Alan Leaman assesses Paddy Ashdown’s and Tony Blair’s attempt to realign British politics – ‘the Project’ – and draws lessons for the future. NOtes on A political relationship Blair and Ashdown bservers of Liberal journalists that the first job of a Lib structures of British party politics Democrat politics Dem leader is to spot what is hap- that Liberal Democrats seek. in recent decades pening in politics, work out how might feel a lit- to benefit, and then announce tle confused – and with confidence that it was always Personal background withO some justification. There your plan to bring this particular My credentials for writing about was the Alliance in the 1980s, circumstance about. The truth is this are partial, as many will no with its doctrine of ‘equidis- that all political parties have to doubt rush to point out. A long tance’ from the Conservatives tack to prevailing winds and take personal history of involvement and Labour and explicit hope of advantage where they can. in the Liberal Party – on policy a hung parliament. Then Paddy But this is also the story of a committees, working in the office Ashdown took his merged party long, consistent and hard-fought of Paddy Ashdown when he was in the direction of greater coop- effort to redesign the battle lines leader (including drafting the eration with Labour, particularly of UK politics; in particular, to Chard speech), as a parliamentary after the accession of Tony Blair realign the centre-left. Some candidate and, finally, as Lib Dem as its leader, prefigured in his argued that Paddy Ashdown’s Director of Strategy in the run- 1992 speech in Chard.1 Charles approach was the exception to up to the 1997 general election Kennedy spoke during his time the Lib Dem strategic rule – an – meant that I spent around two as Lib Dem leader of replacing attempt to create a shortcut to decades immersed in these strate- the Conservative Party while power. They contrasted this with gic issues. I even wrote a journal repositioning his party to the left the ‘long march’ that would keep article called ‘Ending equidis- of the Labour government. And, the Lib Dems more independent tance’.3 I was closely involved in to bring the story right up to of other parties and ensure that its what, I believe, was the most seri- date, Nick Clegg has written that policies were not compromised. ous attempt to realign British pol- the Labour Party’s ‘time is up’, In truth, Ashdown’s contri- itics since the creation of the SDP. that the Liberal Democrats can bution is exceptional only in the I also came to those roles with ‘replace Labour as the dominant sense that it was almost a trium- a grounding in what might be force of progressive politics’,2 and phant success. It suited its times – called the pluralism of the left. At has taken his party into a govern- electorally as well as politically. It University the Liberals partici- ing coalition with the Conserva- delivered a number of reforms and pated in organisations called the tive Party. benefits for the Lib Dems – par- Broad Left and the Left Alliance. It is easy to caricature this as ticularly constitutional reforms – Campaign organisations such as the opportunism of a flexible that would otherwise have been the Anti-Apartheid Movement and pragmatic third party. I once lost. And it very nearly secured and Charter 88 brought Liberals explained to a gathering of BBC the fundamental changes in the into close and often cooperative 68 Journal of Liberal History 67 Summer 2010 notes on A political relationship: blair and ashdown contact with members of the the Alliance – from Roy Jenkins’ wrong, was that the Labour Party Labour Party as well as others. Dimbleby lecture onwards – was unlikely to be able to win a The long period of Conserva- all fitted with this narrative of future election on its own. At the tive electoral domination from realignment. time, no one could have foreseen 1979 onwards, mirrored in many As Mrs Thatcher consolidated the creation of New Labour. This parts of the country by a Lib Dem the Conservatives in power dur- occasioned a certain amount of advance in local government, ing the 1980s, the opposition chutzpah on our part. I recall giv- the arrival of ‘no overall control’ parties naturally became more ing a press briefing for the Sun- councils and tactical voting by interested in each other and, from day papers on the weekend after Labour and Lib Dem supporters time to time, would learn how to the election in which we said that in constituencies, all added to the cooperate. When Paddy Ashdown Paddy was now gearing up to take experience. To me it was natural published his 1989 book, Citizen’s on the role of effective leader of that Liberals should look around Britain, we made sure that Labour the opposition. for allies and partners. luminaries such as Giles Radice The second lesson was more Of course, there is plenty of and Raymond Plant were aware significant and robust. The final anti-pluralism on the centre-left of it and encouraged to respond. days of the campaign had been as well. Tribalism runs deep and Subsequently, Plant went on to uncomfortable for us. John Major wide in the Labour movement, chair a commission for Neil Kin- had made a lot of the uncertainty where it mixes with a particular nock on electoral reform which implicit in a hung parliament or suspicion of liberalism and elec- reported in 1993, while Radice a Lib–Lab arrangement. It had toral reform. Liberal Democrats was a voice for sanity on Europe pushed many voters back to the also hold their party dear for the and much else. Conservatives. The conclusion best and worst of reasons. In local and other elections, we drew was that, next time, the None of my experience led me too, we became more and more political ground would have to be to believe that Labour were any- conscious of the so-called ‘tac- prepared in advance of the elec- thing other than a serious com- tical vote’. This phenomenon tion, not while the campaign was petitor, an obstacle to the Liberal was being driven from the grass in full force. The electorate would Democrat ideal of a more open, roots – by voters as much as by need to have evidence – prior to decentralised, reformist, progres- politicians. But it subtly altered going to vote – that cross-party sive and forward-looking alterna- the atmosphere at Westminster cooperation could work and that tive to the Conservatives. They as well. By the time of the 1992 it could support stable and effec- were too closed and statist to be general election it was a natural tive government. the answer; but they were too and widespread view that some Much of the Lib Dem approach large and obstinate to be ignored. sort of Labour–Liberal Demo- to the next parliament flowed Any Liberal Democrat strategy crat arrangement could emerge from this second conclusion. has to have a coherent answer if the result was indecisive, even Yet, at first, it gained little trac- to the question: what do you do though the party’s formal posi- tion. Paddy threw himself into about Labour? tion remained one of ‘equidis- his Beyond Westminster4 project, tance’. Paddy and I had even been the elector- to the frustration of many of his to Germany to talk with the FDP senior colleagues. The election of The build up to Blair – up to about how they prepared for coa- ate would John Smith as leader of the Labour 1992 lition talks. Party closed down many possibili- It is important to understand that When Neil Kinnock used need to have ties (though, curiously, he did res- the Blair–Ashdown relationship the last week of the 1992 Labour urrect the old Liberal Party slogan came at the end of a long process. campaign to suggest movement evidence – One More Heave – to describe Lib-Labbery had been around for on proportional representation his political strategy). The Lib years. When Ashdown eventu- towards the Lib Dem position, he – prior to Dems and Labour then fell out – ally moved to end equidistance, pushed Lib–Lab relations to the spectacularly on many occasions we felt that we were returning the top of the election agenda. The going to – over the ratification of the Euro- Liberals closer to their core and Conservatives quickly saw their pean Union’s Maastricht Treaty, historic strategy and purpose, on chance, linking the two opposi- vote – that with each accusing the other of the reasonable enough basis that tion parties together and using bad faith and poor judgement. modern Liberal history begins fear of a Labour victory to squeeze cross-party Yet, still, the logic of the Chard with Grimond. the Lib Dem vote. The circum- speech was pushing both par- In the 1960s, Jo Grimmond stances that Lib Dems had often cooperation ties and their thinking. When talked about realigning the left hoped for – a high prospect of a could work Michael Heseltine abruptly around a non-socialist alternative hung parliament with a converg- announced a massive pit closure to Conservatism. David Steel led ing Lib–Lab policy agenda – had and that it programme, we made sure that the Liberal Party into a formal rebounded to our disadvantage. Paddy spoke at the main protest relationship with the Callaghan could sup- demonstration alongside Smith. government via the Lib–Lab pact. Numerous political conferences, Both Grimond and Steel were The build up to Blair – 1992 port stable seminars and private dinners ena- drawing, inter alia, on strong onwards bled progressives in both parties to networks of cross-party relation- We drew some lessons from the and effective get to know each other and to seek ships and discussions.