INFORMATION TO USERS

This dissertation was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image o f the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part o f the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections w ith a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 46100 A Xerox Education Company 73-11,599

WAKSMUNDSKI, John, 19t^3- McKINLEY POLITICS AND THE CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN LABOR, 1870-1900.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1972 History, modern

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor. Michigan

© 1973

JOHN WAKSMUNDSKI

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFIIMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. M cKi n l e y p o l i t i c s a n d t h e c h a n g i n g ATTITUDES TOWARD AFRICAN LABOR 1870-1900

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

John Waksmundski, B.S., M.S.

The Ohio State University 1972

Approved by

Adviser Department of History PLEASE NOTE:

Some pages may have

indistinct print.

Filmed as received.

University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Several individuals and institutions aided me in the preparation and writing of this dissertation, I take great pleasure in thanking them for their invaluable assist­ ance.

To Professor K. Austin Kerr, I am grateful for the supervision and direction he has provided in the research and writing of this dissertation. To Professor Robert H.

Bremner, I owe a major debt for without his friendly and professional advice my graduate training period would have been a far more difficult experience. Professors Kerr and

Bremner have contributed greatly to my understanding of

American social, political, economic, and intellectual his­ tory in general and of the period between 1865 and 1920 in particular. To Professor Warren Van Tine, I am grateful for his perceptive insights into labor history, and for his suggestions and criticisms regarding this study. He has always been more than willing to help me.

A number of libraries have assisted me in the col­ lection of data so important to my study. I benefitted much from my experiences in Washington, D.C. at the National Archives and the Department of Archives and Manuscripts in the Catholic University of America, and in Columbus, Ohio

ii at the Ohio Historical Society and The Ohio State Univer­ sity Library. Many librarians and archivists have been cooperative in disclosing information and leading me to pertinent sources,

Anthony Libertella, now Professor of History at

Iona College, has shown an unusual interest in the ideas contained in this dissertation. For his friendship and willingness to listen to and share problems, I will be always grateful.

The enduring patience and encouragement of my wife.

Sue Waksmundski, and my sons, Michael and David have sustained me not only in completing this study but in my overall quest for higher education. Without their help, this dissertation might not be a reality, and for that reason it is as much theirs as mine. VITA

June 9 , 19^3 =-*••••. . Born - Puritan, Pennsylvania

I96I-I965 ...... United States Air Force

1967 ...... B.S., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

1968 ...... M.S., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio

1968-I969 ...... High School Teacher, Spencerville, Ohio

1969-1971 ...... Graduate Assistant, Depart­ ment of History, The Ohio State University

1971-I972 ...... Research Fellowship, The Ohio State University

1972-1973 ...... High School Teacher, Upper Arlington Schools, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS' OF STUDY

Major Field: American History

America in the Twentieth Century. Professor K. Austin Kerr

American Social and Intellectual History. Professor Robert Bremner

American Legal and Constitutional History. Professor Bradley Chapin

Czarist and Soviet Russia. Professor Michael Curran BUYERS AND SELLERS

What is a man worth?

What can he do?

What is his value?

On the one hand those who buy labor.

On the other hand those who have nothing

to sell but their labor.

And when the buyers of labor tell the

sellers, "Nothing doing today, not a

chance!" - then what?

Carl Sandburg

Honey and Salt PREFACE

This dissertation proceeds along two lines, each

related to the emergence, in the l890's, of a pragmatic-

capitalist oriented way of looking at American society and

organized labor’s position in that society. It seeks, first, to examine the underlying assumptions and beliefs regarding labor during a critical era by exploring the responses of leading unionists, intellectuals, politicians and businessmen to the immense challenge of socio-economic change sparked by intense industrial growth. Of particular importance here is the challenge of "the labor question," perhaps the single most important issue facing Americans during the I890’s and early twentieth century. In an effort to shed light upon these issues this study addresses itself to such questions as these: how was labor accepted into the emerging capitalist order? What were the sources within organized labor and the business and political communities which helped shape labor policy? And finally, what new conditions forced people to deal with the labor problem and how did labor fare as a result of this new focus?

The second objective of this study is to associate this focus on the labor problem, and what it meant for the progress of trade unions, with the career of William McKinley.

' Vi Unlike the theoretical approach involved in understanding

an ideology emerging from men's responses to labor issues,

this objective dictates a more narrative approach. Its goal is to describe the attitudes and policies of William

McKinley, and his friend Mark Hanna, toward the laboring

classes, especially during the height of their power. For example, two significant pieces of legislation relating to labor were passed during the McKinley presidency. In

1898 Congress enacted the Erdman Act, providing "a means for mediation and arbitration of controversies affecting railways and their employees. A second measure, passed in the same year, established an Industrial Commission to investigate, among other things, the problems of labor and management and furnish suggestions which may "harmonize conflicting i n t e r e s t s . "2 These legislative measures, be­ cause they address themselves to settling the issue of labor's position in the capitalist framework, are closely associated to the development of those attitudes and ideas inherent in the new employer outlook tov/ard organized workers.

The time base for this study is the late l890's, and to a lesser extent, the early .twentieth century. This

^U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin of Labor, Vol. XXIV - 1912 (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- ing W i c e 7 I9I2y, pp. 1, 58-61.

^UiS., Statutes at Large. XXX, pp. 476-77. vii period has been chosen because it represents both a climax and take-off point in American intellectual and economic history. From the Civil War onward the United States had been subjected to a phenomenal amount of social and economic change— the rise of powerful monopolies and "Robber Barons," the rise of the industrial city, the continuing waves of immigrants, industry’s triumph over agriculture, the spec­ tacular growth of labor- unions— with which traditional

American ideas could not keep pace. As America entered the eighteen-nineties, however, many important leaders in academic, labor, business, and politics began to perceive the dawn of a new era and offered ideas and programs to readjust the American political economy to the new realities.

The 1890’s are also important in that, except for the New Deal era, it is generally recognized as the most important period in American labor history. During the nineties Samuel Gomper’s "pure and simple unionism," the guiding philosophy of the labor movement for decades to come, asserted itself over idealism, socialism,' and the ideological and political challenges of strong minorities within the movement. Youthful unions such as the American

Federation of Labor and the United Mine Workers showed remarkable endurance by weathering massive unemployment resulting from the severe depression of 1893-97. Various groups of workers, moreover, fought and survived a number

' viii of violent wars with capital, most notably the furious up­ heavals at Coeur d ’Alene, Homestead, and Pullman.

Although the nineties serve as a focal point, I have not assumed that all important ideas and developments re­

lated to the labor problem are confined to this decade.

Earlier periods have also been surveyed to demonstrate the impact of the changing economic scene and the pattern of responses to it. Moreover, when certain situations in the nineties lead to obvious conclusions, or when ideas born in the nineties later matured into policy, there has been no reluctance to extend the study into subsequent decades.

The hypothesis of this study is that labor advanced during the age of McKinley largely because significant numbers of influential men, William McKinley and Mark Hanna among them, realized the severity of the labor question and adopted positions conducive to incorporating the working class into the capitalist society. What is meant here by labor advancing is, on the one hand, simply unions increas­ ing their membership and taking strides toward becoming a permanent part of the American economic scene. On the other hand, and more importantly, it means that a substan- - tial number of prominent individuals came to accept trade unions as proper agencies for securing the advance of worker interests. To be sure, this does not imply that at the end

of the nineteenth century labor found its millennium.

On the contrary, in 1897 organized labor comprised only about 4 per cent of the nonagricultural work force. In addition, there were persistent problems of unemployment,

low wages, long hours, and child labor. What this study theorizes is not the end to labor’s problems, but rather that, at the turn of the century, a group of prominent thinkers and policy makers, responding to their perceptions of the part labor should play in the changing economy, formulated a new outlook toward trade unions. This view, which can be loosely defined as the "new corporate labor policy," emphasized cooperation with conservative unions in order to insure a harmonious society based on sound capitalist principles.

This study will begin, first, with an introductory statement on the nature and importance of the new labor policy emerging in the l890’s. Second, it will examine the magnitude of social and economic change in post Civil

War America, the subsequent emergence of the labor ques­ tion, and certain individual’s responses to it. Third, it will turn to the career and policies of William McKinley and show how he, along with Mark Hanna, exhibited a pro­ gressive attitude toward labor and assisted in creating an atmosphere susceptible to a new outlook toward labor unions. Fourth, it will discuss the Erdman Act and how it was, to some extent, exemplary of the new policy of recognizing unions as valid bargaining agents for their members. Finally, it will conclude with a summation of the general trends covered in the study, relating them to the broader perspective of American industrial society, and to a lesser extent, some of the historical interpreta­ tions of the labor's role in that society. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 11

VITA ...... Ill

PREFACE...... vl

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

II. ' THE CHANGING VIEWS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMY, I865 - I9OO ...... 14

III. WILLIAM McKINLEY AND THE WORKINGMAN 64

IV. THE ERDMAN ACT, AND THE CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS RAILWAY LABOR IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA ...... ---112

V. CONCLUSION ...... 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 178 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the process of trying to understand anew the

emergence of urban-industrial society from village-agrarian

society in America, historians in recent years have di­

rected their attention less than in the oast on individual "great men" and events and more on understanding histor­

ical processes and the emergence of new social systems

from old«^ Reflecting the recent concern with understand­

ing American institutions and their values, scholars are more frequently expanding the boundaries of their studies

in an effort to bring social, economic, and political

systems into sharper focus. Following this trend, it seems

important in our thinking regarding the American past to

relate, more directly, the real human experiences of

changing social systems, and the subsequent general

Compare, for example, Robert Wiebe’s The Search For Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967;, which en­ deavors to better understand a period of history by describ­ ing the shift from provincial agrarian to bureaucratic mid­ dle class values, and its affect on the urban-industrial society with Harold U, Faulkner's Politics. Reform and Ex­ pansion 1890-1900 (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) which utilizes a more topical approach to understanding the 1890*8 . 2

Ideological responses of the people experiencing changing conditions, to actual national political policy and socio­ economic development.

The politics and policies of William McKinley and

Mark Hanna, and their relationship to the institutionaliza­ tion of conservative labor unions in the l890*s provide a rich opportunity for explaining the actual process of how growing perceptions of changing social systems had specific ramifications in public policies. Throughout their public careers McKinley and Hanna felt the impact of the indus­ trial revolution; and this compelled them to fashion cer­ tain perceptions and viewpoints regarding the nature of the changing' capitalist economy.

For McKinley and Hanna, as well as most other ob­ servers of their era, the most persistant "problem” re­ volving around intense Industrial expansion was how to assimilate the rising American proletariat into a socio­ economic environment so dominated by classical economic theories and pro-capitalist values. In the decades span­ ning from the Civil War to the turn of the twentieth cen­ tury America’s industrial expansion was grounded in the factory system operated by a rising class of blue-collar workers. This group, continuously gaining in size from succeeding waves of immigration, and absorbing the hard­ ships of an impersonal production oriented economy, posed 3 a most crucial question: What role, considering the nature

of late nineteenth century urban Industrial growth, would

American labor play In the modern political-economic

syafcem?

Paced with the rigidity of the Inherited laissez-

faire Ideology, and a value system which viewed the worker merely as a commodity, this "labor question," as It was

called, persistently begged for an answer. Initially the greatest obstacle to dealing with the question proved to be the complete lack of status, or even Identity, of labor unions,. During much of the Gllden Age political and econ­

omic observers adhered to the view of labor depicted by

Henry Wood In Natural Law In the Business World published

In 1884. Wood, a proper Bostonian who spent much of his

life commenting on economic questions, believed that the fate of Individual workers was Inevitably fixed by those natural laws, among them the law of supply and demand, postulated by the classical economists. For unions to seek higher wages, thus tampering with these natural laws, was tantamount to heresy. Wood asserted, moreover, that

trade unions were guilty of a multitude of economic and moral blunders detrimental to the fabric of American

society. Among these were an antagonism toward capital,

the worker’s very own saviour; a tendency to reward men

for being members of trade unions rather than for honest, productive labor; a penchant to petition for Increased 4 wages with no concern for commensurate rises in prices; and finally the inclination of unions to be either violent or socialist, or both.^

There is little question that Wood’s ideas en­ joyed considerable influence, particularly among tradition­ alist-minded businessmen who sought to rationalize the status quo. However, at the very moment that Wood was expounding his treatise a number of reformers and political economists had emerged to criticize and challenge laissez-, faire economics. One element In this group was the "new school” of American political economy dominated by the noted economists Richard Ely, Simon Patten, and John

Bates Clark, Rejecting the immutability of economic laws, and calling for a closer relationship between ethics and and economics, these thinkers and their associates in the newly organized American Economic Association saw much hope for the laboring classes.

At the same time, sincere reformers like Henry

George and Edward Bellamy sought to deal with the "labor question" by proposing their panaceas for social and econ­ omic salvation. They, however, like the prophets of the

2 For a short summary of the philosophy of Henry Wood and its influence on the late nineteenth century view of labor, see Paul F, Boiler, Jr., American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Naturalism. I965- (Chicago; hand McNally Co,, 1^6^;. pp. 5 "Social Gospel" and "New Economics" could only take the

Initial step of attacking traditionalism while, at the same time, appealing for an Ideological and practical re­ orientation* Radicalism In the west, legitimatized under the banner of the People’s Party, likewise sought to solve labor’s dilemma; however Its agricultural orientation simply deflected any genuine concern for the labor problem.

Perhaps only Marxian socialism, combining class consciousness with Its formula for collective ownership of the means of production, truly addressed Itself to the

Issue of labor’s status and Identity In the new economic system3 Despite the uncertainties regarding the exact strength of socialism In Gilded Age America, It Is evident that, from time to time, the socialists manifested consid­ erable prestige, both politically and In organized labor, particularly In times of severe economic crisis. Par more frequently though the socialist’s "reform and complaint"

Ideology was diluted by "good times" and the promises of

America’s burgeoning Industrial revolution. Furthermore, the socialists, blinded by their utopian formulas, tended to play down many Important social and political problems of the day. In 1900, Eugene V, Debs, head of the American

Socialist Party, Ignored things American by asking: "What but meaningless phrases are ’Imperialism,’ ’expansion,*

’free silver,’ ’gold standard,’ etc,, to the wage worker?" 6 After all, claimed Debs, the worker stood outside of Amer­

ican society and consequently found these "issues" to be 3 irrelevant. Of course. Debs thinking proved erroneous, for as many politicians, business leaders, and union of­

ficials had demonstrated, these issues actually made up the substance of the American political economy; and they received due attention from the increasingly conscious

American working class.

Socialism and the other panaceas, then, may have forced more conservative Americans to be mindful of the conditions and status of the American proletariat. But, faced with the relative lack of class consciousness on the part of the great majority of American workers, the standard of living offered by flourishing capitalism, and the overwhelming onslaught of emerging middle class values, socialism as well as other rival ideologies frequently found themselves relegated to the role of eggs never fully hatched.

How, then, was the problem of the social and econ­ omic position of the new blue collar class finally resolved?

As the nineteenth century moved into its last decade, the answer appeared to take shape in the form of a middle class, industrially oriented ideology developed through

Writings and Speeches of Eugene V. Debs (New York; Hermitage t’ress. Inc., 194b), p, 37, 7 pragmatic responses to the human experience of Intense economic change. In the late eighteen-eighties organized

labor, resolutely Involved In determining the future pos­ sibilities for Americans tollers, played a decisive role

In promoting a cooperative economic framework In which all sectors of the Industrial economy could work together

In peace and harmony. Permitting the reformist unionism espoused by the National Labor Union In the 1870*s and the Knights of Labor in the l88o*s to burn Itself out, a minority of organized workers, led by the American Fed­ eration of Labor, began to embrace the "pure-and-simple unionism" of Samuel Gompers, the APL*s chief executive who waged a relentless war upon Idealism, radicalism, and political Involvement, Gompers believed that success for the labor movement depended on establishing a mature business-like organization similar to that of organized capital. "The organization and concentration of the one- capltallsts," said Gompers In I896, "pre-supposes the organization and concentration of the other-workers,"^

For the most Influential man In American labor, the essence of the American system rested not with some panacea or socialist theory, but with "constitutionalism"

In Industrial relations, where two organized groups could

^American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, I896, p. 20. negotiate their differences within the framework of a corporate value system* It was this balance of power ideology which Gompers and numerous other business union leaders cultivated during the l890*s; and it was the one which, by adopting the most acceptable methodological and ideological approach, offered one solution to the problem of the position of the American working-class in industrial America.

Assisting Gompers and his fellow "bread-and- butter” unionists in their pursuit of a cooperative cap­ italist order were several business leaders who had come to believe that recognition of unions was a wise policy.

These men by no means represented the majority of Amer­ ican business leadership, but nonetheless, as the l890*s progressed it became increasingly clear that more and more industrialists favored an enlightened course toward organ­ ized labor. Typical of this group was Charles J, Hurrah,

President of the Midvale Steel and Ordnance Company in

Philadelphia. Testifying before the United States Indus­ trial Commission in 1900 Hurrah commented that his company

"found that trade unions and labor organizations of all kinds are decidedly beneficial to the employer." Harrah viewed organized labor as a stabilizing influence, enab­ ling employers to avoid the confusion and bitterness which usually attended negotiations with hundreds of individual 9 workers. Hurrah advised against recognition or dealings with radical union leaders; he argued, however, that "when a labor organization has at its head a thinking man, a stu­ dent like Mr, Gompers, for instance , , . it is decidedly of benefit to the manufacturer,"5

Of all the forward-thinking industrialists of this period few had more influence on the American political economy than Marcus Alonzo Hanna, Although often portray­ ed as an enemy df labor, Hannahs actions and record as an employer tell of a man both compassionate and far-sighted in his dealings with the worker population. He displayed a particular readiness for hearing the worker’s side of the story. And he detested employers who fâiled to adopt a common sense approach to settling labor disputes. In

1894 he berated George Fbrtimer Pullman, lord and master of the Palace Car Company, for failing to arbitrate the differences between himself and his employees during the famous Chicago railroad strike.^ Later, when a strike

^Testimony of Charles J, Hurrah, Industrial Commis­ sion, Reports, XIV (Washington, D,C.; Government Printing Office, I90I), 349-50, The Midvale Company was a pioneer­ ing organization in another area. It was at the Midvale Steel Plant at Nicetown, Pennsylvania that Frederick W, Taylor fashioned his ideas and plans for scientific manage­ ment in the factory system. See Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift; Scientific Management in the Progressive Ëra (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904), pp. I-17.

^In expressing his anger Hanna spewed forth the well publisized phrase: "A man who won't meet his men half­ way is a Godr-damn fool," See Thomas Beer Hanna (New York: 10 broke out In one of Hanna’s own Interests In Buffalo he was called upon to act according to his principles.

Following the advice of Samuel Gompers, he patiently listened to the workers expose attempts by superintendents and foremen to force "men seeking employment to pay them extortionate fees" and promptly discharged all of the guilty officials.^

More important than these isolated attempts to stay on good terms with labor was Hanna’s leadership as an exponent of the progressive-pragmatic approach to the labor question. Evoking the use of collective bargaining and arbitration, Hanna pursued his most cherished goals— economic expansion and industrial peace— through a more equal distribution of power between employers and employ­ ees,® As a man nurtured on nineteenth century capitalist

6 (Cont’d) Alfred A. Knopf, 1929), pp. 132-33. It is worth noting that Pullman, an extreme hardliner on the issue of bar­ gaining with unions, had for many years been a "high- Tariff man" and heavy donor to the National Republican party. It is hard to determine what effect Hanna’s state­ ment may have had on Pullman’s future relationship with the G.O,P, See Roy Ginger, "A Compulsory Heaven at Pull­ man," in Leonard Dinnerstein and Kenneth T, Jackson, ed,, American Vistas 1877 to Present (New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1971), p, b«, 7 For an excellent discussion on Hanna and the work­ ing class see Stephen J, Sheinberg, "The Development of Corporation Labor Policy, 1900-1940" (unpublished Ph,D. dissertation. University of Wisconsin, 1966), pp. 1-20, 8 Herbert Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work (New York: MacMillan Co., l9l2, pp, 84-95. See also (Jerald W, Wolff, "Mark Hanna’s Goal: American Harmony," Ohio History. LXXIX (Summer-Autumn, 1970), 138-51, 11 ethics, Hanna accepted the growth of trusts as a natural phenomenon. But he also recognized that the expanded growth of monopolies could have adverse effects on the working class and make them more receptive to radical solu­ tions. To avoid this catastrophe he advised employers to ally themselves with conservative, responsible union of­ ficials and welcome the laboring class as a copartner in

America's corporate expansion. In developing this policy

Hanna surmised that any radical solutions to the labor problem could be diluted. In other words, Hanna's con­ duct was, to a large extent, directed at counteracting the socialist and communist influence among the laboring classes,9 In the latter instance, Hanna, like many

Americans of his day, was reacting to his own particular perceptions of the dangers accompanying the rapid econ­ omic changes occurring in his country,

Hanna is also important because through his politi­ cal partnership with William McKinley he helped create a . social and political environment in which employers could readily develop a more progressive viewpoint concerning the incorporation of organized labor into the capitalist economy. Ideologically speaking, William McKinley and

HannaÎ His Book (Boston: Chappie Publishing Co., I9Û4), pp. 39-45, 12

Mark Hanna held remarkably similar views » particularly regarding politics and business. Each possessed a deep faith in organization for the purpose of insuring stability; and because they actively supported this line of thinking, they fostered a flexible attitude toward the labor prob­ lem: an attitude not dissimilar to that of the pure-and- simple labor leaders and their allies in the business com­ munity who were drifting toward adoption of a new employer attitude based upon a harmonious relationship between organizations of workers and organizations of employers.

To be sure, this was the attitude refined and promoted by the National Civic Federation which Hanna helped organize and served as its first president.

It seems apparent, then, that in the l890»s there emerged, largely from the perceptions of men deeply con­ cerned with the labor question, certain points of view which fused into an ideology encompassing all the values necessary for secure industrial progress.

Initially this ideology meant different things to different groups of people. For pragmatic unionists, it held out hopes for union recognition and acceptance into the capitalist order. For employers and politicians it served as a convenient device for promoting social and economic stability as well as counterbalancing any radical alternatives to the corporate value system which 13 they held in the highest esteem. As time passed, however,

these ideological responses, sustained by the efforts of

the National Civic Federation, coalesced into what has

been loosely defined as the "corporate ideology," a set of

attitudes and manners associated with conduct which aimed

to maintain power relationships and value systems guar­

anteed to insure continued corporate growth. Furthermore,

It Is this Ideology, this socio-economic system with Its reverence for security, stability, and the rationalization of business which has pervaded American thinking through­

out the twentieth century. CHAPTER II

THE CHANGING VIEWS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMY, 1865-1900

This chapter makes an attempt to relate the changing views and attitudes toward the American workingman and his efforts toward organization In post-Clvll War America.

These prevailing views and attitudes, so critical to labor's acceptance Into Industrial society, underwent significant change as Glided Age America experienced the Impact of ad­ vancing Industrial capitalism. Throughout most of the period the predominate attitude toward labor was hostile, primarily because of the workingman's seeming habltualness toward violence and the reformist philosophies of the early national labor unions. However, by the 1890's, much of the labor movement came under the leadership of "conserva­ tive business unionists"; and their pragmatic efforts com­ bined with the "progressive" views of certain Influential business leaders and politicians helped organized labor advance toward respectability In the capitalist economy.

Finally, under the aegis of the National Civic Federation, an organization of business and labor leaders seeking to promote collective bargaining between equally balanced

Ik 15 groups, "conservative" labor unions won acceptance into the highest circles of industrial capitalism. « » »

Between 1865 and the beginning of the twentieth cen­ tury, the United States experienced a devastating economic revolution culminating in the clear-cut victory of indus­ try over agriculture,^ Five transcontinental railroads came into existence, and competitive builders laid enough tracks to convert America into one gigantic market place.

Increasing numbers of steel and textile mills, oil wells, slaughterhouses, and other facets of production attested to the country's growing affection for the machine and mass production. Industrial cities, fed by dreaming im­ migrants and hopeful country folk, blossomed along every waterway, changing America from a provincial small-town society into an expanding urban-industrial society. Huge impersonal corporations, unrestrained, and supervised by ambitious and ruthless magnates brought untold prosperity to America, making her, by I900, "the greatest industrial power in the world,

In 1900 U,S, manufactured products valued $13,010,000,000 compared to approximately $4,717,000,000 for agriculture. See Abstract of the Twelfth Census, 1900 (Washington, D,C,: Government Printing Office, Ï904), pp, 219-300, Carl N, Degler, The Age of Economic Revolution 1875- 1900 (Glenview, 111,: Scott^ Foresman, and dol,, Ï967), p» 4, 16

But accompanying this rapid post-Clvll War expan­ sion were a variety of serious economic and social prob­ lems. Among them were currency and banking problems, the crisis In agriculture, the problems of growing urban­ ization, and the question of government regulation of monopolies. However, of all the problems facing late nineteenth century America none had the enduring Impact of the labor problem. It was the labor problem which brought violence to the American scene. It was the labor problem, and Its close association with mass Immigration that posed the ominous "threat" of a foreign socialist conspiracy. It was this same problem, moreover, which so dominated late nineteenth century America that It Is chiefly responsible for historians employing such labels as "the turbulent eighties" and "heartbreaking nineties" to describe the two most significant decades of the period.3

It was Immediately after the Civil War that trade unionism began emerging as an Important facet of American economic life. In August, 1866 seventy-seven delegates, representing a variety of labor organizations and eight- hour leagues, met In Baltimore to discuss the possibilities for acquiring an eight-hour work day In order to "make-

^See, for example, Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization. Vol. Ill: 1865-1918 (kew York: Viking Press, 1949), pp. 113-41, 211-37. 17 work" for those unemployed due to the post-1864 return of soldiers and cutbacks in war industries. In the process they founded the National Labor Union, the country’s first

"permanent" national labor organization. Selig Perlman, the famous University of Wisconsin labor economist, has described the N.L.U. as "a loosely built federation of national trade unions, city trades* assemblies, local trade unions, and reform organizations of various descrip­ tions, from philosophical anarchists to socialists and woman suffragists."^

In its early congresses the National Labor Union set forth a number of general aims which apparently posed little if any threat to the powers that be in American society. Its trade policy was rigid and conservative, placing heavy stress on trade organizations and calling for close policing of apprenticeship laws. Furthermore, at the opening meeting the various committees strongly condemned the use of strikes, recommending arbitration or political action as probable substitutes for promoting worker interests. On the reform side of the ledger, the

N.L.U,*s prime goals were the establishment of the uniform eight hour workday throughout the country, and the formation of both consumers* and producers* coopera­ tives. Finally, women’s rights; the abolition of convict

Selig Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: Macmillan Co., 19^3), P* ^5. 18 labor; Immigration restriction to protect native workers;

the opening of the public domain only to bonafide settlers; the creation in Washington of a Department of Labor; and

the repeal of the Convict Labor Act of 1864 were addition­

al objectives of the early N.L.U.^

The formation of a national organization with dis­

tinct goals failed to help the N.L.U. acquire new members.

However, a major step toward solving this problem was

taken at the union's third congress in 1868 when William

H. Sylvis, skilled head of the successful Iron Molders*

International Union and one of the great labor leaders of

that era, was elected president. Only forty years old,

Sylvis was a man of extraordinary zeal and dedication to

trade unionism. Speaking of his love for labor's cause,

he once declared: "I hold it more dear than I do my family or my life. I am willing to devote to it all that I am

or have or hope for in this world.True to his word,

Sylvis immediately embarked on a three-month recruiting

^Factual information relating to the history of the National Labor Union is taken from Poster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America; A History (New York: Thomas y. Crowell Co., 1949), pp. 100-13; Joseph G. Rayback, A History of ^erican Labor (New York: Macmillan Co., 19B^Tr"pFTiTE‘- 28; Jonathan Grossman, William Sylvis. Pioneer of American Labor: A Study of the Labor Movement During the Era of the Civil War (>tew Ÿork: Columbia University Press. 1945). pp. 220-74.

^Quoted in Dulles, Labor in America, p. 102, 19 tour through the south bringing several locals into the ranks of the N.L.U.

Although Sylvis' enthusiasm and inspired leader­ ship worked miracles for the N.L.U. in an organisational sense, it did little to solidify the union ideologically or help it focus on economic issues* More and more the

Union became a reform and political organization seeking to escape the wage system rather than work within it as a job-and-wage-conscious body, Sylvis himseIf— before his untimely death in July, 1869— had perceptibly moved in this direction.^ Richard F. Travellick, skilled organizer and head of the International Union of Ship Carpenters and Caulkers, succeeded Sylvis as president; but he, too, followed the trend away from trade unionism and into political action. By 1870 the National Labor Union had become what the informed labor historian Norman Ware des­ cribed as "a typical American politico-reform organization, led by leaders without organizations, politicians without parties, women without husbands, and cranks, visionaries, and agitators without Jobs."® The end came two years later

7 During the l860*s Sylvis had become increasingly disgruntled over workers throwing their votes to supposedly pro-labor politicians who eventually broke their promises to the workingman. He finally concluded that "if labor has its own political party workingmen can vote for men of them and with them . . . We should then know for whom and for what we voted," See Grossman, William Sylvis. p. 23^.

^Norman Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States 1860-1969? A Study in Democracy (New York: b. Appleton and Ü"o’V 1929), p. 11. 20 when the N.L.U, transformed itself Into the National Labor

Reform Party and sought its future in the presidential campaign of I872. Meeting in Columbus, Ohio the party hammered out a platform emphasizing monetary reform to­ gether with the other reforms it had been preaching since the N.L.U.'s inception. In addition, they nominated Sup­ reme Court Justice David Davis of Illinois for president and Governor John Parker of New Jersey for vice-president.

Davis withdrew his candidacy, however, when the Liberal

Republicans nominated the famous editor and political activist Horace Greely for president, Davis’ declina­ tion dealt the final blow to the already bitterly divided

Labor Reform Party, and when it collapsed so did the

National Labor Union.

Despite the N.L.U.’s conspicuous success after

1868, it seemed to elicit little reaction from the monied aristocracy. Because it abhorred strikes and preferred to seek its goals in the political arena it simply proposed no real challenge to traditional American values. More­ over, the period from I868 to 1873 was one of relative prosperity for America and this fostered the growth of a substantial number of national unions, including the large shoemakers union, the Knights of St, Crispin, numbering approximately 50,000 in 1873.^ All trade unions during

a John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the United States. II (New York: Macmillan Co.,1918), p. 47. 1870-1872 had a total membership of approximately 300,000

representing a relatively high 9.1 per cent of the Indus­

trial wage earning class.Thus the National Labor Union

constituted merely one union among many, and since the nation was experiencing "good times," it presented no

challenge to the goals and values of the emerging capital­

ist class. In short, the National Labor Union brought

little attention to the labor problem, and was part of it only through the beneficial ideas it may have passed on to future labor movements.

The disintegration of the N.L.U, immediately pre­ ceded one of the most confusing yet telling periods in

American labor history, the depression years of 1873-1878.

Victimized by constant wage cuts, severe unemployment and general hard times, workers in the l870*s reacted with demonstrations of protest and strikes which often led to violence and insurrection. In addition, although organized labor remained basically conservative, a number of immi­ grants entering the country during this time brought along a radical perspective which they tried to fasten onto the labor movement. Thus the two ingredients which tended to spark anti-union sentiment, that is labor strife and the

Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union: The Development and Significance of ïts Structure. Govern­ ing Institutions and Economic Policies (Cambridge. Mass.; harvard University !Pres8, Ï96b), p. 19. 22 threat of foreign conspiracy, came upon the American scene in the 1870*8. And despite organized labor’s repudiation of radical ideas, employers generally hostile to union­ ization conveniently played on the public’s fear of social­ ism and anarchism to weaken or suppress all of organized labor.

Several examples of labor unrest in the seventies provide evidence of management’s rigid view toward labor.

In January, 187^ a group of unemployed New Yorkers planned to meet in Tompkin’s Square to call upon city officials to relieve their economic burden. However, when it became know that radical members of the socialist International

Workingmen’s Association were going to participate, the workers’ police permit as well as the mayor’s pledge to speak were canceled. When the meeting went on as sched­ uled the police dispersed the crowd with an overt show of force.Many of the demonstrators were trampled and clubbed, but the local press, seemingly Ignorant of the plight of the unemployed, blamed the situation on foreign e l e m e n t s . ^2 The prestigious New York Times stated that

^^Sanford Cohen, Labor in the United States (Colum­ bus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill books, Inc., i960), pp. 85-

^^New York Times. January 1^-15. 187^. See also, Herbert G . Gutman, "The Compkins Subject*Riot’ in New York City on January 13, 1874: A Reexamination of its Causes and its Aftermath," Labor History. VI (Winter, I966), 44-70. 23 "the persons arrested yesterday seem all to have been foreigners— chiefly German or Irishmen, Communism is not a weed of native growth nl3

More fuel was added to this anti-labor attitude during the upheavals permeating the coal industry in the mid-seventies. In late l8y4 America's anthracite coal miners, angered by oppressive wage cuts, ceased work and begun what is referred to as "the long strike of 1875."

Immediately the miners ran up against the implacable foe of labor Franklin B. Gowen, dictator of the Pennsylvania coal operators. Gowen, by simultaneously holding the presidency of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad and the Anthracite Board of Trade, easily manipulated the labor policies of a great number of mine owners. Spending near­ ly four million dollars to break the I875 strike, and con­ vincing the operators that the miners were being led by

"advocates of the Commune and emissaries of the Interna­ tional" Gowen literally smashed the organization of anth­ racite labor, the Miners* and Laborers* Benevolent Associa­ tion. The miners only received sympathy from the public and friends in the labor movement; no enlightened attitudes toward labor came from the moneyed eleraents.^^

^^Quoted in Dulles, Labor in America, p. 116, 111 Philip S, Poner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States Prom Colonial Times to the Pounding of the American Federation of Labor IHew Ÿork: International Publishers, i9^7),pp, ^55-60; Rayback, History of American Labor, pp. 131-32, Coinciding with the "long strike of 1875" 24 This bitter anti-union feeling intensified during the famous railway strikes which swept the country in

1877. Like the miners, railroad workers felt the wrath of the depression, and in similar fashion responded with strikes and violence* The most serious disturbances oc­ curred in Martinsburg. West Virginia and Pittsburgh. In each case the railway workers manifested considerable support from public opinion, other unionists, the unem­ ployed, and even small businessmen* But this proved too little, for employers presented a united front; and since the law was on their side they could call on the authori­ ties to crush the strikers*^5

14 (Cont»d) was the scourge of the so-called Molly Maguires, consisting of murder and various acts of violence and terror carried out by a "secret society" operating in the anthracite rich Schuylkill County in Pennsylvania* Here too, Gowen, with the aid of Pinkerton spy James Mcphalan, took the initia­ tive in overthrowing the Molly Maguire Order. Several "mollies" were brought to trial, and despite the ensuing mockery of justice, the labor movement suffered another serious setback* See J* Walter Coleman, The Molly Maguire Riots; Industrial Conflict in the Pennsylvania Coal Region (Richmond, Va*: Garrett and Massie, ïnc,, 1^36); Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., The Molly Maguires (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

^^Por an analysis of the railroad strikes of 1877 see Samuel Yellon, American Labor Struggles (New York: Har- court and Brace Co., 1936), pp. 3-3d* A more thorough treat­ ment can be found in Robert V. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959). See also the contempor- ary, but lacking version in J. A. Dacus, Annals of the Great Strikes in the United States: A Reliable History and Graphic bescription of the Causes and Thrilling Events o^ tHe Labor Strikes and'Riots of 1877 (Chicago; L. T« Palmer and Co., 25 More important, however, was the damage employers

and their supporters did to the concept of unionism by

characterizing the strikers as revolutionary and anti-

American. The distinguished labor historian Poster Rhea

Dulles aptly described this effort by outlining the veno­ mous response of leading newspapers to the strikes of seventy-seven:

Headlines and editorials declared that com­ munism was at the bottom of the strike and responsible for its violence in Baltimore, Pittsburgh and other parts of the country. It was described as "an insurrection, a revolu­ tion, an attempt of communists and vagabonds to coerce society, an endeavour to undermine American institutions." The New York Tribune stated only force could subdue this "ignorant rabble with hungry mouths"; the Times charac­ terized the strikers as "hoodlums, rabble, bummers, looters, blacklegs, thieves, tramps, ruffians, incendiaries, enemies of society, brigands, rapscallions, riffraff, fellons and idiots," and the Herald declared that the mob was "a wild beast and needs to be shot down." Reading such headlines as "Pittsburgh Sacked— the City Completely In the Power of a Howling Mob," and "Chicago in the Possession of Com­ munists," an alarmed public was swept by hysterical fears.

These attitudes typified the views of those in authority who believed that workers had no rights and must bend to existing economic conditions.

It seems obvious, then, that the prevailing atti­ tude of those in positions of economic and political power

Dulles, Labor in America, p. 121, For similar reactions from differing sources see Yellon, American Labor Struggles, pp. 21-22, 28, 34-38, 26

toward labor during the l870*s was negative. Industrial­

ists, aided by their friends in power, fought labor on

all fronts. They refused to tolerate even docile and

fraternal organizations. Fearful of impending violence

coupled with the spread of socialism^7 and anarchism, the

powerful and well-organized enemies of unionism directed

their energies to discrediting organized workers. When more conservative unions openly denied any association or

sympathy with radicalism their opponents merely turned

a deaf ear and proceeded to stigmatize all labor organ­

izations as revolutionary and un-American, As Louis

Adamic writes of this period; "The Capitalists as a class were thoroughly agreed upon one thing only - their opposi­

tion to the proletariat*s strivings to improve its

status,Labor'8 only allies came from the public and

^The restlessness of the workers in the l870*s did heighten their sense of class consciousness, giving some hope to the socialists. In I876, two socialists groups formed the Workingmen’s Party which changed its name to the Social­ ists Labor Party in 1877. Operating within these organiza­ tions the socialists made political gains in Milwaukee, Chicago, and other cities. By 1879 the S,L,P, "claimed a membership of 10,000 in 100 locals in twenty-five states." Undoubtedly employers were aware of this new threat to their value system. See Daniel Bell "The Background and Develop­ ment of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Donald Drew Egbert and Stew Persons, ed,, Socialism and American Life. I (Princeton,N,J,; Princeton University ^ress, 1952), pp. 235-36.

^^Louis Adamic, Dynamite; The Story of Class Violence in America (New York: Viking tress, 1931), p. 23. 27 Its own ranks, not from employers or federal officials.

The anti-labor attitudes pervading the l870*s, combined with the depression of 1873* had a very adverse effect on the stability of trade unionism in America.

Trade-union membership dipped dramatically from 300,000 to 50,000 through the seventies, and several nationals, in­ cluding the once prosperous Knights of St. Crispin, vir­ tually disappeared. However, one union, the Noble and Holy

Order of the Knights of Labor, managed to weather the des­ tructive seventies* Founded by the Philadelphia tailor

Uriah P. Stephens in 1869, the K. of L, evolved slowly along three levels, "At the bottom were the local assem­ blies composed of individual members. Locals, in turn, were grouped geographically into district assemblies. Each district assembly elected delegates to the annual conven­ tion or General Assembly, which elected the officers and the General Executive Board.Membership was open to all wage earners, excluding lawyers, doctors, bankers, stock­ brokers, liquor salesmen, and professional gamblers. By

1878, when the General Assembly was formed, the Knights had over eleven district assemblies, and a membership slightly

19 Gerald N. Grob, Workers and Utopia: A Study Of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor Movement 186"5- 1900pr?5. (Evanston. 111.; Northwestern University Press. 1961). 28

Knights kept alive. In the critical depression years of

the mid-seventies, the ideal of a national labor union, an

ideal crucial to the anticipated elevation of the laboring

classes.

Like the National Labor Union, the Knights of Labor was reformist and somewhat radical in desired ends, but

conservative and patient in implementing means to attain those ends. The union demonstrated particular concern over the unchecked accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few anti-labor capitalistsj it warned in the preamble to its constitution that if this trend continued it would surely lead "to the pauperization and hopeless degradation of the toiling masses.To escape this calamity the leadership called for, among other things, the unification and education of all labor, the establishment of coopera­ tives, government ownership of railroads and telegraph lines, and a number of measures aimed at equalizing in- 22

20 Anthony Bimba, The History of the American Working Class (New York: International Publishers, 1936)* p. 1^4; Commons and Associates, History of Labour. II, p. 339.

^^Quoted in Dulles, Labor in America, p. 131. 22 Ibid.. p. 132. 29 These Idealistic and reformist principles were un­ questionably difficult, if not impossible to execute.

Nonetheless, the Knights, at least ideologically, renoun­

ced the use of strikes to achieve their humanitarian goals.

Although eager to encourage and support boycotts, the

K. of L. generally looked to arbitration rather than indus­ trial strikes as the proper means for winning concessions from employers. As the constitution of 1884 affirmed:

"Strikes at best afford only temporary relief and members should be educated to depend upon thorough education, cooperation and political action, and through these the abolition of the wage system,This philosophy was per­ haps best exemplified in the thinking of Terence Vincent

Powderly, the Knights' Grand Master Worman from 1879 to 1893, Powderly, an Irish Catholic with a strong humani­ tarian strain, eluded issues related to wage-consciousness and persistently stressed that strikes solved few of the basic problems facing workers. "The tendency of the times is to do away with strikes," he wrote in the early l880*s,

"That remedy has been proved by experience to be a very

Quoted in Harry A, MiIlls and Royal E, Montgomery, Organized Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co,, 1945) p. o7. To eliminate the wage system, declared a top official in the Knights, would require more than mere struggles for "in­ creased wages and a reduction in the hours of Labor," See Grob, Workers and Utopia, p. 38, 30 costly one for employer and employee.One of Powderly*s greatest sources of pride was that during his fourteen year tenure as President of the Knights of Labor he never once ordered a strike.

His own solution to labor problems was strictly

Jeffersonian, particularly in its appeal for a more inde­ pendent workingman. He believed the wage system could be circumvented, not through violence, but "by opening to the worker an escape into self-employeraent through coopera­ tion,"^^ in short, through the "establishment of producer cooperatives,"27 Cooperatives, for Powderly, were the essential mechanism for bringing freedom and equality to all men. Throughout his life he maintained his faith in this principle; "my belief that cooperation shall one day take the place of the wage system," he proclaimed later in his autobiographical The Path I Trod, "remains unbroken."^®

oil Quoted in Dulles, Labor in America, p. 137. ^^Charles A, Madison, American Labor Leaders; Person­ alities and Forces in the Labor Movement (New York; 'Frederick linger Publishing Co,, i950), p. 5b.

^^Perlman, History of Trade Unionism, p, 71.

Rayback, History of American Labor, p. 1^7. 28 Quoted in Harry J. Carmen, Henry David and Paul N, Guthrie, ed., The Path I Trod; The Autobiography of Terence V. Powderly (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. ^83. Hereinafter cited as Powderly, The Path I Trod, 31 Although not all members of the K, of L. followed

Powderly*s advlce,^^ the union enjoyed tremendous success

under his leadership. This was especially true during the

first half of the eighties when, despite increasing indus­

trial unrest, the Knights grew from approximately 28,000

members in I88I to an incredible 700,000 in mid-l886.^®

Even more significant, however, was the interest the

Knights generated in the labor movement, and in the labor

question in general.

This became evident in 1882 when the United States

Senate authorized the Committee on Education and Labor to

conduct an investigation into the whole subject of rela­

tions between labor and capital. Originally, the inves­

tigation was induced by politicians trying to influence

the views of industrial workers regarding the tariff. But

thanks to the efforts of committee chairman Henry W, Blair

of New Hampshire, the investigation proved to be an impar­

tial and worthwhile probe into such issues as the conditions

In 1883 the Knights engaged in its first widespread strike, and in that same year Powderly himself "was obliged to acknowledge that the strikes, and not co-operaation, were responsible for the growth of the order." See Commons and Associates, History of Labour. II, p. 351.

^°See Donald Kemmerer and E. D. Wickersham, "Reasons for the Growth of the Knights of Labor in I885-I886," Indus- trial and Labor Relations Review. Ill (January, 1950),----- 32 and status of laboring classes, the causes of Industrial turmoil, and the possibilities for legislating better relations between capitalists and workers. The investiga­ tion, by inviting a broad spectrum of people to comment on the labor questions, marked a sort of turning point in

American economic history, "For the first time in American history a broad sample of opinion on industrial problems was collected and r e c o r d e d , ”31

Another example of the deepening interest in the labor problem during the rise of the Knights of Labor was the establishment, in the summer of 1884, of a federal

Bureau of Labor in the Interior Department, As already indicated, labor unions for years had advocated the creation of such a bureau. Apparently their efforts, combined with the impact of renewed labor unrest and the depression of

1883 finally brought the issue before Congress, There, after some debate, those arguing that a federal Bureau of

Labor would help Congress solve industrial problems as well as show the legislator’s concern for the welfare of workers carried the day. Following the creation of the Bureau several people, including Terence Powderly applied for the

31 John Garraty, ed,, Labor and Capital in the Gilded Age; Testimony Taken by the Senate Committee Upon the Rela­ tions Between Labor and Canital-lÜÜS (boston: Littlë^s brown and Co,, 19bb), p, xi. 33 office of commissioner. The job went to Carroll Davison

Wright, a humanitarian labor reformer and statistician, who for ten years had served as chief of the innovative

Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics and Labor.It was

Wright, through his indefatigable dedication to investi­ gating labor problems, who forced Americans to contemplate the impact of labor on the American economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

To be sure, such landmark developments as the crea­ tion of a Senate Committee and a Bureau of Labor to study issues concerning both labor and capital represented valua­ ble progress to those committed to the advance of unions.

However, these gains should not obscure the fact that many, if not most industrialists remained negative toward labor throughout the l880's. Despite the remarkable growth of the Knights most employers remained determined to ignore unions, and exercise personal control over their workers.

Typical of those embracing this attitude was John Roach, a prominent and controversial shipbuilder, who mouthed sympathies toward workers but chose to snub unions and "deal - with" worker complaints on an individual basis. Other anti­ union managers were even more discreet, often combining their

James Leiby, Carroll Wright and Labor Reform; The Origin of Labor Statistics (Cambridge. Mass.; Harvard Univ­ ersity Press, I960), pp. 3-4, 68-75. 34 power to discharge with blacklisting to remove labor

leaders or agitators. 33

If these methods proved Ineffective in thwarting

the power of the Knights of Labor, there always existed the

more reliable technique of labeling the union as subver­

sive, This became all too evident in 1886 when the Knights

were associated with the anarchist inspired Haymarket bomb­

ing, Because 6f the misfortune imposed on workers in the

depression of the mid-eighties the Knights, largely through

the efforts of the rank and file, began participating in

strikes. Surprisingly, the K, of L., unlike its contempor­

aries in the labor movement, enjoyed incredible success

through industrial action. Their most important victories

came against the railroads in 1884-85, particularly the

Jay Gould lines located in the Southwest, With these suc­

cesses the membership and prestige of the K, of L, sky­

rocketed; in the year following the summer of I885 the Knights mushroomed from a mere 104,000 to 703,000,34

But no sooner had the Knights become the darling

of the workingman, than its influence started to dwindle.

The first distressing sign came in March, I886 when the

33 Edward C, Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age; Busi­ ness. Labor, and Public Policy ibbO-ld^V (kew Ÿork: Holt, klnehart, and Winston, 19bl^, pp. 362-66, 34 Rayback, History of American Labor, pp, 161-62; Grob, Workers and Utopia, pp. 6 3-70, 35 union again struck Gould's Southwestern Railway system.

This time the powerful and unscrupulous financier was ready, and after two months of intermittent violence, the strike dissipated in a critical defeat for the Knights of Labor. At about the same time, the rank and file, acting in violation of the orders of Powderly, involved itself in the popular eight-hour movement. The decision proved disastrous, for on the nights of May 4, 1886 the

Chicago police, believing that a group of protesting strikers in Haymarket Square were being influenced by an

"evil" group of anarcho-syndicatists, decided to disperse the assembly. As the police "debated" their orders with the protesters a bomb exploded, and by the time the shoot­ ing stopped at least ten people were killed and over fifty injured.35 ,

The Haymarket bombing was a tremendous setback for

American labor, meaning primarily the Knights of Labor,

35t w o studies providing information on the Haymarket affair are Bessie L, Pierce, A History of Chicago (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), III, pp.^73-o9; and Henry David, The History of the Haymarket Affair. A Study in the Amer­ ican Social Revolutionary and Labor Movements (New York: t^arrar and Rinehart, 1 9 .

^^It should be understood that engaging in "expensive sympathetic strikes" was not the only reason for the decline of the Knights, Internal dissension over organization, leadership, and philosophy also contributed to the union's demise. See George Gorham Groat, An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America (New York: Macmillan Co., 36 A wave of hysteria swept the country, and the anti-labor , press took full advantage. Furthermore, a majority of people chose to blame the K, of L,, or at least its radical elements, for the "incident" in Chicago, Even though the

Knights had initially opposed the eight-hours strikes, and denounced the anarchists as "cowardly, murderers, cut­ throats, and robbers," they still absorbed the brunt of anti-labor sentiment,For the moment, public opinion identified labor with violence and the Knights suffered accordingly. After 1886 its membership and influence stead­ ily decreased, until I893 when the once powerful Knights of Labor had become inept.

In summation, it can be said that the history of labor in the l880*s was marked by both achievements and frustrations. On the one hand, the return of prosperity following the depression of the seventies worked well for labor. Aside from the portentous rise of the Knights, at least "sixty-two international unions were established between I880 and 1889,"^^ In addition, the federal govern­ ment finally acknowledged the importance of the labor question and created a Bureau of Labor, and authorized a

"^Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age, p, 38O»

^^Philip Taft, Organized Labor In American History (New York; Harper and Row, Publishers, l$ô4), p, 84, 37 congressional investigation into the existing state of

affairs between capital and labor. On the other hand,

these gains failed to change most industrialist’s basic view of organized workers. The vast majority of business­ men continued to express barbaric attitudes toward unions, and this, combined with the hostility of the law wrecked unionization. Furthermore, the business manager’s per­ sistence in associating the labor movement with European radicalism39 and violence, as illustrated in the reac­ tions to the Haymarket Riot, also proved detrimental to the success of unionism. In short, labor progressed markedly during the 1880’s; but steadfast employer oppos­ ition to the idea of effective labor unions prohibited organized workers from realizing their most cherished goal: active participation in the power politics of modern econ­ omic relations.

3 9 Although divided the socialists remained active in the l880’s. In 1886 the Socialist Labor party backed Henry George of the Union Labor party for mayor of New York City. One of George’s supporters, Daniel DeLeon, a brilliant Marxist who later challenged the American Federation of Labor, also began his rise during this period. See Harry W. Laidler, History of Socialism: A Comparative Survey of Social­ ism, Communism. Trade Unionism. Cooperation. Utopianism'.'"and Other Systems of Reform and Reconstruction (New York: Thomas Y7 Crowell Co., 1968), pp. 579-82, 38

While the Knights of Labor withered, the American

Federation of Labor rose to assume leadership of the Amer­ ican labor movement. The A.F.L, grew out of the Federa­ tion of Organized Trades and Labor Unions established by a group of discontented labor leaders meeting in Pittsburgh in 1881. These men tended to be members of a national or international union of a trade whose members increasingly resented the controls imposed by the heterogeneous Knights,

Moreover, they opposed the reformist philosophy of the

K, of L., offering in its stead a "new unionism" primarily concerned with working for short-run economic gains within the existing capitalist framework. Initially the Federa­ tion of Organized Trades and Labor Unions had little dif­ ficulty in cooperating with the Knights. However, as the

1889's progressed the K, of L, aggravated the growing split in American labor by becoming more aggressive in curbing national unions. To cope with this situation, the dissat­ isfied trade unionists called a conference in Philadelphia in May, I886. At that meeting the delegates appointed a committee to draw up a treaty aimed at ameliorating the differences between trade unions and the Knights. The prin­ cipal terms of the treaty were directed toward preventing local or district assemblies from organizing any trade having a national organization, or from interfering with the affairs or policies of trade unions. Although the treaty 39 was not a declaration of war, it clearly signified the growing rivalry between the K. of L. and the trade unions,^®

The trade-union committee presented its treaty to the Knights but with no success. Consequently another meet­ ing, aimed primarily at forming an Independent "American

Federation or Alliance of all National and International

Trades Unions" was scheduled for Columbus, Ohio in December,

1 8 8 6 . At this historic conference, a committee of Knights made one last futile attempt at negotiating differences only to discover that the rift between their organization and the trade unions had reached an impasse. The belliger­ ency of the leaders on each side, the persistent Jurisdic­ tional squabbles, and, most important, the growing ideolog­ ical separation simply drove a wedge between the two groups.

While attempts at conciliation floundered the Columbus assembly of forty-two delegates representing twenty-five craft organizations proceeded to form the American Federa­ tion of Labor and elected Samuel Gompers, the chief advocate of craft separation from the Knights, its first president.

^®Grob, Workers and Utopia, pp. 111-12. 41 A comprehensive listing of the purposes of the Colum­ bus conference appears in Philip Taft, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New York: Harper and Rôw7~3^95TT7~Fr’'357**~^ 42 For sources on the beginnings of the American Fédéra­ nt ion of Labor, see: Lewis L. Lorwin, The American Federation of Labor; History. Policies, and Prospects (Washington. D.C.; ■!rhe ferookings institution, 1933) * pp. 7-23; Bernard Mande 1, Samuel Gompers (Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1963), 40 Thus by the end of 1886 the K, of L, and several of Its

national and international trade unions had taken radical­

ly different paths. In the span of but one year their

rivalry would become tantamount to a declaration of war;

so bitter that Gompers would declare the Knights of Labor

"Just as great enemies of Trade Unions as any employers

can be, only much more vindictive. I tell you that they will give us no quarter and I would give them their own medicine in return. It is no use trying to placate them or even be f r i e n d l y . "^3

Samuel Gompers was the principal architect and

driving force behind the A.F.L, Born in the London tene­ ments in 1850, Gompers came to the United States in I863

and immediately took up the trade of his father: cigar making. Before long he became involved in union and radi­

cal activities and, along with Adolph Strasser and Ferdi­ nand Laurr ell, began reorganizing the Cigar Maker’s Union.

42 (Cont’d) pp. 70-75; Taft, A.F.L. in the Time of Gompers. pp. 31-62; Commons and Associates. History of Labor. II. pp. 396-413; Rayback, History of American Labor, pp. 194-207; Dulles, Labor in America, pp. 150-65: Grobl Workers and Utopia, pp. 99-118. 43 Quoted in Grob, Workers and Utopia, p. 119. 44 Adolph Strasser, an early convert from socialism to pure and simple trade unionism, was active in organizing the Cigar Makers International Union and served as its president in I877. Ferdinand Laurrell was a Swedish social­ ist who eventually migrated to New York. There he met Gom­ pers and introduced him to German socialist literature. Laurrell, too, drifted from socialism to pure and simple unionism and influenced Gompers in the same direction. In this endeavor he exhibited many of the important skills

necessary for successful union leadership. A man of boundless energy and ambition, Gompers proved himself to be an adequate speaker, aggressive organizer, and excellent

administrator. Most important, he kept in close contact with the workers and projected the image of a man who had come up through the ranks.It was these talents which

Gompers utilised to rebuild the Cigarmakers International, and then the A-,F.L. into an organization capable of dominat­ ing the opening fifty-odd years of contemporary labor history.

In addition to being the administrative head of the A.F.L., Gompers also served as the leading spokesman for the "new unionism" associated with craft unionism. Unlike the reformist ideologies preached by Sylvis and Powderly, the basic principles of Gompers * "new unionism'- concentra­ ted solely on economic opportunism. For Sam Gompers, labor's salvation rested not with such panaceas as currency reform or cooperation, but in extracting immediate economic benefits from the existing capitalist system. Although a student of Marx and Engels, Gompers accepted industrialism, the rise of corporations, and the wage system as historic­ ally "correct" phenomena. The job of organized labor was to

Gerald Emanual Stearn, ed., Gompers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), p. 7. 42 squeeze the "possible"— shorter hours, better wages, and

Improved working conditions— from the existing capitalist orderGompers wisely perceived, moreover, that the industrialization of America constituted a phase when

"groups replaced individual effort." This trend revealed itself in such industrial organizations as the trust.

However, Gompers cautioned labor, warning that it was not the unions duty to curtail this "normal development but to find the principles and technique for utilizing group action and group production in furtherance of general wel­ f a r e . "^7 "Economic justice," Gompers asserted, "will come through the organization of economic agencies"there­ fore labor should organize and act in such a way as to acquire enough power to force the cooperation of various groups in equalizing the benefits obtained from expanding industrial capitalism.

In structuring and managing the A.F.L, Gompers sought to establish a powerful and effective economic pressure group, capable of pursuing its goals over an extended period

Gomper's philosophy is presented in Mandel, Samuel Gompers. pp. 37-42, 62-65; Dulles, Labor in America, pp. 153- 56. 47 Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor; An Autobiography. II (New York: È. P. button and Co., Ï9È5), pp. 21-22. 48 Ibid.. p. 26, 43 of time. He hoped that the federation would assume a

position equal to other powerful groups, and become worthy

of acceptance with stature into the industrial order. Pro­

fessor Gerald Stearn skillfully described Gompers* effort;

The "new unionism" of Gompers parodied the emerging corporate structure of big business • • , Skilled workers were gathered by craft into geographic, or shop, locals. The locals in turn were strongly bound to a national union of the craft led by an elected, full time and well paid administration which exer­ cised firm control over member locals. Strike funds, centrally controlled, were accumulated and work stoppages were called with national approval not local initiative. Benefits were paid members and their families for sickness, loss of income during periods of unemployment, and death. An equalization process was devised so that the more-monied locals transferred funds to less prosperous ones. Trade agree­ ments— contracts— were negotiated and signed between unions and employers on a craft basis. Special "union labels" were placed on approved products while non-union goods were boycotted. Regular journals, filled with economic, social, and political as well as union news, were en­ couraged. Paid organizers were sent out to unionize workers by craft. Members with politi­ cal, ideological, or reformist tendencies were tolerated though not encouraged. Finally, a high and compulsory per capita tax was assessed to finance the operation. "Trade unions," Gompers once remarked, "are the business organ­ izations of the workers,"49

By creating a closely knit federation of trade unions com­

posed of men loyally committed to his pragmatic philosophy

Gompers hoped to insure, first, the survival of his union both in prosperity and depression, and secondly, to elevate

49 Stearn, ed., Gompers. p. nn organized labor to a position where its voice carried

weight in the economic system.

Although the A.F.L, clearly conformed to "the trend

toward economic organization and business politics" emerg­

ing in the late 19th century, its early existence provided

slim hope for achieving Gompers* goal of equality in indus­

trial relations.In the decade following 1886, the A.F.L.

faced "struggles with the Knights, with *recalcitrant *

trades, with socialism, with strike failures, and with a

depression.In addition, the federation had to with­

stand the inherited hostility to unionism in American busi­

ness, which was aggravated in the early nineties by strikes

in Homestead, Pennsylvania in 1892 and Pullman, Illinois in 1894.52

But through it all the American Federation of Labor

survived, and in doing so it had escaped the one problem which destroyed earlier labor movements: "the problem of

staying o r g a n i z e d . "53 By abandoning "anti-monopoly"

Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago tress, 1957), pp. 48-70.

^^Rayback, History of American Labor, p. 194.

For a discussion of "opposition to labor in the 1890's" see Taft, Organized Labor in American History, pp. 136-58.

^^Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Macmillan Co., 192b), p. 16È. 45

crusading in favor of sound job-conscious trade unionism;

and by creating a centralized organization capable of hold­

ing the dedication of its members, the A.F.L., in the

eighteen-nineties, was able to withstand those shocks which

defeated preceding labor organizations, and emerge as a

viable force in America's industrial environment. The only

remaining question was just how well would the rest of

America receive organized labor as a prominent force in

guiding the future industrialization of the United States.

Because of the impact of the A.F.L., or perhaps be­

cause of the need for adjusting to the newly experienced

institutional and socio-economic realities of a maturing

urban industrial society, no issue, no overarchinc socio­

economic problem, received more attention during the nine­

ties and early twentieth century, than the relationship between business management and industrial labor. From

various walks of life, academics, journalists, reformers,

politicians and labor officials all poured forth their

opinions regarding prospects for capital and labor, the two

principal elements of American production. As one astute

employer put it: "The conflict . . . between united labor

and united capital constitutes to the industrial world 46

*The Labor Q u e s t i o n . *"54

This preoccupation with "the labor question" in­

volved a developing process of social thinking in which

two major themes, or focal points, intertwined yet stood

out. There was, first, a growing awareness of the condi­

tion of the working class, especially in the milieu of the

nation*s first industrial depression crisis, and equal

concern for improving the lot of the country’s blue-collar

industrial work force. Closely related to this conscious­

ness, was a growing stress in public rhetoric that the

key to any industrial progress depended on the ability of

labor and capital to work together in a spirit of co­

operation and harmony.

Some observers, like onetime fhrxist and prominent

Massachusetts labor leader Frank Keyes Foster, felt that

the conditions of manual laborers in the l890*s showed

constant progress, primarily because the workers themselves were taking action. Increasingly aware of the world around

them, workers more readily expressed discontent with their

environment. A new "social consciousness," combined with

"Some of the Rights and Wrongs of Labor and Capital," Outlook. L I U (May 9. I896), 85I; See also W. A. Morthcott, ^'The kights of Men," Arena. XXVI (December, I90I), 561; Herbert M. Ramp, "The Laborer’s View of the Labor Question; How the Laborer Peels," Arena. XVIII (November, 1897), 644. W, H. Pfahler, "Co-operation of Labor and Capital," Annals of the American Academy. XX (July, 1902), 45. Hereinafter cited as Annals. 47 "Increased freedom and enlarged opportunities" raised

America’s workers to a new social status. Moreover, this sudden advance of labor with its emphasis on education and organization, represented not the anarchy of a socially irresponsible class, but rather acute dismay over unjust conditions voiced by those whose aspirations had developed simultaneously with industrial progress.

Poster’s perceptions, it is important to note, had developed during a fifteen year labor career spanning the

1880’s and most of the nineties. Although he had his youth­ ful affair with radicalism, by the time he joined the Amer­ ican Federation of Labor he had rejected Marxian collec­ tivism and aligned his thinking with the more pragmatic union chiefs, Samuel Gompers and Adolph Strasser,Labor’s problem. Poster came to believe, was a direct consequence of the velocity of change emanating from America’s indus­ trial revolution. To solve the problem the worker had to learn to deal with the variety of crises attending large

Frank K. Poster, "The Condition of the American Work­ ing-Class: How Can It Be Benefited," Forum. XXIV (February, 1898), 711, 716; P. B, Thurber, "The Organization of Indus­ try," Arena. XXII (September, I899), 304. William J. Kerby, "The Laborer and His Point of View," American Catholic Quar­ terly Review. XXVI(January, I90I), 108.

^^Arthur Mann, Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age (Cam­ bridge, Pass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 189-90. 48 scale industrialism. The laborer had to abandon his dreams of the old "New England shoe shop" where "the man was more that a tender to the machine and the military rule of our present industrial system did not pose a perpetual menace to the individuality of the operator,"57 in place of this sentimentality, the laboring-class should develop a more realistic approach to the new factory system; an approach which would enable workers to come to grips with the com­ plexities of the industrial situation which was denying them the full measure of their rights and needs.

Poster's opinions and beliefs are particularly sig­ nificant because as a pioneer member of the A.F.L. his

Intellectual creed reflected the thinking of the hihgest councils of the union. He was, in a sense, the party

Ideologue expressing not revolutionary ideas but the of­ ficial position of the American Federation of Labor. Like

Gompers, he uncompromisingly opposed those radical labor spokesmen who resorted to high-sounding rhetoric and empty theories. In 1894, when the Socialist threat to the A.F.L. was very real,5^ he scorned the union's "radical friends"

Frank K, Foster, "Printers, Their Unions," in George E. McNeill, ed., The Labor Movement ; The Problem of To-day (Boston; A.M. Bridgman and do., 1886;, pp. Ï94-^b.

^^For observations on the threat of Marxians to the A.F.L., see Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor. I, pp. 4lb-27; Bell, "Background anü development of Marxian Socialism in the United States," in Egbert and Persons, ed., Socialism and American Life. I, pp. 250-56. 49 for their ignorance of "American history," and their fail­ ure to realize that any political program proposed by

laborers could only be successful if it adhered to tradi­ tional American principles,Foster's own ideological stand, or union ideal, was more middle-of-the-road, more in tune with the pragmatic ideology which was beginning to dominate the American scene. Its emphasis, contrary to any rival socialist ideology, was on the gradual uplifting of the working class through the application of organizational pressure to equalize the relationship between worker and X. , 60 businessman.

In sum, then, by alluding to the new social con­ sciousness of workers and their ability to gain some sem- blence of control over their individual lives Foster was calling attention to his own remedy, and that of the A.F.L,, for treating the complicated industrial problems of the late 19th century. The cardinal point of this remedy was effective organization directed at elevating workers to their

^^Prank K. Poster, "Labor Policies, Politics, and Platforms," American Federationist. I (March, 1894), 5-6.

^^Mann, Yankee Reformers, pp. 191-93. Foster's "union ideal" maintained that ’’organization, properly financed and Judiciously directed will secure to its member­ ship large material and moral advantages." See Frank K. Foster, "Trade Union Ideals," Publications of the American Economic Association. 3rd Series, ÏŸ (New York: Macmillan Co., 1903), 245. 50

rightful status in the unified economic society. Since

"the aggregation of capital in corporations has largely

destroyed the mobility of labor and dwarfed the economic

influence of the individual laborer," Poster proclaimed,

"it is only by associative effort that the laborer can make

his voice heard in the counting-room; and it is only by as­

sociative effort that he is enabled to secure considera­

tion from an economic standpoint

Interest in the changing status of the workingman,

and concern for his plight received an additional boost

from public opinion. Contrary to a common generalization,

industrial capitalism experienced significant difficulty in

imposing its ideology and way of life on many of the nation's workers. This was especially true in smaller Industrial

towns, where workers utilized favorable local conditions

to blunt the impositions of the industrialists. In the

smaller communities businessmen had to wrestle with the

problems inherent in any close-knit society. Frequently

employers of factory labor could not find strikebreakers

because the small town social structure and ideology was

predominately anti-industrial. In addition, the geographic

^^Prank K, Poster, "The Condition of the American Working-Class," 711-22, 51 impediments, combined with the embittered resistance gen­

erated by locals sympathizing with strikers made it unwise

and sometimes dangerous for industrial managers to import

strikebreakers.

During the great railroad uprisings of 1877 local

authorities attempting to repress disorderly strikers often

found themselves confronted with an angry public whose sym­ pathies were clearly on the side of the strikers. When the mayor of Martinsburg. West Virginia arrested a number of

strike leaders, he soon found them released thanks to the efforts of a large crowd of sympathizers. Later, when Governor Matthews ordered, and even led state militia against the strikers the effort proved futile either due to the soldier*s fraternizing with strikers or the hostile public's intervening to stop the troops. Eventually Pres­ ident Hayes ordered in federal troops to quell the West

Virginia disturbance.^^

When the strike spread to Pittsburgh and railroad management again requested the use of force they received much the same treatment accorded their counterparts in Martins- burg. The mayor of Pittsburgh, aware "that practically all the inhabitants of Pittsburgh believed that city was being discriminated against by the Pennsylvania road in the matter

^^Yellon, American Labor Struggles, pp. 10-15. 52 of freight rates and were clearly on the side of the strikers" largely Ignored the appeal for help. Ultimately

Governor John P. Hartranft ordered In troops, but only those from Philadelphia were effective as the Pittsburgh mllltla could not be relied upon to uphold the property rights of the railroad owners. It should be noted, more­ over, that the more duty-conscious Philadelphia mllltla soon engaged In a bloody battle with an armed and enraged mob ending with the soldiers' retreat from the city

Professor Herbert C, Gutman further alludes to the public's concern for labor by asserting that during the

1870's workers In Ohio, particularly those In small Indus­ trial towns, reinforced their advantage over Industrial­ ists through active participation In local politics.

This penchant for political activism, and the threat It carried at the polls frequently enabled workers to receive the support of local officials and the press. It was this

"sense of community," moreover, which often helped workers emerge victorious In Industrial disputes as well as enhance their efforts In holding back repressive industrial cap-

^^Commons and Associates, History of Labour. II, pp. 188- 89; Yellon, American Labor Struggles, pp. 16-20.

^^See Herbert G, Gutman, "The Workers Search for Power; Labor In the Gullded Age," In H. Wayne Morgan, ed.. The Gullded Age: A Reappraisal (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 57. 53 As America progressed through the Gilded Age, it became increasingly evident that the majority of American workers were demonstrating a marked independence in their attitude toward the emerging industrial society. In the process they continued to receive popular support and by the 1890*8 many people clearly sympathized with the burden- bearer and recognized that his voice must be h e a r d , ^5

"They [the workers]," wrote Day Allen Willey "are being elevated in the eyes of the people and labor is acquiring the dignity so often ascribed to it by the orator, forcing a national recognition of Its position, partly by its own efforts, partly by the broad and deep interest which is being manifested in the army of toilers.In light of this situation the principal issue facing both the indus­ trialist and labor leader was control. America had reached the point in her history where responsible people were compelled to recognize a strong labor class. The question was how to build a society in which labor received sub­ stantial benefits, but the ideology of industrial capitalism

^^Hugh McGregor, "The Incorporation of the Working- Class," Forum. XXIV (January, I898), 579. John H. Gary, "The Sociâr Ünrest," Atlantic. XCI (April, 1903), 569.

^^Day Allen Willey, "The Changed Status of American Labor," New England Magazine. XXIX (September, I903), 24. 54 would still predominate. The answer, of course, was pro­ vided by the likes of Frank K, Poster along with other pragmatic labor elites who joined with like-minded indus­ trialists and politicians in fashioning a social and econ­ omic environment in which labor’s development, both struc­ turally and ideologically, would parallel that of industry, and each would seek profit and welfare within the confines of traditional capitalist values.

The emphasis placed on "The Labor Question," the concern over the position of the working-class, and the quest for a pragmatic and rationalistic approach to indus­ trial progress also stemmed from the need for change in the face of severe labor unrest. Most scholars are familiar with such significant labor disputes as the great railroad uprisings of 1877, the Haymarket Riot of 1886, the Home­ stead Steel Strike of 1892, and the Pullman strike of 1894.

What is frequently overlooked, however, is the overall pic­ ture; the phenomenal amount of industrial labor disputes which pervaded the late 1880*s and l890’s. Indicative of the prevalence and intensity of industrial warfare were two extensively detailed reports of the Commissioner of Labor, dated 1894 and 1901, devoted entirely to strikes and lockouts.

His Sixteenth Annual Report showed that from l88l through 55 1900 there were 22,793 strikes throwing over six million

men out of work. More Important, In 1886 the number of

strikes more than doubled, and In the ensuing decade of

the 1890's there was an average of over 1,000 work stop

pages per year.^^ These alarming statistics and their

real life overtones forced people to evaluate the wage

system and the state of affairs between labor and capital*

In 1890 Lyman Abbott, Social Gospel leader and In­

fluential editor of the Christian Union, touched on the

seriousness of unrest in the Industrial community:

That we are approaching an Industrial rev­ olution may not be true; that one Is promised or threatened cannot be doubted. The discon­ tent with the existing social order is deep, widespread, and extraordinary. It character­ izes In different degrees nearly all classes, all faiths, and all commercial and Industrial communities. Anarchic movements, strikes, labor unions, socialistic conventions are by no means the only Indications of the Industrial discontent and unrest. These are serious In their proportions, and In some Instances almost revolutionary In their results.68

Abbott claimed that American laborers had Indicted the wage system and had Initiated demands "which nothing less than

^U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor. 1901. Strikes and Lockouts (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1901;, p. 16. See also Carroll D. Wright, "Strikes In the United States," North American Review, CLXXIV (November, 1902), 763. ------68 Lyman Abbott, "The Wages System," Forum. IX (July, 1890), 518. 56 revolution will satisfy.”^9 At the turn of the century,

John Swinton, famous journalist and champion of labor,

echoed Abbott*s sentiments by warning that strikes would become increasingly ominous unless industry was reorgan­

ized with more power and profits going to workers«70

Of course, no major social or economic revolution

took place; least not one which would drastically redis­

tribute power and wealth. However, a strong movement did

develop, aimed at getting labor and capital to co-operate with one another. For many harmony between the hirer and

the hired seemed to be the best solution to the labor problem,

A number of the people advocating reconciliation between the trade-unionist and capitalist stressed the

interdependency of the two. "These two great factors of

production," said one writer, "are thoroughly dependent

the one on the other, being indispensable auxiliaries. Labor is inert and helpless without an advance from cap­

ital to sustain life during the period of production, and

^Ibid.. 520, Other essayists who were concerned with the seriousness of discontent in the l890*s include Henry Holt, "The Social Discontent— I. Its Causes," Forum, XVIII (February, 1895), 654-78; Henry W, Parnum, "Labor Crises and Their Periods in the United States," Yale Review. VII (August, 1898), 180-96; Gary "The Social Unrest§69-72. 70 John Swinton, "Two Brief Articles on Labor Strikes," Independent. LII (Mary 24, 1900), 1240. 57 capital not only owes its existence to the savings of

labo;*, but also depends for its perpetuation on the con­

tinuance of the harmony of relationship."71 it seemed as though two arch rivals suddenly had similar interests and even common enemies,7^

That labor and capital appeared to be taking sim­ ilar paths, that is placing their faith in "organization," also served as justification for increased harmony. Soc­ iety, some maintained, is organic, with each class con­ tributing to the welfare of the entire community.73 Con­ sequently, labor should be given certain rights in order to pull its load and function on an equal basis with capital. "We can secure no organic completeness in society till every part ministers to every other part in reciprocal advantages. It is on this claim that the rights of labor rest."^^ Labor should no longer be merely a commodity but

^ G. F, Milton, "The Relations of Labor and Capital," Sewanee Review. IV (November, 1895), 66. See also Lloyd Bryce. ^*The Trust and the Workingman," North American Re­ view, CLXIV (June, 1897), 45.

7% e r b e r t N. Casson, "The Trade-Unions and the Monop­ olist," Arena. XXVIII (December, 1902), 597.

^^Poster, "The Condition of the American Working Class," 721.

7^John Bascom, "The Right of Labor," Quarterly Journal of Economics. XVIII (August, 1904), 512. See also bavid Dudley Field and Oren B. Taft, "Solutions of the Labor Prob­ lem," North American Review, CLVI (January, 1893), 66,67; McGregor, "The Incorporation of the Working-Class," 579. 58 a recognized part of industrial society equal to and shar­ ing all the advantages of capital.^5

This concept of harmony, or at least that aspect of it which pertains to cooperation between labor and capital carried over into the early Progressive Era. With it went the belief that organized labor could profit most by adopt­ ing a conservative philosophy. Unions referred to as bene­ ficial organizations were those who had wise leadership, rejected violence, and encouraged arbitration. In short, for unions to accomplish such important goals as recogni­ tion and the right to collective bargaining they themselves were expected to adjust to changing conditions in the industrial society.76

The National Civic Federation, created in Chicago in the mid-nineties and operating on a nationwide basis by

1900,77 constituted the heart of the movement to secure har­ mony by welcoming conservative labor into the industrial

75 Alexander Purves, "Harmonizing Labor and Capital by Means of Industrial Partnership," Annals. XX (July, 1902),

76 W. H, Pfahler, "Co-operation of Labor and Capital,"

For a worthwhile discussion of "the formative years of the NCF" see Marguerite Green, The National Civic Federa­ tion and the American Labor Movement 1900-1^25 (Washington, Ü.C.: Catholic University Press, 1956), pp. 1-36. 59 sector, James Weinstein, in his controversial study on the NCF, points out that its most prominent leaders,

"viewed the problem of the relationship between capital and labor as central to the political and economic stability of the emerging system of large corporations." The Federa­ tion, Weinstein continues, concentrated most of its early efforts toward mediating labor disputes.

In order to play the role of "Tribunal of Peace" effectively NCF leaders had to abandon many of the tradi­ tional attitudes toward organized labor. Unlike the staunchly anti-labor industrialists of the 1870*s and

1880*s, the business leaders controlling the NCF encouraged recognition of labor unions so long as they were "guided by proper rules and governed by judicious and conservative leaders.Of course NCF policymakers had the same perspec­ tive as earlier business leaders. They too harbored a deep fear of industrial violence and socialism. However, they felt that a new trade union strategy, aimed at incorporating conservative unionists into the arena of industrial rela­ tions, could help end labor unrest and advancing socialism.

^^James Weinstein, "The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State; 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968),8-^.

NCF secretary, to Samuel Gompers cited in Philip Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States. Ill, p.7 1 . 60 In an expression of confidence, Mark Hanna, the NCR's first president declared that the federation held out the possi­ bility "for the total abolition of strikes in the United

States."GO Ralph M. Easley, Chairman of the NCR's Execu­ tive Council, was convinced that the craft unions "were the real bulwarks against socialism" and he used the threat of the growing menace of radicalism to campaign for acceptance of conservative union.In pursuance of this new labor policy the NCR invited the prominent "pure and simple" labor leaders— Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell, and Daniel

J. Keefe— to be active members. And some NCR business leaders, particularly Easley, willingly defended organized labor against its critics.G2

In a sense, members of the NCR possessed a missionary zeal, considering themselves engaged in the great work of promoting industrial peace. The Rederation's industrial department, responsible for bringing organized labor and organizations of employers together to resolve their differ­ ences, pursued their goal by way of conferences and Joint agreements. "The Civic Rederation," reported Oscar S. Straus, a public representative of the Industrial Department and

^°Ibid.. p. 62.

^^Ibid.. p. 72. 82 Ralph M. Easley, "A View of the Labor Question," Harpers Weekly. XLVII (November 5, 190^), 1694. It was Easley who conceived and organized the NCR. 61 Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of Commerce and Labor,

"believed that if it organized a machinery which contained within itself the representatives of both laborers and employers, and associated with these two the representa­ tives of the general public, it would have the true basis for the solution of the labor question."^3 Bringing to­ gether representatives of the three parties to every indus­ trial dispute— capitalists, workers, and the general public— and relying on their sense of fair play and desire for har­ mony, the NCR strategists hoped to avoid conflict and create a brotherhood of business and labor.

Apparently this policy was successful, for American labor, at least as it existed at that time, seemed to ad­ vance substantially in the iBpO’s and early 1900's.

Ralph Easley, writing in 1902, noted that "the ad­ vance of organized labor in the United States as one of the most remarkable developments of the last decade."®^ One year hence, Gunton's Magazine reiterated Easley's message:

There has never been a time in this country when the unions were so strong, asserted their demands with such vigor, and commanded such tremendous resources as now.

^^Oscar S. Straus, "Results Accomplished by the Indus­ trial Department* National Civic Federation," Annals. XX (July, 1902), 37-38. 84 Ralph M, Easley, "What Organized Labor Has Learned," McClure's Magazine * XIX (October, 1902), 483.

^^"The Union Versus the Open Shop." Gunton's Maga- zine. XXV (August, 1903), 102. 62 With the establishment of the National Civic Federa­ tion the prevailing views and attitudes toward organized labor had shifted from general hostility to acceptance.

Of course, in a large sense, most workingmen had been betrayed, for the conservative craft unionists who collab­ orated with the NOP only helped to deprive the workers of their militancy, and in the case of unskilled industrial workers, their basic right to organize. But, for all intents and purposes, craft unionism was American labor in 1900, and given the nature of its leadership it is not surprising that it welcomed acceptance into the NCP, The

NCF*s union policy adapted perfectly to Gomper*s thinking.

Growing more conservative as the nineties progressed,

Gompers soon became primarily concerned with security and recognition. Conveniently, he came to regard "the National

Civic Federation as a principal agency in bringing together individuals committed to recognizing organized labor and arranging conferences between employers and labor represen­ tatives,"^^ By labor representatives Gompers undoubtedly meant himself and fellow labor leaders of similar thinking.

Still it would be unfair to blame Gompers for his eagerness to compromise and cooperate with the NCF, for not only was he in tune with the contemporary quest for industrial peace

86 Mande1, Samuel Gompers, p. 224. 63 and harmony but his typically pragmatic response to NCF

obviously helped "elevate" labor. Until the late l890’s

labor and capital had been at each others throats, result­

ing only in disaster for the worker. Now a group of con­

servative employers and politicians were offering a dif­

ferent approach to social change, an approach very much in

agreement with the conservative pragmatic union leaders*

desire for cooperation between "equally" balanced groups in the capitalist economy,®*^

To those possessing the expedient gift of hindsight,

labor's collaboration with NCF officialdom might be termed heresy, or, at the least, making the best of a bad situa­ tion. However, if one compares labor's position at the time of the NCP with the worker's struggles of the previous

30 years it becomes clear that within NCP guidlines -organ­ ized labor made its greatest strides to date toward the permanent acceptance of union-management bargaining in the industrial society.

Approximately one year after joining the NCP Gompers expressed a belief that "combinations of employers" and or­ ganized workers were showing a "growing tendency toward mutual agreements," See Samuel Gompers, "Organized Labor, Its Struggles, Its Enemies and Pool Friends," American Federa- tionist, XIII (November, 1901), 481, CHAPTER III

WILLIAM M c K i n l e y a n d t h e w o r k i n g m a n

It is of historical significance that the National

Civic Federation’s idea of accepting organized labor as a recognized American institution enjoyed its greatest vogue during the presidency of William McKinley. Actually when

McKinley assumed the nation’s highest office in I896, labor was suffering through one of its most discouraging moments. The depression of 1893-97 had severely reduced or wiped out many a worker’s earnings, thus precipitating a drastic reduction in union membership. Equally dis­ heartening was the fact that labor could find no allies.

Up to this time little progress had been made in labor legislation; and the power structure's attitude toward unions was clearly revealed when the Sherman Act and court injunctions were employed to suppress strikes and boycotts.

By the time McKinley involuntarily left office, however, many of the problems labor inherited from the depression had been alleviated. For example, the return to prosperity, due in part to America’s foreign expansion in the latter part of the century, significantly raised annual earnings; and trade unions once again were attracting a mass of workers into their protective folds. Alexander Dana Noyes

64 65

in his book Forty Years of American Finance reports that

although the country’s financial plight persisted into

1897, the period immediately thereafter saw U.S. prosperity

"become the wonder of the outside world.Union member­

ship increased substantially during the McKinley presidency moving from 447,000 in 1897 to 1,124,700 in 1901.^

These "victories" for labor and McKinley's associa­

tion with them were no doubt largely the result of the

times, 'particularly the post-1897 return to prosperity.

However, this should not obscure the fact that McKinley's

character and background suited him well for establishing good rapport with the working-class. Perhaps his greatest virtue, and the one which guided his thinking regarding

American labor, was his flexibility. During the l890's the majority of industrial and political leaders took rather

took rather rigid stands concerning the role labor should

lAlexander Dana Noyes, Forty Years of American Finan­ ce; A Short Financial History of the Government and People of the United States Since the Civil War 1865-1907 (New York: G. P. Putnam's"Sons's, 1909), pp. 257-83. Statistics listed in Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930), pp. 391-93 show an increase in annual earnings following 1897.

^See Leo Wolman, The Growth of American Trade Unions 1880-1923 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1924) pp. 29, 33. Membership in the United Fine Workers of America rose from 11,000 in 1897 to 91,000 in 1900. See Paul M. Angle, Bloody Williamson A Chapter in American Violence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 95. 66 play in the economy. Pacing such opposition, organized labor could only respond favorably to a man vjith McKinley’s willingness to listen and accept different views, H, Wayne

Morgan, the noted McKinley biographer, reinforces this point:

Some Republicans, and many Democrats, represented only business interests, but McKinley’s background, personality, and constituency opened his mind to change and moderation. As a Congressman, he fav­ ored civil service reform, federal protec- ' tion of voting rights, and workable business regulation, reflecting the needs and aspira­ tions of an expanding middle and working class. Like Mark Hanna, he had many friends in organized labor, and protection heightened his appeals in shops and f a c t o r i e s . 3

Furthermore, throughout most of his political career, and particularly during the nineties McKinley enjoyed good relations with labor and frequently received worker support at the polls. In turn, the popular Ohioan and his friend,

Mark Hanna, served the progress of labor by accepting a forward looking view regarding labor’s admission into the industrial community. Unlike many of their political and business counterparts, McKinley and Hanna believed unions were here to stay. Consequently, they deemed it profitable to cultivate conservative unionism in an effort to assure that an identity of interests between labor and capital could prevail over industrial violence and the rising evil of socialism.

Quoted in H, Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics. 1877-1896 (Syracuse, N.Y .: Syracuse University Press, 1969), p. 4Ü5. 67 Since McKinley spent much of his life seeking to stay on good terms with labor, it seems worthwhile to examine his career in order to gain further insight into late nineteenth century views and attitudes toward organ­ ized labor. It is the goal of this chapter to do just that. The discussion is based on a topical approach, with emphasis on McKinley’s successful campaigns for and elec­ tions to the Ohio governorship and the presidency, and his handling of certain labor problems while holding those offices. Perhaps by exploring these historical phenomena more light will be shed on the conspicuous parallel be­ tween the triumph of the McKinley-Hanna wing of the

Republican party and the general "advance" of organized labor toward recognition and acceptance into the American political economy.

In the turbulent first half of the l890’s, Ohio seemed to typify the American scene. Many of the country’s most crucial issues and problems were clearly evident within the state. Advancing industrialism, boom to bust Populism, the Anti-Saloon League, bossism, lynchings, and Coxey’s

"Commonweal of Christ" were all making themselves felt.

Most of all, the Buckeye State, like the rest of the country, suddenly encountered an unusually high degree of labor strife.

Shortly after the election of President Cleveland the 68 economy spiraled downward causing severe shortages in the

money market, increased unemployment, and unexpected cuts

in wages. Accordingly Ohio workers expressed their dis­

content . In 1892 the state experienced a total of seventy-

seven work stoppages, each lasting on the average nearly

three weeks. One year later, thé number of strikes increas­

ed by eighteen and lated an average df 20,7 days. Even more serious, the 1893 strikes involved 25,309 workers

compared to 6,592 the previous year. And finally, "in 189%

the number of strikes reached one hundred, an average

length of 47,5 days, and involved 45,580 workers.

Under these chaotic and often violent conditions the

game of politics became a delicate and uncertain business,

A responsive party found itself being forced to cope not

only with the traditional ethno-cultural divisions among

voters, but with groups of citizens whose consciousness of

their economic position in the society was aroused by the

despair of the depression. To build support, well-devised

strategies and careful compromises would have to be per­

fected and carried through, Vincent P, De Santis relates

that the Republicans, one of three parties attempting to

meet this problem, found it necessary to hold "together the

various elements that made up the party— businessmen.

Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Anal­ ysis of Midwestern Politics 1850-1900 (New York; The Free Press, 1970), p, 192, Although surprisingly numerous these work stoppages did not have full impact until the winter of 1893 when the depression really set in. farmers, Negroes, federal officeholders. Union v;ar veter­ ans, and labor. In short, the G.O.P, came to realize that winning elections depended upon tv;o essentials; for­ mulating and maintaining a broad working coalition and antagonizing as few interest groups as possible.

In Ohio the crucial nature of this "coalition- nonalienation" politics was best understood, and most adeptly put to use by the McKinley-Hanna wing of the Repub­ lican Party. After losing his congressional seat in I890,

William McKinley rebounded by winning the Statehouse by

21,000 votes over Governor James E. Campbell in 1891.^ It was an important victory. The Ohio governorship, a frequent steppingstone to national office, projected the popular

Canton native into the Republican presidential picture

All this meant nothing, however, if McKinley failed as

Ohio’s chief executive and as the state’s party chieftain.

^Vincent P. DeSantis, "The Republic Party Revisited, 1877-1897," in Morgan, ed.. The Guilded Age: A Reappraisal. p. 101. ^Secretary of State, Ohio Statistics. 1891. p. 233. For the story of and reaction to McKinley’s victory see Stark County Democrat, November 5, I89I, and Cleveland Leader. November 4, 189I.

. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, I963), p. 152. "Indeed, from i860 through 1912 the Republicans only twice failed to select their presidential nominee from Ohio, Illinois, or Indiana." See Richard J, Jensen, "The Winning of the Midwest: A Social History of Elections, I888-I896" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1966), vii. 70 Weak leadership would inevitably prove politically calami­ tous .

But McKinley planned to avoid such catastrophe by moving the Republican Party in a new direction. To insure success he settled on a two-fold strategy. First of all, he would utilize his personal appeal and integrity^ to form and keep a strong Republican coalition. Secondly, he would, unlike earlier party leaders, attempt to align himself and his party with the workingman. This courting of labor eventually brought rewards in a variety of ways.

Besides delivering worker votes, it resulted in a number of positive labor reforms. The Governor’s attitude toward workingmen, moreover, reflected some of the ideas which

Hanna and many conservative "reformers" put forth through the National Civic Federation in the opening decade of the twentieth century.^

Pew if any historians have ever challenged McKinley’ integrity. In May, 1893 the Governor discovered that W. Z, McDonald, the chief inspector of workshops and factories was misusing public funds. He promptly ordered a "full and broad and searching" investigation. One month later, con­ vinced of the inspector’s guilt, McKinley dismissed him. In an era of rampant political corruption this act could only have impressed the working class. See McKinley to E. W. Poe, May 16, I893, and McKinley to W. Z.McDonald, June I3 , 1893. McKinley Letter Book, Ohio Historical Society. 9 For an authoritative study of the ideas and actions of these "conservative Progressives" see Weinstein, The Cor­ porate Ideal in the Liberal State; 1900-1918. 71 In light of the conventional view of McKinley, as a staunchly conservative Republican only concerned with the tariff, his pro-labor leanings appear surprising.

However, after examling his early career one tends to arrive at a different view. As a young lawyer he ably defended a group of Massillon miners "indicted for riot at the Warmington coal mine. His effort gained him little popularity, but the youthful attorney did manage to get all but one of the defenders acquitted. In addition he refused to accept any fee, being amply rewarded with the loyal friendship of labor in Stark county.Shortly thereafter these people helped McKinley gain a seat in

Congress, where he quickly acquired a reputation as an enemy of free trade. However, he persisted in associating his tariff ideas with the interests of the working class.

"The chief ground upon v;hich we can Justify a protective tariff today," he argued in I885, "is that it is in the interest of American labor— American black labor as well as

American white labor— and the protective tariff we want is a tax sufficient to make un the difference between the

Stark County Democrat, June 29, I878; see also Andrew Roy, A History of the Coal Miners of the United States from the Development of the Mines to the Close of the Anthracite Strike in 1902 Including a Brief Sketch of Ëarly British Miners (Columbus, Ohio; J. L. Traugerf 1907), pp. 170-73; Beer, Hanna, pp. 79-80.

^^Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 12. 72

prices paid labor in Europe and the prices paid labor in

America.

Apparently as McKinley progressed down the political

trail he came to perceive something of which few nineteenth

century politicians were: that the working class, as a

class identified apart from ethnic differences, constituted

a potent economic and political force. During the l880’s

and 1890’s many American workers began demonstrating this by combining economic coercion with political power. More

and more they turned to the use of the strike as a weapon against capitalism and special privilege. The late eighties saw the concept of a "mutuality of interest between working­ man and employers with strong opposition to strikes , , , rapidly lose its support within organized l a b o r , "^3 And by the 1890’s labor itself affirmed that everyone had come to accept and fear by declaring that the nineties symbolized

"an epoch of strikes,

McKinley had witnessed firsthand the ever increasing power of labor. In his native Stark county, workers encoun-

Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley (New York: D, Appleton and Co., 1W93;p. 59^

^^Irwin Yellowltz, The Position of the Worker in Amer­ ican Society. 1865-1896 (Englewood Cliffs, N,J ,: Prentice- Hall, 1969), p. 93.

^^John Swinton, Striking for Life: Labor’s Side of the Labor Question; The Right of Workingmen to a Fair Living (New York: American Manufacturing and Publishing Co., 1894), p. 78. 73 tered little trouble in establishing a foothold in indus­ trially expanding Alliance, Canton, and Massillon. The decades following the Civil War found workers in these small cities receiving higher wages than their fellow toil­ ers in Chicago and Akron. Such benefits were directly related to the ability of Stark county workers to organize.

Beginning with the Massillon Miner's Association in I863 and the Iron Moulders Union Beneficial Association No. 5 in 1874 the Canton area quickly became a center for several labor groups. By I886-I887 the Canton City Directory listed at least nine "prominent" unions,

McKinley, through political necessity, worked hard to gain the support of these men. It was no easy task, for their natural inclination was to vote DemocraticDespite this tendency, it surprised few political observers when, in 1891, the Major launched his first campaign for governor

"in Niles, his birthplace, and seat of the steel industry."1?

5por information on early unionism in Stark county see Norman Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States. 1860-1895: A Study in Democracy (New York; D. Appleton and Co., 1929), p. 210; and Edward T. Heald, The Stark County Story, Vol. II: The McKinley Era. 1875-1901 (Canton. Ohio: Stark County Historical Society, 1950), pp. 273-75. ^^In McKinley's first race for Governor, Stark county gave his opponent, James E. Campbell, a plurality of 162 votes. See Stark County Democrat, November 12, I891.

^"^Morgan, VJilliam McKinley, p. 155. 74

After winning the state's highest office, McKinley

quickly called on the Republican majority In the General

Assembly to transform his pro-labor views Into action. The

legislators responded favorably, enacting measures dealing with worker safety, recognition of unions, and the settle­ ment of labor disputes by arbitration. These laws did not make Ohio progressive and are prone to appear Insignificant unless viewed In relation to the times. Politicians In the nineties were Inclined to treat labor severely; self help

and lalssez-falre doctrines still prevailed, and the smallest effort to help the working class could almost be termed "reform."

McKinley can hardly be classified a reformer In the traditional sense, but he did take an Interest In worker problems. In his Inaugural address he departed from applaud­ ing the progress of Ohio to call the audience's attention to the lack of safety provided for the states 80,000 rail­ road employees. He cited an Interstate Commerce Commission report stating that In Ohio In I89I, "2,451 railroad em­ ployees were killed and 22,391 others were Injured." He further Indicated that with "proper legislation" the number of such tragedies could be substantially reduced.^®

Some two months later the 70th General Assembly acted

In regard to the Governor's recommendations. Senate Bill

^^The Inaugural i^ddress was printed In Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 11. 1892, and Canton Reoosltory, January l4, i B'92. 75

No, 326 ordered railroad corporations to install power brakes on their engines and equip all cars "with air-brakes and automatic couplers , . . v/hich can be coupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.

Another law, enacted earlier, prevented railroad companies from requiring their employees to work over fifteen hours in succession without at least eight hours rest. Ten hours on duty, moreover, came to be considered a days work and any additional service called for a reward in pay beyond the normal per diem.

These statutes had a remarkable effect. In his annual message in 1893, McKinley pointed out that "the number of employees killed and disabled" had been reduced to 1 ,738. However, he still refused to express complete satisfaction, and called for supplementary safeguards on railroads within the state. He also focused new attention oh the increasing number of injuries and hardships endured by workers on the electric and cable street railways. He urged the Assembly to ease their burden by furnishing the electric and cable street cars "with vestibules, so as to protect motormen and conductors from severe weather.

19 Laws of Ohio. 1893, pp. 184-85.

^°Ibid.. 1892, pp. 311-1 2 .

Ohio Executive Documents. 1892, I, p. I3 , 76 The latter proposal eventually found its way into the law books. McKinley's actions in behalf of railroad workers undoubtedly stemmed from the fact that he wanted them in the Republican coalition. He felt genuinely concerned over the "attitude of railroad men" toward him believing 22 there existed no "good reason" for their rejecting him.

Interestingly enough, the railroad employees seemed fully aware .of the Governor's political sensitivity. In late

1893 five West Virginia railroad worker groups requested that he intervene in their wage dispute with a company operating out of Cleveland, In the process they hoped to

"fully establish the fact to the workingmen" of America that Ohio's Governor was truly "the champion of labor,"

At the same time they reminded him that railroad employees numbered 821,000 men determined to cast their votes for the politician who showed that he was their friend,^3

Meanvihile the whole of organized labor was intensely engaged in a battle for recognition and the right to recruit new members. The McKinley administration proved quite cooperative on this issue, and passed legislation declaring it a misdemeanor for any person or company "to prevent

22 Doyle [McKinley's secretary] to A, G, Lewis, May 23, 1893. McKinley Letter Book, Ohio Historical Society,

S, W, Murphy to McKinley, November 22, 1893. McKinley Governor's Papers, Ohio Historical Society, 77 employees from, joining, and belonging to any lawful labor organization."^^ This law mirrored the McKinley-Hanna philosophy. Unions were inevitable; better to accept them and mold them into a conservative part of the capitalistic system.

House Bill No. IO6 9 , enacted by the General Assembly in March 1893, reflected another element of the McKinley-

Hanna doctrine. This law created a State Board of Arbitra­ tion to settle peaceably differences between labor and management. Both the Governor and his kingmaker had high hopes for the future and understood that prolonged indus­ trial strife could disintegrate the projected Republican coalition. Both men hoped that by applying the concept of arbitration to labor disputes they could insure business progress and avoid possible political suicide.

The technique of arbitration had become popular in

1886 when the first permanent arbitration boards were es­ tablished in Massachusetts and New York. The impetus for their creation came from economic and religious reformers as well as concerned politicians. Each of these groups expressed alarm over the potential danger inherent in the drastic increase of violent strikes.McKinley had been

^\ a w 5 of Ohio. 1892, p. 269. 25 See William E. Akin, "Arbitration and Labor Con­ flict : The Middle Class Panacea, I886-I9OO," The Historian, XXIX (August, 1967), pp. 565-83. 78 one of the concerned politicians, and while serving in the

House of Representatives he enunciated his faith in arbi­

tration;

I believe it [Arbitrâtiron] is the true way of settling differences between labor and capital; I believe it will bring both to a better under­ standing, uniting them closer in interest, and promoting better relations, avoiding force, avoiding unjust exactions and oppression, avoid­ ing the loss of earnings to labor; avoiding disturbances to trade and transportation; and if this House can contribute in the smallest measure, by legislative expression or other­ wise, to these ends, it will deserve and receive the gratitude of all men who love peace, good order, justice, and fair play

The Ohio Board of Arbitration, although conscien­

tiously administered, never fulfilled McKinley’s expecta­

tions. A business-oriented society simply refused to meet

labor halfway. Continually the board members found worker

representatives more receptive to arbitration than em­ ployers . Consequently, in the first two and a half years

of the Board’s existence it dealt with only twenty-eight work stoppages, only fifteen of which it managed to settle.

Nonetheless, when McKinley left office he praised the

Board's efforts and requested that its powers be expanded.

U.S., Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., XVII, 3038; Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley. pp. 198-9 9 . ^^Reports of the State Board of Arbitration of Ohio for the Years 1893, iBg^, 1895, and ÏÜ9&. Together with a Copy of the Arbitration Act and The Rules Adopted in Pur­ suance Thereof (Norwalk, O'., 1897)', pp. 81, Ï67. ^^The Board was seriously handicapped in that it could not act on cases involving firms operating in several counties. See Executive Documents. 1895. I, p. 19. 79 Perhaps the Board provided its best services as a

mouthpiece for McKinley's Republicanism. Its practical

goals, like those of the McKinley-Hanna wing of the party,

were to bring capital and labor closer together as well

as gain full "recognition" of unions,These objectives,

in tune with the new party strategy, clearly sought to add

labor votes to the Republican ledger.

The latter was verified when McKinley stood for

reelection in November 1893. In virtually all counties

with a substantial worker voting bloc he improved over the

Republican showings of I89I and I892. Two excellent exam­

ples of this voting pattern were industrial Stark and

Tuscarawas counties. The Major lost both of these areas in

1891 but reversed the results two years later. In his

native Stark county, with its heavy miner population, he

showed a plurality of over 8OO votes. Two years earlier he

had lost there by approximately I50 votes.30 The toilers

remembered his legislative achievements; "coalition-non-

alienation" politics was succeeding.

McKinley’s successes near his home base were perhaps

only exceeded by his showing in the state’s southern coun­

ties. This area had long been considered Foraker country,

and the Governor had offended the prominent Cincinnati

^^Annual Report Board of Arbitration. I893 thru I896, p. 71-77.

^°Ohio Statistics, 1893. pp. 325, 329, 420, 465, 472; Stark County Democrat. November 16, 1893. 80

Republican by supporting John Sherman for the Senate in

1892. One Republican newspaper^ moreover, proclaimed that the G.O.P, could expect little support from the tradition­ ally Democratic southern miners; "Once a Democrat, always a Democrat." Accentuating these problems, this same news­ paper ridiculed those who boasted that McKinley would carry

Ohio by 40,000 votes. Ironically, this was very close to his exact plurality over Democratic challenger Lawrence

Neal 31

Despite the importance of the I893 verdict the

McKinley-Hanna strategists saw little reason for rejoicing.

Their sights were on I896, and the prospect of keeping newly acquired constituents in the Republican ranks did not appear easy. By late I893 the depression began to bear down on Ohio’s working class. McKinley himself informed the Assembly that the state was' "suffering from a prolonged industrial depression. "32 How he handled this impending economic crisis, and labor’s reaction to it would have much to say about his chances of reaching the White House.

The economic burden accompanying the depression

3^-Cincinnati Enquirer, August 11, I893. "In the gubernatorial election of 1Ü93 the Democrats took the worst beating they had suffered since the Vallandigham election of 1863." See Thomas A. Plinn "Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics," Journal of Politics, XXIV (August, I962), p. 532.

^^Executive Documents, I893, I, p. 1. 81 fell on Ohio late in the summer of I893. Hardest hit was the state's coal industry. In August, "owing to the string­ ency of the money markets," miners in the Hocking and

Sunday Creek Valleys received negotiable notes instead of checks in their pay envelopes. The operators promised the workers that in sixty days the company would redeem the notes "with interest of 6 percent per annum after thirty days from the date thereof.The miner's reacted with bitterness. Within a day all area mines shut down, and the union called for a mass meeting. John Nugent, President of the Ohio UMW, who favored the negotiable notes, rushed to the meeting in an attempt to pacify the dissident elements. Vehemently voicing their anger, the men jeered

Nugent until he was "finally compelled to withdraw." __

Further asserting their indignation, the miners passed resolutions calling for the expulsion of all state and national officers who agreed with the operators. They con­ cluded by pledging to remain idle until the operators officially avowed to pay the miners in full every two weeks.

Similar episodes occurred throughout the state as more operators resorted to reducing wage rates. Although the reductions appeared justified, they violated the exist­ ing contract and placed enormous hardships on the miners.

And because of the latter, a growing animosity pervaded

Reports on the miners' reactions to the notes are in the Cincinnati Enquirer, August 11, 12, I893. 82 relations between the union and operators throughout the

winter months. The situation grew even more tense when the

mine owners declared that uniform wage cuts would have to

go into effect by mid-January 1894. In rebuttal the United

Mine Workers announced at a state convention in February

that it favored "the maintaining of the present scale until

our contract expires, on April 30, I8g4."3^ This declara­

tion coincided with the UMV/*s determination to stabilize

"wage rates during downward cyclical fluctuations";how­

ever it also hardened the battle lines.

In the ensuing days, despite attempts at reconcilia­

tion, neither side relented, and wage rates failed to

stabilize. Finally, seeing no other way out, the UMW lead­

ership ,announced at the national convention held in Columbus

that work would be suspended on April 21 for the purpose of

restoring the scale stipulated in the existing contract.

With this announcement the great coal strike of 1894 became

a reality.

^ On May 1, I893 the operators agreed to pay the existing wage scale for another year. This cale was based on 70 cents for the Hocking Valley. At a miners' convention in January I894, however, the owners explained that the May agreement would have to be shelved and wage cuts implemented in order to compete with the Western Pennsylvania district. Details of these and other events leading up to the strike in April are taken from the report compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Executive Documents, 1894, III, pp. 121-24.

^^Morton Baratz, The Union and the Coal Industry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 51. 83

The decision to strike could not have been an easy one. At the time the United Mine Workers of America was only four years old, and the work stoppage threatened the organization’s very survival,Added to the fear of a dissolved union was the specter of human misery. Most miners had worked little the past winter, and their families faced inevitable suffering. Perhaps their only consolation was the outpouring of "sympathy and support nationally," which included an offer of cooperation from Samuel Gompers on behalf of the American Federation of L a b o r , 37

Furthermore, the ominous consequences of a nation­ wide strike in such a key industry proved instantaneous and painful. At the beginning of the shutdown there were nearly 125,000 miners without income and the figure steadily grew to 180,000, In Ohio the figure stood at 29 ,000,3^

Moreover the railroad industry became seriously threatened,

Refering to the menacing situation in the Hocking Valley, one conductor commented: "It looks as if four-fifths of the

^^Ibid, . p, 5 2 , 87ohio state Journal, April 22, 1894, It should be noted that the Ohio miners did not have a monopoly on suffer­ ing. Unemployment reigned supreme in 1894, reaching as high as 67,250 in Hew York City and 100,000 in Chicago, See Samuel Resnick, "Unemployment, Unrest, and Relief in the United States During the Depression of 1893-97," Journal of Political Economy, LXI (August, 1953), 328.

^^Ware, Labor Movement in U.S., p, 221; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 22, 1894, 8^ freight crews would have to be laid off. *’39 Steamers in

Ohio ports also were crippled by the work stoppage. Within a week after the miners laid down their tools the Lake Erie ports complained of critically low coal reserves. Actually, the coal famine, combined with the sheer magnitude of the strike worried some operators and gave the miners hope for victory.

In spite of the imminent coal crisis McKinley did little'in the early weeks of the strike. Instead, he chose to deal with another potential threat to his political al­ liance with labor. On April 27, in Mt. Sterling, Ohio, a group refered to as Galvin's regiment of Coxey's "army of peace" boarded a B & 0 freight train and adamantly refused to leave. Gradually tension mounted until the sheriff telegramed the Statehouse informing that the "tramps" had defied his authority, and unless McKinley objected he would

"attack at daylight." Aware of the political consequences which might result from bloodshed the Governor decided to send in troops under Adjutant General Howe, while at the same time ordering the sheriff "not to make any move.

^^Ohio State Journal. April 22, l8g4.

^^Cleveland Plain Dealer. April 28 and May 1, 189^j see also Roy, Coal Miners, p. 326. 41 See the series of telegrams related to this incident in McKinley Letter Book, Ohio Historical Society. 85

McKinley^s delaying tactics turned out to be an extremely wise move. Once in charge, Howe's men managed the affair sensibly. When they ejected the "hobos" from the train the mood became almost comical, and the only mishap occurred when a young soldier accidently fired his weapon injuring no one. The press praised both the

Governor and Howe ; the latter being commended for "bringing peace and goodwill out of threatened bloodshed.The

Commonwealers should have fared so well in other states.

What fev/ realized during the events at Mt. Sterling was the political genius behind McKinley's actions. Had a serious confrontation transpired at the sight of the freight train he would have lost immense political capital. Nearly all of the Mt. Sterling citizenry had supported the Coxey- ites. It was they who had fed the "industrial army" for over a month and eventually paid their way on to Columbus.

If Howe had bungled, several Mt. Sterling votes plus those of numerous pro-Republican laborers most likely vjould have been forfeited. Considering the political consequences involved it is not surprising that when Howe reported to

McKinley's apartments, long after midnight of the 28th, he found the Governor awake and eagerly awaiting his report

Nor is it startling to hear that the Chief Executive was ever grateful "for the peaceful manner in which the trouble

il2 Cincinnati Enquirer, April 29, 1894; Ohio State Journal, April 29, 189^. 86

had been quieted,"^3

The favorable outcome of the crisis at Mt. Sterling,

like the political victory of 1893, was not to be celebrat­

ed. By late April an emergency situation had materialized

in the coal trade. Although the coal strike was official­

ly only ten days old the UMW, lacking in funds, suddenly

realized that victory must come soon or the families of its members would face starvation. To further complicate matters the goal behind the suspension— the depletion of bituminous coal reserves— had been subverted by vast ship­ ments of anthracite coal from active fields in Pennsylvania

and West Virginia.

The everyday reality of their dependent's lack of

food, combined with the thought of their own "brothers" betraying them riled Ohio's striking miners. Talk of violent

action to prevent importation of anthracite coal swept

through the idle coal fields. The miner’s obligatory con­

tractual agreement "to voluntarily assist in the work of protecting life and property wherever threatened" disinte­

grated as the inflamed workers entertained thoughts of

dynamiting bridges.

^^Cincinnati Enquirer, April 29, I8g4.

24 2| For a discussion of the crisis revolving around these two problems see Roy, Coal Miners, pp. 326-30. 87 Gauging the emotional state of his men, President

McBride hurriedly Issued a bulletin arranging for a joint convention of miners and operators to he convened In Cleve­ land on May 15, 1894, McBride hoped to use the meeting to work out a settlement and reopen the mines. On the ap­ pointed day the convention opened with the owners of 300 mines represented,^^ Almost Instantly the miner's repre­ sentatives and the operators clashed. The Intensely stub­ born Pittsburgh producers asserted that they would reject any agreement; the miners countered by having them "figur­ atively kicked out of the meeting." Four days later the ejected operators left for home vowing to break the strike.

Meanwhile, the miners reiterated their old demands for 70 cents a ton In Ohio and 79 cents a ton In Pennsylvania,

The operators who had remained at the convention promptly spurned these requests,With no agreement In sight the meeting adjourned an utter failure. McBride’s hopes for a compromise vanished and dark clouds once again hung over the unproductive coal fields.

The expected violence erupted on May 30 when a group of miners attacked three trains "laden with West Virginia

^^Executive Documents, 1894, III, pp. 125-26,

^^Clnclnnati Enquirer, May 15, 16, 19, I894, Paul Kleppner states that the Pittsburgh operators held the key to the May 15 meeting. Had they been willing to make a settlement the Ohio operators would have followed. See Kleppner, Cross of Culture, p, 241, coal" at Sherrodsville, Ohio.More serious, however, at

least from a political standpoint, was the damage done to

freight trains and railroad equipment In Athens County.

Here, with Glouster serving as a sort of agitation center,

embittered miners purportedly burned railroad bridges, broke

Into company tool sheds, sidetracked a coal train, and

destroyed couplings and brake rods. Sheriff M. M. Riley,

overwhelmed and alarmed, persuaded McKinley to send troops.

Such a'hasty plea for assistance quickly evolved Into an

obvious blunder. The miners had the entire community behind

them. Despite McKinley’s calling In the mllltla, the Repub­

lican Party managed to escape recriminations as Riley

accepted full blame for the episode. After all. It was

Riley’s "unwarranted assumption that anarchy was prevailing

that misled. Governor McKinley to order out troops." When

the sheriff’s panicky telegrams were published, the somewhat

calmer miners took It upon themselves to exonerate the it Q Governor. McKinley’s popularity with the workers had

^^Ohlo State Journal, May 30, l8g4. ^^Rlley to McKinley, June 2, 1894. McKinley Governor’s Papers, Ohio Historical Society. '^Cincinnati Enquirer. June 1, 1894; Kleppner, Cross of Culture, p 244. In fairness to Sheriff Riley It should be pointed out that on June I, the Ennulrer reported the situation near Glouster to be so critical that "a single overt act" could "precipitate endless scenes of bloodshed and pillage." Also see Riley’s side of the story In the Enquirer, June 3, 1894. weathered another politically dangerous crisis.

The continued violence of the first two weeks of

June, 189% offered additional challenges to McKinley's al­

liance with labor. More than once disruptions in or near

mining towns required ordering up the militia. Still, in

reading the contemporary, accounts of these crises one is

amazed at McKinley's prudent handling of explosive situa­

tions. Often he seemed to side with the miners and delay

in dispatching the National Guard even when there existed

clear evidence of property damage. When troops had to be

used he maintained an extra close watch over their opera­

tions.

The Governor's rather cautious attitude toward strik­

ing workers became clear on June 3 when four hundred miners began holding up trains near Bellaire. One newspaper related that although a "bloody encounter" appeared immi­ nent the Governor seemed undisturbed;

The miners are thoroughly ugly, and will not listen to reason. The Governor has refused to call out the troops unless there should be actual violence committed.50

Two days later. Sheriff James Mason of Guernsey county ap­ pealed for aid in handling a "mob of 500" miners who had

captured a "train of cars belonging to the Baltimore and

Ohio Railroad Company." Joining Mason were the company

^^Cincinnati.Enquirer, June 4, 1894. 90 officials who requested protection for their property be­ cause the miners threatened to destroy the trains by fire.

McKinley refused to be convinced of the severity of the situation, and did not order up troops until a second appeal came nearly a day later. And after sending the men, he made certain that he be fully "advised on developments."

This reluctance to use force undoubtedly was politi­ cally motivated, for conditions in Guernsey county had long been ripe for a bloody encounter. Also, to prevent the Governor from acquiring the image of a suppressor, care­ ful steps were taken to see to it that all the guardsmen received implicit warnings not to over-react in carrying out their assignments. Colonel Coit, commander of the fourteenth regiment out of Columbus lectured his troops;

You are soldiers and great responsibility rests upon you and we want no foolishness. Do nothing without the consent of your com­ manding officer and pay strict attention to orders. If you are brought to face trouble and are jeered at or insulted do not answer, as your commanding officers will take the responsibility and protect y o u , 51

Undoubtedly the emphasis on delay and caution helped pre­ vent McKinley from acquiring an image as the politican who suppressed the miners.

On June 7 McKinley again answered a plea for help and dispatched 1,500 guardsmen to embattled Cambridge. This

A detailed account of the Guernsey county incident can be found in the Ohio State Journal. June 7, 1894. 91 time he "personally superintended the arrangements," and within twenty-four hours he restored peace without any spilling of blood. His actions received the plaudits of the journalists who credited him with a "brilliant piece of military tact" in sending in a large and efficient force. Coincidentally, only a day later a mob in Canal

Dover had surrounded and captured a regiment of the Ohio

National Guard! This time, however, the Major once more elected not to retaliate until he had been fully advised on the situation.52

What motivated McKinley’s resistance to use troops was that many of the guardsmen belonged to the working class, and they had no appetite for confrontations with the miners. Perhaps the close relationship between the state’s soldiers and miners can be best illustrated by a series of events at Wheeling Creek. In this Belmont county community the miners were particularly incensed and on

June 9 one of their bolder numbers fired into General

Hovre’s camp narrowly missing a sentinal. Howe ’ s men

Cincinnati Enquirer, June 7 and 8, 1894. There were numerous "minor" instances of violence or threatened vio­ lence which McKinley chose to ignore. For instance, on June 6 in Salineville the railroad brought in a group of Italians to load trains. Hearing of this the miners "sent courier throughout the village" and before long 250 persons gathered; and when they came "in sight of the work train, the Dagos, terror stricken, dropped their shovels and sought safety in flight." These aggressors were certainly not "pawns" of any political party. See Ohio State Journal. June 7, 1894. 92 returned fire and for the first time the Oiard had fired upon the miners. Although no one was injured Harry C.

Sherrard, McKinley’s aide-de-camp, rushed to the scene expecting more trouble the next day. To nearly everyone's surprise the following day, Sunday, brought only calm.

Although the majority of people aligned themselves with the workers there seemed to be a special understanding be­ tween soldier and miner. They attended Sunday services together, and a bit later "two beautiful miner lassies

. . . sweetly sang duets for the boys."^3 Such fraterniz­ ing virtually eliminated hostilities and surely did not hinder Republican efforts to appease the miners.

McKinley's hesitant responses to the labor strife of 1894 appear even’more satisfactory when matched against reactions in other states. Not only was it not unusual to call up troops to suppress labor riots,54 but as often as not bloodshed did occur. On the Sunday that the Ohio

Guardsmen and Wheeling Creek miners "sung and danced"

^^Cincinnati Enquirer, June 10 and 11, 1894.

^^From 1886 to I895 governors called on the National Guard 328 times for riot duty. McKinley called the Guard up 13 times in 1894, about half the time to quell labor riots. He v/ithdrew all troops used in the Miners' strike by June 21, 1894. See Robert W. Coakley, "Federal Use of Militia and the National Guard in Civil Disturbances: The Whiskey Rebellion to Little Rock," in Robin Higham, ed., Bayonets in the Street: The Use of Troons in Civil Disturb­ ances (Lawrence. Kansas: University Press. I969). p. 27; and Winthrop Alexander, "Ten Years of Riot Duty," Journal of Military Service Institute. XIX (July, I896), 7. 93 together "two strikers were shot by deputies in Uniontown,

Pennsylvania. "55 Approximately two weeks later a Grand

Jury in Brazil, Indiana charged nine miners with first degree murder in connection with the death of a railroad engineer on June 6.56 And, of course, this was the same year when the events of that fatal thirteenth day of the

Great Pullman Strike culminated with a volley of bullets being fired into a mob of men, women, boys and girls. 57

'Obviously McKinley, unlike many chief executives, feared the political repureussions emanating from the de­ ployment of the militia to quell labor riots. The reason­ ing behind this cautious attitude is found in his partic­ ular brand of politics. From the very beginning he had campaigned for miner’s votes. He considered them his friends ; and in 1892 he addressed them at their organ­ ization’s third annual convention in Columbus by stating:

"There is nothing too good for you in Ohio,To anger the miners in their moment of need would be to surrender hard won political capital. Of course, balancing his political strategy with his executive duties often proved

^^Cincinnati Enquirer. June 11, 1895.

^^Ohio State Journal, June 22, 189%.

^"^Swinton, Striking for Life, pp. 119-30.

^^Quoted in Roy, Coal Miners, p. 320. 94 difficult. As Professor Paul Kleppner points out: "To

McKinley, the events of the coal strike, and especially the requests for troops, were something of a traumatic e x p e r i e n c e ."59 Attaining a reputation as the man who used troops against the workers deeply concerned McKinley as well as threatened to destroy the Republican image which he and Hanna were bûilding.

While McKinley maneuvered to keep his support amongst the miners, the leaders of the United Mine Workers

Union moved to end the crippling coal strike. On June 9,

1894, the opposing sides agreed to assemble in Columbus and a day later they hammered out a compromise. The Union officers accepted a 10 cent increase over what the miners received when the strike began. Although this represented

10 cents less than their constituents had been demanding the national officers, believing that a continuance of the struggle might destroy the UMW, eagerly signed the agreement. President McBride, who led the signing, explain­ ed the leadership’s position in an official bulletin an­ nouncing the end of the work stoppage:

We assure you that we did not enter into this agreement because it was pleasing or even sat­ isfactory to us, but because we seriously be­ lieved that better could not be gotten, no matter how long the struggle continued , . . We are so confident of the correctness of our position in signing and advising the acceptance

^^Kleppner, Cross of Culture, p. 246. 95 of this contract, that on its acceptance or rejection by you we stake our reputation as your servants and our further continuance in official position.

This sacrificial gesture on the part of the National officers drew little sympathy from the Ohio rank and file.

A. A. Adams, President of the Ohio District, denounced the compromise and refused to give his signature.His declination coincided with the sentiments of the men he represented as was indicated at the convention of Ohio miners held a week later. At this "bitter and heated" meeting the miners vindicated Adams, accepted the 60 cent rate under protest, and went on record as officially condemning the compromise agreement. In addition, they passed by two-thirds vote a resolution repudiating the actions of McBride and the other national officers. Indeed, the Ohio miners were so antagonized'that one newspaper reported that there existed little doubt that many would refuse to pay their dues in an attempt to starve out the national leadership.This observation apparently proved correct for one historian has affirmed that "at the end of the strike there was a return to district agreements and the national union disappeared."^3

^% h i o Executive Documents, 1894, III, p. 128.

^^Cincinnati Ennulrer, June 11, 1894.

^^Cleveland Leader, June 21, 1894. ^^Yellowltz. Workers in American Society, p. 221, 96

In contrast to the UMW officialdom, McKinley and the Republicans emerged from the strike in fine shape. Al­ though the Governor could not escape all criticism for his use of the militia he did manage to keep the worker con­ stituency his party had acquired in 1893. This development was crucial for throughout 1893 and I894 the Democrats continued to lose supporters who came to associate their party with "hard times." After the strike many disgruntled

Democratic miners joined the Populist crusade, but a few

Catholic miners went Republican, thus adding slightly to the party’s I893 gains.This welcoming of Catholic voters, moreover, reflected the Hanna-McKinley desire to steer the party away from its traditional pietism and enlist the sup­ port of non-pietist voter groups.

Returning briefly to McKinley’s role in the miners’ strike one is struck by a small incident which reveals another method employed by the Governor to maintain worker support. Near the end of the strike the particularly embittered miners of Stark County returned to McKinley ten dollars he had previously donated to the Massillon Miner’s

Relief Committee.Surprisingly, their declination failed to deter the Canton native from pursuing his political goals. In the months following the strike the Hanna-McKinley

Kleppner, Cross of Culture, p. 249. 65 Canton Repository. June l4, 1894. 97

faction of the party persisted in viewing the workers as

a necessary and vital part of the Republican social base.

The latter fact became even more visible In the

winter and spring of 189^-1895, During this period the

miners of Hocking, Athens, and Perry counties, known in

the coal trade as the Hocking Valley, fell victim to an

unexpected set of circumstances. Due to the Increase In

machine mining, the shutdown of several key mines, and the

areas unfavorable position In relation to markets, hundreds

of miners were forced off the job.^^ Impoverished and without the aid of any relief agency these men decided to

appeal directly to the Governor for assistance. McKinley

answered their plea with a statewide campaign aimed at bringing relief to the destitute miners and their families.

He sent numerous letters requesting "certain cities and villages to make donations of supplies and money to relieve their needs. Moreover, the Governor applied his personal influence and that of his office to persuade the Pennsylvania

66 During 1895 each of the three counties in the Hock­ ing Valley had 669 or more miners unemployed. The nearest number of unemployed recorded by another mining county was 217. Pew counties suffered over 100 unemployed and at least 10 out of 30 counties reporting showed a gain In employment. See Executive Documents. 1895, III, pp. 1147-55.

67 Ibid., I, p. 25; see also McKinley to Honorable Guy Major, Mayor of Toledo, January l4, I895. McKinley Letter Book, Ohio Historical Society. 98

Railroad Company to transport donated supplies "wherever

they may be needed free of charge."^8 Largely as a result

of this sort of campaigning, donations came from a variety

of sources including the Standard Oil Company, the Toledo

Blade, and numerous churches and lodges.

It should be further noted that McKinley's rescue

efforts were not temporary. He maintained his deep concern for the helpless miners until he left office in January,

1896, and beyond. In March 1895 before embarking, on a two week trip to Georgia, he invited S, J, Coultrap who super­ vised the relief project to stop by his office for a brief­ ing on the current situation in the Hocking Valley. "I want," McKinley informed Coultrap, "to make ample provision before going away for supplies during my a b s e n c e . "^0 Nine months later, in his farewell message to the Ohio Assembly,

McKinley gave the totals of his relief effort. Money raised amounted to $4,948.87 of which $1,011.90 was passed on to his successor to be used for the same purpose. The total value of all supplies reached $31,785.05. Most important, according to the future president, "there were 2,722 families assisted.

^^McKinley to W. VI, Medary, January 24, 1895 in ibid.

^^See correspondence January-March 1895 in ibid.

^McKinley to Coultrap, March 4, I895 in ibid.

^^Executive Documents, 1895. I, p. 25. 99

It seems interesting that McKinley who had been pictured by contemporary cartoonists, his Populist oppon­ ents, and many later historians as a cold business pol­ itician could have been so deeply concerned about the wel­ fare of a few thousand miners. But these observers tended to overlook one all important item, and that is the high ' value the Hanna-McKinley faction of the Republican party placed on worker votes. This, of course, does not infer that political gain was the sole motive behind the relief project. On the contrary, reliable evidence shows that

McKinley always possessed a personal feel for working people. However, as the I896 election results will show, the relief drive did deliver handsome political dividends.

Before considering this "critical election" another object of note should be emphasized. As 1895 progressed, the economic situation of the Ohio miner steadily improved.

As Robert Hazeltine, Inspector of Mines, then reported, coal production for I895 totaled 13,683,879 tons, an in­ crease over strike marred I894 of 1,773,600 tons. Iron­ ically, three of the seven counties which benefitted most from this upsurge in production were Stark, Guernsey and

Tuscarawus, areas vrhich had experienced labor strife in

1894. Even more significant on a statewide basis was the

^^Ibid.. Ill, p. 1144. 100

Increase in miners wages. For the year I 895 the average

coal worker's take home pay came to $221.75, an increase

of nearly $40, or $3.28 a month over I8g4.

Thus it appears that McKinley gained in popularity

on two counts. One the one hand, he could assume credit

for the economic betterment of most of the state’s miners

and in turn associate his party with "prosperity.” Not

a difficult task since after two-and-one half years of

depression the Democrats had been indelibly marked as the party of "hard times," On the other hand, because of his positive role in the relief project he was able to main­

tain Republican strength in the only area of the state

suffering economically— the poverty-stricken Hocking Valley.

By a combination of good luck. Democratic failure, and delicate maneuvering the Hanna-McKinley strategy had en­ dured.

McKinley’s "progressive" attitude toward labor con­ tinued to be in evidence during his race for the White House in 1896. Throughout the presidential campaign the McKinley forces engaged in a concerted effort to secure the friend­ ship of workingmen. To capture valuable labor votes, the

Republicans impressed upon workers the ominous threat posed

73 Compare Inspector of Nines, Robert N. Hazeltine’5 reports in the Executive Documents. 1894. III. d. 904 and 1895. Ill, p. 1T 57: 101

ky the Democrats’ free silver policy. G.O.P. spokesmen predicted that free silver would destroy business confidence and plunge the country into depression. Free silver, they further argued, only helped the agrarians of the West and

South at the expense of urban workers. As an alternative the Republicans offered the protective tariff. Cleveland's free trade policies had brought disaster to America's work­ ers; but FcKinley, following the policies of sound money and protectionism would restore economic growth and end unem­ ployment .

Furthermore, the Republican National Committee made judicious use of the politically conscious Terence V.

Powderly, who had decided to play an active role in McKinley's campaign. During the campaign Powderly was called on to deliver political speeches and at least once Hanna requested that he write a letter on "The Effects of Free

Silver on Labor" for publication in a number of leading

^Samuel Thompson McSeveney, "The^Politics of Depres­ sion: Voting Behavior in Connecticut, Now York, and New Jersey, I893-I896" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Univer­ sity of Iowa, 1965), pp. ^26-2 7.

^Powderly to M. S. Quay, March ] 4, 1896, Powderly Letter Books, Department of Archives and lanuscripts. Cath­ olic University of America, Washington,'D.C. Hereinafter cited as Powderly Letter Books.

T^See A. C. Robertson to Terence V. Powderly, August 31, 1896, Powderly Letter Books; John P. Elkin to T, V. Powderly, September 10, I896, Powderly Letter Books. 102 newspapers. Some of Powderly's labor "friends" failed to appreciate his backing McKinley. But the Republican

National Committee took an opposite view. After the elec­ tion victory W. M. Hahn, Chairman.of the Committee's

Speaker’s Bureau thanked Powderly for his assistance:

"Your active interest, your faithful work, your intelli­ gent discharge of every duty and your zeal, greatly com­ mended you; and the several committees in the states where you addressed your countrymen have advised us of your faithful work."^^

On Election Day, I896 the Republican appeals to the laboring classes reaped its harvest. Realizing a popular vote victory of 7,035,638 to Bryan’s 6,467,9^6,79 McKinley

V. Powderly, September I6 , 1896, Powderly Letter Books. Hanna’s reouest was part of a project "to publish a number of letters from prominent Republican leaders" assigning each a "special subject." The purpose of the project was to portray the Republican side of a given issue in the campaign.

M. Hahn to T. V. Powderly, November 25, I896, Powderly Letter Books. After the election PovJderly applied for the position of Commissioner-General of Immigration. His candidacy was strongly challenged by several labor officials and politicians, including members of the Executive Council of the AFL who visited President McKinley to personally lodge a protest. These protesters tended to stress Powderly's lack of popularity in labor circles ; however an examination of his letter brooks leads to the conclusion that those voicing op­ position simply favored another may for the post. Nonethe­ less, Powderly was appointed and confirmed to the position. See Pov.^derly Letter Books; and *Powderly, The Path I Trod, pp. 29&^)9.

7^Por a complete numerical breakdown of both the popular and electoral vote see Paul W. Glad, McKinley. Bryan, and the Peonle (New York: J. B. Ljppincott Co., 1965), pp". 200-01. 103

McKinley’s solicitations it was also apparent he had done

well among the nation’s laborers.

McKinley’s successes sparked a barrage of complaints

charging that employers had coerced workers into voting the

Republican ticket. Though this cannot be entirely refuted it is doubtful that brow-beating carried the election.

Moreover, this line of reasoning only distorts the workers true response to the candidates. "Few workers," writes

H. Wayne Morgan, "believed that businessmen would actually close their plants if Eryan won, but they could readily be­ lieve his victory would bring a crash, with unpredictable results . . . Labor simply had little in common with

Bryan’s agrarian interests.Paul W. Glad concurs.

My conclusions on the East and Middle West are based on evidence presented in two authoritative studies: McSeveney’s "The Politics of Depression: Voting Behavior in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey"; and Kleppner, The Cross of Culture. Both McSeveney and Kleppner agree that McKinley outdid Bryan in appealing to workers. And though both assert that cultural factors— nationality, religion, race, and "moral" issues— are the prime deter­ minants of voter behavior, by the mid-lSgO’s the depres­ sion had enabled the Republicans, using the tariff as a • propaganda weapon, to secure the votes of prosperity minded workers. Also, McSeveney and Kleppner concur that the shift in voting patterns during the depression years 1893-1895, topped off by McKinley victory in I896 forged a voter realignment which enabled the "party of McKinley" to dominate American politics for years to come.

^^lorgan. From Hayes to McKinley, p. 523. See also Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous Ivlth Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform (i]ew York: Vintage Books, 1955) p/5L ^ 104 explaining that Bryan ’’sympathized with industrial workers,

and he developed his arguments with them in mind, but he

never really penetrated to a deep understanding of their needs.”82

Late in October McKinley himself dismissed rumors

of political intimidation. Assailing those who would prefer

to believe that employers and workers could not cooperate

and join in the persuance of identical goals, the G.G.P.

candidate declared that ’’the only coercion that is going on

is the coercion of reason, of conscience and experience.

Once in office the ’’McKinley-Hanna team” continued

to support labor and the latter reaped the benefits from

such a policy. A classic example was the progress enjoyed by the United Mine Workers after 1897. Formed on January

25, 1890, when the National District Assembly 135 of the

Knights of Labor merged with the National Progressive

Union,the U.M.V/.A. struggled through an early period of*

82 Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the People, p. 50.

^^Quoted in Richard J. Jensen, ’’The Winning of the Midwest : A Social History of Elections, I888-I896” (unpub­ lished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, I966), p. 64. 84 McDonald, David J. and Lynch, Edward A., Coal and Unionism; A History of the American Coal Miners’ Unions Tindianapolis,' Ind.: Cornelius Printing Co., 1939), pp. 22- 105

abortive strikes, unstable membership, and feeble finances.

Then, in response to a wage crisis in the mining industry

the executive board of the UMW, led by President Ratchford,

voted to strike on July 4, 1 8 9 7 . The severity of the economic situation which produced the strike was partially evident in the union's statement regarding what occasioned the walkout:

Our suspension is not a choice, but an alternative. It is the voice of an enslaved 'class urged to action by cruel and unbearable conditions; the protest of an overworked underpaid people against longer continuing a semi-starved existence. The limit of endur­ ance was reached when honest labor could no longer sustain itself . . . On one side, we were confronted by a heartless array of em­ ployers, whose combined wisdom and wealth suggested no remedy other than continued sub­ mission to avarice and greed; on the other side, we were met by the cries of nearly one million men, women, and children appealing for their rights to the opportunities of life and wages to sustain them compatible with economy, civilization, and present industrial condi­ tions.

Although the UMW was only 11,000 strong when the suspension commenced, more than 150,000 miners eventually laid down their tools in a massive effort aimed primarily at attain­ ing higher wages.

. E. George, "The Coal Miners' Strike of I897," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XII (January, I898), I87, 199.

^^Quoted in Samuel Gompers. "Strikes and the Coal- Miners," Forum. XXIV (September, 1897), 31.

^"^Angle, Bloody Williamson, p. 94. 106 The strike lasted through autuinn, carrying with it extreme poverty and degradation for miners' families. For­ tunately, their grief was eased somewhat by an unprecedented response of sympathy and aid from the public. Governor

Asa Bushnell led a welfare drive on behalf of the Ohio miners. And substantial offerings came from different locals of the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of

Labor.

' A settlement "by Joint conference and conciliation" was finally reached in Chicago on January 28, I898. The union won an I8 per cent wage increase and a reduction in the hours of labor from 10 to 8 hours in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio,

West Virginia, Kentucky, and Western Pennsylvania,The victory marked a turning point for the United Mine Workers of America, For the first time the union had survived a strike remaining financially sound and keeping its member­ ship intact. In addition, the Interstate Joint Conference which settled the strike "laid the foundations of an institu­ tion for collective bargaining in the bituminous field" which operated from the time of the settlement on through the mid-1920's.90 John Mitchell, writing later as President

George, "The Coal Miners' Strike of 1897," po. 200- 06. 89 John Mitchell, "The Mine Worker'5 Life and Aims," Cosmopolitan. ' XXI(October, 1001), 622-30. 90 Arthur E. Suffern. The Coal Miners' Struggle for Industrial Status: A Study of the Evolution of Organized Relations and Industrial Principles in the Coal Industry (kew York: r-acMillan Co., 1926), p. 71I 107 of the U.M.W.A., expressed pleasure over these develop­ ments :

Both operators and miners concede that the adoption of this humane and business­ like method of adjusting all di fferences affecting conditions of employment is preferable to the method of strikes and lockouts, with the consequent bitter suf­ fering and loss of profits.91

This triumph did not.immediately end the successes of the U.M.V/.A. during the McKinley presidency. On the eve of the election of 1900 the miners in the poorly organized anthracite'coal regions of Pennsylvania went out on strike.

Almost immediately Mark Hanna intervened in behalf of John

Mitchell and his union. Seeking out J. P. Morgan and cer­ tain other Wall Street interests, the Ohio Senator let it be known that a prolonged strike posed the danger of a Bryan victory. Before long, the implementation of pressure tactics convinced a number of operators that the .miner’s demands were justified; and a shaky, though politically beneficial agreement was secured just before the election.

^^Mitchell, "The Mine Worker’s Life and Aims," p. 62%.

92por information on the coal strike of 1900 see Robert J. Cornell, The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902 (Wash­ ington, D.C.: Catholic University of American Press, 1957), pp. ^4-59; Carroll D. Wright, "Report to the President on. Anthracite Coal Strike," U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin of the Department of Labor, Vol. VII-1902 (Washington, U.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 120 4; John Mitchell "The Great Coal Strike," Independent, LII (November 1, 1900), pp, 2613-16; "The Miners' Struggle," American Federaltionist. VII (October, 1900), pp. 314-16. 108 Three significant revelations emerged from the strat­ egy deployed during the strike. One was Mitchell’s keen interest in preserving the fortunes of the McKinley admin­ istration. Writing to Daniel Keefe, President of the

International Longshoremen’s Association and friend of

Hanna, Mitchell expressed regret that the'strike provided an "avenue through which designing politicians can attack the administration" and "dissipate the prosperity arguments which are made by those favoring the administration."93

A second revelation was the interest the National

Civic Federation had exhibited toward settling the strike.

The NCF’s Board of Conciliation and Arbitration considered the miners strike to be its first important item of busi­ ness. And as Marguerite Green reports:

The services of the NCF had contributed much to the concessions which allowed the union to continue work in the anthracite fields. The negotiations had also helped the leaders of the Federation to clarify their ideas concerning the aims and methods of their organization. As the most important issue confronting the American people, the labor problem should be dealt with by a body of experts who were trained to do what the American businessman had no time to do for himself.94

Mitchell to Daniel Keefe, October 4, 1900, John Mitchell Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. Hereinafter cited as Mitchell Papers. ^Varguerlte Green, The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement 1900'-i925 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, l9bO), pp. 15-19. 109

Finally, the strike revealed Hanna’s continued in­ terest, even after the election victory, in sustaining in­ dustrial peace. When the pre-election settlement expired on April 1, 1901 and the miners again threatened to strike

Mitchell asked Hanna to seek concessions from the obstinate coal-carriers. The Ohio industrialist worked tenaciously throughout March, finally persuading several companies to meet with UMW representatives to adjust grievances. These efforts, temporarily averting another strike once again demonstrated that McKinley-Hanna Republicanism was dedicated to promoting harmony between the employer and e m p l o y e e .

After looking at McKinley’s political career and his dealings with labor, one must be impressed by his willing­ ness to consider the workingman’s problems. Because of the intensity of labor strife which accompanied the eighteen- nineties, labor often found itself winning more enemies than friends. Throughout this period, moreover, the Demo­ cratic party, once the hope of workingman, came under the influence of agrarians. In light of these developments,

McKinley’s humane views, along with the Republican party’s

^^This discussion is based on Mitchell to Mark Hanna, March 20, 1901; Mitchell to W. D. Ryan, March 21, 1901; Mitchell to W. B. Wilson, March 25, 1901, Mitchell to W. B. Wilson, March 26, 1901, and Mitchell to W. B. Wilson, March 28, 1901, all in the Mitchell Papers, 110 catering to worker interests could only have served labor well in its quest for recognition in the face of intoler­ ance.

In a sense, McKinley and his party's courting of labor was no different than the actions of other elites who, by following a "response and adaptation" approach, often found it beneficial to listen to organized labor. Actually

McKinley and the Republicans merely reacted to what politi­ cal scientist Everett Ladd calls the "effective environ­ ment," the complex and changing "social system" in which political parties are forced to operate.For example, in the election of I896, Republican strategy was partially reversed because its traditional rural Protestant voting base had been usurped by the Democrats when they nominated the fundamentalist William Jennings Bryan. Responding prag­ matically to this new alignment, the Republicans decided to seek the support of the Catholic immigrants in the urban areas. As Ladd concludes: "As long as it was McKinley vs.

Bryan, with McKinley standing for the industrial society against Bryan's agrarianism and fundamental Protestant style and concerns, the new immigrant, like other urban dwellers could be persuaded to give substantial support to the Republicans."^'^ The party of McKinley, then, by

96 Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1970), p. 1.

^^Ibid., p. 161. Ill

adjusting to altercations in the social system or "effec­ tive environment" found itself cast not only as the party of business but, to a large extent, the party of America workers. Thus one should not be astonished that after

1896, with industrial capitalism and McKinley Republicanism firmly entrenched, labor made significant advances; and that within the National Civic Federation, an organiza­ tion dominated and controlled by Republican businessmen, organized labor found its best hope for acceptance into the capitalist economy. CHAPTER IV

THE ERDMAN ACT, AND THE CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD RAILWAY LABOR IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA

On February 26, 1895 Constantine Jacob Erdman, a little known businessman and politician, declared on the floor of the United States House of Representatives that

"it Is believed that after the first blow has been struck, the settlement of labor questions Is very difficult, and that If mediation and conciliation be early resorted to. It will probably avoid In many cases the necessity of arbi­ tration. Erdman was explaining the famous railroad labor bill which eventually bore his name. Recently the country had been shocked by the violence and economic damage per­ petrated during the Pullman railroad strike of 189^. Now

It seemed both necessary and wise to devise some means for the peaceable settlement of railroad disputes. Accordingly,

Attorney General Olney, a leading actor In the events of

1894, presented to the House Committee on Labor the bill

^U.S., Congressional Record. 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., XXVII, 2789. Constantine J. Erdman, A Democrat from Penn­ sylvania, served In the U.S. House of Representatives from 1893 to 1897. After leaving office Erdman, a lawyer by profession, went Into business and served as president of three companies located In the Allentown area. See Biograph­ ical Dictionary of the American Congress, 177^-1961 (Wash- ington, b.c.:Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 864.

112 113 being interpreted by Erdman, its House sponger.

Although not enacted until 1898, during the admin­ istration of William McKinley, the Erdman Law was highly significant, not because it worked, or was even implemented; but because it stood as evidence of a changed attitude to­ ward settling railroad labor disputes. No longer would the federal government be so anxious to utilize naked force to suppress striking railway workers. Prom here on it was assumed that in the event of a strike, railroad managers and union representatives would be brought together to make every effort at mediating or arbitrating their differences.

And since, under the Erdman Act, either party could call for mediatory assistance in its squabbling with the opponent, railroad labor had reached a new pinnacle: it was now recog­ nized as a valid member of the industrial community capable of and deserving the license to bargain for the rights of the workers it represented. In effect the Act was the first federal recognition of the legal right of a trade union to exist and exercise collective bargaining power.

To be sure, the hopes for railroad labor and peace in the railroad industry offered, at least in theory, by the

Erdman Law stood in marked contrast to the events which had dominated the railway economy over the previous twenty years.

From the strikes of 1877 to the Pullman fiasco of 189^ labor troubles persistently plagued America's railways. Furthermore, 114

the federal government had intervened in these disputes,

not with a workable or fair method for settlement, but with

a show of force to protect property and suppress strikers.^

But the truly vengeful enemy of railroad labor unions

during this period was not the politician or even the often

times reactionary press. Rather, it was the railroad man­

agers who adamantly resisted any interference by unions in

company affairs. During the epidemic of railroad disputes

in 1877 the vast majority of employers rode roughshod over

railroad workers, implementing any policies they desired

irregardless of the consequences. The events surrounding

the sudden wage cuts of 1877 typified this attitude. When disgruntled trainmen threatened to demonstrate against

the Erie Railroad’s 10 per cent wage cut a company official, no doubt bolstered by the support of the New York militia,

confidently proclaimed that "any demonstration would be speedily put down, even if it should be found necessary to sacrifice life."^ Fortunately the latter proved unnecessary as the proposed strike threat miscarried. Nonetheless Hugh

J. Jewett, the rancorous and dictatorial president of the

Erie line saw little reason for ending the fight. Seeing

Gerald G. Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes; The Begin­ nings of Federal Strike Policy (Ann Arbor, Mich.; University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 1.

^Quoted in Robert V. Bruce, 1877: Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959), p. $4. 115

his opponents vanquished, he promptly ordered the firing

of all the leading strikers including their spokesman

Barney J. Donahue.^

Of course, not all employers were as vindictive as

Jewett, and a few even sympathized with the plight of their men. However, for the most part, there remained near unan­ imity on two issues. First, labor unions, if allowed to exist at all, must not interfere in railroad business ; and secondly if a policy decision presents the dilemma of choos­ ing between the workers or the company, the nod must always go'to the latter.

One of the clearest indicators of the railroad lead­ ers' attitudes toward unions in the eighteen-seventies was the various methods and devices used to curtail or suppress energetic unions and striking workers. From a practical viewpoint, the most, devastating of the anti-strike tactics, at least in a humanitarian sense, was the use of strike­ breakers to replace striking workers followed by the dismis­ sal of these same workers, and particularly their leaders.

This action, moreover, was frequently succeeded by the creation of a blacklist or sheet containing the names of specified troublemakers. Once the names on the list became known to the various railroad officials, these men found it

Ibid., pp. 53-55. Donahue, a brakeman, worked on the Erie line nearly twenty-five years receiving enough injuries to leave him a near cripple. 116

extremely difficult, if not impossible to gain employment.^

One can only speculate regarding the psychological impact

imposed on these men and their families because of their

inability to acquire work, even after years of dedicated

training and service, in their chosen profession.

If the managers failed to destroy the unions with

these tactics, there always existed a last resort; the call­ ing in of federal troops to repress the strikers. Through­ out American labor history armed force has always come in on the side of business and property, and the l870's proved no exception. As a matter of fact, deploying the federal military during the Great Strike of 1877, although not an innovation, set a precedent for the use of government troops in future disturbances. Of course, it is not sur­ prising that railroad officials readily received the support of politicians. In the seventies, as Professor Gerald G.

Eggert affirms, the railroads wielded awesome political power;

In some states they seemed to control the political machinery completely and their rap­ port with high officials was impressive. Rail­ road promoters and lobbyists swarmed in the halls of Congress, seeking charters, franchises, subsidies, and land grants while fighting against investigations, regulation, and new taxes. When not at war with the farmers and small town merchants who were trying to bring them under control, they struggled with one

^For examples of the implementation of these anti­ strike techniques see Bruce, 1877, pp. 35, 54, 57, 60, 62, 117

another for legislative favors. The induce­ ments they offered were the free pass, the political contribution, influence, and on occasion the outright bribe. They also held out such considerations as legal fees to be paid, construction contracts to be let, and a wide variety of positions to be filled."

Some railroad officials, such as Erie’s president Jewett, once served in public office. Others moved freely in and out of the business and political bureaucracies. Still others simply resorted to arm twisting or gift giving to gain political favors. During the 1877 uprising in Martins- burg. West Virginia president John Garrett of the Baltimore and Ohio made his demand for federal troops by presenting

Governor Matthev/s with a choice: either ask President Hayes for the troops or prepare to leave politics. 7^ Thomas A.

Scott, scion of the powerful Pennsylvania railroad did his persuading with a bit more subtlety. He offered his lux­ urious private rail car to Pennsylvania Governor Hartranft and his family in order that they might partake of a six week tour of the country in plutocratic style.^

Considering the influence of railroad chieftains over government officials, their similar backgrounds and shared values, and combining this with the lack of previous

Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, p. 5. See also Thomas 0. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, I M 5-I89O, the Business Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953)/ pp. 189-96.

^Bruce, 1877, p. 80.

^Ibid. , p. 73. 118 precedent It seems hardly remarkable that during the up­ heavals of the seventies the federal government had no policy or machinery for dealing with major railroad strikes.

But even more important as an obstacle to the creation of any viable policy for settling railroad disputes was the weak and conservative nature of the early railroad unions.

With little pressure from organized railway workers the federal government merely fell back upon the contemporary principles of Social Darwinism and the inherited premium on property rights.

In a large sense, the railroad officials' requests, and the governments "policy" of using troops to suppress striking workers was not as malicious or bias as it might appear. Their actions merely upheld "the system" as they, the men of authority, perceived it. Neil W. Chamberlain, professor of economics at Yale university, refers to this situation when he speaks of "the spirit of the management view prevailing in the nineteenth century":

[The] vigorous assertion of management right is obviously linked to the notion of business as private property. Property rights are an essen­ tial ingredient of a competitive society, and a union effort to infringe on such rights is an attack on the system itself. For workers to combine to bring pressure or power to bear on management, to force it to concede certain of its rights of property, could readily be construed not only as unlawful but Immoral. Thus property rights, managerial authority, and the competitive system could all be linked together as a kind of holy trinity, and the unions could be cast in the role of Beeizebubs who would attack the kingdom 119

of econonlc righteousness for personal power and enrichment.9

Without question, Chamberlain's observation characterizes

the attitude of most railroad leaders and government offic­

ials between 1877 to 1894. During this period railroading was an extremely competitive business. More than a few railroad leaders held their positions because they had mastered the art of economic and political survival. Until the railway unions became equally adept in that art they

could expect little sympathy either from their bosses or the federal establishment.

The most predominant of the organizations of railroad, employees in the l870's and l880's were the "Big Four Brother­ hoods," the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers founded in

1863, the Order of Railway Conductors in 1868, the Brother­ hood of Locomotive Firemen in 1873, and the Brotherhood of

Railroad Trainment a decade later. Initially these organ­ izations joined together primarily as mutual insurance as­ sociations. Because of the high risk involved In railroad employment, and the companies' reluctance to cover on-the- job injuries, the workers banned together to provide benefits

Neil W. Chamberlain, "The Philosophy of American Man­ agement Toward Labor," in William Haber, ed.. Labor in a Changing America (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 19bb), p. 178. 120 to injured colleagues and their families.Between I867 and 1888 the Mutual Insurance Association of the Brother­ hood of Locomotive Engineers paid out nearly $327,000 to v/idov.'s, orphans, and disabled union members,

On an industry-wide basis such insurance and benefit features as those of the BLE constituted a mere pittance, for the Engineers along with the other brotherhoods repre­ sented only a small fraction of those employed in railroad­ ing. Indeed, the exclusive brotherhoods, organized along craft lines, symbolized, along with the AFL, the most aris­ tocratic and conservative forces in late nineteenth century unionism. Their interests were pragmatic, emphasizing in­ surance protection and job security. As a consequence they stressed loyalty to the industry and arbitration as a means of settling differences, while at the same time scrupulous­ ly avoiding costly s t r i k e s . ^2 "The wise course . . . for

I, Leo Sharfman, The American Railroad Problem; A Study in War and Reconstruction (New' York : The Century Co., 1921), pp'. 318- 19; Fred Albert Shannon, Economic History of the Peoole of the United States (New York; Macmillan Co., 19 3b), pp. 615-lb.

^^Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., ed., The Railroads: The Nation’s First Big Business, Sources and Readings (New York; Harcourt','Brace, and World, Inc. , 1965), pp. 13d-38 12 Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement, vol. II : From the Founding of the American Federation of Labor to the Emergence of American Imneriallsm (New York; Internation­ al Publishers, 1955), pp. 2^7-48; Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire. I897-I917 (New York; Rinehart and Co., Inc., I95I), p. 287 ; Sellg Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York; Macmillan Co., 1923), pp. lbO-82. 121

employers and employed," asserted the Locomotive Engineers

Monthly Journal in 1873, "Is to settle differences about wages, working hours, and all other matters growing out of

the relations of capital and labor, by Intelligent discus­

sion, friendly consultation, and mutual concession, each

side having regard to the rights of the other. The fatal

course is for one partner to organize opposition to another.

Strikes are as disastrous In practice as they are in

theory.

This "philosophy" or pragmatic ideal prevailed during

the strikes of 1877. Although the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers did participate briefly In the strikes. It soon

found the companies too formidable, and, like the other

brotherhoods, steered clear of any conflict. Ray Ginger,

in his eloquent biography of Eugene V. Debs, reports that

during the 1877 riots in Pittsburgh "the Locomotive Engineers

and the Order of Railway Conductors furnished strikebreakers

to the railroads. Only the Trainmen’s Union, founded In

Allegheny City, Pennsylvania on June 2, 1877 offered any hope

The Journal went on to warn "prudent workingmen" against strikes, for they "are usually instigated by lazy vagabonds who, by skillful and Industrious labor, seek to live on the proceeds of noisy and demagogical agitation." See Locomotive Engineers’ Monthly Journal "The Inutility of Strikes, in Irwin Yellowltz. The Position of the Worker In American Society. I865-I896 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.; Pren- tice Hall, inc., 19^9)', p. 94 . 14 Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross; A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (Mev; Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 19^9), p. 24. See also Sharfman, American Railroad Problem. p. 319. ------122

for united resistance against the industry; however, with­

out the aid of the brotherhoods it, too, succumbed to the

railroads.

In the light of these circumstances, it is apparent

that throughout the 1870’s railroad labor had made few gains excluding the right to struggle for its existence.

The exclusive and conservative nature of the brotherhoods,

combined with the seemingly limitless power and influence of railroad officials permitted the latter to maintain a stranglehold on their employees. If the most obvious lesson of the 1870's was not the absolute supremacy of the harsh principles mouthed by tyrannical railroad magnates, it was the exceedingly urgent need for railroad workers to become more aggressive if they hoped to secure any semblance of

status or bargaining power in their industry.

During much of the I88O ’s the more aggressive elements

among railroad workers rejected the conservatism of the brotherhoods and worked through the expanding Knights of

Labor. In reality, the Knights, with their aversion to

^The Trainmen’s Union, formed largely through the ef­ forts of the energetic young brakeman Robert A. Ammon, sought to establish an organization which would protect the workers "more vigorously than the Brotherhoods did." See Samuel Yellon, American Labor Struggles (New York; Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1936), pp. 9,"lë, 2^; Bruce, 1877, pp. 61-63; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, p. 7. 123 strikes, gave these assertive laborers little moral or financial support. But the Knights did provide capable leadership through the bold agitator Joseph Buchanan.

Buchanan, never one to avoid a fight, directed his activ­ ities against Jay Gould’s Southwestern System, a 4,115 mile ribbon of track located primarily In Missouri, Texas, and

Kansas.

Jason "Jay" Gould belonged to that group of railroad officers Thomas C. Cochran calls the "general entrepreneur."

An Influential financier whose Investments controlled several businesses, Gould seldom served as a full-time executive In any one organization. Unlike the professional manager, the general entrepeneur operated outside the company and tended to have a broadened economic view. He focused on the total financial picture, the long-run possibilities for security and Investment. Whereas the professional manager may have been concerned primarily with the expansion of his own particular department, the general entrepreneur con­ cerned himself with stock manipulation and the future of his securities. This external focus often found the general

John R. Commons and Associates, History of Labour In the United States, II (New York; Macmillan Co., Iglb), pp. 307-bh. 17 Ruth A, Allen, The Great Southwest Strike. Univer­ sity of. Texas Publication i\io". 42Ï4 (Austin, Tex. : University of Texas Press, 1942), pp. 14-18. 124

entrepreneur preoccupied v/ith financial maneuvering, while

the professional managers concentrated on bureaucratic

and supervisory activities.

Of course, in all systems of categorization there

exists factors which lead to deviation from the norm. From

time to time a general entrepreneur would become uneasy

over the goings-on in his company and immerse himself in

the company's everyday business, if not directly then

emotionally.^^ Apparently the staunchly competitive Gould

felt compelled to involve himself in the disturbances per­

meating his rail lines between I883 and I886. That he

should is not surprising. A frail but ambitious man,

Gould had built a fortune, as well as a despicable reputa­

tion, in corporate finance by being ruthlessly daring,

cold-blooded, and downright d i s h o n e s t . 20 Disdainful toward

both his= fellow financiers and government officials. Could

cared even less for striking employees. "Strikes," he

claimed before a Senate Committee in the mid-eighties,

"... generally come from a class of dissatisfied men—

^^Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, pp. 9-10.

^^îbld., pp. 10-11.

^^Julius Grodinsky, Jay Gould; His Business Career, 1867-1892 (Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 19-25; Dictionary of American Biography, VII (New York; Charles Scribners Sons, 1931) * PP* ^5'^t-55. "before he (Gould) died he was worth approximately a hun­ dred million dollars, which he acquired along with the title of the most hated man in America." See Richard O ’Connor, Gould's Millions (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 12. 125 the poorest part of your labor generally are at the bottom of a strike.

Irate telegraph workers initiated the strikes against Gould in I883. They sought an eight-hour workday, a six-day week, and a 15 per cent increase in wages. The telegraphers received sympathy from the Knights, the public, and the press, but they failed to muster enough economic backing to bend the unyielding Mr. Gould. After the strike collapsed, Gould counterattacked, blacklisting numerous strikers and forcing those retained to pledge that they would shun unionization,^2

Gould’s triumph proved shortlived. Early in 1884

Buchanan-led railroaders successfully struck the Denver and

Rio Grande ; and on May 4th the shopmen, encouraged by the railroaders’ triumph, went out against the Gould-dominated

21 John A. Garraty, ed., Labor and Capital in the Gilded Age; Testimony taken by the Senate Committee between Labor and Canital - ÏÜ83 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., ~ 1968), pp. 123-24.

22 Norman J. Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States 1860-1895: A Study~Tn Democracy (New York; D. Apple­ ton and Co., Ï929), pp. 127-28. The jprincipals in the telegraph strike— employees. Western Union President Norwin Green, and Gould— aired their differences before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor then investigating labor- capital relations. Their testimony, however, only accen­ tuated their disagreements, and offered nothing toward ad­ justing differences. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Report Upon the Relations between Labor and Canital, and Testimony taken by the Committee. Vol. I and II (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1885). 126

Union Pacific. Gould relented, but within three months

resorted to old habits by dismissing certain shopmen and

cutting the wages of a small group of machinists. This provoked another brief strike, which again ended in victory for Buchanan and his followers. Gould, in an announcement

that must have shocked Satan himself, promised to nego­ tiate future differences,

Before long Gould regained his senses and over a five-month period ordered 10 per cent wage cuts on the

Missouri, Kansas and Texas line as well as the Wabash. A bitter fight ensued, and between February and September,

1885, Gould, ignoring his earlier commitment to negotiation, did all he could to break the strike. Moved by the serious­ ness of Gould’s challenge the Knights, including Powderly himself, decided finally to assist the Buchanan-led forces.

This action overwhelmed the railroads. "Their traffic," wrote economist F. W. Taussig in I887, "was annihilated, public opinion and the State Governments were against them,"

Gould deemed it wise to restore old wage rates and give

23 Joseph R. Buchanan, The Story-of a Labor Agitator (New York; The Outlook Co., 1903). PP. 70-99; Ware, Labor" Movement. pp. 13^-36.

^^U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee, Investiga­ tion of Labor Troubles in r"issouri, Arkansas. Kansas. Texas. and'Illinois. 49th cong. . 2d sess, . House Report No. 4174 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, I887), pp. i- xxi; F. W. Taussig, "The Southwest Strike of I886," Quar­ terly Journal of Economics. I (January, I887), l85-8Fj Buchanan, Labor Agitator, pp. 142-63; Ware, Labor Movement , pp. 139-45: 127 Gould regained the upper hand in 1886. This time

a long anticipated showdown erupted when the company dis­

charged shop foreman C. A, Hall, an employee of the Texas

Pacific at Marshall, Texas. Immediately Martin Irons,

Chairman of the Executive Board of District Assembly No.

101, sent a telegram to the various locals asking whether they would back their "executive board in demanding the rein­

statement of Bro. C, A. Hall?" The workers voted in the af­ firmative, or at least it appeared that they did. It is

said that when some confusion evolved regarding whether the

local assembly at Moberly, Missouri had voted to strike or not, the issues was settled when Mr. Irons, then visiting

Moberly, was forced at gunpoint to sign the strike order.

By March 10, 1886 the majority of workers on Gould’s

Southwest System were once again on strike.

As the strike progressed, attempts were made, both by the governors of Missouri and Kansas and Powderly, to get the contending parties to resort to arbitration. But the deep differences and misunderstandings between the warring parties, combined with Gould’s desire for a showdown ren­ dered the effort futile. With hopes for a negotiated set­

tlement virtually ruined, the combatants turned to trad­

itional methods of adjusting grievances. The workers per­ petrated various acts of violence, and Gould countered with

strikebreakers, Pinkerton detectives, state militiamen.

^^Allen, Southwest Strike, 50-62. 128 and federal marshalls. The final settlement v;as worked out not across a bargaining table but in the streets and trainyards of various southwestern cities ; it was written not in ink but in blood. Capitulation came on

May 4 when the Knights, acting on the advice of the Con­ gressional committee investigating the strike, ordered its members back to work, Gould, acting true to form, promptly blacklisted numerous employees ; and Martin Irons exper­ ienced such difficulty in attaining employment "that he was once put on the rock pile as a vagrant, fastened to a ball and chain,"26

Despite the expectations generated by the victories of 1884 and I885, the Knight’s surrender in I886 made it clear that the situation for railroad workers had changed little since 1877. Gould and his lieutenants, carriers of the 19th century’s oppressive capitalist ethic, had won the final victory. In the process they had either flaunted or violated all agreements while making a face of collective bargaining. The Unions, for their part, still lacked the strength which can only come through unity. As for the

^^Fred A, Shannon, The Centennial Years; A Political and Economic History of America from the Late 1Ü70's to tha Early 1890*5 (Garden City. New York; Doubleday and Co,, Inc., 1967), pp, 226-29; See also U.S., Congress, Select Committee, Investigation of Labor Troubles, 49th Cong., 2nd, sess., House Report No. 4174, pp. i-xxv; Terence V, Powderly, The Path I Trod (New York; Columbia University Press, 1940), pp. 117-33; Allen, Southwest Strike, pp. 63-158; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, pp. 60-6I, 129 federal government, it again sided with the capitalists and failed to advance any policy for ending labor-manage- ment disputes other than the conventional use of force.

Tovfard the end of the 1886 strike, the federal gov­ ernment did consider legislation relating to the railroad problem, and conducted a long investigation into the strike; however these efforts proved of little value. In 1886 Con­ gress considered an arbitration bill sponsored by Represen­ tative John Joseph O ’Neill, a Democrat from Missouri.

The O ’Neill bill proposed that in the event of a railroad labor dispute an "impartial and disinterested" board of three would be set up to arbitrate differences. According to the statute, each disputant was to name a member to the board and these two would then select the third. The only shortcoming in the law was the lack of provisions for en­ forcing the judgement of the arbitrators.^^

Speaking in behalf of the bill, and the need for some "peaceful method" for adjusting disputes Congressman

O ’Neill referred to the disastrous situation in the south­ west :

. . . we can not have a continuance of the condition of affairs that prevail today through five States in this Union— practically a revolu­ tion, all business suspended, the people of great cities suffering from the increase in the price

27 Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1961, pT l409; Eggert, RaiIroad Labor Disputes, p. 71-

28 U.S., Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., XVII, 2959. 130

of food and fuel, from inability to obtain supplies, also resulting in thousands of men being thrown out of employment from the same cause,^9

Among several other Congressmen speaking in behalf of the bill was Republican William McKinley of Ohio who stated that passage of the bill would, through "legislative suggestion," advise the principle of arbitration "to both capital and labor as the best and most economic way of composing differences and settling disagreements which experience has uniformly shown, in the absence of an amic­ able adjustment, results in loss to all classes of the com­ munity, and to none more than the workingmen themselves."30

Although the O'Neill law received a favorable hear­ ing in the House and was promptly passed 199 to 30, it was delayed in the Senate nearly a year. The upper house finally passed the law in February, 1887, but it was killed by President Cleveland who devised a program of his own.

The committee established by the House to "investi­ gate into the underlying causes of the differences existing

^^Ibid., 2959.

% b i d .. 3038.

^^Cleveland "suggested a permanent commission of three members v;ith authority to investigate any railway labor dispute which threatened to interfere with interstate commerce," but Congress refused to go along. See Leonard A, Lecht, Experience Under Railway Labor Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 15; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, pp. 76-77. 131 between employers and employees of railway companies"^2 was headed up by Democrat Andrew Gregg Curtin, a Represen­ tative from Pennsylvania and friend of Terence Powderly.

The committee went about its work diligently, traveling

4880 miles to Interviev; all the major leaders In the strike as vieil as 576 other people implicated either directly or indirectly in the strike. However, the committee did not complete its assignment, for it failed, as Congress spec­ ified, to "report what legislation in their opinion is neces­ sary to bring these troubles and differences to satisfactory conclusion."3^

At the conclusion of its majority report the committee admitted there existed "grievances of which the laborers and workingmen of the roads had Just reason to complain," The report further noted the discovery of "a black list," and declared that "by no combination of capital or no extent of incorporated power can the listing of an American citizen being unworthy of employment be justified." But despite these verbal admissions and reprimands the committee avoided the issue of dealing with future strikes. Rejecting arbi­ tration as non-enforcible, the committee concluded that

32 U.S., Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., XVII, 3391. 33Biographical Directory of Amerjcan Congress, 1774- 1961, p. 766; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, pp. 74-77. ■

^^U.S., Congressional Record, 49th Cong., 1st sess., XVII, 3391. ~ 132 under the commerce provisions in the Constitution, Congress already possessed "ample power to control and regulate, so far as interstate commerce is involved . , . the rights and duties of the employers" and employees in the railroad in­ dustry, Apparently, as far as the committee was concerned.

Congress’ commerce powers served as an adequate mechanism for treating future disturbances.^^ Before long another railroad strike would prove them wrong, and once more direct attention to the need for some means to ease labor- capital conflict.

It was the eruption of the Burlington strike on

February 27, 1888 which served once again to focus attention on the adjustment of disputes effecting the transportation

Industry. The chief adversaries in the 1888 strike were both highly conservative. Representing capitalism was the

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy railroad presided over by

Charles Elliott Perkins and his subordinates, George W. Holdredge and Harry B, Stone. These men were essentially

U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee, Investiga­ tion of Labor Troubles, pp. xxiv-xxv; Eggert, Railroad Labor Problem, pp. 78-SO ", One committee member, Ilev; Jersey Repub­ lican James Buchanan, presented a minority report blaming the companies for the strike and criticizing the committee for its inaction. He expresssed particular disappointment in the committee’s failure to examine more closely the prob­ lem of industrial violence. See Ibid., pp. xxii-xxx. 133 social Darwinists. They viewed strikers as disloyal,

selfish and totally underserving of the right to collective

b a r g a i n i n g . C o n t e s t i n g the Perkins group were two power­

ful and respected railroad brotherhoods, the Brotherhood

of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) and the Brotherhood of Loco­ motive Fireman (BLF). The Engineers were led by the pac-

ifistic P. M. Arthur, who "emphasized the mutual depend­

ence of capital and labor and the necessity of settling

disputes between them by amicable discussion." The BLF's

leadership consisted of Grand Master Frank P. Sargent and

to a lesser degree the Grand Secretary and Treasurer Eugene

V. Debs. In 1888 these two unions, composed largely of men with very similar job orientations, decided to work togeth­ er against their common enemy, the CB&Q.

The major grievances provoking the strike were wage rates and the Burlington practice of paying men by the trip with no compensation for delays caused by layovers in var­ ious tov/ns. The brotherhoods demanded that the company abandon its policy of paying engineers and firemen accord­ ing to a scale based on time in service and pay every qualified man full scale. In addition, the company was asked

^ Donald L, MeMurry, The Great Burlington Strike of 1888; A Case History in Labor Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 195^), pp. E^8, 11-16; Shannon, Centennial Years, pp. 230-31. 37 McMurry, Burlington Strike, pp. 28-30; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes. ppT 81-Ü2", 134 to replace the trip classification system with a standard

pay rate of 3-1/2 cents a mile for passenger trains and 4

cents a mile for freight trains.

Perkins and his managers rejected all the demands.

They believed that the company and not the workers had the

final say on wage policies, and since the Burlington was

engaged in a rate war, wages should, if anything, be re­

duced. The brotherhood chiefs, P. M. Arthur and Frank

Sargent, tried to soften management's attitude and avert a

strike through negotiation. Their efforts, however, proved

fruitless and the majority of union members responded with

an affirmative strike vote.

For the most part, the Burlington strike was over

before it got off the ground. The company, taking advan­

tage of a lack of union solidarity, hired several Pinkerton

detectives to recruit unemployed or willing engineers to

act as strike breakers. The Pinkertons procured numerous

engineers from the Knights of Labor who had been suffering

from the restructive policies of the brotherhoods and were

eager for revenge. Within three weeks after the opening

of the strike, Perkins had a sufficient number of engineers

to keep operative. The brotherhoods remained off the job

until January 8, 1809 but defeat was inevitable. After his

victory, Perkins rehired only a fraction of the strikers ; he had never once considered nor consented to arbitration 135 or any other form of collective bargaining. Although the Burlington strike reaffirmed the sup­ remacy of capital over labor, it at least had one redeem­ ing feature. The 50th Congress, in session during the strike, reintroduced the O'Neill bill aimed at arbitrating railway labor disputes. Voluntary arbitration conducted before three commissioners, one each chosen by the rail­ roads and labor, and the third by these two, still consti­ tuted 'the heart of the bill. However, a provision was added authorizing the President to investigate strikes by establishing an investigatory board composed of two com­ missioners plus the commissioner of labor. This "temporary commission" was set up "for the purpose of examing the causes of" a strike and determining "the best means for adjusting it «39

Congressional debate over the bill took place in an atmosphere favorable to its passage. However, some House

^^Factual information on the Burlington strike was gleaned from Me Murray, Burlington Strike, pp. 4-5, 28-33, 38-52, 103, 106-09, 130-31, 138-53, 295-300, 209-10; Shannon, Centennial Years, pp. 230-32; Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, pp. 81-64. 39 U.S., Statutues at Large, XXV, pp. 501-03; U.S., Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 3097; United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation, RaiIway Strikes and Lockouts; A Study of Arbitration and Concilia­ tion Laws of the Principal Countries of the World Provid­ ing Machinery for the peaceable Adjustment of Disputes Be- tween Railroads and their Employees, and Laws of Certain Countries for the Prevention of Strjkes (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 133. 136 members voiced disapproval over the inadequacies in the bill. Congressman Parker of New York called the measure

"mere temporary make-shift, leaving all the great questions that are disturbing the labor, the transportation, and the business of the country precisely where they have been, while congress makes a pretense of having done something."

Congressman Buchanan of Iowa, while alluding to the weak­ nesses of the bill, pointed out that Congress, in pursuit of its duty to settle labor problems should "establish and originate . . , courts ...to hear and determine all con­ troversies between railroad managers and the employees of railroad companies." Finally, George D. Tillman of South

Carolina went so far as to interpret the bill as a "fraud

. . . void of any practical utility" to the parties concerned and serving only to waste away "big fees" to arbitrators and witnesses.

Nonetheless, the legislators, undoubtedly influenced by the slow progress of the Burlington strike and the fact that 1888 was an election year, passed the bill. Many prob­ ably followed the thinking of Congressman Parker who in spite of reservations stated that he would "vote for this bill, if it is the best that can be obtained." Others, also believing that some bill was better than one, probably took note of Congressman Buchanan's observations that the

40 U.S., Congressional Record, 50th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 3097, 3099, 3Ï00, 3Ï01, 3197. 137 bill’s supporters never pretended that it was "anything more than a mere voluntary arbitration bill.

The Senate kept the bill in committee for fourteen weeks before finally reporting it to the floor. The delay, however, represented mere formality, for the upper chamber wasted little time debating the bill. Within a month it passed the measure and on October 1, 1888 President Cleve- ij2 land’s signature made it law.

' The Arbitration Act of 1888 was the first federal law designed to settle labor disputes peaceably. However, that was its only claim to relevance, for during the ten years of its existence its arbitration provisions were never

Implemented, and its investigatory features applied only once, by President Cleveland to investigate the Pullman strike of 1894.^3 .

Ironically, it was the Pullman, or Chicago railway boycott and strike of I894 which revealed, in glaring detail, the inadequacies of the Arbitration Act of I888. The Pullman

^^Ibld.. 3099, 3101. 4 2 Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes. 104-05. 43 Howard S. Kaltenborn, Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes (Chicago; Foundation Iress, inc., 19^3), p. 37; Thomas Russell Fisher, Industrial Disputes and Fed­ eral Legislation With Special Reference to the Railroad Coal. Steel and Automobile Industries in the U.S. since 1900 (hew York; Columbia University” Press, 19%), pp. I56- 57] Lecht, Railroad Labor Legislation, p. 16. 1^1 strike, perhaps the most famous labor controversy in Amer­ ican history, has received- extensive historical coverage and many of its details are common knowledge. What is most important about the strike, however, is that it con­ tained all the ingredients of late-nineteenth century rail­ road labor disputes and represented the climax, for decades to come, of such confrontations.

The beginnings of the Pullman strike are analogous to the- sources of rift which sparked earlier railroad up­ heavals. In the late spring of 1894 George Pullman, the dictatorial ruler of the Pullman Palace Sleeping Car Com­ pany, began suffering the economic repercussions of the panic of 1093. To cut expenditures, he decided to slash worker wages and stagger work schedules. At the same time, in Pullman, Illinois, the company town which operated much like a feudal manor, rents and other costs remained the same as before the wage cuts. Before long harships devastated the Pullman employees, and their only recourse was to take a c t i o n . ^5

See, among others. United States Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July. 1894 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1895), pp. xv-liv; Aimont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike; The Story of a Unique Experi­ ment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1942); Frederick T. Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787-1903. 67th Cong., 2nd sess.. Senate Document 263 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 195-204, 298-305; Eggert, Railroa.d Labor Disputes. pp. 152-91 ; Ginger, Bending Cross, pp. 100-47. 45 Ginger, Bending Cross, 10 8-112. 139 Nearing desperation, a group of Pullman employees chose to place their hopes in the American Railv/ay Union

(ARU), the year-old heterogeneous railway labor organiza­ tion headed by the competent and dedicated Eugene V, Debs.

Acting as an ARU affiliate, these disenchanted workers carried their case to the company requesting negotiations on the issues of wages and rents. The proposals were re­ fused outright and on May 10 Pullman laid off three members of the' union's negotiating committee, an action which the commission investigating the strike acknowledged as "not an unusual proceeding." Embittered and desperate, Pullman’s employees voted to go out on strike.

Approximately one month after the strike vote, the

American RaiIway Union dealt directly with the Pullman issue at its regular convention meeting in Chicago from June 9 through June 26. After much discussion, the delegates voted - to boycott any company handling Pullman cars. This action brought the ARU into direct conflict with the "voluntary, unincorporated" General Managers Association (GMA) made up of the general managers of twenty-four leading railroad companies "centering or terminating" in Chicago. From then on, the principal combatants in the Chicago Strike v:ere not

46 U.S. Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike, pp. xxxvii-xxxix. The Commission noted that ^'the Pullman Company is hostile to the idea of conferring with organized labor in the settlement of differences arising between it and its employees." See Ibid. , p. xxv. 140 Pullman and his workers, but the ARU and GMA.^^

Both the ARU and GMA were unique. The ARU repre­

sented the first ’’serious," and most successful attempt at

uniting all railroad workers into one camp. The GMA, on

the other hand, instituted an extraordinary union of poten­

tially competitive railroad executives. However, despite

their uniqueness these organizations resembled, in a crit­

ical way, the antagonists of earlier railroad disputes.

Each stood for competing ideologies ; the ARU for change in

private property relations and the GMA for the status quo

and maintenance of business interests. Like the railroad

executives of years past, the members of the GMA. preferred

to deal only with conservative unions. Testifying before

the strike commission, Everett St. John, general manager

of the Rock Island railway and chairman of the GMA, re­ marked that he saw "no necessity for an organization" such as the ARU. "We have always gotten along comfortably well— in fact, in a very satisfactory manner— with the old orders as they exist.The "old orders," for the most part, were sitting out the Chicago strike.

47 Ibid,. pp. xviii, xxviii, xxxix. See also Donald L. McMurry, "Labor Policies of the General Managers’ Assoc­ iation of Chicago, 1886-1894," Journal of Economic History, XIII (Spring 1953), 160-78. 48 Ibid. , p. 227. When queried as to what he might suggest to avoid future railroad strikes St. John was evas­ ive, stating he was "unable to offer any suggestions . . . likely to solve the problem ..." See Ibid., p. 253. 141

Another important way in which the Chicago strike followed the pattern set by earlier uprisings is reflected in the actions of the federal government. Once more Wash­ ington played the crucial role in a strike, not as a peacemaker but as the defender and protector of traditional union-management relations. When the GMA sought help in crushing the ARU’s vicelike grip on railroad transportation it found a compliant ally in the Attorney General Olney.

Professor Gerald Eggert notes that "Olney from the first was willing to throw the full weight of the federal govern­ ment into crushing the boycott."^9

After some deliberation, Olney chose to use the

Sherman Anti-Trust Act to issue an injunction against the strikers’ interference with Interstate commerce and the movement of the mails. Bolstered by a conservative judici­ ary, Olney and his associates convinced President Cleveland to send the U.S. Army to Chicago.The troops arrived on

Independence Day, and as is often the case, the level of violence escalated. For nearly three months the strike had been relatively peaceful, but within three days after state and federal troops arrived numerous skirmishes erupted, one

49 Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, p. 158.

^°Ibid., pp. 158-71

^^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 205-09. Ik2 Nonetheless, by July 17 the government had helped conclude

another transportation strike; the leaders of the GMA,

like Jay Could and the other defenders of the capitalist

ethic who had gone before them, carried the day. Eugene

V. Debs, the idealistic leader of the American Railway Union, was in custody.

But the weathering of another industrial upheaval

and the continued oppression of labor did not end the Pull­ man affair. There still existed one last issue worthy of

consideration. One more burning question had to be re­

solved; was the country periodically to endure severe and bloodletting railroad strikes or would the federal govern­ ment assume the initiative in seeking a just method for reconciling future disputes? This issue was of primary

interest to the United States Strike Commission investigat­

ing the Chicago strike.

Manned by Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. Wright,

former New York Railroad Commissioner John D. Kernan, and

lawyer-politician Nicholas E. Worthington, the strike com­ mission sought less to determine the heroes or villians

of the Chicago affair than to penetrate beyond the strike

and into the overall problem of industrial warfare. The

commission report praised neither the ARU, GMA, or the

federal government for their role in the strike. "The great

trouble with the Chicago strike," concluded Commissioner 143

Wright, "was that it was a pig-headed affair all a r o u n d . "52

In its conclusions and recommendations the commis­

sion took two positions indicative of a brighter future for American labor. Reflecting on emerging trend of the nineties, the commission defended the right of labor to organize and emphasized that responsible unions were vital to a strong industrial society. Noting that unions are probably inevitable, the commissioners asked if it was not wise "to fully recognize them by law; to admit their neces­ sity as labor guides and protectors, to conserve their use­ fulness, increase their responsibilities, and to prevent their follies and aggressions by conferring upon them the privileges enjoyed by corporations with like proper restric­ tions and regulations?" The corporations had enjoyed a half-century of healthy growth, exclaimed the commission; it was now time for unions to benefit from a similar exper­ ience .

The commission's advocacy of stronger unions was further revealed in its suggestions for adjusting future disputes. Its report called for the establishment of a per­ manent three-man United States strike commission to inves­ tigate and offer solutions during railway labor disputes. In the advent of a strike the commissioners, joined by a

^^Quoted in Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, p. 2l4.

^^U.S, Strike Commission, Report on the Chicago Strike. p. xlviii. 144 representative from the contesting companies and unions were to hear, adjust, and determine their particular con­ troversy. In addition, the report requested that state governments adopt methods whereby employers and employees could arbitrate their differences. Also, the States should enact statutes outlawing "contracts requiring men to agree not to join labor organizations . . . as conditions of employment." Finally, as a proper step toward alleviating industrial conflict, the report urged employer recognition of labor unions. "If employers will consider employees as thoroughly essential to industrial success as capital, and thus take labor into consultation at proper times, much of the severity of strikes can be tempered and their number reduced.Thus, the strike commission offered a mandate for change .commensurate with the times : recognize labor organizations and deal with their representatives in an effort to conciliate and arbitrate differences.

In the year following the strike investigation two of the commissioners, Kernan and Wright, joined with members of the House Labor Committee to devise an arbitration law aimed at supplanting the one passed in 1888. In the process, they enlisted the ideas of Attorney General Olney, whose

5 4 Ibid., pp. lii-liv. Ik5 experience in the Pullman strike apparently made him a

staunch advocate of arbitration. Olney welcomed the chal­

lenge and contributed more than anyone to the final draft presented to Congress. In addition, he supported Kernan and Wright, along with the secretary of the ICC Edward

Moseley and chairman of the House Labor Committee Lawrence

E. McCann in their efforts to persuade congress to enact qq the new bill.

Debate on the bill opened in the House on February

26, 1895. Although some legislators expressed skepticism over various parts of the bill, much of the debate con­ cerned itself with whether labor or management favored the new law. When queried as to who in labor supported the measure. Congressman Erdman, the bill's sponsor, mentioned signed statements of support from the leadership of five railvjay brotherhoods.^^ On the other hand, the "evidence" presented as indicative of railroad support for the bill was mostly circumstantial. "Sockless" Jerry Simpson, the famous Kansas Populist, responded to one congressman's

^^Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, pp. 217-22.

^^Erdman cited "E. E. Clark, of the Order of Railway Conductors ; Frank P. Sargeant and P. M. Arnold, of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman; P. M, Arthur, of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers; D. L. Cease and W. G. Edens, of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen; and V/.V. Powell; of the Order of Railroad Telegraphers" as request­ ing passage of the arbitration measure. See U.S., Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 1st sess., XXVII,2793. 146 request for proof of railroad’s support of the measure

by noting that Attorney General Olney favored the bill

and since "he is the attorney and director of a great many railroads . . . that ought to be satisfactory to the gentle­ man." Simpson’s insight failed to satisfy the congress­ man, but it did add laughter to the proceedings. Congress­ man Gcosvenor alluded to the failure of railroad managers to make their views known on the bill; an action which, considering their past behavior regarding railway legis­ lation, indicated their consent to an arbitration m e a s u r e . 57

As the debate progressed, these issues seemed to fade in light of the legislators urgent desire to pass some sort of arbitration law. The explosiveness marking the past twenty years of railway labor disputes, combined with the fresh memory of the Pullman fiasco weighed heavily on the legislators. "We are to-day," declared Congressman

Dunn, "... on the very brink of what may be an industrial revolution." Representative Ryan of New York noted that

"conditions can scarcely be worse than at present, when the only remedy for every slight misunderstanding seems to be the calling out of troops with all the deplorable atten­ dant consequences." Gradually, congressional concensus seemed to be embodied in a statement by Congressman Lacey of Iowa: "Arbitrations sometimes do not accord full justice

^^Ibid.. pp. 2794, 2796. 147 but they are much better than v/ar."58

It appears that this sense of urgency carried the

day, for the House passed the law on the very day of the

debate. The Senate, however, failed to act on the measure

before it closed its session on March 4. Nonetheless, the

bill was reintroduced in every subsequent session until it

passed the Fifty-sixth Congress, It was approved and signed

into law by President McKinley on June 1, 1898.^^

The so-called Erdman Act, unlike the Act of I888,

initiated, for the first time, the concept of government

mediation and conciliation of railroad labor disputes. The

chief responsibility for administering the act fell to the

United States Commissioner of Labor and the chairman of

the Interstate Commerce Commission. Section two of the act

stated "that whenever a controversy concerning wages, hours

of labor, or conditions of employment shall arise between

a carrier . . . and the employees . . . seriously inter­

rupting or threatening to interrupt" interstate commerce

"the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission and

the Commissioner of Labor shall, upon the request of either

^^Ibid., pp. 2795-96, 2803.

^°Ibid. , op. 2789-2805, 2819, 2881, 2961-62, 3075; 54th Cong., 1st sess., XXVIII, po. 49, 3463; 54th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIX, or. 2387-90, 2403; 55th Cong., 2nd sess., XXXI, pp. 72, 4638-49, 4842-58, 5046-53, 5566. 148 party to the controversy . . . put themselves in communica­ tion with the parties to such controversy, and shall use their best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to amicably settle the same.

The new law eliminated the investigation features of the 1888 law, but did retain and strengthen its arbitra­ tion features. For instance, if the commissioners failed in their efforts to mediate or conciliate differences, they then endeavored to settle the controversy through arbitra­ tion. A board of three, composed of the contesting parties and a neutral chairman were to determine the settlement.

Awards made by the arbitration board would be binding and conclusive, and in force for at least one year.

During the first eight years following its enactment the Erdman .Act was invoked but once. In September, I898 a group of conductors and brakemen working in the Pittsburgh switching district petitioned eight roads using their

See Appendix in Harry Edwin Jones, Inquiry of the Attorney General'5 Committee on Administrative Procedure Relating to the National Railroad Adjustment Board - His­ torical" Background and Growth of I'achine.ry Set Up for the Handling of Railroad Labor Disputes, lÜ8Ü-194o (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 19^1) ; U.S. Statutes at Large, XXX, p. 424,

^^Lecht, Railroad Labor Legislation, pp. 17-18. In addition to providing machinery for the settlement of strikes the Erdman Act forbade yellow-dog contracts and the use of blacklists, making such violations punishable by fines ranging from $100 to $1000. 149 switching service requesting higher wages and improved working conditions. They asked that the present rates of:

Day conductors 24 cents per hour

Day breakmen ...... 18 cents per hour

Night conductors ...... 25 cents per hour

Night breakmen ...... 19 cents per hour be replaced by new rates as follows ;

Day conductors ...... $2.75 per day

Day breakmen ...... 2.50 per day

Night conductors ...... 2.90 per day

Night breakmen 2.70 per day

Furthermore, the trainmen appealed for a 10-hour workday with overtime pay for duty beyond the normal 10 hours.

In the ensuing months various committees of. employ­ ees presented their demands to the various roads. Most of the smaller roads hedged, while the more powerful ones ignored the requests. Since most of the switchmen belonged to the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen the leaders of that

The historical background and correspondence re­ lating to the first case brought under the Erdman Act are taken from U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor; Volume XXIV - 1912 (Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1912), pp. 29-42; and National Archives, Record Group No. 13, Board of Arbitration, Inter­ state Commerce Controversies, Erdman Act Case Files, 1899, 1907-1913. 150 union chose to involve themselves in the Pittsburgh squab­

ble. Following the brotherhood*s fourth biennial conven­

tion in May, I899, P.M. Morrissey, Grand Master of the

Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, decided to deal with the matter by testing the efficiency of the Erdman Act, In a

letter to E. A. Moseley, Secretary of the ICC, Morrissey

expressed his "desire to take advantage of the arbitration

act, and enlist the offices of the chairman of the Inter­

state Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor in

the hope of settling" the Pittsburgh affair a m i c a b l y .

Approximately three weeks later, lorrissey, in a compre­ hensive five-page letter to ICC Commissioner Knapp and

Commissioner of Labor Wright, made formal application for government mediation. In the letter he presented the historical background to the dispute, warned of the danger of a strike, and "concluded that the controversy is suf­ ficiently serious to warrant asking . . . intervention, as permitted by section 2 of the Act of Congress, approved

June 1, 1898, entitled ’An Act Concerning Carriers engaged in Interstate Commerce and their Employees

^^P. H. Morrissey to E. A. Moseley, May 29, I899, U.S.. Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin; Volume XXIV-1912. p. 3 1 . 64 P. H. Morrissey to Martin A. Knapp and Carroll D. Wright, June 21, 1899, National Archives, Record Group No. 13, Erdman Act Case Files, 1899, 1907-1913. 151 Knapp and Wright, concluding that they had Juris­ diction in the case, addressed a Joint letter to the managers of the various railroads involved enclosing a copy of I-torrissey’s formal request for mediation.On

August 4th the commissioners summarized the company responses in a letter to Grand Master Morrissey. You will see from the answers of the com­ panies that our offer of mediation has been declined. The friendly offices tendered by us in the manner and for the purposes con­ templated by law have not been accepted. While our proffer of service has been treated with respect and courtesy, the answers and attitude of the roads are a declination of our official assistance in settling the difficulty which admittedly exists.

There was plainly no occasion for us to make further effort to induce the companies to submit the matter to arbitration, for their answers have anticipated that effort by an explicit and positive refusal to arbitrate the controversy. We believe that refusal is final, and are con­ vinced that no influence on our part can change their determination in that regard.

In a final expression of futility the commissioners admitted that the workers had sought redress through proper channels. "It is not their fault, and we believe not ours," confessed the commissioners, "that nothing has been

See Knapp and Wright to W. H. Barnes, President of the Alleghney Valley Railway Co., July 1, 1899» Ibid. The other roads involved in the controversy included the Penn­ sylvania R.R., Pennsylvania Lines West of Pittsburgh, Alle­ gheny Valley By., Pittsburgh and Western R.R., Union R.R. (including employees of Carnegie Steel Co.), Monongahela Connecting R.R., and the Laughlin Iron Co. See U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin; Volume XXIV - 1912, p. 30. ------152 accomplished.There was no opinion regarding the rail­ road's refusal to mediate.

Though the Erdman Act failed them, the employees of

the Pittsburgh district continued In their struggle for higher wages. In the succeeding months the trainmen's union engaged In direct negotiation with the heads of the principal roads. Once this failed, the workers voted to strike, an action whlch convinced the companies to grant pay Increases, thus terminating the controversy.^7

* * * *

At first glance It would appear that the Inability of the Erdman Act to deal with Its first case, and the attitude displayed by the railroads during the case Indicated that. In the late nineties, little had changed regarding railroad labor disputes. But such a conclusion Is Inaccur­ ate, for In reality, the Erdman Law signaled a meaningful change In attitude toward unions, collective bargaining, and the settlement of strikes. As Professor Eggert effec­ tively postulates; "Increasing numbers of thoughtful men both In and out of government no longer accepted force as the ultimate answer to railway labor disputes, and the

^^Knapp and Wright to Worrlssey, August 4, I899, Ibid.

^ .S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin; Volume XXIV - 1912, p. 42. 153 Erdman Act, weak though it was, stood as evidence of that changed attitude."68

Although the Erdman Act failed its initial test, evidence shows that both its principles and its machinery were the wave of the future. In the years immediately following 1898 there occurred a "revival in railway union­ ism" with certain advances in collective bargaining. Be­ tween 1906 and 1913 the Erdman Act gained a sudden respect­ ability and sixty-one cases were brought under it. Of these, forty were settled through the machinery in the Act, while the other twenty-one were settled peacefully. Indeed, for nearly a quarter-century after I898 no major upheaval occurred in the railroad industry, and when such a strike did threaten the Erdman law served as a guldepost for new legislation generally favorable to raiIway l a b o r . ^9

In a very real sense, then, the disastrous Pullman strike of I894 proved to be the high point in an ongoing educative process making the powers that be in America aware of a new "effective environment"— marked by more

Eggert, Railroad Labor Disputes, p. 225. 69 Ibid., p. 239; Lecht, Railway Labor Legislation, pp. 14-30; A. R. Ellingwood, "The Railway Labor Act of 1126," Journal of Political Economy. XXXVI (February, I928), pp. 53-Bn Specifically5 the Newiands Act of 1913 and the Railway Labor Act of 1926, each a response to a real or threatened strike, were successors to the Erdman Act. 154 assertive unions. In the sociopolitical period extending from the l870’s to 1900 railway labor unions had developed at a pace far behind the corporations. If they had not gained power so slowly, much civil strife andthe eventual need for drastic change might have been avoided. However, this was not the case and during the administration of

William McKinley It became Increasingly clear that a new method, divorced from the use of federal troops, would be needed to settle the railway labor problem. The Erdman

Act, the embodiment of a new conciliatory attitude, took a giant step toward providing that method.

Thus, when Constantine Erdman spoke In the House of

Representatives in defense of mediation, conciliation and arbitration of railway labor disputes he was not merely voicing the.doctrines contained in the bill which would eventually bear his name. Included In the substance of his message was the culmination of an educative process of response and adaptation to over twenty years of railroad upheaval, and the signal for changes In future attitudes and approaches to railway labor and the resolution of transportation problems. CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The trends described In this study are essential

to and reflective of the nature of the modern American

industrial economy. One trend, the evolution of the trade union-as a functioning part of industrial society in a way deemed "responsible" by a significant sector of the political, intellectual, and business establishment created a tripartite economic context in which three principle groups— business, labor, and government— interacted. The other trend, that of the career of William McKinley corres­ ponding with the early success of unions is demonstrative of how the impact of change accompanying the industrial revolution affected certain influential men. McKinley, and his businessman friend PTark Hanna, clearly possessed nine­ teenth century minds. Yet both of them became absorbed, whether willingly or not, in the worker's struggle for acceptance and survival. It was the new sociopolitical environment created by labor’s struggle which led McKinley to defend striking miners, to actively aid destitute workers during his governorship, and to eagerly seek labor votes in his quest for executive positions. It was this new environ­ ment, moreover, which resulted in the Erdman Act, a law

155 156

legalizing railroad unions and their right to collectible

bargaining, being enacted during the McKinley Presidency,

In short, the sociopolitical environment emanating from

labor's quest for equal rights forced many businessmen

and politicians, Irregardless of personal philosophy, to

adopt Ideas, policies, and attitudes which both reflected

and shaped that environment.

The American worker’s struggle for Industrial equal­

ity corresponded with the rise of modern Industry In the post-Clvll War era. During this period the United States

was controlled by wealthy finance capitalists. They

dominated political affairs, controlled private enterprise,

and literally Imposed their value system on the rest of

the nation. This value system placed a high premium on

Individualism, free enterprise, and an uncontrolled, unreg­

ulated laissez faire economy, while at the same time,

largely Ignoring human needs and values.

Under these conditions the average American laborer

could have little hope ; however, he was saved by the crucial

phenomenon of change. In all likelihood the period between

1870 and 1900 experienced greater and more chaotic social,

economic, and technological changes than any comparable

period in American history. Such occurrences as the vast

Influx of non-English speaking peoples, rapid urbanization,

and the sharp fluctuations In the economy had a peculiar

effect on America. These changes showed another side of 157

the American dream, a side accentuated not by the promise

of wealth but by the reality of teeming slums, class

stratification, and great disparity between the wealthy

and the poor.

It was primarily because of the inevitable problems

of social and economic adjustment to the darker side of

American society that American labor began to unite and

struggle, often in a very violent nature. In the l870’s

and 1880*5 American workingmen, lacking unity in either

goals or philosophy, tried several ways to alleviate indus­

trial abuses. The first prominent national unions, the

National Labor Union and the Knights of Labor, sought to

escape the wage system by forming cooperatives in which

profits could be distributed more equally among the pro­

ducers of the goods. The more craft oriented railroad brotherhoods chose a more conservative route, working with­

in the wage system and seeking the right to collective bargaining. Then, too, there were the more radical ele­ ments, whether they be socialists, anarchists, or merely

disgruntled workers, who opted for violent action. They added American color to Western industrial violence:

Tompkins Square, Molly Maguires, Hocking Valley, Haymarket and Homestead,

But, from a practical standpoint, it mattered little in the seventies and eighties whether William Sylvis' NLU or Terence Powderly's Knights experimented with cooperation. 158

or whether P. M, Arthur and the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers tried working within "the system," or even

whether the Trainmen’s Union or various socio-anarchists

attempted insurrection. In the two-and-one-half decades

following the Civil War the financial capitalists and

business managers maintained their pre-eminence. Railroad

executives stubbornly opposed any infringement on their

decision-making by brash unions or rowdy strikers. And with the power of the courts and the federal government behind them, business leaders suppressed strikes, dismissed

and blacklisted workers, and made a mockery of the concept

of collective bargaining. The only reward for the strikers

of the seventies and eighties was the setting of precedents

for future altercations.

Despite these early setbacks American labor continued

to struggle for a place in the industrial community. Just when the labor movement seemed at its nadir, following the

defeat at the hands of Jay Gould in 1885-86 and the Hay­

market disaster of that same period, it gained new momentum.

Several factors contributed to the post-1885 resur­

gence of organized labor, including the creation of the

Bureau of Labor Statistics by the federal government, and

the interest in labor problems shown by the investigatory

work done in the mid-eighties by the Senate Committee on 159

Labor and Educa':ion. However, probably the most important factor in this new resurgence of labor was the founding of the American Federation of Labor by Samuel Gompers.

Gompers brought a new and lasting philosophy and character to the American labor movement. This philosophy, commonly referred to as "business unionism," was grounded in ideo­ logical conservatism with a strong emphasis on worker self-interest rather than social reconstruction. Unlike social or socialist unionism, "business unionism" rejected class-consciousness and militancy in favor of a value system oriented toward Improving the status of trade unions vis ^ vis other interest groups in society.

More important, however, is the fact that the APL’s value system reflected the basic values of the larger society. By conforming to the American value system the APL not only found it easier to adjust to changing conditions, but it also discovered that certain influential politicians and business leaders were receptive to the concept of responsible, conservative unionism. Thus, relatively, con­ servative unions, such as the APL, the United Mine Workers, and the Railroad Brotherhoods, made considerable progress after 1886 because conservative men of prominence, respon­ sive to these unions* acceptance of American capitalist values, saw them as possible promoters of harmony in a potentially explosive industrial setting. As a matter of fact, a second important factor stabilizing the labor movement after 1886 was the willing­ ness of a number of individuals to recognize labor unions as vital to a secure industrial economy. This study has focused primarily on the career and thinking of but one of these men, William McKinley of Ohio, McKinley was born into a growing industrial area of Ohio, and his political career paralleled the American industrial revolution and the rise of the worker. As a man caught up in a changing society he responded and adapted to that society. As a young lawyer he defended striking miners, as a congressman he spoke up in favor of arbitration and authored the famous tariff which he felt would maintain worker wages. As a governor he sponsored progressive labor legislation, con­ cerned himself with the safety of striking miners, and provided social welfare for destitute workers. During his' campaign for the presidency his party openly courted and won urban labor votes. And finally, during McKinley's presidential years, such legislation as the Erdman Act and the creation of an Industrial Commission to Investigate the problems of labor and capital served as evidence of a new ideological outlook more positive toward American labor.

The work of the United States Industrial Commission,

1898-1902, a topic not discussed in the text of this study. 161 provides further evidence of the growing feeling in the late nineties that capital and labor could work together in peace and harmony. An act of Congress, dated June 18,

1898 created the commission "for the purpose of studying problems relating to industry with a view to formulating remedial legislation." The act further stated that the commission would consist of five members each from the

Senate and House, as well as nine other members appointed by President McKinley. Among those serving on the com­ mission were its chairman. Senator James H. Kyle who also chaired the Senate Committee on Education and Labor;

Representative John H. Gardner, head of the House Committee on Labor; Michael Ratchford, President of the United Mine

Workers * Union; and at least three others who had been associated with organized labor.^

The commission operated out of its headquarters in the Bliss Building in Washington, D.C, aided by a corps of expert agents and assistants. It was divided into five sub-commissions, two of which pertained to conditions of labor. The commission conducted studies, collected data, and heard testimony all with the purpose of examining industrial conditions in America and, if needed, making recommendations for improving those conditions. Among the

^Carroll D. Wright. "Industrial Commissions in the United States and in Austria." Quarterly Journal of Econ­ omics . XIII (January, 1899), 228-^9. 162

various economic elements examined by the commission were

agriculture, trusts, and transportation. This study, how­

ever, is primarily concerned with the commission's work in

the field of labor.

In conducting its investigation into the conditions

of labor and capital the commission obtained testimony

from numerous witnesses— many of whom occupied high posi­

tions in industry and labor— while at the same time sur­ veying tremendous amounts of documentary and statistical

evidence. So extensive was its work that its final report

on labor alone ran a total of 232 pages.^

A cursory glance at volumes 7, 12, and 14 of the nineteen thick volumes compiled by the commission indicate

that the status of labor unions, and attitudes toward them had improved during the McKinley Administration. Samp­

lings of the testimony given before the commission serves to reinforce this observation. For example, John McMackin,

Commissioner of Labor Statistics for the state of New York, alluded to the growth of unions during the McKinley Admin­

istration, when he noted that in his State, between the

The dates and scheduled appearances of the various people testifying is found in Records of the Department of Commerce, Minutes of the Industrial Commission. October 17, 1898— February 10, 1902, The National Archives, Washington: 1953; the actual testimony is contained in the Industrial Commission, Reports, 19 vols, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900-02; the final report on labor is in volume 19. 163 years 1897 and 1900, unions increased by 500 and member­ ship by nearly 100,000.3 Mr. D, P. Kennedy, an organizer for the Indiana AFL remarked that in his district condi­ tions of organized labor were much stronger than 5 years earlier, though not quite as strong as 10 years earlier.^ Although the witnesses representing the business community held divergent views regarding abor organiza­ tions, several showed a new receptiveness toward unions.

Though his principal reason for cooperating with union labor was to prevent friction. President Henry Clay Fry of the National Glass Company stated that after 25 years of using non-union labor his company now recognized and dealt with only union labor.5 Hamilton Carhartt, a

Detroit clothing manufacturer, testified that his company sought out organized labor and that their communications with them had always been cordial.^ President Hurrah of the Midvale Steel Company, though not himself a dealer with unions, declared that he believed "trade unions and labor

Industrial Commission, Reports, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1901), p. 799. McMakin added that organized labor in New York comprised 75 per cent of the mechanical trades, but perhaps only one-eighth of all laborers. 2| Ibid., p. 739.

^Ibid.. p. 898.

^Ibid.. pp. 658-62. 164 organizations of all kinds are decidedly beneficial to the employer." His plant had not unionized because most of his men were on piecework, dictating great diversity in wages based on bonuses for different levels of produc­ tion. He further contended that he and his men always lived up to wage agreements. Despite the "uniqueness" of the Midvale situation, Hurrah felt that in other cases, particularly where labor was paid on a day rate, unions would have the positive effect of stabilizing wages in competing plants.

In its final report the commission further reflected current trends by recognizing the necessity for strong labor organizations.

It is generally recognized that the growth of great aggregations of capital under the control of single groups of men, which is so prominent a feature of the economic develop­ ment of recent years, necessitates a corres­ ponding aggregation of workingmen into unions, which may be able also to act as units.°

Acknowledging that "in the operations of the market, the workingman is almost always under grave disadvantages" the

Commission Report granted that only;

By organization of labor, and by no other means, it is possible to introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry. By this means only the workers can effectively take part in determining the conditions under

^Ibid., XIV, pp. 349-50.

Ibid., XIX, p. 800. 165

which they work. This becomes true in the fullest and best sense only when employers frankly meet the representatives of the workmen, and deal with them as parties equally'interested in the conduct of affairs.“

The report went on to say that things were improv­ ing; the United Mine Workers and mine operators already practiced industrial democracy based on friendly negotia­ tions. And, as testimony before the commission disclosed, more employers were beginning to "view the organization of labor with increasing tolerance, even where they do not view it with marked favor.

Collective bargaining, another issue critical to the acceptanc of organized labor, also received extensive coverage in the commission's final report. It was noted that progress in this area occurred only recently, but by

1898 at least ten leading trades had adopted some system of collective bargaining or arbitration. Furthermore, the report commented that for collective bargaining to succeed labor organizations must be strong enough to command the respect of employers.

It seems clear, then, that the creation and work of the Industrial Commission serves as additional evidence of the increased significance of organized labor in the late

^Ibid.. pp. 801-805.

^°Ibid.. p. 885.

^^Ibid.. pp. 839, 844. l66

1890's. It Is for this reason that a brief description of its effort is provided here. Interestingly enough, the

Industrial Commission, representing the first attempt by the federal government to ascertain labor and other social problems and recommend reform legislation, was jointly appointed by Congress and President McKinley, giving cred­ ence, if only by implication, to the latter’s awareness of

American labor.

Following up on the earlier discussion, it must be noted that William McKinley was not the only man of influ­ ence in the late nineteenth century who manifested some sympathy for the cause of labor. Men like Congressman

O'Neill and Constantine Erdman and their supporters of the

Arbitration Bill of 1888 and the Erdman Act also demon­ strated much concern over labor-management relations, and the position of workers in American industry. Numerous intellectuals, writers, and critics who focused on the

"labor question," the plight of American workers, and the need for greater equality between employer and employee also gave labor a boost in the nineties. Even as staunch a defendant of law and order as Attorney General Bichard

Olney worked for a better break for unions by writing and backing legislation which would enable the government to solve labor disputes without resorting to the use of 167

force. And, of course, there were those "farsighted"

businessmen, such as Mark Hanna, Ralph Easley, and Oscar

Straus, who established and operated the National Civic

Federation with the idea of promoting industrial harmony

through greater cooperation with conservative unions. It should be further noted that it is not the purpose

of this study to make these men appear as social reformers.

There is little doubt that most of them were among the most conservative thinkers in the 19th century America;

and much of labor suffered well into the nineties and after

despite their efforts. However, this does not alter the

fact that most of these men were attuned to the "labor problem" and believers in the inevitability of unions. It

also does not alter the fact that during the McKinley admin­

istration, a period in which men responsive to unionism dominated, organized labor made great strides. Between

1897 and 1900 union membership skyrocketed, the United Mine

Workers and AFL solidified themselves, and the rail and

coal industries established frameworks for collective bargaining which prevailed for decades onward. These gains, to be sure, failed to alleviate the plight of many strug­ gling workers; however, they did help to elevate organized labor, as it then existed, into a permanent participating institution in the capitalist framework.

In its long quest for survival and recognition why did organized labor find many of its allies among 168 conservative politicians and businessmen, and why did it enjoy such great success during a Republican administra­ tion dominated by men who have traditionally been depicted as conservative business politicians? This is a question which goes to the heart of the nature of the American capitalist society and various historical interpretations of labor’s progress in that society. It could be spec­ ulated that organized labor progressed during the McKinley presidency simply because America had just emerged from the darkness of depression into an era of prosperity. But this would not involve adequate historical analysis, nor would it shed any light on how industrial America adapts to a changing environment.

Actually, the free enterprise system is vitally dependent on both workers and capitalists. Each group must work, struggle, and cooperate in a similar industrial set­ ting. In the early years of industrialization, however, the capitalists had the upper hand. They had the law, traditional economic thought, money, and puppet govern­ ments on their side. As time progressed, however, and industrialization brought traumatic changes, workers at­ tempted to unite and change the balance of economic power.

In the process they threatened to upset the harmony upon which the free enterprise system is so dependent. Initially the ruthless capitalists could adamantly resist, but as 1^! costly strikes and worker power escalated so did the need for accommodation.

It was in this context, this changing social, politi­ cal, and economic environment that many discerning poli­ ticians and employers chose to recognize and cultivate conservative unions. It is not that these men, whether they be McKinley, Hanna, or the members of the National

Civic Federation, were reformist oriented. Rather, they wisely perceived the temperament of the times and reacted and adapted to the changing industrial surroundings. Or­ ganized labor made substantial gains in the late nineties and early twentieth century not because these men neces­ sarily desired it. Those who accepted or even supported the institutionalization of organized labor most likely could have lived with things as they were in the l870’s and 1880's. However, these men abhored violence and any semblance of socialism or anarchism; and labor’s struggle was often attended by severe conflict, and tarnished with

"foreign" ideas. This threatened the security and stability of a capitalist order already menaced by intense economic competition. The plausible solution v;as to reward labor, to accept union-management negotiation, and to create a brotherhood of business and labor which promoted social stability and economic profit while counterbalancing any radical alternatives to the emerging corporate order. 170 over the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin workers, combined with a series of defeats by AFL affil­ iates in 1903 also proved harmful to labor’s cause.13

Perhaps the most devastating of all the post-1903 obstacles to continued labor advances was a host of anti­ union court decisions. The invalidation by Supreme Court of section 10 of the Erdman Act is a classic example of these damaging judicial pronouncements. Section 10 had outlawed so-called "yellow-dog" contracts by declaring

"that any employer subject to the provisions of this act,

. , . who shall require any employee, or any person seek­ ing employment, as a condition of such employment, to enter into an agreement, either written or verbal, not to become or remain a member of any labor corporation, association, or organization; . . . is hereby declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor . . .

Five years after the enactment of the Erdman Act employers began violating section 10 by requiring their employees to sign iron-clad oaths agreeing not to join any union. Then in I908, William Adair, an agent of a railroad

Joseph G, Rayback, A History of American Labor (New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), pp. 2 0 7 - 2 6 ; Dulles, Labor in America, pp. 19^-99.

^^U.S., Department of Commerce and Labor, Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor. Volume XXIV-1912 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,'1912), p. 61. 171 employer, discharged 0. B. Coppage because he belonged to

a union. The immediate question was whether Adair "did

unjustly discriminate against an employee . , , contrary to

the forms" or the Erdman Law. However, by the time the

case reached the High Court the principal issue was the

constitutionality of section 10.^^

The government lawyers argued that in the Erdman

Act Congress wrote legislation outlawing discrimination against union members with the idea of eliminating a major cause of strikes as well as protecting interstate commerce.

The Court failed to be persuaded, however, and ruled Sec­ tion 10 unconstitutional on the basis that to punish an employer simply for dismissing an employee who was a union member constituted "an invasion of personal liberty, as well as of the right of property, guaranteed" under the

Fifth Amendment. The Justices, by a ruling of six to two, also upheld the right to freedom of contract by affirming that:

An employer has the same right to prescribe terms on which he will employ one to labor as an employee has to prescribe those on which he will sell his labor, and any legislation which disturbs this equality is an arbitrary and un- .^ justifiable interference with liberty of contract.

^^Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History, Volume II Since 18q 8 (New York: Apoleton-Century- Crofts, 1963), p. 46.

^^Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. I6l, 164 (1908). 172

The Adair case was succeeded by a number of other

decisions injurious to organized labor. In the Danbury

Hatters* case (Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 27^ (I908)), the

Supreme Court set a precedent by holding the Sherman Act applicable to labor unions. In the Bucks* Stove and

Range Case, Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell were sentenced to prison for violating an injunction against promoting an

"unlawful" boycott.Finally, in Coppage v. Kansas, the

Court once again ruled against section 10 of the Erdman

Act by holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting

"yellow-dog" contracts.^^

It seems clear, then, that the post-1900 counter­ offensive against unions left the promise of I898 unful­ filled, and spearheaded a return to a more reactionary out­ look toward unionization. These developments are mentioned here merely to place the enthusiasm shown unions in the

1890*8 in proper perspective. It would be fallacious to lead the reader to assume that such positive reforms as section 10 of the Erdman Act signaled a permanent revolution in attitudes toward organized labor. The concept of

17 Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Develop­ ment (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19^3J, p. 517. ^ ^^Harold U. Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire. 1897-1917 (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1951), p. 298.

^^Coppage V. Kansas, 23C u .S. 1 (1915). 173 unionization received wide support in the nineties, but

Its acceptance was all too brief, and the anti-union cam­ paign of the early twentieth century erased many previous gains.

Some of the labor and economic historians interpret­ ing the period and issues under discussion have stressed the themes of conflict and consensus. For example, Philip

Taft and Philip Ross, in their article "American Labor

Violence; Its Causes, Character, and Outcome" briefly dis­ cuss most of the major upheavals mentioned here and conclude that "the United States has experienced more frequent and bloody labor violence than any other nation." Noting that labor violence has "sharply reduced in the last quarter of a century," Taft and Ross, nonetheless maintain that, until the National Labor Relations Act eliminated the "conditions that gave rise to past labor violence," conflict was the fundamental underlying feature in American labor history.

In contrast to Taft and Ross, Edward Kirkland and

Selig Perlman argue that throughout American history only a minority of unionists favored radicalism, and consensus

See Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character and Outcome," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (NewYork: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 2B1-396. 174

has been the fundamental theme of the American labor move­ ment. Kirland, in his authoritative Industry Comes of Ag;e.

asserts "that the philosophy of labor frequently resembled that of managers and employers." He further argues that

it is "misleading" for historians analyzing the era between

i860 and 1900 to concern themselves merely with labor up­ heaval. He points out that after every major strike at least one major capitalist or politician spoke positively about unions. More attention, Kirkland concludes, should be paid to the "foresight and flexibility of both labor and capital.

Perlman, though he is more theoretical, is in agree­ ment with Kirland. In his seminal work entitled A Theory of the Labor Movement. Perlman emphasizes the lack of

"class-consciousness" in American labor, while directing attention to labor's cognizance of "the virtually inalter­ able conservatism of the American community as regards private property and private initiative in economic life."

Paced with this conservatism, the labor movement, Perlman maintains, "arrayed Itself on the same side," requesting

^^Edward C. Kirland, Industry Comes of Age; Business, Labor, and Public Policy 1860-1897 (New 7orki Holt, Rine- hart, and" Ivins ton, 196l), pp. 394-98. ^^Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: Macmillan Co., 192c’), pp. 152-71, 200-07. 175

There is no question that these interpretations, offered in the conflict and consensus framework, are im­ portant historiographical contributions. Each approach, though contradictory to the other goes far in determining whether sharp and bitter conflict dominated American labor history, or whether employers and employees adhered to a basic set of values based largely on the capitalist framework.

But one v:onders whether the themes of conflict and consensus are too restrictive as approaches to interpreting the American labor movement. Does it necessarily follow that if the majority of American workers are not radical they have sold out to the capitalists? By the same token, ifa business manager compromises with striking employers has he jeopardized capitalist values? It would seem that perhaps there is something in between, something like a mutual accommodation whereby neither labor or management totally capitulate. Few would deny that in most instances labor joined in a harmony of beliefs with the capitalists.

But does that mean the capitalists made no concessions to the unions? Obviously not, and an important question might be what was the nature of the capitalists and their sup­ porters accommodation with organized labor? In a sense, this study has sought to address itself to that question. 176

In both a precise and conclusive statement, then, this study contends that in the late 1890's, after nearly twenty years of struggle, organized labor was well on its way to being a bonafide member of the American industrial economy. Much of organized labor’s success at that time was due to its participation in various violent upheavals.

However, equally important was the emergence, during the late 1880’s and l890’s, of a new attitude toward unions.

During this period certain influential men in business and politics responded to a chaotic and changing industrial environment and altered their thinking toward accommodating organized labor. One such individual was William McKinley, and it is interesting that during his presidency organized workers made some of their greatest strides toward improv­ ing relations with management, toward participating in collective bargaining, and toward acceptance as a permanent

American institution.

To be sure, this new approach to labor problems failed to solve all of the workingman’s problems. In the

1890'5 and after child labor, low wages, long hours and unsanitary working conditions remained very much a part of American industry. Furthermore, the belligerent posture exhibited toward unions betv.'een 1904 and 1914, accented by the decisions of a repressive Judiciary, largely shattered the promise of the late nineties. Nevertheless, the new 177 importance accorded unions during the McKinley adminis­

tration deserves historical attention for it signified

the best organized labor had done to date; and the best

it would do, comparatively speaking, until the Mew Deal era of the 1930's. BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Manuscript Materials

John Mitchell Papers. Department of Archives and Manu­ scripts, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

McKinley Governor's Papers. Ohio Historical Society. Columbus, Ohio,

McKinley Letter Books. Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

National Archives, Record Group No. 13, Board of Arbi­ tration, Interstate Commerce Controversies. Erdman Act Case Files, 1899, 1907-1913. Terence V, Powderly Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Catholic Universitv of America, Washington, D.C.

William McKinley Papers. Presidential Papers Microfilm. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1961,

United States Documents

Abstract of the Tv:elfth Census, 1900, Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1904,

Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress. 1774-1961. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.

Industrial Commission. Reports, 19 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1900-02,

Jones, Harry Edwin. Inquiry of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure Relating to the National Railroad Adjustment Board - Historical Back­ ground and Growth of Machinery set up for the Hand­ ling of Railroad Labor Disputes. 188o-1940. Wash­ ington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1941,

178 179

Records of the Department of Commerce, Minutes of the Industrial Commission, October 17, Ibyb - February lO, 1^02. The National Archives, Washington: 1953.

Report of the United States Board of Mediation and Concll- iation/ l^l$-l9Ï7. Washington, D,C,: Government ^Printing Office, 1918,

United States Board of Mediation, Railway Strikes and Lockouts: A Study of Arbitration and Conciliation Laws of the Principal Countries of the World Providing Machinery for the Peaceable Adjustment of Disputes Between Railroads and Their Employees, and Laws of Certain Countries for the Prevention of Strikes. Washington, D,C.: Government Printing Office, 1916.

United States Congress. House, Carriers Engaged In Inter­ state Commerce and Their Employees, Report No. 4^4. 55th Cong., 2nd" sess.," lb9b, ~

United States Congress. Senate, Carriers Engaged In Interstate Commerce and Their Employees. Report Wo. 591, 55th Cong,, 2nd sess,, Ï890.

United States Reports, Cases Adjudged In the Supreme Court, Vols, 208, 236, New York: Banks Law Publishing Co,, 1908, 1915.

U.S, Board of Mediation and Conciliation, Railroad Labor Arbitrations, Washington» D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1916,

U,S, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957. Washington, D,C,: Government Printing Office, I960,

U,S, Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation. Report on the Operations of the United States Board of Media­ tion and Conciliation, 1913-1919» Washington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1920,

U.S, Congress, House, Select Committee, Investigation of Labor Troubles In Missouri, Arkansas. Kansas, Texas, and Illinois, House Report No, 4174, 49th Cong,, 2nd sess,, I887,

U.S, Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Report Upon the Relations between Labor and Capital» and Testimony Taken by the CommitteeT H vols. Washington', D.C,: Government Printing Office, I885. 180

U.S. Congressional Record. Vols. XVII, XIX, XXVIII, XXIX, and XXXI.

U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor. Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor. Vol. XXIV - 1912. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912.

U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor. Bulletin of the Department of Labor. Vol. VII - 1902. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902.

U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor. 1901. Strikes and Lockouts. Washington, D.C.; Government Print­ ing Office, 1901.

U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor. Tenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor. 1894. Strikes and Lockouts^ Vol. I. Analysis of " Tables. General"" Tables of Strikes and Lockouts. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.'1B96.

U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin No. 9 8 , Mediation and Arbitration of Rail­ way Labor Disputes in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912.

U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin No. 303. Use of Federal Power in Settle­ ment of Railway Labor Disputes. Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1922.

U.S. Statutues at Large. Vol. XXV, XXX.

U.S. Strike Commission. Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July 189^. Washington, D.C. Government IPrinting Office, 1095.

Wilson, Frederick T, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787- 1903. 67th Cong., 2nd sess,. Senate Document ^63, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922.

State Documents

Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the Fiscal Year ending November 15, I894. Columbus, Ohio: The Westbote Co., State Printers, 1895. I8l

Joint Committee of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. Report of the Committee Apnolnted to Investigate the" Railroad Rio.ts in July, 1877. Harrisburg, Pa., WfW,

Laws, of. Ohio. 1892, I893. Ohio Historical Society. Columbus, Ohio.

Ohio Executive Documents. 1892, 1893, 189^, 1895. Norwalk, Ohio: The Laning Printing Co., State Printers, 1893-1896.

Reports of the State Board of Arbitration of Ohio for the Years 1893. 1894, 1Ü95. 1896. Together with a Copy of the Arbitration Act and the Rules Adopted in I’ursuance Thereof. Norwalk, Ohio: The Laning Printing Co., State Printers, I893-I896.

Secretary of State. Ohio Statistics. I89I, 1893. Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

Other Primary Sources

American Federation of Labor. Proceedings. I896.

Buchanan, Joseph R. The Story of a Labor Agitator. New York: The Outlook Co., 1903.

Commager, Henry Steele, ed. Documents of American History. Vol. II: -Since 18q8. New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1963. Garraty, John, ed. Labor and Capital.in the Guilded Age: Testimony Taken by the Senate Committee Upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital - 188^ Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968,

Gompers, Samuel. Seventy Years of Life and Labor: An Autobiography! 2 vols. New York; E, P. Dutton and Co., 1925.

Hanna, Marcus A. Mark Hanna. His Book. Boston: Chappie Publishing Co., 19047

Powderly, Terence V. The Path I Trod: The Autobiography of Terence V. Powderly. New York: Columbia Univ- ersity Press, 19^0.

Powderly, Terence. Thirty Years of Labor: 1859-1889. Columbus, Ohio: Excelsior Publishing Co.7 1B9O, 182

Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley, New York; D, Appleton and Co., 1893.

Woods, William A. "Injunction in the Federal Courts." Yale Law Journal. VI (Apr. 1897), 248-251.

Writings and Speeches of Eugene V. Debs. New York: Hermitage Press, Inc., 1948.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Adamic, Louis. Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America. New York: Viking Press, 1931.

Allen, Ruth. The Great Southwest Strike. University of Texas Publication No. 4214. Austin, Tex.; Univer­ sity of Texas Press, 1942.

Angle, Paul M. Bloody Williamson: A Chapter in American Lawlessness. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

Baratz, Morton. The Union and the Coal Industry. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955.

Barnard, Harry. Rutherford B. Hayes and His America. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1954.

Beer, Thomas. Hanna. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1929.

Bimba, Anthony, The History of the American Working Class. New York: International Publishers, 1936. "

Bining, Arthur Cecil. The Rise of American Economic Life. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 19^3.

Binkley, Wilfred E, American Political Parties: Their Natural History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945.

Boiler, Paul P., Jr. American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Naturalism, 1865-1900. Chicago: Rand Pick ally and Co., 1959.

Brody, David., ed. The American Labor Movement. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971. 183

Broehl, Wayne G,, Jr. The Molly Maguires. Cambridge, Fass,: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Bruce, Robert V. 1877: Year of Violence. Chicago; Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1970.

Carlton, Prank Tracy. The History and Problems of Organ­ ized Labor. New York; D. C. Heath and Co., 1911. Chamberlain, Neil W. Collective Bargaining. New York; McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951.

Chandler, Alfred D.j Bruchey, Stuartj and Galambos, Louis, eds. The Changing Economic Order; Readings in American Business and Economic tiistory. New York; Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1968.

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., ed. The Railroads. The Nation’s First Big Business. Sources and Readings. New York; Harcourt', Brace and World, Inc., 1965.

Chasan, Will. Samuel Gompers; Leader of American Labor. New York; Praeger Publishers, 1971.

Cochran, Thomas C. Railroad Leaders. 1845-1880. The Business Mind in Action, Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1953.

Cohen, Sanford. Labor in the United States. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill' B'ooks,' inc., I960.

Coleman, J. Walter. Labor Disturbances in Pennsylvania. Washington, D.C.; Catholic University Press, 1936.

. The Molly Maguire Riots; Industrial Conflict in The Pennsylvania Coal Region.Richmond, Va.; Garrett and Massie,'ïnc., 1936.

Coleman, McAlister. Men and Coal. New York; Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 19^3. Commons, John R. and Associates. History of Labour in the United States. 4 vols. New York; Macmillan Co., I s W , '

Cornell, Robert J. The Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902. Washington, D.C.; Catholic University of America Press, 1957. 184 Croly, Herbert. Marcus Alonzo Hanna. His Life And Work. New York: MacMillan Co., I9I2'.

Dacus, J. A. Annals of the Great Strikes in the United States. A Reliable History and Graphic Description of the Causes and Thrilling Events of the Labor Strikes and Riots of 1Ü77. Chicago: L, T. Palmer and'To./'-IF7T.------David, Henry. The History of the Haymarket Affair: A Study in the American Social - Revolutionary and Labor Movements. New York: Russell and Russell, TJW. --- Degler, Carl N, The Age of Economic Revolution 1876-1900. Glenview, 111. : Scott, Foresrnan, and 'Co,, 1957.

Derber, Milton. The American Idea of Industrial Democracy, 1865-1965. Chicago: University of Illinois Press,

Dlnnerstein, Leonard and Jackson, Kenneth T., eds. American Vistas, I877 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Dorfman, Joseph. The Economic Mind in American Civiliza- tion. Vol. Ill: 1865-1918. New York: Viking Press,

Douglas, Paul H. Real Wages In The United States, I89O- 1926. Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1930.

Dulles, Foster Rhea. Labor in America: A History. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co,, 1966.

Dunn, Arthur Wallace, From Harrison to Harding: A Personal Narrative, Covering a Third of a Century. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922.

Egbert, Donald Drew and Persons, Stow, eds. Socialism and American Life. Vol. I. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952.

Eggert, Gerald G. Railroad Labor Disputes: The Beginnings of Federal Strike Policy. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, I967.

Estey, Marten. The Unions: Structure, Development, and Management. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967. 185

Faulkner, Harold U, and Starr, Mark, Labor In America. New York: Oxford Book Co., 1957.

Faulkner, Harold Ü. Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 1090- 1900. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

The Decline of Laissez Faire 1897-1917. New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1951.

Fels, Rendlgs. American Business Cycles. 1865-1097. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1959.

Fisher, Thomas Russell. Industrial Disputes and Federal Legislation With Special Reference to the Railroad. Coal / Steel and Automobile Industries In the U.S.~~~ Since 1900. New York: Columbia University Press, I s W T

Foner, Philip S. History of The Labor Movement In The United States; Prom Colonial Times to the Founding of the American Federation of Labor. New York; international Publishers^ 1947.

' History of The Labor Movement In The United States. Vol. II; From the Founding of the American !Pc-5eratlon of Labor " to the Emergence'oi''Amer1 can Imnerlalism. New York: International Publishers, 1955. ______. History of the Labor Movement In the United States. Vol. Ill; The Policies and Practices of the American Federation of Labor, 1900-190?^ New York : International Publishers, 1964.

Purnlss, Edgar S, Labor Problesm; A Book of Materials For Their Study. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925.

Ginger, Ray. The Bending Cross, A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs. New Brunswick, N.J.Rutgers Unlver- slty Press,. 19^9.

Glad, Paul W. McKinley, Bryan, and the People. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 19^4.

Goldman, Eric. F. Rendezvous With Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1955. Green, Marguerite. The National Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement 19DQ-I923. Washington, b.c.: Catholic University of America Press, 1956,

Griffin, John I. Strikes; A Study in Quantitative Econ­ omics . New York: Columbia University Press, 1939.

Groat, George Gorham, An Introduction to the Study of Organized Labor in America, New York; Macmillan Co.,

Grob, Gerald N, Workers and Utopia; A Study of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor Movement 1865-1900. Ëvanston, 111,: Northwestern University Press, 1961,

Grodinsky, Julius, Jay Gould; His Business Career, 1867- 1892. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania bress, 1957.

Grossman, Jonathan, William Sylvis, Pioneer of American Labor; A Study of the Labor Movement During the Era of the Civil War. New York: Columbia University Frees, 1945. Haber, Samuel. Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Manage­ ment In the Progressive Era 1890-1920. University of Chicago Press, 1964,

Haber, William, ed. Labor In A Changing America, New York: Basic Books, Inc,, 1966,

Harvey, Katherine A. The Best-Dressed Miners; Life and Labor In the Maryland Coal Region. 1835-1910. Ithaca, N,Y,: Cornell University Press, 1969.

Hays, Samuel P, The Response to Industrialism; 1885-191^1. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Heald, Edward Thornton, The McKinley Era I875-I9OI, Vol. II; The Stark County Story, Canton, Ohio; Stark County Historical Society, 1950.

Higham, Robert, ed. Bayonets in the Street; '"he Use of Troops and Civil Disturbances! Lawrence, Kansas; University Press, 1969.

Holbrook, Stewart H, The Story of American Railroads, New York: Crown Publishers, 19^7. 187 Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, The WhlrllglP: of Politics; The Democracy of Cleveland and Bryant Chicago: Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 1963.

Hoxle, Robert Franklin, Trade Unionism In the United States, New York: D. Appleton and Co,, I919.

Jordan, Philip D, Ohio Comes of Age 1873-1900. Vol. V, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archaeological and His­ torical Society, 1943.

Josephson, Matthew. The Politicos, I865-I896. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc,, 1938,

Kaltenborn, Howard S. Governmental Adjustment of Labor Disputes, Chicago: Foundation Press, Inc,, 1943,

Kirkland, Edward C. Business In The Gilded Age: The Conservatives' Balance Sheet. Madison, Wis,: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952,

...... Industry Comes of Age; Business, Labor, and - Public Policy"1B60-I897. New York; Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961.

Kleppner, Paul, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics 1850-1900, New York: The t^ree Press, 1970.

Kohlsaat, H.H, From McKinley To Harding, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923.

Ladd, Evert Carll, Jr. American Political Parties: Social Change and Political Response, New York: W. W. Norton and Co,, 1970,

Laid1er, Harry W, History of Socialism: A Comparative Survey of Socialism, Communism, Trade Unionism. Cooperation, Utonlanlsm, and Other Systems of Reform and Reconstruction, Mew York: Thomas Y, Crowell Co.,196 8.

Laslett, John, The Workingman In American Life, Selected Readings, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968.

Lecht, Leonard A. Experience Under Railway Labor Legisla­ tion , New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Leech, Margaret, In The Days of McKinley. New York: Harper and Row," 1959, 188 Leiby, James. Carroll Wrlp;ht and Labor Reform; The Orlrins of Labor Statistics. Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, I96O,

Lindsey, Almont. The Pullman Strike; ^he Story of a Unioue Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval. Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Lorwin, Lewis L. The American Federation of Labor. Wash­ ington, B.C.; Brookings Institution, 1933.

T.ynch, Edward A. and IcDonald, David J. Coal and Unionism. A History of the American Coal Miners' Unions. Silver Spring, Maryland: Cornelius Printing Co., 1939.

McMurray, Donald L. The Great Burlington Strike of 1888; A Case History in Labor Relations'. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1956.

McNeill, George, ed. The Labor Movement: The Problem of Today. The History. ^Purpose, and Possibilities of Labor Organizations in Europe and America; Guilds. Trades-Unions and Knights of Labor; Wages and Profits ; Hours of Labor; Functions of Capital; Chinese Labor; Competition; Arbitration; Profit-Sharing and Coopera­ tion; Principles of the Knights of Labor; Moral and Educational Aspects of the Labor Question, Boston: A, M, Bridgman and Co., 1 BB7 .

MacDonald, Luis. Labor Problems and the American Scene. New York: Harper and Row, 1938.

Madison, Charles A. American Labor Leaders. Personalities and Forces in The Labor Movement. New York : Fred- erick Ungar Publishing Co., 19^2.

Mande1, Bernard. Samuel Gompers. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1963.

Mann, Arthur. Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age. Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 195^.

Marcus, Robert D. Grand Old Party; Political Structure in the Gilded Age loUO-lt’96. New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1971. Mi Ills, Harry A. and Montgomery, Royal E. Labor’s P-"ogress and Some Basic Problems. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1938. 189

Mitchell, John. Organized Labor, Philadelphia: American Book and Bible House, 1903.

Morgan, H. Wayne. From Hayes to McKinley; National Party Politics. 187*7-1896. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1969.

William McKinley and His America. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

Morris, Richard B., ed. Encyclopedia of American History. New York: Harper and Bros., 1953.

Leglsla South-Western Publishing Co,7"l p 9 T Noyes, Alexander D, Forty Years of American Finance. New York: G, P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909.

Olcott, Charles S. The Life of William McKinley. 2 vols. Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 19l6.

Felling, Henry. American Labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960.

Perlman, Selig. A History of Trade Unionism in the United States. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923.

...... é A Theory of the Labor Movement. New York: Macmillan Co., 192b.

Perlman, Selig and Taft, Philip, History of Labor in the United States. 1896-1932. New York: Macmillan Co.,

Pierce, Bessie L. A History of Chicago, vol. III. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 195Y. Radosh, Ronald, ed. Debs. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pren- tice-Hall Inc., 1$71.

Randle, C. V/ilson. Collective Bargaining, Principles and Practices. Boston; Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951.

Payback, Joseph G. A History of American Labor. Nevf York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Reed, Louis S. The Labor Philosophy of Samuel Gompers. New York ; Columbia University ri-ess, 1930. 190 Rich, Bennett M. The Presidents and Civil Disorder. Wash­ ington, D. C , ; The Brookings Institution, 1941.

Robertson, Ross M. History of the American Economy. New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1955.

Roy, Andrew. History of the Coal miners of the United States from the Development of the Mines to the Close of the Anthracite Strike in 1902 Including a Brief Sketch of E:arly British Miners. Columbus, Ohio: J. L. Trauger, 1907.

Schlesinger, Arthur Meier. The Rise of Modern America I865-I95I. New York: Macmillan Co., 1925.

Shannon, Fred Albert. Economic History of The People of The United States. New York : Macmillan Company, T 9W.

______. The Centennial Years: A Political and Economic History of' America from the Late' IÜ70 ' s to the Early 1890's. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., Ï967."

Sharfman, I. Les. The American Railroad Problem: A Study in War and Reconstruction. New York: 'i’he Century Co., 1921.

Stearn, Gerald Emanuel, ed. Gomoers. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971.

Straus, Oscar S. Under Four Administrations: From Cleve­ land to Taftl Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company," 1922.

Suffern, Arthur E. The Coal Miners' Struggle For Industrial Status: A Study of the Evolution of Organized Rela­ tions and Industrial Principles in the Coal Industry. New York; M acmillan Co., 1926.

Swinton, John. Striking for Life; Labors Side of the Labor Question; The Right of Workingmen to a Fair Living. New York: American Manufacturing and Publishing Co., 1894.

Taft, Philip. Organized Labor in American History. New York: Harper and Row, 196^4.

The A. F. of L. In The Time of Gompers. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1957. 191 Thompson, Slason, A Short History of American Railroads Covering Ten Decades. New York: D, Appleton and Co., 1925.

Ulman, Lloyd, The Rise of The National Trade Union; The Development"and Significance of Its Structure, Governing Institutions, and Economic Policies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I966.

Ware, Norman J. Labor In Modern Industrial Society. New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1935.

______. The Labor Movement In the United States, 1^00-1*595; A Study In Democracy. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1929.

Weinstein, James. The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State; 1900-1918. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

Wiebe, Robert H. The Search For Order. 1877-1920. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967.

Wieck, Edward A. The American Miners' Association: A Record of the Origin of Coal Miners* Unions In the United' States. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 19^10.

Witte, Edwin E. The Government In Labor Disputes. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1932.

Wolf, Harry D. The Railroad Labor Board. Chicago: Univer­ sity of Illinois Press, 1927.

Wolman, Leo. Ebb and Flow In Trade Unionism. New York : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936.

The Growth of American Trade Unions, I88O-I92 3 . New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1924. Wright, Carroll D, The Industrial Evolution of the United States. New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1Ü95.

Yellen, Samuel. American Labor Struggles. New York: Har­ court, Brace and Co., 1936.

Yellowltz, Irwin. The Position of the Worker In American Society, 1865- 1895. Englewood' Cliffs N.J.; Prentice Hall, 1959. 192

Articles

Abbott, Lyman, "Industrial Democracy." Forum, IX (August. 1890), 658-69. -----

"The Wages System." Forum. IX (July, I890), ^ - 2 9 .

Adams, Henry C. "The Report of the Industrial Commission. II Transportation," Yale Review. XI (November, 1902), 251-56 .

Akin, William E. "Arbitration and Labor Conflict: The Middle Class Panacea, I886-I9OO." The Historian. XXIX (August, 1967),•565-83. Alexander, Winthrop. "Ten Years of Riot Duty," Journal of Military Service Institute. XIX (July, I896), 1-62,

"Arbitrate the Arbitrable Points." Outlook. LXXXII (Septem­ ber 6 , 1902), 10-1 2 .

Archbold, John D, "Effect of Trusts on Labor," Independent, LII (March 15, 1900), 645-4%.

Anderson, Frank. "The Janizaries of Plutocracy," Arena. XXI (February, I899), 192-201,

Atkinson, Mabel. "Trusts and Trade Unions." Political Science Ouarterlv. XIX (June, 1904), 193-223.

Bailey, L. H. "The Report of the Industrial Commission. Ill - Agriculture." Yale Review, XI (November, 1902). 257-6 6 ,

Baker, Ray Stannard, "A Corner in Labor." McClure’s XXII (February, 1904), 366-78.

"Organized Capital Challenges Organized Labor." McClure's. XXIII (July, 1904) 279-92.

"The Reign of Lawlessness." McClure's, XXIII “iMÏÏy, 1904), 43-57.

"The Trust's New Tool - The Labor Boss." McClure's. XXI (November, I903), 30-43.

Barton, Frederick. "A Christian Gentleman: William McKinley," Chantauouan. XXXIV (November, I9OI), 134-37. 193 Bascom, John. "The Right to Labor." Quarterly Journal of Economics, XVIII (August, 1904), 492-512.

Bates, Stockton. "How to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts." North American Review, CLX (March, I895), 371-74.

Bennett, J. W. "Democracy or Autocracy - Which?" Arena, XXIX (April, 1903), 355-63.

"The Better Ways as to Labor," Century « LXV (January, 1903), 478-81. Bierbov/er, Austin. "Impending Labor Problems." Overland, XXI (February, 1893), 217-22.

Bridgman, R. L. "Labor’s Solution." Outlook, LXXV (Septem­ ber 19, 1903), 179-81.

Bryce, Lloyd. "The Trust and the Working-Man." North American Review, CLXIV (June, I 897), 719-31.

Buchanan, Joseph R. "The Story of a Labor Agitator,'" Outlook, LXXV (December 12, 1903), 894-900.

Cadman, Harry. "The Future of Industrialism." Overland, XV (June, 1890), 9 1 . - *“

"Can Arbitration in Labor Troubles Be Effective?" World’s Work, V (Novebner, 1902), 2789-90.

Carey, George W. "Capital and Labor," Arena, XXVI (Decem­ ber, 1901), 628-30.

Carmen, Harry J. "Terence Vincent Povjderly: An Appraisal." Journal of Economic History, I (May, 1941), 83-87.

Carter, Thomas H. "The Republican Outlook," North American Review. CLVIII (April, 1894), 423-32.

Casson, Herbert N. "The Trade-Unionist and the Monopolist." Arena, XXVIII (December, 1902), 596-6OI.

"The Cause of Strikes." Review of Reviews, IX (January, 1894, 75.

Cease, D. L. "The Labor Vote and What Controls It." Gunton’s Magazine, XXVII (October, 1904), 349-56.

Clark, Charles Worcester. "Compulsory Arbitration." Atlantic, LXVI (January, I89I), 34-4 4. 194 Clark, E. E. "Arbitration of Industrial Disputes." Annals, XXIV (September, 1904), 285-95.

Clark, John Bates. "Is Authoritative Arbitration Inevit­ able." Political Science Quarterly, XVII (December, 1902), 553- 67.

"Monopoly and the Struggles of Classes." Political Science Quarterly. XVIII (December, I903), 599-613.

Cleveland, Grover. "The Government In the Chicago Strike of 1894." McClure's, XXIII (July, 1904), 226-40.

"The Coal Miners' Strike." Gunton's, XIX (October, I9OO), 316— 22.

Cole, H. Oscar "Arbitration and Conciliation Practically Applied." Outlook, LVI (May 8 , 1897), 115-18.

Commons, John R. "A New Way of Settling Labor Disputes." Review of Reviews. XXIII (March, 1901), 328-33.

"Arbitration, Conciliation, Trade Agreement." Independent, LVI (June, 1904), 1440-44.

"Social and Industrial Problems." Chautauguan, XXXIX (March, 1904), 13-22

"Compulsory Arbitration." Review of Reviews, X (December. 1894), 666. ' "

The Constitutionality of Labor Legislation." Yale Review, VII (May, 1898), 5-7.

Cooley, T. M. "Lessons of Recent Civil Disorders." Forum, XVIII (September, I894), 1-19.

Coolldge, L. A. "The Late Senator Hanna." Review of Reviews. XXIX (March, 3^04), 296-97.

"Corporations, Trusts, Capital, and Labor - I," Overland, XV (June, 1890), 662-65. ------

"Corporations, Trusts, Capital, and Labor - II." Overland, XVI (July, 1890), 99-100.

Cummings, Edward. "A Collectivist Philosophy of Trade Unionism." Quarter]v Journal of Economies, XIII (January, 1899), 151-86. 195 "Industrial Arbitration in the United States, Quarterly Journal of Economics. IX (July, 1895), 353-71.

"The Death of Senator Hanna," Gunton's « XXVI (April, 1904), 308-09. DeSantis, Vincent P. "The Republican Party Revisited, 1877-1897," in H, Wayne Morgan, The Gilded Age; A Reappraisal, Syracuse, N. Y ,: Syracuse 'University Press, 1963.

Dick, Charles, "Why the Republicans Should Be Endorsed," Forum, XXX (November, I900), 257-74,

Dolliver, Jonathan P, "William McKinley," Independent LlII (September 26, I9OI), 2267-71.

Dolph, Joseph N, "Does the Republican Party Need Re-Organ- ization," North American Reviev;, CLVl (January, 1893), 54-6Ô:

Easley, Ralpy, "A View of the Labor Question," Harper’s Weekly. XLVlll (November 5, 1905), 1694-169^7^

"Senator Hanna and the Labor Problem," Independent LVI (March 4, 1904), 483-87.

"What Organized Labor Has Learned," McClure's XIX (October, 1902), 483-92,

"The National Civic Federation," Independent. LIV (August 28, 1902), 2065-1

"Editor’s Table," New England Magazine, VII (September, 1892), 13O-3T:

Ellingwood, A,R, "The Railway Labor Act of 1926," Journal of Political Economy, XXXVl (February-December, 1928), 53-82.

Ely, Richard T,, et al, "A Programme for Labor Reform," Century, XXXIX (April, I89O), 938-51.

Ely, Richard T, "The Report of the Industrial Commission, 1 - Labor," Yale Review, XI (November, 1902), 229-50,

"Ex-President Cleveland and the Railroad Strike of 1894," Review of Reviews, XXX (July, 1904), 84-85. 196

Farnum, Henry W, "Labor Crises and Their Periods in the United States." Yale Review, VII (August. I898). 180-96.

Field, David Dudley and Taft, Oren B. "Solutions to the Labor Problem." North American Review, CLVI (Jan­ uary, 1893), 61-6TH

Flinn, Thomas A. "Continuity and Change in Ohio Politics." Journal of Politics. XXIV (August, 1962), 529-44.

Ford, Tirey L. "The Damn of Experience," Overland, XXVIII (October, Ï896), 470-77. ^

Foster, Frank K. "Labor Policies, Politics, and Plat­ forms." American Federationist, I (March, 1894), 5-6.

"The Condition of the American Working Class; How Can It Be Benefited?" Forum, XXIV (February, 1898), 711-22.

"Trade Union Ideals." Publications of the American Economic Association, 3rd series. Vol. IV. New York: Macmillan Co., 1903, 230-47.

Gary, John H. "The Social Unrest." Atlantic, XCI (April, 1903), 5 69.

Gantt, H. L. "The Bonus System of Rewarding Labor." Review of Reviews, XXVI (September, 1902), 326-28.

George, J. E. "The Coal Miners’ Strike of 1897." Quarterly Journal of Economics. XII (January, I898), 186-208.

Gibbons, James Cardinal. "President McKinley." Independent, LIII (September 26, I90I), 2271-72.

Gompers, Samuel. "Organized Labor in the Campaign," North American Review, CLV (July, 1892), 91-96.

_____ . "Organized Labor. Its Struggles, Its Enemies, and Pool Friends." American Federationist, VIII (November, I9OI), 479-82.

"Strikes and the Coal-Miners." Forum, XXIV (September, 1897), 27-33

______"The Limitations of Conciliation and Arbitra­ tion." Annals, XX (July, 1902), 29-34. 197 Gray, John II. "The Social Unrest." Atlantic. XVI (April, 1903), 569-72.

Groat, George Gorham. "Industrial Arbitration in New York State." Yale Review. XV (February, 1907), 412-31.

Grob, Gerald M. "The Railroad Strikes of 1877." Midwest Journal of Political Science. VI (Winter, 1954-55), 16-34 .

"Terence V. Powderly and the Knights of Labor."' Mid-America. XXXIX (January, 1957), 39-55.

"The Knights of Labor and the Trade Unions." Journal of Economic History. XVIII (June, 1958), 176-92 .

Grusvenor, Charles H. "President McKinley." Independent. LII (July 26, 1900), 1767-69. ------

Gutman, Herbert. "An Iron Workers Strike in the Ohio Valley, 1873-1874." Ohio Historical Quarterly, LXVIII (Octob­ er 1959), 353-370.

'______. "The Braidwood Lockout of 1874." Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, LII (Spring. i960), 5-28. ------

______. ' "The Tompkins Square Riot in New York City on January 13, 1874; A Re-examination of its Causes and Aftermath." Labor History. VI (Winter. 1966). 44-70. — ------

______. "Trouble on the Railroads in 1873-1874 ; A Pre­ lude to the 1877 Crisis?" Labor History, II (Spring, 1962), 215-235. ------

______. "The Workers Search for Power: Labor in the Guilded Age," in H. Wayne Morgan The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963.

H.L.N. "President McKinley and Ilis Views." Harpers Weekly, XLIII (August 1 9 , 1899), 826. Hadley, A. T. "Government Administration of Industrial Enter­ prise." Yale Review. IV (February, I896), 398-408.

Halstead, Albert. "Chairman Cortelyou and the Republican Campaign." Review of Reviews. XXX (September. 1904), 294-98. “ “ 198 "The President at Work - A Character Sketch." Independent. LIII (September 5, 1901), 2080-8

Halstead, Murat. "A Century of the State of Ohio." Revievr of Reviews. XXVII (April, 1903), 426-30.

Handiboe, John. "Strikes and the Public Welfare." North American Review, CLXXV (November, 1902), 91-9"81

Hanna, Marcus A. "Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration." Annals, XX (July, 1902), 21-26.

Hanneman, John Bell, and Ramage, B. J. "President McKinley." Sewanee Review, IX (October, 1904), 483-93.

Herrick, Myron T. "Senator Hanna And The State." Harper's Weekly, XLVIII (April,.1904), 621-22.

Heighten, Henry E. "An American View of the S-trikes." Overland, XXXVIII (November, 1901), 346-54.

Hobson, J. A. "Compulsory Arbitration." North American Review, CLXXV (November, 1902), 597-606.

Hoffman, Charles. "The Depression of the Nineties." Journal of Economic History, XVI (June, 1956), 137- ' ET

Holaind, Rene. "Industrial Arbitration." American Catholic Quarterly Review, XXV (January, 1900), 109-19.

Hollander, J. H. "Political Economy and the Labor Question." North American Review. CLXXVI (April, 1903), 563-70.

Holt, Henry. "The Social Discontent - I. Its Causes." Forum, XVIII (February, 1895), 664-78.

"How Cleveland Dealt with the Chicago Strike." Harper’s Weekly, XLVIII (July 16, 1904), 1083-84. '

"How The Republican National Committee Works For Votes." Review of Reviews, XXII (November, 1900), 549-55.

"Industrial Arbitration." Review of Reviews, XIV (August, 1896), 225.

"Industrial Peace." Gunton's Magazine. XXVII (September. 1904), 246-56. 199 "Industrial Peace Through Arbitration." Arena. XXXII (September, 1904), 303.

"Industrial War and Peace." Outlook, LXXIV (July 13. 1903), 392-93. "Is the Labor Problem Likely to Work Itself Out?" HarDer’s Weekly. XLVII (June 20, 1903), 1049-50.

Jenks, Jeremiah W. "The Trusts; Pacts Established and Prob­ lems Unsolved." Quarterly Journal of Economics, XV (November, I9OO), 46-74.

Job, Frederick W . "A Means of Affective Arbitration." World’s Work. V (December, 1902), 2856.

Kasson, John A. "Impressions of President McKinley, With Especial Reference to His Opinions on Reciprocity." Century, LXIII (December, I9OI), 268-75.

Kelly, M.E.J. "Strikes as a Factor in Progress." North American Review, CLXIV (January, I897), 24-31.

Keramerer, Donald and Wickersham, E.D. "Reasons for the Growth of the Knights of Labor in I885-I886." Indus­ trial and Labor Relations Review. Ill (January, 1950), 213-20.

Kerby, William J. "The Laborer and His Point of View." American Catholic Quarterly Review. XXVI (January, 1901); 108-24.

Kleberg, Rudolph. "State Control of Trusts." Arena, XXII (August, 1899), 191-200.

"Labor Laws." Independent. LV (July 16, I903), 1700-01.

"The Labor Vote." Gunton's Magazine, XXVII (September. 1904). 238-45.

"The Lesson of the Steel Strike." Gunton’s Magazine, XXI (October, 1901), 331-38.

Levasseur, Emile. "The Standard of Living of American Work­ ingmen." Yale Review. V (August, I896), 122-42. Lodge, Henry Cabot. "Outlook and Duty of the Republican Party." Forum, XV (April, 1893), 250-58.

"The Opportunity of the Republican Party." Harper’s Weekly. XXXVIII (February 17, 1894), 350-51. Logan, Walter S. "The Right of the Laborer to His Job." Arena. XXIX (June, 1903), 586-92.

London, Jack. "The Class Struggle." Independent. LV (November 5, 1903), 2603-10.

Long, John D. "Some Personal Characteristics of President McKinley." Century. LXIII (November, I90I), 144-46.

Lovejoy, Owen R. "The Rights of Property and the Rights of Man." Arena. XXX (November, I903), 517-25.

Ludlow, John I. "Two New Social Departures." Atlantic. LXXVII (March, I896), 36O-67". ]

Macarthur, W. "Political Action and Trade-Unionism." Annals. XXIV (September, 1904), 316-30,

"The American Trade-Unions and Compulsory Arbitration." Forum. XXX (February, I90I), 737-51.

Macfarland, Henry B, F. "Mr. McKinley As President." Atlantic. LXXXVII (March, 1901), 299-313.

"The Character of William McKinley." Review of Reviews. XXIV (October, 1901), 430-32.

MacKay, H. W. B. "Law, Lawlessness, and Labor." Arena. XIX.(March, I898), 378-87.

Mann, Horace. "The Labor Problem," Arena, XXIX (February. 1903), 125-30.

Mason, Norman T. "Compulsory Arbitration A Practical Remedy." Arena. XVI (September, I896), 622-28.

Maxey, Edwin. "Private Property and Public Rights." Arena. XXVII (December, 1902), 56I-6 8 .

McGregor, Hugh. "The Incorporation of the Working-Class." Forum. XXIV (January, I898), 579-90.

McMurry, Donald L. "Labor Policies of the General Managers* Association of Chicago, I886-I894." Journal of Econ­ omic History. XIII (Spring, 1953), I6O-7B. Milton, G. F. "The Relation of Labor and Capital," Sewanee Review. IV (November, 1895), 62-72. "The Miners’ Struggle." American Federationist, VII (October, 1900), 3P 1-1 6.

Mitchell, John. "Recognition of the Trade Unions." Independent. Llil (August 15, 1907), 1895-98.

"The Great Coal Strike." Independent. LII (November, I9OO), 2613-16.

"The Mine Worker’s Life and Aims." Cosmopol­ itan, XXI (October, I90I), 622-30.

"Mitchell’s Doctrine of ’Classes.’" Harper’s Weekly, XLVIII (January, 1904), 45-46:

"Monopoly, Lawlessness, and Usurption." Independent, LV (April 2, 1903), 804-05.

Morse, Anson D. "The Republican Party." Political Science Quarterly, VII (September, I892), 522-35.

Munsey, Frank A, "The Republican National Convention." Munsey’s . XXIII (August, 1900), 672-82.

"William McKinley." Munsey’s, XXVI (November, 1901), 155-61

Nelson, Henry Loomis. "Industrial Liberty, Not Industrial Anarchy." North American Review, CLXXVIII (April, 1904), 571- W : ------

"New Aspects of the Labor Movement." Independent, LVI (April, 1904), 977-78. '

"A New Industrial Conspiracy," Current Literature, XXXV (October, 1903), 475-76.

"The Non-Union Man vs. ’The Scab.’" Gunton’s Magazine. XXIV (January, 1903), 19-24.

North, S. N. D. "Industrial Arbitration: Its Methods and Its Limitations." Quarterly Journal of Economics, X (July, 1896), 407-300.

Northcott, W . A. "The Rights of Men." Arena, XXVI (December. 1901), 561-69 . “

"Organized Capital Versus Organized Labor." Review of Reviews. XXX (July, 1904), 81-82. "Organized Labor and the Law." Review of Reviews, VII (June, 1893), 586. Outerbrldge, A. E., Jr. "Pending Problems For Wage-Earners." Popular Science. XLIX (May, I896), 57-71, "A Permanent Labor Court of Appeals." Gunton*s Magazine, XXV (August, 1903), 110-15. "The Personal Relations of Employer and Employee," Independent. LIV (May 29, 1902), 1319-20.

Pfahler, W. H. "Co-operatlon of Labor and Capital." Annals, XX (July, 1902), '15-58.

"Labor Unions as they Appear to an Employer." Annals. XXI (January, 1903), 46-54.

Phillips, R.E, "Self-Help to Employees." World's 'Work, I (February, I90I), 389-94.

Pierce, Edwin C. "The True Politics for Prohibition and Labor." Arena, IV (November, I89I), 723-29.

Plllsbury, Arthur J. "The Final Word." Overland. XXVIII (November, I896), 594-98.

Plehn, Carl C. "The Report of the Industrial Commission IV - Taxations." Yale Review. XI (November, 1902), 267-77. ' Porter, Horace, "What the Republican Party Stands For." Forum. XXI (August, I896), 722-26.

Powderly, T. V. "Government Ownership of Railways." Arena, VII (December, 1892), 58-6 3 .

"The Plea For Eight Hours." North American Review. CLVI (April, I89O), 464-69.

. "The Workingman and Free Sliver." North Amer­ ican Review, CLIII (December, I89I), 728-3 6.

"Wanted: A New Party." North American Review. CLV (November, 1892), 592-95.”

"A Practical Remedy for Strikes." Gunton*s Magazine. XIII (August, 1897), 88-98. "President Eliot on the Labor Problem." Outlook. LXXVI (February 27, 1904), 494-96. 203 "President FcKinley’s Life and Political Career." Outlook, LXIX (September 21, 1901), 144-45.

"The Progress of the Ccimpaign." Harper's Weekly, XLIV (October 20, 1900), 996.

"The Progress of the World: Industrial Warfare." The Review of Reviews, X (October, 1894), 366.

"The Progress of the World." Review of Reviews, XXVII (June, 1903), 643-65.

Review of Reviews, XIV (December, I896), 643- WT

Purves, Alexander, "Harmonizing Labor and Capital by Means of Industrial Partnership." Annals, XX (July. 1902). 61-77. Ralph, Julian. "Marcus Alonzo Hanna." Cosmopolitan. XXXIII (June, 1902), 153-57.

Ramp, Herbert M. "The Laborer's View of the Labor Question; How the Laborer Peels." Arena, XVII (November, I897), 644-72.

"Recent Labor Rulings by Federal Courts." Review of Reviews, VII (June, 1893, 584-86. ------

Rens, Conrad. "The Wage Contract and Personal Liberty." Popular Science, XLI (September, I892), 644-52.

"The Republican Candidate: The Record of President McKinley's Administration." Review of Reviews, XXII (July, 1900), 33-40.

Resnick, Samuel. "Unemployment, Unrest, and Relief in the United States During the Depression of 1893-97." Journal of Political Economy, LXI (August, 1953), 324-45. Robinson, Maurice H. "The Report of the Industrial Com­ mission. V - Trusts." Yale Review, XI (November, 1902), 278-9 6 .

The Work of the Industrial Commission." Yale Review. IX (May, 1900), 76-79.

Schindler, Rabbi Solomon. "Compulsory National Arbitration." Arena, VII (February, 1893), 306-11. 204 Schurz, Carl. "Impending Dangers." H a m e r ’s Weekly, XLII (February 19, I898), I7I.

Seager, Henry R. "The Attitude of American Courts Towards Restrictive Labor Laws." Political Science Quar­ terly . XIX (December, 1904), 5Ü9-611.

"Self-Enforced Arbitration." Outlook, LXVIII (August 24. 1901), 946-48.

"Senator Hanna." Outlook. LXXVI (February 20, 1904), 436-37.

"Senator Hanna On Labor Unions and Socialism." Gunton’s ■ Magazine. XXVI (March, 1904), 201-05.

"Senator Hanna on the Labor Question." Harper’s Weeklv. XLVIII (February, 1904), 192-93. T ^

"Senator Hanna’s Place in History." Current Literature, XXXVI (April, 1904), 384-85. .

"Senses Versus Sensation in Politics." Gunton*s Magazine, XXV (December, 1903), 471-77.

"Should Labor Unions be Incorporated." Review of Reviews, XXVII (February, 1903), 217-18.

Slanker, James A. "A Federation of Labor." Arena. XXIX (May, 1903), 536-40.

Smalley, Eugene V. "William McKinley - A Study of His ' Character and Career." Review of Reviev/s, XIV (July, 1896), 33-4 5 .

Smith, E. J. "A Living Profit and a Living Wage." Forum, XXVIII (January, I9OO), 542-53. "

"Socialism in the United States." Independent, LIV (Novem­ ber 27 , 1902), 2850-5 1 .

"Society’s Right to Industrial Peace," Chautaunuan, XXXIV (October, 1901), 10. '

"Some American Labor Laws." Review of Reviews, III. (June, 1891), 500. ------

"Some of the Rights and Wrongs of Labor and Capital." Outlook. LIII (April Ï8, I896), 700-02.' 205

"Some of the Rights and Wrongs of Labor and. Capital." Outlook/'LIII (May 9, I896), 851-53. Spahr, Charles B. "America’s Working People." Outlook, LXVI (October 7, 1899), 349-56.

Steffens, Lincoln. "A Labor Leader of Today." McClure’s. XIX (August, 1902), 355-57.

Stevens/ John S. "The Sympathetic Strike: A Warning to Labor." Independent, LV (June 25, 1903), 1493-97.

Stevenson, James G. "Industrial Reform." Arena, XIV (October, 1895), 317-21.

Stewart, Ethelbert. "The Sympathetic Strike." Independent, LV (August 20, 1903), 1980-82.

Stimson, P. J. "Democracy and the Laboring Man." Atlantic, LXXX (November, 1897), 605-19. Straus, Oscar. "Results Accomplished by the Industrial Department, National Civic Federation." Annals, XX (July, 1902), 37-42.

"The Conference for Industrial Peace." North American Review, CLXXIV (February, 1902), I75-81.

"The Strike of 200,000 Coal Miners." Review of Reviews, IX (June, 1894), 649.

Swinton, John. "Two Brief Articles on Labor Strikes." Independent. LII (May 24, 1900), 1240-41.

Taft, Philip. "On the Origins of Business Unionism" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XVII (October, 1963), 20-38.

Taft, Philip and Ross, Philip. "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome." in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr. The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, I969.

"A Talk With Mr. Gompers." Review of Reviews, X (July, 1894), 27-29. ------

Tandy, Francis D. "Strikes, Trusts, Boycotts, and Black­ lists." Arena, XXIII ( F e b ruaryI 9OO), 194-203. 206

Taussig, F. V/. "The Southwest Strike of 1886." Quarterly Journal of Economics. I (Jan.1887), l85-2lFI

Thanet. Octave. "The Working-Man." Scribner’s, XVI (July, 1894), 100-07. ' “

Thompson, Slason. "Violence In Labor Conflicts." Outlook, LXXVIII (December 17, 1904), 969-72.

"The Three Strategic Chiefs of the Presidential Campaign." Review of Reviews. XIV (October, I896), 421-33.

Thurber, F. B. "The Organization of Industry," Arena, XXI (September, 1899), 301-12.

Titherlngton, R, H, "A Brief Outline of McKinley’s Career," Munsey’s , XXVI (November, I9OI), 161-73,

Townsend, Edward W, "The National Republican Convention," Harper’s Weekly, XLIV (June 30, 19OO), 593-95.

"The Truth About Mark Hanna," Review of Reviews, XXII (November, I9OO), 590-91.

"The Union Verses the Open Shop," Gunton’s Magazine, XXV (August, 1903), 102-0 9 .

Walker, John Brlsben, "Capital and Labor Commission," Cosmopolitan. XXXII (February, 1902), 403-05.

Walling, William English, "The New Unionism— The Problem of the Unskilled Worker." Annals, XXIV (September, 1904), 296-315. Walsh, George Etherbert. "The Ethics of Great Strikes. North American Review, CLV (October, 1892), 5 04-6,

Wandby, William S. "Labor’s Rights and Wrongs," Arena, XXVII (March, 1902), 267-76. —

Ward, Lester P, "Plutocracy and Paternalism," Forum, XX (November, 1895), 300-10,

Warfield, Gus, "What Has followed the Coal Strike." World’s Work, VII (March, 1904), 4571-78,

Wells, B, W, "Miners and Iron Workers at Home and Abroad." Sewanee Review, I (May, I893), 309-19.

West, Henry Litchfield, "American Politics," Forum, XXXV (April, 1904), 483-97. 207 "William McKinley." Forum, XXXII (October. 1901), 131-7. Weyl, Walter E. "Mine Discipline and Unionism," Outlook, LXXI (July 19, 1902), 734-37.

White, Henry "Is Industrial Peace at Hand." Indeoendent, LIV (January 2, 1902), 29-30.

"Machinery and Labor." Gunton's, XXIII [August, 1902), 122-31.

White, William Allen. "Hanna." McClure's. XVI (November, 1900), 56-64.

Whlttelsey, Sarah S. "Tendencies of Factory Legislation and Inspection In the United States." Annals. XX (July, 1902), 235-53. Willey, Day Allen. "Changed Status of American Labor." New England Magazine, XXIX (September, 1903), 24-31,

"William McKinley." Harper's Weekly, XL (June 27» 1896), 628. "William McKinley; A Chronology." Review of Reviews, XXII (December, 1900), 673-74.

Willoughby, William Franklin. "The Concentration of In­ dustry In the United States." Yale Review, VII (May, 1898), 72-94.

Wlndmuller, Louis. "What a Democrat Expects from Major McKinley." Harper's Weekly, XL (August 15, I896), 810.

Winston, Ambrose P. "A Quarter Century of Strikes." Atlantic, XC (November, 1902), 656-67.

Woodruff, Clinton Rogers. "Protection of Workingmen," Annals. XIV (July, I899), 99-105.

"The Work of the Industrial Commission; The Hazards of Arbitration." Yale Review, XI (November, 1902), 225-2 8 . ------

"The Workingman's Right." Century, LXV (December, 1902), 317-18 .

Wright, Carroll D. "Compulsory Arbitration An Impossible Remedy." Forum, XV (May, 1893), 323-31. 208

. ’'Industrial Commissions in the United States and in Austria." Quarterly Journal of Economics, XIII (January, I899),"22B%31.

. "Strikes in the United States." North Amer­ ican Review. CLXXIV (November, 1902), 757-68,

"The National Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers, I892-I9OI." Quarterly Journal of Economi cs, XVI (November, 1901) , 37-68.

Yarros, Victor S. "This Year’s Strikes and the Present Industrial Situation." Review of Reviews, XXX (October, 1904), 430-33.

Yearly, Clifton K., Jr. "The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Strike of 1877." Maryland Historical Magazine, LI (September 6, 1956), 188-211.

Unpublished Materials

Falzone, Vincent Joseph. "Terence V. Powderly; Mayor and Labor Leader, I849-I893." Unpublished Ph.D. Disser­ tation, Catholic University of America, 1970.

Jensen, Richard J. "The Winning of the Midwest : A Social History of Elections, I888-I896." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, I966.

MeSeveney, Samuel Thompson. "The Politics of Depression: Voting Behavior in Connecticut, New York, and New ' Jersey, I893-I896." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Iowa, I965.

Sheinberg, Stephen J. "The Development of Corporation Labor Policy, 1900-1940." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation University of Wisconsin, I966.

Sigmund, Elwin W. "Federal Laws Concerning Railroad Labor Disputes; A Legislative and Legal History, I877-I934." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois, 1961.

Newspapers Canton Repository

Cincinnati Enquirer 209 Cleveland Leader

Cleveland Plain Dealer

Ohio State Journal

Stark County Democrat

New York Times