H-21 Workhorse, which into action by recent European developments—notably was used by the Air Force as a rescue craft and by the Germany’s spectacular public exhibitions of Heinrich Army (“Shawnees”) to haul troops and cargo. The P.V. Focke’s Fa-61—Sikorsky went back to developing heli- Engineering Forum became the Piasecki Helicopter copters. By 1939 he had created the VS-300, an ungain- Corporation in 1947, then a division of Vertol Aircraft, ly looking contraption consisting of a sprawling bare which in turn became a division of Boeing Aircraft. metal frame mounting a single main rotor for lift and a Venerable Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight assault heli- small-tail rotor for control. Although this “flying bed- copters, lineal descendants of the first Flying Banana have spring” was not aesthetically pleasing and performed been the backbone of Marine helicopter aviation for more more like a bucking bronco than a steady workhorse, it than four decades and continue to serve with the fleet became the first practical American helicopter after its to this day.

71 ARTHUR M.YOUNG port a doctor on an emergency call, and it also rescued The brilliant, but somewhat eccentric, scion of a a pair of fishermen stranded on an ice floe in 1945. The wealthy Pennsylvania family, Arthur M. Young invented third prototype featured an advanced instrument panel, a rotor stabilizer bar that allowed two-bladed rotors to a bare metal tubular tail boom, and a distinctive power light utility helicopters. His invention enabled Bell Plexiglas bubble canopy. Helicopter Corporation to produce the two most prolif- Building on the lessons learned while improving the ic helicopter models in history, each of which remained early models, Young next developed the first full pro- in production for more than 30 years. duction Bell helicopter labeled the Model-47. This Young began developing his idea while employed by machine, first flown on 8 December 1945, was the first Lawrence D. Bell’s aircraft company, the same firm that helicopter certified for sale by the Civil Aeronautics produced the first U.S.-built jet (the P-59 Bell Administration. It was quickly adopted as a training air- Airacomet) and the first supersonic aircraft (the X-1 craft by the military under the Army designation H-13 and rocket plane). After 15 years of building models and the Navy designation HTL. The Navy Department pur- researching rotary-winged flight, Young perfected his rev- chased 10 HTL-1s for evaluation in 1947. A dozen HTL- olutionary new concept. He knew that Sikorsky’s tail 2s followed in 1949, with nine HTL-3s the next year. The rotor concept eliminated torque, but he wanted to HTL-4 was virtually identical to the HTL-3 except for improve flight stability and reduce weight. His solution some internal mechanical improvements. Eventually, was a small counter-weighted stabilizer bar linked nine variants of the HTL saw naval service, and the directly to the rotor that functioned like a flywheel, a Navy purchased more than 200 of them between 1947 device that kept the rotor blades independent from the and 1958. The Model-47 was so successful that the last movement of the fuselage. In 1941, he assigned his HTLs were not stricken from the Marine Corps flight line patents to Bell Aircraft with an agreement to oversee the until 1962, and H-13s were still in service with the U.S. production of a few prototype Model-30 helicopters. Army well into the Vietnam War. The first of these rolled out at Gardenville, New York, Modern-day Marines fly two descendants of the HTL, in December 1942, and then made its first untethered the Bell UH-1N Huey Twin utility helicopter and the flight the following June. The second prototype looked heavily armed AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopter. like an automobile with its fully enclosed cabin and four Both have rendered yeoman duty thus far and are slat- wheels. That aircraft was the first helicopter used to trans- ed to continue naval service for the foreseeable future. most unique feature of the aircraft tour, VMO-6 had a reputation for achieved in October 1952 during was a removable forward canopy being a “happy ship.” In the words intense fighting at the Hook when that allowed access for two of commanding officer Major Wal- the Communists made their only stretchers inside the cabin. This lace J. Slappey, Jr.: “Morale was successful, albeit temporary, pene- latter feature protected injured extremely high. . . . The squadron tration of the Jamestown Line. In passengers from the elements was loaded with gung-ho person- May 1953, the helicopter section while enroute to advanced med- nel. Pilots were actually stealing was reorganized into three eche- ical care, a significant improve- flights from one another. . . . The lons: a liaison and medical evacu- ment over both the HO3S and HTL engineering department was out- ation flight assigned to the 1st models. The HO5S also possessed standing, working round the clock Marine Division command post; superior flight characteristics that . . . . Every man pulled his weight the squadron headquarters and made it a good reconnaissance by simply knowing what needed most aircraft located at airfield A-9; and observation aircraft. Unfortu- to be done and doing it willingly.” and a maintenance crew in addition nately, its underpowered engine From April 1952 until the arm- to any “down” aircraft stationed at and some structural defects limited istice in July 1953 the helicopter Ascom City (A-33). In May and the aircraft’s performance. By the section of VMO-6 averaged about June, HO5S-1 helicopters from end of July, VMO-6 mustered eight 600 missions per month, usually VMO-6 served as standby plane HO5S-1s in addition to nine HTL-4s. flying out between 200 and 300 guards in support of the MarLEx I Plans called for the HO5S to com- wounded. More than 1,000 mis- and II amphibious exercises. pletely replace the HTLs as soon as sions were mounted in two differ- Two HTLs and five HO5S-1s possible. The number of HTLs ent months during the summer of suffered major damage due opera- steadily declined as time passed 1952 with the single month record tional mishaps or crashed due to until only one HTL-4 remained of 721 non-combat missions flown mechanical failures during the when the ceasefire was declared a in September. Squadron records squadron’s stay in western Korea, little over a year later. for combat missions (375) and and all HO5S-1s were grounded in Throughout the remainder of its medical evacuations (428) were July 1953 because of numerous

72 Aviator and Aircraft Losses in Korea, 1950-1953 Crews Killed 1stLt Arthur R. Bancroft TSgt Joe L. Brand, Jr. MSgt Gilbert N. Caudle, Jr. Capt David T. Gooden 1stLt Robert A. Longstaff 1stLt Charles B. Marino Sgt Richard L. Parsell Capt Allen W. Ruggles Maj Doil R. Stitzel

Helicopter Losses Date Unit Type BuAer No Cause

12 Sep 50 VMO-6 HO3S-1 122514 Operational mishap 25 Sep 50 HU-1 (USN)* HO3S-1 122720 Enemy fire 29 Sep 50 VMO-6 HO3S-1 Unknown Operational mishap 9 Nov 50 VMO-6 HO3S-1 Unknown Operational mishap 3 Dec 50 VMO-6 HO3S-1 Unknown Enemy fire 27 Jan 51 VMO-6 HTL-4 Unknown Operational Mishap 12 Mar 51 VMO-6 HO3S-1 122518 Operational mishap 13 Apr 51 VMO-6 HO3S-1 122517 Enemy fire 19 Apr 51 VMO-6 HTL-4 128638 Operational mishap 24 Apr 51 VMO-6 HTL-4 128632 Enemy fire 25 Aug 51 MAG-33 HTL-3 124566 Operational mishap 28 Aug 51 VMO-6 HTL-4 128633 Operational mishap 17 Sep 51 VMO-6 HTL-4 128902 Operational mishap 22 Sep 51 VMO-6 HO3S-1 124342 Operational mishap 28 Sep 51 HMR-161 HRS-1 127802 Operational mishap 22 Oct 51 HMR-161 HRS-1 127789 Operational mishap 22 Oct 51 HMR-161 HRS-1 127792 Operational mishap 12 Jan 52 MAMS-12 HO3S-1 122528 Mechanical failure 21 Jan 52 HMR-161 HRS-1 127797 Operational mishap 23 Jan 52 VMO-6 HTL-4 122521 Operational mishap 7 Feb 52 VMO-6 HTL-4 128892 Enemy fire 1 Mar 52 HMR-161 HRS-1 Unknown Structural failure 14 Mar 52 VMO-6 HTL-4 128625 Operational mishap 17 Mar 52 VMO-6 HTL-4 128887 Operational mishap 27 May 52 HMR-161 HRS-1 127784 Operational mishap 12 Feb 53 HMR-161 HRS-1 127798 Mechanical failure 25 Mar 53 HMR-161 HRS-1 127822 Mechanical failure 18 JuL 53 VMO-6 HO5S-1 130112 Enemy fire

* U.S. Navy helicopter “on loan” to VMO-6 with one Navy pilot and one Marine crewman on board.

73 stateside tail boom failures. The helicopter or were air evacuated to sonnel, helicopters, and gear were only combat loss occurred on 18 Japan by fixed-wing transport stowed on board the aircraft carri- July 1953 when an HO5S-1 piloted planes. er Wasp (CV 18) when it bid good- by First Lieutenant Charles B. Even at this late date, Marine bye to the Far East and sailed for Marino was hit by enemy antiair- helicopters in Korea were called Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe, craft fire while on an artillery spot- upon to perform another mission Hawaii, on 26 March 1955. ting mission. The helicopter lost never dreamed of by the early Following the ceasefire, VMO- control and crashed killing both planners at Quantico. This time 6’s helicopter section continued to the pilot and the artillery observer. the HRSs of HMR-161 provided the provide liaison, observation, and This was the last helicopter-related best solution to a tangled diplo- medical evacuation for the 1st combat casualty in Korea. matic knot. The Marines were Marine Division. The squadron responsible for the safety of non- also supported training exercises. Ceasefire repatriated enemy prisoners, Chi- The last HTL-4 departed in August nese and North Koreans, who did 1953, and all HO5S-1s were back in At 1000 in the morning on 27 not want to return home and action by October. The squadron July 1953, the United Nations and would instead be placed in the reached a helicopter milestone of Communist delegations sat down custody of a neutral country, note when Major John T. Dunlavy inside Panmunjom’s “Peace Pa- India. The problem was that Syng- flew VMO-6’s 55,000th flight hour in goda” to sign the formal ceasefire man Rhee, the president of the Korea during an HO5S-1 test hop agreement that would bring an Republic of South Korea, refused on 14 May 1954. The squadron end to the fighting in Korea. The permission for Indian troops to began standing down on 4 Feb- deed was done in only a few min- enter his country. In the words of ruary 1955, and finally departed utes, and the guns fell silent a half- General Mark W. Clark, USA, the Korea when four separate incre- day later, at 2000 that evening. It United Nations field commander: ments sailed from Inchon for San was, however, an uneasy peace. “We had to go to great lengths to Diego in April 1955. Neither side fully trusted the other. live up to our pledge . . . that no The fighting had stopped, but few Indian troops would set foot on Contributions believed the war was really over. South Korean soil. Therefore, we The Marines did not stand down set up an airlift operation, which The final accounting showed and were not going home to carried more than 6,000 Indians nine Marine pilots and aircrew march in any victory parades as from the decks of our carriers off men lost their lives during heli- they had in 1945. Instead, the 1st Inchon by helicopter to the De- copter operations in Korea, four Marine Division was ordered to militarized Zone. It was a major due to enemy fire. Helicopters organize post-armistice battle posi- undertaking which just about wore proved to be generally more tions and to establish a “no pass” out our helicopter fleet.” resilient and far less vulnerable to line south of the Demilitarized Marine Helicopter Transport enemy fire than most thought pos- Zone. The Marines were also Squadron 161 carried on in Korea sible prior to the test of combat— charged with assisting in the final for almost two more years. Its only six (all from VMO-6) of more prisoner exchange of the war, HRS-2s and -3s transported cargo, than two dozen helicopters de- Operation Big Switch. This would personnel, and medical evacuees stroyed during the war were shot be a high-profile undertaking that until orders to prepare to leave down while an uncounted number would be conducted under the Korea arrived in late February suffered some damage at the watchful eyes of the international 1955. The squadron moved from hands of the enemy but returned to press. Anticipating many of the A-17 to Ascom City and the heli- base for repairs. The helicopter former prisoners would need med- copters flew to Iwakuni, Japan, to section of VMO-6 flew 22,367 mis- ical assistance, helicopters from prepare for the sea journey. On 12 sions including 7,067 medical HMR-161 stood by to carry litter March, HMR-162 officially as- evacuations in 35 months of com- patients or those too weak to trav- sumed responsibility for supporting bat flying. During its time in the el by ambulance to the U.S. Army the 1st Marine Division in Korea. By combat zone, HMR-161 logged 11th Evacuation Hospital at Free- that time part of the squadron had 19,639 flights (4,928 combat and dom Village near Munsan-ni. already departed on board the 14,711 non-combat), transported Seriously injured men were taken amphibious cargo ship Seminole 60,046 people, evacuated 2,748 directly to the hospital ships by (AKA 104) and the remaining per- seriously wounded, and offloaded

74 7,554,336 pounds of cargo. Marine Observation Squadron 6 was awarded a individual U.S. Presidential Unit Citation and shared two others as an organic component of senior commands. In addition, the squadron received a Navy Unit Commendation, an Army Distinguished Unit Citation, and three Korean Presidential Unit Citations for its actions in Korea. Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 was recognized for its participation as a component of commands that were awarded one U.S. Presidential Unit Citation, a Navy Unit Commendation, and one Korean Presidential Unit Ci- tation. Some notable early Marine helicopter pilots met mixed fates after their combat service. First Lieu- tenant Gustave Lueddeke succumbed to poliomyelitis not long after returning to HMX-1 at Quan- tico, Virginia. Major Armond HMR-161 Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov-Dec51 Delalio was killed during a test HMR-161 conducted its first aerial medical evacuation on 13 September 1951. flight when his specially config- Although medical evacuation was a secondary mission, the squadron carried more than 2,000 seriously wounded men to various locations for advanced medical ured HRS caught fire and crashed at care. Its sister helicopters of VMO-6 evacuated more than 7,000 during 35 Patuxent River Naval Air Station, months of combat flying. Maryland. First Lieutenant Lloyd Engelhardt and Captain Gene Cutcheon both rose to the highest Services. The United States Army Morrison each commanded Marine aviation post in the Marine Corps. owes a salute to the Marines for Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 McCutcheon was the director of conceptualizing and testing the as lieutenant colonels in the 1960s. aviation on the eve of the Vietnam principles of modern airmobile Morrison, in fact, got to put into era and then later both he and warfare. The Army had long been practice the helicopter combat tac- Armstrong held the post of deputy interested in rotary-winged aircraft tics and techniques he pioneered in chief of staff (air) as major gener- and actually used some primitive Korea when he led the squadron als—McCutcheon from 1966 to helicopters during World War II. during its deployment to Vietnam in 1970 and Armstrong in 1975. The Marine Corps, however, pio- 1965. Brigadier General Edward C. Lieutenant General McCutcheon neered doctrine, employed full Dyer and Colonel Keith B. Mc- was actually slated to become the helicopter units in combat, and Cutcheon both sat on the influen- first Marine aviator to wear four developed hands-on tactical con- tial Hogaboom Board that restruc- stars on active duty until he was cepts in Korea. Phib-31, written at tured the Fleet Marine Force in tragically felled by cancer immedi- Quantico, Virginia, before the 1956. The board recommended ately after commanding Marine Marines even had a helicopter that all Marine divisional equip- forces in Vietnam. squadron, is arguably the forerun- ment be air transportable and Much like that first Marine ner of today’s airmobile doctrine. entire assault battalion landing HO3S that guided the rescue party According to Air Force historian teams be helilifted ashore to to the mired amphibious jeep in Robert F. Futrell: “Army officers secure beachheads using vertical the marsh at Quantico in 1948, were [so] impressed by the utility of assault techniques. Captain Victor VMO-6 and HMR-161 led the way Marine helicopters in Korea [that] Armstrong and Colonel Mc- for helicopters in the other General Ridgway asked the De-

75 partment of the Army to provide whose light utility helicopters per- helicopter performance in combat, four Army helicopter transport formed search and rescue, medical and helicopters thereafter became battalions, each with 280 heli- evacuation, liaison, and reconnais- a full partner in naval aviation copters.” His request was signifi- sance—missions that closely par- rather than the “stepchildren” they cantly scaled down (to only two alleled the needs of those had previously been. It is a tribute companies), but within a decade Services. to the dedication, bravery, and the Army went on to create an air- Today the legacy of those early skill of Marine helicopter air and mobile division whose assault ele- helicopter pioneers of HMX-1, ground crews in Korea that heli- ments could be helilifted into VMO-6, and HMR-161 lives on copters are vital components of combat. The Navy and the Air within the Marine Corps as well. the modern Marine air-ground Force took their cues from VMO-6 Marine skeptics were silenced by team. Current Marine helicopter pilots are mounted in the direct Col Keith B. McCutcheon became one of the most versatile and best-known descendants of those simple ro- Marine aviators during his career. He was an innovator and theoretician as well tary-winged machines that tra- as a doer, and, like his hero MajGen Roy S. Geiger, he commanded both air and ground units in combat. versed the Korean skies from 1950 National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A132705 to 1953: Bell UH-1 “Hueys” and AH-1 Sea Cobras were sired by the HTL “eggbeaters,” the tandem- rotor Boeing-Vertol CH-46 Sea Knights are advanced developments of Frank Piasecki’s HRP “flying banana,” and the massive Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallions evolved from the much smaller HO3S-1 “pinwheels.” Currently, the tilt-rotor Boeing MV-22 Os- prey is making true the vision of designer Frank Piasecki about the future of rotary-winged flight voiced a half century earlier: “The most dramatic progress will be increased speed of vertical-lift aircraft. This will come from two directions: helicopter designers will add speed to their machines; conversely, airplane designers will add vertical-lift capabilities to their high-speed aircraft. The result will be a blending of flight into machines fully capable of both helicopter flight as we know it and high-speed flight.” While we cannot be certain exactly what the future holds, we can safely state that vertical assault and rotary-winged assault support will remain mainstays of Marine Corps doctrine well into the 21st century. With this in mind, we should always remem- ber this is due to the achievements of the Korean “whirlybirds” that led the way.

76 About the Author

Marines in the Korean War Commemorative Series