LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP

34 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 LIBERAL DEMOCRAT LEADERSHIP

An important factor verall, the Liberal or worse state than they found it; Democrats have been see Table 1. contributing to Owell served by their lead- the survival and ers – particularly during election campaigns, which is when most Communications skills achievements of the electors see and hear them; Paddy The leader’s communication skills Ashdown, and cover a variety of characteristics, Liberal Democrats has all performed credit- including media-friendliness and been the abilities of the ably in the elections in which they the ability to communicate well in led the party. different settings, such as confer- individuals who have So what makes a good Liberal ence speeches, press conferences, Democrat leader? All leaders inevi- interviews and meetings with party led the party. Given tably possess a mixture of strengths members. Particularly in the early the media’s tendency and weaknesses; equally, all change years of the party, when the leader and develop in response to the new was almost the only Liberal Demo- to focus on the party challenges and stresses of their ten- crat likely to receive any media ure in office. Nevertheless, it is attention, his ability to communi- leader to the exclusion possible to identify a series of char- cate the party’s message was crucial acteristics and abilities which make to its survival. All the four party of their colleagues, an individual well or less well fit- leaders have possessed some skills as the Liberal Democrat ted to the job. The leader needs a communicator – it would be diffi- communication skills, being able to cult to be elected to Parliament and leader has always played project the party, the party’s posi- then to the party leadership with- tion and his own competence as a out them – but their styles have a significant role in party leader and potential Prime varied widely. establishing the image Minister. This ability is reinforced It was clear even before his if the leader has something to say election to Parliament that Paddy of the party in the – a distinctive position or image for the Ashdown was a naturally gifted party. A related characteristic is his speaker; in 1981, after his first mind of the electorate. ability to develop a strategy for the speech to the Liberal Assembly, This in turn places party: what does the leader want opposing the deployment of US to do with his leadership, whether cruise missiles in the UK, he gained a premium on the in opposition or in government? a standing ovation. He worked hard The leader also needs to manage on his delivery and style, receiv- leader’s effectiveness, his own party, including his parlia- ing assistance from, among oth- which is why Charles mentary colleagues and the party ers, Max Atkinson, author of the in the country. Finally, the leader’s classic study of political speech- Kennedy’s and Menzies personal abilities – including their making, Our Masters’ Voices.1 energy, stamina and self-belief – Although his conference speeches Campbell’s perceived underpin everything else. could occasionally suffer from shortcomings caused This article considers how the being over-rehearsed, at his best four men who have so far occupied he was a powerful and inspiring such concern in 2005–06 the Liberal Democrat leadership speaker, with a compelling voice measure up against these charac- and distinctive turn of phrase. He and 2007. Duncan teristics and have proved effective was probably even better at talks Brack describes the in advancing the position and aims with small groups of party mem- of the party. In addition to this bers or ordinary citizens, taking characteristics of the qualitative assessment, a quantita- his jacket off and turning his chair tive element can be added through round in an easy, familiar way. He ideal Liberal Democrat examining the leaders’ political dealt effectively with the media leader, and considers records, in terms of votes won, and although at times could tend to MPs, MEPs and councillors elected, sound sanctimonious (something how the four men who party membership and their own of an occupational hazard for poli- personal opinion poll ratings, dem- ticians from third parties, used to have so far led the party onstrating the leaders’ electoral criticising both government and achievements and the extent to opposition), he came over well to measure up. which they left the party in a better the public, and frequently featured

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 35 liberal democrat leadership in opinion polls as the most popular simple soundbites, and took some tendency to focus primarily on party leader. time to settle into the political thea- the Labour and Conservative par- Charles Kennedy was also a nat- tre of Prime Minister’s Questions. ties, and journalists’ preference for urally gifted speaker, though with Although all this had improved reducing everything to a two-way a very different style to Ashdown’s substantially by the time he stepped choice, the Liberal Democrats suf- – low-key, humorous, often self- down, it was the initial poor image fer from an indistinct image; vot- deprecating. He honed his skills that stuck in the public’s mind. ers are often unclear what the party at Glasgow University, where he Nick Clegg has had less of a stands for. won the Observer Mace for debat- political apprenticeship than any of The more that the leader can ing. While studying for a PhD in the other Liberal Democrat lead- establish a Liberal Democrat posi- the US, he taught public speaking ers – five years as an MEP and just tion that is both memorable and and carried out research in speech two and a half as an MP before different from those of the other communication, political rhetoric being elected leader – but has been parties, then, the more effective he and British politics. After election a decent communicator, lacking the will be in projecting the party as a to the Commons, he soon acquired inspirational qualities of Ashdown whole. This includes the ability to a reputation as a gifted communi- but proving much steadier than spot a distinctive Liberal Democrat cator, both on the conference plat- Kennedy and much more attuned position in an existing debate, but form and TV, reaching not just to the political cut-and-thrust than even better is to be able to create an the usual political audience but a Campbell. After his election he entirely new and distinctive policy wider public with appearances on proved an effective speaker at party position which the party can call programmes such as ‘Wogan’ and conferences, and increasingly dis- its own. Or, it may revolve around ‘Have I Got News for You’. He played an ability to grab the media a more general positioning of the came over well in the 2001 elec- limelight. He also set out to pro- party, associating it with a set of tion, his image as an ordinary man, mote the party outside parliament, attitudes or general trends, or rela- someone people could enjoy a drink holding regular ‘town hall meet- tionships to either or both of the with in the bar, contrasting posi- ings’, where members of the public other two main parties. tively with his opponents, the pro- could question him on any topic Ashdown himself succeeded fessional politicians and they chose, a practice he took up in finding positions for his party William Hague. again after the formation of the which were highly liberal, princi- He steadily came to rely, how- coalition in 2010 and extended to a pled and distinctive – though his ever, too heavily on his native weekly radio phone-in on LBC. first attempt at finding a defini- talent and too little on detailed Clegg’s high point was the first tion for the new merged party, the preparation. The low point was the television leadership debate dur- adoption of the name ‘Democrats’ launch of the election manifesto in ing the 2010 election campaign, in 1988, was disastrous and was April 2005, where he proved inca- where he performed strongly in reversed a year later. His champi- pable of explaining the details of putting over the message that real oning of the right of Hong Kong the party’s policy on local income change was needed and that only citizens to be given British pass- tax. He was able to shrug this off the Liberal Democrats, with no ports in advance of the colony’s as a result of the birth of his son The leader record of failure in government, incorporation into China, after three days before, but in reality could deliver. ‘I agree with Nick’ the Tiananmen Square massacre in he was under-prepared and hung- needs com- became a widespread slogan after 1989, was distinctly more successful over. Although his performance used it several times in raising the profile of the party. improved later in the campaign, the munication in the debate, and ‘Cleggmania’ Later positions included support for party probably suffered from the became a phenomenon. He could the Maastricht Treaty of European fact that voters did not see him as a skills, being not, however, sustain this record Union in Parliament (including potential Prime Minister in what in the second and, especially, the voting with ’s govern- was a closer election than 2001. able to pro- third, debate, and his performance ment after it lost its majority fol- Like Kennedy, Menzies Camp- in the radio and TV debates against lowing internal rebellions) and bell acquired a fine debating repu- ject the Nigel Farage in the run-up to the pressing for western action on Bos- tation at Glasgow University, and European election in 2014 was nia and Kosovo. honed his skills further as a Scottish party, the much less impressive – though he In domestic policy, Ashdown advocate. He proved an eloquent gained respect, at least within the steered the party towards a more debater in the House of Commons party’s posi- party, for his decision to take on the market-oriented economic pol- and steadily built a reputation as a UKIP leader over the question of icy than the Liberal-SDP Alli- respected commentator on foreign tion and his EU membership. ance had possessed (including the affairs and an effective critic of gov- own compe- proposal for independence for the ernment policy. This did not serve, Bank of England, implemented however, as a suitable apprentice- tence as a Distinctive positioning by Labour after the 1997 election), ship for his leadership. Aged 64 Communications skills are of lim- a strong environmental platform when elected leader, he looked party leader ited value if the leader has noth- and a pledge to invest in public ser- and acted older, with an old-fash- ing particular to say. A constant vices, including, most memorably, ioned turn of phrase and style of and poten- problem for the Liberal Democrats a penny on income tax for educa- dress; his age was cruelly mocked has been to be noticed; as Paddy tion. By 1993, the party was coming in newspaper cartoons. He had tial Prime Ashdown is supposed to have said, top in opinion polls asking which too much respect for intellectual ‘I’d sell my grandmother for a bit party was the best on environmen- argument to be comfortable with Minister. of definition’. Given the media’s tal issues; it also scored relatively

36 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership

Table 1: Leadership performance Ashdown (1988–99) Kennedy (1999–2006) Campbell (2006–07) Clegg (2007–) Personal ratings (net score satisfied minus dissatisfied and date)a When elected –4 Aug 1988 +11 Aug 1999 +5 Mar 2006 –3 Jan 2008 Highest during leadership +58 May 1997 +42 June 2001 +6 May 2006 +53 Oct 2010 Lowest during leadership –24 July 1989 +8 June 2004 –13 May 2007 –45 Oct 2012 When stood down / latest +39 July 1999 +20 Aug 2005b –11 Sept 2007 –42 July 2014 Range (highest – lowest) 82 34 19 98 Party poll ratings (per cent and date)c When elected 8 July 1988 17 Aug 1999 19 Mar 2006 14 Dec 2007 Highest during leadership 28 July 1993 26 Dec 2004, May 25 Apr 2006 32 Apr 2010 2005 Lowest during leadership 4 June – Aug, 11 Oct 99, July 00, 11 Oct 2007 7 Feb 2013 Nov 1989 Jan, May 01 When stood down / latest 17 Aug 1999 15 Jan 2006 11 Oct 2007 8 July 2014 Westminster election performance: MPs and vote MPs when elected 19 46 63d 63 MPs when stood down / latest 46 62 63 56e Highest party vote in election (per cent 17.8 1992 22.0 2005 n/a 23.0 2010 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 16.8 1997 18.3 2001 n/a n/a and date)

European election performance: MEPs and vote MEPs when elected 0 10 12 12 MEPs when stood down / latest 10 12 12 1 Highest party vote in election (per cent 16.7 1994 14.9 2004 n/a 13.7 2009 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 6.4 1989 n/a n/a 6.6 2014 and date)

Local election performance: councillors and votef, g Councillors when elected 3,640 4,485 4,743 4,420 Councillors when stood down / latest 4,485 4,743 4,420 2,257 Highest party vote in election (per cent 27 1994 27 2003, 2004 25 2006 25 2009 and date)

Lowest party vote in election (per cent 17 1990 25 2002 24 2007 11 2014 and date)

Party membershiph, i Membership when elected 80,104 82,827 72,064 64,728 Membership when stood down / latest 82,827 72,064 64,728 43,451 Change (per cent) +3.4 –13.0 –10.2 –32.9 a Ipsos-MORI series on ‘satisfac- e 57 MPs were elected in 2010, but the total number of councillors largest UK political parties has tion with party leaders’; ibid. Mike Hancock was suspended fell by about 15 per cent. declined fairly continuously b Ipsos-MORI did not ask the from the party in January 2014. h Stephen Tall, ‘Lib Dem party since the 1950s. From 1988 to question after August 2005 dur- f Colin Rallings and Michael membership: the occasional 2011, Conservative membership ing Kennedy’s leadership. Thrasher, Elections Centre, ups and mostly downs since fell by about 85 per cent, and c Taken from the Ipsos-MORI Plymouth University. For vot- 1988’ (Lib Dem Voice, 3 August Labour membership by about 30 series, available at: http://www. ing figures, years in which local 2014); leadership election results per cent; set against this, the 46 ipsos-mori.com/researchspecial- elections coincided with general (including numbers of ballot per cent fall in Liberal Democrat isms/socialresearch/specareas/ elections are excluded. papers issued) at http://www. membership from 1988 to 2013 politics/trends.aspx g The total number of council- crosenstiel.webspace.virgin- does not look so bad. Source: d was elected in the lors has been falling since the media.com/ldelections/lead- House of Commons Library Dunfermline & West Fife by- mid 1990s, as unitary authorities ers.htm. ‘Latest’ figures are end Standard Note, Membership of election during the 2006 leader- have replaced district councils 2013. UK political parties (December ship election. in some areas; from 1994 to 2013, i Membership of all the three 2012).

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 37 liberal democrat leadership well on education, though remain- anti-American and far left groups), Communica- however, overwhelmingly defined ing in third place.2 Both the elec- Kennedy left it until the very last by the party’s decision to enter into tion manifestos produced under moment to decide to join in, tak- tions skills coalition with the Conservatives in Ashdown’s leadership were well ing the decision without consulting 2010. This had led most observers regarded by the media. ‘The Liberal Campbell, or anyone else, follow- are of limited to conclude that this was his strat- Democrat essay far out-distances ing a Guardian lunch at which jour- egy from beginning, and indeed, its competitors with a fizz of ideas nalists criticised his prevarication. value if the he did make early attempts to steer and an absence of fudge,’ stated The In fact, although Kennedy rarely the party to the right, announcing Guardian in 1992.3 In 1997 The Inde- showed much initiative, he gener- leader has after the leadership election his sup- pendent called the party’s manifesto ally displayed good judgement in port for free schools and a widening the most challenging of the three, reacting to events. Over the Rom- nothing par- of the use of private health care to saying that politics without the sey by-election in May 2000 (where ticular to say. meet NHS targets, and beginning Liberal Democrats would be ‘intol- he took on the Conservatives over to talk about using savings in public erable’; Peter Riddell in The Times their policy on immigration and on A constant expenditure to cut taxes rather than enjoyed its ‘refreshing candour’ and the right of self-defence, after Nor- see increased spending elsewhere. admired Ashdown’s willingness folk farmer Tony Martin had shot problem for The 2010 manifesto, however, with to leap where Tony Blair feared to dead a burglar), gradual withdrawal its top four priorities of the pupil tread.4 from the Joint Consultative Com- the Liberal premium, constitutional reform, In this respect, as in many oth- mittee set up by Ashdown with the job creation through green growth ers, Charles Kennedy was a com- Labour government, and his refusal Democrats and investment in infrastructure, plete contrast. Laid back to the to participate in the Butler Inquiry and an increase in the income tax point of inertia, he seldom pushed into the intelligence on Iraqi weap- has been to threshold, paid for by closing tax any particular position, leaving the ons of mass destruction, he instinc- loopholes and green taxation, did running to be made by others in tively adopted positions that kept be noticed; not represent a notably right-wing the party. The book he published in the party happy while differentiat- agenda, and the reasons for joining 2000, The Future of Politics, although ing it in the eyes of the public. as Paddy a coalition with the Conservatives designed to answer the question ’s leadership instead of Labour were so strong ‘What makes this Kennedy fel- was too brief to give him much of Ashdown is that it is inconceivable that any low tick? … Why is he a Liberal a chance to develop any distinctive alternative leader would have done Democrat?’5 revealed only, as his positioning of his own. He inher- supposed to anything different – which is why biographer put it, ‘a startling lack ited an agenda of policy reform, only a handful of activists voted of original thinking on policy or a including significant changes in have said, against the coalition at the party’s strand of political thought that was taxation policy and a new approach ‘I’d sell my special conference in May 2010.8 identifiably his own’.6 The ques- to the British nuclear deterrent, Clegg’s handling of party posi- tion was still going begging in June but fought for these changes in a grandmother tioning within the coalition has 2005, when Kennedy failed to give way that Kennedy never would not been without its problems. any convincing answer to Steve have, including in particular his for a bit of At the beginning he chose – not Webb MP’s question after his deliv- intervention in the debate on Tri- unreasonably – to stress the virtues ery of a paper on the party’s future dent at the spring 2007 party con- definition’. of coalition as an effective form prospects: ‘I would just like to ference, which clearly swung the of government, but went too far know: what motivates you? What vote. However, he was too innately in giving the impression that the gets you up in the morning?’7 cautious for the leader of the third coalition was better than a Liberal The major exception to this, party. On a number of occasions, Democrat government would have of course, is Iraq, where Kennedy he took his time reaching decisions, been. As the introduction to the full ended up in the fortunate posi- only to find that the ground had coalition programme claimed: ‘We tion of opposing an unpopular war shifted under his feet, often because have found that a combination of backed by both the government of leaks to the media, before he our parties’ best ideas and attitudes and its main opposition, and with could announce them (his measured has produced a programme for gov- a united party behind him. In real- response to Gordon Brown’s mis- ernment that is more radical and ity, no Liberal Democrat leader chievous attempt to recruit Liberal comprehensive than our individ- (apart, possibly, from Ashdown, Democrats into his cabinet in 2007 ual manifestos’,9 and at the Liberal who supported Blair’s actions, but ended up looking like duplicity and Democrat conference in September only in private) would have been weakness). His preference for con- 2010, Clegg argued that the coa- likely to do anything different: in sultation before he reached deci- lition was ‘more than the sum of September 2002, the party con- sions – in itself an admirable trait our parts’.10 In practice this simply ference voted overwhelmingly to – sometimes stopped him making undermined the party’s image as support military action only as a the snap decision that might have anything more than Tory sidekicks. last resort and under a clear UN served better. The crushing electoral defeats in mandate, and in February 2003 the Nick Clegg made early attempts the 2011 local, Scottish and Welsh party’s Federal Executive called to carve out distinctive positions elections, and the failure of the unanimously for Liberal Demo- for the party, over, for example, alternative vote referendum, forced crat participation in the major equal rights of residence for Gur- a reappraisal. As Clegg put it a week anti-war march in London. Held khas, or his call for the resignation later, ‘the current government is a back by the concerns of the foreign of the Speaker, Michael Martin, coalition of necessity ... In the next affairs spokesman Menzies Camp- over the failure to police MPs’ phase of the coalition, both partners bell (who feared association with expense claims. Clegg’s image is, will be able to be clearer in their

38 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership identities ... You will see a strong potential or actual, with other par- early years at all without Ashdown, liberal identity in a strong coalition ties; or both. It should be noted, or at least would have taken much government. You might even call though, that a leader can prove longer to recover. it muscular liberalism.’11 Yet three himself effective without having In the second phase of his leader- years later, after even worse results any particular strategy. The real- ship, 1992–97, he successfully rode in the 2014 local and European elec- ity of life for a third party in Brit- the rising tide of support for centre- tions, he had to do much the same, ish politics is that its performance left sentiment and the rejection of defending the decision to enter coa- depends often – perhaps mostly the Conservative government that lition while highlighting policy – on external factors over which it not only swept Labour into power differences with his coalition part- has little or no control: the perfor- in 1997 but delivered the highest ners: ‘I want people to know that mance of the government and the number of seats for a third party for we have our own distinct vision, main opposition, and key devel- seventy years. Under a less skilled based on our own distinct values – opments such as wars or economic leader, the Liberal Democrats could a liberal belief in opportunities; a recessions. As the journalist and easily have been squeezed out by liberal faith in people’s talents and party employee David Walter Blair’s . The abandon- ambitions’.12 described it, ‘the party’s position ment of ‘equidistance’ between The major problem faced by has been that of a surfer, waiting the Conservatives and Labour that Clegg is that whatever he says, a patiently for the right wave to rise Ashdown championed from 1992 portion of the electorate now does and then using all its skills to stay onwards can thus be seen as an – not believe him – a legacy primar- upright and to travel as far and as ultimately successful – attempt to ily of the way in which the party fast as possible’.14 become part of the movement for campaigned in 2010 on a promise These constraints never, how- change rather a casualty of it. to phase out university tuition fees, ever, prevented Paddy Ashdown In contrast, the third phase of and then signed up to a policy of from developing a strategy – or, the Ashdown leadership, 1997–99, increasing them once in govern- indeed, several. He had mapped was a failure, as Ashdown himself ment. Clegg has only himself to out his own three-phase plan on freely admits. Following up his blame for this: he (and the party’s becoming leader: proposal, in 1992, to ‘work with economic spokesman, ) others to assemble the ideas around never believed in the policy and The first was survival from a which a non-socialist alternative never attempted to advance it in point of near extinction; the sec- to the Conservatives can be con- the coalition negotiations, despite ond was to build a political force structed’,16 he edged steadily closer the damage that they should have with the strength, policy and to the Labour leader Tony Blair realised this would inflict in the positions to matter again in Brit- after his election in 1994; this led light of the party’s election cam- ish politics; and the third was in turn to agreement on a joint paign, which included all its MPs to get on to the field and play in agenda for constitutional reform signing pledges to vote against any what I believed would become a (the Cook–Maclennan agreement), increase in tuition fees, and one of very fluid period of politics.15 covert electoral cooperation with his own election broadcasts focus- Labour in the 1997 election, secret ing entirely on the ‘broken prom- Strategic planning of this sort was talks over a joint electoral plat- ises’ of other parties. It may be that absolutely typical of Ashdown, form and a , his perceived poor performance in one of the characteristics almost and the eventual creation of a con- the 2014 debates with Nigel Far- everyone who worked with him sultative Joint Cabinet Commit- age can be at least partly attributed The ability remembers – he always had a plan, tee between the two parties after to the fact that some in the elector- and a position paper, and when the election. Although several ate are now no longer prepared to to develop he achieved one objective he was aspects of the Cook-Maclennan listen to his message whatever it is. already looking ahead to the next. agenda were implemented, the big As one of his ministers despairingly a strat- And in fact, within the constraints prize, proportional representation put it in 2014, ‘is there anything he he faced, he was remarkably suc- for Westminster, was never even can say on any subject that doesn’t egy for the cessful. His party survived its first close – either because Blair never just make things worse?’13 difficult years, despite the self- meant it, and was simply string- party is am inflicted wounds it had inherited ing Ashdown and his party along, from the break-up of the Alliance or because he did mean it but was Party strategy important and the merger negotiations, its unable to force it through his own The ability to develop a strategy internal weaknesses of finance and party. for the party is am important lead- leadership membership, the challenges it faced Ashdown’s approach increas- ership characteristic: what does for third-party status from the ingly alarmed his own MPs and the leader want to do with his character- Owenite SDP and the Greens, and party activists, particularly after leadership? This may focus on the istic: what its lack of a distinct image. He took the 1997 election, when they could development of distinctive posi- the party organisation seriously, see no point in trying to align tions, as discussed above, but it is does the chairing its Federal Policy Com- themselves with a Labour govern- – at least potentially – more than mittee and giving a clear lead on ment with a massive majority. As that. The strategy can be internal, leader want key policies, working with council- Tony Greaves has observed, ‘Lib- revolving around reforms of the lors and campaigners and restoring eral Democrats loved their leader party’s organisation or campaign- to do with his morale and a sense of purpose. It but, insofar as they sensed his ing approach; or it can be exter- is not unreasonable to suggest that strategy, most wanted none of it. nal, concerned with relationships, leadership? the party may not have survived its The “what if” question must be

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 39 liberal democrat leadership how much more could have been style became steadily less well To start with, Nick Clegg’s achieved if all that time at the top suited to the higher profile role the strategy was similar to Campbell’s: and personal energy had been spent party began to play after its oppo- to stabilise the party after a forced on something other than “The sition to the Iraq War boosted its leadership election. He achieved Project”.’17 But was there a realistic standing in the approach to the this and presided over a period of alternative? Like the Liberal lead- 2005 election, widely expected gradual recovery in the opinion ers and to be considerably closer than the polls, reassuring the party that it before him, Ashdown was driven 2001 contest. His lack of a coher- would have no need to face a third inexorably by the logic of the Lib- ent agenda became increasingly leadership election. As discussed eral Democrats’ position as a third obvious and his (previously largely above, it is not clear whether Clegg party. However well the party per- hidden) alcoholism began to cause came into office with a clear plan formed in elections it never seemed more problems, including a series and determination to move the feasible that it would leap straight of missed speeches and a disastrous party to the right, or whether it to majority government from third opening to the 2005 election cam- simply seemed a sensible response position, or even replace one of paign. The feeling, in the party and at the time to the disintegration of the two bigger parties as the main outside, that the Liberal Demo- New Labour and the attempt by the opposition. Sooner or later the crats had failed to realise a historic Conservative leader David Cam- party would hold the balance of opportunity in the 2005 election eron to attract Liberal Democrat power, and in the political circum- helped to trigger increasing con- supporters. After the party’s deci- stances of the 1990s it was incon- cern, which manifested itself in a sion to enter into coalition with the ceivable that the Liberal Democrats notably unhappy party conference Conservatives in 2010, most com- could have reached an arrangement It should in September 2005 and a wide- mentators found it easier to present with anyone other than the Labour spread perception of drift and lack it as the former, conspiracy stories Party. Indeed, Ashdown was not be noted, of direction – all contributing sig- about takeovers of the party by a particularly aiming for a hung nificantly to Kennedy’s forced res- small right-wing clique making parliament, in which, he thought, though, that ignation in January 2006. His basic a better story. It is also plausible, any attempt to bring in PR would problem – that he had no agenda however, that Clegg was simply be seen as weakness on the part of a leader can for his leadership, no obvious rea- reacting to circumstances, in a way the bigger coalition partner; he son to be leader and no idea of the that his predecessors had always wanted to introduce it from a posi- prove him- direction he wanted the party to done. Having said that, it is also the tion of strength, with both par- go in – perhaps leads to the conclu- case that Clegg was the first Liberal ties of the left genuinely behind self effec- sion that even if Liberal Democrat Democrat leader not to have been it. His problem was that most of leaders have little real control over active in politics under Thatcher’s the Labour Party was never com- tive without the success of their party’s strategy, and Major’s Conservative govern- mitted to PR at all, and saw no having any they do at least need to be seen to ments; his instincts always appeared point in making any concessions to have one. to be more hostile to Labour and Ashdown’s party once they com- particular Menzies Campbell’s immedi- economic-liberal than were Ash- manded a 179-seat majority in the ate tasks were to stabilise the party, down’s, Kennedy’s or Campbell’s. House of Commons (though he did strategy. The after the disruption of the previous This was reinforced by the eco- achieve it for the European elec- six months, to professionalise its nomic-liberal tendencies of the tions and the new Scottish and reality of life organisation and to give it direc- majority of the Liberal Democrat Welsh parliaments). But Ashdown tion. To a considerable extent he Shadow Cabinet, in contrast to the was always going to try; he did for a third achieved all three. Like Ashdown, wider parliamentary party and the not possess the temperament to sit he took the party organisation seri- party membership as a whole. quietly on the sidelines, snatching party in Brit- ously, chairing meetings effectively As noted above, Clegg’s strat- what chances he could to advance and imposing a sense of purpose. In egy in coalition has veered from incrementally. And in the final ish politics is terms of policy, he largely adopted concentrating on the virtues of analysis, if Ashdown had delivered the reform agenda begun after the coalition as a form of effective on PR, the third phase of his lead- that its per- 2005 election but, as noted above, government to differentiating his ership would have been seen as a fought for it and pushed it through. party more clearly from the Con- triumphant success. It was a calcu- formance After Gordon Brown’s arrival as servatives. Yet while the first phase lated strategy, but it failed. Prime Minister in June 2007 raised of this approach may have been Charles Kennedy possessed depends the prospect of a general election in successful, with one study of the an entirely different approach to the autumn, a manifesto was final- coalition’s first eighteen months party strategy: he didn’t have one. often – per- ised after the September confer- concluding that it ‘set a model for As noted above, this is not always haps mostly ence, and the party organisation harmonious and unified govern- a major defect. Unlike Ashdown, was in good shape to fight an elec- ment’,18 the second phase has been he inherited a party organisation – on external tion in October. Unfortunately for much less so, with a succession of in reasonably good shape, and, as Campbell, none of this counted for awful local election results, and noted above, he proved astute at factors over much in the outside world, where the party’s opinion poll rating judging political opportunities he failed to build an image as an stuck generally below 10 per cent. and reacting to events. He had a which it has effective and charismatic leader. It It was always clear that entry into good election campaign in 2001, was not his strategy but his image coalition – with any other party – with a net gain of six seats even little or no that let him down; and Brown’s would alienate a proportion of the though most observers expected postponement of the election from party’s voters, but the party always losses. However, his leadership control. autumn 2007 sealed his fate. hoped that it would win others to

40 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership replace them, including those who policy, where the Liberal Demo- Indepen- much as possible, the grim national perhaps might have supported them crats signed up almost entirely to picture. in 2010 but had not because they the Conservative agenda for reduc- dently- believed the party could never form ing public expenditure, despite a government. In reality, there their manifesto warning of the minded and Party management is very little sign of this, and the perils of cutting too fast. This The leader needs to manage his party’s actions in coalition could came as a surprise to the Conserva- inherently own party. Independently-minded almost have been designed to alien- tive negotiating team; George and inherently suspicious of author- ate its core bases of support. As one Osborne, the Shadow Chancel- suspicious ity, the Liberal Democrats are not Liberal Democrat minister put it lor, is reported to have said: ‘This an easy party to lead; as Paddy Ash- as early as 2011: ‘Unless we can get should be the happiest day of our of authority, down put it in June 1999: some of the fluffy bunny voters lives, because it’s all our policy the Liberal back, we are done for. I’m not sure that’s being agreed’.20 (Clegg’s jus- … our beloved Lib Dems, who there are enough centre ground tification was that the coalition Democrats are, bless them, inveterately voters. The Lib Dem base has been needed, above anything else, cred- sceptical of authority, often public sector workers, students and ibility in the financial markets, are not an exasperating to the point of intellectuals. We have contrived to given the growing sovereign debt dementia, as difficult to lead fuck them all off.’19 This is perhaps crisis in Greece and other European easy party to where they don’t want to go as the most serious criticism that can countries.) It can also be argued a mule, and as curmudgeonly be levelled at Clegg’s strategy for that the party underplayed its hand lead. about success as one of those the party: that while he was right in the distribution of ministries, football supporters who regards to enter coalition, his and his col- leaving them without control of his team’s promotion to the leagues’ actions since have been any of the major spending depart- premier league as insufficient conducted without enough thought ments such as health or education. because they haven’t also won to the party’s ability to survive. Constitutional reform and climate the FA cup!24 A key part of Clegg’s strategy change are important issues for will be to face the 2015 election the party but are less salient to the The leader has much responsibil- with a strong list of Liberal Demo- general public. This only serves to ity, but not always a commensurate crat achievements in government demonstrate, one academic argued, amount of authority. Neverthe- – the first third-party leader to be ‘what happens when vegetarians less, he can do much to earn – or to able to do so since 1945. There is a negotiate with carnivores’.21 In an lose – the respect and affection of real record which the party will opinion poll in May 2011, 74 per his party members, and the lack of point to, particularly in the areas cent believed that the Liberal Dem- either makes it more difficult for of income tax, green energy, child ocrats had little or no influence him to get his own way. However, care and the legalisation of same- over government decisions.22 the party has never been faction- sex marriage. Equally, there are The party’s achievements will be alised in a way in which other par- many Tory measures which the important to some groups of voters, ties often are; there has never been Liberal Democrats have prevented, but overwhelmingly the coalition a group hostile to everything any including several dropped from partners will be judged in terms of of the four leaders have tried to do, the Conservative manifesto in the their economic record; and, as an and the party membership has con- coalition agreement. To set against analysis of the record of coalition sistently proved loyal to the leaders this, of course, there are clear fail- governments in other countries it elects. The successive overthrows ures, particularly in Clegg’s own suggests, the electoral benefits of of Charles Kennedy and Men- area of ministerial responsibility, economic growth are normally felt zies Campbell were implemented constitutional reform – notably by the party of the Prime Minis- by Liberal Democrat MPs, not by the defeat of the alternative vote ter rather than by any other parties members in the country – under- proposal and the dropping of plans within their coalition.23 More fun- lining the importance of manag- for reform of the damentally, how the British elec- ing the parliamentary parties. The (though the adoption of fixed- torate will respond to a period of situation has become more com- term parliaments will have lasting coalition is not clear: commonplace plicated since 2010, with three dif- consequences). in other developed democracies, it ferent groups – cabinet ministers, Will this, however, prove to be is still rare in the UK, and the evi- all Liberal Democrat ministers, enough? There is a credible argu- dence suggests that what would and backbenchers (including some ment that the Liberal Democrats elsewhere be viewed as parties sacked former ministers) needing did not get enough out of the coali- cooperating in the national inter- to be managed – along, of course, tion negotiations in the first place. est is more likely to be interpreted with the parliamentary party in the The party likes to point to the in the UK as the Liberal Democrats House of Lords, the party in the fact that a greater proportion of in general, and Nick Clegg in par- country (including its structure of its manifesto pledges than of the ticular, breaking the promises they committees, English regional and Conservatives’ made it into the made in 2010. In reality, this will autonomous Scottish and Welsh coalition agreement, but since the force the party back into a strat- parties), and the leader’s own office Tory manifesto was twice as long egy with which it has long been and advisers. as the Liberal Democrat one, the familiar: fight the election like a Paddy Ashdown was a party coalition agreement was still Tory- series of by-elections, focusing on manager par excellence. After dominated. This is particularly local issues and the strength of the some initial mistakes, his efforts to true in the crucial area of economic local candidate, while ignoring, as rebuild the party after its disastrous

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 41 liberal democrat leadership early period, his down-to-earth by an MP, but not necessarily the And he needs by supporting the idea of a refer- manner and easy rapport with leader. Unlike Ashdown, however, endum on British membership of party activists and his evident cha- his impact on the Committee, and to love his the EU, a response to the growing risma generated not merely respect on the party’s policy-making pro- pressure from the Conservatives but love; as the Economist put it in cesses, was almost zero. party and all and UKIP for a referendum on the 1991, ‘ordinary party members will He failed most starkly in man- potential European constitution; take things from him for which aging his MPs. Initially his more it stands for; many Liberal Democrat peers had they would have lynched David collegiate style of leadership was experienced the European ques- Owen’. 25 He managed the party welcome after Ashdown’s lead from as Ashdown tion as a defining issue of their time structure well, involving himself the front, but it gradually turned in politics in the 1960s, 1970s and fully in its committees and key into a leadership vacuum. He was put it, ‘It is, 1980s, and tended to be a good deal organisations. Yet it is also true, as often very talented at analysing a incidentally, more pro-EU than their counter- Tony Greaves pointed out, that his situation (suggesting that he might parts in the Commons. The party’s strategy of doing deals with Labour have been a success at the career he not neces- slide in the opinion polls through- – ‘The Project’ – steadily alienated almost followed, journalism) but out 2007 led to number of MPs and first his parliamentary party and seldom put forward a clear direc- sary for par- peers starting to try to destabilise then the wider party membership. tion for his MPs to react for or his leadership, briefing the press This was not a case, however, of a against, although he was capable of ties to love against him and hoping to trigger leader losing touch with his party; it on some occasions, for example a new leadership election – which Ashdown argued that he knew over Iraq. Never close friends with their leaders ultimately succeeded. exactly what he was doing: most of his MPs, he seldom mixed Nick Clegg proved himself a socially with them and steadily – to respect relatively astute party manager up I quite deliberately went round grew more and more isolated – until entry into coalition in 2010. building up my popularity in reinforced by the behaviour of his them is usu- Relatively unknown within the the party, both by delivering office, which, necessarily, devoted party on his election, he steadily results and also by being very more and more of its efforts to ally enough. came to command respect for his consensual, conscious of the fact keeping him out of sight rather energetic efforts to raise the party that when I started to play on the than keeping him in touch. Despite But it is vital profile, both in parliament and the field in stage 3, I was really going all this, his parliamentary party dis- country, culminating in his sterling to have to [use up this politi- played an incredible degree of loy- for leaders performance in the 2010 election. cal capital and] … make myself alty, those of them that knew about to love their Although his leadership election unpopular with the party.26 his alcoholism repeatedly cover- gave no hint of his preference for a ing up for him, sometimes over parties – more right-wing slant to party pol- After his resignation, Ashdown a period of years. Right up until icy (see above), he was able to edge remained immensely popular with the last few months, most of them otherwise the party in that direction with- Liberal Democrats; the announce- never wanted him to go, just to be out too much trouble. He paid less ment, at the September 2013 confer- better. In the end it was Kennedy why would attention personally to the party ence, of his appointment as chair of that destroyed his own support by organisation than did Ashdown the 2015 general election campaign failing to show any signs that he we put up and Campbell, chairing the Fed- was greeted with delight. understood his lack of leadership eral Policy Committee only briefly Charles Kennedy displayed a and was capable of dealing with it. with it?’ (and not particularly successfully), very different style of party man- Menzies Campbell inspired though the major review of the agement: laid-back and relaxed, respect rather than the affection party structure he commissioned in this formed a considerable part of generated by Ashdown and Ken- 2007–08 (the ‘Bones report’, after his attraction after the last, divi- nedy; he was less well-known its author) led to some organisa- sive, years of the Ashdown leader- in the party in the country, and tional reforms, mainly in the party ship. He was already well-known always more of an aloof figure at headquarters.27 within the party, and well-liked, party conference. Nevertheless, Although all wings of the party partly because of his lone stand, he had a solid reputation as a long- supported entry into coalition, it amongst the SDP’s MPs, against term activist and candidate in the was Clegg’s handling of the tuition David Owen’s opposition to merger Scottish party, and a respected fees question in government which in 1987, partly because of his ami- foreign affairs spokesman and dep- severely damaged his reputation, able and approachable nature, uty leader under Kennedy. But as among party members as much as partly because of his popular media with Kennedy, he failed mainly the wider public. Over the first half profile. In the end, however, sim- in managing his parliamentary of the Parliament, his approval rat- ply being likeable was not enough; party, where he lacked solid sup- ing amongst party members fell he needed to at least try to give a port. Although the vast majority from +68 in July 2010 to –2 in Sep- lead to the party, but, as his former of the party’s MPs had voted for tember 2012.28 It is notable, how- speech-writer Richard Grayson him in the leadership election, there ever, that right up until the May commented in 2005, he was ‘per- was no real inner circle commit- 2014 elections, there was no system- haps more chairman than leader’. ted to the Campbell leadership; as atic attempt to force him out; and Even in that role he was not nota- an obvious caretaker leader never the ‘Lib Dems 4 Change’ campaign bly successful. Like Ashdown, he likely to do more than one elec- started afterwards failed to gain chose to take over the chairman- tion, most of them were looking much momentum, with another ship of the Federal Policy Com- ahead to his successor. He alien- Lib Dem Voice poll in May 2014 mittee, a post which has to be filled ated many Liberal Democrat peers showing opposition to resignation

42 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 liberal democrat leadership by 54 per cent to 39 per cent – Citizen’s Britain in 1989, and Beyond has been argued by this author33) is partly because there was no obvious Westminster in 1994;31 his confer- unresolvable. alternative leadership candidate and ence speeches often challenged As argued above, although partly because many party mem- party orthodoxies, particularly in Menzies Campbell’s leadership bers recognised that the problems the early years. He was – almost helped to stabilise the party after facing the party were wider than always – tremendously self-confi- Kennedy’s resignation, his own just Clegg’s leadership. In fact, the dent, sometimes too much so; as his image then undermined it. As main impact of the coalition on the adviser Richard Holme warned in one commentator put it, ‘he has party has been a significant fall in January 1997 about his approaches been wounded by polls suggest- its membership, down by 35 per to Tony Blair: ‘You must not get ing that voters still preferred Ken- cent from 2010 to December 2012, carried away with the film script nedy drunk to Campbell sober ... when it stood at 42,501 (though it you have written in your head – He likes to think of himself as a has since seen a slight increase (see two strong people standing up and statesman. He needs to remember Table 1); since most of those leav- shaping history.’32 Arguably, this that a leader also has to be a sales- ing can reasonably be assumed to self-confidence led him to put too man.’34 He was a decent, honour- be hostile to Clegg’s leadership, this much trust in Blair and to believe able and thoughtful man, driven has in practice helped to secure his too strongly in the prospects for by a sense of duty and responsibil- position. ‘The Project’ – but, as argued ity underpinned by an instinctive, above, it was worth the attempt. slightly old-fashioned liberalism, Charles Kennedy’s main prob- rather than by any clear ideological Personal abilities lem was that he never appeared or policy agenda – but these quali- Leading the Liberal Democrats is a to believe in his own abilities as ties proved to be not enough for stressful and at times thankless job. leader. Possibly this was a result leading a third party lacking a clear As well as the normal pressures of of only infrequently having to national message in an increasingly politics, there is the strain of car- fight for his goals; after he was media-intensive age. rying the responsibility of being selected as SDP candidate for Ross, Whatever criticisms can be lev- the main – sometimes almost the Cromarty & Skye in 1983, his elled at Nick Clegg, one has to only – public face of the party, political career followed almost admire his toughness. The abuse together with the knowledge that effortlessly. His candidacy for the he suffered over tuition fees was far the media is watching every step leadership in 1999 can be seen as worse than that faced by any Lib- and probing every secret. It there- simply following the line of least eral Democrat leader, or by most fore helps if the leader is healthy resistance, which was to do what politicians in any circumstances. and possesses energy and stamina. everyone expected him to and Student demonstrations before the He also needs to believe in his own put his name forward. This back- Parliamentary vote in December basic abilities and competence. ground, coupled with an over- 2010, well-supported and occasion- And he needs to love his party and reliance on his natural talent at the ally violent, were targeted par- all it stands for; as Ashdown put expense of preparation, left him ticularly at Clegg and the Liberal it, ‘It is, incidentally, not neces- with too few reserves of self-con- Democrats; he was burnt in effigy sary for parties to love their lead- fidence and self-discipline to fall and had excrement pushed through ers – to respect them is usually back on under the strains of leader- his letterbox in his constituency enough. But it is vital for leaders to It seems to ship. He had seemed to be able to home. (His young sons once asked love their parties – otherwise why overcome his shyness at school and him: ‘Papa, why do the students would we put up with it?’29 be an iron university by donning a different hate you so much?’35) Despite the As his diaries reveal, even Paddy persona, as an actor or as a debater, additional strains of representing Ashdown sometimes buckled law of poli- but he could not cope with the the party in coalition, and acting under the strains of leadership. ‘I requirement, as leader, to wear a as one member of the ‘quad’ which am plagued by the nightmare that tics – or at public persona all the time. Under takes the key decisions, he retains, the party that started with Glad- pressure, when he had to perform – at least in public, a very high level stone will end with Ashdown’ he least of Lib- for example in election campaigns of self-confidence, sharing this recorded on European election day – he could often recover much of characteristic with Ashdown. This in 1989, and after the results were eral Demo- his native ability and talent, but is almost certainty a prerequisite announced three days later, ‘to bed away from pressure, in the day-to- of effective leadership – but it also about 3.00. I couldn’t sleep a wink. crat politics day work of Parliament and the has its drawbacks, as in the tuition We are in a very black position month-to-month job of manag- fees episode, when Clegg failed indeed.’30 Nevertheless, in public he – that par- ing the party, he too often simply to appreciate the opposition his displayed an apparently inexhaust- ties elect lapsed into inertia. All of this was position would generate, because ible supply of energy, helped by his of course exacerbated by alcohol, he had convinced himself of its obvious physical fitness, and hyper- leaders as which he turned to increasingly, rightness. activity. He thought – and wor- perhaps out of recognition of his One interesting aspect of party ried – about everything, ringing up different own under-performance. Whether leadership is whether the leader is party spokesmen, for example, to he would have proved a fine leader an insider or an outsider. Kennedy get them to respond to an obscure as possible if it wasn’t for his problems with and Campbell were the former, proposal in a local party’s confer- alcohol (as expressed in the title with a long background in Liberal, ence resolution. He was fascinated from their of his biography, Charles Kennedy: SDP and Liberal Democrat poli- by ideas, and published a series of A Tragic Flaw) or whether he was tics (starting at university) before books and pamphlets, including predecessors. a poor leader drunk or sober (as becoming leader. Ashdown and

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 43 liberal democrat leadership

Clegg were the latter, coming into All the four had an election in 2007 resulted in a Government: Coalition (2010–2011)’. politics, and the Liberal Democrats, hung parliament, could have occu- In Duncan Brack and Robert Ingham late and with no particular back- men who led pied a coalition ministerial post (eds.), Peace, Reform and Liberation: A ground before being elected to the with distinction; but, like Kennedy, history of Liberal politics in Britain, 1679– Commons or the European Parlia- the Liberal his own qualities did not equip him 2011 (Biteback, 2011), pp. 362–65. ment. Insiders are more likely to for playing the role of the Liberal 9 HM Government, The Coalition: Our understand and respect the party; Democrats Democrat leader in the twenty-first Programme for Government (May 2010), outsiders are more likely to dis- century. His leadership saw a steady p. 8. count the party’s response and over its first fall in the party’s poll ratings and a 10 Full speech available at www. perhaps care less about its survival twenty-five slight drop in its council strength. libdemvoice.org/full-text-nick- – but also, perhaps, more likely to Nick Clegg is still the big cleggs-speech-to-liberal-democrat- provide the innovation and new years have unknown: his place in history, as autumn-conference-21236.html thinking that third parties need to the first Liberal in British govern- 11 Nick Clegg speech, 11 May 2011, prosper. displayed ment for more than sixty years, is ‘One year in: coalition and Liberal secure, but what shape he will leave politics’. qualities that the party in after the 2015 election 12 Nick Clegg speech, 9 June 2014, Conclusion is still to be determined. He led ‘Opportunity for everyone – that’s It seems to be an iron law of politics have served the party to its highest ever vote in the liberal promise’. – or at least of Liberal Democrat 2010, but the polling and electoral 13 Rafael Behr, ‘The Lib Dems could politics – that parties elect leaders their party record since entering coalition has survive in government by going back as different as possible from their been grim; although to an extent to their roots’, 30 July predecessors. All the four men who well; all have this would have happened any- 2014. led the Liberal Democrats over its way, some of his decisions, particu- 14 David Walter, The Strange Rebirth of first twenty-five years have dis- possessed larly over tuition fees, have made Liberal England (Politico’s, 2003), p. 3. played qualities that have served it worse. 15 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- their party well; all have possessed weaknesses Whether the next leader will ries: Volume Two, 1997–1999 (Allen weaknesses that helped to under- take over a secure position in a con- Lane / The Penguin Press, 2001), p. mine their leadership; all have pos- that helped tinuing, or new, coalition govern- 494. sessed skills that were suited to ment, or will, like Ashdown, be 16 Paddy Ashdown, ‘A broader move- some periods of leadership and not to under- faced with the task of rebuilding a ment dedicated to winning the bat- to others; and all have been very mine their party from near-collapse, remains tle of ideas’, 9 May 1992 (the ‘Chard different from one another. to be seen. speech’), in Duncan Brack and Tony Paddy Ashdown rescued his leadership; Little (eds.), Great Liberal Speeches party from near-collapse and estab- Duncan Brack is Editor of the Journal (Politico’s, 2001), p. 427. lished it firmly as an effective and all have pos- of Liberal History. He has worked 17 Tony Greaves, ‘Audacious – but fun- coherent third force. Although he with all four Liberal Democrat lead- damentally flawed’, review ofThe failed in his main aim – to deliver sessed skills ers in his capacities as Director of Policy Ashdown Diaries – Volume 1: 1988–1997, proportional representation for (1988–94), Chair of the party’s Federal Journal of Liberal History 30 (spring Westminster – the deals he reached that were Conference Committee (2003–10) and 2001), p. 28. with Labour helped to change the Vice Chair of its Federal Policy Com- 18 Robert Hazell and Ben Yong, The country’s constitution for good. As suited to mittee (2012–). Politics of Coalition: How the Conserva- can be seen from Table 1, he left the tive-Lib Dem Government Works (Hart, party in much better shape than he some periods 1 Max Atkinson, Our Masters’ Voices: 2012). found it, in terms of MPs, MEPs The language and body language of politics 19 Jasper Gerard, The Clegg Coup (Gib- and councillors, and its standing in of leadership (Methuen, 1984). son Square, 2011), p. 234. the polls; he also remains the leader 2 See Ipsos-MORI series, available 20 Rob Wilson, 5 Days to Power: The achieving the highest personal pop- and not to at: http://www.ipsos-mori.com/ Journey to Coalition Britain (Biteback, ularity rating. researchspecialisms/socialresearch/ 2010), p. 171. Charles Kennedy initially gave others; and specareas/politics/trends.aspx; anal- 21 Tim Bale, ‘The Black Widow Effect: the party the quiet life it craved ysis based on all respondents. The Why Britain’s Conservative–Lib- after Ashdown’s last years, and all have been party first came top on environmen- eral Democrat coalition might have had a successful first few years, but very differ- tal issues in September 1993, and an unhappy ending’, Journal of Liberal ultimately failed (whether because thereafter always came first or second History 76 (autumn 2012), p. 9 of alcohol or because of his own ent from one as long as the question, or a related 22 Coralie Pring, ‘Disloyal Lib Dems’, innate weaknesses) to fulfil effec- one, was asked. YouGov, 16 May 2011. tively the high-profile role increas- another. 3 Leader, The Guardian 19 March 1992. 23 Bale, ‘The Black Widow Effect’. ingly needed in the party leader. 4 David Butler and Denis Kavanagh, 24 Paddy Ashdown, open letter to lead- Nevertheless, he led the party to its The British General Election of 1997 ership contenders, The Guardian, 11 strongest ever representation in the (Macmillan, 1997), p. 178. June 1999. House of Commons, the European 5 Charles Kennedy, The Future of Politics 25 ‘Paddy’s people’, Economist 14 Sep- Parliament and local authorities; (HarperCollins, 2000), p. xii. tember 1991. the question that hangs over his 6 Greg Hurst, Charles Kennedy: A Tragic 26 Duncan Brack and Harriet Smith, leadership is whether he could have Flaw (Politico’s, 2006), p. 119. ‘Ashdown as Leader’, Journal of Liberal achieved more. 7 Ibid., p. 225. History 30 (spring 2001), p. 13. Menzies Campbell helped to sta- 8 This is explored in detail in Philip 27 For a detailed assessment, see Mark bilise and reorganise the party, and, Cowley and Martin Ryder, ‘Into Pack, ‘Nearly three years on, how

44 Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 report: the progressive coalition that never was –lessons from the ashdown–Blair ‘project’

does the Bones Report look?’, Lib Beyond Westminster: Finding Hope in became a Labour government min- Dem Voice, 1 June 2011. Britain (Simon & Schuster, 1994). ister under Gordon Brown, and 28 Polls conducted by Lib Dem Voice; 32 Ashdown, The Ashdown Diaries Vol- remains in Westminster today as these are unweighted but participa- ume One, p. 452 MP for Wolverhampton South tion is large enough to make them 33 See Duncan Brack, ‘Liberal Dem- East. Pat McFadden said that the reasonably representative. ocrat Leadership: The Cases of ‘Project’ could primarily be under- 29 Paddy Ashdown, open letter to lead- Ashdown and Kennedy’, Political stood through the prism of per- ership contenders, The Guardian, 11 Quarterly 78:1, January – March 2007. sonality: Tony Blair ‘was, like June 1999. 34 Andrew Rawnsley, ‘Burst out of the Ashdown, a big leader … and he 30 Paddy Ashdown, The Ashdown Dia- pinstripes and show us some passion’, believed in a ’. ries: Volume One, 1988–1997 (Penguin, Observer, 17 September 2006. Paddy Ashdown’s first gen- 2000), pp. 50–51. 35 Chris Bowers, Nick Clegg: The Biogra- eral election as leader of the Lib- 31 Paddy Ashdown, Citizen’s Britain: A phy (Biteback, second edition, 2012), eral Democrats was in many ways Radical Agenda for the 1990s (Fourth p. 249. one of political containment, fol- Estate, 1989) and Paddy Ashdown, lowing the trauma of unification Looking with the SDP in 1988. However, within days of the result, and with back, in 2013, Labour in flux, Ashdown deliv- ered a landmark speech in Chard on the post- in on the need for a new, non-Socialist, centrist approach 1992 period, to British politics. Looking back, in 2013, on the post-1992 period, Ashdown he described his feeling that a bi- Report partisan approach was necessary, as described his ‘we genuinely feared defeat again to the Tories … everyone believed feeling that this, including Tony, until his The Progressive Coalition that never was – phone call to me at a Somerset sec- lessons from the Ashdown–Blair ‘project’ a bi-partisan ondary school on the day before the 1997 election’. Evening meeting (joint with the Labour History Group), 22 approach Roger Liddle was a key bridge between the two parties during January 2013, with Paddy Ashdown, Roger Liddle and Pat was nec- the era and an advocate of coopera- McFadden MP; chair: Steve Richards essary, as tion from within both: he described Report by Douglas Oliver himself as having ‘ratted and re-rat- ‘we genu- ted’ à la Winston Churchill, after leaving Labour to join the SDP and s the Liberal Democrat– Red–Yellow cooperative initiative inely feared then the Lib Dems, before being Conservative coalition buried, at least by the time of Ash- lured back by his good friend Peter Aenters its parliamentary down’s retirement from the Lib- defeat again Mandleson, following Tony Blair’s mid-term, the Labour and Lib Dem eral Democrat leadership in 1999. rise to power. He described his History Groups met in Westmin- However, despite this, almost to the Tories sadness at Neil Kinnock’s defeat, ster to reflect upon another, past, two decades on, in the context despite being a Liberal Demo- attempt at inter-party collabora- of a Yellow–Blue coalition, the … everyone crat candidate that year in North tion: the 1990s ‘Project’, initiated period’s relevance to British politi- Hertfordshire, because, he said, he by Tony Blair and Paddy Ashdown, cal life seems enduringly salient. believed this, sensed common purpose between to defeat British Conservatism As evidence of that, three of the the two parties. Throughout the and redefine the British political key protagonists in the ‘Project’ including period Liddle retained strong centre-ground. – Paddy Ashdown, Pat McFad- friendships and a network of pow- The fourth successive Tory gen- den and Roger Liddle – chaired Tony, until erful connections in both parties. eral election victory in April 1992 by The Independent’s Steve Rich- Pat McFadden said that the ‘Pro- provided an existential challenge to ards, were re-united to speak of its his phone ject’ failed critically in two out of the British political left and liberal impact and moment, as well as its three respects. He felt that ‘leader- centre: despite the difficulties of relevance for today, in front of an call to me at ship, arithmetic and subject’ were the post-Thatcher transition, John audience of over a hundred mem- a Somerset the three factors that ‘mattered’, but Major’s victory led many to believe bers of the History Groups of both that although the first was strong, Conservatism was in danger of parties. secondary failures in the latter two aspects holding indefinite sway over Brit- Pat McFadden was a key adviser doomed the project. ish public life, and that the forces of to the Labour Party throughout school on the Ashdown and Blair, he felt ‘were ‘Progressivism’ could never win in the 1990s, and his career spanned “big leaders” who believed in some- Britain again. John Smith’s leadership as well day before thing transformational’. Blair liked Whilst the 1997 general election as Tony Blair’s ascent to power as and trusted Ashdown, and felt that, did result in an eventual defeat party leader and Prime Minister, in the 1997 like himself, he was an outsider to of Toryism, the historic Blair the aftermath of Smith’s untimely his own party. However, the ‘arith- landslide also eventually left the death in May 1994. McFadden later election’. metic’ of Labour’s domination in

Journal of Liberal History 83 Summer 2014 45