report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

does the Bones Report look?’, Lib Beyond Westminster: Finding Hope in became a Labour government min- Dem Voice, 1 June 2011. Britain (Simon & Schuster, 1994). ister under Gordon Brown, and 28 Polls conducted by Lib Dem Voice; 32 Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries Vol- remains in Westminster today as these are unweighted but participa- ume One, p. 452 MP for Wolverhampton South tion is large enough to make them 33 See Duncan Brack, ‘Liberal Dem- East. Pat McFadden said that the reasonably representative. ocrat Leadership: The Cases of ‘Project’ could primarily be under- 29 Paddy Ashdown, open letter to lead- Ashdown and Kennedy’, Political stood through the prism of per- ership contenders, The Guardian, 11 Quarterly 78:1, January – March 2007. sonality: Tony Blair ‘was, like June 1999. 34 Andrew Rawnsley, ‘Burst out of the Ashdown, a big leader … and he 30 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- pinstripes and show us some passion’, believed in a Big Tent’. ries: Volume One, 1988–1997 (Penguin, Observer, 17 September 2006. Paddy Ashdown’s first gen- 2000), pp. 50–51. 35 Chris Bowers, Nick Clegg: The Biogra- eral election as leader of the Lib- 31 Paddy Ashdown, Citizen’s Britain: A phy (Biteback, second edition, 2012), eral Democrats was in many ways Radical Agenda for the 1990s (Fourth p. 249. one of political containment, fol- Estate, 1989) and Paddy Ashdown, lowing the trauma of unification Looking with the SDP in 1988. However, within days of the result, and with back, in 2013, Labour in flux, Ashdown deliv- ered a landmark speech in Chard on the post- in Somerset on the need for a new, non-Socialist, centrist approach 1992 period, to British politics. Looking back, in 2013, on the post-1992 period, Ashdown he described his feeling that a bi- Report partisan approach was necessary, as described his ‘we genuinely feared defeat again to the Tories … everyone believed feeling that this, including Tony, until his The Progressive Coalition that never was – phone call to me at a Somerset sec- lessons from the Ashdown–Blair ‘project’ a bi-partisan ondary school on the day before the 1997 election’. Evening meeting (joint with the Labour History Group), 22 approach Roger Liddle was a key bridge between the two parties during January 2013, with Paddy Ashdown, Roger Liddle and Pat was nec- the era and an advocate of coopera- McFadden MP; chair: Steve Richards essary, as tion from within both: he described Report by Douglas Oliver himself as having ‘ratted and re-rat- ‘we genu- ted’ à la Winston Churchill, after leaving Labour to join the SDP and s the Liberal Democrat– Red–Yellow cooperative initiative inely feared then the Lib Dems, before being Conservative coalition buried, at least by the time of Ash- lured back by his good friend Peter Aenters its parliamentary down’s retirement from the Lib- defeat again Mandleson, following Tony Blair’s mid-term, the Labour and Lib Dem eral Democrat leadership in 1999. rise to power. He described his History Groups met in Westmin- However, despite this, almost to the Tories sadness at Neil Kinnock’s defeat, ster to reflect upon another, past, two decades on, in the context despite being a Liberal Demo- attempt at inter-party collabora- of a Yellow–Blue coalition, the … everyone crat candidate that year in North tion: the 1990s ‘Project’, initiated period’s relevance to British politi- Hertfordshire, because, he said, he by Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown, cal life seems enduringly salient. believed this, sensed common purpose between to defeat British Conservatism As evidence of that, three of the the two parties. Throughout the and redefine the British political key protagonists in the ‘Project’ including period Liddle retained strong centre-ground. – Paddy Ashdown, Pat McFad- friendships and a network of pow- The fourth successive Tory gen- den and Roger Liddle – chaired Tony, until erful connections in both parties. eral election victory in April 1992 by The Independent’s Steve Rich- Pat McFadden said that the ‘Pro- provided an existential challenge to ards, were re-united to speak of its his phone ject’ failed critically in two out of the British political left and liberal impact and moment, as well as its three respects. He felt that ‘leader- centre: despite the difficulties of relevance for today, in front of an call to me at ship, arithmetic and subject’ were the post-Thatcher transition, John audience of over a hundred mem- a Somerset the three factors that ‘mattered’, but Major’s victory led many to believe bers of the History Groups of both that although the first was strong, Conservatism was in danger of parties. secondary failures in the latter two aspects holding indefinite sway over Brit- Pat McFadden was a key adviser doomed the project. ish public life, and that the forces of to the Labour Party throughout school on the Ashdown and Blair, he felt ‘were ‘Progressivism’ could never win in the 1990s, and his career spanned “big leaders” who believed in some- Britain again. John Smith’s leadership as well day before thing transformational’. Blair liked Whilst the 1997 general election as Tony Blair’s ascent to power as and trusted Ashdown, and felt that, did result in an eventual defeat party leader and Prime Minister, in the 1997 like himself, he was an outsider to of Toryism, the historic Blair the aftermath of Smith’s untimely his own party. However, the ‘arith- landslide also eventually left the death in May 1994. McFadden later election’. metic’ of Labour’s domination in

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 45 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

throughout the 1980s and ’90s, and was a figure of inspiration for many in the Liberal Democrats, both in terms of constitutional matters and other areas. In the early years of Blair’s gov- ernment, there was limited coop- eration between Liberal Democrats and Labour over the issue of con- stitutional reform, and in 1998 Jen- kins delivered a radical report on electoral reform, recommending a form of ‘AV Plus’. However, it ultimately foundered on the apa- thy of the Labour Party: whilst modernisers like incoming For- eign Secretary Robin Cook sig- nalled support, many conservative elements inside it did not, notably Cabinet members John Prescott and Gordon Brown. Indeed, according to Liddle, even moderate members of Labour were sceptical, because they feared that, under PR, Labour would be usurped as the party of the centre-ground by the Liberal Democrats. Blair’s attitude to electoral reform remained ambiguous; indeed, according to Steve Rich- ards, who said he had interviewed the new Labour leader exten- sively during the period, he was ultimately negative throughout, even in the mid-1990s. Ashdown noted that, once in government and as time went on, it became clear that Blair ‘was not a pluralist … he wanted power for himself’. Paddy Ashdown felt that electoral reform was the ‘critical framework’ within which the realignment of the left could occur and with- out it the ‘Project’, as a whole, was undermined. McFadden stated that whilst PR was an area of common inter- est, it was not a strong enough ‘sub- ject matter’ in itself and that there Westminster after the 1997 land- Top: from left Pat McFadden described Tony was a lack of common purpose slide precluded further coop- – Roger Liddle, Blair’s feeling that ‘the divide in in other areas that New Labour eration, and he sensed that Blair Steve Richards, the progressive vote had allowed felt were important: public ser- underestimated the importance of Paddy Ashdown, a period of mostly Conservative vices, pensions and other domestic forces throughout the Labour Party Pat McFadden. dominance’. issues. According to McFadden, resistant to cooperation with lib- Bottom: standing In his 1979 Dimbleby Lecture, whilst Blair had faith in Ashdown, erals and unenthusiastic about the room only at the Roy Jenkins – liberal Labour Home he had little faith in the Liberal case for electoral reform. meeting. Secretary and founding father of Democrats as a whole, a suspicion A key subject of connection the SDP – had famously outlined that grew in the years of govern- between the two groups was the the case for electoral reform, and its ment as, under Ashdown and later desire to reform the voting system. importance in defending a strong Charles Kennedy, the Lib Dems Despite four powerful parliamen- political centre, from the irrational opposed reforms to Higher Edu- tary majorities, the Conserva- whims of the extremist factions of cation and initiatives to provide tive popular vote in the 1980s and Britain’s two right and left-wing greater administrative autonomy 1990s was always smaller than parties. Jenkins was an influen- for schools and hospitals. that accumulated by Labour and tial figure for many modernising McFadden felt that ‘New the Liberal Democrats combined. figures within the Labour Party Labour’ was then – and now

46 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

– misunderstood as an extension of throughout the ‘Project’ both were Most notably, Liberal Demo- right-wing Labour, and a resurrec- cognisant of the need for approval crats disagreed with Tony Blair tion of the Gaitskellite tradition in from their own parties, and this over the 2003 Iraq war (though the party. According to McFadden, party approval, or lack of it, proved curiously not Ashdown, who was Blair believed in broad-church pol- important in the eventual collapse by then outside Westminster, as itics that went beyond traditional of the ‘Project’. But Liddle and NATO High Representative in notions of party; however McFad- Ashdown both felt that Blair was Bosnia). Pushed for a counter-fac- den also stated that proportional unwilling to cede power from cen- tual historical analysis, Ashdown representation was an insufficient tral government and the Labour would not be drawn on how his- point of connection between the Party; McFadden did not demur. tory might have been different. two parties. The Joint Cabinet Committee Instead he related a colleague’s In response to McFadden, Ash- (JCC) aimed at promoting com- anecdote of the first meeting down rebuked the idea that Blair mon endeavour between the two between Chairman Mao and Henry was ultimately a positive agent for parties gradually broke down fol- Kissinger in the 1970s and the sto- reform. He argued that, within lowing Ashdown’s retirement and chastic nature of history: asked the Liberal Democrats, the historic Charles Kennedy’s succession to how history would have been dif- foundation that the ‘Project’ sought Liberal Democrat leadership in ferent had the Russian leader been to build on was deep: the intel- 1999. This development marked assassinated in 1963 and not the lectual legacy of Liberal leader Jo the ‘Project’s ultimate demise by American President, Mao report- Grimond in the ’50s and ’60s – who the decade’s end. edly stated that it was unlikely rejected Socialism as an antidote to A lively discussion ensued in the Mrs Kruschev would have ended the perceived bleak imperialistic audience about the ‘Project’ and the up married to the Greek shipping Conservatism of the post-war era reasons for and degree of its fail- magnate Onassis. – and the strategic approach of the ure. Speaking from the floor, Bill Mark Twain once remarked that ‘Gang of Four’ who aimed to ‘break Rodgers, member of the ‘Gang of ‘History does not repeat itself, but the mould’ of politics through the Four’ and Liberal Democrat leader it does Rhyme’. In that light, there creation of the SDP in the 1980s. in the House of Lords in the early has been much speculation that the As Liberal Democrat leader, Ash- years of Blair’s premiership, spec- cross-party relationship might be down said he felt like a custodian ulated that ‘self-deceit’ was key reconceived after the 2015 election, of this legacy, and that this was the to understanding the project: ‘it particularly if the ‘arithmetic’ test rationale behind his centrist politi- was never going to work from the can finally be passed. cal positioning between 1992 and beginning’. Liddle stated that the ‘Project’ 1994, and his frustration that Blair Ashdown was more positive ‘is not yet dead’ and that there was had ‘occupied Liberal Democrat about its aims: whilst he accepted a strong chance that the two par- ground’ once he became leader of that the odds were against suc- Liddle stated ties might be thrust together: as in the Opposition. cess, ‘romanticism is the hallmark the 1990s, the purpose remained Liddle highlighted Blair’s of all great political movements that the ‘Pro- unchanged – ‘dishing the Tories’. address to the Fabian Society on – including the SDP – and with- McFadden was cool on the sub- the fiftieth anniversary of Labour’s out it very little is achieved, even ject’ ‘is not ject and warned against presump- post-war landslide as evidence when the main objectives are left tive allocations of vote shares to of Blair’s pluralistic feelings and unachieved’. Although the ‘Pro- yet dead’ and parties long before people had awareness of the Liberal herit- ject’ did not live up to the high voted: ‘it’s up to us as politicians to age. In the speech, Blair had said aspirations held for it, it did suc- that there offer solutions to the ongoing chal- that Clement Attlee’s victory was ceed in bringing about reforms lenges to people’s living standards’. as much to do with the legacy of such as devolution in Scotland and was a strong Ashdown said that, for Liberal Liberal members Beveridge and Wales, as well as helping to double Democrats, pluralism could involve Keynes, as of Nye Bevan and others Liberal Democrat parliamentary chance that any party that believed in the within the Labour movement. representation in May 1997, in the national interest and liberal values, Ashdown said that throughout face of the Labour surge, through the two par- and he praised Nick Clegg’s flexible the process he had wished to main- a combined association with approach to coalition and his deci- tain the Liberal Democrats’ inde- anti-Toryism. ties might sion to take his lead from the elec- pendence and stressed that even One audience member asked torate in 2010. where alignment was possible, it how the Labour era would have be thrust Pressed by Richards on his ulti- was conditional upon his own par- been different had the Liberal Dem- mate attitude to post-2015 coop- ty’s consent. Ultimately though, ocrats been able to work alongside together: as eration with Labour, Ashdown Ashdown argued the Liberal Dem- the other party effectively in some in the 1990s, referred to the transferable skills ocrats had a positive attitude to form of coalition. Ashdown said he had developed in the military cooperation: by way of evidence, that in the context of Liberal Dem- the purpose and how they were of to use him he highlighted its relatively united ocrat coalition, Labour’s perceived in his later political career: ‘in my and pragmatic approach to govern- disdain for Human Rights as well remained time in the Marines, I spent time ment shown since 2010, in juxtapo- as the lack of challenge it provided in Borneo, and was trained in how sition to the attitude of their Tory to Euroscepticism, could have been unchanged – to discover elephant traps – this is coalition bedfellows. much altered and improved. Liddle one!’ Each of the three panellists and Ashdown spoke of their disil- ‘dishing the highlighted the ‘personal political lusionment with certain aspects of Douglas Oliver is Secretary of the Lib- risks’ both political leaders faced: Blair’s legacy. Tories’. eral Democrat History Group.

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 47