Journal of Issue 25 / Winter 1999–2000 / £5.00

Liberal DemocratHISTORY

Crossing the Floor Roy Douglas A Failure of Leadership Liberal Defections 1918–29 Senator Jerry Grafstein Winston Churchill as a Liberal J. Graham Jones A Breach in the Family Megan and Gwilym Lloyd George Nick Cott The Case of the Liberal Nationals A re-evaluation Robert Maclennan MP Breaking the Mould? The SDP Liberal Democrat History Group Issue 25: Winter 1999–2000 Journal of Liberal Democrat History Political Defections Special issue: Political Defections The Journal of Liberal Democrat History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group 3 Crossing the floor ISSN 1463-6557

Graham Lippiatt Liberal Democrat History Group Editorial The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of 5 Out from under the umbrella historical topics, particularly those relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Tony Little Party and the SDP. The Group organises The defection of the Liberal Unionists discussion meetings and publishes the Journal and other occasional publications. 15 Winston Churchill as a Liberal For more information, including details of publications, back issues of the Journal, tape Senator Jerry S. Grafstein records of meetings and archive and other Churchill’s career in the Liberal Party research sources, see our web site: www.dbrack.dircon.co.uk/ldhg.

18 A failure of leadership Hon President: Earl Russell. Chair: Graham Lippiatt. Roy Douglas Liberal defections 1918–29 Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, 24 Tory cuckoos in the Liberal nest? articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed publication; all articles Nick Cott submitted will be reviewed. The case of the Liberal Nationals: a re-evaluation Contributions should be sent to: Duncan Brack (Editor) 31 Donald Johnson Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, London SW16 2EQ. email: [email protected]. Robert Ingham The last Liberal imperialist All articles copyright © their authors.

34 A breach in the family Advertisements Adverts are welcome; please contact the J. Graham Jones Editor for rates. Megan and Gwilym Lloyd George 40 Breaking the mould? Subscriptions/Membership An annual subscription to the Journal of Tony Little interviews Robert Maclennan MP Liberal Democrat History costs £10.00 (£5.00 unwaged rate; add £5.00 for overseas subscribers); this includes membership of the 45 A progressive’s dilemma History Group unless you inform us otherwise.

Neil Stockley interviews John Dickie Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Group’) should be sent to: 47 Reviews Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; David Dutton, Simon. Reviewed by Duncan Brack. email: [email protected] Christopher Mayhew, A Cold War Witness. Reviewed by Robert Ingham. Emma Nicholson, Secret Society. Reviewed by Graham Lippiatt. Published by Liberal Democrat History Group, c/o Flat 9, 6 Hopton Road, London SW16 2EQ

Printed by Kall-Kwik, 426 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5TF The front cover cartoon shows three well-known defectors: Joseph Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and David Owen. Cartoon by Martin HorwoodHorwood. January 2000

2 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Editorial Guest Editor Graham Lippiatt introduces this special edition of the Journal of Liberal Democrat History. CrossingCrossing thethe floorfloor

n the day in September  that former MP, May  of Keith Raffan, the former MP for OHugh Dykes, defected to the Liberal Demo- Delyn and now a Liberal Democrat Member of the crats from the Conservatives, the radio in my office Scottish Parliament. In November , a number of was tuned to a pop music station, to help us all work others defected, including Lord Thomas of better. But there, on the hour, every hour, was a news Swinnerton and a former MEP, Peter Price who item about this political coup for the Liberal Demo- (like Hugh Dykes) was selected on to the party’s list crats, with snippets of interview from the leading for the  European elections. In February , players. For once, all through the day, the party was another former Tory MP, Anna McCurley, joined receiving positive publicity. So as working hours the Liberal Democrats, one of a number of promi- drew to a close, I decided to ask one of the lads in nent Scottish Conservatives to change sides. Then, the office what he thought of the news. ‘To tell you in October , the sitting MEP for London the truth’ he said, ‘I don’t listen to the news really, es- South and Surrey East, James Moorhouse followed. pecially if they’re about politics. I just like the back- Something was clearly happening out there. Most of ground noise.’ For whatever reason, he simply had these defectors have identified the hostility of the not registered that anything significant had hap- current Tory party to a constructive role in Europe pened. It was like the philosophical cliche about and to civil rights issues as major factors in their de- whether the tree falling in the woods with no-one cisions to leave the Conservatives. There is a pattern to hear it actually makes a sound. If a political event here, which deserves some serious political analysis occurs but ordinary electors do not actually register and which seems to show that political defections it, can it really be said to have any significance? are more than cynical attempts to save careers or There is little doubt, however, that for the politi- shallow nine-day wonders. cally aware, defections of this kind are hugely impor- As long as there has been politics, people have tant occasions. Otherwise, there would never have changed sides publicly. This special edition of the been a news item about Hugh Dykes’ decision at all. Journal turns the focus on defections to and from the Many column inches in the broadsheet press and cur- Liberal Democrats and their predecessor parties. The rent affairs publications are a measure of how politi- articles look at individuals, those who have lit up the cians and political commentators love to talk about political sky like Winston Churchill or Megan Lloyd and analyse these things. For political activists, these George and less well-known figures such as Donald defections can be terrifically exciting and a tremen- Johnson. They also examine groups and seek to ex- dous boost to morale. Like getting all the good pub- plain the impact the formation of new political or- licity from a by-election victory without having been ganisations like the Liberal Unionists, Liberal Na- obliged to pound the streets working for it. tionals and the Social Democratic Party had on the The question this raises, then, is similar to the one parties they left or went on to unite with. about by-election wins. Is the razzle and dazzle out Some defections are like a firework display, pro- of all proportion to the actual significance? Are po- ducing glamorous national publicity but quickly litical defections all image and no substance? A ban- forgotten. Remember the Liberal Democrat candi- quet only for political anoraks to feast on? date in the Newham North East by-election in If Hugh Dykes’ conversion had been a one-off, it June  who defected to the Labour Party on the might be possible to take that view. But there have eve of poll? But perhaps the impact of that defec- been a steady stream of defections from the Tories in tion was more deeply felt inside the local party. recent years. Emma Nicholson was the most high- What was the effect on local morale? One of the profile, a sitting MP from a constituency in an area articles in this issue looks at the defection of a local where the party was determined to maximise its councillor from the Liberal Democrats to Labour. vote. But this was followed in October  by the And our interview with former Party President defection of Bolton MP Peter Thurnham, and in Robert Maclennan tracks the personal difficulties

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 3 defectors are forced to face as well as Democrats, or Reg Prentice’s leaving and fail to offer politicians the chance the public, political ones. s Labour for the Conservatives — either to satisfy their personal ambi- Dr Alan Sked of the LSE recently but perhaps only when those govern- tions or to shape events according to wrote to me to say that, in the final ments are already weak. No liberal- the policies and values they support; the analysis, political defections probably minded Tory MPs defected during the post- Liberal Party being the clas- had no political significance other than Thatcher years, after all. Others take sic contemporary example. upon the careers of the people con- place when the parties being deserted The impact of defections on political cerned. However, looking at the articles seem to be lurching to extreme posi- parties is certainly worthy of serious re- in this special issue, it seems to me that tions, abandoning the effort to be a search and analysis. The pieces in this they may have some impact on the de- broad church, such as the Labour Party special edition of the Journal are de- velopment of parties or wider political of the early s from which the SDP signed to contribute to that process and movements. Some defections weaken was forged, or the current Conservative in the hope that they will initiate fur- governments, for example the high- Party in its anti-Europe, English-na- ther debate and study. profile defections from John Major’s tionalist orientation. To ry party of Alan Howarth to Labour Defections also occur when political Graham Lippiatt is Chair of the Liberal and Emma Nicholson to the Liberal parties cease to be vehicles for power, Democrat History Group.

Research in Progress If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 2) for inclusion here.

The party agent and English electoral culture, c.1880 – c.1906. The The Liberal Party and foreign and defence policy, 1922–88; of development of political agency as a profession, the role of the particular interest is the 1920s and ’30s, and the possibility of election agent in managing election campaigns during this period, interviewing anyone involved in formulating party foreign and and the changing nature of elections, as increased use was made of defence policies. Dr R. S. Grayson, 8 Cheltenham Avenue, the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's College, Twickenham TW1 3HD. Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected]. Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focussing particularly on Liberal Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew anti-appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Gardner, 22 Birdbrook House, Popham Road, Islington, London N1 Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT36 7SN 8TA; [email protected]. The Liberal Party and the wartime coalition 1940–45. Sources, The Hon H. G. Beaumont (MP for Eastbourne 1906–10). Any particularly on Sinclair as Air Minister, and on Harcourt Johnstone, information welcome, particularly on his political views (he stood as Dingle Foot, Lord Sherwood and Sir Geoffrey Maunder (Sinclair's a Radical). Tim Beaumont, 40 Elms Road, London SW4 9EX. PPS) particularl welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, Richmond TW9 4DL; [email protected] The political life and times of Josiah Wedgwood MP. Study of the political life of this radical MP, hoping to shed light on the question The Liberal Party 1945–56. Contact with members (or opponents) of why the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the primary of the Radical Reform Group during the 1950s, and anyone with popular representatives of radicalism in the 1920s. recollections of the leadership of Clement Davies, sought. Graham Paul Mulvey, 112 Richmond Avenue, London N1 0LS; Lippiatt, 24 Balmoral Road, South Harrow, HA2 8TD. [email protected] The grassroots organisation of the Liberal Party 1945–641945–64; the role Defections of north-east Liberals to the Conservatives, c.1906– of local activists in the late 1950s revival of the Liberal Party. Mark 1935. Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and Egan, 42 Richmond Road, Gillingham, Kent ME7 1LN. develop an understanding of changes in electoral alignment. The Unservile State Group, 1953–1970s. Dr Peter Barberis, 24 Sources include personal papers and newspapers; suggestions Lime Avenue, Flixton, Manchester M41 5DE. about how to get hold of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, The Young Liberal Movement 1959–1985; including in particular Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. relations with the leadership, and between NLYL and ULS. Carrie Park, 89 Coombe Lane, Bristol BS9 2AR; Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, [email protected]. 173 Worplesdon Road, Guidlford GU2 6XD; [email protected]. The political and electoral strategy of the Liberal Party 1970–79. Individual constituency papers, and contact with members of the Crouch End or Hornsey Liberal Association or Young Liberals in the Party’s policy committees and/or the Party Council, particularly 1920s and 1930s; especially any details of James Gleeson or Patrick welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts Moir, who are believed to have been Chairmen. Tony Marriott, Flat CM23 3JW. A, 13 Coleridge Road, Crouch End, London N8 8EH.

4 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Liberal Unionists The defection of the Liberal Unionists in 1886 was the greatest blow the Liberal Party suffered in the nineteenth century. Tony Little explains what happened and suggests that there are still some unanswered questions. OutOut fromfrom underunder thethe umbrellaumbrella

his, if I understand it, is one of those golden been neglected. And despite the degree of attention, ‘Tmoments of our history, one of those opportu- there remain a number of unanswered questions nities which may come and may go, but which which would repay further study. rarely returns.’ Gladstone was at his most persuasive There are two main theses explaining the great as he wound up the debate on the second reading of disruption of the party. One may be described as the the Government of Ireland Bill on the night of  ‘conspiracy theory’. In this haut politique version of June . But his final words, ‘Think, I beseech you; events, the ageing Titan, Gladstone, saw off a two- think well, think wisely, think, not for the moment, pronged attack on his leadership by Hartington for but for the years that are to come, before you reject the Whigs and Chamberlain for the Radicals but was this bill’ betrayed that he knew he faced defeat. unexpectedly outmanoeuvred by Churchill and Salisbury for the Tories. We were heavily beaten on the nd Reading, by  to . A scene of some excitement followed the declara- The alternative ‘great forces’ explanation argues tion of the numbers: one or two Irishmen lost their that the growing democratisation of the political balance. Upon the whole we have more ground to be system inevitably drove the aristocratic elements of satisfied with the progress made, than to be disap- the Liberal Party into the arms of the Tories to pro- pointed at the failure. But it is a serious mischief. tect their landed interests. Meanwhile, the remnants Spoke very long: my poor voice came in a wonderful manner. of the Liberal Party, obsessed with Ireland, took an inordinately long time to discover the need to ap- The stoic note in Gladstone’s cryptic diary suggests peal to the wider electorate through New Liberal- that even after the scale of the defeat was known the ism, creating the frustrations which inevitably led to Liberal leadership were underestimating the damage the formation of the Labour Party. In this theory the done to the party. The split, which was crystallised in defection of Chamberlain was a lucky bonus for the the biggest Commons division to date, was as signifi- opposition.  cant as the break up of the Tories in over the A third explanation, which is gaining ground, fo- Corn Laws. Some ninety-three Liberals voted cuses on the unfortunate collision of views over Ire- against the whip and others sympathised with the land without which the party would have had time rebels. The great separation kept the Liberals out of to develop new leaders and policies to succeed power for all but three of the next twenty years and Gladstone. But if Ireland was an accident was it just deprived the party of the leadership of both its waiting to happen? Radical and Whig wings. It created a new party, the Each of these summaries is of course a caricature of Liberal Unionists, which maintained a parliamentary the views held on a complex issue but are offered as presence into the twentieth century. route-maps through the complex pot-pourri of prin-  The crisis of is perhaps the most heavily ciples, personalities and power plays which follows. analysed of all incidents in late nineteenth-century politics but attention has been so much on the im- Gladstone’s umbrella plications for the two major parties that the signifi- After several fruitless attempts, the modern Liberal cance of the Liberal Unionists in their own right has Party was formed in  out of a coalition of

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 5 Whigs, Radicals and Peelites with an- jointly by Lord Hartington in the domestic reform in a manner which cillary support from Irish members. Al- Commons and Lord Granville in the had not been necessary under his own though the majority of the party, even Lords. However, and perhaps inevitably, leadership of the party. The continuous then, described themselves simply as Gladstone could not keep out of poli- feuding within the cabinet required the Liberals, the terms Whig and Radical tics. The Bulgarian atrocities of  continuation of Gladstone’s leadership continued to be used and can be a gave him the excuse he needed. His — only he was able to enjoy the confi- source of confusion in the struggles of return disrupted Hartington’s leader- dence of both sides and he provided the the s. ‘Whig’ was used not only for ship but Gladstone’s loathing for oratorical skills to give cohesion to the the small coterie of aristocratic families Disraeli’s (now Lord Beaconsfield’s) diversity of views within the wider of the ‘Cousinhood’ but more widely foreign policy, expressed through the party, the umbrella under which they all for those with links to the gentry and great Midlothian speechmaking cam- sheltered. land rather than industry, and often in- paign of –, made a second pre- While all concerned recognised the discriminately for any Liberal of mod- miership unavoidable. It also sowed the desirability of sheltering under the erate views. Similarly, ‘Radical’ covered seeds of the  secession. umbrella, the tensions of working to- not only those of firm utilitarian views Shannon is highly critical of gether and the jockeying for the suc- but also those who argued vigorously Gladstone’s leadership in – but cession created the initial ingredients for one or more of the single-issue re- argues a convincing case. Gladstone for the crisis. The marked differences form campaigns. performed best leading from the front in in the personality of Gladstone, Despite the diversity of its parliamen- a positive campaign imbued with moral Hartington and Chamberlain are tary membership, the Liberals formed conviction. His victory in  was seen as a further but frequently exag- the government between –, achieved on the negative theme of un- gerated complication. – and –. Disraeli’s – doing the evils of Beaconsfieldism. Con- Inevitably for senior Victorian politi- government was seen as a temporary sequently, he failed to give the cabinet a cians, all were rich. Gladstone inherited disturbance allowing the Liberal Party strong lead but despite continuously wealth from his merchant father but to recuperate from Gladstone’s great threatening, failed to retire. The failure had to make it work to help rescue his reforms. to lead was exasperated by Irish ob- wife’s family from financial embarrass- Following Palmerston’s death in struction in the Commons and by a di- ment. He had an establishment educa- , Gladstone had become the domi- vided government reaction to various tion and an early entry into politics. He nant personality in the party, and in foreign, especially colonial, events was extremely energetic both physi- spite of a crisis over the  reform which forced themselves haphazardly cally and mentally and driven by an bill, its inevitable leader. His reforming onto the agenda. Into the vacuum cre- evangelical need to justify himself to his government of – came to grief ated stepped special-interest groups Maker. His movement from the Tory to over internal disputes on education with a variety of nostrums for reform. the Liberal Party did not undermine his policy and Ireland. Gladstone’s disgust In the cabinet, Joseph Chamberlain and desire to see the aristocracy play its full and, at sixty-five, a longing to spend a Charles Dilke were the spokesmen for part in the leadership of the nation. A retirement in settling accounts with action. The radicalism of Chamberlain high church Anglican, he derived con- God led him to resign the leadership of and Dilke was resisted by Hartington, siderable support from the noncon- the party in . He was succeeded who came to be seen as obstructive to formist masses. An efficient administra- tor and persuasive orator, it was spite- Gladstone addresses the cabinet in 1883, a rather fanciful artist’s impression. Chamber- fully thought that he was always able to lain is recognisable by his monocle, near the pillar. Hartington is second from the right convince himself that his self-interest with Harcourt to his right. was also the interest of the nation. Chamberlain and Hartington were of a younger generation, both in their early fifties in . Lord Hartington was heir to the Duke of Devonshire, one of the largest landowners in the country. Known for his keen interest in horse racing, he enjoyed a full social life, mix- ing with the Malborough House set sur- rounding the Prince of Wales. He con- veyed the impression that his involve- ment in politics was purely noblesse oblige, for which he had to endure endless en- nui. However, Reginald Brett, his former secretary, later Lord Esher, made it clear that ‘apart from politics he has no real interest in life; and cut off from them

6 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 he would be in reality as bored as he ap- pears to be by them’. Very straightfor- ward, with a ‘pulverising style of argu- ment’, he led by virtue of his position rather than through organisation, ora- tory or policy development. Joseph Chamberlain could not have been a greater contrast. His fortune was made in manufacturing in Birmingham. His political fortune grew from his dy- namic mayoralty of the city. He entered national politics through the organisa- tion of nonconformist protests over the  Forster Education Act. His strength was in the efficient electoral organisation of Birmingham, which he was attempt- ing to expand into a national grassroots radical campaigning body through the Originally captioned ‘Brains, Birth and Brummagen’, this caricature shows Gladstone, National Liberal Federation (NLF). At Hartington and Chamberlain on the government front bench before the great divide. that time the NLF was very far from na- tional and was perceived more as a cau- • The wider electorate opened up to Gladstone government had lost the will cus forcing radical policies on to resistant Chamberlain and his allies the to live. The government had nearly moderates. While his sharp tongue and prospect of a radical Liberal Party fallen under the public uproar that fol- publicity-seeking gained him enemies, free of the drag of Whig/aristo- lowed General Gordon’s death at Khar- he was a prickly character, easily of- cratic influences. toum in February . Polite but ex- fended. Unlike Hartington, Chamber- • There was stiff competition to woo hausting argument continued over a lain was a complex man prone to ma- the new county electorate with range of issues in the cabinet and the noeuvre and to see plots in the actions of radical policies — particularly the government took the opportunity of a others. Ambitious, he sought leadership provision of municipal allotments budget defeat in June  to give up for what he could accomplish and to (popularised as ‘Three Acres and a its seals. Quite why remains a mystery. wean the party away from Whiggish Cow’). As a corollary, Whig fears The Liberal leadership had been leanings. But it is important to recognise and disenchantments intensified, warned of the likelihood of defeat.Why that his differences with Hartington with some of the younger Whigs did they not tighten whipping? Why were purely political and that imperial- acting as a ginger group to offset did Irish Liberals support the rebels and ism was a common bond. the better organised radicals. risk hastening an election which would • The focus on the new electorate lead to their defeat? Why did the gov- The gage of battle seems to have diverted Liberal atten- ernment push the Home Rule Irish Two other key ingredients must be con- tion from the consequences of redis- MPs into the hands of the Tories? sidered — the  election and Ireland. tribution on the boroughs and cities. Lord Salisbury formed a minority The  Reform Act, which widened The creation of single-member seats Conservative administration with their the franchise in county constituencies, and the elimination of small bor- support and an election was called for was the major Liberal achievement of oughs worked against the Liberals, November  but not before the al- – but it was passed only after a creating havens of ‘villa Tories’ in the ready convoluted Irish problem had confrontation with the House of Lords. suburbs. been given another twist. Speaking to the Annual Conference of • Most significantly, it was in no party’s the National Union of Conservative tactical interest to exclude Ireland ‘Ireland, Ireland! that Associations in , Randolph from the reform or to reduce the cloud in the west, that Churchill, a rising star of his party, de- number of Irish MPs in proportion 17 clared ‘Parliamentary reform is the gage to the population. It was also recog- coming storm’  of battle, and the Party which carries it nised that this would be to the ben- Since , Ireland had been a part but will have power for a quarter of a cen- efit of the Home Rule party at Lib- always an uncomfortable part of the tury’. His opponents shared Churchill’s eral expense. United Kingdom. Its MPs always view and were prepared to allow the To- formed a distinct group but for most of Following a reform act and the redistri- ries a significant part in the redistribu- the period allied to the other British bution, it was the convention that a tion of seats, in order to win a more political parties. Following a brief general election would be held soon af-  democratic electorate. Fenian uprising in , Isaac Butt re- ter the preparation of new registers. But There were four important conse- newed efforts to create a constitutional before this happened, the second quences: party to win greater autonomy for Ire-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 7 land. Under his reasoned leadership, who are forever seeking to some modest electoral success was discredit English rule in achieved. In , some fifty-nine Irish Ireland by the personal MPs were willing to describe them- ruin of the Minister who selves as Home Rulers but of these represents it in the probably thirty could be more appro- House.’ priately described as Liberals, eighteen Gladstone’s policy on previously sat as Liberals. Indeed, Ireland has been catego- McCalmont’s Poll Book, while happily rised by H. C. G. Matthew listing the appropriate MPs as Home as ‘coercion and concilia- Rulers in the constituency results, does tion’, heading off Irish not distinguish these Irishmen from agrarian violence by firm Liberals and Conservatives in the sum- action but seeking to meet mary tables even as late as . Irish grievances with the Charles Stuart Parnell, a Protestant objective of reconciling landlord, succeeded Butt but took time the Irish to their link with to consolidate his hold on the party. England. However, as Even before Butt’s death in , harshly but not inaccu- Home Rule MPs obstructing the House of Commons Parnell had not played by the rules. In rately characterised by during a coercion bill. Parliament, he ignored the conventions Salisbury, ‘every successive of debate, aiming to obstruct the instalment of concession was wrung upon. He will not stick to any mini- progress of any but sympathetic Irish from them by agitation on the other mum even if he could now be induced  business. Outside parliament he devel- side, so that even the grace and value of to formulate another.’ Chamberlain’s oped a complex relationship with those their vicarious generosity, whatever it mistrust was shared by his fellow Bir- who preferred direct action and vio- may be, is absolutely lost’. In particular, mingham MP, John Bright, a radical of lence, not condoning the violence but Gladstone, who retained a touching faith an earlier generation. Of a conversation  building on the grievances of both the in the paternalistic leadership role of the with Gladstone early in he records poor agricultural labourers and the ten- aristocracy, never succeeded in breaking ‘I thought he placed too much confi- ant farmers. These tactics were critical the link between the nationalist and dence in the leaders of the Rebel Party. I in consolidating agrarian grievances. could place none in them, and the gen- support for the The dissatisfac- eral feeling was and is that any terms Home Rule party Successive secretaries tion with Irish made with them would not be kept, among previous spend unshining hours policy was a signifi- and that, thro’ them, I could not hope Liberal voters and cant source of dis- for reconciliation with discontented in saying No to  in the wider elec- content within the and disloyal Ireland.’ torate created by impossible demands, cabinet. Hartington, Lord Salisbury’s short minority ad- the  Reform and hunting for plausible whose family were ministration added one more incendiary ingredient to the mix. Lord Carnarvon, Act. Hostility to answers to insoluble important Irish the Irish tactics was landowners, and Salisbury’s Viceroy for Ireland, had a se- crucial in the di- riddles. whose brother died cret meeting with Parnell in which he vide in the Liberal at the hands of Irish created an impression of empathy with Party in . terrorists, favoured the smack of firm Home Rule. (This was unauthorised The Liberal Government of – government. Forster resigned from the and was later repudiated by Salisbury was unprepared for Irish difficulties and government rather than see it brokering when it became public.) Parnell urged perplexed by the task. John Morley, who deals with Parnell. Irish electors on the mainland not to later held office as Irish Secretary, spoke of Chamberlain, unwilling to see coer- support the Liberals in the general elec- Lord Frederick Cavendish, Hartington’s cion as a lasting policy, opened his own tion and raised the ante in negotiations brother, spending the afternoon before channels to Parnell to develop schemes Mrs O’Shea undertook with Gladstone his assassination in ‘that grim apartment for local government. Unfortunately on his behalf. in Dublin Castle, where successive secre- his intermediary, Captain O’Shea, the taries spend unshining hours in saying husband of Parnell’s mistress Kitty, ‘Keep your ranks still, 27 No to impossible demands, and hunting proved to be a source of misinforma- firm and steady’ for plausible answers to insoluble rid- tion, leading Chamberlain to believe The  election confounded Lord  dles.’ G. O. Trevelyan, who succeeded that he had been double-crossed by Randolph’s prophecy and the expecta- Cavendish, wrote: ‘No-one could un- Parnell. Writing to Gladstone in Octo- tions of the other party leaders for a derstand what it is to be the representa- ber , he complained: ‘I cannot see large Liberal majority. On the back of tive of the central government in the my way at all about Ireland. Parnell has ‘Three Acres and a Cow’, the Liberals face of the false and unscrupulous men shown that he is not to be depended did well among the new county elec-

8 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 torate, though the new members were 31 as likely to be Whigs as radicals. The To- Table 1: Election Results 1880–1885 ries gained in the cities from the crea- Liberal Conservative Home Rule Majority tion of single-member seats and from 1880 359 238 63 58 Parnell’s boycott of English Liberals. By By-elections –19 17 2 some contemporary estimates – 1885 335 249 86 0 seats were lost to the Liberals by Irish intervention and, while modern com- putations suggest a figure as low as six, plined group than in . Parnell Since the Irish Home Rulers had Parnell had further alienated the party waited to be wooed. been siding with the Conservatives most likely to be sympathetic to his as- For each of the major Liberal lead- and no party had an independent ma- pirations. ers, leaving the Conservatives in and jority in the Commons, Lord Salis- As foreseen by Gladstone, the biggest vulnerable to Liberal votes on impor- bury determined to meet the new gainers were the Irish Nationalists in- tant measures looked the most attrac- House in government. But he too creasing representation from sixty-five tive option. But beyond a shared inter- was content to bide his time and, un- ahead of the election to eighty-six, a est in not renewing their own quarrels like Disraeli in similar circumstances, clear majority of the  Irish seats and their motivations were very different. Salisbury neither sought to outflank a majority even within Ulster. Con- Hartington was comfortable with Tory Gladstone in bidding for Irish sup- servatives held eighteen Irish seats in policies and would have been happy to port nor rushed to entice the moder-  compared to twenty-six in . back tough Irish coercion proposals. ate Liberals. The Liberals were eliminated. His greatest anxiety following the elec- Who knows what would have hap- T. A. Jenkins argues that Chamber- tion was to obtain a face-to-face meet- pened if Liberal nerves had held but, in lain was the biggest loser. His push to ing of the Liberal leadership to secure a the critical period between the elec- create a Radical party independent of coordinated approach. Chamberlain tion results in November  and the the Whigs had failed. Jenkins also makes thought the Irish would be more ame- meeting of the House in January , a good case of continued commitment nable to Liberal proposals when they the course of history was transformed by the aristocratic Whigs to Liberalism had had a sustained taste of Tory rule. by some ill-omened spin doctoring. In during the  campaign. Gladstone, already secretly convinced December, Gladstone’s son Herbert, Far from winning an overwhelming of the necessity for Home Rule and apparently concerned by fears of majority, the Liberals had slipped back. believing that the Tories were willing to Chamberlain’s rivalry to his father, Parliament was hung. Table One sum- concede, thought that Tory-led propos- briefed the press on his father’s con- marises the results for the  and als supported on an all-party basis version to Home Rule.  elections. However, the bare num- would be the best solution. bers are slightly misleading. The Liberal majority for – was generally better than indicated. Firstly, party alle- The Liberal leadership sheltering under the Gladstonian umbrella. Chamberlain is forging giance was sometimes secondary to lo- ahead with the Unauthorised Programme. Hartington, holding Gladstone’s hand, is cal factors and secondly the Home dragging his heels while John Bright brings up the rear. Rulers of  were not a homogenous group and some had a stronger alle- giance to the government than to Parnell — only twenty-thee voted for Parnell’s leadership of the party, with eighteen against. The arithmetic suggests that a Con- servative government would not be able to maintain itself in office for any length of time and certainly under modern party disciplines it would have quickly failed. However for Gladstone, who could never rely on the discipline of his own side and whose political maturity had been gained during the confused party poli- tics of the Crimean War, bringing down the Tories would not have been the prime consideration. The Home Rulers of  were a better disci-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 9 keep my counsel’. of the leadership to Hartington. Failure Hoping to exploit would give Hartington the chance to the Liberal divisions, initiate or support a policy more to his the Conservatives own liking. lost the support of By March the ‘enquiry’ had turned the Irish during the into proposals for draft legislation on debate on the Home Rule and a land purchase Queen’s speech, by scheme. Gladstone’s penchant for bold taking up coercion. leadership had reasserted itself. At this In part, they were point Chamberlain and Trevelyan re- outmanoeuvred. signed from the cabinet and the road The Liberals de- to the split was open. Gladstone had feated them not on hoped that a ‘slow fermentation in Ireland but on a many minds, working towards the final ‘Three Acres and a product’ would convince his col- Cow’ amendment leagues of his policy and it can be ar- put down by Cham- gued that for the bulk of the party it berlain’s lieutenant worked. There was little enthusiasm Jesse Collings. for Home Rule but, for most, a Gladstone formed grudging acceptance of Gladstone’s his third govern- proposals and a willingness to trust the ment proposing ‘to old leader were sufficient. examine whether it For Chamberlain it was inadequate. is or not practicable’ His presence in the government had to introduce a ‘Leg- maintained his status in the party and Chamberlain and Hartington resisting the summons of islative body, to sit in he had hoped either to convince the  Gladstone at the end of the 1885 election campaign. Dublin’. On this government to return to his scheme of basis he was able to extensive but purely local government entice Chamberlain for Ireland or to promote land purchase ‘Men like these will lead, into office and bought time to further as an alternative, not a supplement, to his party’s education. Home Rule. In this he had failed. not school us’ But not all were taken in. The Whig Despite its crucial importance, Ireland rebellion had begun. Eighteen Liberals ‘In their ranks, spread had not played a dominant part in the voted against Collings’ motion and a wild distraction’ election where on the Conservative further forty-nine abstained or were The revelation of Gladstone’s plans side a low-key approach best preserved absent without a pair. Two Independent opened a vigorous debate. On  April freedom of action and, among Liberals, Liberals also abstained. This was a sub- the first reading debate of the Home the greatest debate had been between stantial proportion of the margin of Rule bill began and, unusually by mod- advocates and opponents of Chamber- Liberals over the Conservatives. Sixteen ern standards, was spread over four days. lain’s Unauthorised Programme. In- of the eighteen who voted against, and Within the Liberal Party, the opponents deed, Gladstone’s Irish policy has been both the Independent Liberals, subse- of Home Rule began conspicuously to described as ‘a night cavalry ride around quently also voted against Home Rule organise their resistance. Nevertheless, the flank of his own army’. In defence, and stood as Liberal Unionists. This the period up to the second reading in Shannon has highlighted Mr G’s at- group was predominantly from the the middle of May (deliberately?) pro- tempts to prepare his colleagues, and in moderate end of the party. Twnety-four vided the opportunity for negotiations particular Hartington, for what of the abstainers and two who were and compromise as the scale of the po- Gladstone saw as inevitable. His ob- paired were also Home Rule rebels. Of tential rebellion became known. lique style left Hartington perplexed the previous Liberal cabinet, not only From the beginning, Hartington set and the party in consternation when Hartington but Lord Selborne, Lord his heart against the bill, speaking in the Herbert launched his ‘kite’. The kite Derby, Lord Northbrook (from among first reading debate on  April. On  also doomed Gladstone’s efforts (always the moderates) and Bright (from the April, he shared a platform with Salis- likely to be futile) to persuade Salisbury, radical wing) declined to serve. bury at the Opera House, Haymarket, through his nephew Arthur Balfour, to Pledged to oppose Home Rule with Peter Rylands to represent the adopt Home Rule. himself, Hartington at least was initially radicals. The meeting was chaired by Extraordinarily, even in January willing to stand on the sidelines while Lord Cowper, a former Liberal Lord , Gladstone tried to maintain the the government tried its experiment. A Lieutenant of Ireland and attended by fiction of ‘freedom of action’ and as ‘an success for Gladstone would open the three other Liberal peers and fourteen old Parliamentary hand’ intended ‘to way for his retirement and a reversion

10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 dissenting Liberal MPs in addition to a tantly, the moment came and went with sixty-four MPs present and nine selection of Tory luminaries. Three without the concessions Chamberlain letters of regret. This demonstrated the other Liberal peers and three MPs sent had expected. Why? growing collusion between the two apologies. Hartington’s boats were Gladstone remained optimistic unionist wings as Chamberlain at- burnt but joint meetings were too great throughout the process. In mid-April tended with eighteen of those from his a novelty for grassroots Liberals and he was described by Hamilton as ‘full of own meeting and spoke. The extensive there was no repeat. A meeting of dissi- confidence and determination’, arguing and prestigiously Whig, Liberal Union- dent Liberal peers was held in Lord that ‘if the bill is carried by a small ma- ist Committee was unveiled on  May, Derby’s house on  April attended by jority (say twenty), he will consider it a featuring twenty-five peers, including , with letters of support from a fur- defeat.’ Did this optimism influence five dukes, and twenty-eight MPs. ther . There was a steady stream of Gladstone’s judgement? It is more The proceedings and attendees at Whig resignations from Household ap- likely, he recognised that concessions to these caucus meetings were openly re- pointments. Chamberlain would be ‘treated as an ported in the newspapers and the gov- On  April the Liberal Unionists acknowledgement of his superior ernment can have had no illusions as to proved they meant business by estab- greatness & wisdom, the scale of oppo- lishing that sine qua non of British & as fresh point of sition to the bill. politics a ‘Committee’. In addition, an departure accord- ‘Never, never, never’. Following the office was set up, at  Spring Gardens, ingly’. Most prob- meeting at Dev- to form, as George Goschen put it to able of all, as Herbert reported to onshire House, The Times thoughtfully Lord Wolmer, ‘a centre whence infor- Labouchere, it was ‘because father had provided a list not only of those attend- mation can be given, and whither not sufficiently mastered the difficulties ing the ‘private’ meeting but also fur- news can be carried.’ Hartington en- which presented themselves to his ther lists of those declared and probable trusted the organisation to three mind.’ Where Gladstone did not want opponents of the government’s bills. young Whig MPs, H. R. Brand (the to make progress, none doubted his According to this report there were  son of the Speaker), Craig Sellar and ability to find difficulties in the detail. likely opponents,  supporters and Albert Grey. For Chamberlain this was the final thirty Liberals undeclared. The radical wing of the unionists, straw. ‘The attempt at a compromise Gladstone was never an enthusiast hesitated as to an appropriate strategy. having come to an end under circum- for party meetings and it is a measure of The seizure of control of the National stances which almost amounted to a the government’s desperation that he Liberal Federation by Gladstonian ac- breach of faith’, he set about consoli- was persuaded to address a meeting at tivists on  May must have acted as dating the opposition among his own the Foreign Office on  May. The in- warning of the strength of grass roots supporters. On  May a meeting was vitation was extended to those ‘in fa- opinion. Labouchere, a loyalist radical held at  Prince’s Gardens, Chamber- vour of the establishment of a legislative MP, an inveterate gossip and deal bro- lain’s South Kensington home, at- body in Dublin for the management of ker, appointed himself intermediary tended by fifty to sixty MPs, plus ten affairs specifically and exclusively between Chamberlain and the govern- letters of sympathy, out of sixty to sev- Irish’ — discouraging to hard-line ment. Chamberlain cleverly focused enty invited. opponents but flexible to waverers.  the debate on retaining Irish members Two days later Lord Hartington ar- responded. The conciliatory tone, effec- at Westminster, an ancestor of the West ranged a meeting at Devonshire House tively killing land reform while keeping Lothian question. Cleverly, because the presence of the Irish MPs at Westmin- Chamberlain gains the backing of his local, Birmingham, party to butcher Gladstone’s ster was the key symbol of Imperial Irish bills. unity and more cynically, getting rid of the Irish members and their obstructive tactics was possibly the most attractive feature of the whole bill to uncommit- ted Liberals. A concession to Chamber- lain would probably have alienated as many as it reconciled. Nevertheless, at one time, it was believed that Gladstone would make sufficient concessions to prevent Chamberlain’s group slipping into opposition. Gladstone opened the second reading debate on  May. It is generally agreed that this speech did not match the standards either of his first reading contribution or the June winding-up speech but more impor-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 11 the door open to Irish representation at defeat, simply abandoning the policy, solution?’ ‘He had no doubt that an im- Westminster, and the offer to recast the could not be reconciled with any mediate appeal, attended as it might be bill after a second reading vote of prin- Victorian sense of honour. with risks, was preferable to any appear- ciple won over some of the doubters. • Retirement to allow the reformation ance of “showing the white-feather” … Two days later, in a moment of of a Liberal government under The Tories might gain more seats than Thatcherite vehe- Hartington would they would lose … but Mr G would mence, the game ‘All the world over I will have appealed to come back at any rate with a more was lost. Baited the dissidents. Be- united party of his own.’ This argu- across the chamber back the masses against fore the event, it ment gelled well with Gladstone’s own by Michael Hicks the classes.’ was the outcome thoughts as expressed in a letter to Sir Beach and Lord they imagined. But Joseph Pease a few days earlier: ‘… the Randolph it was not in keep- body of the nation, so far as we can Churchill that in order to stay in office ing with the fighting character dis- judge, has hailed our imperfect efforts the government would ‘reconstruct’ the played by Gladstone throughout his with enthusiasm.’ Hamilton, a senior Home Rule bill, Gladstone responded: career. civil servant, himself put the case ‘Never, never, never’. • Resignation would have bought against dissolution and for delay, as late Chamberlain called another meeting time. The Tories, even if backed by as  June, without success. Gladstone of his supporters on  May in Com- the dissidents, would need time to was, as Churchill declaimed a few mittee Room  of the House where establish a minority government weeks later, ‘an old man in a hurry’. he put the choice of walking out or and formulate a policy before call- The contemporary Gladstonian voting against. He then read a letter ing an election. If the Conservatives view of the election is summarised by from John Bright, announcing the old could not form a government, Morley. ‘No election was ever fought radical leader’s decision to vote against, Gladstone would have bought time more keenly, and never did so many though apparently advocating others to and demonstrated that there was no powerful men fling themselves with abstain and ward off dissolution. alternative. livelier activity into a great struggle … Bright’s action spoke louder than his • An immediate dissolution would test Mr Gladstone’s plume waved in every words. Only three of the fifty-five the public popularity of Home Rule part of the field … The incomparable present were willing to support the bill, and optimisti- thirteen voted for abstention and cally drive the One of the key factors behind the break up of the party in 1886 thirty-nine to oppose. No further talks dissidents into was Gladstone’s reluctance to retire. or pleas prevailed. the wilderness. ‘Every man in combat Clear evidence ex- ists that the alterna- straining’ tives were can- The cabinet met the day after the defeat vassed. On  and resolved to ask the Queen to dis- April, Hamilton solve parliament. An election was called records a conversa- for July. This decision was reached tion with Lord quickly and with little dissent within Rosebery, the government. Historians have passed Gladstone’s even- by equally speedily. Yet it should be tual successor, ‘He considered the most damaging devel- would much prefer opment to Liberal unity in the whole Mr G’s resigning. A dispute. Each of the previous Liberal dissolution would governments, in ,  and , split the Liberal had been ended by internal rebellion Party into smither- but in each case time was bought for eens.’ On  May, the hard feelings to soften, for new Gladstone met rallying calls to be found. On these with the Chief earlier occasions Liberals were not Whip, Arnold called to fight Liberals. Morley, and Francis Characteristically, Gladstone’s case in Schnadhorst, the cabinet was based on precedent and chief agent and constitutional propriety but it is equally ‘arch-wirepuller’. clear that it had a strong political base. Schnadhorst was What were his alternatives? asked directly: ‘dis- • Staying in office after such a major solution or no dis-

12 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 that ‘one more heave’ would resolve the 58 Table 2: Election Results 1886 Irish conundrum was not shattered un- Conservative Liberal Gladstonian Home Rule til Gladstone’s retirement nearly ten Unionist Liberal years later. At the dissolution 251 101 232 86 July 1886 317 77 191 85 ‘And the fight be won’ Gains/Losses 66 –24 –41 –1 The Liberal Unionists had won. They had preserved British imperial unity. effort was in vain. The sons of Zeruiah the dissidents and ,, for the But the consequence was not what were too hard for him, and England Conservatives but since the  uncon- they expected. Gladstone neither re- was unconvinced.’ Although unop- tested seats meant that there were tired nor did the loyalist Liberals aban- posed, Gladstone carried out the by ,, fewer votes than in  it don his policy. Despite the narrow base now traditional oratorical assault on was not a true test of electoral feeling. of their disagreement with the majority Mid-Lothian. But he extended his The uncontested seats favoured the of the party, the Unionists had been speechmaking to Glasgow, Manchester Conservatives over Liberals by about forced to establish a new electoral or- and Liverpool (where he declared ‘all : though only one seat, Lincolnshire– ganisation at short notice. The dissi- the world over I will back the masses East Lindsey, changed hands by this dents had fought and survived the gen- against the classes’, earning the method. The Liberal Unionists faced no eral election, even holding the balance Queen’s rebuke). He stood for Leith as contest in twenty-nine seats but it was of power in the Commons. This guar- well as Mid-Lothian to drive out W. the Irish Nationalists who faced the anteed their continued importance at Jacks, a dissident who had recanted but fewest contests. Westminster. turned coat a third time. However, Gladstone resigned rather than meet In part their electoral survival re- this frantic activity by a seventy-six the new House. His ambition for one flected the loyalty of constituents to es- year-old leader and his opponents was last great achievement had brought fail- tablished members and in part the elec- not matched by the same dedication in ure, a noble failure, for which Ireland toral pact with the Conservatives. But the constituencies,  out of the  continues to pay. He had also failed to there are reasons to suggest they had were uncontested compared to thirty- obliterate the dissidents. In the Com- prospects of long-term survival. Geo- nine in . mons the loss was largely numerical. graphically, Unionists were strong in Preparations on the other side had The social background of MPs was not Devon, Cornwall, parts of Scotland begun early. In March, Salisbury and substantially changed. They continued (especially around Glasgow) and East Hartington had opened talks, with to represent every type of constituency Lancashire — areas where a more mili- parallel discussions between Cham- though there had been a retreat from tantly Protestant tradition continued to berlain and Churchill, and by early the high water mark in the counties have an influence. Chamberlain’s or- April had agreed an electoral pact. To- and Liberals would become more reli- ganisational skills ensured a solid block ries would not stand against incum- ant on the Welsh and Scots who also of loyal unionist voters in the West bent Liberal Unionists in exchange for harboured hopes of devolution. The Midlands. But as with so many defect- encouragement for Liberal Unionist desertion of the Whig Lords was im- ing groups of MPs, they lacked both the supporters to vote Conservative else- portant. The residual Liberals could organisational and ideological strength where. With considerable effort by the only muster forty-one for the vote in to hope to form a majority party. To ry whips against the natural inclina- the Lords on the second Home Rule With the editor’s permission, the tion of local Conservative associations, bill. The loss of the peers was also felt in tale of this dilemma will be told in a the deal held. Only three Liberal Un- the wealth of the party both centrally future issue. ionists faced a Tory opponent, includ- and locally. Worse, the election had To ny Little is Secretary of the Liberal ing Salisbury’s son-in-law Lord given the Liberal Party a clear leader- Democrat History Group and a regular con- Wolmer, though as many as eight oth- ship and purpose and had left it tantalis- tributor to the Journal. ers stood down in the face of Con- ingly close to its ambition. The illusion servative hostility. A Radical Union- ist Association was formed on  June. In the outcome, parliament was Table 3: Liberal Unionist Results again hung, and while the consolation The Fate of the Rebels Liberal Unionist Victories for Liberals was that even in these most adverse circumstances the Conserva- Returned unopposed 25 Returned for existing seat 62 tives could not quite win a majority, the Returned in contest 37 Abstainers joining LUs 4 Abstainers joining LUs New members replacing LUs balance of power had shifted. The over- Abstainers joining LUs 4 New members replacing LUs 3 Beaten by Gladstonians 12 Won from Gladstonians 7 all results of the election are shown in Beaten by Conservatives 2 Won from Irish Nationalists 1 Table Two. Retired 21 The popular vote was ,, for the Gladstonian Liberals, , for Total 101 Total 77

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 13 1 Quoted in J Morley, Life of William Ewart Brack et al Dictionary of Liberal Biography, Po- 1833–1908, Longmans 1911, Vol.II, p95 et Gladstone, 1903. liticos, 1998. seq. Gladstone was equally reluctant to call a 2 Quoted in H C G Matthew, Gladstone 1875– 15 Ld Randolph Churchill, Speech 2 October meeting. 1898, Oxford, 1995, p255. 1883. Cited in P Marsh The Discipline of Popu- 33 J Chamberlain, A Political Memoir, ed C H D 3This thesis is intriguingly set out in A B Cooke lar Government, The Harvester Press, 1978. Howard, The Batchworth Press 1953. and J Vincent The Governing Passion: Cabinet 16 In August 1884, Gladstone estimated that the 34 M R D Foot, The Hawarden Kite, recently re- Government and Party Politics in Britain 1885– Irish ‘so called National Party’ would increase its printed in Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 86 Hassocks 1974 numbers from ‘a little over forty to near eighty’. No. 20, 1998. 4For example see G Goodman Liberal Unionism: H C G Matthew, Gladstone 1875–1898, Oxford 35 T W Heyck, op cit. The Revolt of the Whigs, Victorian Studies, 1995, p 180. 36 R T Shannon, Gladstone, Heroic Minister 1865– 1959. 17 Gladstone in a letter to his wife, 12 October 1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, 5For an analysis of the Whig commitment to Lib- 1845 p374 et seq eralism prior to the Home Rule crisis see T A 18 Alan O’Day, Irish Home Rule 1867–1921, Man- 37 House of Commons 21 January 1886. Jenkins Gladstone, Whiggery and the Liberal chester University Press,1988, p38. O’Day 38 Gladstone, memo reprinted in H C G Matthew, Party, 1874–1886, Oxford 1988. The Radical analyses all the attempts to secure Home Rule Gladstone 1875–1898, Oxford 1995, p239. wing of the party is less well served. T W Heyck, up to the creation of the Irish Free State 39 Gladstone to Granville 9 December 1885 in A The Dimensions of British Radicalism, Univer- 19 J Vincent and M Stenton (ed) McCalmont’s Par- Ramm (ed) The Political Correspondence of Mr sity of Illinois Press 1974 contains a useful statis- liamentary Poll Book, reprinted by Harvester Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876–1886, Ox- tical analysis but hits the wrong tone in its analy- Press 1971. ford, 1962 vol II p414. sis of issues and the complexity of views within 20 Eg in the Land War of 1880/82 from which we 40 A typical response was that of Sir W Harcourt, the party derive the term ‘boycott’. Chancellor of the Exchequer, gossiping with 6For the classic analysis of the composition of the 21 J Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Hamilton, a former secretary to Gladstone, 30 party in the mid-century see John Vincent, The 1903 Vol III, p67. January 1886: ‘We none of us believe in Mr.G’s Formation of the British Liberal Party 1858–67, 22 Trevelyan to Gladstone 20 August 1883 quoted plan; but we have no alternative policy to sug- Hassocks 1976. in T W Heyck, op cit gest.’ D W R Bahlman (ed) The Diary of Sir 7 See R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minister 23 H C G Matthew, Gladstone and Ireland, Journal Edward Walter Hamilton, 1885–1906, The Uni- 1865–1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, of Liberal Democrat History, No. 20, 1998. versity of Hull Press, 1993, p21. 1999. For further detail see Shannon Gladstone 24 Ld Salisbury, Speech in Liverpool, April 1882. P 41 The Times 15 April 1886 and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, Thomas Nel- Marsh, op cit 42 D G Boyce (ed), The Crisis of British Unionism, son, 1963. 25 Letter 26 October 1885. J L Garvin, The Life of The Historians’ Press, 1987, p10. 8R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minister 1865– Joseph Chamberlain, MacMillan 1933, Vol II, p 43 14 April. D W R Bahlman (ed) op cit, p34. 1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, pas- 114. 44 Cited in R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minis- sim. 26 20 March 1886. R A J Walling (ed) The Diaries ter 1865–1898, p429 9For a fuller development of this argument see D of John Bright, Cassell, 1930, p537. Later he re- 45 11 May 1886. Cited in J Chamberlain, A Political A Hamer Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone fers to Home Rulers as ‘the criminal gang in Memoir, p217–8. and Rosebery, Oxford, 1972. Parlt. and in Ireland.’ p557. 46 Chamberlain, op cit p219. 10 Caught up in the Crawford divorce scandal, 27 This and subsequent sub-headings are taken 47 The Times 13th May reports on Chamberlain’s which effectively ended his political career, from The Liberal March as in the Liberator Song meeting; 15th May on Hartington’s; 24th May on Dilke played a minor part in the crisis. Book 10th Edition 1995. the Liberal Unionist Committee. 11 In October 1891, Lord Salisbury wrote to his 28 Alan O’Day, op cit. 48 J Morley, op cit vol III, p332 nephew ‘Hartington is at Newmarket and all po- 29 T A Jenkins, op cit. 49 Chamberlain’s whip, W S Caine, estimated that litical arrangements have to be hung up till some 30 Chamberlain had forecast ‘The Tories will be after this meeting thirty dissidents were lost or quadruped has run faster than some other smashed and the Whigs will be extinguished.’ shaky. Chamberlain, op cit p 222. quadruped.’ (R H Williams (ed) The Salisbury- To A J Mundella, 7 October 1885 in T W Heyck, 50 J Morley op cit, vol III, p335. Chamberlain, op cit Balfour Correspondence 1869–1892 op cit. p 222. Hertforshire Record Publications, 1988) 31 1880 Figures taken from Alan O’Day op cit. By- 51 For the text of the letter see Chamberlain, op cit 12 M V Brett (ed), Journals and Letters of Reginald election data from McCalmont’s Parliamentary p 224. Viscount Esher, Vol 1, Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Poll Book. 1885 results from The Liberal Year 52 D W R Bahlman (ed) op cit p 35, p37–8. 1934, p125. Book, 1918 cited in McCalmont’s Parliamentary 53 Gladstone to Pease 15 May 1886. Cited in Shan- 13 Op cit Vol 2 p299 Poll Book. non op cit p434. 14. For a fuller profile of the Liberal leaders see D 32 B Holland, Life of the Duke of Devonshire 54 J Morley op cit, vol III, p342–5 55 Jacks remained inconsistent. Gladstone relin- quished Leith for Mid-Lothian. Jacks unsuccess- fully contested the by election as a Liberal Un- ionist but successfully fought Stirlingshire as a Contribute to History Group Gladstonian Liberal in 1892. 56 McCalmont’s Parliamentary Poll Book op cit, In- troduction pxix publications 57 P Marsh op cit p112. Are you interested in helping producethe Journal of Liberal Democrat History, and other 58 For the state of the parties at the dissolution I have added to the Liberal Unionists, who voted Liberal Democrat History Group publications? We are looking for volunteers to help with against Home Rule, known opponents who ab- the following: stained or who later stood as Unionists. Ab- stainers whose allegiance was unknown or who • Book reviews for the Journal – any book of relevance to the histories of the Liberal stood as loyalists were added to the 228 who Democrats, Liberal Party or SDP. voted for the bill. A petition at Ipswich had cost the Liberals two seats in April 1886, preventing • Sources of photos and cartoons for the Journal. Chamberlain’s lieutenant Collings voting against Home Rule. The Liberal Unionist out- • Interviewers, and ideas for interviewees, for a major new publication, Liberal come is sometimes stated as seventy-nine but Century: an oral history of twentieth century Liberalism (due out in 2001 or 2002). this includes two Tories who adopted the Un- ionist label as a convenience. Volunteers are always welcome – please contact the Editor, Duncan Brack, at the 59 For a detailed analysis see W C Lubenow, Parlia- address on page 2. mentary Politics and the Home Rule Crisis, Ox- ford 1988.

14 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Churchill Winston Churchill was one of the famous politicians to have held high office in the administrations of two different parties. The text of this article was first delivered as a toast to the University Club of Toronto and a remembrance of the ‘Other Club’ in 1995 by Liberal Senator Jerry S Grafstein QCQC. WinstonWinston ChurchillChurchill asas aa LiberalLiberal

y topic for the toast to the club is Churchill: sive dreadnoughts. Military strategists in England re- MWinston Churchill as a Liberal. A strange spond that Britain’s control of the seas should be ac- topic for a club toast as some might suggest Church- celerated by enlarging her already awesome fleet to ill himself was considered by some as not exactly safeguard the Empire in all her majesty and maintain ‘clubbable,’ though he was a member of a number of the balance of power in Europe. clubs. Since we, in the Senate, particularly these days, Meanwhile, on the domestic front, a number of get the feeling that we are not exactly ‘clubbable’ young sparkling political stars are emerging. Winston ourselves, Churchill as the classic irreverent outsider Spencer Churchill, first elected to Parliament as a seems rather a kindred spirit. To ry in the  election for the constituency of In  Churchill jointly founded, together with Oldham, is bent on following in the illustrious, if ill- the great F. E. Smith QC, later Lord Birkenhead, one fated, steps of his late father, Lord Randolph of the finest speakers of his day, yet another kind of Churchill, who was a leading member of the Tory club. They established a dining club for politicians of establishment. Lord Randolph was a friend of the all stripes and outstanding non-politicians interested Prince of Wales and inheritor, so young Churchill in ideas, served up with superb cuisine, laced with believed, of the great social policies of Benjamin fine wine and shrouded by mellow smoke of aged Disraeli, called by all ‘Tory Democracy.’ cigars. One purpose of the club was to cut across Unfortunately, Lord Randolph Churchill’s mete- party lines and create friendships to minimise politi- oric career, aimed right at the Prime Minister’s of- cal differences and partisanship. This they grandly fice, was cut down by a serious disease, upsetting his named ‘The Other Club,’ and Churchill rarely rationality, causing him slowly to slide into a tor- missed its regular fortnightly dinners. ‘Great tact will mented and deranged death. be necessary in the avoiding of bad moments,’ After his father’s unhappy demise, young Church- Churchill wrote to Bonar Law about ‘The Other ill, already a soldier, became a notorious columnist Club’s’ organising idea. Churchill always believed and respected author, whose sensational escape from that personal friendship and civility were more im- a Boer gaol in South Africa was widely publicised in portant in public life than personalised political par- all the London papers. He has returned to England tisanship. to pursue his fame and fortune in print and politics. I intend to give you a taste of one embattled England finds herself embroiled in a divisive na- Senator’s revisionist view of history, rather than cur- tional debate, splitting the coalition government led rent politics. Any semblance in my remarks between by the Conservative Party and its alliance with Lib- today’s politics and yesterday’s history is therefore erals and others who call themselves Unionists. Sud- purely coincidental. denly, the Tory prime minister, Arthur Balfour, re- The year is . The place is England. England verses fifty years of traditional Tory Free Trade policy stands at the very height of her imperial power. Ger- and supports higher tariffs for the first time. Church- many plots to outstrip England’s superior sea-power ill, an unabashed Free Trader, uncomfortable with by secretly laying plans for the construction of mas- this sudden departure from the traditional policies of

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 15 So it is in spring ing his Liberal colours, and in June of  that , at the Cobden Club, held within Churchill rises to the auspices of the Midland Club in speak in Parliament Manchester (the home of Free Trade) after Lloyd George he launches a scathing attack on his in yet another tur- former Conservative colleagues. bulent debate on ‘We know perfectly well what to ex- Free Trade. pect … [the Tory Party] has become Churchill, a Tory the party of great vested interest; cor- still, is insulted ruption at home, aggression to cover it when the Tory up abroad; trickery of tariff juggles, tyr- front bench and al- anny of party machine; sentiment by most all the back the bucketful, patronage by the pint; bench (except a open hand at the public exchequer; few hecklers) im- open door at the public house; dear mediately leave the food for the millions … and … cheap House and repair to labour by the millions …’ the smoking rooms In , a new Liberal government while he is speaking forms, led by Sir Henry Campbell- — a deliberate Bannerman. It is confirmed in office snub. Weeks later, the following year in a landslide elec- Churchill rises in tion victory for the Liberal Party. the House of Com- Winston Churchill becomes a youthful mons, loses his train member of the outer Cabinet as Under of thought in mid- Secretary of the Colonies under Lord speech and retires Elgin, who sits in the Lords. It was at Winston Churchill with David Lloyd George, when both were embarrassed. Mem- this time that Eddie Marsh, soon to be- cabinet members. bers murmur that come Churchill’s lifelong assistant, re- he may be suffering luctantly agreed to join Churchill as his the Tory Party, seeks new friends and al- from the same defect that doomed his private secretary. He was told by Lady liances to maintain his principled phi- father decades before. Lytton, to assuage his fears about the losophy. At the same time, Churchill is Shortly thereafter, on May st, mercurial Churchill, that ‘the first time also becoming increasingly disen- Winston Churchill, revived, re-enters you meet Winston you see all of his chanted with the elitism of Tory social the House of Commons, pauses, bows faults and the rest of your life you spend policies that protected the prerogatives to the Speaker and crosses the floor to discovering his virtues.’ of the upper classes at the numbing dis- sit beside Lloyd George in the same seat My admiration for Churchill deep- advantage of the poor. Churchill meets occupied by his revered father when in ened even further after I happened and quickly becomes enamoured with opposition. The Parliamentary report in across a speech he gave in his successful another rising political star, David the Manchester Guardian of  June , by-election in  at Dundee. Asquith Lloyd George, destined to become the recorded how Churchill actually had brought him into the Cabinet as greatest Liberal of his age. They seem to crossed the floor to the Liberal benches President of the Board of Trade. At that share more things in common than set a number of times on the night of the time, Ministers on appointment were them apart. Lloyd George, a Welsh law-  May, just to make sure no-one required by law to resign their seats and yer rising from humble origins by his missed the significance of the occasion. fight a by-election. Churchill sought lyrical gift of tongue, is a mesmerising Churchill realised he must make the re-election in Northwest Manchester and charming personality. Churchill is move, even though his association de- but lost. He then found a new constitu- duly mesmerised and charmed. ferred taking further punitive action ency in Dundee. The Dundee speech Churchill writes and speaks in favour of against him. As a newly minted Liberal, was made during Churchill’s most en- Free Trade in the run-up to the coming he assays opportunities and chooses a lightened period, when he ran flat out election, antagonising Tory loyalists on Liberal constituency, a seat in North under Liberal colours. The speech also all sides, including Prime Minister West Manchester, the home of Cobden clarified for me my youthful confusion Balfour and Churchill’s own Tory Asso- and Bright, the bastion of Free Trade. when I was first attracted to the siren ciation in Oldham. Conspiring with When asked why he left the Con- song of Socialism. Churchill, with pow- the Tory whips in London, in his ab- servative Party, he retorts that he did not erful clarity, boldly contrasted Liberal- sence, his association passes a resolution leave the Conservative Party or his prin- ism and Socialism with these words suggesting Churchill seek another con- ciples. Rather, the Conservative Party which have echoed down through the stituency, since he so disagrees with deserted its principles and left him. decades, with even greater resonance. party trade policy. Churchill warms to the task, carry-

16 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Liberalism is not Socialism, and never times of unemployment (public jobs in ment. This sudden reversal in Liberal will be. There is a great gulf fixed. It is reforestation and road building). He policy turned out to be a key to the fall not a gulf of method, it is a gulf of prin- promoted legislation restricting eight- of Lloyd George and the Liberal Party. ciple … Socialism seeks to pull down wealth, Liberalism seeks to raise up hour work days for coal miners and re- The Irish Treaty was fatal to them, as it poverty. Socialism would destroy pri- strictions on child labour. He repeat- led not to peace but continuing civil vate interests; Liberalism would pre- edly advocated a ‘safety net’ to protect unrest. This sudden reversal in policy serve private interests in the only way the victims from the ravages of compe- was the beginning of the end for the in which they can be safely and justly tition. While he believed in Free Trade Liberal Party in England. preserved, namely by reconciling them  with public right. Socialism would kill and competition, he also believed in of- In Churchill fell ill with appen- enterprise; Liberalism would rescue en- fering some protection to those who dicitis during an election. He wrote terprise from the trammels of privilege simply could not compete. looking back on this period a decade and preference … Socialism exalts the He declaimed on public platforms later: ‘In a twinkling of an eye, I found rule; Liberalism exalts the man. Social- that the biggest threat to the cause of myself without an office, without a seat, ism attacks capital, Liberalism attacks peace came not from abroad but the without a party, and without an appen- monopoly. crisis at home: the gap between rich dix’. Later, in , Churchill ran two And so, in the next two decades, from and poor, obsolete laws protecting in- more times and was defeated. He finally  to , Churchill held a dizzying herited property and the vested inter- reverted to Conservatism again, after array of portfolios as a Liberal minister ests. He argued repeatedly for ‘mini- making his peace with Baldwin, the — President of the Board of Trade; mum standards of life and work’ to at- Leader of the Conservative Party, who, Home Secretary; First Lord of the Ad- tain domestic civility. after the  election immediately ap- miralty; Minister of Munitions; Secre- Viscount Simon, a close and lifelong pointed Churchill to the Exchequer. tary of State for War and Air; and Secre- contemporary, wrote after Churchill Churchill never would return to the tary of State for the Colonies. became Prime Minister again in : Liberal fold and the Liberal Party never His vibrating fortunes, matching his regained its lustre. Again, Churchill be- At the root of his many-sided nature … ideas, raced up and down in public remains the essence of Liberalism. His lieved that he had not left the Liberal opinion like a roller coaster. In each tolerance, his sympathy with the op- Party but that the Party had deserted its ministry he brought a volcanic energy pressed and the underdog, his courage own principles and lost its way. and a visionary stream of ideas. He was, in withstanding clamour, his belief … One of the most fascinating insights in turn, the father of the submarine, of in the individual … all derive from a into Churchill’s attraction to the Liberal the tank, of oil-driven warships. He heart, a head [and] made him a Liberal statesman … his Liberal views were not Party was his lifelong helpmate, com- created the first Anglo/Arab oil consor- a mere pose, so that he has carried his panion and wife, Clementine Churchill, tium to fuel and secure British naval Liberal temper with him throughout born and bred a Scottish Liberal. might. his life …’ Churchill was once asked why his mar- As President of the Board of Trade, Other colleagues riage was so successful. He responded by he organised la- noted that a major saying that he had never had breakfast bour exchanges to ‘In a twinkling of an eye, theme of his life was with his wife. Of the volumes written prevent sweated la- individual rights about his relationship with Clementine, bour. He first es- I found myself without and his unswerving awkward, complex and difficult at times, tablished unem- an office, without a seat, belief in the liberty one note endeared me to his famous ployment insur- to work out, as one wife. Throughout their loving and illus- ance in England. without a party, and civil servant wrote, trious relationship, spanning six decades He led attacks without an appendix.’ one’s own salvation, together, she always voted Liberal. against the House to follow one’s own of Lords when it star. So Churchill wished to afford Senator Grafstein has served as policy ad- defeated a Liberal budget — the fa- equal freedom for others to do like- viser in a number of Canadian government mous ‘People’s Budget’ — which led to wise. ‘I stand for Liberty’ he proudly Ministries and is an author and expert in the first reform of the Lords.  proclaimed more than once. This was media issues. In , he founded and edited He wrote articulate books – radical his lifelong Liberal theme. He vehe- the Journal of Liberal Thought. In Janu- in their time – entitled Liberalism and  mently opposed Bolshevism and ary , Prime Minister Trudeau appointed the Social Problem and The People’s Rights, Communism because he believed him to the Senate of Canada. He currently defining a sweeping social agenda of re- each was, at its very roots, opposed to serves as a member of the Foreign Affairs form that only became accepted public individual liberty. He carried over this Committee. policy decades later. belief in the essence of liberty as the The text of this article was first published He railed against property specula- foundation for relations between states in Finest Hour, the internet magazine of tion and contrasted wealth built on real that so informed all his foreign policy the Winston Churchill Center in Washing- estate as ‘Plunder’ compared to ‘produc- principles. ton DC, by whose kind permission, and that tion’ of goods as being in the public in- In –, Churchill was a player in of Senator Grafstein, it is reprinted (in a terest. He advocated public works in negotiations that led to the Irish Settle- slightly edited version) here.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 17 Defections 1918–29 The post-First World War period saw many Liberals, including high-profile personalities such as Winston Churchill, decide that the time was right for them to change political parties. Dr Roy Douglas examines why. AA failurefailure ofof leadershipleadership An explanation of Liberal defections 1918–1929

iberal defections from – were mostly ration’, in order to establish ‘national unity’ with the Lrelated, directly or indirectly, to the tensions Conservative opposition. The formation of the which were set up in the party during the course of Asquith Coalition in May  was not universally the Great War; tensions from which it never fully popular in the party and when the new government recovered. introduced the notorious McKenna Duties later in On  August , Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Sec- the same year, many staunch Liberal free traders be- retary in the Liberal government, made a speech in came restive. The introduction of conscription in the House of Commons which left little doubt that – was also a matter of serious controversy Britain would soon be at war. A group of radical MPs, among Liberals and occasioned the resignation of nineteen of them Liberals, signed a resolution protest- the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon. Several other ing that there was not sufficient reason for Britain to very famous Liberals nearly resigned with him. intervene. The German invasion of Belgium on the Towards the end of  came the strange ‘palace following day appears to have changed the minds of revolution’ which resulted in Asquith’s departure some doubting Liberals, but not all. Two members of and the establishment of a new coalition under the Cabinet — Viscount Morley and John Burns — Lloyd George. Asquith and his principal associates and a junior Minister, C. P. Trevelyan, resigned from left the government altogether. But Asquith re- the government. None of them, had been signatories mained the Liberal leader, while the organisation to the resolution. The reasons for the resignations of and finances of the party remained in the hands of is Burns and Morley is not entirely clear, and neither of Chief Whip, John Gulland. Lloyd George, as Prime them played any great part in later events; but Minister, proceeded to appoint government Chief Trevelyan was opposed to the war and remained very Whips, one a Liberal, the other Conservative. active for a long time to come. Gradually, Lloyd George’s Liberal friends amassed Throughout the conflict, there was a small group their own finances. Here was the origin of what of Liberal parliamentarians more or less opposed to would later be famous as the Lloyd George Fund. the war. That group was rather ill-defined but some The Maurice debate of May  was of critical indications of its strength is provided by the fact that importance. Ostensibly, the issue turned on the ac- on  February  a resolution calling on the gov- curacy of government statements about the strength ernment to keep open diplomatic moves for peace of the army in France, and the appropriate way of was supported in the division lobbies by twenty Lib- discovering the truth of the matter. There is good eral MPs. Some, but not all, of the Liberal critics of reason for thinking that there was grave but wholly the war adhered to a body called the Union of excusable misunderstanding on both sides. Be that Democratic Control (UDC) which brought them in as it may, Liberal MPs were deeply split: seventy-one close contact with the Labour minority holding voting with the government, ninety-eight against it. similar views. Labour was also divided, but with only a single ex- Disputes over how to fight the war produced ception the Conservatives backed the government much deeper Liberal divisions. Many Liberals were and so saved the situation for Lloyd George. far from happy about the government’s immediate There remained the serious possibility that a gen- decision to set controversial matters like land taxing eral election would be held while the war was still in and Irish Home Rule into cold storage ‘for the du- progress and in July  Freddie Guest, Lloyd

18 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 George’s Chief Whip, drew up lists of since Jesus Christ’. But which candi- dependent Labour candidate. C. P. Liberal, and also of Labour, MPs who dates should be regarded as supporters Trevelyan, at Elland, was opposed by a could, and could not, be regarded as of Lloyd George and his government? Conservative recipient of the ‘coupon’, government supporters. Thus the Lib- Letters of approval – the so-called ‘cou- an Asquithian Liberal and a Labour eral parliamentarians were already under pons’ – were sent to selected candidates candidate. deep stress, not on one issue but on sev- in most British (though not Irish) con- The upshot was a huge win for the eral, long before the Armistice of No- stituencies, over the signatures of Lloyd Coalition.  ‘couponed’ Liberals and vember . This stress became greater George and the Conservative leader, thirty ‘uncouponed’ Liberals were as time went on and would soon lead to Bonar Law. elected. Asquith, and all his principal many defections from the party. Where a Conservative MP was de- followers, were defeated. All Liberal fending his seat, he nearly always re- members of the UDC and others about The coupon election ceived the ‘coupon’. Where a former whose attitude to the war there was any Immediately after the Armistice, the Conservative MP was standing down, real doubt, were defeated, most of them Prime Minister called a general elec- the ‘coupon’ usually went to the new heavily so. The Conservatives, with  tion. He originally hoped to keep the Conservative candidate. The same rules MPs, formed a large overall majority in wartime coalition in being and even to were applied to Liberals who were on the House of Commons. extend it. Some weeks before the Ar- Guest’s ‘approved’ list. Agreements were mistice, he made a very attractive offer reached for most other British con- Aftermath to induce Asquith and his associates to stituencies by the headquarters of the It was immediately apparent that a join the government; but the offer was Conservative and Lloyd George Liberal good many Liberals felt, and would rejected. Lloyd George also hoped that organisations. In some cases the ‘cou- continue to feel, much animosity and Labour would remain in the coalition pon’ was given to a mushroom wartime mistrust towards others in their party. but Labour decided by a large majority body, the National Democratic Party Asquithians who had lost their seats as a to withdraw. So the coalition was now, (NDP). A few British constituencies result of the ‘coupon’ arrangements felt for practical purposes, the Conserva- did not receive the ‘coupon’ at all, in- deeply aggrieved. Liberal pacifists had tives and half the Liberals, with a few cluding those contested by Labour can- no reason to feel affection for either of hangers-on. didates who had been on Guest’s list. the main groups in the party. Some, in- The  general election had many Conservatives usually did not stand in deed, had begun to depart even before extraordinary features. The electorate constituencies where they were not the General Election – E. D. Morel, not had been greatly increased. For the first scheduled to receive the ‘coupon’, an MP, but Liberal candidate for the time, women received the parliamentary while Liberals usually stood whether highly winnable constituency of vote, though only at age thirty. The male they were to receive the ‘coupon’ or Birkenhead – became secretary of the electorate, which not. The Asquith- UDC in  and forfeited his candi- had been more or ian organisation dature. In April  he joined the ILP, less restricted to The popularity of Lloyd did not denounce which was then affiliated to the Labour householders be- George – ‘the man who Liberals receiving Party. Shortly before the election, fore , was now the ‘coupon’ but Trevelyan indicated his intention to extended to nearly won the war’ – was Asquith himself, join Labour — but that did not save all over twenty-one. enormous. One of his and most of his him from Labour opposition. Ponsonby The Labour Party, Liberal supporters principal followers, joined the ILP soon afterwards. So did which had never were denied it. Outhwaite, though he later adhered to fielded more than described him as ‘the Those Liberals a much smaller movement, the Com- eighty-one candi- greatest man since Jesus who had been monwealth Land Party. dates before the Christ’. more or less open Once politics began to settle down war, now had close opponents of the after the election, there were further on . In Ireland, a war were treated Liberal defections. Josiah Wedgwood relatively new force, Sinn Féin, stood roughly by everyone else, including had been Liberal MP for Newcastle- posed to fight nearly everywhere. In a Asquithians and Lloyd Georgites alike. under-Lyme since . He shared the sense, the electorate was more naïve than The experiences of three noted mem- enthusiasm for land taxing evinced by it had been for a long time, because for bers of that group will illustrate what his colleague Outhwaite, who sat for a four years all politics had been about the happened. R. L. Outhwaithe, Liberal neighbouring constituency, and in the war itself, and the great issues which victor of a sensational by-election at debate on  August  had taken a were bound to arise in the aftermath had Hanley in , was opposed by an similar view about foreign policy. When received little public discussion. Asquithian Liberal, a Labour candidate, war came, however, he went out to The popularity of Lloyd George – and an NDP candidate who received fight and won the DSO. There is con- ‘the man who won the war’ – was the ‘coupon’. Arthur Ponsonby was op- siderable doubt how Wedgwood’s can- enormous. One of his Liberal support- posed at Dunfermline by a Liberal who didature in  should be labelled; he ers described him as ‘the greatest man received the ‘coupon’ and also by an in- seems to have been offered the ‘coupon’

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 19 the war. There had also been a sea als; but the two groups were of roughly change in the character of the Labour similar size. Seven men who previ- Party. Before , it was essentially a ously sat as Liberal MPs were now on working class pressure group attempt- the Labour benches. ing to influence Liberal or Conserva- tive governments rather than a party The politics of chaos defined by ideology seeking to become In the new Parliament there was some the government itself. From  on- rapprochement between Asquithian and wards, political ideology became much Lloyd Georgeite Liberals but nobody more important. The Labour Party be- anticipated another general election in gan to see itself as a possible party of the near future and such contacts were government, and it was open to all leisurely. comers sharing its ideology. Perhaps Bonar Law resigned in May , some of the Liberal defectors felt that when his health finally collapsed and Labour policies were still not fully de- was succeeded by Stanley Baldwin. A fined and that they could play a large few months later, the new premier de- part in shaping those policies in future. clared in favour of tariffs and this led to For some time after the ‘coupon’ another general election at the end of David Lloyd George, Liberal Leader 1926– 31 and Prime Minister 1916–22. election, local Liberal Associations con- the year. The cause of free trade brought tinued to include supporters and oppo- disparate Liberals together in unwonted but refused to use it as he had little con- nents of the Coalition; but the central union, just as it had done twenty years fidence in the Coalition. In any event organisations of the Asquithians and earlier. The Liberal manifesto was he was unopposed. For a very brief mo- Lloyd Georgeites became more and signed jointly by Asquith and Lloyd ment he inclined towards the more deeply hostile to each other. Sev- George. With very few exceptions, Lib- Asquithians; then he despaired of them eral critical by-elections, including the erals went into battle as a united party. too and joined Labour. Noel Buxton, Paisley contest of March , when Even this moment of Liberal who had sat as a Liberal MP for North Asquith was returned to Parliament, in- reunification witnessed one significant Norfolk down to , was defeated by creased the mutual animosity. defection. Dr Christopher Addison had a ‘couponed’ Conservative. What de- Asquithians made eager war on Coali- been an important minister in Lloyd cided him to defect was the iniquitous tionists; while the ‘Coalies’ eventually George’s Coalition, but he broke with the peace treaties which began to emerge set up their own organisation and be- government in  because the housing in . Early in , when Asquith came known as the National Liberals. policy with which he had been associated was fighting his successful campaign in (They must be distinguished from the was frustrated by the Conservative ele- Paisley for return to the House of Liberal Nationals, who were established ment in the Coalition. He then became Commons, nine men who had for- in very different conditions in .) an Asquithian but lost his Parliamentary merly sat as Liberal MPs sent a letter of The next general election came un- seat in . In , while the election support to his Labour opponent. expectedly in the autumn of , campaign (in which he was not a candi- Why had there been so many Liberal when the Conservative rank-and-file date) was in progress, he announced his defections to the Labour Party? We may rebelled against their own leaders and intention to join the Labour Party. reject the cynical retort that these peo- pulled their party from the Coalition. ple were seeking personal advantage. Equally suddenly and unexpectedly, H. H. Asquith, Liberal leader 1908–26 and The Labour Party had certainly made Bonar Law – who had withdrawn from Prime Minister 1908–16. some advances in , but, lumping politics for health reasons in the previ- the two Liberal groups together, there ous year – emerged as Conservative were still far fewer Labour than Liberal leader and then as Prime Minister. MPs and there was not much reason yet No party was really prepared for this for believing that Labour would soon contest. The Liberals were split into two become the principal party of change. hostile groups. The Conservatives On the negative side, the main rea- seemed on the point of splitting as well. son for most of the defections was their Labour was undoubtedly a rising force loss of confidence in the Liberal leader- but the Labour Party of  contained ship during the war, Asquithian and a wide range of disparate elements. Lloyd Georgeite alike. Either that, or The Conservatives, with  seats, their distress at the treaties which won an overall majority. For the first emerged from the Paris Peace Confer- time, Labour, with , ran second. ence. On the positive side, some of There were  Liberals. Not all of them were attracted by the growing these may be classified with any cer- pacifism of Labour in the last year of tainty as ‘official’ or as National, Liber-

20 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 The result of the  general elec- prominent member of the imperialist subvention from the well-heeled Lloyd tion was  Conservatives,  Labour wing of the Liberal Party. In the pre- George fund. Liberal reunion, however, and  Liberals. Thus no party had an  Liberal government he had served did not mean united finances, and for overall majority. The Conservatives as Secretary of State for War and later as months there were complex manoeu- were still the largest single party but Asquith’s Lord Chancellor. His army vres on the subject. Until that matter they had been heavily defeated on the reforms were the foundation of his was resolved, the last thing the Liberals very issue on which the election had reputation as an administrator and were wanted was a general election. In the been called. Labour was ahead of the much admired by men like Kitchener. end however the Labour government Liberals but not greatly so; and unlike In later life, Haldane’s particular interest was defeated — perhaps it actively the Liberals, they had few people with was education and his views on that courted defeat over the Campbell case, ministerial experience. There were in- subject appear to have attracted him to and a new general election was forced tense discussions about possible ways of Labour. Labour was desperately short of in the autumn of . resolving the problems posed. distinguished lawyers and when the The Liberals faced disaster, and they The Conservatives remained in of-  general election results were re- probably knew it. Some money was fice until the new Parliament met in vealed MacDonald and Haldane imme- granted from the Lloyd George fund January . Labour predictably diately discussed the possibility that he but it was too little and too late. The moved a critical amendment to the might joint a Labour government. party could only field  candidates, King’s Speech. The Liberals, in view of Thus far, most of the important Lib- against  a year earlier. For the first the circumstances of the election, could eral defections since  had been in time, it was now obvious to the world hardly support Baldwin, and would the direction of Labour. Immediately the that a Liberal government, or a govern- emerge with little dignity if they ab- new parliament met in January , ment in which Liberals formed a major stained from voting. there were signs element, was out of Winston Churchill was still a Lib- that some might be Now the Liberal Party the question. eral at the time but had lost his seat at looking in a differ- began to experience Events of the Dundee in  and had failed to se- ent direction. previous twelve cure election at West Leicester in the W inston tensions of a different months had pro- following year. He advanced an in- Churchill was the kind; between those duced another ef- triguing suggestion. The Liberals first great departure. fect on the Liberal should support the critical amend- In February  who preferred Labour to Party. The old ten- ment but should follow this with one he was urged by the the Conservatives and sions between of their own, denouncing socialism. press lords, Beaver- those who preferred pacifists and pro- Both motions would be carried, one brook and Rother- war Liberals, and with Labour and one with Conserva- mere, to stand as an Conservatives to Labour. then between tive support; and constitutional prac- independent in the Asquithians and tice would require the King to call on forthcoming by-election in the Abbey Lloyd Georgeites, had already played a Asquith to form a government. division of Westminster. Writing to his major part in reducing the party from Churchill’s advice was rejected.  wife, Churchill noted that ‘there are first to third place in British politics. Liberals voted for the Labour amend- thirty Liberals in the House and at least Now the Liberal Party began to experi- ment, ten against it, seven were absent another thirty candidates who wish to ence tensions of a different kind; be- unpaired and three were absent act with the Conservatives and who [sic] tween those who preferred Labour to paired. The government was defeated the Conservatives are anxious to win as the Conservatives and those preferred by  votes to . Baldwin resigned allies’. Churchill had apparently hoped Conservatives to Labour. and Ramsay MacDonald formed the for both Liberal and Conservative sup- So matters stood before polling day first Labour government. port in the by-election but in fact he got arrived. When it came, the results were Nobody could have been surprised neither and all three established parties even worse than might have been ex- about three of the ex-Liberals included ran against him. Nevertheless, he missed pected. The Conservatives secured a in the new Cabinet — Charles election by only forty-three votes. large overall majority. Labour lost some Trevelyan, Noel Buxton and Josiah Lacking an overall majority, the new ground but did not fare disastrously. The Wedgwood. They were among the few Labour government was in a vulnerable Liberals were reduced from  seats to Labour MPs who had substantial par- position. The Conservatives, however, forty-two. Asquith and many other well- liamentary experience. Nor could there were not willing to precipitate another known Liberals were defeated. Over one have been much surprise when general election for some months to hundred Liberal seats were lost to the Ponsonby became a junior minister. come, while Liberals faced appalling Conservatives and sixteen went to La- What was really remarkable was the problems over finance. The ‘official’ bour. Seven of the eight Liberal gains presence of Viscount Haldane as Lord funds of the party were at a very low from Labour were in constituencies Chancellor. He certainly had no lean- ebb, and the impressive campaign of which the Conservatives did not fight. ings in a pacifist direction. At the turn  was only possible because the In the immediate aftermath came the of the century, Haldane had been a Asquithian organisation received a large final breach with Churchill. At the elec-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 21 fit to give notice to mander Joseph Kenworthy was heir to the voters in his a peerage dating from the fourteenth constituency the century. He was also an Asquithian hero opportunity of de- in more senses than one. Kenworthy ciding if they were had a distinguished war record, and at a happy with an MP by-election in  had captured Hull wearing a new label. Central from the Conservatives with a About the same huge overturn of votes. When Ken- time, two men who worthy defected to Labour, he took the had entered the honourable view that a man elected in House since the war, one interest should not transfer to a dif- but were defeated in ferent one without giving his electors , departed in the opportunity of deciding whether the same direction; they still wanted him as their repre- the Asquithian C. F. sentative. So he resigned his seat and Entwistle and the defended the constituency in the ensu- Lloyd Georgeite, H. ing by-election. Kenworthy was com- C. Hogbin. fortably victorious; the Liberal fell to a One MP who did derisory third place. not renounce his After Asquith’s resignation there was a Liberal allegiance sharp struggle for control of the Liberal was almost as embar- Party. At the turn of –, Lloyd rassing to the party as George won, although he never bothered the various apostates. formally to claim the post of Leader. Freddie Guest, Lloyd Money was poured into the organisation George’s sometime from the Lloyd George fund, while high- Chief Whip, regis- powered committees worked assiduously tion, he won Epping as a ‘Constitution- tered one of the few Liberal gains of on policy questions. alist’ with Conservative support. To , in Bristol North. This victory, Soon another prominent Liberal MP, widespread astonishment he then se- however, was clearly explained by the William Wedgwood Benn (later Vis- cured the post of Chancellor of the Ex- fact that the Conservatives, who had count Stansgate and father of Tony chequer in Baldwin’s second govern- fought there in , withdrew from the Benn) seceded to the Labour Party. ment. The appointment of a political contest and allowed Guest a straight Benn had sat as a Liberal MP since maverick who, whatever else was at fight against Labour. Thereafter Guest sat . He was a very loyal Asquithian heart a free trader, served notice that the as a Liberal, but usually voted as a Con- and in the immediate aftermath of the Conservatives had learned the lesson of servative: a fact which excited consider-  general election Asquith sought,  and were unlikely to make a frontal able protest from West Country Liberals. unsuccessfully, to persuade him to be- assault on free trade for a long time to come Chief Whip of the non-Coalition come. It was important in attracting to The Lloyd Georgeite Liberals. When Benn changed parties, Conservative ranks those Liberals whose he, like Kenworthy, considered it his main reason for being Liberal at all was revival After the  general election, Lloyd duty to resign and there was a by-elec- this single issue and who regarded the tion in his constituency, Leith. Unlike prospect of a Labour majority with George won a rather acrimonious con- test for the chairmanship of the Liberal Kenworthy, however, Benn did not something close to terror. stand as a candidate in that election. Other Liberals soon began to drift to MPs but Asquith, although no longer in the House, remained leader of the party. Ernest Brown retained the seat for the the Conservatives. By the middle of Liberal Party. The majority was small , Hamar Greenwood and Briga- This state of affairs continued even after he received the Earldom of Oxford and but it was the first encouraging by- dier-General E. L. Spears, both of them election result for a long time. important Coalition Liberals, though Asquith in the following year. In the middle of , however, he had a The fortunes of the Liberal Party currently out of the House, had de- improved greatly. Four days after Leith parted in that direction. Later in the stroke, which led him to resign the leadership a few months later. Thereaf- polled, the Liberals won another by- year, the Liberal Party adopted a new election, this time a gain from Labour land policy, at Lloyd George’s behest; ter he played little part in politics and  in the London working class constitu- this was the cause, or at least the occa- he died in . Very soon after Lord Oxford’s retire- ency of North Southwark. Six further sion, of the departure of two of the seats were captured by Liberals in by- small band of remaining Liberal MPs ment, the Liberal Parliamentary Party suffered another important defection, elections in the next couple of years, — Hilton Young and the great industri- against only one loss. In addition to alist Sir Alfred Mond. Neither man saw this time to Labour. Lieutenant-Com-

22 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 these changes, the Liberals regained two MPs to Westminster and where Harold Cox, who opposed the policy Carmarthenshire when Mond ob- each elector had two votes. Before , of old age pensions, is the most famous; tained a peerage. For the time being, it often happened in such places that a but even Cox took no steps to join a the flow of Liberal defections was Liberal and Labour man ran in harness different party. We might, perhaps, add staunched. against two Conservatives. Preston was the group of ‘Lib-Lab’ miners who fol- Soon, however, there were further the only constituency where this old lowed the advice of the trade unions developments in the Freddie Guest practice still prevailed in . A Labour and transferred to the Labour Party just saga. Towards the end of , a gather- man headed the poll, with the Liberal, before the general election of January ing of Liberals in his Bristol North William Jowitt, also elected close behind , but this defection was not op- constituency passed a resolution con- him. MacDonald immediately turned to posed by Liberal headquarters and demning his dispo- Jowitt and he ac- might justly be regarded as ‘collusive’. sition to support cepted the office of The contrast with the period – the Conservatives The 1923 revival was Attorney-General.  is enormous. The various schisms of and also his inat- wrecked by the foolish This implied a the wartime period were obviously of tention to Parlia- decision to set another change of party and major importance in bringing about mentary duties. Jowitt resigned to the many defections; but it is surely sig- The rebels consti- party in office, instead of cause a by-election. nificant that the defections continued tuted themselves as striking out for power The general de- long after the war was over and even the Bristol North moralisation of the when the schisms had been – formally Liberal and Radical themselves. Liberal Party was at least – healed. Association. They signalled by what The great difference between the pre- were soon recognised as the proper happened next. Liberal headquarters war and post-war Liberals was that in the Liberal Association for the constituency left the decision whether to contest the earlier period they were almost continu- and adopted a candidate who stood by-election to the local party. The Pres- ously fighting for what were perceived as against Guest at the ensuing general ton Liberals refused the challenge. The great causes, against a formidable enemy; election. Labour won the seat and in votes of both Labour and Conservative while for a large part of the post-war pe- , Guest formally switched to the candidates were close to what they had riod, compromises of one kind or an- Conservatives. been a month or so earlier, so Jowitt other were made with other parties. This At the general election of , all was returned under his new colours. applied particularly, but not exclusively, to three parties fought in the great majority the post-war period of Lloyd George’s of constituencies and the Liberals were Reflections Coalition. The compromises which were able to mount a more powerful campaign Winston Churchill once said that the implied by Coalition were necessarily than five years before. The Liberal repre- use of recriminations about the past was dispiriting because real differences were sentation, only forty-two in , was in- to enforce greater efficiency in the resolved not by confrontation between creased to fifty-nine but this was not re- present. Modern Liberal Democrats open antagonists but by obscure and se- ally a victory at all. The party had thrown may usefully ask whether the circum- cret deals between members of the same in everything it had and it was still in third stances attending past defections and government. place, far behind the other two. Labour other disasters should be pondered by The two points in the post-war pe- won more seats than the Conservatives; people directing the party today. riod which really did provide some en- the Conservatives won more votes than In the present article, attention has couragement for the Liberals were the Labour. Theoretically, the Liberals held been given to defections by Liberals general election of , when they the balance of power; in practice this was who were prominent at national level. were defending the historic cause of free not the way matters worked out. Baldwin These, of course, were not the only de- trade, and the years –, when they resigned and MacDonald formed the sec- fections which were taking place and were fighting on a radical programme of ond Labour government, without either perhaps not the most important ones. reform designed to break the economic man bothering to discover how the Lib- There are records of many defections inertia of the period, with its gloomy ac- erals would act. by people active in local government; companiment of mass unemployment. As in , the Labour Prime Minis- but there were innumerable ordinary The  revival was wrecked by the ter was short of lawyers. Haldane, who Liberals who just quietly dropped out foolish decision to set another party in had been Lord Chancellor in  was and who have left no record. office, instead of striking out for power dead; but this time MacDonald was able In the period between Campbell- themselves. It was not a coalition; the to appoint one of the Lords Justice of Bannerman’s acceptance of the Pre- Liberals were free agents to vote against Appeal for the job and did not need to miership in December  and the the Labour government if they chose — poach from another party. He was still eve of the Great War in , the Lib- and, indeed, they eventually did so. But short of a convincing Attorney-General, eral Party promoted many radical just as their connection to the Con- however, and for that post he did look to changes which could hardly have been servatives in the Coalition period drove the Liberals. Preston was one of the rela- anticipated at the start. Yet the promi- tively small number of towns which sent nent Liberal defections were few. concluded on page 51

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 23 Liberal Nationals Since the Liberal Nationals first divided from the official Liberals and eventually merged with the Conservatives, they have often been regarded as Tory cuckoos in the Liberal nest. Nick Cott re-evaluates their role. ToryTory cuckooscuckoos inin thethe LiberalLiberal nest?nest? The case of the Liberal Nationals: a re-evaluation

he Liberal Nationals under Sir John Simon This significance was enhanced after the departure Tbroke away from the Liberal Party led by from the Government of the independent Liberals Herbert Samuel in October . This followed fif- under the leadership of Herbert Samuel in . Sup- teen years of intra-party feuding within the Liberal port for Neville Chamberlain and appeasement cost Party dating back to the fall of H.H. Asquith as the Liberal Nationals influence during the period of Prime Minister in December , and the subse- Churchill’s premiership (–), and after the Sec- quent rivalry between Asquithians and supporters of ond World War, they became even more reliant on the Lloyd George which left many Liberals feeling disaf- Conservative Party for their electoral prospects. In fected. More immediately, there were concerns over , the organisations of the two parties were fused the future of Liberalism, with many aspects of the together under the Woolton–Teviot agreement (the Liberal creed having been assailed, and the desire for Liberal National party being renamed the National a National Government in the wake of the troubled Liberal party), permanently ending their independ- domestic and international scene of the early s. ence, and making them appear indistinguishable from The position taken by the Liberal Party in giving the Conservative Party. Joint associations were not Labour its general support (in return for possible formally wound up until , although by then most concessions such as electoral reform) was also being of them had disappeared anyway. questioned, due to the Labour Government’s inad- equacy in dealing with the crisis. Liberal dissatisfac- I tion was expressed in the – session, which The Liberal National party is perhaps the most inac- saw Liberal divisions over governmental legislation, curately and unfairly treated of all forces in twentieth most notably the Kings’ Speech, when a small group century British political history. Until recently, the of rebels under Sir John Simon and Sir Robert party was dismissed as a mere adjunct of the Con- Hutchison voted for a Tory amendment. The divi- servatives. This view rests on the facts that the party sive nature of Lloyd George’s policy towards the at its conception started its own organisation and in- Government came to a head in June , when Si- dividual members seemed prepared to compromise mon resigned the whip. It was clear that this position on essential aspects of Liberal identity, and in the post- commanded much support amongst the Liberal war era, the party’s ever closer relations with the Con- ranks and this provided Simon with the confidence servatives. However, such views now have to be re- to go it alone in October. evaluated since recent investigations have reached Founded to support a coalition, the Liberal Na- very different conclusions, outlining an essentially tionals were a significant part of the National Govern- Liberal basis for Liberal National politics. From my ments, –, under Ramsay MacDonald (– own research, I have detected a similarly Liberal ele- ), Stanley Baldwin (–) and Neville Cham- ment within the party, and in this article I will hope to berlain (–), fighting two elections in conjunc- add to work already done in exploring some new an- tion with Conservative and National Labour allies. gles. Discussion will focus on the origins of the party,

24 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 where I hope to show that the Liberal Liberal centrism seems to have been tionist-leaning measures were enacted Nationals can be slotted within a ‘Liberal born in the later nineteenth century, by Lloyd George during his time at the centrist’ tradition, which was essentially when high politics was dominated by a Board of Trade, where his flexibility to- pragmatic, consensual and coalitionist in fear of Britain’s relative economic and wards party dogma was displayed attitude. This suggestion will be seen to physical decline as seen through the through his patents legislation. Coop- remove from the Liberal Nationals the poor physical health of its citizens. eration with the Conservatives was charge of defection and puts their ac- These fears culminated in the desire for sought after , when new conditions tions on a much more honourable foot- National Efficiency, a movement of so- made it almost essential both for the na- ing. This article will examine other rea- cial imperialists who advocated more tional interest and the Liberal pro- sons for the split in , which will be government intervention in the gramme. The constitutional crisis of seen to lie in intra-party conflicts economy and in social welfare provi- –, precipitated by the House of stretching back at least as far as the First sion. All this impacted on the Liberal Lords’ rejection of the  Budget, led World War. Party, with challenges to its social, eco- to fears of the possible imminent col- nomic and imperial policies. lapse of the constitution and more per- II Perhaps the most significant challenge sonally speaking for Lloyd George, the The origins of the Liberal National came from the imperialist and social re- collapse of his National Insurance pro- party can be traced back to a centrist former, Joseph Chamberlain, whose posals, which depended on the extra strand of thinking in Liberal high poli- casual approach to Liberal doctrine and revenue outlined in the Budget. Frus- tics, dating from the later nineteenth clashes with the Gladstonian leadership trated by the inability to reach a com- century, which was pragmatic, consen- led him and others to leave the party in promise, Lloyd George engaged in secret sual and coalitionist in orientation.  to form the Liberal Unionists and coalition talks with the Conservatives. In Whilst Liberal centrists may have dis- cooperate with the Conservatives. This a memorandum he circulated to Arthur played different attitudes over time as deprived the Liberal Party of one of its Balfour and other Opposition chiefs, he political contexts changed, what re- greatest reformers, with many shattered expressed his feeling that ‘some of the mained consistent was the desire for a Liberals contemplating their future in most urgent problems awaiting settle- ‘nationalised’ politics to meet particular the party. Some of those dissatisfied ele- ment, problems which concern inti- crises facing the country which party ments did stay and grouped together as mately the happiness and the efficiency politics could not address, since it was the Liberal Imperialists in the s un- of the inhabitants of these Islands, their by nature adversarial and self-interested. der the leadership of Lord Rosebery. strength and influence can only be suc- Such sentiments were not consistently The group included H. H. Asquith, Sir cessfully coped with by active co-opera- applied by individual Liberals, since Edward Grey, R. B. Haldane and the tion of both the great parties in the National politics was often only seen to later Liberal National Walter Runciman State.’ He was also willing to consider be necessary in times of national uncer- amongst its ranks, and there were non- the fiscal question, taking the tainty, such as wartime, periods of eco- committed sympathisers such as David Roseberyite view that an inquiry should nomic decline or where there was a Lloyd George. Whilst this group cer- be conducted to examine the case. perceived threat to Britain’s parliamen- tainly had an imperialist agenda, it ex- The period – could possibly tary traditions or to its Empire. The pressed its centrist tendencies in the de- be seen as a period of triumph for Lib- theory was that during such times a se- sire for greater cooperation, calling for eral centrism, since during this time Lib- ries of reforms to avert danger could be an ‘unbroken front’. Also, there may erals cooperated with Conservatives in speedily enacted, restoring confidence have been some flexibility towards free government to win the First World War and stability, since decisions could be trade. Chamberlain’s growing accept- and then the peace. In so doing they made on a consensual basis. It follows ance of protection as a means to finance were prepared to implement protection- then, that co-operation meant depar- measures of social reform could have ist measures such as the McKenna Du- tures from orthodox viewpoints, and been influential since evidence exists ties of , the Paris Resolutions of this can be detected, particularly re- that the issue was tentatively explored. , and the Safeguarding of Industries garding the issue of trade. In theory, However, the boldness of Chamberlain’s Act , despite the fact they were alien Liberals were free traders, but even on Tar iff Reform campaign of  was to orthodox Liberalism. Through pur- this issue a certain centrist flexibility beyond the acceptance of most Liberal suing a pragmatic agenda, Liberals had can be detected, although this has not Imperialists. Other ways of meeting de- now set aside one important tenet of really been characterised as a continu- sires for social reform were being con- Liberalism, although it is unclear ous element by historians. Liberal cen- sidered by Liberals which seemed just as whether such Liberals wanted the free trists can also be seen to have schismatic adequate and less controversial, leaving trade system swept away forever, or tendencies. Coalition and coalition in- only Rosebery to argue for an all-party whether this situation was envisaged as a trigues drew politicians away from conference on the issue. temporary one. Certainly, Liberals in the party doctrines and the party tribe and The period of Liberal government s presented themselves again as free towards those in other parties, particu- from –, despite being riddled traders, although this may have been due larly the Conservatives, who shared with party controversies, also saw Liberal to opportunistic electoral considerations, similar anxieties. centrism at work. A number of protec- since free trade was one of the few issues

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 25 to separate them from the Conservatives would carry the country.’ His ultimate accordance with their traditional fiscal after the war. They were also unable to aim seems to be the eventual leadership principles. I do not see how direct taxa- separate themselves from a romantic at- of Cecil himself. tion can be increased …’ However, it tachment to the Gladstonian era, which With so many attempts to bring to- was not just future Liberal Nationals ex- prevented even pragmatists exercising gether opposing forces in the interests of pressing such views. Malcolm Baines has more forethought about policy. national unity, it seems hard to under- drawn attention to the fact that there In the early twenties, many Liberals stand why the Liberal Nationals have re- was little to separate the future Liberal viewed National politics as the best way ceived such a bad press for essentially Nationals from the independent Liberal of securing Liberal goals in domestic and adopting the same pragmatic course. Party. Lord Lothian, in his pamphlet imperial legislation, as they lost faith in These moves seem quite consistent with Liberalism in the Modern World, suggested Liberalism’s ability to succeed independ- the view of Walter Runciman that: ‘the ‘the possibility of a world system of ently after the war. This led to the desire problems with which we are now faced complete free trade has gone and will for even greater integration of Liberal are not whether it shall be Conservatives probably never return.’ Herbert and Conservative forces, with Lloyd or Liberals who occupy the Treasury Samuel and his colleagues were playing George and higher ranking Coalition Bench … and dominate the policy of the role of campaigners for ‘freer’ trade, a Liberals in particu- Whitehall, it is modified definition of free trade, which lar being keen on Important to Liberal rather whether reluctantly accepted the need for tariffs the idea of creating British democracy in a hostile climate, but this was exactly a single centre party Nationals was the desire and the British con- the same position as the Liberal Nation- — an objective to retain their Liberal stitution shall sur- als. Runciman summed up his party’s known as ‘fusion’. vive the fate which feeling fairly well in  when he said: Winston Church- identity, but they felt has overpowered ‘I do not love subsidies, and I think that ill’s view is typical that Liberal measures democracies of the subsidy system has always been a bad in his assertion that were only achievable other European element in foreign competition. The ‘a united appeal un- countries’. The only reason we have for using subsidies der your (Lloyd through compromise. desire for coopera- now is to fight subsidy with subsidy, and George’s) leader- tion was mild com- by these means hope, ultimately, to in- ship … would secure a Parliament capa- pared to that of the early s, since duce all subsidising countries to stop ble of maintaining the Empire & restor- there were no calls for fusion, and coop- their subsidising simultaneously.’ ing Prosperity …’  Frederick Guest eration was originally intended as short In acknowledging the similar views called for the ‘formation of the Central term (although circumstances altered regarding protection between the two Party and for the establishment of the the position later). Important to Liberal Liberal wings, the actions of the Liberal great triumvirate.’ These views are Nationals was the desire to retain their Nationals can be seen as essentially Lib- those of later defectors, whose own un- Liberal identity, but they felt that Liberal eral, since the majority of high-ranking certainties about their position within measures were only achievable through Liberals agreed with the modification the party might have led them to see the compromise. Important Liberal Na- of free trade. As a result of these simi- creation of new party as a means to tionals such as Runciman had previously larities in , both sides were pre- abandon Liberalism without losing face. participated in the wartime coalition pared to come to electoral arrange- However, similar sentiments were ex- and so it also seems strange that he, as the ments with Tory protectionists and to pressed amongst those who remained author of the Paris Resolutions, has not work with them in government. This within the Liberal Party and this suggests been chastised by historians for his illib- can be seen in fiscal enactments such as that the idea was close to Liberal prag- eral intentions in –. the  Import Duties Act, which matic instincts. This position was paral- Whilst Liberals had largely returned provided for a % revenue tax with leled, although to a lesser degree, in the to their free trade traditions in the s, imperial preferences to be put in place. Asquithian wing of Liberalism. Michael the protectionist argument had gained However, the Samuelites were never Bentley has drawn attention to this in his weight by the end of the decade, as other quite so publicly committed to such claim that moves were afoot to mould a nations started to impose greater tariffs measures as their Liberal National col- party under the leadership of Lord Grey, on British goods. Also, social insurance leagues and this eventually led to their the former Liberal Foreign Secretary, expenditure was putting pressure on the departure from the government in Sep- bringing in a progressive Tory element Treasury and practical measures were tember , although it should be under Sir Robert Cecil. Not all of the needed to address the deficit. Liberals pointed out it took over a year for them ‘conspirators’ intended that there should again started to voice concerns about to actually ‘cross the floor’. Their pub- be a new party created, but this does free trade in response. As Sir John Simon, licly lukewarm attitude had been ac- seem to have been the intention of the future leader of the Liberal National commodated through an ‘agreement to some, particularly Gilbert Murray, Cecil party put it: ‘Free traders will have to differ’ policy which let them avoid the and Runciman. As Murray put it, the face the possibility of filling up the gap convention of collective responsibility combination ‘would give a united Lib- in the revenue of this year and the next and to campaign against this position if eral Party plus the RC group and I think by some form of taxation which is not in necessary. This agreement was vital to

26 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 the Samuelites for pragmatic reasons perialist sentiments, so the new Labour war, when the Labour Party began to rather than principle. Whilst they were Government, which wanted India to overtake the Liberals in parliamentary offering general support to the govern- have self-government, bypassed it by an- importance and there was a perceived ment, and were privately sympathetic nouncing that India should make consti- threat from Bolshevism. Many Liberal de- to changes to the fiscal system, they had tutional progress towards Dominion sta- fectors expressed unhappiness in the to appease their rank and file, whose tus. After this snub, Simon’s anger towards s at so-called Liberal concessions to views were much less accommodating Labour never subsided. Imperialists like socialism in foreign affairs, by favouring to even short-term protectionist meas- Simon saw India as the crown jewel of Bolshevik Russia, and in Lloyd George’s ures. Liberal Nationals could afford to the Empire and saw any attempt to alter social policies. However, those who de- be more bold since they could guaran- its status as a threat to the entire Empire. fected were not unrepresentative of the tee Conservative support in the event This view may certainly have been in the rest of Liberalism. Despite accusations of of haemorrhaging Liberal support. minds of other Liberals, including Lloyd his socialist intent, Lloyd George spoke of George, who rejected the government’s the ‘very grave consequences’ for the III conclusions regarding India, although un- ‘whole order of society’ of the socialist It is not only in the approach to politics like Simon, for them it was not a resigna- movement. Fellow Coalition Liberal T. J. where there are similarities between the tion issue. Simon’s stance is, however, evi- Macnamara feared socialists wanted to two sides in . Individual Liberal Na- dence of the emotional pull of the India bring the whole parliamentary system tionals shared an outlook with other Question for Liberals. Some imperialist ‘about our ears’. Liberals who did not later join. The first former Coalition Liberals also departed Anti-socialism was not just about the of these is a sense of imperialism, which with Simon. It would be interesting to fear of a socialist government or Bolshe- links individual Liberal Nationals with discover whether, like Simon, they too vik revolution in the s. It was also the imperialist section of the Liberal were disaffected by their party’s position motivated by the frustration that Liberals Party. This sentiment was in a sense illib- on the issue. felt in their inability to define a course eral in the desire to promote British The other main area of continuity lies separate from Toryism or socialism. Liber- power interests, often by force and in its in the attitude towards socialism. Fear of als often referred to the ‘middle way’ de- paternalistic view that colonial subjects the rise of socialism provoked anti-social- fined sometimes as a ‘… move away from were unfit to govern their own affairs. ist attitudes. The starting point is with … rigid individualism … to broader and Feeling of this sort developed in the at- nineteenth century social imperialists, deeper conceptions of national responsi- mosphere of the late nineteenth century many of whom were seeking ways to buy bility and of international relationships; when Liberals felt uncertain about Brit- the support of the working classes but this is a very different thing from ain’s future global strength, but did not through concessions moving towards the really find expression as part of a govern- to demands for so- The frustration that acceptance of the mental programme until the establish- cial welfare legisla- not less rigid collec- ment of Lloyd George’s Coalition. This tion, often referred Liberals felt in their tivism of the Social- era set a precedent, since it was the first to as ‘semi-social- inability to define a ist creed … Be- government in which Liberals made an ism’. This, it was course separate from tween those two ex- active imperialism the centre of foreign hoped, would stem tremes there is, we and imperial policies. They were thus the tide of socialism. Toryism or socialism ... believe, a via media drawn away from traditional Liberal sen- Some such meas- Liberals often referred to which liberal- timents which stressed the ruler’s role in ures were carried the ‘middle way’. minded men and educating and devolving responsibilities out by the Liberal women who form to colonial subjects, as Edwin Montagu Government of the majority of the found during his time as India Secretary, –, but perhaps these policies were electors of this country anxiously desire –, when he was derided for con- motivated more by an elitist view of the to pursue …’ However, this muddled demnation of the Amritsar Massacre. Empire than by the genuine concern for thinking was not enough on which to Sir John Simon’s view of Britain’s role working-class issues that their New Lib- build support. The growth of class politics in India was an issue which contributed eral rhetoric suggested. Behind the leg- in the s showed the possibility of to his departure from the Liberal Party, islative programme of these years and the politics without a Liberal Party. Since the since in the months before his resignation, compact with Labour there was a fear of Liberal Party was a moderating force in it supported a Labour Government creeping socialism. The fact that Lloyd society and a pillar of the British constitu- which wanted to give India the self-gov- George was willing to seek a coalition tion, many Liberals resented the rise of ernment which he and Liberals before with the Tories in  suggests that he class as an issue which might lead to its him had opposed. Simon’s particular in- feared the consequences of constitutional destruction. They derided socialists for terest in the India Question had arisen deadlock would come in the form of a their irresponsibility in appealing to class from the  Statutory Commission on socialist advance. loyalties. As E. D. Simon put it, ‘both the India, which he had chaired. By , it As socialism became more successful, general strike and the coal strike have was anticipated that the Commission’s the Liberal attack on it became more in- shown us … “The Two Nations” … If the findings would be much in line with im- tense. This is particularly the case after the Liberal Party disappeared, the division of

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 27 political parties would … become a class tions were so bitter that they could be enemies and allowed him to rise to the division. This would be a long step to- characterised as civil war. However, Lib- leadership by . This created a sense wards the greater danger that faces this eral politics during the First World War, of discomfort and isolation for the sup- country, the danger of class war.’ or even before, may also have played porters of Asquith. Many felt that Lloyd Future Liberal Nationals were con- their part. These strains affected future George’s Political Fund, which he had tributors to anti-socialist tendencies in Liberal Nationals, some of whom saw gathered through the sale of honours, the Liberal Party. They were amongst themselves at the centre of party feuding, was allowing him to buy support. Many the most vocal critics of Lloyd George’s so it is likely that these factors were im- either went into isolation or joined overtures to Labour, as a socialist party, portant in the eventual decision to leave. like-minded individuals setting up after , and although their detach- Many of the difficulties in the inter- groups to counter the Lloyd George ment from Lloyd George was leading war period were the result of the feud- influence. The Radical Group was them to formal separation from him, ing between supporters of Asquith formed in  for this purpose and in there is little in substance to differenti- (some of whom were later Liberal Na-  this was superseded by the Liberal ate them from mainstream Liberal tionals) and those of Lloyd George. The Council. The latter even developed its opinion. Sir John Simon’s assertion that problem had begun during the war, with own set of policies, in effect making it a ‘Socialism … is a poisonous doctrine’ the replacement of Asquith by Lloyd party within a party. because it ‘seeks to substitute for the George as Prime Minister in December Since there were a number of Gladstonian principle that money is . Asquith’s supporters felt that Lloyd former Asquithian elements repre- best left to fructify in the pockets of the George was responsible for his fall, ac- sented in the Liberal National party in people the wholly different principle cusing him of conspiring with the Con- , it seems likely that the decision to that the State will manage money bet- servatives. Relations were further soured leave was influenced by the wartime di- ter than we shall’ even identifies him by the compact Lloyd George agreed vision which had left a legacy of dis- with old-fashioned Liberal orthodoxy. with the Conservatives for the  trust which could only be resolved Whilst this might suggest his likely de- election which signalled preference for through ultimate dissociation from the fection from such a party, which in his Coalition Conservative candidates over Liberal Party. This conclusion can be view meant ‘nothing more than being a Asquithian Liberals. For them, this sig- drawn from the earlier careers of Lib- mere variant of Socialism,’ and a move nalled a lack of principle and Lloyd eral Nationals, particularly Sir John Si- towards the Conservatives, who were George’s determination to remain in mon. His problems with the Liberal opposed to socialism in its entirety, it power at whatever price. An almost irra- Party and, in particular with Lloyd cannot be used to suggest that he was a tional loathing of Lloyd George devel- George, began even before the – Conservative since many other Liberals oped, which was reinforced by the cor- Liberal split, over the naval estimates for agreed with him and might well have ruption scandals of the Coalition. –. Simon saw dangers in the na- taken the same course had a Lib-Lab The two elements seemed less than val race with Germany and in Cabinet coalition been formed in . happy to be reunited in , when advocated a reduction in naval ex- Liberal reunion brought supporters of penditure.  In theory, Lloyd George IV Asquith and Lloyd George back under was on the same side, since he origi- Party conflicts are a key factor in ex- the same banner, and this contributed nally opposed increases in line with the plaining why defections occurred in the to the electoral collapse in . For public image he chose to present as a inter-war period. Many Liberals found it Lloyd George this seems to have been Liberal radical. Privately he was more in difficult to remain in a party where rela- beneficial, since the election knocked tune with Churchill’s desire for in- tions between key individuals and fac- out many of his erstwhile Asquithian creases in expenditure and sought to broker a compromise. This is likely to have annoyed Simon since he was sup- Grey addressing a meeting of the Liberal Council. posedly the greatest radical heavy- weight capable of convincing Asquith of the radical case, and it is imaginable that this soured his feelings towards Lloyd George. However, it was during the war that Simon’s bitterness really came to the surface. Lloyd George’s early advocacy of conscription defied all Liberal principles as far as Simon was concerned. He sought to expose what he saw as Lloyd George’s insincere radi- calism, bringing the two into conflict. Simon’s resistance to conscription eventually led to his exit from Asquith’s coalition in December , for which

28 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 he blamed Lloyd George, since his was damaged by a number of factors. not impress. He saw within the radical opinion seemed to have the greatest in- Amongst these was the South Wales proposals the wasteful expenditure of fluence on the direction of policy. coal dispute in the summer of . the Coalition years and the state com- This personal bitterness coloured Whilst at the Board of Trade, pulsion of land and industry he had dis- the relationship between Lloyd George Runciman attempted to broker a com- liked during the war. However, since he and Sir John Simon in the s. Simon promise between the miners, who and other Liberal Council members was amongst Lloyd George’s most wanted permanent wage increases and were able to go into the  election high-profile critics and Lloyd George the employers, who were prepared only supporting the Lloyd George pro- did everything possible to obstruct his to concede war bonuses. The failure to gramme (at least in public), it is unclear career. During the Spen Valley by-elec- reach a settlement led to Lloyd George how seriously the criticisms should be tion in February , Lloyd George stepping in and finding a solution taken. Sheer spite, rather than real put up a Coalition Liberal to obstruct which granted the miners virtually all policy disagreements, may have had Simon’s chances of election. The Coali- their demands. This infuriated more to do with it, particularly since tion tried to smear Simon with the Runciman, who must have felt his po- before the war Runciman had been claim that he was unpatriotic and had sition undermined. Another factor was broadly progressive and in favour of tried to mount a legal challenge to the the divergence over war strategy. Like state intervention in the economy. war in . In the later s, Simon Simon, Runciman Lloyd George’s did not involve himself much with battled with Lloyd former Coalition Asquithian co-ordinated efforts to George over con- Since the Liberal Party Liberal supporters counter Lloyd George, but he was very scription, but his was a moderating force were also present in critical of Liberal policy under him. pragmatism meant the ranks of the The earlier career of Walter it was never a resig- in society, many Liberals Liberals Nationals, Runciman is also of interest since his nation issue. Nev- resented the rise of class so they cannot alto- position in the party had often been far ertheless, he as an issue which might gether be seen as from harmonious. As a Liberal Imperial- strongly opposed the resting place of ist in the s he came into conflict the total mobilisa- lead to its destruction disaffected with the leadership under Sir Henry tion of resources Asquithians. These Campbell-Bannerman, affecting his for the war effort by the state, and this Coalition Liberals, however, had reasons chances of being selected for the put him under constant pressure from to resent Lloyd George also. In , for Dewsbury by-election in . His Lloyd George and other compulsionists example, Lloyd George had asked views also brought him into conflict in the cabinet, who looked to ways of Clement Davies to draft amendments with nonconformist elements later at circumventing the Board of Trade. His to Labour’s Coal Bill, but in the end, he the Board of Education, –, where horror at the level of national debt led U-turned and supported the Labour his attempts to impose public control to his resignation in . Bitter at the Government, in what was seen as a cyni- over state-funded schools were not ap- strategy compulsionists were forcing on cal ploy to win concessions. Davies re- preciated. Nevertheless, Runciman’s re- the Cabinet, Runciman went into op- sented Lloyd George for his opportun- lationship with Lloyd George was prob- position to attack them and to cam- ism and became disillusioned with Lib- ably more significant in causing disaffec- paign for a negotiated. peace. Much of eral politics. tion, since these other problems were this attack was to be directed against the Lloyd George’s character and meth- ones of the moment rather than longer- Lloyd George Government, whose ir- ods were generally unpopular. Sir term antagonism. responsibility he wanted to expose. Henry Morris-Jones, for example, later As was the case with Simon, the ori- Like Simon, he blamed Lloyd George spoke of his qualified support for him, gins of poor relations with Lloyd for forcing him out, and for putting un- even during the Coalition years. This George dated back before the war, dur- due pressure on Asquith to accept shows that distaste for Lloyd George ing the time he spent at the Board of compulsionist policies. was not a sectional issue, but something Education. His troubles there were The circumstances of Asquith’s fall which affected the entire Liberal Party compounded by lack of extra financial and the  election were important and may have later contributed to a support from the Treasury. This provides in adding to Runciman’s hatred of move towards the Liberal Nationals on the background to poor relations dur- Lloyd George, and set the tone for his both sides of the party. ing the war, since this decision angered relationship with him in the s and Runciman who may have suspected early s. Runciman was arguably V that the supposed Welsh radical had the leader of the Asquithian element af- This article has argued that, far from the sneaking sympathy with his noncon- ter , chairing the Radical Group Liberal Nationals being an adjunct of formist critics and therefore tried to and later the Liberal Council. the Conservative Party in the s, the make his period at Education deliber- Runciman used the Liberal Council to party was part of a tradition within the ately difficult. campaign against Lloyd George’s poli- Liberal Party stretching back fifty years. During the war the relationship be- cies as well as his influence. Lloyd The reasons for leaving the Liberal tween Runciman and Lloyd George George’s renewed progressivism did Party appear in many cases to have been

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 29 personal difficulties with individuals that Churchill disliked Simon’s ambition National politics can only work inside more than policy, particularly poor rela- and tried to keep him at arms’ length, so government; out of government it is tions with Lloyd George, who had alien- it is unclear whether Churchill himself meaningless. ated up to half the party’s MPs by . really wanted fusion. Nick Cott is a research student at Newcastle This would not, however, be an appro- The National Liberal party can be University. priate place for ending the discussion. seen to be a party which took Liberal After all, in  the National Liberals centrism to its logical conclusion, in 1Particular works of this sort include: Roy Doug- were effectively swallowed up by the fusing itself with another force (even if las, The History of the Liberal Party (London 1971), Robert Skidelsky, Politicians and the Conservative Party, although the name this was not a fusion of equals and the Slump, 1929–31 (London 1967), and Trevor National Liberal was preserved until Conservative element was bound to Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, . What was it, then, which led to an predominate). Attempts by Liberals to 1914–35 (London, 1966).  2 See David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post- essentially Liberal party being subsumed undertake similar tasks in the s had war National Liberal Party: an historical post- by Conservatism after the war, when this failed, partly because there were signifi- script’, Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989), pp. 357– did not occur in the arguably more un- cant differences, more in tradition than 367, Graham Goodlad, ‘Communications —  The Liberal Nationals, 1931–1940: the prob- certain situation of the s? This is dif- actuality, between the Liberals and lems of a party in ‘partnership government,’’ ficult to ascertain without more detailed Conservatives. Cooperation with the Historical Journal, 38, 1 (1995), pp. 133–143, investigation. The only substantive study Conservatives over a number of years and Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of in existence is that by David Dutton, and had shown Liberal Nationals that these Walter Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford (1870–1949)’, Newcastle Ph.D., 1993. even this can only been seen as a pre- differences were not of much substance. 3The idea of a Liberal centrist tradition has been ap- liminary analysis, but this study and However, this form of fusion was not plied in discussion of various Liberals particularly other sources I have examined can be inevitable. Had the Liberal Nationals in the case of Lloyd George. See work by Martin Pugh, especially Martin Pugh, ‘Left in the Centre? used to suggest probable answers to the not been so enthusiastic in the desire to Lloyd George and the Centrist Tradition in British question. pursue National politics, they might Politics’, in Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times It seems that the long period of coop- have detected a swing of the pendulum of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), pp. 17–27. It has recently been used in discussion of the Lib- eration between the parties in govern- back to party politics, which started in eral National Walter Runciman. See Jonathan ment, of fourteen years, had shown the  and resulted in a Labour landslide Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter Runciman, two forces that they could cooperate in a in . The recognition of these 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford (1870–1949)’, changed post-war world from , changes led to some Liberal Nationals University of Newcastle Ph.D. thesis, 1995, p. 20.  4The Liberal Imperialists advocated imperial ex- since the old battles seemed irrelevant. returning to the Liberal Party. How- pansion, particularly in South Africa and domes- However, the Liberal Nationals had not ever, most did not recognise the elec- tic reforms in line with National Efficiency. accepted Conservatism, just as the Con- toral shift and remained where they 5 H.H. Asquith, The Times 12th October 1899 in H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The servatives had not accepted Liberalism. were, still seeing themselves as being Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite The two forces had gradually moved good Liberals, although some later re- (Oxford, 1973), p. 43. closer together so that by , it seemed gretted the course they took.  The 6 G. Searle, Country Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of ‘National Government’ in Modern to those Liberals and Conservatives co- logic of fusion was to leave Liberalism Britain, 1885–1987 (London, 1995), p. 63. operating with each other that there was behind, but the party still tried to assert 7 H.C.G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists: The little to separate them. They could per- a Liberalism of its own into the s, Ideas and Politics of a Post-Gladstonian Elite haps be said to have met half-way, form- even if this amounted to little other (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100–102. 8Kenneth Morgan, Lloyd George (London, ing a liberal-conservatism. Stanley than the defence of civil liberties and 1974), p. 59. Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain had anti-socialism — something which the 9 Lloyd George Papers C/6/5/1 hoped for the fusion of sympathetic lib- Conservative Party was capable of do- 10 Lloyd George Papers C/6/5/1. 11 For a justification of all these measures see The eral elements with Conservatism, but it ing without its cooperation. Fusion can Lloyd George Liberal Magazine Vol. 1 June was not under their leadership that this be seen to have been accomplished re- 1921 No. 9. fusion actually occurred. The unification luctantly and many felt it had contrib- 12 Churchill papers 2/121: 27th February 1922 –  Churchill to Lloyd George. of Liberal and Conservative elements uted to Liberal decline after . 13 Lloyd George papers F/22/3/37 16th January happened under Churchill, the former National politics had been essen- 1922 – Guest to Lloyd George. Liberal free trader, an advocate of fusion tially pragmatic before . The ac- 14 See the view of H.A.L. Fisher in John Campbell, in the s. Taking this factor into con- tions of the Liberal Nationals in Octo- Lloyd George – The Goat in the Wilderness (London, 1977), pp. 25–33. sideration, the ultimate victory can be ber of that year converted it into a 15 Michael Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and the Grey seen to be that of Liberal centrists rather principled stance. In doing so, they cut Conspiracy of 1921’, Historical Journal, 20 2 than Conservatives, although such out an escape route for themselves. (1977), pp. 461–478. Conspirators included Gilbert Murray, Walter Runciman, Sir Robert claims must be tempered by evidence of Whilst they continued to be a liberal- Hudson, Herbert and Henry Gladstone, Donald an uneasy relationship between Church- ising force when in government, out Maclean, Arthur Murray, J.A. Spender, H.W. ill with Simon. Simon had opposed of power this principle amounted to Massingham and Lord Cowdray. 16 Runciman papers WR 185 January 31st 1920 Churchill during the First World War in little. The Liberal National party’s Gilbert Murray to Walter Runciman. his desire for total war, and he had sup- brand of National politics could not 17 Runciman papers WR 185 January 31st 1920 ported appeasement during the s. support a socialist government, nor Gilbert Murray to Walter Runciman. From a personal point of view, it seems was that support sought. Principled concluded on page 51

30 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Donald Johnson Robert Ingham reviews the career of a self-styled ‘political entrepreneur’ who moved from the radical wing of the Liberal Party to become a Conservative MP. DonaldDonald JohnsonJohnson The last Liberal Imperialist

t is well known that several prominent Liberals was educated at Cheltenham College and Gonville Iabandoned the Liberal Party for the Labour Party and Caius College, Cambridge, before qualifying as after the dispiriting election results of ,  and a doctor in  at St Bart’s Hospital, London. He , amongst them Megan Lloyd George and practised as a GP in Thornton Heath throughout Dingle Foot. Perhaps less well known is that there most of the s, before becoming a Demonstrator was a similar drift of talent into the Conservative of Anatomy at Oxford University in . He de- Party at the same time. George Wadsworth, Liberal tailed his medical career in A Doctor Regrets in , MP for Buckrose from –, stood as a Con- later writing that he ‘repeatedly became involved in servative and Liberal candidate for Sheffield the toil of medical work despite all my best efforts to Hillsborough in ; Eric Johnson, Liberal candi- escape them’. date for Lancaster in , was elected Conservative Like many of his generation, Johnson was inspired MP for Manchester Blackley in ; Donald to enter the political arena as a result of the deteriorat- Moore, who contested Manchester Moss Side in ing international situation in the mid-s and what  and Manchester Blackley in , joined the he judged to be the inadequate responses to it of the Conservative Party in  and fought several elec- major parties. Employing familiar medical terminol- tions thereafter; and Henry Kerby, a prominent ogy, he described the Conservative Party’s foreign member of Radical Action, joined the Conservative policy as resulting from ‘senile dementia’ and accused Party in  and was elected MP for Arundel and the Labour Party’s stance on international questions as Shoreham in . ‘schizophrenic’. Although he had regarded the Liberal Donald Johnson was one of that company of war- Party as little more than a historical curiosity, Johnson time Liberals who later joined the Conservative Party. judged that his political philosophy – he was a self- His career in both parties was turbulent. He broke the confessed ‘rebel against the social climate of prestige, wartime truce to fight a by-election at Chippenham family tradition, subservience, moral cowardice and as an independent Liberal, when the Liberal leader- anything which militated against political independ- ship backed the Conservative candidate, and accused ence’ – tallied with liberalism, and he admired the the Liberal leadership of being the ‘most outstanding Liberal Party’s stance on foreign affairs. He accepted example of nepotism of any institution I have ever an invitation by his home town’s Liberal Association known’. Elected Conservative MP for Carlisle in to become their parliamentary candidate and con- , he soon acquired the maverick tag. He resigned tested the  general election. His experience in the Tory whip in January  and fought the general Bury was not happy, however. His adoption meeting election of that year as an independent candidate. He went badly when he failed to mention free trade and chronicled his political career in intimate detail in a he came a moderate third. Despite the success of a series of autobiographical volumes which were pub- protest meeting against the Hoare-Laval Pact, he re- lished by Johnson’s own firm. The most important of signed the Liberal candidature in March , later these books, from a Liberal perspective, was Bars and dismissing the Bury Liberals as ‘tea-drinking noncon- Barricades, which provides the only published first- formists, beer-drinking clubmen and businessmen hand account of the disputes within the Liberal Party councillors’. during the Second World War. Casting around for a constituency with a more Donald McIntosh Johnson was born in Bury, energetic set of Liberal activists, Johnson was recom- Lancashire, on  February , the son of Isaac mended to fight Bewdley, where a by-election was Welwood Johnson and Bertha Louise neé Hall. He pending after Stanley Baldwin was elevated to the

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 31 peerage. There was some optimism that sation, its reluctance to embrace new He had no base in the constituency and Bewdley could be won by a Liberal if a ideas and the successful attempt to pre- received practically no help from the lo- Labour candidate kept out of the field, vent discussion of the electoral truce, cal Liberals. All three party leaders but Johnson saw only ‘a dozen charm- Johnson formed the Liberal Action backed the Conservative candidate, ing elderly and middle-aged people … Group immediately after the Assembly David Eccles. Members of Radical Ac- [whose] enthusiasm for the languishing ended. Its aim was to ‘activate and ener- tion ‘discovered a variety of reasons for Liberal cause knew no bounds’. He gise the Liberal Party, both as regards not being able to help at Chippenham polled , votes – the best Liberal re- policy and organisation’. The Group on the crucial dates’ and there were no sult since  – but was easily de- comprised mostly younger Liberal can- offers of help from the Common Wealth feated. By this time the political scene didates and attracted the support of sev- Party, independent MPs Vernon Bartlett in Oxford, where Johnson was now eral Liberal MPs, including, at first, Ri- and A. D. Lindsay, or from previously based, was becoming more interesting. chard Acland and George Grey and, friendly Liberals such as Clement Johnson met Ivor Davies, who entered later, Clement Davies and Tom Davies. The local press waged a vicious the fray of the  Oxford by-election Horabin. It met on occasional week- campaign against Johnson, accusing him against the wishes of the Liberal leader- ends in London and provided a ready of being ‘unbalanced’ for contesting the ship. Johnson was angered by what he audience for Johnson’s memoranda on seat and ‘diverting effort from the win- saw as the pusillanimous attitude of the domestic and international affairs. The ning of the war’. Liberal hierarchy but when Lindsay Action Group was far from being Nevertheless, his small campaign emerged as the ‘progressive’ candidate Johnson’s poodle, however, and he was team, which included independent MPs and Sir Archibald Sinclair personally re- frustrated that it was divided over the W. J. Brown and George Reakes, as well quested Davies to stand aside he reluc- question of the electoral truce. Despite as Radical Action stalwart Honor tantly did so. This was to be the first of Johnson’s prompting, the Action Group Balfour, found that they had no diffi- Johnson’s brushes with the Liberal did not propose a motion for the  culty in attracting crowds to their meet- leadership which led him to break with Assembly opposing the truce. Although ings and Johnson was confident of vic- the party after . such a motion was debated, in the last tory. In the event, he lost, but by only When war broke out, Johnson was hour of the Assembly, only one other  votes. It was an amazing result, con- one of the first politicians to consider member of the Action Group was pre- sidering the uneven balance of resources how the political mistakes of the inter- pared to support it, leading to Johnson’s between the two candidates, but war period could be avoided in future. resignation as secretary of the Group. Johnson reflected bitterly on the ‘be- He drafted a memorandum on the sub- Johnson remained a member of the trayal of Destiny’ he had suffered, caused ject for Sinclair in  which he ex- Action Group, now renamed Radical by the refusal of the Liberal Party lead- panded into a book, Safer than a Known Action, but, with Ivor Davies, focused ership to show some political courage Way, which was published in  un- his attention on fighting a by-election. and grasp the opportunities afforded by der the pseudonym ‘Odysseus’. Safer In his words, ‘the time was ripe for the the electorate’s increasing disillusion than a Known Way was a rambling per- political entrepreneur who could stake with the pre-war order and its Con- sonal manifesto, in which Johnson ar- a claim in the unexplored territory of servative defenders. Johnson had left gued for industrial co-partnership and anti-party truce sentiment’. Johnson the Liberal Party to fight the by-elec- federal world government in order to drew up a list of a hundred constituen- tion and did not rejoin it. He helped save ‘Liberal capitalism’ from the evils of cies which he regarded as promising other independent Liberal candidates at state socialism. Senior Liberals gave a territory for an independent Liberal the Darwen and Bury St Edmunds by- lukewarm response to Johnson’s ideas, candidate and it was decided that he elections and stood as an independent but he circulated them to Liberal can- would contest those in the south of the candidate for Chippenham, with the didates, winning some support from the country while Davies would contest backing of the Liberal Association, in likes of Clement Davies, Richard those in the north. Much effort was de- , finishing third. Acland and George Grey. Johnson was voted to ensuring that Davies and Johnson’s career within the Liberal also an early opponent of the wartime Johnson would not be faced with other Party was over – he predicted that the electoral truce, by which the major po- independent candidates when the right party had ‘perished’ and that ‘we shall litical parties had agreed not to contest seat came up — eight independents have no more “Liberal revivals”’ – but by-elections during the war, effectively initially emerged to contest the Central he had been bitten by the political bug ossifying the party balance in the Bristol seat in February  — and and wished to continue in politics. He House of Commons. Johnson per- there were attempts to reach a deal with faced a choice between embracing so- suaded Bewdley Liberal Association to the Common Wealth Party towards the cialism or forgiving the Conservative back a resolution questioning the truce same end. Party its sins of the s. Frank for consideration at the  Liberal Eventually, one of Johnson’s hundred Pakenham, a colleague from the cam- Assembly. Opposed by the party leader- seats, Chippenham, fell vacant, with paign against Quentin Hogg in the ship, the resolution was placed last on polling day set for  August . Oxford by-election, tempted him left- the agenda and was never reached. Johnson put his name forward, but faced wards, while David Eccles, his foe at Dissatisfied with the party’s organi- formidable difficulties from the outset. Chippenham, tempted him to the right.

32 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 He chose the latter course and joined with his local association. Worse was to votes than if I had been a ‘“Flat Earth” the Conservative Party in , arguing come, when Johnson announced at the candidate’. that ‘liberal-minded people must defeat association’s  annual general meet- Late in life, Johnson regarded him- socialism’ and then turn on snobbery ing that ‘he wasn’t sure whether he self as an old-style Liberal, or a ‘Liberal and privilege in the Tory party. could go on being a Tory MP’ and that Imperialist’, as he styled himself. An Seeking an immediate entry to the he would decide his future once he had active member of the right-wing House of Commons, Johnson was inter- decided where the Conservative Party Monday Club, but no supporter of viewed by several Conservative Associa- stood on the key issues of the day. Enoch Powell, he was mostly inter- tions, but failed to be selected as a pro- Johnson’s political career effectively ested in the need to rescue the Con- spective candidate for the  and  ended when he became the first Con- servative Party from the aristocratic elections. He noted that ‘just as it was servative MP to call for the resignation Eden/Macmillan/Douglas-Home era, considered a good thing to select an ex- of Harold Macmillan, during the in order for socialism to be effectively Liberal on the short list for interview … Profumo crisis, in June . His state- combated. A bitter opponent of the it was an equally satisfying operation to ment, and subsequent outspoken oppo- Common Market, he penned Ted turn an ex-Liberal down’. He was sition to Macmillan’s leadership, led to Heath: A Latter Day Charlemagne in elected to Sutton and Cheam council in the executive committee of Carlisle . A resident of Sutton, he did not , but the mundane life of municipal Conservative Association passing a mo- vote for Graham Tope in the  by- politics was not for him and he again tion of no confidence in him in Octo- election, although he acknowledged sought to reach the House of Com- ber . A special meeting of the Asso- residual sympathy for the Liberal mons. Conservative Central Office ciation in December  confirmed cause. He would surely have become a pushed him towards Carlisle, where it the decision and, rather than resign strong supporter of Margaret Thatcher was felt that Johnson’s background could from the House of Commons, Johnson as Prime Minister, but he died on  help attract the sizeable Liberal vote to resigned the Conservative Whip on  November , before she swept into the Conservative cause. Johnson was se- January . In his resignation state- office in the  general election. lected and, in the absence of a Liberal ment, Johnson said ‘the Conservative Johnson was neither a good writer, candidate, elected, in . Party is clearly undergoing a great sick- nor a particularly successful publisher Johnson documented his parliamen- ness. In its present state of mental agony and nor, as a politician, did he make a tary career in A Doctor Returns (), A it is allowing itself to be tortured by lasting mark on history. He was not a Doctor in Parliament () and A ghosts. On all sides during the past four great political innovator, although he Cassandra At Westminster (). It was a months I have encountered nobody but readily picked up new ideas, boasting restless, unhappy career. Johnson did Rip Van Winkles still living in the days in his entry to Who’s Who that he was not intend to sit quietly on the of Mr Harold Macmillan.’ the first MP to ask a question about backbenches, faithfully obeying the Free from the bounds of party disci- the establishment of an ombudsman, party whip. Nor did he expect ministe- pline, Johnson enjoyed his few months in . He might have acquired a rial office, having entered the House at of independence in the House of reputation as an unflagging critic of the relatively advanced age of fifty-five. Commons, which included presenting the executive — a Tam Dalyell of his He wanted to campaign, especially on a Single Transferable Vote Bill under the times — but his views did not fit with the issue of mental health care, but his ten–minute rule procedure. He can- the shape imposed on British politics colleagues in government were antago- vassed his constituents and naïvely de- by the party system and he lacked the nistic to what they interpreted as his cided that there would be support for patience and political judgement nec- disloyalty. Johnson felt that his Liberal him as an independent candidate at the essary to manipulate that system to his past was held against him and that he forthcoming general election. His cam- own ends. He wished to be a political would forever be an outsider in the in- paign started well, but the last-minute adventurer, but failed to establish the ter-bred, public school dominated Par- nomination of a Liberal candidate, base camp in either the Liberal or liamentary Conservative Party. Brian Ashmore, signalled the end of Conservative Parties necessary for him Unable to find an outlet for his cam- Johnson’s hopes. Johnson speculated to strike out into unexplored territory paigning zeal in Parliament, and in- that Ashmore was backed by ‘Con- with a prospect of success. His impor- creasingly dissatisfied with the Con- servative money’, an allegation which tance, today, lies in his writing, which servative Party, in the same way as he Ashmore strongly objected to, insisting illuminates aspects of recent political had been unhappy with the Liberal on a late insertion to A Cassandra at history otherwise forgotten, and in the leadership twenty years earlier, Johnson Westminster to register the fact. fact that he exemplifies a breed of Lib- drifted towards Edward Martell’s Na- Ashmore’s campaign was actually eral which abandoned the Liberal tional Fellowship movement, which funded by the Rowntree Trust, who in- Party in the s and s in order combined ‘common sense with a sprin- sisted that their involvement be kept se- to fight socialism but which was not kling of … old-fashioned Liberalism’. cret. Johnson polled just  votes. He able to settle in the Conservative Party Martell was regarded as a threat to the wrote that ‘I did even worse than I until the Thatcherite revolution was unity of the Conservative Party and this could possibly have expected. At the well under way. alliance brought Johnson into conflict end of all this effort, I got no more Robert Ingham is a historical writer.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 33 The Lloyd Georges J Graham Jones examines the defections, in the 1950s, of the children of David Lloyd George: Megan to Labour, and her brother Gwilym to the Conservatives. AA breachbreach inin thethe familyfamily

G. thinks that Gwilym will go to the right and  she became a cogent exponent of her father’s ‘LMegan to the left, eventually. He wants his dramatic ‘New Deal’ proposals to deal with unem- money spent on the left.’ Thus did Lloyd George’s ployment and related social problems. Although op- trusted principal private secretary A. J. Sylvester posed by a strong local Labour candidate in the per- write in his diary entry for  April  when dis- son of Holyhead County Councillor Henry Jones in cussing his employer’s heartfelt concern over the fu- the general election of , she secured the votes of ture of his infamous Fund. It was a highly prophetic large numbers of Labour sympathisers on the island. comment. The old man evidently knew his children. In , she urged Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin to welcome the Jarrow marchers, and she battled he- Megan roically (although ultimately in vain) to gain Special Megan Lloyd George had first entered Parliament at Assisted Area Status for Anglesey. Megan’s innate only twenty-seven years of age as the Liberal MP for radicalism and natural independence of outlook Anglesey in the We Can Conquer Unemployment gen- grew during the years of the Second World War, eral election of  May , the first women mem- which she saw as a vehicle of social change, espe- ber ever to be elected in Wales. Her maiden speech, cially to enhance welfare reform and the rights of which she did not deliver until  April , was a women. She served on an impressive array of war- notably pungent, left-wing peroration in support of time committees within the ministries of Health, the Rural Housing Bill introduced by Ramsay Labour and Supply, while in  her close friend MacDonald’s second minority Labour government. Herbert Morrison, the Minister of Supply, invited Almost immediately she had carved out a distinct her to chair the vaunted ‘Women against Waste’ niche for herself as an independent minded, highly campaign. She also pressed for increased agricultural individualistic member with unfailingly strong radi- production and for more effective organisation of cal, even labourite, leanings — to the acclaim of her the Women’s Land Army. famous father. When the so-called National Gov- All these activities served to activate her indig- ernment was formed in August , Megan be- enous labourism, as did her unqualified welcome for came one of the tiny group of Lloyd Georgeite ‘in- the proposals of the Beveridge Report and her dependent Liberals’ and was, in this guise, comfort- membership of the Central Housing Advisory ably re-elected to the Commons in the general elec- Committee established to coordinate post-war tions of  and . In the former campaign she housing construction. In the first ever ‘Welsh Day’ had fiercely opposed MacDonald’s plans to axe pub- debate held in October , which she herself was lic spending, and she appealed for job creation, most privileged to open, Megan’s rousing speech called notably in the port of Holyhead where unemploy- for the reconstruction of the public industries — ment ran at perilously high levels. Even in the early coal, steel, electricity and forestry — and she insisted s there were persistent (if unconfirmed) ru- that the full employment achieved by the exigencies mours that she was likely to join the Labour Party as of war should continue in the post-war world. She she frequently urged cooperation between the Lib- had clearly drifted far to the left of mainstream, eral and Labour Parties, and it is possible that it was moderate Liberal thinking and she voiced concern only her overwhelming loyalty to her father which over the policies which her party might embrace kept her true to the Liberal faith. when peace came. Together with colleagues like In the – Parliament, Megan continued to (Sir) Dingle Foot, she urged that the Liberals should press for an expansionary economic approach to align themselves unambiguously on the left, reject- tackle the problem of the ‘intractable million’ long- ing out of hand any possibility of an alliance with term, structural, unemployed, and in the spring of the Simonite Liberal Nationals.

34 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Most surprisingly, in the general elec- sonal friend of both Clement Attlee and destine negotiations with Herbert tion of , Megan was relieved of Herbert Morrison and was on especially Morrison to prepare the ground for a Conservative opposition on Anglesey amicable terms with the close-knit ‘Lib-Lab pact’. Then, in November, (one of five Liberal MPs in Wales to re- group of women Labour MPs, one of matters came to a head when Megan ceive this stroke of good fortune) and whom was to recall, ‘Megan was a great and three followers – Foot, Roberts and she faced only a sole Labour opponent favourite in the Labour women’s Parlia- Philip Hopkins – staged a revolt inside in the person of Flying Officer Cledwyn ment of ; we looked on her as one the Liberal Party, threatening to join Hughes (now Lord Cledwyn of of us’. Her close relationship with La- Labour immediately and causing Penrhos), a Holyhead solicitor then on bour MP Philip Noel-Baker also Clement Davies seriously to consider leave from the RAF. Local rumours that brought her closer to the left. She was resigning as party leader. Eventually the she had made a pact with the Anglesey vehemently critical of local electoral storm blew over, and the fractious party Conservatives were totally unfounded pacts between the Liberal and Con- remained intact, but Megan remained as it was Hughes who seemed to reap servative parties and she frequently at- obsessed with what she insisted was a the benefit of a two-concerned fight. tacked what she considered to be Clem- distinct ‘drift to the Right in the Liberal ‘Unless Liberalism is the dominating ent Davies’ right-wing stand. As early as Party — a drift away from the old radi- force in the next House of Commons’ December  she had spoken out in cal tradition’,  and with what she re- asserted Megan, ‘We shan’t get peace, defence of the nationalisation pro- garded as Clement Davies’ weak-kneed good houses or work’, subsequently gramme of the Labour government: ‘We leadership — ‘There is no telling what claiming that ‘the Liberal Party [had] the are not afraid of public control of coal, Davies will say or do next’. When the most practical policy for social security transport, electricity and water’, and a next parliamentary session began in in the famous Beveridge Plan’. In the year later she was the only Liberal MP to November, Megan was predictably event her majority was unexpectedly defy the party whip by supporting the outspoken at a meeting of the Liberal axed to ,, only twelve Liberals MPs government’s Transport Bill. Party Committee — ‘The Liberal ship were re-elected to Westminster (seven of Persistent rumours that Lady Megan is listing to the right and almost sunk these from Wales) and Megan was sud- was on the point of joining the Labour beneath the waves’.  denly compelled to re-assess her political Party intensified during  and . When the ‘frustrating and frustrated position. Congratulating her constitu- Describing her as ‘the only … radical Parliament’ elected in February  ents on remaining firm in the midst of left in the Liberal Party’ influential was compelled to go to the country in the ‘Socialist avalanche’, she declared, north Wales trades union leader Huw T. the autumn of the following year, Lady ‘My faith in Liberalism and its future re- Edwards implored her to ‘move left’ in Megan faced yet another extremely mains unchanged’. But the nub of her November , and Herbert close three-cornered fight in Anglesey. new-found dilemma was this: how Morrison in particular urged her to Cledwyn Hughes fought the seat for the should the self-confessed Labourite change her political allegiance. Small third general election in succession and radical respond to a landslide Labour wonder that Clement Davies appointed local Conservatives had secured a nota- government firmly entrenched in power her deputy leader of the Liberal Party bly strong contender in O. Meurig and determined to enact its own left- in January , a move undoubtedly Roberts who launched hard hitting per- wing legislative programme? designed to restrict her freedom of ma- sonal attacks in Megan – ‘True Liberals Following the Liberal Party’s near noeuvre. Even in her new position, in Anglesey are not at present repre- decimation at the polls in , and the she underlined her party’s need for a sented by any candidate’ – while the unexpected defeat of party leader Sir ‘true Radical programme’ adding performance of the Liberal Party within Archibald Sinclair in Caithness and somewhat impudently, ‘of course that the House of Commons marked them Sutherland, E. Clement Davies, the lit- means shedding our Right Wing’. out, he claimed, as ‘a very small party tle-known former Simonite MP for Generally, Davies and his chief whip which cannot even agree among them- Montgomeryshire (like Megan, a vet- Frank Byers failed conspicuously to selves.’ It was suggested that Lady eran MP first elected in ) was cho- create a united front within the Liberal Megan, like Emrys Roberts and Edgar sen as party ‘chairman’ by the twelve re- Party during the years of the Attlee ad- Granville, had been singled out for spe- maining MPs. Lady Megan Lloyd ministrations. cial attention by the Tories because of George, after  just about the only In the general election of , their general support for the Labour popular national figure within the party Megan surprisingly increased her ma- government. In the event, a substantial still an MP, had suddenly become ‘a mi- jority in Anglesey to , votes. Now upsurge in the Conservative poll in An- nority radical in a minority Party’, there were no more than nine Liberal glesey deprived Megan of victory by  whose new-found role was to attempt to MPs in the Commons, five of them in votes. At last Cledwyn Hughes had suc- thwart Davies’ strong inclinations to veer Wales. In May, she and Dingle Foot co- ceeded in capturing the seat. For Megan his party sharply to the right. Entering authored a lengthy memorandum pro- it was a severe personal blow as she had the House of Commons in , Jo testing against the internal organisation been more confident of re-election than Grimond found her ‘perpetually young, of the Liberal Party. Together with in . Reflecting on her ignominious perpetually unfulfilled’ and yet ‘nervous Emrys Roberts (Merionethshire) they defeat to Liberal elder statesman Lord and idle’. She had become a close per- were simultaneously engaged in clan- Samuel, she wrote, ‘There is no doubt that

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 35 Eventually, in No- Gaitskell in the party’s final election vember , Megan broadcast on  May, and she was after- Lloyd George refused wards accused of a tendency to ‘hog the an invitation to stand mike’ repeatedly. again as Liberal candi- Throughout the campaign Labour date for Anglesey, assert- made much of its distinguished new re- ing that she had ‘latterly cruit, who duly penned a column for been disturbed by the the ‘party platform’ election series pub- pronounced tendency lished by the Daily Mail, and contrib- of the official Liberal uted items to an array of local newspa- Party to drift towards pers during the run-up to the poll. the Right’. She also During the closing two weeks of the tendered her resignation election campaign Megan spoke every as deputy leader of the day to enthusiastic audiences wherever David and Megan Lloyd George in 1923 party. The radical wing she went — ‘They call me the wild of the Liberal Party now woman of Wales. The Liberal Party left a substantial number of Liberals voted had no MPs and was consequently un- me, not the other way about’. To ry. The truth is that I am too left for able to mount an effective challenge to Lady Megan herself returned to the the modern Liberal taste’. For the first what it regarded as Clement Davies’ Commons in November  as the time since  no member of the Lloyd uninspiring leadership. Edgar Granville Labour MP for Carmarthenshire in a George family represented a Welsh con- had thrown in his lot with Labour in by-election caused by the death of vet- stituency in Parliament. January . Megan wavered as  eran Liberal Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris. Predictably, feverish speculation im- gave way to , displaying what the She captured the seat by a majority of mediately surrounded Lady Megan’s press dubbed a ‘tactful – or tactical – more than , votes and increased future political intentions. Many ob- coyness’, and ‘sphinx-like silence.’ She her majority in the general elections of servers asked the same questions as mat have hesitated because of the diffi- ,  and .The outcome of Gwilym Roberts — ‘What is going to culty of finding a suitable seat in Eng- the  by-election reduced the be Lady Megan’s political future? Will land and because entering the faction- number of Liberal MPs to five, and this she stick to the Liberal Party or will she racked Labour Party of the early s represented the nadir of the party’s for- join Labour?’ Initially, a buoyant – divided rigidly into Bevanites and tunes as it faced stagnant local organisa- Megan told the local press, ‘ I am not of Gaitskellites – was an unappealing pros- tion, hopelessly inadequate financial re- retiring age nor of a retiring disposi- pect. During , however, conversa- sources, a total of only thirty paid tion. I am ready for the next fight tions with Attlee persuaded Megan that agents in the whole of Britain and a whenever it comes.’ As she was the the Labour Party was now the essential woeful lack of radical and progressive president of the tenacious Parliament voice of British radicalism, and in April policies. Former Liberal MPs Dingle for Wales campaign, there was consider-  she announced that she had re- Foot and Wilfred Roberts also went able speculation that she might join solved to join the party: ‘The official over to Labour during , while Plaid Cymru. In December, together Liberal Party seems to me to have lost all Emrys Roberts retired (permanently as with her sister, Lady Olwen Carey- touch with the Radical tradition that in- it so happened) from political life. Evans, she left on a tour of the USA and spired it … There is a common attitude As Labour MP for Carmarthenshire Canada, telling Anglesey Liberals, ‘I of mind and thought between Radicals for the last nine and a half years of her would sooner go down with my and Labour’. life (she died prematurely in May ), limehouse colours flying than abandon Although her conversion took place Megan may have found herself some- my radical principles … I have fought a too late for her to fight a seat for La- what hamstrung, missing her former good fight and I have kept my faith. bour in the general election of May freedom as the highly independent That is the only important thing in , Megan was immediately bom- backbench Liberal member for Angle- public life. My conscience is perfectly barded with scores of insistent requests sey, and sometimes feeling a little ill at clear’. Some commentators conjec- to speak throughout the length and ease representing a division with a sig- tured that she might stand as a Liberal breadth of the United Kingdom. It was nificant industrial base. She became un- again in Anglesey or perhaps contest a widely felt within the Labour Party that comfortable, too, at her new party’s by-election in an English constitu- any prospect of electoral success de- marked reluctance to embrace a worth- ency. James Callaghan (Cardiff South) pended on winning over disillusioned while measure of devolution for Wales. urged her to return to the Commons: former Liberals. In Welsh constituencies It is possible, moreover, that her rela- ‘But you must come back as a member in particular, she may have brought tively late entry into the Labour Party of our party. First because we are right large numbers of ‘radical Liberals’ into meant that she was never offered a min- about the malaise and the remedies for the Labour fold. Lady Megan appeared isterial position or even the opportu- the twentieth century. Secondly, be- alongside Herbert Morrison, Jim nity to speak from the opposition front cause there is no other way back.’ Callaghan and party leader Hugh bench.

36 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 Gwilym Although he remained intensely loyal jor Price received the stock letter of to his father during the harsh vicissitudes support of Herbert Samuel, leader of Megan’s elder brother Gwilym was the  second son and the fourth child of which beset the Parliamentary Liberal the mainstream group of Liberal MPs. David and Margaret Lloyd George. Hav- Party during the lifetime of the second Both Gwilym Lloyd George and Price ing attained the rank of major while in Labour government, in early September were contesting the constituency for  command of a battery of artillery on the , the wake of the formation of the the fourth successive general election – Somme and at Passchendaele during the National Government, Gwilym (con- a unique record – and perhaps it was First World War, he became closely in- trary to press speculation) accepted the only the eleventh-hour withdrawal of volved with his father’s career during the position of parliamentary secretary to the Labour aspirant which enabled years of the post-war Coalition govern- the Board of Trade, his first ministerial Gwilym to hold on by a majority of   ment, attending the  peace confer- appointment. ‘Gwilym is to be offered a just over , votes. ences and displaying an avid interest in post today’ wrote Lloyd George to his All four Lloyd George Liberals were  foreign affairs. In  he entered the wife at the end of August, ‘He was very in fact re-elected in October and  House of Commons as the Coalition disinclined to take it. I offered no opinion, again in November . Throughout  Liberal MP for Pembrokeshire in a but I am expecting to hear from him. the s Gwilym was generally loyal to straight fight with Labour at a time Unemployment & trade figures getting his father’s domestic and foreign policies, worse. It is a dreary prospect for the new warmly embracing his dynamic ‘New when his father’s writ certainly still ran  in rural Wales. He held on to the seat in a Gov[ernment]’. Margaret was more Deal’ proposals during the spring and  positive — ‘We were delighted about summer of . Yet father and son did three-cornered contest in , soon  becoming a junior Liberal whip during G[wilym]’. It may well be that Lloyd not enjoy the same kind of rapport as the brief lifetime of the first minority George, although disapproving, was re- Lloyd George shared with Megan. Labour government. luctant to veto his ambitious son’s first When Gwilym’s wife, Edna, informed In , however, Gwilym was de- prospect of office. At the same time, her father-in-law in November that ‘the feated by the Conservative Major Charles Gwilym’s brother-in-law Major Goron- result would be very close in Price, a Haverfordwest solicitor and wy Owen (Liberal, Caernarfonshire) ac- Pembrokeshire’, Lloyd George, ‘annoyed county councillor, who had also stood cepted the position of Comptroller of with her’, responded simply by ‘literally the Household. pump[ing] optimism into him over the the previous year. In the wake of his de-  feat, his father (while privately accusing When, however, in early October, telephone’. On polling day, his princi- him of indolence) made him managing- Ramsay MacDonald announced his pal private secretary A. J. Sylvester noted director of United Newspapers (which government’s intention of going to the in his diary, ‘He showed little concern country, both Gwilym and Owen for Gwilym, who is the one in diffi- included the Daily Chronicle) and a junior  trustee of the infamous National Liberal promptly resigned from the govern- culty’. At the same time the old man Political Fund accumulated during the ment, after only five weeks in office. had spared no effort to buttress Megan’s years of post-war Coalition government. Gwilym followed his father’s line, as- election campaign in Anglesey, even ad- At this point Gwilym remained very serting that the sudden dissolution dressing huge open-air audiences at much in the mainstream of the Liberal meant ‘that the Conservatives [had] Llangefni and Holyhead. In the event  Party, which he was anxious to re-build, been successful in stampeding the Megan’s majority was and  and sought to regain his Pembrokeshire country into a rash and ill-timed gen- Gwilym’s a wafer-thin . constituency. Somewhat unexpectedly eral election from which they hope to Yet in the following summer Gwilym (in the wake of an announcement, only snatch a party majority. This will enable accompanied his father on his infamous two days before the dissolution of Parlia- them … to enact the full Tory pro- visit to Hitler at Berchtesgarden. He re- gramme of protectionist tariffs’. The mained one of the trustees of the Lloyd ment, that an air base was to be estab-  lished at Pembroke Dock, news of which decision to appeal to the electorate was, George Fund and was to some extent he insisted, ‘a discreditable manoeuvre dwarfed in stature by the name of his fa- was certain to enhance the prospects of  Major Price, the sitting Conservative by the Tory Party’. Urged by party mous father and more mercurially dy- MP), Gwilym recaptured the division in chief whip Ramsay Muir to reconsider, namic sister, Megan. Gwilym (‘takes af- May , joining his father and newly Gwilym showed his draft resignation ter his mother … quite straight’) lacked elected sister Megan at Westminster. This letter to his father who only then indi- bravado, was sometimes accused of iner- made Lloyd George ‘the first man to have cated his heartfelt approval of his son’s tia and apathy, and was known within his a son and daughter with him in the decision. Together with father, sister constituency as ‘Ask my Dad’ after a suc- House of Commons.’ Even the defeated Megan and Goronwy Owen, he cession of embarrassingly evasive replies To ry leader Stanley Baldwin was said to formed a curious Lloyd Georgeite at political meetings. In his account of rejoice in the unprecedented success of splinter group of Independent Liberals Lloyd George’s activities, Sylvester wrote  the Lloyd George dynasty, while com- who took their place alongside the La- in his diary in October , ‘He is not menting, ‘I like Gwilym; he takes after his bour MPs on the opposition benches, quite certain of the attitude of some of mother’. Gwilym was in fact to remain the only Liberals initially ranged in op- the family at the moment, particularly MP for Pembrokeshire until . position to the National Government. Gwilym, whom L.G thinks has got a In Pembrokeshire, Tory contender Ma- swelled head’.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 37 At the outbreak of the Second World tional minimum wage for working Churchill’s broadcast on  June, ‘Be- War, Gwilym returned to his former miners. Perhaps it was only Churchill’s tween us and the orthodox Socialists position as Parliamentary Secretary to personal veto which blocked the out- there is a great doctrinal gulf which the Board of Trade, strikingly the only right nationalisation of the coal indus- yawns and gapes … There is no such gulf Liberal to join Chamberlain’s pseudo- try and Lloyd-George’s ambitious pro- between the Conservative and National coalition government which now in- posals to convert the electricity supply Government I have formed and the Lib- cluded Churchill and Eden. He served industry into a public corporation. erals. There is scarcely a Liberal senti- amicably in this position under Cham- Gwilym Lloyd-George was now a ment which animated the great Liberal berlain and Churchill until February political figure of some importance. It leaders of the past which we do not in-  when he became Parliamentary had been proposed in  that he herit and defend’. So consistent was Secretary to the Ministry of Food un- might become Viceroy of India and in- Gwilym’s support for the Conservatives der Lord Woolton. These offers may tense rumours circulated in  that he that in  the Liberal whip was finally have been made to conciliate his father was about to be chosen Speaker of the withdrawn from him. (who was by now too old for high of- House of Commons. Sylvester recorded In his public speeches, Gwilym fice) by whose outmoded ranting ora- on  March, ‘The Speaker is very ill. Last Lloyd-George now insisted that no ma- tory Gwilym himself confessed to be- Friday I went to see Gwilym at the Min- jor policy issues divided the Liberals ing embarrassed. In June , he was istry of Food and ascertained from him and the Conservatives, and that, to both promoted to the new position of Min- that he was definitely interested in the parties, the battle against the ‘socialist ister of Fuel and Power where he re- Speakership, and that if it were offered to menace to liberty’ was paramount. mained for more than three years until him he would certainly take it. I am do- Asquith’s daughter, Lady Violet the dissolution of the Coalition at the ing a lot of propaganda on his behalf’. Bonham-Carter, reported coyly to termination of hostilities. Sylvester At the end of the war it was noticeable Gwilym’s sister Megan at the end of noted in his diary for  October : that he did not follow the Labour men , ‘Gwilym is speaking with Harold and the other Liberals out of the govern- Macmillan etc.’ During the February Gwilym opened the debate on coal and  did exceedingly well. He was very con- ment in advance of the election. In the general election campaign, he ap- fident in his manner and made a good general election of , now standing peared on Conservative platforms even impression on the House. At two in Pembrokeshire as a ‘National Liberal in constituencies where Liberal candi- o’clock, whilst L.G, Megan and I were and Conservative’ (and relieved of Tory dates were standing and he was publicly at lunch, Gwilym joined us. L.G. said to opposition) he was disowned by the him: ‘However worried you were, it was narrowly re-elected Liberal Party. nothing like what I felt’. I must say that ‘Politicians are like L.G. looked the part too, as he sat on by  votes. Even ‘Gwilym has the front opposition bench. With his so, he appears to monkeys. They higher caused us a lot of eyes and mouth open, he was terribly have been offered they climb, the more worry’ party leader het up all the time Gwilym was speak- by Sir Archibald Clement Davies la- ing. During the whole of lunch an end- Sinclair the leader- revolting are the parts mented wearily to less number of MPs came up to con- gratulate L.G. on Gwilym’s speech say- ship of the small they expose.’ his predecessor, Sir ing that he must feel a proud father. L.G band of Liberal Archibald seemed really pleased. MPs, immediately Sinclair. The La- In his new post Lloyd-George (his use refusing the offer because of the onerous bour Party targeted highly marginal incidental expenses which the position Pembrokeshire as one of its most likely of the hyphen was significant), display-  ing unfailing tact and professional com- would entail. He also turned down the wins, soon increasing its representation chairmanship of the National Liberal in local government in the county and petence. He made a vital contribution  to the war effort, encouraging the min- Party at the same time, and, when the bringing in party heavyweights like ers to produce ever-increasing supplies new House assembled and Churchill of- Clement Attlee and Aneurin Bevan to of coal (required for both the war in- fered him a place on the opposition woo the local electorate. The ploy suc- dustries and domestic heating) and per- front bench, he insisted he could sit only ceeded as Desmond Donnelly narrowly   suading consumers to exercise rigid as a Liberal. ‘And what the hell else toppled Gwilym by votes in . should you sit as?’ was Churchill’s char- Gwilym ventured north in search of economy in its use — thus winning the  ‘battle of the gap’ in the sphere of fuel acteristically belligerent response. It a safer haven, eventually securing the supplies. He also inaugurated a far- soon became apparent, however, that ‘National Liberal and Conservative’ reaching reorganisation of the industry, Gwilym was supporting the Conserva- nomination for Newcastle-upon-Tyne setting up a National Coal Board to tives and seemed to enjoy a warm rap- North where he won comfortably in  proffer him advice on wartime regula- port with Churchill, who, as a former — with Churchill’s support and Liberal himself, had genuinely regretted in spite of an Independent Conserva- tion. Collaborating with Labourite  Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, the departure of all the other Liberal tive rival. He offered himself to his he helped to establish the ‘Bevin Boy’ ministers from his Coalition govern- new electorate as ‘a firm opponent of  scheme to increase the labour force in ment in the spring of . Gwilym Socialism and a supporter of the Con- the coal mines and to institute a na- would no doubt have eagerly endorsed servative policy’ and making an especial

38 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 appeal to traditional Liberals: ‘A word quite independent of his famous father. 20 Holyhead and Anglesey Mail , 19 October 1951 to Liberals. The old antagonism be- A convivial, popular and respected col- 21 The Times, 24 October 1951 22 See House of Lords Record Office, Herbert tween Liberals and Conservatives has league, he made friends in all political Samuel Papers A/155/xiii/161, Megan Lloyd lost its meaning today. I can find no es- parties, and his ‘move to the right’ was George to Samuel, 9 November 1951 sential difference between them in never especially resented in political cir- 23 Ibid 24 Liverpool Daily Post, 27 October 1951 policy and outlook, while both are fun- cles. He displayed administrative compe- 25 North Wales Chronicle, 2 November 1951 damentally opposed to Socialism, the tence in several government depart- 26 Western Mail, 27 October 1951 deadly enemy of Liberalism and Free- ments, and his work at the Ministry of 27 Liverpool Daily Post, 7 December 1951   28 Ibid dom. The first duty of Liberals in this Fuel and Power during – , build- 29 NLW MS 22752C, f 38, James Callaghan to  election is the defeat of Socialism’. ing up and conserving the nation’s en- Megan Lloyd George, 31 December 1951 His return to the Commons coincided ergy supplies, was a major contribution 30 Gregynog Hall, Newtown, Liberal Party of with Megan’s defeat in Anglesey. to the success of the Allied war effort. Wales archive, Megan Lloyd George to W Schubert Jones, 5 November 1952. Churchill, evidently fully aware of his Upon attaining the position of Home 31 Columns from the Guardian and Western Mail administrative acumen and tactful ap- Secretary, he made the memorable com- cited in Jones, A Radical Life p 238 proach, immediately re-appointed ment, ‘Politicians are like monkeys. They 32 Cited ibid p 248 33 D E Butler, The British General Election of 1955 Lloyd-George to the sensitive position higher they climb, the more revolting are (London, 1955) p 61  of Minister of Food, where until  the parts they expose’ — a strange re- 34 Cited in Jones, A Radical Life p 249 he cautiously presided over the gradual mark from a Conservative Home Secre- 35 Liverpool Post and Mercury, 3 June 1929. See also Frances Lloyd George, The Years that are withdrawal of food rationing (which he tary and one who was the son of the Past (London, 1967) p 221 himself had helped to implement dur- arch-monkey himself. Yet Gwilym had 36 Cited in A H Booth, British Hustings, 1924– ing the war) and made economies in himself succeeded in climbing the 1950 (London, 1956) p 90 the bill for food imports. greasy pole of political life without for- 37 NLW MS 20,440D, no 1872, D Lloyd George to Margaret Lloyd George, ‘Wednesday’ [26 Au- In October , Churchill pro- feiting the respect and friendship of fel- gust 1931]. moted Lloyd-George to be Home Sec- low politicians or the goodwill and ad- 38 House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George retary and (the largely nominal) Minister miration of the British people. Papers I/I/3/22, MLG to DLG, 3 September 1931. for Welsh Affairs. Ironically, when the J. Graham Jones is an assistant Archivist at 39 The Times, 9 October 1931 monster petition of the Parliament for 40 Cited in his obituary ibid., 15 February 1967 the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth, Wales campaigners of the early fifties was 41 Roy Douglas, The History of the Liberal Party, currently responsible for the Welsh Political 1895–1970 (London, 1971) presented to parliament by the move- Archive. He is the author of A Pocket 42 Life with Lloyd George, p 134 diary entry for 6 ment’s indefatigable president, Lady Guide: The History of Wales () and November 1935 Megan Lloyd George, in , she 43 Ibid., p 135, diary entry for 14 November 1935 several articles on late nineteenth and twen- placed it in the hands of her brother. 44 See the News Chronicle, 2 November 1935, tieth century politics. where Gwilym estimated that the not insignifi- Under Anthony Eden, Lloyd-George cant sum of £100,000 had been expended on piloted through the House of Com- 1 Colin Cross (ed.), Life with Lloyd George: the the election campaign from the Lloyd George mons the  Homicide Act, a measure diary of A J Sylvester, 1931–1945 (London, Political Fund. The same point is made in Frank 1975) pp 206–207. Owen, Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, which somewhat modified the severity 2 See J Graham Jones, ‘Lady Megan’s first parlia- his life and times (London, 1954), p 692 of the law in murder cases. He generally mentary contest: the Anglesey election of 45 Life with Lloyd George, p 206 diary entry for 14 resisted the growing pressure for the 1929’, Transactions of the Anglesey Antiquar- April 1938. But cf. Owen op. Cit., p 694, ‘As a ian Society and Field Club, 1992, pp 107–122 rule, they got on splendidly, for Gwilym could abolition of capital punishment follow- 3 Evening News, 18 June 1945 calm the old man out of his most typhonic rage ing the public outcry over the infamous 4 North Wales Chronicle, 27 July 1945 by a funny story, delightfully acted’. Timothy Evans case, arguing for its re- 5 See the reports in the Holyhead Mail for June 46 Life with Lloyd George, p 304 and July 1945 tention as a deterrent and as a statement 47 Ibid.’ p 312–313, diary entry for 1 March 1943 6 Jo Grimond, Memoirs (London, 1979) p 149 48 Douglas, op. Cit. P 249 of society’s ‘moral revulsion for murder.’ 7 See NLW MS 20,475C, Atlee to Megan Lloyd 49 See his obituary notice in the Guardian 15 Feb- When Macmillan succeeded Eden in George, 4 September 1948 and 10 March 1949 ruary 1967  Lloyd George was unceremoni- 8 Jean Mann, Women In Parliament (London, 50 Cited in Douglas op. cit. P 249 1962) p 21 51 Cited in C Cooke, Sir Winston Churchill: a self- ously shunted off to the House of Lords 9 Caernarvon and Denbigh Herald, 7 December portrait (London, 1954) p 199 as the first Viscount Tenby. He accepted 1945 52 NLW MS 20475, no 3168, VB-C to MLG, 17 No- his fate with characteristic good grace 10 News Chronicle 20 December 1946 vember 1947 11 Liverpool Daily Post, 12 December 1948 53 NLW Clement Davies Papers J3/11, Sir and humour, and jested that the title 12 The Observer, 2 January 1949 Archibald Sinclair to Davies, 9 January 1950. I should have been ‘Stepaside’. Among the 13 The Times, 22 January 1949 am most grateful to Mr Stanley Clement-Davies wide array of public offices which Lord 14 Western Morning News, 12 January 1949 of London for his kind permission to consult his 15 House of Lords Record Office, Herbert Samuel Tenby filled during the last decade of his father’s papers. Papers A/130(30) 54 Ibid. J3/10, Davies to Sinclair, 6 January 1950 life were president of University Col- 16 Cited in Robert Pitman, What happened to the 55 See D Butler, The British General Election of lege, Swansea and chairman of the Liberals (Tribune pamphlet, 1951) 1951 (London, 1952) pp 93–94 Council on Tribunals. 17 Cited in Mervyn Jones, A Radical Life: the Biogra- 56 Election address of Gwilym Lloyd-George, 25 phy of Megan Lloyd George (London, 1991) p 213 October 1951 Gwilym Lloyd-George, Viscount 18 Cited ibid, p 214 57 Cited in Andrew Sweeting, ‘Gwilym Lloyd- Tenby, succeeded in carving out a dis- 19 The phrase is that used by Harold Macmillan, George, Viscount Tenby’ in Brack et al (ed) Dic- tinct niche for himself in political life, Tides of Fortune (London, 1969) p 352 tionary of Liberal Biography (London, 1998)

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 39 SDP Robert Maclennan was one of the original MPs who left the Labour Party to found the SDP, eventually becoming its third, and last, leader.Tony Little interviewed him during this year’s Liberal Democrat conference at Harrogate. BreakingBreaking thethe mould?mould?

n , twenty-nine Labour MPs and one Con TL: The seat you fought (Caithness and Sutherland) was Iservative, backed by some senior political figures held by a Liberal. who were not in Parliament, defected to the newly RM: It was. In  I defeated a Liberal by a mere formed Social Democratic Party. Their bold plan sixty-four votes. The choice of Caithness & Suther- was to break the mould of British two-party politics land had been mine. I had expressed an interest to and this led first to the Alliance with the Liberal the Labour Party in fighting that particular seat. It Party and eventually to merger and the formation of was in a part of the country I knew and cared for the Liberal Democrats. and had known for a very long time. Robert Maclennan was a leading figure in this TL: You seemed to have quite a fast rise in the Labour process. He first entered Parliament as Labour MP Party. In your first Parliament you became a PPS and then for Caithness & Sutherland at the general election of a junior minister. Were you ambitious? , defeating the Liberal incumbent George RM: I was ambitious to hold the seat at first because Mackie.He was one of the few MPs who defected I had a very small majority. The first job was to get to the SDP to hold onto his seat at the  general myself re-elected. After that, I had hoped that even- election. When the SDP membership voted for tually I would get involved in foreign affairs and be- merger with the Liberals, David Owen resigned as come a spokesman and eventually a minister. I had party leader, later opting to keep a ‘continuing SDP’ no doubt about that being an appropriate goal. But in being. Robert Maclennan was elected unopposed in the period following the  general election, at as leader of the SDP for the period of the merger which I did hold my seat, the issue of the European negotiations, and was joint leader of the new merged Community (as it then was) rose up to the surface. I party with David Steel until the election of Paddy felt very angered about the direction the Labour Ashdown in July . Party took. I really was putting my position as a ris- This background has given Robert Maclennan a ing young politician at risk, because I resigned from unique perspective from which to comment on the an Opposition Front Bench spokesmanship in , triumphs and disappointments of political defection quite early on. I had only been there for a couple of and to talk about the personal pain of leaving behind years and the whole period had been plagued by friends and achievements in one party to embark what I saw as an unfortunate and indeed an unac- into an uncertain future in another. ceptable U-turn on European union. TL: What brought you into politics in the first place? TL: You presumably participated in the referendum campaign? RM: A desire to improve the condition of our fellow RM: I did, and I was one of the sixty-nine MPs who human beings; a sense of anger at the low aspirations of voted against the party three-line whip on the issue politicians in government. I really became active in the of Europe along with Roy Jenkins and Shirley thirteen years of Conservative government after . Williams and others and that really was the begin- TL: Your choice of party, was it inevitably Labour? ning of my disaffection. So it started quite early in RM: Not absolutely inevitably. But it seemed to be the my Parliamentary life. party of the progressives in British politics at the time TL: In terms of defecting from Labour, was Roy Jenkins’ and the only vehicle through which one might hope to Dimbleby Lecture (delivered on  November ) the achieve one’s political goals. The Liberal party, which I crystallising factor for you? did consider, seemed to be so reduced and with so few RM: No, not altogether. In a sense to me, my conver- prospects of being even in a position of influence that it sion had occurred earlier. I was a junior minister in the seemed to me quite impossible to join it at that time. government of –. During that time I was con-

40 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 came very acrimonious after the general support. When I decided to make the election had been lost by the Labour gov- break and told the constituency, the ernment. It became increasingly a break SDP was not yet formally in being. The between friends, many of whom shared Council for Social Democracy (CSD) the same objections to the tendency of had been formed, and indeed the the party. In addition there were the Limehouse Declaration had been made, moves towards de-selection against indi- but it was only a signal that we were vidual MPs in their constituencies and likely to break. The response to the for- then there was an appalling conference in mation of the CSD was so immense Blackpool in the autumn of . And and positive that the bringing into be- that actually was for me the break point. I ing of the SDP had to be advanced. told my constituency party that I would TL: But that suggests there was always a not stand again as a Labour candidate if plan to have a separate party. the policies which had been adopted at RM: There was a contingency plan to do that autumn conference were to become so. If we had not evoked such sympathy Robert Maclennan MP the policies on which the Labour Party and support we might have remained as a fought the next election. cerned about the role of the trades union separate faction within Labour. movement, particularly in relation to the TL: How did they react? TL: A relatively small number of Labour conduct of economic policy at the Treas- RM: Most of them were rather sup- MPs compared to the total size of the party ury under Denis Healy. I thought their portive and agreed with my general joined at the beginning. Was that a disap- bullying tactics were unacceptable and I view about the monstrousness of what pointment? became more and more disenchanted had been done. with the class politics of the Labour Party. RM: No, not at all. I think we were ac- I was doing a job which I thought was TL: Was this backing at constituency level tually pleased that we got so many on important within the government and I unusual amongst those who defected? the very first day, I think twelve if I re- thought it was right to get on with the RM: I was unusual in several respects. member rightly. By the end it was job, but at the same I was very disturbed First of all, I had made my declaration twenty-nine. That was a pretty good about the corporatism, if you like, of the long before anyone else had. It was unu- tally. The pressures against leaving a Labour Party and the fact that all the time sual in that there was a very considerable party are very strong. The uncertainty the trades unions were trying to call the degree of understanding and agreement about whether one survives as a politi- shots and dictate where the public interest and support for my position and after- cian are immense. And you have to be lay. I did not really believe that was appro- wards when I did leave the Labour Party prepared to accept the probability that priate. Even before the Dimbleby Lec- many of the people in the management you will not survive. committee of the Labour Party in the ture, I had really decided before that if a TL: There was a lot of criticism by the La- constituency went with me. A third went new party was formed, I would join it. I bour Party then that those who did defect immediately and another third followed had talked to Roy Jenkins in the period were not prepared immediately to offer them- shortly thereafter. I had talked very between  and the general election of selves for re-election. openly with my agent about the situation. May . I used to go to Brussels quite a RM: We did discuss that and I would have And I kept the public informed. lot as a junior minister dealing with issues been willing to stand again but I thought of agricultural prices because I was con- TL: Did you find it a very painful experi- the consensus was that it would have sumer minister and I attended Council of ence, given that you had been in the Labour been quite selfish so to do, because I was Ministers’ meetings. I often saw Roy and Party so long? in a position where I felt in my bones that exchanged views with him about the RM: In one sense, obviously, it was the pubic was with me and would prob- state of play and the state of mind of many painful to break with people, many of ably have re-elected me. But I recognised members of the Parliamentary Labour whom I liked personally, many of that there were other constituencies Party. So my mind had moved to the pos- whom shared my views about policies where support for the Labour Party was sibility of a break. but were not able for one reason or an- instinctual and almost hereditary, where it TL: To what extent was there coordination other to make the break but I never had would not have been so and I thought we among the disaffected Labour MPs at that any pain however in leaving the institu- should all behave in the same way. So far time? tion of the Labour Party. I do not think as the constitutional position was con- RM: There was no coordination. There I have ever regarded a political party as cerned, I had been elected as a Labour was an exchange of views with people an institution to which personal attach- MP, it is true, but I had also made plain my continuously. There were all kinds of lit- ment should be given, as it if it were views on issues of policy and they were tle factions and organisations within the some form of religious creed. A party is very far removed from those which the Labour Party and I was seriously con- only valid as a means to obtain political Labour Party spent a lot of time making cerned about the way the party was go- ends and once it ceases to enable you to great play. And indeed very far from the ing. Of course it all accelerated and be- do so, it is only rational to withdraw manifesto on which we had fought the  election.

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 41 TL: There was a considerable amount of ecutive committee, the arrangements for went down to the unit of the constitu- sympathy from the public to the formation of assemblies and so forth. ency. But the Federal constitution which the SDP. Was that a surprise to the people was developed for the Liberal Democrats TL: When you were doing that, you were involved? was really building on the thinking of the obviously setting out to do something that RM: I think it was a surprise. We were SDP. We had a number of things which was very different from the Labour Party’s very pleased and recognised that what we carried on, for example the appeals proc- constitution, but how much was that your had been saying about the readiness of the ess to avoid disputes having to be decided own work and how much the ideas of a country to break away from the old two- by committees when they really were es- group of like-minded people? party politics was not just an expression of sentially quasi-judicial matters. RM: It was pretty much my own work. I hope; it was a diagnosis of a condition. did have the assistance of Will Goodhart, TL: When the SDP was formed, was there a TL: Did the enthusiasm mean that the contin- who actually was the lawyer who drafted common decision of the group of MPs that gency plans really were not adequate, that the the document, but I prepared the brief they would approach local Liberals and seek thing took off faster than you could cope with? and took it through the decision-mak- an Alliance? RM: No, not at all. The initial enthusi- ing steering committee of the party. RM: I think that varied from individual asm and the huge response from the to individual. In some parts of the TL: You were involved in drafting the consti- public which flooded in gave us all country the Liberals were not very tution of the Liberal Democrats as well. Did wings. We really did set up the organisa- strong and that was part of the reason you find there were lessons from the drafting tional structure very quickly, engaging why the SDP was a separate party. In of the SDP constitution of things to avoid or people to work with us. We drafted an some areas they were rather stronger things to bring in? initial constitution and we had great and we naturally gravitated into talks RM: Not altogether. The situation was a success in the arrangements for the with each other. But it was the situation little different. Some of the best features of early conferences for which we trav- on the ground really that determined the SDP constitution we retained. But elled the length and breadth of the what was the sensible thing to do. some of them had been necessities for the country. The whole development was moment when we were a growing party TL: So in your own case, presumably there almost spontaneously enthusiastic and and were not necessary when we united was a reasonably strong Liberal Party in people gave enormous amounts of time with the Liberals. For example, we had Caithness and Sutherland? and money to make it work. had as a basic unit of organisation in the RM: It was more of a strong Liberal tra- TL: What part did you play yourself in the SDP the area party, which straddled con- dition than a strong Liberal Party. Actu- setting up of the organisation? stituencies. This was in order to enable the ally they had not fielded a candidate RM: I played quite a big part in it. I was membership which was active on the against me at the previous general elec- present at the launch of the CSD. I went ground in one constituency to help the tion. So they were not all that strong or- to Scotland as the only Scottish Member formation of parties in other constituen- ganisationally and there was never any of Parliament associated with this move cies, or at least to attract members and en- question of putting a Liberal candidate to carry the flag there. I drafted the initial sure there was activity. It also helped to up against me as I understand. The gen- document which really was the consti- have this structure when it came to nego- eral picture in the country was of the tution of the CSD, and then took par- tiating seats during the Alliance with the SDP being stronger in areas where the ticular responsibility for the constitution Liberals, deciding which party would Liberals had not been strong. It was a of the SDP which set up the structures, stand in which seat. But that was no complementary relationship in many the policy committee, the national ex- longer required when we merged and we parts. There were areas where there were difficulties, obviously, but I participated in the discussions with the Liberals on Founding the new party: David Steel and Robert Maclennan. the sharing of seats for the Parliamentary elections in Scotland and we really man- aged it without serious ructions. And I think at the end of the day, most people were satisfied. Some people had to make sacrifices but they did so with a rather good will. For some it paid off. Jim Wallace, for example, had been selected or was expected to be selected as the Liberal candidate for Dumfries but he made way for the SDP. He was shortly thereafter selected to stand for Orkney and Shetland. TL: There were those who came with you from the Parliamentary Labour Party and

42 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 those who had sympathy but who did not TL: Do you see it as a great achievement vote. It was also a tragedy that so many defect. Was there work put in to try and con- that the founding of the SDP eventually good people were not elected. We had vert more people? forced the Labour Party to reform? not learned about targeting seats. Per- RM: Members of the new party were RM: I certainly think that it had a be- haps we did not have the resources to do very sensitive to people who might neficent impact upon politics as a whole even that. We certainly did not make the share their ideas but were in different and that it did have an impact primarily breakthrough we had hoped for but we situations on the ground in their own on the Labour Party in moving them did establish a bridgehead from which it constituencies and we really did not away from the appalling class-based poli- was possible to go on and build, and it proselytise amongst our friends. We tics which had scarified the scene in this was a seminal point in the history of the continued to be friendly and if they country for too long. But the Labour Liberal Democrats. We were not wiped wanted to talk to us, of course we Party was not totally converted by our out. We were able to build on the narrow talked. And that did lead to a gradual activities and the basic Liberalism of the base and carry forward the process increase in the ranks of the SDP in Par- Liberal Democrats is something which which in many ways was perhaps liament between  and  which they are incapable of feeling any affinity stronger for having gone through a pe- was very heartening. But there were to. They are collectivist. They are riod of adversity. some people who took it very badly. centralist. They are basically bossy. They TL: At what point did it dawn that it was Some who were genuinely outraged by think they know what is best for every- necessary to have the merger? what we had done. There were some one. They are not drawn to libertarian RM: I think there were some people who were less outraged but regarded us positions. They do not see the individual who thought quite early on that it as something of a threat and as casting a as the person whom we politicians are in would make sense. reflection on their unwillingness to business to protect. There were others make the same move. So there was a They are too ready A political party is not who felt that it range of different responses. to subscribe to the might happen and tyranny of the ma- some form of religious TL: Was this an ideological split, with hos- perhaps that it jority. tility from left-wingers? creed. It is only valid as a should happen but RM: No, the left-wingers in most cases TL: Whilst it would means to obtaining that it should not be wrote us off. Some of them even went so not be fair to character- political ends. rushed. I was cer- far as to say we had done the honest ise his views in that tainly in that camp thing; that we should never have been in way, one gets the im- myself. Others were the Labour Party anyway. The real prob- pression that David Owen was never drawn totally opposed to it and that response lem was with the centre and the centre- to Liberalism in the way you have just de- led to the split within the SDP after the right, people like Roy Hattersley, who scribed it.  election. I thought it would be bet- despite his evident disagreement with RM: No, I think that is probably true ter if it was not a shotgun wedding, and the direction of the Labour Party, felt with the benefit of hindsight. He was not that the hearts and minds of the SDP that it was treacherous to leave it; that it at heart a liberal with a small ‘l’. He cer- and Liberals should be seen to be well was an institution that should command tainly was not a Liberal with a capital ‘L’. and truly committed to it. So I favoured our loyalty even when it erred. a more gradualist approach than that TL: Did that create problems for you as an which was adopted by the two parties in TL: How did that hostility reflect itself? SDP group? the referendum. But once the members RM: To some extent in the barracking RM: It created immense problems after had expressed their view, it was quite one faced in the House of Commons, the  election. Even before that clear it was a democratic decision fairly in the general hostility of manner and election, there were tensions which and properly arrived at, and the impor- in public denunciations. I suppose it stemmed from his very strong personal- tant thing was to make it work and work eased off gradually but it took an aw- ity and his unwillingness, in truth, to well. It was also very important to estab- fully long while to disappear. Perhaps it work with people when they disagreed lish as a basis for the new party never totally disappeared but as the La- with him at all, Liberals and Social understandings and agreements about bour Party reformed itself there was a Democrats. A lot of people admired how that new party would operate. That slight tendency on the part of some of him hugely for his energy, his commit- was why there were such tough discus- those people not to understand why we ment, his readiness for change and he sions prior to the formal agreement fol- all did not throw our hands in the air was a man of great charismatic personal lowing the referendum. We had a long and say ‘Wonderful; time to go home’. qualities but the political philosophy and rather arduous process of beating They did not seem to appreciate how which informed his stances was always our heads together to reach agreement events had moved on. Some of them, a little hard to detect. on the constitution of the new party. like Roy Hattersley, were even left be- TL: There must have been huge disappoint- This was a matter of real significance and hind inside the new Labour Party. It is ment at the result of the  general election it did ultimately lay the foundations for rather curious how that group neither within the SDP? the organisation we have today. Ours is a fitted into the post- party nor into RM: It was an amazing achievement to very strong and very democratic party the post- party. have more than a quarter of the popular with decentralisation in a federal sense

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 43 which honours and values the individual Owen and who had the belief that Brit- man beings that have a birth, a life and a membership as sovereign. It is both effi- ish politics could be changed by an indi- death. That whole concept is a non- cient and deliberative in its approach to vidual. For them, he was that man. That sense; although it may have been help- policy-making. These were issues which was never a view to which I subscribed. ful in shaping the book. Beginnings and were very important in my mind be- ends in history are often difficult to TL: Was the break-up of the SDP actually a cause I had felt there had been some point to. There is a continuity, a flow, of more painful experience than your defection weaknesses in the old Liberal Party which the SDP was a part. Many peo- from Labour? which had led to policy lurches which ple in the Labour Party – and I suspect, RM: Certainly for some people it was. I had damaged the public perception of not least, Tony Blair – were influenced was very unhappy about it indeed, be- the Liberal Party as a consistent party. I by the thinking of the SDP. They had cause I had put a lot of creative energy felt you had to give the members of the also noticed the spectacular public sup- into the SDP. I was both angry with party a real opportunity to participate port for it when it was launched. They David Owen and somewhat despairing and that those who did should be prop- no doubt wanted to replicate that ef- of the folly of my fellows who had erly prepared for the conferences and fect. I think it gave some the idea that shown so little regard for the demo- properly representative of their constitu- you really could draw a line under the cratic processes of our party. They had encies; that deci- past and re-present yourself, which is campaigned on the sions should not be what Blair and New Labour have done. slogan of ‘one just taken as a result New Labour is not an There have certainly been innovations member one vote’ of the happenstance which the SDP brought into politics SDP Mark II. The SDP but when the result if you just turned which have been copied by Labour. For went against them, up at a conference. cared about social instance, the SDP was the first party to they felt they were put its membership onto a computer TL: The overwhelm- justice. entitled to try and database and we used public relations ing majority in the smash the whole advisers much more than any party had Liberal Party voted for the merger and very process. So, yes, there was a good deal of done before. We did go in for some few, whatever their misgivings, decided to drop bitterness and that took quite a time to sample polling. We did things which are out. Why was not that the case with the eradicate. But the new party, despite the now taken completely for granted. In SDP? appalling difficulties of the year – organisational terms the SDP was a RM: There was a significant loss of , during which I was joint leader modern party. In ideological terms we membership to David Owen’s ‘continu- with David Steel, actually did establish did contribute to the smashing of the ing SDP’; probably as much as a third of important foundations and in the local class base of British politics, which had the total membership did not join the elections in the spring we did not do as dominated it. Notwithstanding the ex- new party. And it was very much with badly as people feared we might. In fact istence of the Liberal Party, British poli- that third in mind that I had been advo- we did remarkably well, considering. tics was still a class-based war which cating taking the hurdles slowly, but I TL: Do you agree that one of David Owen’s was being fought between two princi- lost that debate and I then had to recog- ideas was that of the ‘virtual’ political party pal players. That is no longer true today. nise that there was a new situation. I re- which could exist as a central entity, propa- gretted that loss of membership and TL: So is New Labour an SDP Mark II, or gandise by television but which did not need David Owen was very largely responsi- are there still fundamental differences? people working on the streets and in the con- ble for that. He personified the SDP and RM: It is not an SDP Mark II. The SDP stituencies; contrasting with Liberal thinking? I think he demonised the Liberals. He had a touch of the old Labour Party RM: When he separated himself from the did not recognise how much there was a about it. It cared about social justice. It SDP and went off on his own, pretending genuine coming together on new did not have Thatcherite beliefs, al- to be the surviving SDP, he tried his theo- ground between the two parties. though David Owen sometimes used ries out on the electorate and he did spec- Thatcherite rhetoric. The membership TL: What was the cause of this split within tacularly badly. I don’t believe there was of the SDP was genuinely more plural- the relatively newly formed SDP? Was it any merit in what he was saying. ist than is New Labour. The SDP from ideological as with the fights that had caused TL: Looking back from today, do you think the very beginning took a strong line people to leave Labour? the breakaway of the SDP influenced the re- on constitutional reform. This brought RM: It was very much more personal- form of Labour or do you think Labour it on to the agenda. Although the Lib- ised. There was a small element of ideol- would have come to its senses and trans- erals had been in favour of many of ogy in it. At that time David Owen was formed in the way it did anyway? these reforms, the support of the SDP more of a central European social demo- RM: I think it is very hard to say. I have for them gave a cutting edge to the de- crat, perhaps, and less of a liberal demo- seen it argued by Anthony King and bate and gave a new impetus to the is- crat, with concerns about individual Ivor Crewe in their book on the life sue. While it has been a Labour govern- freedom. But I really think it was very and death of the SDP * that it made no ment which has delivered on some of largely a personal pull he exerted on the difference. I think they are profoundly these issues, one has felt a certain lack of members. There were some members wrong and I have told them so. I do not who were, frankly, attracted to David believe that political parties are like hu- concluded on page 50

44 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 New Labour In 1995, John Dickie, Liberal Democrat councillor in Camden and Federal Executive member, quit the party and joined Labour. Neil Stockley relates the story of this defection to Labour. AA progressive’sprogressive’s dilemmadilemma

n November , John Dickie quietly ap bour Club and had eventually become recognised Iproached the Labour Whip on Camden Council by the national party and generally acknowledged as and calmly said, ‘I’d like to join the Labour Party.’ In the principal centre-left grouping. Likewise, Dickie that moment he suddenly ended his twelve years’ in- believed that the SDP-Liberal Alliance could dis- tense involvement with the SDP and the Liberal place Labour as the main centre-left force and win Democrats, during most of which he had regarded power. In the mid-s, this was by no means in- Labour as saddled with ideological baggage. credible. Labour had just suffered a massive defeat The switch did not result from any major and, still a doctrinaire socialist party, was making lit- changes in his political beliefs. Dickie is clear that tle headway. In the cut-and-thrust of media politics, he believes as strongly as ever that government Neil Kinnock was frequently eclipsed by the SDP should play an active role in promoting a strong, ef- Leader, David Owen. ficient economy and a fairer society. What had changed, as he saw it, was the political environ- The Liberal Democrats ment. The question had always been one of strategy. By the end of the s, this strategy was all but de- What was the best vehicle to make his political stroyed. First, the  general election saw Labour views a reality? For Dickie, the answer, once so confirmed as the leading centre-left party. Second, clearly the centre parties, was now Labour. the merger of the SDP and Liberal Party turned into a debacle. Dickie supported the move, in order to The SDP ensure the survival of his brand of politics. The fail- John Dickie became politically aware during his late ure of the Alliance’s ‘dual leadership’ had proved to teens. In the  general election, during his A- him that keeping two parties with separate identities level year, he delivered leaflets for the SDP candidate was not a viable strategy. Third, the new party got off in Morecambe and Lonsdale. At that time, the SDP to a bad start. It had dismal ratings in the opinion appeared to be the only party he could support. polls. In the  elections for the European Parlia- Whilst Labour had a ‘strong social concern’, he ment, the Liberal Democrats came fourth, polling could not accept its shift to the far left, which in- well behind the Greens. Dickie, like many others, cluded such polices as the nationalisation of key in- now believed that a divided ‘centre-left’ had no dustries, unilateral nuclear disarmament and with- chance of defeating the Conservatives. drawal from the Common Market. Dickie believed Despite all this, he remained determined to that the Thatcher Government was making some ‘make the merger work’. In part, this was an emo- long-overdue changes to Britain’s economic and in- tional, almost tribal commitment: he wanted to dustrial structures. But he was appalled at its lack of prove the anti-merger SDP members wrong. concern for the social downsides. As for the Liberals, Dickie now concedes that he could have joined ‘they simply didn’t register in Morecambe.’ Labour and backed Neil Kinnock’s drive to scrap At Oxford, Dickie became a committed SDP ac- the party’s most doctrinaire policies. But, at the tivist — President of the SDP Club, Student Union time, Labour still seemed ‘too left-inclined’. In the Secretary and Alliance candidate for the Student Liberal Democrats, there were large numbers of Union presidency. He gained a new perspective on people who shared his brand of ‘sensible politics.’ political strategy from the history of Oxford’s stu- The new party stood for the sorts of economic and dent politics. The social democrats had frequently social policies he had supported most strongly in broken away from the ‘extreme left’-dominated La- the SDP and the Alliance. Now an activist in

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 45 Hampstead and Highgate, he worked those he regarded as troublesome government.’ The congenial ‘tribe’ to hard to ensure that the Liberal Demo- councillors. But he was still a ‘tribal’ which he had been so loyal now crats survived. Liberal Democrat and, indeed, more of seemed more like an irrelevant sect. an ‘activist’ than ever. He became Treas- Realignment urer of the Party in England, a member Life with Labour By , like many Liberal Democrats, of the Federal Executive, the Federal Leaving the party in which he had in- Dickie hoped for a hung parliament, Conference Committee and numerous vested so much time and energy was un- which would put the party in a position policy working groups, and, in May doubtedly a traumatic experience. of influence. But the Conservatives’ , a councillor in Camden. Friendships with a few Liberal Demo- fourth victory in a row left him deeply crats became ‘a little strained’, in part be- depressed for the future of centre-left New Labour cause they were no longer sustained by politics. In particular, Dickie despaired John Dickie’s decision to change par- shared experiences. On the whole, how- at the split in the anti-Tory vote. He ties can be directly traced to Septem- ever, Dickie believes his Lib Dem friends strongly backed Paddy Ashdown’s call, ber , when Tony Blair became respect his decision, however strongly in May , for Liberal Democrats to leader of the Labour Party. Blair im- they disagreed and tried to dissuade him. ‘work with others to assemble the ideas mediately, set about shifting his party On joining Labour, Dickie did not at- around which a non-socialist alterna- on to the electoral ‘middle ground’, tack the Liberal Democrats in public. He tive to the Conservatives can be con- making huge changes to the party’s is firm that he divulged no party secrets; structed.’ Dickie then became one of policies, image and strategy that were nor was he asked to do so by his new the party’s most enthusiastic advocates more radical than anything Kinnock comrades. Four years on, he retains some of cooperation and ‘realignment’ on the had attempted. Blair rapidly domi- affection and a strong interest in the Lib- centre-left. nated the media and political agenda. eral Democrats. Indeed, many of his In , with such former SDP col- ‘New Labour’ was born. friends and business associates are active leagues as Tom McNally and Dick Dickie saw his reasons for staying party members. To take the divorce anal- Newby, he co-founded The Reformer, an with the Liberal Democrats rapidly dis- ogy further, it is almost as if the former internal Liberal Democrat journal, to appearing. He still agreed with many spouses remain good friends. make the case for realignment. In a se- Liberal Democrat principles and poli- Within the Labour Party, Dickie con- ries of forthright editorials, Dickie ar- cies. But he could see no real differ- centrates on his role with the Labour gued that if neither Labour nor the ences between Blair’s political aims and Group on Camden Council. In , he Liberal Democrats could win on their the original reasons he had joined the was elected for a safe Labour ward and is own, then the two parties should work SDP. For him, there was a social demo- now vice-chair of Camden’s Finance together wherever possible. In time, this cratic party that could win power. It and Education committees. He finds the could lead to a new party configura- was ‘New Labour’. Labour was no Labour Party ‘more political, more tion, with most progressives living un- longer out in left field. Its politics were policy-oriented’ than the Liberal der one political roof. Under this sce- now his politics. The Liberal Democrats Democrats. Blair in government is nario, he suggested, the Conservatives’ did not need to replace ‘Old Labour’, in ‘pretty much’ delivering his personal hegemony could be ended. A political order to deliver the type of policies brand of politics. But Dickie clearly party, he argued should be a ‘vehicle for Dickie believed in. New Labour would wishes that he could again be in the achieving power and implementing its do that anyway. Of course, the Liberal same party as many Liberal Democrats, policies, not a talking shop’. And he Democrats might work with Blair. The with whom he sees mostly ‘contrived’ ridiculed the notion that the party party system could change. But, then political differences, and believes that the should embark on a new ‘long march’ and there, social democracy had a new political realignment that started in  to power, arguing that, unlike Liberals and exciting opportunity. has not yet finished. in s Britain, ‘Mao had a map’. Dickie’s decision to join Labour ap- Dickie has few regrets about his de- Even at this stage, Dickie had no de- pears to have been as much an emo- fection. He admits to some feelings of sire to change parties. He perceived tional as an intellectual process. He re- guilt for not letting his federal party John Smith, who succeeded Kinnock as calls the year following Blair’s election activity slowly ebb away before he Labour’s leader in , as ‘decent and as Labour leader as others would the quit. But for John Dickie, the bottom capable’ but ‘representing the past, not slow death of a marriage, with memo- line is his firm belief that in switching the future’. True, he had frustrations ries of ‘restlessness, confusion, angst.’ By to Labour he did ‘the correct and hon- with the Liberal Democrats, most nota- the time of the Liberal Democrat con- est thing.’ bly over the party’s culture of decen- ference in September , he felt tralisation. This came to a head in , more and more detached from the Neil Stockley is former Director of Policy for with the allegations of racism by the party. ‘We were sitting there passing all the Liberal Democrats, and a work colleague Liberal Democrat group in Tower these policies but the real world was of John Dickie. Hamlets. Dickie was depressed by the facing a choice between Major’s Tories fact that the party could not expel and a modernising, social democrat

46 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 ments (as Solicitor-General, Attorney- General and Home Secretary), and his dealings with his new party, the Liberal ReviewsReviews Nationals, are more sketchily treated, presumably because of the relative shortage of records. Dutton also does probably the best job anyone could of persuading his readers that Simon’s failures were not Nobody believed he believed all his own fault. No British govern- ment of any make-up, for example, David Dutton: Simon: A political biography of Sir would not have adopted the policy of appeasement in the s and ’s — John Simon (Aurum Press Ltd, 1992) there were simply too many reasons, Reviewed by Duncan Brack including military and economic weakness, and a genuine desire to right the wrongs of Versailles, for any other hat are we to make of John I had not appreciated that Simon course to have been credibly pursued. WSimon? In common, probably, was perhaps one of the most puzzling But it is not always easy to under- with most Liberal Democrats, before Liberal politicians of the mid-twenti- stand why Simon did what he did, reading this book I knew little more eth century. He occupied a unique though this partly becomes clearer about him that the fact that he led the collection of offices – the Home when one reaches the last chapter of Liberal National break-away from the Office (twice), the Treasury, the the book, ‘The Man’. Why, for exam- official Liberals in  – a group of Foreign Office and the Woolsack – ple, did he resign from the cabinet in MPs who opposed the Labour Govern- and, along with Winston Churchill,  over conscription, a position ment of the time, joined the National shared the distinction of being the only almost wholly at odds with his later Government in  and in due course man to have sat in the cabinet at the career? Why did he become so antago- merged into the Conservative Party – outbreak of both world wars. But nistic to Labour, and to Lloyd George, and a couple of quotes about him by despite these obvious indicators of throughout the s that he was Lloyd George (‘Simon has sat on the ability, intelligence and hard work, one prepared to break with his party in fence for so long that the iron has cannot really call him a political June ? Dutton chronicles the entered into his soul’; ‘I do object to this success. He achieved relatively little in events meticulously but I did not intolerable self-righteousness ... Greater his periods in the Home Office (– always feel that I really understood men ... have done it in the past  and –), and was almost a why Simon did what he did. [changed their views on a major issue], disaster at the Foreign Office (– Perhaps this is because Simon himself but ... they, at any rate, did not leave ) and little better at the Treasury was a difficult man to understand. As behind them the slime of hypocrisy in (–). He was listed second after Dutton notes, Simon’s autobiography passing from one side to another’.) Neville Chamberlain in the famous was largely unrevealing, and his surviv- polemical tract, Guilty Men, as one of ing private papers contain none of the the politicians whose personal short- private and family correspondence comings and attachment to the policy which could have revealed his real of appeasement led directly to the character. Even his diary was written, crisis of . Only as Lord Chancellor apparently, with an eye to the political (–) did Simon serve with any record. There are, of course, many clues: real distinction, finding at the end of his upbringing as an only child; the his career the niche which his legal devastating effect of the death of his first training and ability suited him for. wife in ; his formidable intellect, David Dutton’s biography provides which led him to see perhaps too a very thorough chronicle of Simon’s clearly the benefits, and the drawbacks, career, though its coverage is perhaps a of all potential courses of action; his little uneven. While his period as legal training, which gave him the Foreign Secretary, including the ability to argue anyone’s case but seems Manchurian crisis of – and the possibly to have removed any tendency World Disarmament Conference of to believe in one. –, are analysed virtually memo- Above all, as Dutton brings out randum by memorandum and speech clearly, he had three major failings as a by speech, other aspects of his career, politician. He lacked warmth and an including his time in Asquith’s govern- ability to inspire affection, but too often

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 47 tried too hard to pretend he had them intellect’, noted a New Statesman writer, at attending international gatherings, — one of the most commonly told of ‘for the answer which his heart should particularly the United Nations, where all anecdotes about him was his habit of supply’. Bevan put it more simply: pro-Soviet propaganda was heard loud slapping someone convivially on the ‘nobody believed he believed’. and clear and went unchallenged by back and then calling them by the These, at the end, were his fatal Western diplomats. He wanted a wrong name. He was fatally indecisive, drawbacks, the reasons why he has ‘sustained world-wide anti-Commu- time after time presenting beautifully gone down in history as a failure nist propaganda offensive’ which argued options to cabinet without despite his glittering array of offices, would ‘stress the weakness of Commu- indicating his own preference. What he achieved without any obvious advan- nism, not its strength’ and reveal Russia liked, said Lloyd George, was that tages of birth. ‘There is a sense,’ con- as ‘a poor, backward, devastated someone else should present him with a cludes Dutton, ‘ in which the great country with ridiculous pretensions of decision and then he could put up a barrister who won so many cases for being a ‘liberator’ and ‘the wave of the brilliant case for it. And finally, he lacked others lost his own’. As a political future’. This offensive was particularly belief. ‘Too penetrating a discernment history, this book is interesting. As aimed at developing countries, which and too frail a conviction’, as Eden said. political pyschology it is fascinating. Mayhew feared would fall under the ‘We see him pitifully seeking with his Duncan Brack Communist spell all too easily if Soviet propaganda was not countered. The IRD provided factual back- ground briefings on matters such as justice, the collectivisation of agricul- Cold War politics ture, and the Sovietisation of eastern Europe for journalists, academics, diplomats, politicians, broadcasters and Christopher Mayhew: A War of Words: A Cold War others sympathetic to the department’s witness (I. B. Tauris, 1998) aims and also published a number of Reviewed by Robert Ingham books and pamphlets. Mayhew had hoped that the IRD could also sell the achievements of British social democ- racy and effectively counter Soviet hristopher Mayhew was one of with left-wing elements of the labour propaganda about the British Empire, the rare breed of politicians movement. Mayhew had no time for C but practical difficulties were encoun- about whom it can be claimed that his apologists for Marxism or the Soviet tered, not least in persuading White- political principles were his sole guide Union. Not only had he seen for hall’s mandarins that these efforts throughout his career. A talented himself the restrictions on personal would be worthwhile. Mayhew administrator who combined a freedom and the harsh economic recounts the problems encountered in passion for action with the capacity conditions of the Soviet Union. He had trying to get the scrupulously inde- for original thought, his insistence on also experienced the tactics used by pendent BBC to accept and use IRD defending unfashionable causes Communists to gain influence within material, as well as the interest shown probably cost him the higher office the Labour Party and was convinced in foreign embassies in the IRD’s his talents deserved. He was a vigor- that the leadership of the Soviet Union work. The IRD preceded work by the ous opponent of Communism at a was doing everything in its power to US to counter Soviet propaganda and time when Communists and fellow subvert and, ultimately, destroy, the Mayhew is surely justified in claiming travellers were influential within the economically and politically free that ‘the IRD can probably claim a Labour movement. He defended the countries of the West. He detected signs modest share of the credit for stem- Arabs at a time when many leading of Soviet ideological warfare in even ming and turning back the Soviet politicians and commentators were ostensibly friendly organisations such as ideological offensive’. Zionists. He was one of the few the British-Soviet Friendship Society The second strand of Mayhew’s book ministers to have resigned his post and pioneered the West’s counter-attack, concerns his efforts in the mid-s to because of a political disagreement the ‘War of Words’ referred to in the title replace Communist-led British/Soviet with his colleagues, concerning of Mayhew’s posthumous volume of cultural organisations with bodies run Britain’s role east of Suez. And he memoirs. by the British Council and the Foreign forewarned of the growing Trotskyist ‘War of Words’ is an account of Office. The Communist-led organisa- infiltration of the Labour Party and three different aspects of Mayhew’s tions, such as the British-Soviet Friend- joined the Liberal Party when his crusade against Communism. The first ship Society, organised most of the warnings went unheeded, in . aspect was the establishment, on cultural exchanges between the two It was his anti-Communism, which, Mayhew’s suggestion, of the Informa- countries in the early and mid s, unusually for Labour politicians at that tion Research Department (IRD) particularly as ‘peaceful coexistence’ was time, dated back to his university days, within the Foreign Office in . The promoted as a strategy for dealing with that made Mayhew most unpopular IRD arose from Mayhew’s frustration

48 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 the West by the Soviet regime after department’s archives began to be of England, where they had to concen- Stalin’s death. Mayhew found that the opened up in the mid-s. He also trate votes. And, it had reminded the Communist-led friendship bodies aimed to tackle those scholars of the electorate that to get rid of sitting Tory grossly exaggerated the strength of Cold War who have explained the MPs they would have to vote tactically. Communism in the UK and he conflict in terms of policy mistakes and That is what happened in . The doubted whether Marxism could misunderstandings by two mutually Liberal Democrats targeted winnable genuinely live in ‘peaceful coexistence’ suspicious but not necessarily antagonis- seats, especially in the south and west, with its capitalist foe. The story of how tic powers, an approach Mayhew firmly and campaigned hard for the tactical Mayhew tackled Khruschev, Bulganin rejected. War of Words is a novel, interest- vote in seats all over the country, where and their British supporters head-on ing and convincing addition to the Labour was already in third place. As a and succeeded is one of the most bibliography of the Cold War, as well as a result, the largest number of seats was entertaining parts of this book. valuable account of the influence of obtained for the Liberal Democrats Finally, Mayhew gives an account of Communism over both the Labour and since  — on a lower percentage of his opposition to unilateralism, both Liberal Parties, and a stimulating auto- the poll than had been achieved in the within Gaitskell’s Labour Party and biographical account which supplements previous general election. within the Liberal Party. He sheds new Mayhew’s  volume Time to Explain. Emma Nicholson was born into a light on the defence debate within the The book was published posthumously Conservative background. Her father Liberal/SDP Alliance, saving one or two – Mayhew died in January  – and was a Tory MP. But there were other mildly sarcastic remarks for David Steel owes much to Lyn Smith’s unobtrusive political traditions in her family. Her and Paddy Ashdown: one of this book’s editing. Perhaps its greatest fault is its great-grandfather William Nicholson few disappointments is that Mayhew price – £ for less than  pages – but had been Liberal MP for Petersfield in does not say more on this subject. that certainly represents better value for the late th century. Perhaps this is one Mayhew set out to counter criticism money than the dull, self-serving of the reasons Emma Nicholson is able of the work of the IRD written by pro- memoirs of many politicians. to record that on joining the Liberal Communist journalists when the Robert Ingham Democrats she felt as if she had ‘come home’. Nicholson Toryism was of the traditional, gradualist, non-dogmatic variety. Like his daughter, Emma Nicholson’s father also fell out with his Coming home party, abstaining in the vote condemn- ing President Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and thus running the Emma Nicholson: Secret Society, Inside – and risk of de-selection. The book mentions Outside – the Conservative Party (Indigo, 1996) another Tory MP who did lose the Reviewed by Graham Lippiatt support of his constituency association over the same issue, Emma’s near namesake but no relation, Nigel n his recently published autobiogra the Political Honours Scrutiny Com- Nicolson. Oddly, although she describes Iphy, John Major – our last Prime mittee had recommended otherwise. him as a friend, he is referred to as MP Minister, if you are having trouble John Major must have wished he for Sevenoaks when he actually sat for placing the name – predicts that, against could have dismissed the Emma Bournemouth East. Nevertheless, the background of her defection to the Nicholson phenomenon so easily as he identifying with Tory dissenters like her Liberal Democrats in December , does in his book back in –. As it father and Nigel Nicolson, clearly ‘Emma [Nicholson] will be forgotten’. was, according to The Times, her helped Emma Nicholson loosen the Given her election to the European defection provided the Liberal Demo- tribal ties of political party. Getting Parliament in , Emma Nicholson crats ‘a dazzling firework display’ and punched in the stomach by a ‘fellow’ seems set to stay in the public eye for a lent credibility to the party when To ry MP for daring to vote against the good while longer yet. Mr Major also successes in by-elections or local government for the first time in what comments rather sniffily that the Liberal elections always seemed to be over- was supposed to be free vote also Democrats had nominated her as a life shadowed by New Labour and Tony probably helped Emma Nicholson peer, as if he wants to imply this brings Blair. The Times leader for  January towards the conclusion that she was not something into disrepute, but he cannot  presciently looked forward to the in a party which naturally tolerated quite make his mind up whether it is general election. The previous Tory dissent and free-thinking. the Liberal Democrats, the House of defector Alan Howarth had joined But Secret Society is much more than Lords or both. This (to borrow one Mr Labour. By choosing the Liberal an account of Emma Nicholson’s gradual Major’s pet phrases) is a bit rich coming Democrats, Emma Nicholson had disillusion with and defection from the from the man who insisted on enno- boosted the party’s claim for chief Conservative Party. It is something of a bling Jeffrey Archer — especially after opposition status in the south and west personal manifesto ranging over the

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 49 opposing the introduction of identity its structure is essentially chronological, cards, protecting the privacy of patients’ the subject matter seems at times to jump medical records and supporting moves to around and the story of a particular impose proper standards on those in campaign or political episode is some- public life — all classic liberal themes. times difficult to follow through. But in a More importantly in personal terms, sense this is a reflection of real life. Busy the story is told of Emma Nicholson’s politicians do not campaign neatly on work with children’s charities. In , one issue at a time. Crusades overlap and she joined the Save the Children Fund political themes interact. The organisa- because of her background working in tion of the book brings home the hectic IT, eventually rising to become nature of current political life for an Director. As an MP in  she visited active and campaigning MP. Romania and later founded an All- There is an epilogue to the book Party Parliamentary Group on Roma- which consists of quotations from well- nian Children and launched a financial wishers, mostly traditional Conservative appeal. Against this background and supporters who, like Emma Nicholson, together with an interest in fair and for their own reasons, could stand treatment for international refugees no more of the last government and had and the legacy of the Iran–Iraq and decided to change electoral allegiance. Gulf Wars, Emma Nicholson set up the It would be instructive to know if any issues and policies that Emma Nicholson AMAR appeal in  to assist the of those quoted have reverted to the has campaigned for. These include the Marsh Arabs of Iraq. That appeal raised Conservative fold or whether the deep fight to end all forms of unfair discrimi- £ million over the next five years. A disillusion expressed in their words has nation. Emma Nicholson herself was year later she arranged to bring Amar remained as strong as time passes and born with a hearing deficiency which himself to Guy’s Hospital for treatment the memory of Conservative govern- was not identified until she was seven- to his % third degree burns and then ment fades. Emma Nicholson’s political teen years old. Other causes Emma took him into her own family. This in future is, however, firmly entrenched in Nicholson has espoused are the cam- turn led to greater awareness of the the Liberal Democrats, as a peer and a paign to combat adult illiteracy, the need effects of government policies on those Member of the European Parliament. to persuade and encourage more women in the community and a growing Reading this book, her whole political (particularly members of the ethnic realisation that the Conservative Party life seems to have revolved around minorities) to enter public and political was an integral part of the problem, liberal causes and the only wonder is — life, closer co-operation with our not a means to its solution. what took her so long?

European partners, penal reform, A criticism of the book is that while Graham Lippiatt

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Breaking the mould? the new Liberal Democrats had origi- ceptance of the role of our party in lo- continued from page 44 nated. The differences now are almost cal government, at Westminster and in impossible to detect. This happened very the European Parliament. These [elec- enthusiasm for these policies as if they quickly. Liberals and Social Democrats toral successes] are the easy measures of are concessions given by a Labour Party found they had so little dividing them our advance but the real change is in anxious to win the golden opinions of that it was artificial to talk about it. This the nature of the debate and that, I ‘bien-pensant’ society. But I do not was probably because the members of think, has been our achievement. the SDP who joined the merged party have a sense of their innate enthusiasm TL: And what has been your greatest regret? for the sort of principles which under- were the people who were most moved RM: My greatest regret is that it took so by liberal democratic philosophy. lie the constitutional programme. That long. We are a conservative people. The aspect of SDP thinking has not actually TL: Reviewing politics from  onwards, aspirations of people in politics has not been absorbed by the Labour Party. what would you identify as the greatest matched the needs of the country. We TL: How much do you think the SDP has achievement you participated in? should have been more radical in chal- been the dominant influence on the Liberal RM: Helping to promote into the cen- lenging the nostrums of the other parties. tre of political debate in Britain, liberal, Democrats? Tony Little is the Secretary of the Liberal RM: I do not think it is possible to say. democratic ideas — to end class as the Democrat History Group. One of the most interesting and in a way test of British politics, to end the domi- unpredicted developments was the nance of class in political debate. And to * SDP – The Birth, Life and Death of the speed with which it was impossible to foster pluralism in the political arena. Social Democratic Party by Ivor Crewe tell from which party the members of That is what has led to the greater ac- and Anthony King (Oxford, )

50 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 A failure of leadership who was preoccupied with social reform 5 Elibank memorandum, 2 October 1918 — should not slide into the Labour Party, or Elibank papers 8804, fos. 193–6, National Li- continued from page 23 brary of Scotland. why a Liberal who was preoccupied with 6Figures are variously given. The present author many Liberals to Labour, so did their ap- the dangers inherent in socialism should has made a detailed analysis in A Classification parent leanings towards Labour in  not slide into the Conservative Party. In of the Members of Parliament elected in 1918, Bull Inst. Hist. Res. Xlvii, No.115 (1974), 74–94. drive many Liberals to the Conserva- both cases, some defectors acted for cyni- 7 Dictionary of National Biography: Missing Per- tives. Neither set of defections occurred cal reasons of personal advantage but sons. Oxford 1993, pp 475–6. exclusively during the critical period; most seem to have been motivated, at 8A J A Morris: C P Trevelyan: Portrait of a Radi- each one continued for long afterwards. cal. Belfast 1977, pp 139–141. least in part, by an honest judgement of 9They were: C R Buxton, brother of Noel Buxton The – revival failed partly be- what would conduce to the public good. and briefly an MP in 1910; J King; R C Lambert; cause it came too late and partly because On balance, the main blame for the de- H B Lees-Smith; R L Outhwaite; A Ponsonby; C Lloyd George – the only man could fections must lie not with the defectors P Trevelyan; A V Rutherford; Col. J Wedgwood — Liberal Magazine 1920, p70. possibly inspire and lead it – was pro- but with the inept leadership provided. 10 David Butler and Jennie Freeman, British Politi- foundly mistrusted not only by other cal Facts 1900–1960 (London 1963) p213 give Roy Douglas is Emeritus Reader, Univer- politicians but by a large section of his 62 National Liberals and 54 Liberals. Michael sity of Surrey. He is author of The History Kinnear, The British Voter (London 1968) p94 own party. That mistrust, in its turn, of the Liberal Party –, Land, gives 47 Lloyd Georgeites, 40 Asquithians and traces back inescapably to the compro- ‘29 ‘prefixless’ MPs who were evenly divided People and Politics, several books on inter- mises of the Coalition period. between Asquith and Lloyd George’. national relations and four books in interna- Defections could take place so easily 11 They were: C R Buxton, Noel Buxton, E G tional cartoons. Hemmerde; H B Lees-Milne; A Ponsonby and J C either to Labour or to the Conservatives Wedgwood. Perhaps, technically, we should add essentially because positive Liberal policy 1 Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign an eighth, Frank Hall, elected as a Lib-Lab in 1906. was obscure. For a large part of the period Policy and the Union of Democratic Control, 12 The Times 18 January 1924; given in Martin Gil- 1914–1918, Hull 1996, p.27. bert, Winston S Churchill Vol V companion considered here, it must have been diffi- 2 At the time they called themselves Unionists. (London 1979) pp 94–97. cult for an outsider to perceive what the 3This matter is discussed by the present author in 13 Listed in Liberal Magazine 1924, p124. Liberals would do with power if they got The History of the Liberal Party 1895–1970 Lon- 14 Gilbert, op cit p113. don 1971, pp.113–5. 15 Benn to Asquith, 11 January 1919. Asquith pa- it, or how they would differ from the 4 Guest to Lloyd George, 20 July 1918, LG F/21/ pers, Bodleian Library, 18, fo 41. other parties if they were in government. 2/28 — Lloyd George papers, Beaverbrook Li- 16 Liberal Magazine 1929, 1–2, 76, 264, 341.

There seemed little reason why a Liberal brary collection, House of Lords.

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30 Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Edwardian Liberal Party ing News and Mercury February 2nd. 1931 in Tory cuckoos in the and Business’, English Historical Review, XCVIII Reading papers MSS Eur F118 32–5. Liberal nest? (January 1983) 28–60 pp. 40 & 47. 43 Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter 31 Gladstone-MacDonald Pact of 1903 — an elec- Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford continued from page 30 toral arrangement between the Liberal and La- (1870–1949)’, University of Newcastle Ph.D. bour parties lasting until 1914. thesis, 1995, p. 39. 18 Runciman papers WR 215 undated 1932. 32 For examples see the Churchill papers 5/22 — 44 Runciman papers WR35 19th February 1910, 19 Sir Henry Morris Jones, Doctor in the Whips’ 16th February 1920 Churchill to Sir George Walter Runciman to David Lloyd George. Room (London, 1955), p. 82. Ritchie; Lloyd George papers G/20/14/21 Feb- 45 Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter 20 Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought ruary 19th 1926, Hilton Young to Lloyd George; Runciman, 1st Viscount Runciman of Doxford In. (London, 1949), p. 125. Lloyd George papers G/14/5/8 25th Septem- (1870–1949)’, University of Newcastle Ph.D. 21 Reading Papers MSS Eur F118 38–39: 2nd ber 1924, Sir Alfred Mond to Lloyd George. thesis, 1995, p. 201. March 1931 — Simon to Reading. 33 Lloyd George papers F/3/5/3 19th February 46 Five Simonite MPs were former Coalition Lib- 22 Malcolm Baines, ‘The Survival of the British Lib- 1920, Lloyd George to Balfour. eral MPs, 1918–22: Sir Henry Fildes, Sir eral Party, 1932–1959’, Oxford D.Phil., (1989). 34 T. J. Macnamara in The Liberal Pioneer May Malcolm MacDonald, J. I. Macpherson, 23 Extract from Lothian’s Liberalism in the Modern 1925 No. 4 Vol. 1 Geoffrey Shakespeare, E.A. Strauss. World in Malcolm Baines, ‘The Survival of the 35 Lloyd George Liberal Magazine Vol. 2 June 47 Davies was never a Coalition Liberal MP, but British Liberal Party, 1932–1959’, Oxford D.Phil., 1922 No. 9. had been a supporter of the Coalition. 1989, p. 16. 36 E.D. Simon in The Forward View January 1927. 48 D.M. Roberts, ‘Clement Davies and the Liberal 24 Runciman papers WR 360 5th July 1934 37 For an example see Robert Bernays in The For- Party, 1929–56’, University of Wales MA Runciman to Sir Walter Runciman, Bt. ward View October 1929. (1974), p. 21. 25 The issue they chose to go on was the outcome 38 Sir John Simon speaking to the Western Morn- 49 Colin R. Coote, Editorial: The Memoirs of Colin of the Ottawa Conference, which recom- ing News and Mercury February 2nd. 1931 in R. Coote (London, 1965), pp. 96–7 and p. 112. mended that a general tariff should be applied. Reading papers MSS Eur F11832–5. 50 David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post-war 26 Robert Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George 39 Including eight who were Asquithian Liberal National Liberal Party: an historical postscript’, Coalition: The Politics of Social-Imperialism, MPs, 1918–22: Sir Colin Barrie, Geoffrey Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989). 1900–1918 (Princeton, 1975), pp. 195–196. Collins, A. Harbord, G. Lambert, J.D. Miller, 51 David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post-war 27 Colin R. Coote, Editorial: The Memoirs of Colin Walter Runciman, Sir John Simon, J.S. Holmes. National Liberal Party: an historical postscript’, R. Coote (London, 1965), p. 81. 40 29th January 1914 — Lord Beauchamp, C. Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989), pp. 359–364. 28 David Dutton, Lloyd George, ‘John Simon and Hobhouse, R. McKenna, Walter Runciman & John 52 Most notably Clement Davies. the Politics of the Liberal Party, 1918–31’ in Simon to H.H. Asquith (John Simon’s handwrit- 53 Geoffrey Shakespeare, Let Candles Be Brought Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times of ing) in Randolph Churchill, Winston S. Churchill In (London, 1949), p. 125; Sir Henry Morris David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), p. 86. Vol. 2: Companion, (London), pp. 1857–1858. Jones, Doctor in the Whips’ Room (London, 29 Viscount Simon, Retrospect: The Memoirs of the 41 Liberal Monthly, February 1920. 1955), p. 87. Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon (London, 1952), p. 150. 42 Sir John Simon speaking to the Western Morn-

Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 51 History Group meetings and publications

A Liberal Democrat History Group Evening Meeting A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting Leaders Good and Bad Liberalism in the West Robert Maclennan MPMP, himself a former leader of the SDP, and The West Country has a special place in the Liberal tradition. Home to Professor Peter ClarkeClarke, leading expert on the New Liberals, will look at Isaac Foot and his sons, Thorpe, Penhaligon, Pardoe ... For much of leaders of the Liberal Party and the SDP over the last hundred years, the post-war period, the Liberal Party’s parliamentary representation using analysis and anecdotes to illustrate the strengths and rested largely on the South West English MPs, along with their weaknesses of the two parties leaders. colleagues in the rest of the ‘Celtic fringe’.

The audience will be polled to see who they consider was the best and Michael Steed (University of Kent) and Adrian Lee (University of the worst Liberal/SDP leader of the last century. Chair: Lord HoosonHooson. Plymouth University), discuss the survival and strength of Liberalism in the West Country, at a meeting in the city that was the stronghold of 6.45pm, Monday 28 February the Foot dynasty. Chair: Matthew Taylor MPMP. (following the History Group AGM, at 6.30pm) 8.00pm, Saturday 18 March National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1 Roma Room, New Continental Hotel, Plymouth

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