Ending Equidistance Alan Leaman traces the story of the adoption and abandonment of the Liberal Democrat strategy of ‘equidistance’.

On  May , the Federal Executive of the failure of David Owen and David Steel to agree a common position on their attitude to the Liberal Democrats received and endorsed a other two parties. At times David Owen cam- statement from their leader, Paddy Ashdown, which paigned explicitly for a hung parliament which, formally ended the ‘equidistance’ from the he believed, would open the door to maximum influence for the Alliance. His argument in- Conservative and Labour parties that the party had evitably raised questions about how any influ- maintained during the  general election ence would be deployed. Butler and Kavanagh campaign. The statement was subsequently accepted record: ‘As the election progressed it became plain …. that Dr Owen would be much more with little dissent by the Federal Conference in ready to do business with Mrs Thatcher than Glasgow on  September  as part of the would Mr Steel.’ Executive’s Annual Report. An historic change had The problem of two leaders was resolved by the merger of the Liberals and the SDP to been made, with minimum collateral damage in form the Liberal Democrats in , and by internal division or disaffection. This article describes Paddy Ashdown’s election as the unified par- ty’s first leader later that year. It took longer to the background to this decision, analyses some of resolve the uncertainties of the third party’s role. the surrounding debates, and considers its Paddy Ashdown had argued during his lead- implications for the future strategy of the Liberal ership campaign that the task of the Liberal  Democrats was to replace the Labour Party as Democrats in the light of the general election the leading non-Conservative party of con- result. science and reform. It was a bravura campaign which helped to revive morale within a bat- A short history of tered and divided party. Ashdown successfully equidistance exploited the membership’s disillusionment with their experience of the  election, Equidistance became a term of political art at when it had seemed that the limit of their lead- the time of the  general election, adopted ers’ ambition was to come third. And his mes- by journalists and others to describe the re- sage was consistent, albeit uncomfortably, with fusal of Liberal Democrats to express any pref- the tradition of Liberal leaders since Jo erence between the Labour and Conservative Grimond who had spoken of their desire to parties. But its relatively short and recent ap- realign the left. pearance in the political lexicon does not mean But replacement as a strategic objective was that equidistance represented a new issue for already out of date by the time that it was the third party of British politics. launched. Under Neil Kinnock, the Labour Very few people have ever believed that the Party had begun to recover from its nadir of Liberal Democrats (or, for many decades, their the mid-s, and was also starting to change predecessors) were likely to be able to form a its character. The Liberal/SDP Alliance had government on their own – in the short term failed to eat into Labour’s core vote in those at least. So the party has often been plagued years of maximum vulnerability – why should by questions about how it would handle any the Liberal Democrats be able to do so as La- power short of an outright victory, particularly in the event of an indecisive election result leading to a hung parliament. Indeed, a large This article was originally published in proportion of the difficulties experienced by  The Political Quarterly, vol. 69 no. 2, the Liberal/SDP Alliance in its general April–June 1998. election campaign came about because of the journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 3 bour clawed its way back? lic signal that the Liberal Democrats campaign unfolded, opinion polls Replacement was old-fashioned could have a role to play after the pointed to a hung parliament as the in another sense, too. It assumed that general election. There was a wide- most likely result, since Labour and there was only room in British poli- spread assumption that, in the event the Conservatives appeared to be so tics for two major parties, conced- of a hung parliament, Kinnock’s La- evenly matched. Inevitably, coverage ing that the Liberal Democrats could bour Party would be able to take a of the Liberal Democrats concen- only advance by pushing another weakened Liberal Democrat parlia- trated on this possibility. Press sto- party aside, thereby creating an al- mentary party for granted, and that ries speculated about the price that ternative, but still bi-polar, party Ashdown would have little negoti- Ashdown would demand for sup- alignment. Yet the Liberal Demo- ating leverage. porting a minority government or crats, like their predecessors, believed Ashdown, then, used his March entering a coalition. He began to that this two-party system itself  speech in Nottingham to spell stress that electoral reform at West- needed to be broken. They spoke of out his general election position, and minster was the essential starting the multi-party world which would to toughen his stance in advance of point for any discussions. flow from the introduction of a pro- the coming campaign. ‘Is Labour Equidistance survived as the Lib- portional voting system. As the La- better than the Tories? Or are the eral Democrat position during the bour Party exhibited its first signs of To r ies better than Labour? The an-  general election campaign, but real interest in constitutional reform swer is simple. They’re just as bad as only just. Leading Liberal Democrats (marked also by the establishment of each other!’ It was at about this time managed to stick to the line that they Charter ), the logic of this analy- that Ashdown started comparing the were just as likely to cooperate with sis pointed Ashdown in a different other two parties in television inter- John Major’s Conservatives after the direction from the rhetoric of his views to being ‘run over by a train election as they were to link up with leadership campaign. In practice, re- placement was still-born, and quickly forgotten. At first, Ashdown’s instinct was to By the end of the 1992 campaign, adopt a clearly anti-Thatcherite po- equidistance appeared battered beyond sition. For the first years of the Lib Dems’ life, few people were inter- repair, especially since the prospect of a ested in any position he took, as the hung parliament seemed to have new party struggled for attention and against extinction. But, as Mrs squeezed the Liberal Democrat vote in the Thatcher passed her tenth anniver- final days before polling. To many leading sary as Prime Minister, Ashdown told a Liberal Democrat conference in Liberal Democrats, moreover, equidistance  that, whatever happened after felt like a fraud. the following election, ‘she will have to go.’ In the event, the Conserva- tive Parliamentary Party got there or by a bus. The result is just the Neil Kinnock’s Labour Party, despite before him. Mrs Thatcher was re- same.’ what was perceived to be a growing placed by John Major as leader of In the event of a hung parliament, list of policy overlaps between the the Conservative Party in Novem- Ashdown said, the Liberal Demo- two opposition parties. Even Scot- ber . crats would be guided by policies tish Liberal Democrats, who had The Liberal Democrat position and not by personalities. He told his drawn up plans for a Scottish Par- for the  election was first for- party conference that he was not es- liament in direct negotiations with mally set out in a key passage of pecially attracted to the idea of Labour through the Constitutional Paddy Ashdown’s speech to his par- working with either of the ‘two old Convention, and who therefore were ty’s spring conference in March parties’, but would do ‘what is right under pressure to accept that the . He had been careful to wel- for stable, effective and reforming agreed devolution package should come Major’s rise to the premier- government.’ There was a little-no- take precedence over all other con- ship, remarking that it might herald ticed hint here of strategic tensions stitutional reforms, insisted that pro- a ‘more rational’ style of politics. to come. Was there any real prospect portional representation for West- Ashdown had eschewed Labour’s that putative partnership with the minster was a higher priority. Only tactics of branding John Major a Conservative Party could provide a reform at Westminster would en- ‘Thatcher Mark ’, and he was criti- reforming government of the sort trench a Scottish Parliament, they cal of Neil Kinnock’s inflexibility in that Liberal Democrats would find argued. Since Labour was opposed the face of a changing Tory party. attractive? to electoral reform for the House of Kinnock himself was giving no pub- As the  general election Commons, this enabled the Liberal

4 journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 Democrats to unite around the municated a determined and distinc- The job of the Liberal Democrats proposition that both other parties tive approach to politics. Above all, in the coming Parliament, he said, could be treated equally. his party survived an election which was threefold: ‘to create the force To outside observers, however, might have led to disaster. Only a powerful enough to remove the To- equidistance came to look more like few years before, the Liberal Demo- ries; to assemble the policies capable fiction than fact. For some, this was crats had languished in single figures of sustaining a different government; simply because the Liberal Demo- in the opinion polls. After , it to draw together the forces in Brit- crats had more than enough policy looked like they were a permanent ain which will bring change and re- in common with Labour to make a fixture in British politics. form.’ decision to side with the Conserva- Ashdown warned of the dangers tives incredible. Labour’s policy re- of ‘almost permanent one-party view had already shifted their party The Chard Speech Conservative government’. He said towards Liberal Democrat positions. Yet by the end of the  campaign, that the Labour Party needed to Then, in the final days of the cam- equidistance appeared battered be- change, highlighting many of the de- paign, Neil Kinnock started hinting yond repair, especially since the pros- ficiencies to which Tony Blair would that electoral reform, too, might be pect of a hung parliament seemed turn his attention when he later be- on Labour’s agenda. John Major and to have squeezed the Liberal Demo- came Labour leader. But his most the Conservative press were quick to crat vote in the final days before poll- significant words were reserved for ram home the message that a vote ing. To many leading Liberal Demo- his own party, when he called on for the Liberal Democrats was a vote crats, moreover, equidistance felt like Liberal Democrats ‘to work with for a Labour government. Paddy a fraud. others to assemble the ideas around Ashdown’s protests that he had as Ashdown moved quickly after which a non-socialist alternative to many policy disagreements with La- the  election to prepare the Lib- the Conservatives can be con- bour as he did with the Conserva- eral Democrats for a strategic review. structed.’ He called for a National tive Government were treated with His first conclusion was that the Electoral Reform Commission ‘to respect by commentators, but not Kinnock-led Labour Party had been consider the most appropriate form with much credence. ‘unelectable’. His second was that the of proportional voting’, and told his Another argument also began to Liberal Democrats were now strong party that ‘we must be much less eat away at the credibility of equi- enough to play a more proactive exclusive in our approach to poli- distance as the campaign went on. role. tics than we were in the last Parlia- By , the Conservatives had been His response was to make a ment, and much more inclusive to in government for  years – though scene-setting speech in his Yeovil others in this one.’ under two, very different, prime constituency at Chard in May . He concluded: ‘What we need is ministers. If a hung parliament came about, it would be because the Tory party had lost at least  seats. In a real sense, John Major would have Membership Services lost the election, even if Neil The following listings are available to History Group members: Kinnock had failed to win it. Most Liberal Democrat constituency gains Mediawatch: a bibliography of major articles on the Liberal Democrats would have come at the expense of appearing in the broadsheet papers, major magazines and academic a retreating government. In those journals from 1988; plus articles of historical interest appearing in the circumstances, would it really have major Liberal Democrat journals from 1995. been possible for the Liberal Demo- crats to sustain the Conservatives in Thesiswatch: all higher degree theses listed in the Bulletin of the Institute power? In , Jeremy Thorpe was of Historical Research under the titles ‘Liberal Party’ or ‘liberalism’ (none yet unable to deal with Edward Heath, under SDP or Liberal Democrats). who had held office for less than four years. What chance would Paddy Any member is entitled to receive a copy of either listing free; send an A4 Ashdown have if he tried to protect SSAE to the address on page 2. Up to date versions can also be found on the Conservatives from election de- our web site (www.dbrack.dircon.co.uk/ldhg). feat after  years? Equidistance served its purpose Help needed: due to Richard Grayson’s move to London to become in . It enabled Ashdown to build Director of the Centre for Reform, we need a volunteer to replace him in an independent identity for his party. keeping these listings up to date. Anyone with access to the British He ensured that the Liberal Demo- Humanities Index (Bowker Saur) and the journal Theses Completed (both should be available in university libraries) would find it quite easy. Anyone crats were not swallowed up by a willing to help should contact the Editor at the address on page 2. recovering Labour Party. He com- journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 5 operate with John Major’s adminis- tration to ensure that it survived. The Labour Party front bench played a more traditional opposition game, looking for ways in which they could, with support from Conserva- tive Eurosceptics, defeat the legisla- tion, even to the point of putting the Treaty at risk. Dramatically, this di- vergence came to a head when Lib- eral Democrat MPs voted with the Government on the paving motion which preceded a resumption of the Bill’s passage. Mutual recriminations flew across the opposition benches of the House of Commons. On that night, the new forum and debate that Ashdown had called for in his Chard speech looked a considerable distance away. By , however, the political at- The Scotsman, 19 September 1995 mosphere was very different. The Lib- eral Democrats were in the doldrums. a new forum and a debate on a ain and the building of a sustainable The  European elections had much wider scale – one which is economy are the keys to all other turned out to be a disappointment, owned by no particular party and necessary changes.’ Yet, despite this even though the party had won its encompasses many who take no for- evident movement, equidistance was first-ever seats in the Strasbourg Par- mal part in politics, but wish to see still in place. liament. Tony Blair’s elevation to La- a viable alternative to Conservatism bour’s leadership, and his ability to in Britain.’ determine the agenda of the centre This more open approach to No quarter for the ground, left many Liberal Democrats politics – reflected in the cross-party Tories not knowing how to respond. Some membership of the Borrie Commis- were anxious to praise him; others sion on Social Justice and the Lib- The years between  and May rather wished they could bury him. eral Democrat Dahrendorf Commis-  were extraordinary ones in Moreover, the  Liberal Demo- sion on the economy – was quickly British politics. Sterling’s exit from crat conference in Brighton was a interpreted by journalists and many the Exchange Rate Mechanism took chapter of mishaps and mistakes, mak- within the Liberal Democrats as the place as the Liberal Democrats were ing it a public relations disaster. Com- first move in a new courtship with meeting at their Harrogate confer- mentators started to speculate that the Labour. So Ashdown had to spend ence. And, for a while, it was the Lib Liberal Democrats would now be time emphasising two points – that Dems who were the main benefici- pushed aside by the Blair juggernaut. he had no intention of seeing the aries of the collapse in support for Many in the party feared that they To r y/Labour duopoly replaced by a the Conservatives which followed. were right. To r y/Labour-Liberal duopoly; and Byelection victories in Newbury Nagging away all this time was a that he did not wish for any sort of and Christchurch put Ashdown’s continuing internal Liberal Demo- electoral pact or other arrangement. party centre stage. A lacklustre La- crat debate about how to deal with After a rather inchoate and diffi- bour Party under John Smith’s lead- equidistance and what, if anything, cult debate at the Liberal Democrat ership was failing to capture the pub- should be put in its place. Tony Blair’s conference in Harrogate that au- lic’s imagination, and showing little leadership of Labour had (to many tumn, Ashdown was rewarded with interest in the Lib Dems. Meanwhile, eyes) made a change more possible, a conference motion which agreed the Liberal Democrats were making building as it did on shifts in Labour that the party’s policy development progress in each round of annual lo- policy towards Liberal Democrat should be ‘inclusive’ and that: ‘Lib- cal elections. positions that had already taken place eral Democrats should develop and The two opposition parties had since . It had certainly made a debate ideas by working with peo- very different approaches to the leg- reconsideration more urgent. ple, of all parties and none and at all islation implementing the Maastricht For a few months, the Liberal levels, who believe that fundamen- Treaty. Liberal Democrats wished the Democrats trod water while they tal change in the governance of Brit- Bill well, and were prepared to co- tried to settle this decision. Despite

6 journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 this sense of preoccupation, and La- Liberal Democrats were now firmly was still considerable scepticism bour’s renewed campaigning effort and overtly an anti-Conservative within the Liberal Democrats about in areas of third party strength, the party, committed to ousting the To ny Blair’s new Labour Party, and Liberal Democrats were bolstered by Government from office. The Inde- about his personal commitment to success in the local elections of May pendent newspaper next day de- pluralistic politics. It was also impor- . It was decided then that the scribed the announcement as an ‘his- tant for Paddy Ashdown himself to party had to move to a resolution: toric shift’. emerge from this debate as a force in part, because there was such a for unity within the party. The Lib- head of steam and press speculation eral Democrats had to fashion an behind the issue that it was distract- Was there any argument for voting for a distinctive ing the party from other activity; and alternative? Liberal Democrat platform at the in part because it was important to coming election. They needed space establish a clear position well in ad- With the benefits of hindsight, many and distance from Labour in order vance of the coming general elec- people have treated this shift as a to fight the campaign. tion. Senior Liberal Democrats had statement of the blindingly obvious, Other internal pressures were concluded that they had spent too hardly historic at all. Indeed, it did pointing in the opposite direction. much of the  campaign explain- possess the considerable political vir- Some Liberal Democrats argued that ing their attitude to a hung parlia- tue of being true – it accurately re- equidistance should not be aban- ment – at the expense of time which flected the mood and long-estab- doned – not because they felt par- could have been spent on issues with lished convictions of most Liberal ticularly attached to it, but because more direct appeal to the voters. Democrats, and therefore provided they viewed the alternatives with How much better to set out the po- a much more secure basis for fight- horror. If pushed, nearly all these sitioning arguments well in advance ing a general election campaign. Yet, people would admit in private that of the campaign, and then to move at the time, Labour officials were sustaining the Conservatives in of- on to promoting an attractive and distinctive policy platform. The result was the position state- All of this was summed up in the key ment adopted by the party’s senior committees and published in Liberal paragraph: ‘No quarter for the Tories. No Democrat News on  May. It had let-up on Labour. Liberal Democrats will been put together following detailed discussions with leading Parliamen- continue to campaign and win for the tarians and other figures within the principles and policies that we believe in.’ party. The statement contained a number of elements: a) The Liberal Democrats will con- quoted describing the ending of fice was inconceivable. But their dis- tinue to be an independent po- equidistance as the Liberal Demo- like of the Labour Party (or their tac- litical party, fighting elections on crat equivalent of Tony Blair’s dump- tical calculation that they needed to a distinctive programme; ing of Clause . And it was the re- appeal to Conservative-inclined vot- b) The Liberal Democrats are com- sult of a series of hard-fought argu- ers) was sufficient to impel them to mitted to the defeat of John Ma- ments within the party. want to deny this in public. jor’s Conservative Government, Some alternatives were seriously Another group of leading Lib as a ‘precondition for maximum canvassed internally. There was a Dems argued that, while it would be Liberal Democrat influence’; small group within the Liberal right to rule out any sort of arrange- c) If the Conservatives lose their Democrats which would have liked ments with a defeated Conservative majority in the House of Com- to see a full accord with Tony Blair’s Party, the Liberal Democrats should mons, they will therefore not be Labour Party. They argued that the also commit themselves not to en- sustained in power by the Lib- position eventually adopted would ter any relationship with Labour. But eral Democrats; be seen as an uncomfortable half- this would have been a strange po- d) The Liberal Democrats will keep way house, and that the party should sition for a third party to adopt – their distance from Labour. be open about a desire to seek coa- effectively opting itself out of any All of this was summed up in the lition or some other form of alliance formal post-election influence, and key paragraph: ‘No quarter for the with Labour. But this argument was appearing indifferent to what, for To r ies. No let-up on Labour. Lib- soured by a trickle of defections most people, is the key election eral Democrats will continue to from amongst this group to Labour, question: who should govern? It cer- campaign and win for the principles and it was undermined by the fact tainly would not have sat well with and policies that we believe in.’ The that it did not represent the real cen- the rhetoric of cooperative politics crucial decision had been taken. The tre of gravity within the party. There that had marked out the Liberal journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 7 Democrats and their predecessor parties. Nor was it consistent with habits of cooperation in local gov- ernment, where many councils are now hung. By taking up this posi- tion, the Liberal Democrats would have committed themselves to a life- time in opposition, whatever the re- sult of the general election. It was hardly an attractive proposition to put to the electorate. Others pressed a minimalist case. They did not want an announce- ment of any sort. They argued that, while the presumption that the Lib- eral Democrats would not deal with the Conservatives would surely be- come obvious to anyone who thought about it, there was nothing to be gained from advertising this reality. After all, Liberal Democrat MPs were not being stopped in lo- ‘Well, Cilla .... Paddy sounds nice ....’ The Sun, 19 September 1995. cal high streets and asked whether equidistance had been abandoned By resolving this question rela- in the event, it was. The broader is- yet. Why raise a difficult issue when tively early in the Parliament, the sue of the Liberal Democrat role was you may not need to? Liberal Democrats were able to clear only raised in the form of questions But this position did not suit the the way for the positive platform on about tactical voting, which enabled temperament of Paddy Ashdown, which they fought the  election the party to emphasise its ability to who was anxious to settle a clear and campaign. Starting with The Liberal win its target seats and to confirm public position and who wanted a Democrat Guarantee, which was de- its anti-Conservative stance. mandate from the forthcoming elec- bated and approved at the autumn The relatively specific content of tion campaign for what he called conference in , the party spent their manifesto enabled the Liberal cooperative politics. Nor would it two years refining and promoting Democrats to develop a useful line have survived until polling day. Af- the policies that became the Make of argument about their potential ter all, whether fairly or not, com- the Difference  manifesto. In con- role in a Labour-dominated parlia- mentators and broadcasters knew trast to , when much of their ment. Commentators started to re- that this was a potential weak point election campaign was bogged down fer to the Lib Dems as a possible for the Liberal Democrats. They in nuances of different post-election ‘backbone’ for a Labour government, would probe the issue. Could the scenarios, coverage of the Lib Dems ensuring both that Labour delivered Liberal Democrats have survived a over this period progressively con- on its promises and that new Labour  campaign in which, however centrated on significant policy mes- did not relapse into old Labour hab- theoretically, they had to keep open sages. Candidates and local activists its. On the ground, voters were pre- the possibility that they might sus- reported that the old complaint ‘We sented with the proposition that a tain a defeated Conservative Gov- just don’t know what you stand for’ vote for the Lib Dems would help ernment in office, or worse, had was hardly heard on the doorsteps secure the defeat of the Conserva- looked liked an obstacle to the de- in . tive Government and, in addition, feat of Mr Major’s administration? In some measure, this transforma- increase the chances that any new This was not a question that could tion came about simply because government would take the right easily be fudged. there was such a powerful popular decisions on key issues such as edu- mood for a change of government, cation, health and the environment. The 1997 election though this did not really become A vote for the Liberal Democrats clear until the campaign itself. A became a vote to ‘add value’ to a new The abandonment of equidistance large Labour lead in the opinion government. was essentially a negative act – Lib- polls meant that the issue of a hung To achieve this outcome, however, eral Democrats would not put the parliament was hardly raised at all it was essential that Liberal Demo- Conservatives back into office. But during the campaign, though many crats were not drawn into specula- it created the opportunity for much believed that Labour’s Commons tions about possible post-election sce- that was positive. majority would be far smaller than, narios, and that no-one expressed any

8 journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 preference for a particular type of re- to move to respond. Above all, the lationship with a Labour government. unpopularity of John Major’s Con- The road to Early in the internal discussions about servatives would have made the realignment the abandonment of equidistance, it maintenance of equidistance suicidal was agreed within the party that such for the Liberal Democrats. The strategic significance of ending hypothetical questions should be But events since the  elec- equidistance may be even stronger. avoided. There was no public (and lit- tion confirm that something more Ever since Roy Jenkins’ Dimbleby tle private) discussion of possible ways significant has happened. Labour and lecture in , the centre-left in Brit- of working with a Labour govern- the Liberal Democrats, while re- ish politics has been searching for ment, and leading spokesmen were maining independent and distinctive, ways to reformulate the party-politi- encouraged not to throw any policy have acknowledged that they have cal structure and to transform Brit- issues into the pot of post-election interests in common. They have ish politics itself in order to compete calculations. On only one occasion started to cooperate, as well as to with a dominant Conservative Party. was this informal rule breached. compete. For a short while, it looked pos- Instead, a simple formula was de- The Liberal Democrats moved sible that the SDP/Liberal Alliance vised in , which was then re- quickly in the face of Labour’s huge might be able to pull this off, on the peated at every opportunity up un- Commons majority to adopt a po- back of a broken Labour Party. The til polling day: ‘Every vote cast for sition of ‘constructive opposition’. Alliance was in turn broken by the the Liberal Democrats and every seat we win in Parliament will be used to secure these goals [Lib Dem policy priorities]’. This had two vir- An alternative vehicle needed to be tues: it enabled the campaign to con- found for what has traditionally been centrate on promoting policy, and it provided the electorate with a posi- known as the ‘realignment’ of the left. tive incentive for voting Liberal Democrat – the more seats won, the more Lib Dem policies will be im- This has enabled them to take their combination of Labour’s recovery plemented. place on the opposition benches, under Neil Kinnock and David while also accepting an invitation Owen’s falling out with his col- to join in an innovative Cabinet leagues. So an alternative vehicle Tactic or strategy? committee in which Labour and needed to be found for what has tra- It would be easy to dismiss the aban- the Liberal Democrats will work ditionally been known as the ‘rea- donment of equidistance as oppor- through the implementation of lignment’ of the left. tunist tactics. And it is true that, tac- agreed constitutional reforms. Even The abandonment of equidis- tically, it worked. The Liberal Demo- before the announcement of this tance is a signal that the Liberal crats were successful in winning a new committee, this strategy had Democrats are now capable of play- record  seats at the  general borne fruit in government legisla- ing a role in this alternative. Many election, despite a slight fall in their tion for a proportional system of commentators assumed that this shift overall share of the vote. Their cam- elections to the European Parlia- could not be achieved without a se- paign was almost universally praised ment in time for , and in the rious split at the top of the party, or, for its clarity and effectiveness. The pre-election agreements on consti- at least, without a classic old-style shift of position matched and rein- tutional issues put together by Liberal Assembly row. They were forced the anti-Conservative mood, Robin Cook and Robert proved wrong. This new maturity gave fair wind to tactical voting, and Maclennan. strengthens the ability of the Lib dealt ahead of the campaign with a Despite a massive Labour major- Dems to become participants in the significant area of potential weakness. ity in the Commons, therefore, Lib- next phase of realignment. But it will It also united the party (with few ex- eral Democrats have become signifi- be their capacity to secure electoral ceptions) on a central political issue. cant players in Westminster politics. reform at Westminster that deter- The abandonment of equidis- Their involvement in the Cabinet mines their prospects of success. tance was also a child of its time. committee confirms that, having The Labour Government’s plans To ny Blair’s leadership created a new abandoned equidistance, Liberal for devolution to Scotland and Wales dynamic between the two parties. Democrats are not about to re-adopt will introduce proportional systems He insisted that his senior colleagues it. And Tony Blair’s continuing rheto- of elections to Britain. Proportional cease their attacks on the Lib Dems. ric of new, cooperative and pluralis- representation to the European Par- And the warmth with which he was tic politics points the way to further liament is certain for elections in  received by some leading Liberal rapprochement between the two . These elections will entrench Democrats meant that Ashdown had parties. a more plural party-political system journal of liberal democrat history 19: summer 1998 9 and, hence, the national role of the an event. It had no beginning, and New Labour now seeks reassur- Liberal Democrats. They will also it will have no end. But, following ances that the Liberal Democrats will add to pressure for reform of the  years of Conservative rule, the not jump ship if the going gets tough voting system for the House of next phase of realignment may be and the Conservatives recover; the Commons (now under considera- coming into focus. Tony Blair’s trans- Liberal Democrats are probing for tion by a Commission under Roy formation of the Labour Party into confirmation that Labour under- Jenkins) which will look increasingly New Labour and the Liberal Demo- stands that multi-party politics is anomalous if it retains its first-past- crat abandonment of equidistance here to stay and should be wel- the-post elections. have opened up a new and creative comed. As their relationship deep- Liberal Democrats will naturally period in centre-left politics, based ens, there is no reason why both par- work hard to ensure that this mo- on a model which allows for parties ties should not get what they want. mentum is sustained. Their relation- to cooperate as well as compete, and Should either turn their back on this ship with the Labour Government which, in turn, could modernise and possibility, they will pass up an his- will depend on it. For it is difficult to transform our political system. toric moment of reform. see how ‘constructive opposition’ or This realignment will not require Alan Leaman was Liberal Democrat any other relationship between par- any party to split, or to conquer an- Director of Strategy and Planning – ties short of merger can survive for other. Indeed, it will depend on both  and was previously head of Paddy long if Britain remains stuck in its Labour and the Liberal Democrats Ashdown’s office. two-party political model and with remaining independent, presenting a its first-past-the-post electoral system distinctive but complementary ap- Notes: for the House of Commons: the pres- peal to the electorate under a new  David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The sures all push in fissiparous directions. electoral system. A merger of the two British General Election of  Cooperative, or pluralist, politics will parties would narrow their joint (Macmillan, ). flourish in the longer term only un- constituency, offering the voters a di-  John Curtice and Michael Steed calcu- der a voting system that allows for minished choice and artificially late that tactical voting in  was   more diversity and choice, and which binding different traditions into a worth up to seats for Labour and for the Liberal Democrats. See David rewards those who practice it. Plu- single organisation, making it far Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The Brit- ralism is not easily compatible with more difficult for the two parties of ish General Election of  (Macmillan, the plurality system of elections. the centre-left to keep the Conserva- ), Appendix . Realignment is a process, and not tives out of office.

Research in Progress This column aims to assist research projects in progress. If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other helpful information – or if you know anyone who can – please pass on details to them. If you know of any other research project in progress for inclusion in this column, please send details to the Editor at the address on page 2.

Liberals and the local government of London The party agent and English electoral culture, 1919–39. Chris Fox, 173 Worplesdon Road, Guidlford c.1880 – c.1906. The development of political agency GU2 6XD; [email protected]. as a profession, the role of the election agent in managing election campaigns during this period, and the The political and electoral strategy of the changing nature of elections, as increased use was made Liberal Party 1970–79. Individual constituency of the press and the platform. Kathryn Rix, Christ's papers from this period, and contact with individuals who College, Cambridge, CB2 2BU; [email protected]. were members of the Party’s policy committees and/or the Party Council, particularly welcome. Ruth Fox, 7 Mulberry The Liberal Party and foreign and defence Court, Bishop’s Stortford, Herts CM23 3JW. policy, 1922–88. Book and articles; of particular interest is the 1920s and ’30s; and also the possibility of Liberal defections to the Conservative Party, interviewing anyone involved in formulating the foreign c.1906–1935. Nick Cott, 24, Balmoral Terrace, and defence policies of the Liberal Party. Dr R. S. Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1YH; Grayson, 8 Millway Close, Oxford OX2 8BJ. [email protected]. The Liberal Party 1945–56. Contact with members The grass roots organisation of the Liberal (or opponents) of the Radical Reform Group during the Party 1945–64; the role of local activists in the late 1950s, and anyone with recollections of the leadership of 1950s revival of the Liberal Party. Mark Egan, First Floor Clement Davies, sought. Graham Lippiatt, 24 Balmoral Flat, 16 Oldfields Circus, Northolt, Middlesex UB5 4RR. Road, South Harrow, HA2 8TD.

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