Triple Lock’ Where It Came From, How It Worked and Its Future

The history of the ‘triple lock’ where it came from, how it worked and its future

Fears over Paddy Ashdown’s talks with Labour in the late 1990s triggered the Liberal Democrats to introduce the so-called ‘triple lock’ arrangement to stop Ashdown bouncing the party into a controversial decision on its future. Though never used under his leadership, the process technically stayed in force. It was used for the first time to confirm, ironically, a deal with the Conservative Party in May 2010. The party has since voted to review its working, but with a view to making minor changes rather than to abolish it. iven the triple lock’s in 1988, Paddy Ashdown’s prior- After its first outing in later use to con- ity in the early years of his lead- firm a deal with the ership was to ensure the party’s anger, the triple lock is Conservative Party, survival. Stories of how close the it is ironic that its taxman came to closing down the firmly here to stay. Its Gorigins, in 1997–98, lay in fears of national party over unpaid bills, origins and continuing what the then party leader, Paddy and of opinion poll results show- Ashdown, might want to get up to ing the party so close to zero as relevance are examined with the Labour Party. Winner of to be within the statistical mar- 1 the first leadership election for the gin of error, have been frequently by Mark Pack. newly formed Liberal Democrats retold by Ashdown and his senior

64 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 The history of the ‘triple lock’ where it came from, how it worked and its future

colleagues ever since. However, clearly positioning the party as at the start of conference which by the mid-1990s the threats to the being anti-Conservative and drop- said, ‘Liberal Democrat leaders will party’s very existence had been ping the earlier policy of equidis- tell activists this week that the party seen off, whilst the national politi- tance between the Conservatives will form coalitions with Labour in cal picture had changed markedly. and Labour. In addition, nego- the event of electoral reform for the The Conservative Party was sunk tiations were held between Labour House of Commons and devolved in long-term unpopularity and and the Liberal Democrats to assemblies. Paddy Ashdown will Labour was looking to successfully agree a programme of constitu- brush aside critics … His call for reinvent itself. Against this back- tional reforms. These became cooperation with Labour is backed ground, Paddy Ashdown set off on known as the Cook–Maclennan by Liberal Democrat peer Lord an audacious political strategy – to talks, after the lead negotiators for Jenkins who, in today’s inter- attempt to forge a ‘progressive alli- each party, Robin Cook and Bob view with the Observer, urges the ance’ on the centre-left, united Maclennan. The programme they party to “stop being frightened against the Conservatives and seek- agreed received widespread support of coalitions”.’ Those reports had ing to remedy the historical split (as within the Liberal Democrat Party. been fuelled by an interview that he and close advisors such as Roy But subsequent further moves – Paddy Ashdown gave to the New Jenkins saw it) which had fractured including the creation of a Joint Statesman, in which he talked about anti-Conservative forces early in Consultative Committee after the the possibilities of coalition with the twentieth century, making 1997 general election – and repeated Labour. He recorded in his dia- it a century then dominated by speculation about Ashdown’s inten- ries that ‘my intention was to get Conservative political success. tions, left many party members the Party thinking about what is This was a far from uncontrover- nervous or even hostile to where he on the horizon. I also wanted to sial view amongst Liberal Democrat was leading the party. gauge where the opposition is com- grassroots members. Some objected Symptomatic of this was a lit- ing from … Much consternation because they saw Labour as the local tle-noticed debate one morning from the usual quarters, especially political adversary and did not want at the Liberal Democrat autumn Conrad Russell and Lembit Opik the national party to be cosying up conference of 1997 in Eastbourne, … My second intention in all this is to their opponents. Others agreed in which a councillor tried to to push Blair. If I get a furious reac- in principle about centre-left sym- overturn the Federal Conference tion from the Party at conference, it pathies but feared how far Paddy Committee’s (FCC) decision to will strengthen my hand when we Ashdown was willing to take coop- exclude his submission from the start to negotiate seriously.’3 eration. In fact, as Paddy Ashdown’s conference agenda. Cllr David During conference week there diaries and other accounts have Howarth’s appeal to suspend stand- were headlines such as ‘Ashdown since revealed, Ashdown at least ing orders so that conference could faces fight on Labour links’ speculated about going much fur- debate an emergency motion ruling (Financial Times), ‘Ashdown told not ther with Labour than many of his out coalition with Labour was eas- Left: Paddy to cosy up to Blair’ (The Guardian) critics ever feared at the time – even ily rejected in a sparse debate.2 Ashdown, leader and ‘Ashdown coalition hint splits as far as merger. However, Howarth’s move fol- of the Liberal Lib Dems’ (The Times). The sense In public, there was some suc- lowed pre-conference reports such Democrats of Labour and Liberal Democrats cessful cooperation, with Ashdown as that in the Observer on the Sunday 1988–99 manoeuvring around their possible

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 65 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future future relationship was heightened expectation that it will take place in Mindful of motion,8 which meant that the real by the presence of a Labour minis- spring.’ debate would be over any amend- ter – Alistair Darling – speaking at As a result of these widespread how the ments tabled to the latter. one of the conference fringe meet- expectations, between the autumn Several amendments were sub- ings. The attempts of Howarth 1997 and spring 1998 confer- party lead- mitted which touched on the issue and others to get the issue onto the ences an informal group of people of coalitions and relations with agenda, however, fell foul of pro- worked together, searching for a ership had Labour, but Federal Conference cedural problems, with the result compromise wording that would Committee took for debate a that, rather than a high-profile both deal with David Howarth’s handled Gordon Lishman text (in the name debate advertised in advance on (and their own) concerns and also of Burnley Liberal Democrats9) the agenda, the only debate was the be acceptable to Paddy Ashdown. the Lib–Lab which set out what became known failed attempt to suspend standing This group included Gordon pact, the as the triple lock.10 When deciding orders which took place both with- Lishman, the eventual author of to take the Lishman amendment, out advance notice and in a sparsely the triple lock and a member of wording of the FCC debated whether or not it attended conference hall. the Federal Executive (FE), former was in order, as it sets down rules The reasons for the FCC’s rejec- SDP leader and still-MP Bob the Lishman that the parliamentary party and tion not only of Howarth’s motion Maclennan, popular peer Conrad leadership should follow, yet the but of others on the same topic were Russell, and new MP Ed Davey. amend- party’s constitution states that par- predominantly nothing to do with Donnachadh McCarthy, a regular liamentarians cannot be mandated. the committee members’ views critic of the party leadership and ment was The contrary argument, that the on Ashdown’s strategy. Instead, then on the Federal Executive was constitution only protects individu- they were concerned with how to also involved, as was the party’s motivated als from being mandated and that run conference in the most orderly Chief Executive, Chris Rennard, conference is sovereign, was suffi- fashion. An ongoing strategy con- who was motivated by a desire to by a desire to ciently persuasive for FCC to rule sultation was under way, with a ensure that a form of words was the amendment in order. motion and debate due at the next found which would keep all the avoid, in his Mindful of how the party lead- party conference. In addition, the main players in the party happy, ership had handled the Lib–Lab emergency motion procedure is not including both Paddy Ashdown and own words, pact, the wording of the Lishman well suited to controversial top- Conrad Russell.6 amendment was motivated by a ics requiring lengthy debate, due One problem in achieving this the party desire to avoid, in his own words, to both the short notice periods was that, as the nature of Paddy the party being ‘needlessly riven involved and the absence of options Ashdown’s talks with Tony Blair being ‘need- and split’.11 Lishman also wanted to amend the motion.4 Those, how- became more public, so doubts lessly riven to be sure that the party had a say ever, were reasons for putting off about his strategy spread through in any decision, particularly as such a debate until the party’s spring the party and trust in him was also and split’. the folk history of the party at the conference, rather than for avoid- weakened. Ashdown had been time was that the (Liberal) party’s ing it completely. Moreover, the heard to dismiss previous concerns national leadership had a bad track autumn conference did see criticism as those of ‘conspiracy theorists’. record of negotiating with other of Paddy Ashdown’s line on the While he didn’t actually say the parties – not just over the Lib–Lab fringe and in the strategy consulta- concerns were untrue, the strict pact but also in talks such as the tion session,5 reinforcing the expec- meaning of his words was very dif- formation of the Alliance. By way tation that there would be a major ferent from the likely inference peo- of contrast, many council group debate on the topic at the following ple would take from his phrasing. leaders had experience – often suc- spring conference. This very specific choice of words cessful – of negotiating with other Between the autumn 1997 allowed him to avoid direct deceit; parties in hung councils around conference and the one in spring however, it also meant that as more the country.12 The key part of the 1998 there was a great deal of came to light about what had actu- Lishman amendment read: behind-the-scenes debating and ally been happening, this sophistry Conference agrees that: positioning, and the Conference damaged people’s views of him. (i) in the event of any substantial Communication Group’s (CCG) When it came to the spring con- proposal which could affect the minutes from November 1997 ference, three business motions on Party’s independence of politi- rather acerbically commented that the topic were submitted. One was cal action, the consent will be ‘It was noted that Paddy Ashdown’s from the Federal Executive, ini- required of a majority of mem- interview in New Statesman threw tially as a holding motion, on the bers of the Parliamentary Party our [conference] media message outcome of the party’s strategy con- in the House of Commons and the off course. It was agreed that in sultation, and the other two were Federal Executive; and, future the Ashdown Office will from David Howarth (in the form of (ii) unless there is a three-quarters work more closely with the Press Cambridge Liberal Democrats) and majority of each group in favour Team and the CCG to coordinate his ally Conrad Russell (in the form of the proposals, the consent of messages effectively.’ The minutes of Brent Liberal Democrats). Both the majority of those present and went on to say, of David Howarth’s of these rejected outright a coalition voting at a Special Conference initiative, ‘Although the FCC han- with Labour not only in the present convened under clause 6.6 of the dled attempts to suspend standing but also, given the conditions they Constitution; and, orders and force a strategy debate attached, for the foreseeable future.7 (iii) unless there is a two-thirds well, there is a demand within the Unsurprisingly, both were rejected majority of those present and party for a future debate and an because of the presence of the FE’s

66 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future

voting at that Conference in itself – and the cause of the one vote arose. Not all party officers remem- favour of the proposals, the con- that needed to be counted due to its bered its existence or that it was still sent of a majority of all members closeness – was on whether to have applicable.19 However, the expecta- of the Party voting in the ballot ‘preferably STV’ or simply ‘STV’ tion rapidly spread that it should be called pursuant to clause 6.11 or 13 in the main strategy motion. At the used and, as with the original argu- 8.6 of the Constitution. same time as voting through the tri- ments over its legality, there was a ple lock, conference voted (by 478 pragmatic acceptance of the need to The text was therefore not so much to 343) to retain the word ‘prefer- abide by it. anti-coalition as against Paddy ably’ and thus to have a pragmatic Early on in the negotiations after Ashdown trying to bounce the approach to the concessions that the the 2010 general election, it was also party into one. In particular, the party might be able to wring from decided to proceed with a special placing of an all-member ballot in others over electoral reform. conference regardless of whether the final stage meant that, although With Paddy Ashdown’s further or not that part of the triple lock nominally it gave the party leader a attempts to move the party closer to procedure was actually triggered.20 chance to appeal ‘above the heads’ Labour running into regular oppo- This was both to enable the party’s of the party’s committees and par- sition in the following nine months, leadership to be seen to be in control liamentarians, it more importantly which played a significant part in of events and also to ensure there prevented him invoking a threat his subsequent decision to stand was a widespread party buy-in to to do so at an earlier stage. The down,16 the triple lock then faded the decisions being made. Any deci- proposal can also be seen as the into procedural obscurity for many sion not to call a special conference culmination of a long series of ini- years, although it was briefly talked could have been overturned by a tially Liberal Party reforms aimed about during the expansion of the demand from the grassroots of the at giving ordinary party members Joint Consultative Committee in party, and such a scenario would greater power, such as party mem- autumn 1998. Ashdown did not have put the party’s leadership on bers electing the party leader, the follow the triple lock process for the back foot. Moreover, as one of appointment of the party treasurer this, arguing that it did not apply – Nick Clegg’s advisors subsequently being removed from the leader, and which resulted in an internal party said, ‘Thanks to the special con- strengthening the role of the party battle whereby some members of ference no one in the party can say committees in drawing up the gen- the FE (including Donnachadh they didn’t have a chance to have eral election manifesto. McCarthy) threatened to call a spe- their say.’21 Ashdown himself was keen to cial conference. Ashdown in turn An oddity of the triple-lock have a debate and decision that kept threatened to call an all-member process, however, was that it ended his own options open. By his own ballot, and peace only broke out up being used to pass judgement on account, he was reassured by oth- when Ashdown announced his a coalition agreement heavy on pol- ers that this amendment did just plans to retire. icy, but the process did not formally that, but when he read it himself The triple lock was not com- involve the party’s Federal Policy at 4.30 a.m. (sic) on the day it was pletely forgotten, however, and the Committee (FPC). The inclusion due to be debated, his initial reac- Federal Conference Committee’s of a role for the Federal Executive, tion was far more negative, verging officers, in particular, kept under but not for the FPC, in large part on depressed. Over the course of review the practical implications of dates back to the make-up of the the day, he was half won round by having to organise a special confer- committees in 1997/98, as the FPC, advisors to the view that he should ence under the triple lock arrange- which included both Howarth and neither flat-out oppose it nor view ments,17 discussing them with the Russell, was considerably more hos- its probable passage as signalling the party leadership several times in tile to Paddy Ashdown’s plans. end of his strategy for relations with intervening years and produc- Also technically excluded Labour. ing several documents setting out were the members of the parlia- When it came to the debate, the ways of implementing it. A par- mentary party in the House of amendment itself was relatively ticular problem for the FCC was Lords, although in practice they uncontroversial in the hall.14 Shirley The text was that, because the triple lock process were involved in the meetings Williams was lined up by Paddy was originally passed to deal with a that discussed and then agreed the Ashdown to oppose it, but hers was therefore not possible coalition agreement mid- coalition. Amongst the active par- the only forceful speech against. parliament, many of its supporters ticipants in those meetings was Objections as to its constitutional- so much anti- had not considered in detail how Paddy Ashdown who, despite his ity were raised by Willie Goodhart it might work in the more rushed original strategy of cooperation and Alan Leaman (not long out of coalition timetable after a general election.18 with Labour, spoke strongly in the post of Director of Strategy and as against Over the years, however, the poten- favour of the Conservative Party very close to Paddy Ashdown), but tial timescale for calling a special deal, saying he had been predis- conference representatives reacted Paddy Ash- conference was increasingly refined, posed to being unhappy with it but with a mixture of disagreement and by 2010 the likely election date was won over by its contents. and a belief that, even if techni- down trying was sufficiently clear for it to be pos- The involvement of the Lords cally the amendment could not bind sible to make discreet provisional and the triggering of the special the leader and MPs, the politics of to bounce arrangements ahead of the elec- conference – both technically the situation meant that passing it tion. Moreover, by then Ros Scott beyond the bounds of the triple lock would do so in practice.15 the party was party president and she was – illustrated the extent to which the Unexpectedly, the main bone keen to ensure that the triple lock triple lock had become a synonym of contention during the debate into one. was used if relevant circumstances for ‘involve the party widely’ rather

Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011 67 the history of the ‘triple lock’: where it came from, how it worked and its future

and unhelpful’ phrase; Leices- with some people openly saying many MPs had almost no advance than a legalistic process to fol- ter South (‘Conference resolves that I was proposing to sacrifice notice. This suggested that, unless low to the letter. That broader, to reject all notions of a coali- the Party for a Cabinet seat. If it significant action was taken, more flexible interpretation tion with Labour’); Oldham goes on like this I will lose and Ashdown would not consult in helped ensure its continuing East and Saddleworth, featuring lose badly. I begin to think it is advance on future similar such relevance as a process that could the ‘unnecessary and unhelpful’ impossible to lead the Party to decisions. work in circumstances very phrase and calling for a policy of where I think it has to go.’ (Ash- 13 The three numbered paragraphs down, Diaries: Volume 2, entry for gave rise to the term ‘triple lock’, different from those that gave ‘vigorously opposing on the many issues where we have real disa- 21 September 1997, p. 94). though journalist Brendan Carlin birth to it. However, the need greements with Labour’; and from 6 Conrad Russell’s status in the initially christened it the ‘quadru- for this flexibility also indicated Cambridge City (the Howarth party had been rising over pre- ple lock’ due to the two parts of a case for changing the techni- motion), which read: vious years as his parliamen- the first stage. cal wording, especially to cover Coalition with the Labour tary activities, writing and very 14 Despite being an amendment to a any future situations in which Party well-received speeches to party motion from the Federal Execu- there is no similar broad con- Conference notes the revival conference won him a large fol- tive, the FE ended up not oppos- of speculation about coa- lowing amongst grassroots activ- ing the amendment. sensus about the desirability of lition at national level ists, reflected in very high votes 15 A similar view was taken by the wide consultation. with the Labour Party. in internal party elections. That, Federal Executive at its first meet- The party conference in Conference welcomes coop- combined with the status and ing after the 2010 general election, spring 2011 therefore agreed, eration with other parties where access to publicity granted to him when Philip Goldenberg argued as part of a strategy debate, policy goals coincide and where by virtue of being a parliamentar- that the triple lock was not con- to review of the triple lock it is necessary for good govern- ian, made him a vocal and effec- stitutionally binding. In 1998 ment, whether at local, national tive advocate for the positions he there was a late attempt to derail over the summer of 2011. That or European level. decided to take up. the amendment for being uncon- review is due to come to the Conference notes, however, 7 David Howarth’s primary con- stitutional at an FE meeting after autumn 2011 conference with 1. That Labour’s command- cern was with a coalition with a conference. Tom McNally moved its recommendations for any ing majority in the House of Labour Party that had on its own a motion calling on the party changes to the process. But the Commons means that a coali- an overall majority in the House president to seek legal advice on fact that the review centres tion is not necessary for stable of Commons. However, the extra its constitutionality. The motion conditions called for went beyond was defeated fifteen to one. around modifying the triple government 2. That Labour has shown that. 16 Interview with Chris Rennard, lock, if necessary, shows that insufficient commitment to 8 When the FE was drawing up 2010. Ashdown had told his wife the triple lock is here to stay and funding the public services, its motion for the spring 1998 before the 1997 election that that the role of internal democ- protecting the environment, conference, a proposal to rule he would not continue as party racy in the Liberal Democrats safeguarding civil liber- out coalitions during the whole leader all the way through the continues to be very different ties and reforming the elec- parliament was rejected over- 1997 parliament. However, the whelmingly (with only two votes from that in both the Labour toral system for the House of failure of his political strategy Commons in favour). However, this was in both brought forward and con- and Conservative parties, nei- 3. That coalition would tend to large part due to it being a very firmed these plans. ther of which during the 2010 stifle debate and prevent legit- broad amendment that bundled 17 This included, on one occasion, coalition talks had any process imate and constructive criti- up many different issues within it. looking at the timescales and similar to the triple lock. cism of the Government 9 The local party had previously practicalities in response to a Conference therefore believes that agreed that Gordon Lishman request from the then chief whip, Dr Mark Pack worked at Liberal coalition with the Labour party at could submit on its behalf, so the Paul Burstow, who was in charge national level should be ruled out local party did not actually dis- of planning how the party might Democrat party HQ in 2000–07 for the rest of this Parliament. cuss or agree the text before it was handle a hung parliament. and has contributed as an author or 3 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown submitted. 18 David Howarth was an excep- editor to eighteen books spanning Diaries: Volume 2 1997–1999 (Allen 10 Amongst the other rejected tion to this. He did not see the history, politics and technology. His Lane, 2001), entry for 11 Septem- amendments was one from David number of steps involved as pos- doctorate is in 19th century English ber 1997, p. 89. Howarth which had a simpler ing a problem if a general election elections, and he is Co-Editor of the 4 Ashdown records in his diaries: lock mechanism, but explicitly resulted in a hung parliament, as ‘A long discussion [at the Par- applied it to any extension of the he believed that the formation of most widely read Liberal Democrat liamentary Party Meeting] on current cooperation with Labour. a government could, and should, blog, Lib Dem Voice (www. [Howarth’s motion]. It was finally The Lishman amendment put in be slowed down to accommodate LibDemVoice.org). agreed that we would try to stop more controls but reserved them the process. See David Howarth, the motion going ahead. But, to for larger decisions. Howarth ‘A Coalition is Born’, Journal of 1 Thank you to Liz Barker, Duncan my horror, almost everyone said ended up happy to see his amend- Liberal History 70 (spring 2011), pp. Brack, David Howarth, Gordon that if the Howarth motion does ment dropped in return for the 40–45. Lishman, Chris Rennard and oth- get put down, they would vote party leadership not opposing 19 Hence one phone call from a party ers for being interviewed for this for it. I managed to persuade them the Lishman amendment. Many officer to the author asking if the research. The views in the paper this would be silly. Far better to in Paddy Ashdown’s team also triple lock still applied and if he reflect my own conclusions and do keep our options open. Although were willing to see this trade- could be sent a copy. not necessarily reflect those of any I agreed to have a full debate on off as they feared that Howarth’s 20 The extent to which the triple other individual. party strategy in the spring.’ (Ash- amendment would be passed. lock had become the default way 2 Emergency motions were sub- down, Diaries: Volume 2, entry for 11 Interview with Gordon Lishman, of doing things was also shown in mitted by East Staffordshire, 24 September 1997, p. 94). The 2010. the lack of reaction to a ruling by which described talk of coalition parliamentary party and Ash- 12 Moreover, the creation of the the Federal Appeals Panel in 2010 with Labour as ‘unnecessary and down’s office only had a small rep- Joint Cabinet Committee after that the triple lock was unconsti- unhelpful’ and called for it to resentation on the FCC, and their the 1997 general election was seen tutional. That ruling may result ‘cease’; South Derbyshire, which views were often not followed, so by many in the party as an exam- in constitutional changes ahead also used the ‘unnecessary and this decision to oppose taking the ple of Paddy Ashdown bouncing of the 2015 general election, but it unhelpful’ phrase and made ref- motion was not in itself key to the the party, because the previously has not caused any desire to aban- erence to ‘the many issues where FCC’s subsequent decision. agreed FRED phone-tree process don the process. we have real disagreements with 5 Ashdown records in his diaries (Fast Reaction, Early Decision), 21 Conversation with the author, Labour policies’; Derby City, that, at the consultation session, designed in the case of a hung autumn 2010. again with the ‘unnecessary ‘I was again strongly criticised, parliament, was not invoked and

68 Journal of Liberal History 72 Autumn 2011