67 Genèse des nouvelles Amériques: The Américanité of the Continental Integration Policies of the Bloc Québécois, 1994-2003.
JORDAN BIRENBAUM
Abstract
Unlike the Parti Québécois, and other political formations active at the provincial level, the Bloc Québécois has been required to develop, define, and defend policies at the federal level beyond the mere hypothetical. From 1994 to 2003, the Bloc Québécois – expressed in Parliament and in its platforms – developed policies and engaged in rhetoric that were stridently pro-American as well as strongly in favour of pan-American integration. This rhetoric and these policies were founded upon belief in the essential américanité of Québécois society. Despite the setback of the “non” vote in the 1995 referendum, the Bloc Québécois’s view of Quebec’s américanité became increasingly confident.
The emergence of a Quebec Sovereigntist party, in the form of the Bloc Québécois (BQ), in the federal parliament, coupled with its role as Official Opposition following the Canadian general election of 1993, presented a new frontier for the Sovereignty movement. Although the new formation’s raison d’être was to aid in the accession of Quebec to full sovereignty1 it did not hold this role as its sole function. The Bloc Québécois aimed to generally defend and augment the position of Quebec in the contemporary Canadian federal constitution and, despite its separatist mandate, to act as a Loyal Opposition, holding the government of the day to account on
1 “Bloc members will not forget that their commitment to sovereignty constitutes the real reason for their presence in this House.” Lucien Bouchard, quoted in Manon Cornellier, The Bloc (Toronto: J. Lormier, 1995), p. 97. behalf of all Canadians. This situation forced the Bloc Québécois into a position unlike that of any other Quebec Sovereigntist party. Unlike the Parti Québécois (PQ), and other political formations active at the provincial level, the Bloc Québécois was required to develop, define, and defend policies at the federal level beyond the mere hypothetical. In formulating such policies, the Bloc Québécois implicitly defined the identity of contemporary Quebec society – and a potentially sovereign Quebec society – built upon a foundation of américanité. This implicit foundation of américanité deeply influenced their policy positions, particularly in the areas of external relations and trade. However, the perception of what américanité precisely meant for the Bloc transformed through the 1990s from an emphasis on a U.S.-centric, or continental, view of américanité to a pan- American view of américanité.
Américanité
Academic writing emerging from Quebec and those engaged in Quebec Studies have in recent years become enamoured with the concept of américanité. Academic discussions of this concept began in the late 1970s, but the recent intense interest in the concept has largely been generated in the wake of the 1989 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Whereas most English-Canadian nationalists stridently opposed the Agreement, Québécois nationalists of all stripes largely embraced it, as did the Quebec population at large. This seeming contradiction produced a fascination with this apparent Québécois nationalist affinity for and with the United States. As a result, many authors began to directly discuss the concept of américanité, or to define Quebec’s sociological and economic development upon an implicit, or sometimes explicit, foundation of américanité. Further, the américanité of Quebec was not merely academic musings but seemingly central to the identity of most Quebeckers. A 1997 survey on self-identification in Quebec2 revealed that francophone Quebeckers identify vastly more with the
2 Survey undertaken by the firm Impact Recherche for GRAM (Group de recherché sur l’américanité). 69 Jordan Birenbaum “United States” or “North America” as opposed to “Canada” with a nearly 4:1 ratio – a ratio that jumps to 9:1 when further disaggregated for those whose “first identification” was “Québécois.”3 The definition of américanité that predominates in the literature that examines its relationship to Québécois society and identity embraces a view of américanité that is “sui generis” and largely material-determinist with Quebec’s américanité a material fact represented by such aspects as Quebec’s modes of production, fashion, and transportation. It is the result of a new society whose nature is conditioned by the geographic character of (North) America and the building of a new society from the ground up (where Aboriginals are largely relegated to the role of fauna – a geographic condition, but not a significant cultural interaction). This experience required New World societies to develop based upon a choice along a spectrum from either a “détour européen” to a “refus de l’européanité;” that is either to replicate the ‘mother’ culture as much as possible or to utterly reject the ‘mother’ society and to build an entirely new society – often from disparate elements4. These theories of américanité are flawed for reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper (for a good critique of the theory’s flaws see Joseph Yvon Thériault, Critique de l’américanité), however, it is sufficient to note that many proponents of américanité tend to view américanité as fundamental condition of existence into which other theories about the development of New World societies should fit themselves. As well, the literature examining the concept of américanité has been largely sociological or economic and has not related this concept to the political developments of the last two decades.
“Market” Nationalism
3 Léon Bernier and Guy Bédard, “Américanité-américanisation des Québécois: quelques éclairages empiriques,” Québec Studies, Vol. 29, Spring/Summer 2000, pp. 18-19. 4 Joseph Yvon Thériault,Critique de l’américanité: Mémoire et démocratie au Québec (Montreal: Québec-Amérique, 2005). 70 In the 1960s the sovereignty movement’s nationalism was, rhetorically at least, considerably “Anti-Imperialist.” In the 1970s the sovereignty movement became most significantly animated by “technocratic nationalism,”5 whose goals were aimed at using the state to economically strengthen francophone Quebeckers and safeguard the continued viability of the French language in Quebec. However, unlike “anti-imperialist” nationalists, “technocratic” nationalists held no qualms with American capital in principle. Following the failure of the 1980 referendum on Sovereignty- Association, technocratic state nationalism itself began to give way to “market” nationalism.6 The construction of the Quebec state in the 1960s and 1970s created a class of ambitious technocrats for which the state was less and less able to accommodate within it own ranks. Many of these technocrats turned to the private sector as an outlet for their talents which resulted in a massive increase in the francophone business class with “the economic weight of medium-sized companies controlled by francophones [rising] dramatically though the 1980s” 7 and continues to increase rapidly.8 As well, despite the effect that the language laws9 had on causing an outmigrtation of Anglo-Quebeckers and Anglo-Canadian capital in Quebec, the effect on American capital was much less pronounced10 and by the 1980s Quebec “business elites [were] among the most U.S.-oriented” and U.S. friendly.11 Quebec during the 1980s
5 Robert Chodos, Quebec and the American Dream (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991), p. 156. 6 François Rocher, “The Evolving Parameters of Quebec Nationalism,” International Journal on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, pp. 74-96. 7 Chodos, p. 11. 8 Although Quebec only accounted for only one in five of all post-secondary students in Canada, it accounted “for nearly half of all Canadian students enrolled in business course,” Chodos, 204. 9 Official Language Act, 1974 and the Charter of the French language, R.S.Q. c. C-11 10 Alfred O. Hero, Contemporary Quebec and the United States, 1960-1985, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), p. 28 11 Ibid, 249 71 Jordan Birenbaum became much more attuned to, and enthusiastic about, American business modalities. Market nationalism grew for many Québécois nationalists and sovereigntists because it allowed an escape from the national conflicts within Canada. As former “Bombardier chief” Laurent Beaudoin opined:
The United States has always been a more open market to us than the rest of Canada. In the U.S. if you give them a good product at a reasonable price, they’ll buy it. In Ontario, we’ve always had trouble. Being French is always a problem there.12
The American marketplace provided an outlet in which Québécois businesses could engage in the world beyond Quebec without compromising their nationality for the reasons described by Beaudoin. Unlike in English Canada, so long as a Québécois business offers “a good product at a reasonable price” in the United States, they would not have to compromise or justify their national identity.
Foundations of the Bloc Québécois
The failure of the very modest – by nationalist Québécois standards – 1987 Meech Lake Accord convinced many influential Québécois nationalists that accommodation of Quebec’s national aspirations within the Canadian federal constitution was impossible, and thus that Quebec must wrest a new arrangement with Canada as a sovereign country. As such, disillusioned former federalist nationalists, led by Lucien Bouchard, set out to overcome what Bouchard characterized as the inevitable corruption of Quebec MPs in their “duty” to safeguard Quebec’s national interest by the demands of the party discipline of pan-Canadian parties.13 In the initial formation of the party, the Bloc was neither founded as, nor
12 Quoted in Chodos, 203. 13 Cornellier, 21-22. 72 was it intended to become by most of its initial founding leaders, a mere extension of the Parti Québécois.14 As the Bloc Québécois emerged from the same political, constitutional, economic, and social milieu that catalyzed the academic interest in américanité, the founders and later members of the Bloc responded to the same sociological and economic developments and beliefs that animated academic fervour with the paradigm of américanité. As such, the Bloc developed a vision of Quebec society clearly rooted in its perception of that society’s inherent américanité; and that that américanité should be further developed and enhanced as a way of consolidating Québécois identity and sovereignty in an interdependent world. The Bloc Québécois’s policy platform based upon américanité can be best understood as emerging strongly from the market nationalism of the 1980s. Whereas the PQ was founded upon technocratic state nationalism and later adapted significantly to the emerging market nationalism, the BQ – especially under Bouchard – was founded upon, and enthusiastically embraced, market nationalism. The Bloc Québécois faced a number of challenges following the 1993 General Election. Bouchard had to justify to other parliamentarians that their presence in Parliament would be a constructive one, and not merely an obstructionist shilling for Quebec sovereignty. As well, the Bloc had to justify to Quebeckers that their presence in Ottawa was constructive for Quebec and the sovereignty project. Thus, the party had to formulate policies which presented a uniquely Quebec perspective, so as to illustrate to Quebeckers that their views, and therefore their future, were markedly different from other Canadians and the positions of the pan-Canadian parties. However, they also had to present policies and hold the government to account in a manner that would benefit Canada as a whole. Unlike the PQ who, sitting away from Ottawa, can condemn the actions of Ottawa without having to offer practical and constructive alternatives, the Bloc Québécois does not have this luxury. Although opposition parties will regularly indulge in
14 Cornellier, 30 73 Jordan Birenbaum condemnation without presenting alternatives on many issues, the BQ had to propose concrete alternatives. Unlike BQ Members of Parliament (MPs), PQ Members of the National Assembly (MNA’s) have never had to sit in committee with government MPs working on federal legislation. Although Bouchard was clear before the 1993 election that “it is certainly not our intention to define a program for governing, because the Bloc Québécois will never form a government, not in Ottawa and not in Quebec”15 this was a short lived promise. Although the BQ may “never form a government,” their surprising success in becoming the Official Opposition charged them with a mandate not limited to simply aiding Quebec’s accession to sovereignty, but requiring them to begin to define and formulate policy as though they were a government-in-waiting.
One America
The Bloc Québécois – especially during the initial years under Lucien Bouchard as leader of the Opposition – often abandoned discussion of Quebec in matters of foreign relations, specifically and often largely focused on the role of Canada (including Quebec) in the wider world. Although Bouchard did emphasize that Quebec and English Canada have separate visions of the world and that a sovereign Quebec would wish to maintain a separate foreign policy from Canada, he largely accepted his position as Leader of the Opposition for Canada in matters of foreign affairs and generally approached such issues from a pan-Canadian perspective and made explicit references to the views of Quebec as separate from Canada surprisingly infrequently. This position was maintained largely because of Bouchard’s commitment to parliamentary traditions and thus his responsibilities as Leader of the Opposition. However, his championing of a pan-Canadian foreign policy with infrequent discussions of the specificity of Quebec in foreign relations can also be understood as emerging from his conception of américanité as the foundation of Quebec, and English Canadian, society. In Bouchard’s view Quebec, English-Canada, and the United States shared common
15 Lucien Bouchard, 20 June 1992 in Cornellier, 60. 74 goals and conditions in matters of external relations, especially in terms of continental integration. The initial formulation of américanité pronounced by Bouchard after the 1993 election was highly pro-American and continental. Bouchard sought a role for a sovereign Quebec that was not the mere status quo in inter-American relations, as largely championed by the PQ prior to the 1980 referendum, but an even closer integration of Quebec with the United States. This first formulation of américanité situated Quebec clearly in a delineated North America. Bouchard’s conception of Quebec’s américanité was one that identified américanité primarily with the United States. Thus, as illustrated later, positions taken by Bouchard and the Bloc Québécois under his leadership aimed largely to enhance Quebec’s economic integration specifically with the United States and charge Quebec with a responsibility to support U.S. defined criteria for the defence of North America. Quebec’s economic and military security rested so strongly upon the U.S. and Quebec’s interests in these areas were so close to the U.S. – due significantly to their common américanité – that support of U.S. interest in continental economic and security integration was akin to supporting Quebec’s own interests. One of the main themes during Bouchard’s tenure was to strongly emphasize the common ‘nord-américanité’ of Quebeckers, along with Canadians and Americans. The Bloc attempted to portray the image that Canada was simultaneously too big and too small. Bouchard vigorously argued that Canada’s existence as a multinational state was exceptional in the Western world,16 with multinationalism being the norm of tyrannical empires and failed third-world states. As well, Bouchard clearly portrayed that Canada as a market and security perimeter was far too limited and weak. For the Bloc Québécois under Bouchard a multinational Canada comprising Quebec was dysfunctional as nation-state status was the most effective form of government for modern, Western, democratic
16 Lucien Bouchard (Leader of the Opposition) in Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, 35th Parl., 1st Sess, p. 34 (Wednesday, January 19, 1994). Available at
17 Ibid, 19 January 1994, p. 35 18 Ibid, 21 September 1994, p. 5956 19 Ibid, 13 June 1995, p. 13688 76 efforts to advance democracy and human rights in the Americas and overseas as well. Although Bouchard expressed optimism for global “peace and disarmament,” he nonetheless argued that it must be “done in an orderly fashion… with security which must still be maintained with a minimum of deterrence.” In a post-Cold War world where many voices were questioning the need and role of Cold War defence pacts, Bouchard praised Canada’s close military integration with the United States such that “no two military organizations in the world are closer to each other.” He confirmed the importance and the commitment of the Bloc Québécois, both in the best interests of Canada and a potentially sovereign Quebec to NATO and NORAD and “to an integrated defence of North America.”20 The most unexpected and telling support of “integrated defence of North America” was on the issue of cruise missile testing. When the issue surfaced most “observers had expected [the Bloc] to oppose Cruise missile testing.”21 However, Bouchard took the opposite stance and strong supported Canada’s participation. Bouchard argued that the Liberal government was laying the groundwork to withdraw from its commitments to American cruise missile testing in Canada and was hoping to get the support of the Bloc Québécois and other opposition parties “in order to support its refusal which it is already preparing… to the American request.”22 However Bouchard denounced any such attempts as they were based on “abstract theory and preconceived judgements” which ignored “the real interests and responsibilities of Canada.”23 Bouchard thus denounced the “several senior members of the Liberal Party” – largely strong (English-)Canadian Nationalists – who “attacked” Canada’s participation in American cruise missile testing. Viewing it as attempting “to please an anti-American lobby which still has some roots in certain parts of the country” – those parts of the country being largely outside of Quebec. Instead
20 Ibid, 26 January 1994, p. 394 21 Cornellier, p. 110 22 Hansard HC, 26 January 1994: 395 23 Ibid, 26 January 1994, p. 395 77 Jordan Birenbaum Bouchard argued that it was imperative that Canada supports the cruise missile testing as the “United States is Canada's best friend, its only neighbour, its safest ally, its major trading partner, and a great nation” to whom “Canadians and Quebecers [would] turn” “if there ever was a nuclear threat to Canada.”24 Although not as surprising as the support for cruise missile testing, Bouchard argued for support of American military initiatives beyond the common defence and integration of Canada and the United States such as intervention in Haiti to restore a democratically elected president despite the Canadian government’s opposition.25 This position was an attempt to redefine the Sovereignty movement’s vision of the world. Whereas French-Canadian and Québécois nationalism traditionally had a very strong isolationist tendency, in this conception Bouchard seemingly developed a view that Quebec and Canadian involvement in a U.S.-led effort maintain democracy in the Americas through the risk of ‘blood and treasure’ was not only acceptable, but required as part of Quebec’s and Canada’s common citizenship in the Americas – its américanité. Constantly raising the issue in Question Period,26 Bouchard tried to convince the government to “endorse the idea of armed intervention as proposed by President Clinton in case the Haitian military rulers refuse to comply with the proposed ultimatum.”27 Yet, it was in the field of continental economic integration from which the strongest and most consistent expression of Quebec’s américanité emerged during Bouchard’s leadership. Regardless of economic integration, Bouchard defined Quebec’s américanité as the blessing of sharing the same continent with the United States:
We are fortunate to have the United States as a neighbour. We have to recognize that this country is a considerable asset to Canada. We also enjoy one of the highest
24 Ibid 25 Ibid, May 1994, p. 3877 26 Bouchard, Hansard HC, 13 June 1994, p. 5303; 14 June 1994, p. 5959; 21 September 1994 27 Ibid, 4 May 1994, p. 3877 78 standards of living in the world and this is due, at least in part, to the fact that we are part of the vast North American continent which has an extremely prosperous economy. We should not lose sight of the fact that the United States are on the receiving end of 80 per cent of our exports.
Echoing the theme that emerged forcefully amongst sovereigntists in the 1980s, Bouchard reminded Parliament that the United States was not simply important to Canada and Quebec indirectly as a stable neighbor and a huge dynamic market, but it was the direct result of the U.S. that Canada’s economy was prosperous and dynamic, “let us not forget that the United States are vitally important to us. Most of our large companies that succeed are based on US capital. We must not forget this.”28 As such, the single most important policy championed by the Bloc Québécois in the area of external relations was their strong support of free-trade; and under Bouchard, specifically to the development of Canada’s economic ties to the United States. Whereas the Liberal government of the day had “decided to resurrect the third option favoured by the Trudeau government to reduce U.S. influence on the Canadian economy,” Bouchard instead pushed that the government should “concentrate on developing [Canada’s] trade relations with the United States now that NAFTA has been ratified.” Bouchard argued that Quebeckers desired, beyond all other trade relations, a close involvement in the American economy and denounced government MPs “who see trade relations with the United States as a problem rather than a benefit.” Whereas the Liberals and many English-Canadians had a “lingering… opposition to the free trade agreement,” Bouchard announced that the Bloc Québécois, and Quebeckers in general, were strongly in favour of the agreement and believed attempts to focus trade elsewhere denied the essential américanité of Quebeckers.29 In sum, Bouchard argued that despite the belief that the Liberal government held in this situation, and despite what many
28 ibid, 15 March 1994, p. 2266 29 ibid, 21 November 1994, p. 8036 79 Jordan Birenbaum English-Canadians believed, Quebeckers were not anti-American. They accepted not merely free trade with the United States, but happily embraced close military ties as well, arguing that strong and unwavering support of the United States in just continental defence measures was key in maintaining “an integrated defence of North America” and a key element of Quebec’s view of its place in the world.30
Two Americas
In its early years, the Bloc Québécois was built around the singular leadership of Lucien Bouchard and depended critically upon his individual presence. As such, Bouchard’s departure for Quebec City following the failure of the 1995 referendum signalled a potentially massive shift for the Bloc Québécois. However, its commitment to américanité remained firm even if the manner of its expression began to transform. The period between the departure of Lucien Bouchard and the first year following the Canadian general election of 1997 represented a period transition during which the Bloc Québécois vision of Quebec’s américanité no longer emphasized the singular commonality of “America” that was epitomized by Bouchard’s strong support of US foreign policy goals and instead focused on Quebec’s more unique role in North America. The Bloc under Michel Gauthier (1996-1997) began to define North America as an “Anglophone environment” and thus Quebec as representing a ‘second’ America.31 This formulation was an implicit criticism of Canada; emphasizing that English Canada’s distinct status from the United States was much less justifiable than Quebec’s distinct status from Canada: “in North America, Quebec's culture is unique and must be treated as such.”32 This was a discourse that was only continued by Gilles Duceppe for a year following the 1997 general election.
30 ibid, 26 January 1994, p. 394 31 ibid, 28 February 1996, p. 51 32 ibid 80 Three Americas
Under Duceppe, support for American policies significantly began to decrease. However, the Bloc began to more strenuously discuss and promote relations with other countries in the Americas. By early 1999 the Bloc had begun to move into a more radical form of américanité, de-emphasizing sovereignty-association with Canada in favour of a larger platform in the Americas. In late 1998 Duceppe built upon the tentative foundation of Quebec as a ‘second America’ and began to discuss Quebec’s role in the Americas more forcefully and more adopting a discourse of “three Americas.”33 Typically, Duceppe’s use of the term “three Americas” was geographic: North America, Central America, and South America. However, at times the term was left ambivalent and sometimes was employed such that “three Americas” in the sense of civilizations – Anglophone, Francophone, Hispanophone. The BQ were now presenting Quebec as the centre of a hemisphere-spanning civilization – French in language, (pan-)American in foundation – with a mission to preserve and propagate a uniquely French society fully adapted to the New World. As the “only francophone state in North America”34 the Bloc Québécois “believes that it is only normal that [Quebec] assumes the responsibility for the development of… French civilization in the Americas.”35 In this formulation, Quebec’s role is further enhanced, and its lack of sovereignty even more grotesque, as Quebec is neither merely a francophone anomaly in an Anglophone America, nor merely one of many constituent nations of the Americas, but instead the centre of a New World civilization – Quebec City being on par with Washington and Montreal with New York. This change in discourse can be seen in the publication of the main party documents and the issues raised and language employed in Parliament, pre- and post-
33 ibid, 15 March 1999, p. 12837 34 “seul État francophone en Amérique du Nord,” (my translation), BQ, Plateform, 2000, p. 160 35 “cro[it] qu’il ne serait que normal qu’il assume la responsabilité du développement… francophone en Amérique” (my translation), ibid, p. 65 81 Jordan Birenbaum 1999. Duceppe emphasized this idea in a more personal level in his memoirs, noting that his own children were trilingual – true citizens of the new Quebec “of the Americas.”36 In Parliament the radical shift away from pro-Americanism in Duceppe’s conceptualization of Quebec’s américanité is reflected not in its discussion of the United States, but in the conspicuous silence in regards to the United States at times. During the discussion of the war in Yugoslavia, for example, Duceppe made no direct reference to the United States, despite the fact the United States was leading the mission and providing the vast majority of hardware and conducting the vast majority of strikes.37 On the constructive side, this new approach to américanité received its first substantial airing in Parliament. Although first musing on the idea outside of Parliament in December 1998,38 in March 1999, Duceppe moved for “Canada's participation in the creation of a pan-American monetary union.”39 As well, Duceppe argued for the expansion of NAFTA across the Americas, stating that the BQ would endeavour to secure “that, [in] 20 years from now, the countries of the three Americas will be part of NAFTA.”40 For Duceppe, “Free trade, or a common monetary policy, are not policies of the right,”41 but are instead a means for solidarity amongst nations and the safeguarding of national cultures. The common material experience of New World societies and their common desire for prosperity made economic integration amongst them a mutually beneficial condition that would safeguard national cultures, as relative economic and material prosperity were the tools by which peoples
36 Gilles Duceppe, Question d'identité (Outremont, QC: Lanctôt, 2000), p. 100 37 Duceppe, et al., 36th Parl., 1st Sess., 13504-5(204:1420), 13565(205:1420), 13568(205:1435), 13582-5(205:1605-25), 13760(206:1420), 13762(206:1430), 13819-20(207:1420), 13904(208:1420), 13997-9(210:1205-15), 14018- 9(210:1420), 14025(210:1455), 14100(211:1420), 14152(212:1425), 14221- 2(213:1420), 14270-1(214:1120), 14318(215:1420), 14377-8(216:1235), 14394(216:1420), 14440(217:1420), 14481-2(218:1420). 38 Duceppe, Question, p. 210. 39 Hansard HC, 15 March 1999, p. 12836 40 ibid, 15 March 1999, p. 12837 41 ibid 82 could defend their cultures. Although a “pan-American currency would probably apply to Canada and the United States first, before possibly extending fully to the three Americas in the wake of the liberalization of trade that is on the agenda for all countries in the western hemisphere,”42 Duceppe emphasized the desire for truly Pan- American integration as the way to counteract the overwhelming power of the United States. However, it is the contrast between the Party’s platforms for the 1997 and 2000 elections and the contrast between supplemental publications largely on foreign policy in 1998 and 2003 that most clearly indicate the shift the party undertook in its definition of Quebec’s américanité. In a comparison of the 1997 and the 2000 platforms, not only does the space specifically accorded to discussing foreign relations more than almost double in absolute terms (5% of the 1997 versus 9% of the 2000 platform in relative terms), but references to “North America” or the “Americas” increase, and a strong emphasis is placed on Quebec’s role as the “only francophone state in North America,” that must “assume the responsibility for the development of… French civilization in the Americas.” As well, the Bloc emphasizes Quebec’s historic and continual role in “supporting free- trade”43 and as such was strongly “for the creation of a free-trade area of the Americas.”44 In 1998 (BQ, En marche) and 2003 (BQ, Le Québec) the Bloc Québécois published brief works intended for two audiences: Quebeckers interested in the Bloc’s foreign policy and role in the world and for non-Canadians interested in general information about Quebec, the Bloc’s foreign policy, and the likely foreign policies of a sovereign Quebec. Both works implicitly presented the party’s contemporary conception of Quebec’s américanité, but two publications are very different in their content.
42 Richard Marceau, ibid, 15 March 1999, p. 12837 43 “prononc[ant] en faveur du libre-echange” (my translation) 44 “pour la création d’une Zone de libre-échange des Amériques” (my translation), BQ, Plateform, 2000, p. 120 83 Jordan Birenbaum The 1998 publication, En marche vers un pays… le Quebec, only has a very limited discussion of Quebec’s relation to the United States or role in the Americas. The United States or the Americas are only distinctly mentioned four times and not in a spirit of américanité. The first mention only notes “Montreal is one of the most important… ports in all of Eastern North America.”45 A second mention refers to the Organization of American States, but only in a list of various international organizations that a Sovereign Quebec would maintain membership in, including the UN, the OECD, the Francophonie, and even the Commonwealth.46 As well, the only other mention of the Americas is in the context of the main point that a sovereign Quebec would remain “resolutely free-trading”47 and as such was content with NAFTA and supported the potential of a FTAA.48 Finally, the United States is only distinctly mentioned once and, again, simply to note the strong support that Quebeckers have always given to free trade with the United States.49 However, the 2003 publication is an entirely different creature. Published once again under the direction of Duceppe, this work markedly and repeatedly situates a contemporary and a sovereign Quebec in the Americas with even the title itself proudly proclaimed that Quebec is a “Nation of the Americas.” Unlike the 1998 publication which was published only in French, the 2003 publication was published trilingually in French, English, and Spanish. In this work, references to Quebec’s place in the Americas are replete. There are the typical references to Quebec’s role as “a unique society in North America”50 or as the “principal Francophone society in North America.”51 The work strongly emphasized the “Bloc Québécois[’s] focus on… American continental integration”52
45 “Montréal possède l’un des plus importants ports de mer intérieurs de l’Est de l’Amérique du Nord” (my translation), BQ, En marche, 1998, p. 9 46 ibid, p. 31 47 “résolument libre-échangiste” (my translation) 48 ibid, p. 31-32 49 ibid 50 BQ, Le Québec, 2003, p. 38 51 ibid, p. 35 52 ibid, p. 37 84 including “the creation of… the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)”53 and that “it would be to Quebec’s advantage to adopt a common currency in the Americas.”54 As well it gave prosaic details such as that “Quebec’s economy is the sixth largest in the Americas.”55
Conclusion
The development of positions of the Bloc Québécois during the 1990s towards the United States was of an increasingly strident vision of the fundamental américanité of Québécois society and thus the champion of policies that aim to increase Quebec’s and Canada’s integration with the United States. For the purposes of this paper, despite whatever flaws the conception of américanité may pose theoretically, the Bloc Québécois has embraced the concept in defining Quebec society. For the Bloc Québécois, Quebec society is defined as a culturally and politically liberal, progressive, pluralistic, and francophone society built upon an economic foundation “natural” to North America. This conception of américanité is largely justified by the Quiet Revolution which was perceived by many has having Quebec society radically renounce what was essentially an ancien régime- inspired “détour européen.”56 Essentially, all that remained from before the Quiet Revolution was a common and distinct sense of collectivity and the French language. As well, this new society that the Bloc Québécois was championing was considerably inspired by the “market nationalism” of the 1980s. As such, the ability of the Bloc Québécois to emphasize the idea had wide appeal due to the increasing attention of Quebeckers to the value of “business.” However, the vision of what precisely “américanité” entailed is sufficiently flexible that the Bloc could redefine it to meet their own vision and needs.
53 ibid, p. 36 54 ibid, p. 38 55 ibid, p. 35 56 Gerard Bouchard, Genèse des nations et cultures du nouveau monde : essai d'histoire compare (Montréal: Boréal, 2001), p. 84. 85 Jordan Birenbaum The policy development emerged as two distinct conceptions. These variant conceptions partially reflected the particular preferences of these party leaders, but also of the shift in the goals of the party. However, despite the shifts in policies, each phase nonetheless involved development of policies built around a conception of a fundamental américanité of Québécois society. The first phase under Bouchard was stridently pro-American, emphasizing the desire to build a Quebec and lead Canada in a direction which clearly followed the leadership of the United States. Here, Lucien Bouchard defined a single, common nord- américanité of which Quebec was a equal member. The purpose of this path was clear. Its primary aim was to illustrate the dependence of Canada (including Quebec) on the United States. By doing so, it aimed to illustrate that traditional (English) Canadian nationalist standards of sovereignty were weak and the solution of a sovereign Quebec would return an increased effective sovereignty for both Quebec and Canada. A transition period saw a retreat from pronouncements on close adherence to American leadership and a much-reduced voice on relations with the United States and Quebec’s position in North America. This period under Gauthier and Duceppe emphasized Quebec’s exceptional uniqueness in North America. Quebec’s differences with Anglophone North America were presented in an even more accentuated manner. However, this period did see the foundations of policy initiatives aimed at elaborating and defining Quebec’s américanité as not simply copying of American norms in defiance of Canadian norms, nor the adherence to American leadership. The second conceptualization during the 1990s was the elaboration of policies that illustrated a stridently self-confident form of américanité. In this stage, Quebec became a leading champion of North American and Pan-American integration, often well in advance of US leadership. As well, policies developed during this period emphasized a commonality of new societies and the benefits of continental integration generally. During this period the horizon of américanité was expanded. Whereas the concept of américanité prior to this phase largely emphasized North American (that is to the United States) limits to Quebec’s américanité, the later phase under Duceppe 86 emphasized and expanded the definition of américanité to strongly encompassing a connection to the whole of the Americas. The Bloc Québécois presented a presented a clear and forceful vision of Quebec’s role in the Americas, was unafraid of close collaboration and integration with other nations of the Americas, and no longer felt bound by U.S. leadership for advancing continental integration.
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