P6 TA(2009)0392 Madagascar

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P6 TA(2009)0392 Madagascar P6_TA(2009)0392 Madagascar European Parliament resolution of 7 May 2009 on the situation in Madagascar The European Parliament, – having regard to the declarations issued by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on 17 and 20 March 2009, – having regard to the military takeovers in recent months in Mauritania and Guinea-Conakry and the sanctions subsequently imposed by the international community, – having regard to the inaugural consultative meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar which took place in Addis Ababa on 30 April 2009, – having regard to Rule 115(5) of its Rules of Procedure, A. whereas, following two months of bitter struggle, an army-backed coup d'état was carried out in Madagascar by Mr Andry Rajoelina, an ex-mayor of the Malagasy capital (Antananarivo), on 17 March 2009, B. whereas a self-proclaimed High Authority of Transition, chaired by Mr Andry Rajoelina, suspended the National Assembly and the Senate and, under pressure from the rebels, the democratically-elected President, Mr Marc Ravalomanana, was forced to leave Madagascar, C. whereas Mr Rajoelina, who had been elected mayor of Antananarivo in December 2007, was forcibly removed by the former government in February 2009, D. whereas public anger was exacerbated by a plan by the former government to lease one million acres of land in the south of the country to a South Korean firm for intensive farming, E. whereas this unconstitutional change of government is yet another serious setback in the democratisation process under way on the African continent, reinforcing concern about the resurgence of the scourge of coups d'état in Africa, as expressed at the 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa from 1 to 4 February 2009, F. whereas the Prime Minister, Mr Manandafy Rakotonirina, who had been appointed by the President-elect, and of another member of his government have been arbitrarily arrested, G. whereas the United Nations Security Council and the international organisations of which Madagascar is a member do not recognise this de facto regime and are calling for constitutional government to be restored, H. whereas Madagascar is suspended from the regional groupings - African Union (AU), Southern African Development Community (SADC) - to which it belongs and from the International Organisation of French-Speaking Countries and the Interparliamentary Union; whereas the European Union, the United States of America, Norway and France have condemned the violation of the rule of law and of the constitutional order represented by the coup d'état and have suspended assistance, I. whereas, within the framework of the Africa-EU Dialogue, the 12th Ministerial Meeting of the African and EU Troikas which took place in Luxembourg on 28 April 2009 called for the rapid holding of national elections and the restoration of the constitutional order, J. whereas peaceful demonstrations involving tens of thousands of people have continued in the capital since the day when Mr Andry Rajoelina was installed as de facto Head of State and have been violently repressed by the Malagasy military forces, K. whereas the restoration of the constitutional order should be based on the following objectives and principles: a clear timetable for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections; the involvement of all the country's political and social stakeholders, including President Marc Ravalomanana and other eminent persons; promotion of a consensus among the Malagasy parties; respect for the Constitution of Madagascar, and compliance with the relevant AU instruments and with Madagascar's international commitments, L. whereas the above-mentioned inaugural consultative meeting of the International Contact Group on Madagascar was attended by representatives of the UN, AU and EU and many regional organisations and countries with the aim of coordinating the efforts of the international community to promote a rapid restoration of the constitutional order in Madagascar, M. whereas the UN has launched an appeal for USD 35 700 000 million in humanitarian aid for the country, in anticipation of food shortages later this year as a result of the disruption caused by the political stand-off, N. whereas the fact that the majority of the population lives on less than one USD a day, and low incomes have curtailed the ability of most households to gain access to food, water and sanitation services, healthcare and education, O. whereas the country has been hit by three consecutives years of drought and poor harvests, soaring food prices and chronic food insecurity, as well as by cyclones, 1. Strongly condemns the coup d'état and all attempts to seize power by undemocratic means; 2. Calls for an immediate restoration of the legal and constitutional order in the country and urges the Malagasy parties to comply fully with the provisions of the Constitution of Madagascar in resolving the crisis; 3. Deplores the suspension of the National Assembly and Senate and calls for their prompt reinstatement, and urges that the mandates and immunities of parliamentarians be respected until new democratic parliamentary elections have been held; 4. Calls on the international community to step up its efforts to bring an end to the political violence in Madagascar; 5. Believes that stability, prosperity and democratic freedoms can be ensured only by means of a consensual and inclusive dialogue process which addresses the root causes of the country's wide range of economic, social, political and environmental problems, which is accepted by all parties and which leads to the direct consultation of the Malagasy people; 6. Calls on all political actors to put good governance and the fight against poverty at the top of their agenda, with the aim of improving wealth distribution and the standard of living of the population by introducing a sound sustainable development policy covering basic healthcare, education, job creation, etc.; 7. Supports the initiatives taken by regional organisations and the AU's decision to establish an operational arm of the International Contact Group on Madagascar in Antananarivo, under the chairmanship of the Special Envoy of the Chairman of the AU Commission, Mr Ablassé Ouedraogo; 8. Calls on the AU's Special Envoy for Madagascar, in cooperation with representatives of the international community in Antananarivo and in the light of the discussions which have already begun under the aegis of the AU and the UN, to make contact with all the Malagasy parties with a view to reaching agreement with them on ways and means of achieving a speedy restoration of the constitutional order; 9. Draws attention to the worsening humanitarian situation in the country, which has been exacerbated by the current political developments, and urges the international community, and the EU in particular, to provide increased humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the people of Madagascar; 10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the legitimate authorities of the Republic of Madagascar, the High Authority of Transition, the UN Secretary-General, the AU, the SADC, the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the UN Central Emergency Response Fund and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. .
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