H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, No. 2 (2014)
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H-Diplo | ISSF Forum, No. 2 (2014) A production of H-Diplo with the journals Security Studies, International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, and the International Studies Association’s Security Studies Section (ISSS). http://issforum.org H-Diplo/ISSF Editors: James McAllister and Diane Labrosse H-Diplo/ISSF Web and Production Editor: George Fujii Commissioned for H-Diplo/ISSF by James McAllister Introduction by Scott D. Sagan H-Diplo/ISSF Forum on “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons.” Published by H-Diplo/ISSF on 15 June 2014 Stable URL: http://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf Contents “Two Renaissances in Nuclear Security Studies,” Introduction by Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University .................................................................................................................................. 2 “What We Talk About When We Talk About Nuclear Weapons: A Review Essay,” by Francis J. Gavin, Frank Stanton Chair in Nuclear Security Policy Studies, MIT ................................... 11 Response: “The Case for Using Statistics to Study Nuclear Security,” by Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University, Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University, and Todd S. Sechser, University of Virginia ............................................................................................................... 37 Response: “Nuclear Weapons Are (Still) Poor Instruments of Blackmail: A Reply to Francis J. Gavin’s Critique” by Todd S. Sechser, University of Virginia and Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A&M University ....................................................................................................................... 55 “A Superior Theory of Superiority,” Response by Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University ................................................................................................................................ 63 “Archives and the Study of Nuclear Politics” by Hal Brands, Duke University ....................... 66 “An Apology for Numbers in the Study of National Security . if an apology is really necessary” by Erik Gartzke, University of California, San Diego............................................. 77 “The Use and Abuse of Large-n Methods in Nuclear Studies” An Essay by Vipin Narang, MIT .......................................................................................................................................... 91 © 2014 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, No. 2 (2014) “Two Renaissances in Nuclear Security Studies,” Introduction by Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University “Quality is better than quantity, especially in large numbers.” Anon. ver the past decade, two intellectual renaissances have emerged in the field of nuclear security studies. The first is in political science, where exciting new research O has been published about such important subjects as the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation, the linkages between the growth of civilian nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons, deterrence and compellence theory and practice, and the consequences of new states acquiring atomic arsenals. A second renaissance is occurring in history, as new archives have opened up and scholars are studying such important subjects as Cold War crises, the evolution of international institutions such as the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the history of medium powers and smaller states that decided to pursue or decided to stop pursing nuclear weapons. These two scholarly renaissances, however, have largely developed in completely separate spheres, or on parallel tracks at best, with little interchange between historians and political scientists. This is deeply unfortunate, for creative multidisciplinary research can significantly improve our understanding of complex technical, historical, and political phenomena such as the causes and consequences nuclear weapons proliferation. During the golden age of nuclear strategy in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, when many of our theories about nuclear weapons were first developed, the breadth and diversity of scholars engaged in the field was stunning. Political scientist Bernard Brodie, economist Thomas Schelling, mathematician Albert Wohlstetter, physicist Herman Kahn, and historian Roberta Wohlstetter each produced seminal contributions about nuclear weapons and strategic stability, the danger of surprise attacks, and the possibility of arms control that created both important public policy debates in Washington and personal debates in the hallways of RAND.1 These debates on key security issues both significantly improved the quality each individual’s scholarship and the collective policy relevance of academic research for the U.S. government. In contrast, today, the vigorous debates and intellectual cross-fertilization that enhanced earlier nuclear scholarship are missing. Both political scientists and historians too often publish only in their own disciplinary journals, attend only their own professional conferences, care only about policy implications of their narrow findings, and only engage in debates with members of their own academic tribes. Robert Jervis, James McAllister, and 1 See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960) and Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966); Albert Wohlstetter, The Delicate Balance of Terror (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1958) and “Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country,” Foreign Affairs 39 (April 1961): 355-388; Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961); Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, No. 2 (2014) Francis Gavin are therefore to be thanked for putting together this H-Diplo forum and for encouraging dialogue across the disciplinary divide. This H-Diplo forum is a most welcome exchange of views about the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to nuclear scholarship. My introduction to the forum has three sections. First, I will briefly describe some of the trends I see emerging in the new political science and history scholarship on the effects of nuclear weapons on international politics. Second, I will briefly outline the major points made by the contributors to this lively forum. Third, I will discuss how historians and political scientists can interact and contribute to, rather than simply critique, each other’s work more effectively. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, many political science students and scholars turned their attention to studying civil wars, insurgency, and terrorism, with far less research conducted on nuclear issues. Over the past decade, however – sparked in part by real-world policy concerns about North Korea, Iran, nuclear terrorism, and global disarmament – much new research has been published on nuclear weapons issues. This H- Diplo Forum focuses mostly on new nuclear security literature using large-N statistical methods,2 but the renaissance in political science work on nuclear issues is much broader in focus and more diverse in terms of methodology than this admittedly important emerging strand of the literature. New nuclear weapons research in political science includes important case-study work examining the domestic political and psychological determinants of proliferation,3 normative and constructivist analyses of states’ and individuals’ nuclear identity and ethical taboos,4 new game theoretic models of proliferation and preventive war decisions,5 and the use of public opinion survey 2 Important works include Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 6 (December 2004): 859-885; Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, 1 (February 2007): 167-194; Robert Rauchhaus, Matthew Kroenig, and Erik Gartzke, eds., The Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (London: Routledge, 2011); Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization 67, 1 (January 2013): 141-171; and Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization 67, 1 (January 2013): 173-195. 3 Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Jacques Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 4 Alastair Ian Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 5 Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War,” International Organization 68, 1 (January 2014): 1-31. H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, No. 2 (2014) experiments.6 (Some of the contributions to this H-Diplo forum label the large-N