The Absence of MiddleEastern Great Powers:Political ‘ ‘Backwardness’’ in HistoricalPerspective IanS. Lustick

Propelledby theoil boom of the mid-1970s the Middle East emerged as theworld’ s fastestgrowing region. 1 Hopesand expectations were highfor Arab politicalconsoli- dation,economic advancement, and cultural efflorescence. With falling oil prices and adevastatingwar betweenIran andIraq, these hopes had dimmed somewhat by the early1980s. In 1985, however, the spectacular image of an Arab greatpower was stilltantalizing. A Pan-Arabstate, wrote two experts on the region, would include a totalarea of 13.7million square kilometers, secondonly to theSoviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China,or the United States. . ..By2000it wouldhave more people than either ofthetwo superpowers. This state would contain almost two-thirds of the world’s provenoil reserves. It would also have enough capital to Žnanceits own economicand social development. Conceivably, it couldfeed itself. . ..Access toahugemarket could stimulate rapid industrial growth. Present regional in- equalitiescould ultimately be lessenedand the mismatch between labor-surplus andlabor-short areas corrected. The aggregate military strength and political inuence of this strategically located state would be formidable.. ..Itis easyto comprehendwhy this dream has long intoxicated Arab nationalists. 2 Withinten years, however, this assessment sounded more like a fairytale than a scenario.Indeed the last two decades have been dispiriting for Arab nationalists,not onlymeasured against the prospectof agreatnational state, but compared to levelsof

Iam gratefulfor helpful comments made onpreliminary drafts of this article byThomasCallaghy, MelaniCammett, AveryGoldstein, Steven Heydemann, Friedrich Kratochwil, Sevket Pamuk, and this journal’s anonymousreviewers. Thepaper on which this article is basedwas originallyprepared for a January1996 workshop on ‘ ‘Regionalismand the Middle East’ ’ organizedunder the auspices ofthe Joint Near andMiddle East Committee oftheSocial Science Research Council. 1.El Mallakh1978,195. 2.Drysdale and Blake 1985,225. For similar expectationsand scenarios ofArab unity,prosperity, and power,see Kerr 1982,2; and El Mallakh1978, 186– 89. On the potential for a great Arab state, see, for example,Waterbury 1978, 53– 55, 100; Luciani and Salame ´1988,13; Salame ´1988a,264, 278; and Sira- geldin1988, 204.

InternationalOrganization 51,4,Autumn1997, pp. 653– 83 r 1997by The IO Foundationand the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology 654 InternationalOrganization cooperationand interstate integration in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, where highly developedcountries are joining with rapidly expanding emergent economies in re- gionallybased communities of wealthand growth. In the Middle East, on theother hand,all integration schemes have failed. Intraregional trade remains very low ,with estimatesranging between 2 and8 percentover the last Ž fteenyears. 3 Most Middle Easternstates are experiencing either economic stagnation or absolutedecline. From 1980to 1991the Middle East (including Israel and Iran, but not Turkey) and North Africa registeredalmost a 3percentdecrease in annualincome growth compared to a 1percentdecrease in Sub-SaharanAfrica anda 1percentincrease for allthe develop- ing world.4 Theregion suffered a declineof almost 2 percentin gross domestic product(GDP) percapita between 1980 and 1993. 5 Unemploymentin 1993 was twiceas high (15 percent) as that in anyother region of the world. 6 Manyexplanations have been offered for disunity,economic stagnation, and the failureof anyMuslim or Arab stateto emerge as or tobuild a MiddleEastern great power.Despite the rhetoric and sentiment of Arab nationalismand Arab unityand, morerecently, Islamic unity, contemporary Middle Eastern history is riddled with parochialhostilities, meaningless schemes for mergersand federations, and a raft of regimesstrong enough to suppressdissidents but too weak and insecure to risk inti- mateforms ofcooperation with their neighbors. With ‘ ‘artiŽcial’ ’ colonialborders virtuallyintact, energy and capital surpluses are mostly separated from demographic bulkand centers of militaryand administrative capacity and political appeal. These conditions,it isoftenpointed out, have prevented Middle Easterners from building largeinternal markets and from exploitingtheir homogeneity, resources, and admin- istrative-politicalcapacity for dynamic,long-term economic growth. 7 Mostanalysts who have confronted what Fouad Ajami dubbed the ‘‘Arab predica- ment’’ haveimplicitly or explicitly used the processes and successes of European integrationafter W orldW ar IItoidentifythe requisites of successin theMiddle East andthe reasons for failure. 8 Thosewho have thought the prospects were notall bad for Arab integrationhave stressed what they deemed the growing self-conŽ dence, pragmatism,and  exibilityof states whose separate sovereignty was increasingly recognizedand accepted as permanent by theirneighbors. Using W esternEurope as a pointof reference, these observers expected Arab governmentswould thereby be ableto leaveaside old feuds and cooperate without worrying about political dissolu-

3.See Miller1993, 8; ShaŽk 1995,17. 4.ShaŽ k 1995,15. 5.Ibid., 65. Annual growth in GDP inthe region also decreased, froma peakof 6 percentin the mid-1970sto less than1 percentin the late 1980s.See ibid.,4. 6.Diwan 1995,3. 7.For ausefullist of failedArab integrationinitiatives, see Azzam 1993,227– 28. 8.Despite therecent emphasis onIslam as aunifyingpolitical identity in the Middle East, no frame- workhas beenor ismore promisingas abasis forachieving substantial political and economic integration thanArab nationalism.Therefore, I focusmy analysis on the failure of Arab integrationor Arab state building,while acknowledging that Arabism has neverbeen completely divorced from Islamic motifsand suggestingat theend of thearticle thatthe argument works equally well forMuslim schemes forpolitical integration.For a sample ofthe ‘ ‘obituaries’’ writtenfor Arab nationalunity, see Brown1984, 27– 43; Ajami 1992;and Tibi 1990, 24– 25. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 655 tionor subversion. 9 Someanalysts have stressed the functional necessity of close economiccooperation and political integration, arguing from necessityto inevitabil- ityor likelihood. 10 Otherstrace the large-scale movement of laborand remittances acrossArab stateboundaries, recalling, in theiranticipation that such interdependen- cieswere bindingthe Arab worldinto an economic whole, theories associated with Karl Deutschand Ernst Haas tothe effect that increasing transactions across borders andthe unintended spillover of functionallyimportant requirements for cooperation wouldlead Europe toward both political and economic integration. 11 Morepessimis- ticanalysts have used the European experience to explain why the Arab worldhas notintegrated successfully. Citing regime heterogeneity in theMiddle East, the ab- senceof strong democratic institutions, the skewed distribution of wealth, and the weakness andinsecurity of governments— these observers blame the failure of regional integration onhow different the Middle East is intheserespects from WesternEurope. 12 Myargumentbegins by suggestingthat, whether optimistic or pessimistic,these analysesare based on a misplacedanalogy of post– W orldW ar IIEuropeanstates withpost– W orldW ar IIArab or,more broadly, Islamic or MiddleEastern states. A muchmore fundamental appreciation of thepoliticaland economic quandaries faced bythe peoples of theMiddle East is possible if thedozens of statesin theregion are comparedto thescores and even hundreds of Europeanstates and principalities that, ingradually decreasing number, comprised Europe (and the lands bordering the North Atlantic)from the1200s through the late nineteenth century. The question then be- comes:How isit that powerful states, such as GreatBritain, France, Russia, Ger- many,Italy, and the United States, could arise in theseregions— states that not only combinedthe natural resources, cultural affinities, demographic bulk, military capac- ity,administrative integrity, and economic wealth necessary for activityon the world stageas great powers, but could also serve either as hegemonic leaders in the construc- tionof regionalblocs (especially the EuropeanCommunity) or asdependable, conŽ - dentpartners in such endeavors? This recasts the essentialquestion to be askedabout thecontemporary Middle East in a moreappropriate historical context. Why have therebeen no MiddleEastern great powers?

Westphalia andV ersailles: Warand State Building in Europe andthe Middle East

‘‘TheOttoman Turks,’ ’ wroteAlbert Hourani, in one of his last essays, ‘ ‘maybe calledthe Romans of theMuslim world.’ ’13 From along-cycleperspective, focusing

9.See Noble1991, 52, 78–93; and Taylor 1982, 108– 20. 10.See Sirageldin1988, 185– 207; Kanovsky 1968, 350– 76; Bani Hani 1984, 184; and Drysdale and Blake 1985,225. 11.Ibrahim 1982, 17– 70. 12.See Nonneman1993; Miller 1993, 3– 6. Regardingcivil society, see Barakat 1993;and Luciani and Salame´1988,16– 21. 13.Hourani 1991, 130. 656 InternationalOrganization onthe evolution of states and the cultural, military, and political frameworks that incubatethem, the analogy between the Ottomans and the Romans is foundedon the gradualattenuation and eventual disappearance of animperial center. Both the Otto- manEmpire in the Middle East and the Holy Roman Empire in medieval and early modernEurope advanced and upheld (sometimes in reality,sometimes as legal Ž c- tions)claims of authorityover heterogeneous populations, complex arrays of mon- archs,satraps, vassals, and enormous land masses divided into gradually stabilizing butnever Ž xedadministrative segments. For theemirs, sheikhs, and walis of the Arab world,the gradual decline and Ž naldisappearance of the Ottoman Empire was equivalentto the gradual decline and eventual disappearance of the Holy Roman Empirefor thelords, dukes, kings, and princes of Europe.In both cases enforcement ofclaims to authorityover wide cultural and geographic areas (Muslim Middle East andChristian Europe) was abandonedand replaced with parochial but locally potent claimsto sovereigntyover small pieces of theregion by localelites. InEurope the W estphaliantreaties of 1648 gave formal acknowledgment to the validityof theseclaims (insofar as they could be upheldin thearena of international politicaland military competition) and to replacementof theuniversalsovereignty of theemperor with a hostof separate sovereigns whose autonomous existence had longsince acted as the mainspring of Europeanpolitics. In the Middle East, on the otherhand, most local elites ready to advancetheir own claims to ruleterritories no longerincorporated within the Ottoman Empire were, for themost part, cast aside or submergedbeneath the superordinate power and imperial ambitions of European states.This process began long before W orldW ar I,butitwas theTreaty of V ersailles thatformally acknowledged replacement of the Ottoman Empire’ s universalsover- eigntywith rule by different European ‘ ‘mandatory’’ powersunder the auspices of theLeague of Nations.In this context, the League of Nationsstood for nothingmore thanthe European state system, which had, in anycase, long since emerged as the decisiveforce in MiddleEastern political affairs. Here isrevealed the mostimportant difference in thedevelopmental trajectories of statesystems in Europeand the Middle East. European states developed, expanded, madewar, gainedvictories, and consolidated— or suffereddefeats, shrunk, failed to consolidate,and disappeared— in aninternational context of moderatedbut violent disorder.By one reckoning, in 1900‘ ‘therewere around20 timesfewer independent politiesin Europethan there had been in 1500. They did not disappear peacefully or decayas the national state developed; they were thelosers in a protractedwar ofall againstall.’ ’14 As CharlesTilly noted, early modern Europe was anarchic,but, ‘ ‘largely asa resultof the previous uniŽ cation under the Roman Empire,’ ’ itwas, inbroad culturalterms, fairly homogeneous. 15 Thissetting required prudent rulers of statesto beambitious and encouraged them to considerabsorption (rather than destruction) of neighboringpopulations and wealthy districts as arouteto increased power. Even moreimportantly, rulers operating within this system did so free from theactual or

14.Cohen, Brown, and Organski 1981, 902. 15.Tilly 1975, 77. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 657 potentialinterference of outside powers whose military, economic, and administra- tivecapacities, by dwarŽ ng those of the young European states, could have pre- ventedthe systemfrom operating.Nor were theserulers constrained by international normsagainst acquiring new territory as a resultof victoryin war orthreatof war. 16 Inthe Middle East, on the other hand, and in the Arab MiddleEast in particular, rulersof territories, or candidates for rulership,found themselves not only over- whelmedby thetremendous power of individual European or NorthAmerican states (especiallyBritain, France, Italy, and the UnitedStates) but subjected to anelaborate arrayof internationalinstitutions and norms (represented by thesystem of Concerts andCongresses of thenineteenth century and the League of Nations and the United Nationsin thetwentiethcentury). In sharp contrast to thewar-lubricatedW estphalian system—whose units expanded into great powers, sunk to middle or small power status,or disappeared altogether, as a resultof wars wagedat the highest levels of forceavailable at the time— the system of colonialsubordination and externally en- forcednorms to which the nineteenth and twentieth century Middle East was sub- jecteddid not allow cross-border warfare bylocalrulers to effect substantial change inthe number, size, or internal regimes of states. Myclaim is that thesehistorical sequence-linked differences in the geopolitical contextof Europeanand Middle Eastern state system development constitute not the onlybut the single most important explanation for the contemporary absence of a MiddleEastern great power .Inpart this contention is inspired by AlexanderGerschen- kron’s famousargument more than forty years ago. Gerschenkron pointed out that becauseof competitionfrom stateswhose economies had already industrialized, Rus- siaand other latecomers to industrializationcould not achieve industrialization through free marketcapitalism (as hadearly comers such as Britain and France). 17 I argue thatthis kind of historical perspective can explain political as well as economic ‘‘backwardness.’’18 Inthis Gerschenkronian sense, the route available for theachieve- mentof greatpower status in Europeand North America, which included large-scale state-buildingwars, hasnot been available to those who sought and still seek to enter thegreat power club after its establishment. Prevailingtheories of the conditions under which large centralized monarchical andnational states crystallized in W esternEurope emphasize competition among a plethoraof potentialcore territories, each possessing economic resources, adminis- trativecapacities, cultural solidity, geographical advantages, and/ ormilitarycapabili- ties.19 These‘ ‘conqueringcores’ ’ or‘‘conquestcenters,’ ’ were motivatedto expand

16.Finer 1974, 97. 17.Gerschenkron 1962. 18.The quotes here are ofparticularimportance since byinvokingGerschenkron’ s argumentI mean to draw attention only tothe latecomer logicof the argument as explainingfailure of a particularkind— politicalfailure by all MiddleEastern states tojoin the ranks of the great powers.I do not mean toimplya breakdownin theprocess ofmodernization, any sort of intrinsiccultural or economicbackwardness, or a backwardnessin the form of the polity that emerged intheMiddle East comparedto Europe and North America. 19.For a widelycited survey tracing contemporary European states totheiroriginal ‘ ‘core-areas,’’ see Poundsand Ball 1964, 24– 40. 658 InternationalOrganization andconsolidate their protostate apparatuses by aspirationsto establish larger ‘ ‘em- pires’’ (thatis, sovereign states) of theirown for thegreaterglory of theruling house, bya varietyof aggrandizing impulses, and by strategic worries aboutthreats from competitorswho might otherwise absorb march lands or weakerneighbors. In Brit- ainthe wars ofAlfred theGreat and of the Plantagenet and Tudor monarchs forged theheptarchy into England and the British Isles into the United Kingdom. In France, wars conductedby Capetianand V aloiskings from theIle de Franceproduced, over centuries,the great state we knowas France. In Russia the czars fought wars of expansionand repression to join Slavic territories west of the Urals andvast ex- pansesof Asiaeast of theUrals tothe domain ruled from Muscovy.Using Prussia as abase,Bismarckian diplomacy and a seriesof wars againstAustria, France, and othersproduced Germany. In Italy, Piedmont fought wars againstAustria, sponsored Garibaldi’s landingin Sicily, and marched its army down the Italian peninsula to destroythe old Bourbon monarchy, thereby eliminating the jealous rivalries among separateprincipalities and city-states that had for solong divided Italians. 20 The bloodystruggle between North and South in North America transformed what could havebeen a looseconfederation of states,or acontinentdivided into three or four states,into a continentalstate dominated by acoherentpolitical, economic, and cul- turalelite. 21 Thelong histories of Japan and China re ect the same hard truth— that nogreat state in today’ s worldhas arisen peacefully or legally. 22 Theargumentis notone ofdesignor destiny,but of evolution and at leastpartially unintendedconsequences. ‘ ‘Nodynasty set out to build a nation-state;’’ arguedV .G. Kiernan, eachaimed at unlimited extension . ..andthe more it prospered the more the outcomewas amultifariousempire instead of anation.The nation was theem- pire manque´.Ithad to belargeenough to surviveand to sharpen its claws on its neighbors,but small enough to be organized from onecentre and to feel itself as an entity.23

20.Prussia and Piedmont fought Ž ercer, more purposeful,and temporally more concentratedwars of nationaluniŽ cation precisely because, intheEuropean context, Germany andItaly were latedevelopersas nationalstates. Inother words, consistent with my argument about the obstacles toachieving great power statusfaced bypoliticallatecomers outsideof Europe,these Europeanlatecomers themselves faced higher barriers toentry to the great powerclub than did their predecessors— barriers theysurmounted through determinedleadership, strategic planning,large-scale militaryexertions, and fortuitous tactical alliances withexisting great powers(Piedmont and France versusAustria; Prussia and Italy versus Austria and France).The contoursof Italy were inparticular constrained by what Tilly referred toas the‘ ‘Žlling-inof thestate system.’’ See Tilly1975, 46. See alsoFiner 1974, 84, 95. 21.Deudney 1995, 191– 228. 22.Japan’ s reemergence as agreat powerafter WorldWar II,alongwith that of Germany andChina, owes agreat deal notonly to the implementation of disciplined developmentalist and neomercantilist policies,but to theprior creation of uniŽ ed, territorially expansive, and demographically weighty states throughwars ofsurvival,conquest, and expansion among contending subunits (wars ofGerman uniŽca- tionin the nineteenth century and the warring states periodsof Chineseand Japanese history)as well as to theevolution of strong states andpowerful economies linked to participation in wars withother great powers,from the Sino– Japanese War ofthe 1890s and the Russo– Japanese War ofthe early twentieth centuryto the two world wars. 23.Kiernan 1965, 35. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 659

In1902 Otto Hintze offered a moregeneral version of thistheory for theevolution oflarge, strong territorial states in Europe: Itwas thesituation of theEuropean state system that made the formation of greaterstates historically necessary. France was forcedinto this direction by her strugglewith the Habsburgs; and once France had set the example, it becamea necessityfor theother European states to followher example if they wished to preservetheir independence. The development of military and political power andconstant military preparedness were possibleonly on thebasis of a larger, centrallyruled and administrative territory. The militarist system, with all that it entailedin political terms, proceeded from thepower struggles and rivalries of theContinental states after the close of the Middle Ages. 24 Of allof Hintze’s disciples,Tilly has offered the best and most in uential formula- tionof theargument— that ‘ ‘war madethe state, and the state made war.’ ’ 25 At least, andthis is my point, this is how it workedin Europeand North America, and this is the only waywe knowthat a ‘‘greatpower’ ’ canbe constructed in the modern world. Theinstitutional mechanisms that provided this link between successful prosecu- tionof external wars andthe expansion (territorial and otherwise) of states were political,administrative, and Ž scal.Politically, it became necessary for absolutist monarchsto extendrights of representationin government to those capable of paying thetaxes necessary to Ž nancewars theywished to Žghtorfeltcompelled to be ableto Ž ght.26 Developmentof the‘ ‘national’’ ideaand the extension of politicalrights to thegentry, the bourgeoisie, and later the working class thereby became associated withstates whose relative legitimacy permitted them to raisemore taxes, build larger militarycapabilities, and Ž ghtmorewars tovictoriousconclusions or atleast prevent theirdestruction at the handsof otherexpanded states. 27 Themuchlarger and techno- logicallysophisticated armies and navies sponsored by these states also required moredeveloped and effective administrative structures to extract resources (con- scriptsand taxes), direct their growth, and create broader indigenous (or colonially supervised)industrial and agricultural bases to assure logistical support. 28 The use of theseenhanced capabilities to prosecute successful wars thenled to even greater administrativeand political capacities to tax and extract other resources. 29 While new militarybureaucracies served as models for morepowerful and ambitious forms of statecontrol over civil affairs, investmentsin military-relatedindustrial and agricul-

24.Hintze 1975,174. 25.See Tilly1975, 42; andTilly 1985. Explaining Germany’ s rise togreat powerstatus, Dehio wrote of ‘‘dynamicdiversity’ ’ and‘ ‘fertile friction’’ amongthe Hellenic city-states,the principalities of Renais- sance Italy,and in Europe as awhole.These were thekey factors, he argued,re ected in‘‘theperpetual motionof its struggles,’ ’ thatin a culturallyuniŽ ed but politically divided Europe ‘ ‘gaverise toan im- mense heighteningof all vitalenergies’ ’ andproduced the modern great powers.See Dehio1962, 21– 23. See alsoFiner 1974, 79– 126; and Zolberg 1980. 26.See Ibid.,694, 708, 712; Tilly 1975, 23, 35; Finer 1974, 104– 106; and Tilly 1990, 96– 126. 27.See Ardant1975, 196– 99; Braun 1975; and Tilly 1990, 183. 28.See Tilly1975, 73– 74; Tilly1990, 67– 95; Finer 1974, 98; and Giddens 1985, 111– 16. 29.See Finer1974, 98; Tilly 1990, 189– 90. 660 InternationalOrganization turalgoods contributed to accelerated growth of demand and production in the economyas a whole. 30 As statesbecame stronger, their neighbors had to become stronger— politically, Žscally,militarily, demographically, and territorially. For thestates that became great powers,all these dimensions of powerwent together. 31 Weakerstates either disap- pearedin the struggles among more substantial powers (for example,Burgundy, Brittany,Scotland, Schleswig-Holstein ,Hanover,V enice,the American Confed- eracy,Sicily, Lombardy, and Bavaria) or securedtheir independence (for example, Belgium,the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Poland) in aweb ofalliances and neutrality agreements with great powers unwilling, at least for sub- stantialperiods of time, to riskwar overtheir future. Abroaderbut weaker version of my argument is thatstates, anywhere in the world, thatcould not by the end of the nineteenth century credibly contend at the highest strategiclevel and project power beyond their own geographical regions were much lesslikely to gain the capability to do so subsequently. A strongerbut narrower versionof theargument, and that is what I amadvancing here, is that this factor— latecomerstatus— isthe most important element explaining the failure of great pow- ers,or a singlegreat power, to emergein theMiddle East. In either case, I attribute thisdifferential likelihood to thepotential for existinggreat powers to interruptthe dynamicinteraction of war andstate building that had helped bring them into exis- tenceas such and to the new,dense,and increasingly constraining network of antibel- ligerencynorms in theinternational arena. 32 Theargument is hardly new that the predicament of weakthird world states is a functionof their late arrival in an international system already dominated by and reecting the interests of established large powers. In the economic realm, world systemstheory and dependency theory are both based on thissequential logic. But thesetheories were advancedto explainenduring patterns of economicunderdevel- opmentor underperformance.Strong critiques of thiscluster of theories,by empha- sizingthe record of East Asian and Latin American newly industrializing countries (NICs), highlightthe factthat the debateover the causes of ‘‘underdevelopment’’ and therange of opportunities third world states have to improve their lot within the internationaleconomy has been severely and instructively restricted. Even those economistsand other analysts associated with the W orldBank and the International MonetaryFund (IMF), whohave trumpeted the potential of ‘‘structuraladjustment’ ’ asan escape route from povertyand underdevelopment, set their sights for these

30.See Giddens1985, 128– 35; and Zolberg 1980, 696. 31.Ibid., 691, 693. 32.China, India, and Brazil are examples ofverylarge countriesthat may now,or soon,be legitimately considered‘ ‘great powers’’ butwhich did not have this status at theend of thenineteenth century. These countriescan beconsideredexceptions that prove the rule. China was constructedas auniŽed state as a resultof many wars amongChinese states— wars thatoccurred well beforeany European or North American great powerwas inapositionto intervene, and the country was simplytoo vast to be occupied by the imperial powerseven during the period of the Open Door. India and Brazil, onthe other hand, were shelteredfrom extraregional interventions by British and Portuguese (and then U.S.) imperialism. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 661 societiesno higher than bringing economic performance into line with population growth,employment requirements, and moderately increasing standards of living. 33 Insofaras theorists working along these lines have sought to explainthe absence oflarge-scale state frameworks for economicdevelopment, they have simply re- ferred totheconsequences of Europeanimperialism and the ‘ ‘artiŽcial’ ’ fragmenta- tionenforced by post-colonialboundaries. This approach, however, implies that such fragmentationdid not have to beovercome in Europe and thereby ignores the crucial rolethat war playedin producing the kind of states that could build large internal markets,secure necessary trading and investment advantages abroad, and sustain industrialdevelopment. 34 Neitherdependency– world system theorists nor their crit- icsimagine any form ofpoliticalexpansion for statesnot already established as great powersapart from peacefulregional cooperation or integration. Implicitly, but most categorically,they rule out state strategies of forcibleexpansion that could, intend- edlyor not,result in imperialor nationaleconomies and international military and politicalcapabilities sufficient to rival those of the established great powers. When suchscenarios are described, as they often are by Americanand European analysts in regardto the possibility of a largeArab orfundamentalist Islamic state, they are presentedas wholly illegitimate and dangerous. 35 Oneschool of thoughtthat makes a clearconnection between the character of third worldstates and the consequences of historical sequence that gives them that appel- lationis thecluster of studiesproduced by Carl Rosberg, Robert Jackson, and Jeffrey Herbst.36 Thesescholars have developed the view that the survival of somany weak statesin the third world is dueto thesupport of aninternationalpolitical order that upholdsexisting boundaries and existing regimes against internal threatsand chal- lenges.They have contrasted the actual weakness and political incapacity of these ‘‘quasi-states’’ tothe strength and political capacity of the authentically sovereign statesthat arose in Europeand North America before this century. These ‘ ‘empirical’’ or‘ ‘real’’ states,in Jackson’ s terminology,earned their status by exercising effective control,without external assistance, over the territories and peoples within their des- ignatedboundaries. Mycontentionis that these writers havefailed to recognize an equally consequen- tialeffect of extraregional powers and international norms on third world political development.In the Middle East, perhaps more than in Africa (where theJackson- Rosberg-Herbstline of analysishas been most thoroughly applied) the effect of great

33.With regard to the Middle East, see, forexample, Diwan andSquire 1993, 37. 34.Stein Rokkan argued strongly that ‘ ‘theEuropean sequence simplycannot be repeated inthe newest nations.The new nation-buildershave to start outfrom fundamentally different conditions; they face an entirelydifferent world.’ ’ He wenton to suggest that these new states couldlearn fromhis analysis of the ‘‘manyfacets’ ’ ofEuropean state buildingbut never considered the implications of an environment— presentin European history and largely absent in the modern Middle East— tolerant of successful, preda- torywar. See Rokkan1973, 94. See alsoRokkan 1981. 35.For a rare exception,see StephenV anEvera’ s mentionof futurewars amongArab states as compa- rable tothe wars ofItalianand German uniŽcation in thenineteenth century. See VanEvera 1994,11n. 36.See Jacksonand Rosberg 1982; Jackson 1987; Herbst 1989.For application of these ideas tothe Arab MiddleEast, see Hudson1988, 32– 36. 662 InternationalOrganization powerintervention and enforcement of internationalnorms has been not onlyto prop upotherwise vulnerable regimes against internal challenges, but to preventpotential regionalhegemons from exercisingtheir relative capacities by conqueringor other- wisecoercively integrating their neighbors. 37 Tothe extent that one acceptsthe argu- mentthat political violence on a grandscale is howall developing great powers have weldedlarge populations and extensive valuable territories within a singleadminis- trativedomain and a singlemarket, one must expect that international norms and greatpower policies have been responsible for blockingthe emergence of a great powerin the Middle East by deterringor preventingstate-building wars from being foughtto successfulconclusions across existing Middle Eastern boundaries. 38 Theimportanceof thisanalysis for explainingpolitical weakness in thethird world isevident from thecrucialbut unnoticedrelationship between two observations made byJackson in thecourse of his argument.Jackson claims that if leftto themselves, mostexisting third world states would crumble into far smallerparticularisms. Theseentities might be morecoherent domestically than existing quasi-states, andthere probably would be fewer civilcon icts. However, they would fragment existinginternational society into a far greaternumber of jurisdictionsthan exist now. Insteadof Žftystates, Africa would contain more than ten or twentytimes as many. ..anunmanageable number and would expose the continent to far greaterrisks of externalcontrol than it facesat present .39 Notehere how the prospect of a thirdworld fragmented into hundreds of small stateletsis considered retrograde, ‘ ‘unmanageable,’’ andapt to expose the smaller unitsto even‘ ‘greaterrisks of externalcontrol’ ’ (meaning,presumably, from outside thethird world). Y etsome pages later, as Jacksonis describingEuropean conditions inthe seventeenth century under which ‘ ‘real’’ statesdeveloped, he mentions that therewere ‘‘threehundred-odd independent sovereignties in Germanyalone.’ ’ Among thesehundreds of statesand principalities, proximityand power meant there was alwaysa strongpossibility of war: the classicalproblem of astates-system.Deterrence, alliance, and the balance of powerare responses to it. But competition was alsoa spurto state-buildingand oneof themain reasons for theeventual global hegemony of Europe. 40

37.In a 1990article Herbst doesidentify interstate war as akeyelement inEuropean state expansion andfocuses onthe absence ofinterstate war as ahindranceto state buildingin Africa. However,he attributespeace inAfrica tothe vested interests andpolicies of African elites whodo not wishto risk their holdon powerby destabilizingthe prevailing distribution of territory among states. Instructively,and in sharpcontrast to his emphasis elsewhere oninternationalsystem responsibilityfor preventing successful internal challengesto African governments,Herbst doesnot mention the international system as acon- strainton successful aggrandizingwars inAfrica orthe third world. See Herbst 1990. 38.For an argument that, however brie y, does join the general point I am makingto consideration of Africa, see AliMazrui’ s comments aboutEuropean ‘ ‘disimperialization’’ ofpotentially large African states. See Mazrui1984, 307. For more typicaltreatments ofthe third world as havingsuffered from ‘‘permissive’’ great powernorms with respect tointerstate violenceand that emphasize thedomestic locus ofsecurity threats inthe third world without reference tothe international system’ s preventionof suc- cessful aggrandizingwars, see Ayoob1991; and David 1991. 39.Jackson 1990, 42 (emphasis added). 40.Ibid., 51. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 663

Inother words, a circumstancethat Jackson identiŽ es as the beginningof aprocess leadingto real states and great powers in Europe (hundreds of small states) is treated as an insuperableobstacle when located in the third world. Thus Jackson acknowledges that a keyelement in the production of bigger and stronger European states was aprolonged periodof aggrandizing and balancing wars amonga largenumber of small states. However , hisfocus on the support granted to third world regimes against internal threats leads him to missthe extent to which ‘ ‘externalcontrol’ ’ alsoprevents the kind of rough-and-tumble interstateviolence through which some of thosesmall states could become the third worldequivalents of Muscovy,Piedmont, Prussia, W essex,or theIle de France. Inowturn to abriefaccount of threeattempts by MiddleEastern state builders to useaggrandizing wars andsubversion to expandtheir states— accounts that highlight theimportance of extraregional interventions and Ž rmlyestablished international normsas obstacles to thesuccessful construction of anewgreat power. The impor- tanceof thesecases is not in the failure of Egyptianand Iraqi elites to weldthe entire Arab MuslimMiddle East into a singlestate. After all,despite German, Austrian, Spanish,and French attempts to unite all of Europeunder one political sovereignty, thatnever occurred. Rather, the importance of thesethree cases is thatthey reveal how,throughrelatively small exertions of theirtremendous power, the existing (Eu- ropeanand North American) great powers repeatedly and decisively intervened to preventsuccessfully fought wars from beingused by Middle Eastern state builders as ameansof doingwhat their European and North American predecessors had done. Althougha creativeanarchy could work in the European and North Atlantic state systemsto produce great powers, the Middle Eastern state system— whose leading memberswere inabsolute terms at least as well organized, as populous, and as militarilypotent as earlymodern England or France— was notallowed to operate by thesame rules as hadthe European system. 41

The Frustrationof PotentialMiddle Eastern StateBuilders: Three Examples 42 MuhammadAli Themost signiŽ cant effort by a nineteenthcentury Middle Eastern ruler to transform histerritorial base into the military, political, and economic core of agreatpower was

41.Another way toexpress thisargument is thatbarriers toentry into the ranks of thegreat powers were muchlower for post– Holy Roman Empire European states thanfor post– Ottoman Middle Eastern states. Fundamentally,however, it was because anarray ofgreat powersalready existed in thelatter period andnot in theformer thatthese barriers toentrywere sosubstantial. 42.I willdiscuss what I considerthe three mostinstructive examples, representingthree ofthemost ambitiousand dramatic attempts tobuild an Arab great power.Evidence supporting my argument could be drawnfrom a hostof smaller-scale ventureswhere externalintervention or theexternal enforcement of internationalnorms on behalf of recognizedsovereign states orthe principle of naturalself-determination blockedor blunted state expansionby potentialregional or subregional hegemons. These venturesinclude Syriaunder Assad regardingJordan in 1970 and Lebanon since 1975;Israel inSinai in 1948,1956, and 1975–1981, in Lebanon in 1982– 1984, and in the West Bankand Gaza Stripin 1967– present; Libya regardingChad; Somalia regarding the Ogaaden; Morocco regarding the Western Sahara; Iraqregarding Kuwaitin 1963; and various Iranian initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. Concerning the peculiar but fundamentallyconsistent case ofIsrael, see Lustick1987, 152– 54. 664 InternationalOrganization thatof Muhammad Ali. Muhammad Ali was governor(wali) ofEgypt under the sovereigntyof the Ottoman sultan. This somewhat uneasy relationship of powerful vassalto sovereignlord, when the vassal commanded more military and economic wherewithalthan the lord, is more than a littlereminiscent of the relationship be- tweenpowerful medieval kings, such as Henrythe II ofEngland,and their nominal sovereign,the Holy Roman Emperor. Despite the fact that Henry’ s militarypower andpolitical position were moresecure and more dependable than those of the em- peror,Henry publicly acknowledged the emperor’ s sovereignauthority, even as he proceededto consolidatehis kingdom as the kind of ‘‘empiremanque ´’’(theAngevin Empire)that Kiernan (quoted earlier) characterized as the European route to nation- statehood.Consider the greetings to the Emperor Frederick contained in a twelfth centuryletter to himfrom HenryII: Tothe friend dearest to hisheart, Frederick, by thegrace of Godthe most in- vincibleemperor of theRomans, Henry, king of England, duke of Normandy andAquitane and count of Anjou,greeting and the harmony of true peace and love. . . . Welaybefore you our kingdom and whatever is anywhere subject to oursway, andentrust it to yourpower, that all things may be administered in accordance withyour nod and that in allrespects your imperial will be done. ..toyou,who excelsus inworth,may fall the right to command, while we shallnot lack the willto obey. 43 Similarlanguage would have been used in official correspondence from Muham- madAli to the Sublime Porte, even as Ottomansultans were beggingAli for help puttingdown revolts in Arabia,Crete, and Greece. Indeed, as Afaf LutŽAl-Sayyid Marsothas described in vividdetail, the wars foughtby Aliand his sons,particularly Ibrahim,while formally at the behest of thesultan, were actuallywaged as part of a systematiceffort to expand their control of easternMediterranean trade routes and annexSyria. Territorial aggrandizement through predatory war was thecornerstone ofa policydesigned to winEuropean recognition as a greatpower for thestate being builtby theAlbaniandynasty around an Egyptian demographic, military, administra- tive,and economic core. These wars beganin 1812 when the sultan asked his ‘ ‘vas- sal’’ inEgypt to send troops to Arabiato crush W ahhabipower there and occupy Meccaand Medina. A secondwar, initiatedby MuhammadAli, was aninvasion of Sudanin 1820, listed by Marsot as the ‘ ‘secondof the wars ofEgyptian expan- sion.’’44 Thepurpose of this expedition was, accordingto Ali himself, ‘ ‘toprovide

43.Folz 1969, 196– 97. 44.Marsot 1984, 205. Marsot’ s treatment istakenhere as authoritative.Fred Lawson’ s recent study (1992)argues that Muhammad Ali’ s expansionismwas designedto alleviate internalstrains in the coali- tionof social groupsthat governed Egypt rather thana coherentexercise inrealpolitik.I am unpersuaded byLawson’ s work,though I donot consider his main contentionsto contradict the argument advanced here. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 665 largenumbers of slaves,to bring the territory under Egyptian dominion, and to search for anddiscover gold mines and other mineral resources.’ ’45 Withboth sides of the Red Sea now under Muhammad Ali’ s control,Egyptian powerwas directedelsewhere. Having earlier supported Greek rebels against the sultan,Muhammad Ali now entertained pleas from thePorte to putdown the rebel- lion.Using the sultan’ s distressto gain his approval for Egypt’s annexationof Crete, Alioccupied that island in 1824 and used it as a platformfor landingEgyptian forces inGreece in 1825. A stringof Egyptian victories against the Greeks prompted the Concertof Europe to take note of ‘ ‘anewPuissance Barbaresque in Europe.’ ’46 Metternichhimself warned the European powers of Ali’s questto jointheir ranks. 47 Meanwhile,Muhammad Ali, acutely aware ofEuropean military power and fearful ofa Britishinvasion of Egypt,yet anxious to beacceptedas an equal,wrote to an Austriandiplomat to describehis ambitions in as soothing a manneras possible: Iwantnothing but Egypt. My wishes go no further. Egypt is a smallcountry, but soproductive that, without this war, itwould have been a pearl.Ten years of peaceand I willdraw from itfortymillion talaris [riyals]. If theyleave me to work,this country will be sotransformed that besidethe four great world pow- ers,England, Russia, Austria, and France, Egypt by itsmoney will be the Ž fth. 48 Theexisting great powers, however, were clearlyunwilling to allowEgypt to join theirranks, at least not through successful military campaigns in proximate areas. AccusingMuhammad Ali of fostering piracy in the Adriatic, France, Austria, and Britaincombined to attackand sink the Egyptian  eetat Navarino in October1828. As far asBritish motives were concernedin this incident, Marsot comments that anindependent African, or rather Mediterranean, authority was exactlywhat Mu- hammadAli wished Egypt to become, and what England wished to deny him. Sucha statein controlover the trade and commerce of theeastern Mediterranean wouldpose a threatto Britishexpansionist commercial aims, in terms of trade, andwould turn the sea into an Egyptianenclave over half its area. 49 Ali’s Greekexpedition was overbut not his ambitionsfor constructingan indepen- dentMiddle Eastern great power based in Egypt. He immediatelyset about building anew eetand preparing another army for theconquest of Syria.In November 1831, anEgyptian army under Ibrahim Pasha, Muhammad Ali’ s son,invaded Palestine, andcaptured Acre inMay1832 and Damascus in June.No longer willing to accept Ali’s protestationsof fealty,Sultan Mahmud declared him an enemy of theempire, buttwo Ottoman armies sent against the Egyptians were defeated.Fearing Ibrahim wouldnext march on Constantinopleitself, the sultanappealed to the European pow- ers for help.When Russia responded by sendingwarships into the Bosporus, Britain andFrance took notice. Pressured by Britainand France, wary ofRussia’s intrusion,

45.Marsot 1984. 46.Ibid., 208. 47.Ibid., 213. 48.Ibid. (emphasis added). 49. Ibid. 666 InternationalOrganization andshort of supplies, Ibrahim concluded an agreement with the sultan that recog- nizedEgyptian rule of Syria(including Palestine). Syriahad always been the centerpiece of MuhammadAli’ s ambitionto establish Egyptas agreatpower. Although he didnot imagine himself as a leaderof theArabs, hisson Ibrahim spoke Arabic, identiŽ ed himself as anArab, and used political rheto- ricchallenging rule by emperorsor monarchs‘ ‘onbehalf of theconsensus (ijma) of theumma’ ’ thatcould easily be interpretedin quasi-nationalistterms. 50 In any case, in1838 Muhammad Ali announced his intention of seceding from theempire and incorporatingSyria into his hereditary domain. This prompted another Ottoman ef- fortin 1839to dislodge the Egyptians from Syria,resulting in yetanother Ottoman defeatand Egypt’ s captureof theOttoman  eet.On the deathof SultanMahmud, the newsultan, Abdul Mejid, came to termswith Muhammad Ali in anagreementthat wouldhave recognized Egypt’ s permanentacquisition of Syria. Thegreatpowers would not tolerate this arrangement. Muhammad Ali, said Palm- erston,must be compelled‘ ‘towithdrawinto his original shell of Egypt.’’51 In July 1840Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England announced an agreement with the Porte ‘‘for thepaciŽ cation of the Levant.’ ’ Themain thrust of this convention was anultimatum toMuhammad Ali to retract his bid for independenceand permanent rule of Syria. WhenFrance backed away from supportingEgypt against Britain and the otherpow- ers,the stagewas setfor endingMuhammad Ali’ s greatpower ambitions. ‘ ‘Coercion ofMehemet Ali by Englandif war brokeout might appear partial and unjust,’ ’ wrote Palmerston,‘ ‘butwe arepartial; and the great interests of Europe require that we shouldbe so.’’52 Britishand Austrian ships cut Egypt’ s sealinks to Syria; a contin- gentof Britishmarines defeated Ibrahim’ s forces,and both Beirut and Sidon were taken.When a British eetthen appeared in Alexandriaitself, Muhammad Ali agreed tothe terms of the Treaty of London, including evacuation of Syria, Arabia, and Crete,return of theTurkish  eet,and sharp reduction in thesize of hisarmy. Inaddition to surrenderingterritories, military assets, and sovereign claims, Mu- hammadAli was alsocompelled to accept capitulation treaties that proscribed the statemonopolies he hadestablished to strengthenEgypt’ s infantindustries. The trea- tiesdoomed Egypt to asubordinaterole in theworld economy. As Marsotexplains, Thegrand design of anempireand of hegemonyover the Mediterranean evapo- rated.. ..Withoutembargoes, a captivemarket, and a largearmy to useup much ofthemanufactured goods, Egyptian industrialization slowed down, and most of thewar-related industries were dismantled.The Egyptian economic effort from henceforthbecame geared to turningthe country into an export market for agri- culturalproducts . ..toexport[ing]her raw materialsto Europe,where they were tobemanufacturedand sold back to Egyptas Žnishedproducts. 53

50.Ibid., 226. See alsoDodwell 1931, 257– 58. 51.Marriott 1917, 240. 52.Marsot 1984, 240. 53.Ibid., 246– 47. See alsoRalston 1990, 90, 95. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 667

‘‘TheEgyptian question,’ ’ asMarriot put it, from hisEuropean perspective, ‘ ‘was nowsettled.’ ’54

GamalAbdel Nasser ‘‘Settled’’ asit may have been in theearly nineteenth century, the Egyptian question reappearedin the 1950s and 1960s. This time another ambitious military leader, GamalAbdel Nasser, soughtto establish a greatArab state,with Egypt as its military, cultural,and political core. He wrotethat a worldhistoric role existed for Egypt—a roleas leaderof the Muslim, Arab, and African worlds. The African side of Nasser’s policy,however, was virtuallynonexistent, and after his brutal crackdown on the MuslimBrotherhood at home, his projecttook on adistinctlyPan-Arab cast. Evoca- tionsof a great,united Arab state,from theAtlantic to the Gulf, were aconstant refrainin thepopular Sawtel-Arab (V oiceof theArabs) transmissionsfrom Cairo’s powerfulnew radio station. Nasser’ s questfor Egyptianhegemony in the Arab world was aidedby thousands of Egyptian teachers, journalists, and other professionals workingthroughout the Arab MiddleEast. Egyptian vernacular, Nasserist thinking, Nasser’s cadences,his visage, his alliance with the Soviet Union, his proud and successfuldeŽ ance of theIsraeli-French-British invasion of 1956,and his support of therevolt against France in Algeriaestablished Egypt in the late 1950s and early 1960sas a potentcandidate for leadershipof theArab worldand as a possiblevehicle for itsconsolidation into a newgreat power. As MuhammadAli had always been wary ofBritish intervention to block his state-buildingand state-expanding ambitions, so was Nasser anxiousto remain in the goodgraces of the United States— the new leader of the great power club. When Nasser’s Free Officers overthrewthe Farouk monarchy in 1952, the United States was notsurprised. Friendly contacts had been established in themonths before the revolutionbetween Nasser andthe U.S. CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA). In1954 theCIA channelto Nasser was usedto deliver funds and explore a possibleU.S.– Egyptianalliance. 55 Butas Palmerston and Metternich could not abide a powerfuland independent Egypt,neither could Dulles, Eden, Mollet, or, for thatmatter, Kruschev abide the ideaof a trulyindependent, powerful, and united Arab state.In both periods the overweeningsuperiority of the great powers against any nascent Middle Eastern powerallowed policies toward the Middle East to be guided by mundane, often casual,and usually marginal jealousies, inclinations, and preferences. The British- sponsored‘ ‘Leagueof Arab States’’ andthe American-sponsored Baghdad Pact were twoschemes for thepoliticalorganization of Middle Eastern states that re ected both thegreat powers’ enormous margin of superiority and the way in which great power policiesof major importance for MiddleEastern states could be fashioned rather cavalierlyby greatpower diplomats and intelligence officers.

54.Marriott 1917, 244. 55.Eveland 1980, 96– 105. 668 InternationalOrganization

Inthe immediate postwar period Great Britain had helped found the League of Arab Statesas an institution that could at once preserve existing boundaries within theArab worldand enlist the separate governments in cooperative ventures under Britishauspices. Such limited notions of Arab unitywere alreadysuspect in theeyes ofthe young military leaders and Nasserist and Baathist activists who were taking politicalpower or gainingin uence in Egypt,Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. W esternsup- portfor Israeland schemes such as the Middle East Defense Organization and the BaghdadPact reinforced suspicions that the greatpowers of the W estwere interested onlyin organizinga dividedArab worldagainst the Soviet Union. 56 TheAmerican– Egyptianrelationship soon soured as well. The United States Ž rst promised,then withdrewoffers ofarms andaid for constructionof the Aswan Dam afterNasser demonstratedtoo much independence in his foreign policy. WithArab– Israeli tensions heating up in1955,Nasser turnedto the Soviet Union for arms andmoved to nationalizethe Suez Canal. Egyptian propaganda against the BaghdadPact intensiŽ ed, and waves of Arab nationalistagitation swept through the Arab East.Pro-Nasser, anti-Westernriots erupted in Jordanin January 1956, prompt- ingyoung King Hussein to orderhis British military and political advisers out of the country.When antimonarchist Nasserists won elections in Jordan in October 1956, thenew prime minister immediately placed Jordan’ s militaryunder an Egyptian gen- eral.Mass support for Nasser’s leadershipof a unitedArab worldrose to unprec- edentedlevels after the failure of theBritish-French-Israeli attack on Egyptin No- vember1956. Faced with a torrentof popularoutrage, Jordan canceled its treaty with Britainand terminated the British subsidy. But when Jordan announced its rejection ofproposals for theemergent Egyptian– Syrian union, pro-Nasser armyofficers, backedby Arab nationalistPalestinians, plotted to overthrow the monarchy. In Syria aBaathist(radical Pan-Arab) regimewas facedwith communist subversion from withinand American-supported military threats from Turkey,Iraq, and Jordan. In February1958 it dissolved itself and merged Syria into the Egyptian-dominated United Arab Republic(UAR). Nasser immediatelyinvited all other Arab countriesto be- comepart of the single great Arab statehe was constructing. Nasser wellappreciated that he couldnot achieve the Pan-Arab unity he promised bypolitical appeals and inspiring rhetoric alone. Nasser hadalready provided politi- caland diplomatic support to the Front de Libe´rationNationale (FLN) inits violent struggleto endFrench rule of Algeria.In Lebanon in 1958 a full-scaleArab national- istrevolt, animated by ferventsupport for Nasser amongLebanon’ s Muslimpopula- tionand drawing military support from Syria(now part of theUAR), seriouslythreat- enedthe Maronite-dominated government. Meanwhile in Iraq,Nasser’ s propaganda andEgyptians in thatcountry were agitatingfor theoverthrow of themonarchy. In July1958 a Nasseritecoup, led by GeneralAbd al-Karim Kassem,did overthrow the

56.In a 1952lecture at theArab Universityin Beirut, George Habbash argued ‘ ‘thatduring the First andSecond World Wars theArabs hadadopted a policyof cooperationwith the Allies. He askedwhat this policybrought other than occupation, partition, and disaster upondisaster. Besides, thepacts were clearly designedto perpetuate the condition of semi-sovereignty and to inhibit the Arabs fromchanging their internalstatus quo.’ ’ See Conrad1989, 231. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 669 explicitlypro-W esternHashemite regime. When the new Iraqi ruler had a fallingout withhis erstwhile hero, mass demonstrationsoccurred in Cairo and Damascus in supportof a March1959 revolt against the Kassem regime.The following year Jordanaccused Egypt of responsibility for theassassination of theJordanian prime minister.In the early 1960s, with Syria’ s abruptsecession from theUAR, Nasser’s focusturned toward Y emen,where Arab nationalistarmy officers had ousted the Imamate andinvited Egypt to send support. By 1965seventy thousand Egyptian troops were inY emenhelping the regime against royalist tribesmen supported by SaudiArabia. TheW esterngreat powers responded to what appeared to be developing into a Pan-Arabnationalist juggernaut. Beginning in 1956 the United States and Britain sponsoredseveral clandestine operations designed to overturnthe Syrian and Egyp- tiangovernments through coups or assassinations(similar to the operation that had deposedMossadegh and reinstalled the shah of Iran in1953). 57 Earlyin 1957W ash- ingtonpromulgated the Eisenhower Doctrine under which American military and economicresources could be committedto the Middle East to aidany government threatenedby forcesdetermined to beassociatedwith ‘ ‘internationalcommunism.’ ’ Bolsteredby clandestine Ž nancingfrom theUnited States and the dispatch of the SixthFleet to theEastern Mediterranean, King Hussein, in April1957, used Bedouin troopsagainst his opponents, dissolved Parliament, and imposed martial law .Follow- ingthe arrival of a contingentof Egyptian troops in Allepo later that year, King Husseincomplained of another Nasserist plot against him. The United States re- spondedwith an airlift of tanks and artillery. 58 InJuly 1958, fourteen thousand Ameri- cansoldiers landed in Lebanonto protect the government there against a Nasserist rebellionthat at one pointcontrolled 75 percentof thecountry.At thesametime, with logisticalsupport and air cover provided by theUnited States, two thousand British paratrooperslanded in Jordan to forestalla Nasseristcoup there. In language remark- ablysimilar to thatused by theEuropean powers in supportof theOttoman Empire againstMuhammad Ali 120 years earlier, Britain and the United States both warned of‘ ‘thegrave consequences of anycon ict between their forces and those under the controlof Egyptand Syria.’ ’ 59 Despitetheir explicit focus on what they perceived as the threat of Sovietexpan- sionism,the United States, Britain, and France each pursued policies that treated any independentArab unityscheme going beyond the kind of cooperation among exist-

57.See Eveland1980; and Copeland 1969. For a more recent treatment ofextensive American and Britishcovert operations in this period, see Rathmell 1995. 58.Eveland 1980, 262. 59. TheMiddle East and North Africa 1969– 70 ,1969,794. Although the Soviet Union had supplied arms toNasser beforethe 1956 war andhad helped halt the Suez operation, Kruschev subsequently turned againstNasser whenEgyptian rule of Syria resulted in persecution of Syriancommunists. To the extent thatIsrael’ s veryexistence, depriving Egypt of access bylandto eitherJordan or Syria,interfered with Nasser’s abilityto project his power and consolidate Egyptian domination of thosecountries— to prevent, at least, Syria’s secession—the argument made bymany,that Israel (andZionism) have acted as atoolof Western imperialism tokeep the Arab worlddivided and weak, takes onaclear, perhapsdecisive aspect. Forvariations of this argument, see Shlaim1988, 232– 55; Nonneman 1993, 38– 39; Safran 1969, 83– 87; andGause 1992,441– 69. 670 InternationalOrganization ingstates (as exempliŽed bytheArab League)as contraryto Westerninterests. These policieswere reected in theBritish and French measures already mentioned as well asFrench hostility toward Nasser for hisinspiration and support of rebelsin North Africa. TheUnitedStates was concerned,not somuch about any one country,such as Lebanon,Jordan, or Yemen,but about the prospect of alargeunited Arab stateunder vigorous‘ ‘revolutionary’’ leadership.From theAmerican perspective, in MilesCope- land’s words,‘ ‘Yemenwas onlya foothold’’; Nasser’s realinterest was in‘‘thewhole ArabianPeninsula.’ ’60 Dulleswarned that a passiveU.S. responseto Egyptian– Syrianunity would result in anexpanding power that ‘ ‘wouldshortly take in Jordan andthe Lebanon and ultimately Saudi Arabia and Iraq leavingus witha singleArab Stateostensibly under Nasser butultimately under Soviet control.’ ’61 Infact, U.S. oppositionto anArab greatpower extended beyond concerns some did have of So- vietin uence over such a state.As Dullestold the National Security Council (NSC) inearly 1958: ‘ ‘If thepolicy on the supply of oil from theArab statesto W estern Europewere madeuniform as a resultof theuniŽcation of theArab states,[censored] thethreat to thevitaloil supply of WesternEurope from theNear Eastwould become critical.’’62 Inthe 1960s the UnitedStates responded to Nasser’ s extensionof Egyptianpower intoY emenwith clumsy attempts to manipulate food aid and more effective military efforts,including stationing U.S. Air Forceunits in SaudiArabia. Overall, U.S. policy towardEgypt in theyearsprior to theSix-Day W ar was designedto convince Nasser andhis lieutenants to call off ‘‘theBig Show .’’63 Egyptwas tobe instructedthat it couldbeneŽ t economicallyand politically from relationswith the United States but onlyby abandoningefforts tobringabout Arab unityin the only way (as everyone acknowledged)it couldbe achieved,through aggressive campaigns of propaganda, subversion,and military pressure. As hadbeen Muhammad Ali, Nasser was tobe keptwithin ‘ ‘hisoriginalshell of Egypt.’’

SaddamHusayn From theperspective of politicalgeographers such as NormanJ. G.Poundsand Sue SimonsBall or historians of European state formation such as V .G.Kiernan,two areasin the Arab worldcan be seen to closely meet the economic, demographic, geographic,administrative, and cultural requirements of ‘‘conqueringcores’ ’ or‘‘con- questcenters’ ’ aroundwhich great national states could successfully be constructed. Onearea is Lower Egypt,surrounding the Nile Delta and the Nile River V alley.The otheris Mesopotamia(now Iraq) centeredaround the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

60.Copeland 1969, 266. See alsoJohn W aterbury’s comment that‘ ‘BothSaudi Arabia andthe United States came tobelieve that the Egyptian presence inthe southwest corner of the Arabian peninsula was but theprelude to asubversiveeffort on the part of Egyptto topple the Saudi regime andsomehow ‘ grab’the peninsula’s oil.For their part, radical Arab regimes saw theUnited States (and,by extension,Israel) as the principalimpediment to a rationalutilization of Arab resources.’’ See Waterbury1978, 79. 61.From a memo summarizinga February1958 NSC meeting; cited by Mufti1996, 100. 62.From a memo summarizinga January1958 NSC meeting;cited by Mufti 1996, 102. 63.Copeland 1969, 256– 57, 267– 73. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 671

Syriaas well has often emerged as an important force in its own right but more commonlyas a focusof competitionbetween these Nilotic and Mesopotamian states. 64 Underthe Ottomans both Iraq andSyria receded into backwater provinces of a non-Arab,Muslim empire. During the colonial and immediate postcolonial period, neitherHashemite Iraq norBaathist Syria managed to establishitself as apowerful player.Egypt, on the other hand, in the early nineteenth century and in the mid- twentieth,emerged as a realcontender for leadershipof theArab MiddleEast. After Nasser’s passing,however, Anwar Sadatmoved Egypt away from Pan-Arabismto- ward anEgypt-Ž rst foreignpolicy based on alliance with the United States and peace withIsrael. When Sadat signed the Camp David Accords in 1978without securing thesupport of anyother signiŽ cant Arab country,he openedthe door to Iraq andits youngand ambitious leader, Saddam Husayn, to advancethat country’ s claimto the roleof anArab Prussiaor Piedmontto Saddam’ s Bismarckor Cavour. Beforeits overthrow in July 1958, the British-installed Hashemite monarchy in Iraq hadfailed in variousefforts toconsolidatethe countryas the core,along with the otherBritish-installed Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, of alargeunited Arab state. Furthermore,neither the British nor the Americans—through the Baghdad Pact and theshort-lived Iraqi– Jordanian ‘ ‘Arab Union’’— hadsucceeded in using Iraq asa dependableanchor for theiranti-Nasserist and anticommunist policies. By the late 1970s,however, Iraq beganto comeinto its own. 65 Followingthe jump in oilprices in1973, Iraq’ s enormousoil reserves gave the state a solidrevenue base. Saddam’ s systemof government, though brutally authoritarian at the top, was alsobased on offers ofcultural autonomy to the Kurds and an extensive welfare state.Centrally sponsoreddevelopment policies were effectiveenough to raise living standards throughoutthe country— especially in therural areas and among the Shia Arab plu- ralityin the south. Partly for thisreason, Iraq seemedless vulnerable to thekind of sectarianstrife that afflicted Lebanon and threatened Syria and Jordan. Saddam’s culturalpolicies celebrated his revival of the country’ s worldhistoric importanceunder the Sumerians, Assyrians, and Babylonians in ancient times and theAbbassids during Islam’ s goldenage. Saddam fostered images of arenascentIraq readyto exploitits politicalstability, economic resources, substantial population, and closeties with the Sovietbloc for thebeneŽ t oftheArab worldas a whole. 66 Oil, Iraqi officialsargued, was morevaluable for theIraqi and Arab nationif as much as possiblecould be left in theground for futureuse in petrochemicalindustries. Mean- whilepetrodollars, it was promised,would not be invested outside the Arab area. Thanksin part to a slightbut meaningful moderation in its position toward Israel, Saddam’s governmentmanaged to positionitself in thecenter of non-EgyptianArab attitudestoward Israel and establish Iraq, at the timeof theIranianRevolution, as the

64.Concerning the usually unnoticed success ofa Moroccanstate builderin theearly sixteenthcen- tury,see Cornell1990. 65.Concerning Iraq’ s ascendance inthe late 1970s,see Wright1979– 80; Taylor 1982, 73– 88; Salame ´ 1988b,323– 24; andDawisha 1988,272– 74. 66.Regarding Saddam’ s culturalpolicies, see Davis andGavrielides 1991, 116– 48; Freitag 1994, 31; andBaram 1983,1984. 672 InternationalOrganization politicalcore of the Arab world.In November 1978 an Arab summitconvened in Baghdadunited virtually the entire Arab world,including Saudi Arabia, against the CampDavid Accords and against Sadat. Egypt was isolatedand expelled from the Arab League.Gulf subsidies to Cairowere ended.In 1979Saddam met with Asad of Syria.The two once and future enemies agreed to an elaborate (albeit unimple- mented)federation scheme between their two nominally Baathist regimes. Closer tiesbetween Iraq andJordan and Saudi Arabia soon followed. Sincethe disappearance of the Hashemite Monarchy in 1958, the United States hadcome to dependlargely on the Pahlavi regime in Iran asan anchor for itspolitical andmilitary position in the Gulf.With the shah’ s overthrowin 1979the UnitedStates turnedto Saudi Arabia; but as vital as that country’ s oildeposits were, andas helpful asthe Saudi family could be in funding U.S. military,political, and intelligence activities,Saudi Arabia was toosmall demographically and too weak militarily to replaceIran. Egypt was apossibility,but its isolation after Camp David made it almostas difficultto use as apoliticalor strategicasset as Israel. This isthe contextof ahesitantbut realAmerican tilt toward Iraq atthe end of the 1970s and the beginning ofthe 1980s. The new policy was reected in substantialAmerican and W esternaid toIraq duringthe long, Iraq-initiated, war againstIran. 67 Thiswar, far bloodierand far moredisruptive than Iraq’ s subsequentinvasion of Kuwait,was notconsidered by theW estas a threatto civilization or toWesterninterests. Indeed, it was regularly observedby Westerndiplomats and pundits that the longer the war wenton, without adecisivewinner, the better—hence aid to Iraq was enoughto preventdefeat, but not enoughto producea decisivevictory. Whenthe Iran– Iraq war endedin 1988Iraq was economicallyexhausted— having paidall its petrodollarsfor Westernand Soviet arms— but militarilypotent and politi- callycohesive. The states whose interests were mostdirectly protected by Iraq’ s militarymachine— Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf oil monarchies— now appearedto Baghdadas tempting targets and even as its rightful inheritance. Ultima- tumsissued against Kuwait in early 1990, the invasion of August 1990, and the subsequentbarrage of propaganda challenging the legitimacy of all these states as obstaclesto the welfare anddestiny of the Arab nationwere afull-edged bid for Iraqihegemony in the Arab world.As hadNasser, nowSaddam Husayn was raising theArab banneragainst the legacy of European imperialism and the objectives of Westernneocolonialism— an Arab nation‘ ‘dividedin order to be mutilated, frag- mented,and weakened.’ ’68 Althoughthe governments of theregion (aside from Yemen andJordan) joined the anti-Saddam coalition to protect their own interests, popular opinion—from Beirutto Nablus, Amman, Sana, and Algiers— ifunimpressed with Saddamas a leader,was inspiredby the political ambition of his move and the cogencyof hismessage.

67.See Hiro1991, 119– 21; andMiller and Mylroie 1990, 143– 48. 68.Speech to theFourth Conference of theArab PopularForces, Baghdad, 1 June1995, Baghdad Iraq Television,transcribed by theForeign Broadcast andInformation Service, DailyReport: Near Eastand South Asia,6June1995, 1. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 673

Anenormous amount has been written about Iraq’ s invasionand occupation of Kuwaitin 1990and the massiveAmerican and allied intervention in 1990and 1991— Desert Shieldand Desert Storm—that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait,destroyed a substantialproportion of Iraq’s infrastructureand industrial capacity, imposed crip- plingeconomic sanctions on theBaghdad regime, and severely limited its sovereign controlover a substantialportion of northern (Kurdish) Iraq. The overwhelming majorityof this material casts Saddam as an international outlaw and a brutaldictator whoseruthless use of military force against his neighbors was anoutrage against internationallaw and an intolerable threat to international security. Arguments ad- vancedby the Baghdad government or by its many supporters in the Arab world duringthe heady (for Pan-Arabnationalists) days of late1990— about the paralyzing artiŽciality of boundaries imposed by European imperialists, about the plutocratic regimeswhose control of Arabian peninsula oil wealth was aninsuperable obstacle tothe balanced development of theArab worldas a whole,about double standards usedby the United Nations when dealing with belligerent occupation of territoryby Israelas opposed to Iraq— are ignored in this literature or dismissedas cleverpropa- gandadevices that de ect attention from therealfacts of thematter. As anexample of plausibleand historically valid Iraqi analysis, heard in theW est as oridrhetoric and empty propaganda, consider the resolutions of the Arab Popular ForcesConference in Ammanon 17 September 1990. These resolutions character- ized‘ ‘theU.S. colonialinvasion of apartof ourhomeland’’ as‘ ‘alinkin the chain of thehistorical con ict between our Arab nationand the colonial W est’’ andcompared itdirectly to the W est’s ‘‘defeatof the Muhammad ‘ AliPasha experience which sought to bringabout unity and progress.’ ’ Thelarger motives for theintervention are identi- Žeddirectly with a refusalto allowthe kind of political and economic unity achieved byJapan and the W estto be achievedby Arabs.The resolutions included the follow- ingdescription of the motives that lay behind Operation Desert Shield: Thisinvasion was promptedby efforts toseize control of Arab oiland preclude itsuseas aweaponin thehands of theArab nationto secureits development and modernization,to defendits sovereignty and sanctities, and to realizethe slogan ‘‘Arab oilis for Arabs,for thewhole Arab nation.’’ Likewise,this invasion was alsoprompted by adesireto control the future of mankind, particularly consider- ingthat we areon thethreshold of the21st century, that Germany is going to be reunited,that Japan is achievingan unprecedented renaissance, and that Europe willbecome a unitedentity. Moreover, this invasion was drivenby anattempt to thwartthe Arab culturaland unionist plan initiated by Iraq stronglyand capably afterthe end of theGulf W ar. 69 InW esterndiscussions of theGulf W ar andits aftermath a verydifferent master narrativedetermined what claims were ‘‘thefacts of the matter’ ’ andwhat claims

69. Al-Ra’ay,Amman, 18September 1990. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast andInformation Service, DailyReport: Near Eastand South Asia, 18September1990, 16. For a brief,clear, andconve- nientversion of the invasion as aliberationof Kuwaitand of Saddam as apossiblesavior of theArab nationfrom the imposed fragmentation of colonial borders, see Kuttab1990. 674 InternationalOrganization were ‘‘distractingpropaganda.’ ’ Acentralelement in thisdiscursive framework was theterritorial integrity of existing states, at least those who were membersof the UnitedNations. Within the W esternmaster narrative, this was asacrosanctprinciple, awell-institutionalizednorm, that had been violated in an obvious, outrageous, and intolerablemanner. 70 Notsince Hitler, it was repeatedlysaid, had such a blatant threatto civilized norms and to the rights of small nations presented itself. In this case,loyalty to these doctrines was strongenough, American leadership deft enough, andavailable military capabilities overwhelming enough that the theory of collective securityon which the United Nations is putativelybased was successfullyput into practice. Withoutcondoning Saddam Husayn’ s adventure,the argument in this article pro- videsa differentcontext for understandingIraq’ s seizureof Kuwaitand the Allied response.Not surprisingly, the alternative narrative presented here does partially overlapwith Baghdad’ s propagandaclaims. More importantly, it focusesattention on the‘ ‘normality’’ (from alatemedieval and early modern European perspective) of Iraq’s behavioras an administrative, military, and economic ‘ ‘conquestcenter’ ’ ex- ploitingits particular advantages to achieve a widerhegemonic role in theconstruc- tionof agreatnational state. Nor doesSaddam’ s well-documentedbrutality, includ- ingthe horrors of historture chambers and the genocidal campaigns he hascarried outagainst the Kurds and others, set him apart, in any qualitative sense, from the ‘‘heroes’’ ofthoseEuropean and North American struggles that we nowcelebrate as the‘ ‘state-building’’ workthat created great countries. I amthinking here of Sher- man’s marchthrough Georgia and the exterminationof Native Americans, the Albig- ensianCrusade and the slaughter of the Catharis that helped Catholic France add Provenceto itsterritory, the aggrandizing wars ofEdwardI (inScotland and W ales); orElizabeth I orCromwellin Ireland. 71 Thecontext presented here for interpretingthe Gulf W ar alsocasts the Allied responsein a radicallydifferent light from thatin whichthese events are bathed by theofficial version, which portrays Desert Shieldand Desert Storm as a farsighted, heroic,and creative effort to securea post–Cold W ar worldsafe from barbaricdicta- tors.Through the lens of latemedieval and early modern Europe and America, the greatpowers’ aggressive self-interestedness comes into focus. Their enforcement of normsof peaceand security among sovereign states, norms whose direct effect was todeny Arabs entryinto the great power club by theonly route ever taken into that club,is visibleas a‘‘vitalinterest’ ’ inpreservingpetrodollar monarchies and sheik- domsin the Gulf whose very survival requires the most favorable and intimate of relationshipswith the W esternpowers. On this view ,justas the acquisition of wealthy butmilitarily weak principalities, such as Burgundy, V enice,or Alsace, by major

70.Concerning the role of master narrativesin the framing of news items andepisodes to produce apoliticallyconvenient accounts, including decision rules for the separation of ‘‘facts’’ from‘ ‘irrelevan- cies,’’ see Herman andChomsky 1988. 71.For a contemporaryportrait of Henry VIII describinghis ‘ ‘state-building’’ policiesin terms noless horriŽc thanthose used to describe Saddam’s treatment ofhis political opponents in Kuwait and else- where, see Fitzpatrick1922, 299. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 675 powersin Europewas tobeexpectedas a desiderataof the dozens of wars thesmall statesof thatcontinent fought with one anotheron theway to becoming larger states, soshould one expect that Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates,and Saudi Arabiawould rather quickly succumb to the predatoryambitions of demographically andmilitarily powerful Arab orMuslimneighbors who could put the economic re- sourcesof thesestatelets to moreefficient political and military use. From thisper- spective,it isthesurvival of thesecountries, in thesame neighborhood as Iraq (and Iran), thatis the anomaly, not the Iraqi walkover into Kuwait.

Conclusion

Inhistorical perspective it is notSaddam’ s ferociousness,his use of awar-strength- enedstate to seizevaluable territories, or hiswillingness to useforce to challenge or destroythe independence of neighboringstates that is sodistinctive. It ishis failure. Themost important factor explaining Saddam’ s failureis the same thing that ex- plainsthe failure of MuhammadAli and Gamal Abdel Nasser— they failed not be- causeof the political, national, economic, geopolitical, or cultural inadequacy of Arabs orArab lands(a viewoften put forward byorientalists wondering why the Arabs havenot regained the world stature they achieved in the eighth and ninth centuriesor economic functionalists wondering why no Arab commonmarket has succeeded),but because of afundamentalfact of sequence. When the ferocious men andwomen who built Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy, France, and Russia usedadvantages over their neighbors for territorialaggrandizement and the construc- tionof greatnational states, there was noexternalclub of preexistinggreat powers ableto penetratetheir continents and enforce a paralyzinglyfragmented status quo onbehalf of ‘ ‘civilized’’ normsof interstate behavior. When the Ottoman Empire crumbled,however, and autonomous or semiautonomousArab powercenters began toemerge in the Middle East, an external club of preexistinggreat powers was fully preparedto do exactly that, conveniently seeing their interest in a dividedMiddle Eastas corresponding to a morefundamental necessity for the‘ ‘ruleof law.’’ Political‘ ‘backwardness’’ inthe Middle East, re ected in theabsence of anArab greatpower for whichall other ingredients have been present, is thusexplained, but onlyfrom amuchlonger historical perspective than prevailing interpretations of contemporaryMiddle East politics permit. 72 Suchan explanation turns on arecatego- rizationof the object of explanation—areframing of the problem of the stability of post-Ottomanboundaries in theArab MiddleEast that understands consolidation of

72.Many are theanalysts who have compared Muhammad Ali, Nasser, orSaddam Husayn to Bis- marck andEgypt or Iraqto Prussia. Their comparisons almost always focuson propertiesof the Middle Eastern leaders andcountries that, in some crucial way,do not measure uptothe skills of thegreat German state builderor the resources at hisdisposal. See, forexample, Kimche 1970,233; and Kerr 1971,154– 55. Analyses thatemphasize outsideinterference andpressures fromthe international system as responsible forthe failure of Arab unityattempts donot put these attempts inthe same categoryas Europeanand North American state building.Nor do they discuss the decisiveness oflateness inthese attempts tojointhe great powerclub. See Gause 1992. 676 InternationalOrganization statepower in Europeand North America and expansion in thesize of statesin those regionsto have been, in large measure (though certainly not only), a consequenceof wartimeexertions and victories. To be sure,it isnot uncommon for Westernobserv- ers,especially polemically inclined observers, to makedirect comparisons between aspiringMiddle Eastern hegemons and European precedents. But these comparisons useHitler and Mussolini, not Bismarck and Cavour, as referents; thus, Nasser was a ‘‘tin-hornHitler,’ ’ a‘‘Mussoliniby the Nile.’ ’ Similarthings were saidof Saddam by PresidentGeorge Bush. 73 Ingeneral, W esternobservers make three kinds of categorymistakes when contem- platingprospects for MiddleEastern political and economic performance or Arab or Islamicintegration. First, few considerfailure of a MiddleEastern great power to crystallizeas a puzzleto beexplained.Instead of Italy,Germany, France, Britain, the UnitedStates, and Russia, the reference group used by most W orldBank, Agency for InternationalDevelopment, and IMF ‘‘development’’ expertsto measure Middle East- ernstate performance is composed of South Korea, Taiwan, Chile, Singapore, and otherNICs. From thisperspective, Arab andIslamic states have failed because they haveadopted economically sloppy and politically undisciplined responses to the internationalmarket. This line of analysis clearly identiŽ es the international system asa keyconstraint on ambitiousgovernments in theMiddle East, but why individual MiddleEastern states did not respond to thoseconstraints as the Asian Tigers did, by adoptingand successfully implementing export-led, state-dominated, labor-control- lingstrategies, though interesting in itsown right, is afundamentallydifferent ques- tionfrom whyno great power emerged in the Middle East. The more instructive questionis whyhave these analysts found the Asian Tigers and not the large Euro- peanand North American states to betheappropriate measure of success?Why do theyinsist on Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria as the appropriate scale for comparisonand evaluation,measuring them against Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea? Why do they treatas unworthyof consideration the economic and political potential of aconsoli- datedArab orMuslimMiddle Eastern power, a statethat would be measured against theEuropean, North American, and Asian great powers?

73.Gilbert Burck’ s inuential article aboutNasser’ s hegemonicambitions in the Middle East is an excellentexample ofthis genre. Describing Nasser’ s ‘‘divinefrenzy to make Egyptgreat again,’’ Burck demonstrateshow naturally he andhis audience are accustomed tocategorizingambitious Arab leaders withthe demons of European history rather thanwith its state-founding heroes. He doesthis by distin- guishingNasser andhis partners from Hitler andhis cronies, but onlyin themost marginal and temporary ofways orin ways thatcast Nasser as actuallymore potentor threatening than Hitler: UnlikeHitler, who was able toconquer the emotions of only his own countrymen, Nasser has con- queredthe emotions of a great area outsidehis own country. He has doneit byexploitingArab neuroses andfrustrations. . ..Evenas Go¨ringused to cow Germany’s neighborswith displays of theLuftwaffe, Nasser amazes andheartens hisArab brothersby showingoff the economic progress Egypt has made. ... Civilliberties are inthe hands of the secret police,run by Zakaria Mohieddin,Minister of theInterior. AlthoughMohieddin is as yetno Himmler, heis doingvery well at wire tapping,at encouragingJews to leave thecountry, and at keepingminute dossiers on suspectedenemies ofthe state. See Burck1958, 109– 11. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 677

From thestandpoint of this article, the explanation for thelimited focus of these analystslies in the categorical effectiveness of constraintswithin the contemporary internationalsystem that prevent the use of war asone key ingredient in therecipefor attaininggreat power status used by all of thosestates that have enjoyed it. In other words,establishing South Korea or Chile as models of success, rather than Britain or Germany,re ects just how impossible it hasseemed to contemporary analysts that, absentthe possibility and threat of successfulaggrandizing wars, geographicaland culturalregions (such as the Middle East) now dividedby politicalboundaries could beconstructed into great powers. Asecondcategory error ismadeby most of those who ask whether the Arab and/or IslamicMiddle East could move toward the kind of economic regionalism currently underwayin Europe,East Asia, and the Americas. These observers search for Middle EasternMonnets and the interdependencies, spillovers, and patterns of transaction owsthat their theories of ‘‘regionalintegration’ ’ amongsovereign states tell them willbe critical.This approachignores the distinction made by Deutschin his analysis ofthe history of political integration in the North Atlantic region. The large states whosedestinies were beingjoined in apluralistNorth Atlantic economic and secu- ritycommunity were structuresthat had achieved strength, self-conŽ dence, and ef- fectivenessthrough long historical processes of ‘‘amalgamation’’— processesdeter- minedespecially by the actions and effect of ‘‘strongcore areas.’ ’ Thus,noted Deutsch, hadEngland, Germany, France, Italy, and the United States emerged over centuries from congeriesof smaller,often hostile groups of statelets. Those who measure inte- grationefforts amongtwentieth century Middle Eastern countries according to stan- dardsDeutsch associated with integration among large ‘ ‘amalgamated’’ statesshould expectto bedisappointed. 74 Athirdcategory error ismade by thosewho ask whether the Arab and/orIslamic MiddleEast will ever be able to fulŽ ll thedreams of unionand great power status thatŽ redthe imaginations of Jamal e-din el-Afghani, Michel A aq, Gamal Abdel Nasser, orSaddam Husayn, without subversion,coercion, and war orthe threat of war. Theseobservers search for MiddleEastern leaders who can accomplish such spectacularpolitical feats, ignoring the factthat such leaders never existed in Europe orthe Americasand that no theoryof political amalgamation exists that could justify suchan expectation. SinceNasser’ s demise,prospects have dimmed for Pan-Arabnationalism to real- izethe political potential associated in the modern world with the kind of large, territoriallyconcentrated, linguistically uniŽ ed, historically established, economi- callyblessed, and culturally endowed imagined community represented by the Arabs. AlthoughSaddam’ s adventurein Kuwait did show that Arab nationalistembers still glow,atleast at the mass leveland among many disaffected Arab intellectuals,Islam- istformulas for legitimizinga unitedpolitical order in the Middle East are now

74.Deutsch et al.1957. For a systematic treatment oftheprocess ofgrowth in thepower of European states interms oftherelationship between increasingsize andan increasing disposition toward and partici- pationin war, see Choucriand North 1974. 678 InternationalOrganization substantiallymore promising as the basis for alarge-scalereorganization of political spacein that area. Although I havenot attended speciŽ cally to this alternative, the argumentI havemade— identifying historical sequence and externally enforced inter- nationalpolitical culture as crucial in preventingstate-building wars andmaintaining theconcomitant political fragmentation of the region— would be as applicable to efforts byambitiousIslamist leaders as it has been for explainingsecular failures. Myargument is not thatin the world such as it isthe routes to great power status thatwere opento theprogenitors of France, Britain, Germany, Russia, Italy, and the UnitedStates must now be madeavailable to Middle Eastern versions of HenryVIII, Bismarck,Lincoln, or Cavour.The technologies of war havechanged, and the world isa differentplace. It makes little sense to insistthat powerful countries with vital interestsavoid pursuing those interests out ofaRawlsianattachment to thelawof the junglethat, among other things, produced them as great powers. Nonetheless, aware- nessof the crucial role of war andcoercion in the production of great states, and appreciatingthe implications of thisfact for latecomingnational state builders who seekto utilizethose instruments, can go far towardreducing the self-righteousnessof publicdiscourse with respect to contemporary wars intheMiddle East and in other regionswhere the contradictions between internationally recognized legal arrange- mentsand actual matrices of belief,interest, and power are sharpest. It can also help prepareus for apost–Cold W ar worldin which states capable of projecting power globallyhave such little interest in doingso that aspiring hegemons in some regions Žndthemselvesalmost as free astheir European predecessors were touse force to buildand expand their states. 75 Additionally,the argument presented here can help qualify or correct a hostof casualmisattributions that  owfrom thecategory errors IhaveidentiŽ ed. These are claimsthat Ž nd,in the failure of effortsto movetoward Arab unity,something instruc- tiveabout Arab nationalcharacter, the pedigree of Arab nationalism,the unnatural- nessof a largeArab state,the absence of visionary leadership, the decisiveness of economicjealousies in preventing Arab unityor the eventual decisiveness of eco- nomicfunctionality in achieving it, and the need for stabilityif aid  owsfrom rich Arab statesto poor ones are to increase. 76 Otherauthors, attributing the political organizationof thecontemporary Middle East to theinexorable logic of capitalism in aworldeconomy and/ ortodifferences in thedialectic of particular imperialist lega- ciesin differentcountries, end up creditingthese factors with considerably more than theycan explain. In particularthey fail to notethe role of war inthe construction of

75.Compare BernardLewis’ representative comment in1989that the boundaries of MiddleEastern states, however uidthey may havebeen earlier inthis century, are nowpermanent, with Barry Buzan’ s suggestionthat not only speciŽ c thirdworld boundaries, but the very norm of post-colonial boundary integrity,‘ ‘particularlyin Africa andthe Middle East,’ ’ islikely to come underincreasing pressure. See Lewis 1989;and Buzan 1991, 440 –41. 76.For examples ofsuchmisattributions, see Ajami 1992;Kramer 1993;Haim 1964;Kanovsky 1968, 350–76;Sirageldin 1988; and Rubinstein 1991, 62. Nonneman provides a listof thirteen factors ex- plainingthe failure of Arab unityschemes, withouteven mentioning the unavailability of war as atech- niquefor political amalgamation orthe active extraregionalenforcement ofnormsagainst predatory war. See Nonneman1993, 37– 40; and Miller 1993. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 679 largenational states in Europe and the political and military relevance of sequence andexternal enforcement of norms against successfully prosecuted state-building wars intheMiddle East. 77 Of course,many analysts of the Arab worlddo recognizethat the existence of a largeterritorially concentrated ethnic or national solidarity is itself not enough to producea correspondingstate. Some also emphasize the role of ‘‘politicalwill’ ’ in theconstruction of large national states. They nonetheless have seemed reluctant to takecognizance of thecrucial role coercion must be expected to playas part of this ‘‘politicalwill’ ’ andthe decisiveness of barriersto itsuse erected by the contempo- rary internationalsystem. 78 GhassanSalame ´,for example,offers anexplanation of thefailure of Arab nationalismby describing Arabs astornbetween separate states seekingto maintaintheir individual integrity and an Arab nationalproject seeking to dissolvethose separate identities into a unitedwhole. Citing Italy in thenineteenth century,he askshow that state could ever have come into being if it had been divided insimilar fashion between someItalians . ..strugglingfor there-uniŽ cation of Italyas a singlestate [and] others. ..lookingfor integrationwithin a Europeanframework. The two projectswould have hampered each other and an impasse would have been the likelyoutcome. This dilemma is still real in the Arab world. 79 Salame´neglectsto mentiontwo crucial elements that are the basis of myargument here—Piedmont’ s forcibleuniŽ cation of the separate entities that previously com- prisedItaly, Sicily, and Sardinia and the absence,innineteenth-centuryEurope, of an externallyenforced set of normsagainst successful state-building wars. Theimpasse inItaly, in otherwords, was overcome,neither by nationalsentiment nor economic rationality,but by war asan instrument of politicalwill applied within a permissive internationalenvironment. The impassein theMiddleEast, of whichSalame ´speaks, isunlikely to be overcomein anyother way— neither by Arabs norby Muslims.

References

Ajami, Fouad.1992. TheArab Predicament. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Anderson,Lisa. 1986. TheState and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830– 1980 .Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press. Ardant,Gabriel. 1975. Financial Policy and Economic Infrastructure of Modern States andNations. In TheFormation of National States in Western Europe, editedby Charles Tilly,196– 99. Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press. Ayoob,Mohammed. 1991. The SecurityProblematic of the Third World. WorldPolitics 43(2):257–83.

77.See Anderson1986, 17– 24; and Owen 1981. 78.See Lucianiand Salame ´1988,3; andKhalidi 1988, 62– 63. 79.Salame ´1988a,279. 680 InternationalOrganization

Azzam, Maha.1993. Overarching Regional Cooperation. In TheMiddle East and Europe: The Searchfor Stabilityand Integration ,editedby Gerd Nonneman,227– 34. London: Federal Trustfor Education and Research. BaniHani, M. 1984.Causes ofFailureof PreviousArab Attempts toIntegrate. In TheProblems of Arab EconomicDevelopment and Integration ,editedby AddaGuecioueur, 177– 89. Boulder, Colo.: West- view Press. Barakat, Halim. 1993. TheArab World: Society, Culture, and State .Berkeley:University of California Press. Baram, Amatzia. 1983.Qawmiyya andW ataniyyain Ba’thi Iraq: The Search fora New Balance. Middle EasternStudies 19(April):188–200. ———.1984.Culture in the Service of Wataniyya:TheTreatment ofMesopotamian-Inspired Art in Ba’thi Iraq. In Studiesin Islamic Society, editedby Gabriel Warburgand Gad Gilbar,265– 313. Haifa: Haifa UniversityPress. Braun,Rudolf. 1975. Taxation, Sociopolitical Structure, and State-Building: Great Britainand Brandenburg- Prussia. In TheFormation of National States in Western Europe, editedby Charles Tilly,243– 327. Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press. Brown,William R. 1984.The Dying Arab Nation. ForeignPolicy 54:27–43. Burck,Gilbert. 1958. Nasser’ s Imperial Economics. Fortune, October,109– 11. Buzan,Barry. 1991. New Patternsof Global Security in theTwenty-First Century. InternationalAffairs 67 (3):431–51. Choucri,Nazli, andRobert C. North.1974. Nationsin Con ict: NationalGrowth and International Vio- lence.SanFrancisco: W .H.Freeman. Cohen,Y oussef,Brian R. Brown,and A. F.K. Organski.1981. The Paradoxical Nature ofState Making: TheViolentCreation of Order. AmericanPolitical Science Review 75(4):901–10. Conrad,Lawrence I.,ed.1989. TheFormation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by MarwanR. Buheiry. Princeton,N.J.: Darwin Press. Copeland,Miles. 1969. TheGame ofNations:The Amoralityof Power Politics .New York:College Notes and Texts. Cornell,Vincent J. 1990. Socioeconomic Dimensions of Reconquestaand Jihad in Morocco: Portuguese Dukkalaand the Sa’ did Sus, 1450– 1557. InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies 22(4):379–418. David,Steven R. 1991.Explaining Third W orldAlignment .WorldPolitics 43(2):233–56. Davis,Eric, and Nicolas Gavrielides.1991. Statecraft, HistoricalMemory, and Popular Culture in Iraqand Kuwait. In Statecraftin theMiddle East: Oil, Historical Memory, and Popular Culture, editedby Eric Davis andNicolas Gavrielides,116– 48. Miami: Florida University Press. Dawisha, Adeed.1988. Arab Regimes: Legitimacyand Foreign Policy. In BeyondCoercion, edited by AdeedDawisha andI. WilliamZartman, 260– 75. London: Croom Helm. Dehio,Ludwig. 1962. ThePrecarious Balance: Four Centuries of theEuropean Power Struggle . New York:Alfred A. Knopf. Deudney,Daniel H.1995.The PhiladelphianSystem: Sovereignty, Arms Control,and Balance ofPower inthe American States Union,circa 1787–1861. InternationalOrganization 49(spring):191–228. Deutsch,Karl W.,RobertA. Kann,Maurice Lee, Jr.,Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren,Francis L. Lowenheim,Richard W. V anWagenen. 1957 .PoliticalCommunity and the North Atlantic Area. Prince- ton,N.J.: Princeton University Press. Diwan,Ishac. 1995. WillArab Workers Prosperor BeLeftOut in theTwenty-First Century? Washington, D.C.:W orldBank. Diwan,Ishac, andLyn Squire. 1993. EconomicDevelopment and Cooperation in the Middle East and NorthAfrica. DiscussionPaper No. 9. W ashington,D.C.: World Bank. Dodwel,Henry. 1931. TheFounder of ModernEgypt: A Studyof Muhammad Ali. Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress. Drysdale,Alistair, and Gerald Blake.1985. TheMiddle East and North Africa: A PoliticalGeography. Oxford:Oxford University Press. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 681

ElMallakh, Ragaei. 1978.Prospects for Economic Growth and Regional Cooperation. In TheMiddleEast inthe Coming Decade: FromWellhead to Well-Being? editedby JohnWaterbury and Ragaei el Mal- lakh,149– 206. New York:McGraw-Hill. Eveland,Wilbur. 1980. Ropesof Sand:America’ s Failurein the Middle East. London:W .W.Norton. Finer,Samuel E.1974.State-Building, State Boundaries,and Border Control .SocialScience Information 13(4–5):79– 126. Fitzpatrick,Benedict. 1922. Irelandand theMaking of Britain .New York:Funk & Wagnalls. Folz,Robert. 1969. TheConceptof Empire in Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century . London:Edward Arnold. ForeignBroadcast andInformation Service. DailyReport: Near Eastand South Asia. Freitag,Ulrike. 1994. Writing Arab History:The Search forthe Nation. BritishJournal of PoliticalSci- ence 21(1):19–37. Gause, F.Gregory. 1992. Sovereignty, Statecraft, andStability in theMiddle East. Journalof International Affairs 45:441–69. Gerschenkron,Alexander. 1962. EconomicBackwardness in Historical Perspective .Cambridge:Belknap Press. Giddens,Anthony. 1985. TheNation-State and Violence .Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress. Haim, SylviaG. 1964. ArabNationalism: An Anthology .Berkeley:University of California Press. Herbst,Jeffrey. 1989.Creation and Maintenance of Boundaries: Africa .InternationalOrganization 43 (4):673–92. ———.1990.War andthe State inAfrica .InternationalSecurity 14(4):117–39. Herman, EdwardS., andNoam Chomsky.1988. ManufacturingConsent .New York:Pantheon Books. Hintze,Otto. 1975. Formation of States andConstitutional Development. In TheHistoricalEssays ofOtto Hintze,editedby FelixGilbert, 157– 77. New York:Oxford University Press. Hiro,Dilip. 1991. TheLongest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Con ict .New York:Routledge. Hourani,Albert. 1991. How Should We Writethe History of theMiddle East? InternationalJournal of MiddleEast Studies 23(2):125– 36. Hudson,Michael C. 1988. State, Society, and Legitimacy: An Essay onArab PoliticalProspects in the 1990s. In TheNext ArabDecade: AlternativeFutures ,editedby Hisham Sharabi.Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Ibrahim,Saad Eddin. 1982. Oil, Migration, and the New Arab SocialOrder. In Richand Poor States in the MiddleEast: Egypt and the New ArabOrder , editedby MalcolmH. Kerr andEl SayedY assin,17– 70. Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press. Jackson,Robert H. 1987.Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, andNeoclassical Theory:International Jurispru- dence andthe Third World. InternationalOrganization 41(4):519–50. Jackson,Robert H., andCarl G.Rosberg.1982. Why Africa’ s Weak States Persist:The Empirical and the Juridicalin Statehood. WorldPolitics 34(1):1–24. Kanovsky,E. 1968.Arab EconomicUnity. In InternationalRegionalism, editedby Joseph S. Nye,350– 76. Boston:Little Brown. Kerr, MalcolmH. 1971. TheArabCold War .London:Oxford University Press. ———.1982.Introduction: Egypt in the Shadow of theGulf. In Richand Poor States in the Middle East: Egyptand theNew ArabOrder ,editedby MalcolmH. Kerr andEl SayedY assin,1– 14. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Khalidi,Rashid I. 1988.The Shape of Inter-Arab Politics in 1995.In TheNext ArabDecade: Alternative Futures,editedby Hisham Sharabi.Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Kiernan,V .G.1965.State andNation in Western Europe .Pastand Present 31:20–38. Kimche, Jon.1970. TheSecond Arab Awakening .New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Kramer, Martin.1993. Arab Nationalism:Mistaken Identity. ReconstructingNations and States (special issue). Daedalus 122(3):171– 206. Kuttab,Daoud. 1990. The Arabs,the West, and the Gulf Crisis. New Outlook 33(9):18– 19. Lawson,Fred. 1992. TheSocial Origins of EgyptianExpansionism During the Muhammad Ali Period . New York:Columbia University Press. Lewis, Bernard.1989. The Map of the Middle East. AmericanScholar 58:19–38. 682 InternationalOrganization

Luciani,Giacomo, and Ghassan Salame´.1988.Introduction. In ThePolitics of Arab Integration , edited by Giacomo Lucianiand Ghassan Salame´,xvii–xxxii. London: Croom Helm. Lustick,Ian. 1987. Israeli State-Buildingin the W est Bankand the Gaza Strip:Theory and Practice. InternationalOrganization 41(1):151– 71. Marriott,J. A. R.1917. TheEastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy . Oxford: ClarendonPress. Marsot,Afaf LutŽAl-Sayyid. 1984. Egyptin the Reign of MuhammadAli .Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press. Mazrui,Ali. 1984. Africa Entrapped:Between theProtestant Ethic and the Legacy of W estphalia.In The Expansionof InternationalSociety .Oxford:Clarendon Press. TheMiddle East and NorthAfrica 1969– 70 .1969.London: Europa Publications. Miller,Gary. 1993. An Integrated Communities Approach.In TheMiddle East and Europe: The Search for Stabilityand Integration ,editedby Gerd Nonneman,3– 26. London: Federal Trustfor Education and Research. Miller,Judith, and Laurie Mylroie. 1990 .SaddamHussein and the Crisis intheGulf .New York:Times Books. Mufti,Malik. 1996. SovereignCreations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order inSyria and Iraq . Ithaca, N.Y.:CornellUniversity Press. Noble,Paul C. 1991.The Arab System:Pressures, Constraints,and Opportunities. In TheForeign Policies ofArabStates: Challenge of Change ,editedby BahgatKorany and Ali E. HillalDessouki, 49– 102. Boulder,Colo.: Westview Press. Nonneman,Gerd. 1993. Problems Facing Cooperation and Integration Attempts intheMiddle East. In TheMiddle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and Integration ,editedby Gerd Nonneman, 35–45. London: Federal Trustfor Education and Research. Owen,Roger. 1981. TheMiddleEast in theWorld Economy, 1800– 1914 .London:Methuen. Pounds,Norman J. G., and Sue Simons Ball. 1964. Core-Areas andthe Development of theEuropean State System. Annalsof the Association of American Geographers 54(March):24– 40. Ralston,David B. 1990. Importingthe European Army .Chicago:University of Chicago Press. Rathmell,Andrew. 1995. Secret Warin the Middle East: The Covert Strugglefor Syria, 1949– 1961 . London:I. B.Tauris. Rokkan,Stein. 1973. Cities, States, and Nations: A DimensionalModel for the Study of Contrasts in Development.In BuildingStates and Nations: Analyses by Region, editedby S. N.Eisenstadtand Stein Rokkan,V ol.I., 73–98. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. ———.1981.Territories, Nations, Parties: Towarda Geoeconomic-GeopoliticalModel for the Explana- tionof V ariationsWithin Western Europe.In FromNationalDevelopment to Global Community, edited byRichardL. Merrittand Bruce M.Russett,70– 95. London: Allen & Unwin. Rubinstein,Alvin Z. 1991.New WorldOrder orHollow V ictory? ForeignAffairs 70(4):53– 65 Safran,Nadav. 1969. FromWar to War .New York:Pegasus. Salame´,Ghassan.1988a. Integration in the Arab World:The Institutional Framework. In ThePolitics of ArabIntegration ,editedby Giacomo Lucianiand Ghassan Salame´,256–79. London: Croom Helm. ———.1988b.Inter-Arab Politics: The Return of Geography.In TheMiddle East: Ten Years after Camp David,editedby WilliamQuandt, 319– 53. Washington,D.C.: Brookings Institution. ShaŽk, Nemat. 1995. Claimingthe Future: Choosing Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington,D.C.: World Bank. Shlaim,A vi.1988. Israeli Interference inInternal Arab Politics:The Case ofLebanon.In ThePolitics of ArabIntegration ,editedby Giacomo Lucianiand Ghassan Salame´,232–55. London: Croom Helm. Sirageldin,Ismail A.1988.Future Arab Economic-DemographicPotential: Whither Policy? In The Next ArabDecade: AlternativeFutures, editedby Hisham Sharabi,185– 207. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Taylor,Alan R. 1982. TheArab Balance of Power .Syracuse,N.Y .:SyracuseUniversity Press. Tibi,Bassam. 1990. ArabNationalism: A CriticalEnquiry .New York:St. Martin’ s Press. Tilly,Charles. 1975. Re ections on the History of EuropeanState-Making. In TheFormation of National Statesin Western Europe, editedby Charles Tilly,3– 83. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Absenceof MiddleEastern Great Powers 683

———.1985.War Makingand State Makingas OrganizedCrime. In Bringingthe State Back In , edited byPeter B.Evans,Dietrich Rueschemeyer, andTheda Skocpol, 169– 91. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versityPress. ———. 1990. Coercion,Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1990.Cambridge,Mass.: Basil Black- well. VanEvera, Stephen. 1994. Hypotheses on Nationalismand W ar .InternationalSecurity 18(4):5– 39. Waterbury,John. 1978. The MiddleEast andthe New WorldEconomic Order. In TheMiddleEast in the ComingDecade: FromWellhead to Well-Being? editedby John Waterbury and Ragaei el Mallakh, 21–148. New York:McGraw-Hill. Wright,Claudia. 1979– 80. Iraq— New Powerin the Middle East .ForeignAffairs 58(2):257–77. Zolberg,Aristide. 1980. Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France andEngland. InternationalSocial Science Journal 32:687–716.