Alan Leaman assesses ’s and ’s attempt to realign British politics – ‘the Project’ – and draws lessons for the future.

Notes on a political relationship Blair and Ashdown

bservers of Liberal journalists that the first job of a Lib structures of British party politics Democrat politics Dem leader is to spot what is hap- that Liberal Democrats seek. in recent decades pening in politics, work out how might feel a lit- to benefit, and then announce tle confused – and with confidence that it was always Personal background withO some justification. There your plan to bring this particular My credentials for writing about was the Alliance in the 1980s, circumstance about. The truth is this are partial, as many will no with its doctrine of ‘equidis- that all political parties have to doubt rush to point out. A long tance’ from the Conservatives tack to prevailing winds and take personal history of involvement and Labour and explicit hope of advantage where they can. in the Liberal Party – on policy a . Then Paddy But this is also the story of a committees, working in the office Ashdown took his merged party long, consistent and hard-fought of Paddy Ashdown when he was in the direction of greater coop- effort to redesign the battle lines leader (including drafting the eration with Labour, particularly of UK politics; in particular, to Chard speech), as a parliamentary after the accession of Tony Blair realign the centre-left. Some candidate and, finally, as Lib Dem as its leader, prefigured in his argued that Paddy Ashdown’s Director of Strategy in the run- 1992 speech in Chard.1 Charles approach was the exception to up to the 1997 general election Kennedy spoke during his time the Lib Dem strategic rule – an – meant that I spent around two as Lib Dem leader of replacing attempt to create a shortcut to decades immersed in these strate- the Conservative Party while power. They contrasted this with gic issues. I even wrote a journal repositioning his party to the left the ‘long march’ that would keep article called ‘Ending equidis- of the Labour government. And, the Lib Dems more independent tance’.3 I was closely involved in to bring the story right up to of other parties and ensure that its what, I believe, was the most seri- date, has written that policies were not compromised. ous attempt to realign British pol- the Labour Party’s ‘time is up’, In truth, Ashdown’s contri- itics since the creation of the SDP. that the Liberal Democrats can bution is exceptional only in the I also came to those roles with ‘replace Labour as the dominant sense that it was almost a trium- a grounding in what might be force of progressive politics’,2 and phant success. It suited its times – called the pluralism of the left. At has taken his party into a govern- electorally as well as politically. It University the Liberals partici- ing coalition with the Conserva- delivered a number of reforms and pated in organisations called the tive Party. benefits for the Lib Dems – par- Broad Left and the Left Alliance. It is easy to caricature this as ticularly constitutional reforms – Campaign organisations such as the opportunism of a flexible that would otherwise have been the Anti-Apartheid Movement and pragmatic third party. I once lost. And it very nearly secured and brought Liberals explained to a gathering of BBC the fundamental changes in the into close and often cooperative

68 Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 notes on a political relationship: blair and ashdown contact with members of the the Alliance – from ’ wrong, was that the Labour Party Labour Party as well as others. Dimbleby lecture onwards – was unlikely to be able to win a The long period of Conserva- all fitted with this narrative of future election on its own. At the tive electoral domination from realignment. time, no one could have foreseen 1979 onwards, mirrored in many As Mrs Thatcher consolidated the creation of . This parts of the country by a Lib Dem the Conservatives in power dur- occasioned a certain amount of advance in local government, ing the 1980s, the opposition chutzpah on our part. I recall giv- the arrival of ‘no overall control’ parties naturally became more ing a press briefing for - councils and tactical voting by interested in each other and, from day papers on the weekend after Labour and Lib Dem supporters time to time, would learn how to the election in which we said that in constituencies, all added to the cooperate. When Paddy Ashdown Paddy was now gearing up to take experience. To me it was natural published his 1989 book, Citizen’s on the role of effective leader of that Liberals should look around Britain, we made sure that Labour the opposition. for allies and partners. luminaries such as The second lesson was more Of course, there is plenty of and Raymond Plant were aware significant and robust. The final anti-pluralism on the centre-left of it and encouraged to respond. days of the campaign had been as well. Tribalism runs deep and Subsequently, Plant went on to uncomfortable for us. wide in the , chair a commission for Neil Kin- had made a lot of the uncertainty where it mixes with a particular nock on electoral reform which implicit in a hung parliament or suspicion of liberalism and elec- reported in 1993, while Radice a Lib–Lab arrangement. It had toral reform. Liberal Democrats was a voice for sanity on Europe pushed many voters back to the also hold their party dear for the and much else. Conservatives. The conclusion best and worst of reasons. In local and other elections, we drew was that, next time, the None of my experience led me too, we became more and more political ground would have to be to believe that Labour were any- conscious of the so-called ‘tac- prepared in advance of the elec- thing other than a serious com- tical vote’. This phenomenon tion, not while the campaign was petitor, an obstacle to the Liberal was being driven from the grass in full force. The electorate would Democrat ideal of a more open, roots – by voters as much as by need to have evidence – prior to decentralised, reformist, progres- politicians. But it subtly altered going to vote – that cross-party sive and -looking alterna- the atmosphere at Westminster cooperation could work and that tive to the Conservatives. They as well. By the time of the 1992 it could support stable and effec- were too closed and statist to be general election it was a natural tive government. the answer; but they were too and widespread view that some Much of the Lib Dem approach large and obstinate to be ignored. sort of Labour–Liberal Demo- to the next parliament flowed Any Liberal Democrat strategy crat arrangement could emerge from this second conclusion. has to have a coherent answer if the result was indecisive, even Yet, at first, it gained little trac- to the question: what do you do though the party’s formal posi- tion. Paddy threw himself into about Labour? tion remained one of ‘equidis- his Beyond Westminster4 project, tance’. Paddy and I had even been The elector- to the frustration of many of his to Germany to talk with the FDP senior colleagues. The election of The build up to Blair – up to about how they prepared for coa- ate would John Smith as leader of the Labour 1992 lition talks. Party closed down many possibili- It is important to understand that When used need to have ties (though, curiously, he did res- the Blair–Ashdown relationship the last week of the 1992 Labour urrect the old Liberal Party slogan came at the end of a long process. campaign to suggest movement evidence – One More Heave – to describe Lib-Labbery had been around for on proportional representation his political strategy). The Lib years. When Ashdown eventu- towards the Lib Dem position, he – prior to Dems and Labour then fell out – ally moved to end equidistance, pushed Lib–Lab relations to the spectacularly on many occasions we felt that we were returning the top of the election agenda. The going to – over the ratification of the - Liberals closer to their core and Conservatives quickly saw their pean Union’s Maastricht Treaty, historic strategy and purpose, on chance, linking the two opposi- vote – that with each accusing the other of the reasonable enough basis that tion parties together and using bad faith and poor judgement. modern Liberal history begins fear of a Labour victory to squeeze cross-party Yet, still, the logic of the Chard with Grimond. the Lib Dem vote. The circum- speech was pushing both par- In the 1960s, Jo Grimmond stances that Lib Dems had often cooperation ties and their thinking. When talked about realigning the left hoped for – a high prospect of a could work abruptly around a non-socialist alternative hung parliament with a converg- announced a massive pit closure to Conservatism. led ing Lib–Lab policy agenda – had and that it programme, we made sure that the Liberal Party into a formal rebounded to our disadvantage. Paddy spoke at the main protest relationship with the Callaghan could sup- demonstration alongside Smith. government via the Lib–Lab pact. Numerous political conferences, Both Grimond and Steel were The build up to Blair – 1992 port stable seminars and private dinners ena- drawing, inter alia, on strong onwards bled progressives in both parties to networks of cross-party relation- We drew some lessons from the and effective get to know each other and to seek ships and discussions. The crea- 1992 experience. The first, and common cause. Charter 88 was a tion of the SDP and formation of the one that turned out to be most government. rallying point for reformers across

Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 69 notes on a political relationship: blair and ashdown the whole of the centre-left and the prevailing view amongst Littleborough and Saddleworth was steadily building and winning non-Conservatives was that the by-election was probably the the case for the wider political and election result would be close toughest of the parliament, with constitutional reforms that were (certainly not a landslide). To fail the Lib Dem Chris Davies even- eventually to find their way into to react to these circumstances tually emerging as the victor over the Lib Dem 1997 manifesto and, – to appear to be standing in the Labour’s following an though with less enthusiasm, into way of the tide – would have aggressive and personal campaign. that of Tony Blair’s Labour Party. risked political suicide. More This burgeoning relationship was importantly, it would have also about two political leaders who effectively meant turning our saw personal, party and broader Blair becomes leader – 1994–97 back on the most significant polit- political advantage in drawing The election of Blair as leader ical opportunity for Liberal Dem- closer together. of the Labour Party then added ocrats in a generation. There were some impor- enormously to the possibilities of So the pace quickened, sup- tant personal differences as well. the Ashdown approach. Blair had plemented by the cooperation and Blair had no real understanding a freedom and a potential seen in dialogue that was now possible or appreciation of the effort and no Labour leader before him. He between those at the top of each dedication that was required to had no time for the traditions and party. We talked about a ‘project’ become a Lib Dem MP, or of the dogmas of his own party. There and politicians and journalists emotional and political attach- was no sense in which he was a understood what we meant. We ments this built. Ashdown found socialist. His talk of the need to spoke with Labour about joint Blair’s relative caution frustrating. mend the schism in the centre- work on unemployment – then As a military man, his instinct was left suggested a real potential for a climbing fast towards three mil- to confront problems and move new pluralist settlement. lion: Cook was in favour, Dobson quickly to put himself in a better So Blair marked a break with opposed. Attempts were made to place. Blair, the lawyer, was more traditional Labour. He was distant ensure that both our conferences often looking to work and talk from the trades unions, unambig- were successes and targeted at around problems, buy some more uous about support for free trade the Conservatives – though Blair time, and keep his broader coali- and the market economy, and himself was not above intervening tion on board. eminently pro-European. He was in Lib Dem conferences via press interested in public sector reform. interviews and other manoeuvres. He was also, palpably, a modern Above all, we managed to create The 1997 election and beyond person, with little social conserva- the Cook–Maclennan Commis- In a sense, this strategy delivered tism (though his views on crimi- sion on Constitutional Reform, a too well. The Lib Dems more nal justice were a running sore joint working party of Labour and than doubled their number of with the Lib Dems). Lib Dems to agree on a process for MPs in 1997, benefiting signifi- In the aftermath of Iraq, cash the implementation of key reforms. cantly from their association with for honours, and the financial cri- Paddy also started making the wider cross-party effort to sis of 2007–09 his reputation has speeches about the importance of defeat the Conservatives. But we tumbled. Much of his premiership securing at least ten years – two were faced with a New Labour is now viewed as opportunity lost. parliaments – of reforming gov- landslide. But we should not underestimate ernment and was happy that this The immediate aftermath of just how different he was (and was implied a period of consistent Blair had the election campaign was just felt to be) when he emerged as cooperation on the centre-left. By about the only moment when a Labour leader in 1994. the time of the election, informal a freedom further deepening of the relation- Blair also added to the impera- lists of seats had been given to sup- ship would have been possible tive that was driving the Chard portive newspapers which were and a poten- – and that proved, as we know, speech strategy. For a while, the then able to advise their readers on impossible. As Paddy Ashdown’s Lib Dems were totally eclipsed. how to use their ‘tactical’ votes in tial seen in diaries confirm, Blair pulled back Labour’s new leader seemed to order to maximise the chances of over the weekend following the reach out and to win new friends defeating sitting Conservatives. no Labour election. His majority was too wherever he wanted. The main- Blair and Ashdown clearly large. He was not prepared to tenance of equidistance in those enjoyed their working relation- leader press the issue with his party. circumstances would have left Brit- ship, and the mutual respect that True, the creation of a Joint ain’s third force at best irrelevant, lay behind it. Each would have before him. Cabinet Committee helped and at worst an obstacle to the fresh found in their conversations a cer- He had no deliver much of the constitu- start that Britain yearned for. tain amount of release from the tional reform programme, and to With the passage of time, it is tribulations of their own party. time for the hold off those in the Labour ranks easy for us now to forget that Blair They both were brilliant practi- who wanted to minimise the was an extraordinarily domi- tioners and thinkers about poli- traditions changes. It also helped to sustain nant and imaginative leader of tics, with an instinctive feel for some badly needed the opposition, carrying almost the bigger picture and how voters and dogmas behind the ‘constructive opposi- everything before him and com- were responding. tion’ approach that the Lib Dems manding an unprecedented coa- This was no cosy love-in how- of his own adopted. Ashdown was able to use lition of support. Equally, and ever. Battles were fought when his influence with Blair to consid- in contradiction, we forget that they were needed. The 1995 party. erable effect during the remaining

70 Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 notes on a political relationship: blair and ashdown two years of his leadership, not Why fight Proportional electoral systems are the relationship between Liberal only helping to keep the govern- entrenched in many parts of the Democrats and the Labour Party. ment to commitments previously so hard to UK. In and , too, Clegg’s answer to the old Lib Dem made and to press forward on oth- the Lib Dems have now had expe- question – what do you do about ers but also preventing the Lib become the rience of holding office, and coa- Labour? – made a lot of sense in Dems from lapsing into full-out lition governments have proved this context; he fought them and opposition to the Labour govern- leader of effective, making the Cameron– fought them hard, though it was ment. But this influence was a Clegg coalition following the 2010 noticeable that significant num- declining asset. a political general election that much easier to bers of Labour seats did not fall to In 1997 I argued to the Lib construct. The Blair government the Lib Dem challenge as many Dem Conference that the party party if you implemented significant reforms had hoped and expected. now had an electoral and politi- are not pre- that will not now be undone. And Clegg himself has distanced cal interest in the success of New the Blair–Ashdown relationship himself from previous thinking Labour. But I was already push- pared to use has left a template for others to pick about realigning the centre-left, ing against prevailing party sen- up and use in the future. The sim- telling one interviewer that it timent. The perception that the that position ple fact that this happened means underestimates ‘quite how fluid ‘project’ was the personal creature that it will be that much easier next British politics has become’.6 How- of Paddy and Tony meant that it in the pursuit time around. ever, the party is likely to return was too easily dismissed as an More than that, this very to the question at some point, pro- elite undertaking. The party had of ambitious nearly became the moment when voked, perhaps, by a future refer- decided, consciously or not, that it centre-left politics was changed endum on electoral reform. wanted a quieter life. political much more fundamentally in the Labour, of course, may retreat Strangely, a lot of our focus at direction that Liberal Democrats to a comfort zone of oldish the time was on the potential for goals? exist to promote. A Blair–Ash- Labour, unlearning many of the two referendums: one on entry down administration could have lessons that Tony Blair insisted to the euro and the other on elec- achieved a great deal more. on in the . Alternatively, a toral reform. Both, had they taken In the end, Blair’s failure to new Labour leader might make a place, would have required and answer the question put to him by fresh start, ditch the union link, fostered a new sense of partnership Ashdown (increasingly in public) be prepared to face down a weak- and common purpose amongst – Are you a pluralist or a control ened left and reach out to build centre-left politicians who were freak? – meant that the project new alliances and refashion the prepared to back each cause. could not be sustained. But Ash- centre-left. Liberal Democrats Thousands of words were written down was surely right to try to will want to be prepared for either about both, with much specula- force the issue. Why fight so hard eventuality. tion about when they would hap- to become the leader of a politi- The conditions for a new pen, in which order, and which cal party if you are not prepared to realignment could once again would be more difficult to win. As use that position in the pursuit of re-emerge quite quickly – only we know, the government ducked ambitious political goals? more so. At that point, the Liberal out of both. Democrats will want to study and In late 1998 I said to Paddy build on the experience of Blair Ashdown that he would need to Lessons for the future and Ashdown. stay on as leader in order to help Nick Clegg has written recently secure a yes vote in the two refer- that he wants the Liberal Demo- Alan Leaman worked in Paddy Ash- endums. He nodded, but I could crats to be leaders of a wider lib- down’s office in 1988–93 and was tell from the look in his eyes that eral movement that is capable of Director of Strategy and Planning for his thinking was heading in a dif- being an effective alternative to the Liberal Democrats 1995–97. He is ferent direction. He announced the Conservatives.5 He is right currently CEO of a leading business his resignation as leader of the Lib to do so. He also argues that the trade association. Dems a few weeks later. current Labour Party (it is insuf- ficiently New Labour?) is out of 1 Paddy Ashdown, A Fortunate Life tune with its times. He makes a (Aurum Press Ltd, 2009), p. 268. An evaluation persuasive case. Implicit in this 2 Nick Clegg, The Liberal Moment Was all this worth it? Unques- thesis is a recognition that the (Demos, 2009). tionably. Even in its limited form, centre-left must reorganise itself 3 Alan Leaman ‘Ending equidis- the Blair–Ashdown relationship further if it is to be a real success. tance’, Political Quarterly, April-June delivered electoral and political Inevitably, the onset of the 1998, .pp 160-169 Reprinted in the benefits that would otherwise not 2010 election campaign and sub- Journal of Liberal Democrat History 19, have been available to the Liberal sequent coalition negotiations Summer 1998. Democrats. Arguably, it has pro- with the Conservatives put such 4 Paddy Ashdown, Beyond Westmin- duced better government for the a restructuring of politics on ster: Finding Hope in Britain (Simon country as well. hold. The party electoral battle & Schuster, 1994). As a result of the relationship, a took precedence and the oppor- 5 Nick Clegg, ‘Welcome to the new far larger number of Lib Dems now tunity to construct a serious and era of Liberal politics’, , 17 hold elected positions – in Stras- governing coalition with the September 2009. bourg, , Cardiff, West- Conservative Party after the 6 Interview with Nick Clegg, The minster and in local government. election has dramatically altered Observer, 7 June 2010.

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