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CONFIDENTIAL.
INTSRNAL POLITICS IN EGYPT.
The Long-term prospects of the Army Movement. The increase in anti-regime activities during the past weeks and characteristically vigorous counter measures taken "by the Council for the Revolutionary Command point to the need for a re-assessment of the regime's expectation of life. Such an exercise is particularly necessary in view of the fact that there is a possibility that over the next few weeks agreement in principle on tho Canal Zone question may "be reached. Will the regime last long enough for this agreement on principles to "be translated into a formal ^detailed instrument, and if so, what are the chances of the regime surviving for the duration of the latter? 2» Increased opposition activities have taken the form of an organised rumour campaign, the dissemination of pamphlets on a greater scale, more outspoken criticism in certain sections of the press, and possibly incitement of industrial la"bour and even of discontented elements in the Army including N.C.Os. and Junior Officers. Communist and Left Wing influence, in close alliance with that of certain sections of the Wafd, has "been patent. 3. Tho C.R.Cc. reacted "by the removal of certain hostile or unreliable Army Officers (Major Okasha, Editor of the military- inspired paper Al Tahrir, and Colonel Ahmed Shawki, the Commandant of the Cairo garrison), "by the arrest of communist civilians, (including journalists, students and unemployed workmen), "by establishing a tighter grip on the press and "by setting up the Court of the Revolution. At the same time the C.R.C. have continued their indefatigable efforts to gain or regain support "by public appearances, oratory, etc. ~ 4. The present internal crisis is, of course, not the first that tho regime has had to face in the course of its fourteen months in power. The opposition lias raised its head, only'to "bo "beaten down, at almost regularly recurrent two-monthly intervals; in Novctnber 1952 when Wafdist intransigence was dealt with, in January the occasion of Colonel Mehanna's plot, in March when General Nogui"b embarked on his tour of Upper Egypt> in May when the negotiations were "broken off, ?.n July when the Republic was declared and again now in September* 5. Whether the present recrudescence is more serious remains to "be seen. It may well "be that with tho prospect of an Anglo-Egyptian settlcmant in view, old vested interests, landowning, financial and political, are making a desperate effort to "bring down the regime "before its expectations of life are? to say the least, improved "by. the conclusion of an agree- ment with Her Majesty's Government. 6» Present indications arc that the C.R.C. are weathering tho storm. At the samo time there must "be a limit, even for an authoritarian government, to the process of making enemies even, in the "best of cauaes (purge of corruption, financial retrench- ment and sound educational policies etc.) and then suppressing thorn. . : 7. Tho present situation and future tendencies may : conveniently "b'e surveyed under the following headings, the conclusions teing in paragraphs 26-28 TDolcwc /Council ... 1 . 2 III11 II I I I I I I I I I I I 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
Council for the Revolutionary Command. 8.« Stresses and strains have inevitably developed in the C.R.C. during the past year. The present position is that throe fairly distinct groups can be discernedJ- (l) a group led "by Colonel Gemal Abdel Nasser and including General Abdol Hakim Amor, Squadron/Leader Boghdadi, Major Salah Salem and Wing/Command or GamDl Salem, (2) a group of wavercrs "but on the whole moderate elements, including probably General Neguib himself, Lieutenant Colonel Shafei, Major Kamal-Eddin Hussein and Lieutenant Colonel Zakaria Mohieddin, (3) a group of stormy petrels, i.e. Lieutenant Colonel Anwar el. Sadat, Major Khaled Mohieddin and Squadron/Leader Hassan Ibrahim. With the support of at least some of the second group, including probably on most issues General Neguib, Colonel Nasser is generally able to control the Committee. There is some rivalry between Colonel Nasser and General Neguib (who naturally dislikes the prospect of at some stage yielding the Premiership to Colonel Nasser and of himself becoming a mere figurehead as President of the Republic), but there is also much mutual respect. The recent dismissal of Colonel Shawki, the Commandant of the Cairo garrison, who was a close associate of General "Neguib and whom the latter and Colonel Zakaria Mohioddin tried to save, is probably an indication that in case of need Colonel Nasser and his group can get a majority in the Committee even without General Neguib's vote. There is a tendency for the Committee to contract. Two members, Lieutenant-Colonel Abdel Moneim ^min and Lieutenant Colonel Yusef Mansur Saddik have already been eliminated and Major Khaled Mohieddin may bo on his way out. This tendency is likely to continue and this will probably serve to increase the dominance of Colonel Nasser and his lieutenants, particularly General Amor and Wing/Commander Boghdadi. The alliance between Colonel Nasser and the Salem brothers is certainly less solid than that between Colonel Nasser and General Amer and Wing/Commander Boghdadi and recent indications were that Colonel Nasser and Major Salah Salem hao\disagreed r.n: that General Neguib himself share"1. Colonel Nasser's growing impatience at Major Salemfs irresponsibility and excessive ambition. In the last resort and barring accidents, Colonel Nasser's determination, patience and strength of character seem most likely to prevail and his promotion in due course to the post of Prime Minister appears as part of an almost inevitable process, which General Neguib may not be able to resist. This would leave General Neguib as President of the Republic, a post for which being inclined to be all things to all men, he is eminently suited. The Army. • 9. The existence of dissident elements in the Army is well known, their strength and capabilities less so. The main centres of discontent are:- • (a) a considerable number of officers (and possibly also N.C.Os.) in the old "Corps d'Elite", the Artillery and the Cavalry (including the Armoured Corps). Many of the Artillery officers were, and probably still are, supporters of Colonel Rashid Mehanna, arrested last January, who has considerable gifts of leader- ship and is believed to have objected to the more radical aspects of the C.R.C. policy. Some officers too have Wafdist sympathies. Major Okasha, the recently dismissed editor of "Al Tahrir" and Major • Khaled Mohieddin, ono of tho "rebels" in the Council for tho Revolutionary Command, are "both Cavalry officers and are "believed to have some influence in the Corps. Tho Armoured Corps obviously holds a key r61e. (b) The friends of Colonel Ahmed Shawki, the Commander of Cairo Area, who was recently dismissed, were mostly in the Infantry. (c) Regimental officers who find training of their units hampered "by the secondment of many good officers for political duties and for Liberation Rally training. (d) Senior officers who are disgruntled at promotion of junior officers, particularly General .\tner, tho Commander-in-Chief, over their hoads. This may apply also to some of the junior officers, jealous of their more fortunate contemporaries. (e) The ever growing body of compulsorily retired officers. Although now out of the Service, many wield considerable influence with their friends still serving.
(f). The Moslem Brotherhood has its adherents i(n the Army both among the officers and other ranks. 10. While direct evidence is difficult to obtain, all indica- tions point to a gradually increasing strength and boldness among the opposition elements in the ^rmy. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any successful counter coup d'etat could be mounted solely from within the Army at present. There are two main reasons for this:- (a) It has been clone once, only a little over a year ago, and the all-important element of surprise has been lost, (b) The military intelligence services'have good cover within the Army, and the authorities have shown themselves able and willing to act on their information. 11. The danger of corruption of members of the Army by outside organisations is more difficult to assess. The possibili- ty undoubtedly exists. «t present it would se«ztn th&t there are sufficient loyal spies and informers within the Army to prevent - any large-scale corruption taking place without the regime being warned. As time goes on, however, the loyalty of these people may well waver, and the possibility of successful infiltration will increase, unless the regime can achieve some political success to strengthen their position. IS. ' At' present the Army as a whole is loyal to the regime and it would in our opinion carry out any duties required of it in suppressing internal disorders. Possibly about 30^ of tho officers are completely loyal to the C.R.C.: some 30% are dissatis- fied and potentially disloyal and some may be already actively disloyal: the remaining 40^ are waverers who would always rally to tho stronger faction ancl at present support the C.R.C. Liberation Rally. 13. The Liberation Rally which was established to provide civilian backing for the ^rmy Movement has not been a complete i • /success ... I I • — • "^> » *-• s^ ( f cs *^j i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I. COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
success, in spite of very great efforts "both "by its organisers and "by members of the Council for the Revolutionary Command anti-regime elements claim that the Rally has "been an utter failure. This is something of an over-statement. Liberation Rally Committees have "been organised not only in the cities "but also in small country towns and even in villages throughout the provinces and there has "been no lack of people ready to join. Local meetings, at which members of the C.R.C. have "been present have "been well or fairly well attended and rallies organised in Cairo appear to have been reasonably successful. Considerable success has also marked the military training of voluntebrs under Rally-4>rmy auspices. Colonel Nasser's own view is that more progress has been made than he had expected. Quantity rather than quality has, however, characterised the movement so far and the disinclination shown by the middle, lower-middle and professional classes to take an active pi~rt has been a disappoint- ment* There appears to bo a tendency for committees to be active only on special occasions e.g. visits of Army officers. There is no evidence that the Rally has succeeded in detaching membership from the Moslem Brotherhood or from the V/afcT and it is not improbable that many of the bettor elements who have joined the Rally have done so as a matter of form and that their real loyalty continues to be attached to some other organisation. Many others are, Colonel Nasser admits, holding back. . The riffraff, who packed Rally meetings, are notoriously unreliable. The conclusion is inescapable, that the Rally has so far failed to provide the Army Movement with adequate organised popular backing. Whether it will do bettor when it has a daily newspaper behind it , (such a paper is to appear soon) and, if and when, the C.R.C. can record solid achievement on the political and economic front, remains to be seen. The probability cannot be excluded. Moslem Brotherhood. 14. There has recently been a serious deterioration in relations b otween the Moslem Brotherhood and the ^rmy. The valuable assistance and support rendered by the Brotherhood^ to the Movement during the first six months or so of the new regime is freely admitted. ^ cooling-off in relations became perceptible after the establishment of the Liberation Rally (which the Brotherhood considered was directed against them, or at least run by elements hostile to them). In the months that followed the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, Sheikh el Hodeibi was able to extract considerable concessions from the C.R.C. and strength- ened his own position with the Brotherhood. Nevertheless a further deterioration of relations recently developed and the struggle has now resolved itself into a dispute between Hodeibi and his faction, who are not prepared to give the C.R.C. "carte blanche", and the anti-Hodeibi faction who (probably mainly for opportunist reasons) are prepared to coopernte with the C.R.C. and who are therefore supported by Colonel Nasser. The latter faction propose to try, in the coming Brotherhood elections, to gain control of the Guidance Office and thus clip Hodeibi's wings. Colonel Nasser's reliance on some of the more extreme elements in the Brotherhood has, if seriously meant, its own dangers. It appears, however, to have frightened Hodeibi, who has made overtures to tho C.R.C. and has made conciliatory statements in public, denying any split between the Brotherhood and the Army or even the Liberation Rally. It soems unlikely that Hodeibi will risk a final clash in tho near future, i.e. until an ^nglo-Egyptian agreement is reached, if it is reached within the next few months - and the probability is that the C.R.C. will be able to count on at least the passive 2 '~~& ^T" 1 llD3C~Iob Rf/cPc^/ ll 1 * Mil. 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
support of the Brotherhood for some timo. Even the Hodeibi faction has always maintained that they would support the ^ until the national aspirations were fulfilled. In the longer •term, i.e. after the conclusion of any agreement, increasing opposition by the Brotherhood is to "be expected and this may very well include attacks on any Anglo-Egyptian cooperation that may develop. On the whole it is unlikely that the Brotherhood alone will he able, to challenge the C.R.C. unless for other reasons the Army regime is seriously weakened. Some uneasy •compromise will probably continue. In the event of a return to some sort of constitutional life the Brotherhood's chances of dominating the political scene would probably depend to a large extent on whether it could prove a match for a revived Wafd< A return to full constitutional Government in the near future is, however, improbable. More likely is a fa9ade of parliamentary life with the Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Array discreetly in the background. Both the Brotherhood and the Wafd would bo kept within bounds. Old, Political Parties. 15. The major parties, with the notable exception of the Wafd, are completely disorganised and are virtually dead* The Y/afd retains its mystique and is merely dormant, though its leadership is prevented from being effective and has largely been driven underground. The prestige of its leader, Nahas, has undoubtedly increased during the past few weeks and his rare public appearances have been the occasion of minor popular demonstrations* Osman Moharram's behaviour before the Anti-Graft Court also appears to have enhanced his party's reputation. The left wing of the party (the Wafdist Youth or Vanguard) is conducting an active campaign against the regime, in collaboration with the communists and the fellow travellers. Some elements, like Mohamed Salah-Eddin and Abdel Aziz Pahmy Gomaa, have attempted with little success a policy of collaboration with the Army. It is probable that some Wafdists are engaged either individually or on a group basis in anti-regime activities, involving the dissemination of rumours, suborning of Army officers, etc. It is, however, unlikely that these efforts will be successful, for a variety of reasons, e.g. lack of finance, indifferent and divided- leadership in the party and not least the vigilance and determina- tion of the C.R.C. Given an Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the probabi- lity is that many of those responsible for the Anti-regime campaign would give up hopo and that aomo would even seek'to come to terms with the C.R.C. Vested Interests. • ' 16. Landowning, financial and industrial magnates, who were the politicians of pre-Revolutionary Egypt or at least controlled them, are with few exceptions hostile or uncooperative. For example, 4*ly Maher will identify himself with the C.R.C. only on his own terms: in the world of finance and industry Ahmod «bboud, while displaying his well known capacity for keepirg on terms with any Egyptian Government, is fundamentally hostile. Most of these elements probably look forward to the collapse of the regime. What they fear most is the solution of the Anglo-Egyptian problem, which they, like the regime itself, believe may well secure its future. Their policy is "Give the C.R.C. enough rope and they, will hang themselves". Wot a f ew probably play a more active role and encourage opposition in the press, in left wing circles and possibly even in the labouring classes and in the Army. Some may also bei collaborating on the basis of a Monarchist movement. JJL COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
The present flood of pamphlets is unlikely to "be the unaided work of communists and fellow travellers. All these elements, however, almost certainly now find finance a serious limiting factor. The landlords have had their wings clipped "both "by the fall in cotton prices and by the Agrarian Reform; and the financiers, industridL- ists and "big traders have "been hard hit "by the slump. Their opposition is therefore unlikely to to effective in present circumstances." Given a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian problem and the prospect of stability, many may seek to come to terms with tfco regime. The Middle and Professional Class. 17. With the 'exception of the civil servants, (who have incidentally "been hard hit "by retrenchment) this class, probably more than any other, has maintained its fnith in the Revolution. It contains many reformers and the regime has drawn on it for most of its advisers, including the civilian members of the Cabinet. ^s a class it is, however, weak an?, disorganise:! and efforts to mobilize it in the Liberation Rally have not been as successful as was hoped. If the regime runs into difficulties, it cannot rely on effective support from this relatively small section of the community: if on the other hand it shows signs of succeeding, valuable backing should be forthcoming iii increasing measure. . " Commerce* 18. Trade has been at a low ebb for months, and commercial firms and their many employees have suffered in consequence. Some improvement is, however, expected when money begins to circulate imrc freely after the cotton harvest. Responsible leaders in the commercial world recognise that, though the retrenchment. measures (particularly import restrictions) were painful, the regime has saved the, country from bankruptcy. Industrial Workers, 19. Since the drastic treatment meted out to industrial troublemakers at Kafr el Dawar in the early days of the Revolution, the ^rmy Movement, has on the whole been unpopular with the workers. Communist propaganda and a dislike of "dictatorship", increase in the cost-of-living, unemployment and fear of unemployment have largely alienated this class from the Army Movement. The strenuous efforts made by the Council for the Revolutionary Command to win it over have failed. The stage of pandering to the workers, which was short, was followed by a period of constructive and on the whole sensible reform, including legislation for improved conditions of work, an extension of Trade Union activity, restric- tions on dismissal of labour and a public works programme. Retention of redundant labour was obviously a short term expedient and recent dismissals in a Cairo textile factory led to a sit-down strike that necessitated intervention by the military authorities. In the coming months, however, some slight improvement in industry may bo expected, as cotton begins to move. Competent observers, including British employers and labour, do not anticipate serious labour unrest provided the authorities, as they are likely to do, deal rapidly and firmly with troublemakers. Communism. 20. Though active in the propaganda field, the numerical strength of the Communists and their sympathisers remains weak 1 1 I I I i
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and they are as disunited as ever. • They have been more than usually conspicuous of late on account of the prominence given to leaflet propaganda by the military authorities and to the policy of direct repression "by arrest to which they have "been subjected* The Egyptian authorities claim that their recent increased activity is due in part to outside assistance, probably from Prance* There is, however, no firm evidence to support this and the claim is the usual face-saver advanced in such cases by the Military Intelligence authorities. It is much more likely that the help comes from opposition left wing elements within the country, notably the Youth Movement of the Wafdt The Communists have influence (which is, however, disputed by the rival force of the Moslem Brotherhood) among the industrial workers and students, .us long as the regime has even the passive support of the Brother- hood and itself remains united and maintains the loyalty of the Army as a whole, the power of the Communists will be limited. . The Students. 21. The Universities re-open in October and the Council for the Revolutionary Command, whether genuinely or for reasons connected with the negotiations, say that there is a risk of student troubles. The Ministry of Education's plan to reduce the number of students by some 25$, which is in principle sound but which has alarmed University candidates, has, partly for political partly for practical reasons, been put in cold storage until the new Primary and Secondary School programmes get under way. This decision may have the effect of casing tension, when tho new term begins. Whether there is trouble is likely to depend largely on the attitude of the Moslem Brotherhood, which undoubtedly has influence in the Universities. If thrown in on the side of the pro-regime students, this Moslem Brotherhood influence will go a long way to neutralizing that of tho Wafd and tho Communists. The C.R.C. can also be expected to take a firm line with troublemakers. ; > The Follahin. 22,. In spite of the Agrarian Reform Law, enthusiasm for.the regime among the small-holders and agricultural workers has undoubtedly waned. The number of peasants who will benefit from the Reform Law in the long term is relatively small, and the number of those who have expectations in the immediate future is infinitesimal. The fall in cotton prices has^inevitably led to unfavourable comparisons between the present regime and the previous Y/afdist administration. The attitude of most of the fcllahin is now one of indifference and apathy. Tenant farmers, who form an important section of the agricultural community have profited by low rents and reasonable agricultural prices and have on tho whole been satisfied 'with their lot. The bumper wheat crop, tho prospects of good cotton and rice harvests and the increase in money circulation, particularly when the cotton begins to move, will also have a stabilising effect in the countryside during the coming months. In any case, political trouble for any Government in Egypt comes almost invariably not from the fellahin but from tho towns. ' Popular Support* • 23. General Neguib has retained some but not nil his, considerable personal appeal and can always be relied upon to draw a crowd in town and country. Other members of tho C.R.C. COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
"^ •
- 8 - can also attract audiences but are obviously less popular than General Neguib. The Egyptian mob is, however, notoriously fickle and cannot be relied upon .to back even General Neguib in the event of the regime losing its more solid allies. General. 24. As will be seen from the above dissatisfaction with tho regime is broadly speaking of two kinds, political and economic. Political opposition will inevitably continue as long as there aro Egyptians who seek political power. Opposition which is economic in origin is, on the other hand, less intractable* Given assistance and the possibility of a more prosperous economy, this opposition would tend to disappear and with it would go many of tho weapons on which the political' opposition relies. 25. Unsatisfactory and inexperienced as the present^Govern- ment may be, there is no better Government in sight. The Council of the Revolutionary Command are honest and hard-working and though still lacking in experience they have learned much and have the courage to admit at least some of their mistakes. The Wafd and thu Brotherhood could, if they were allowed to do so, no doubt form a Government. The former, though it may have learned a few lessons, would most probably revert to type in a short time; the latter, through inexperience and the doctrinaire outlook of even its most moderate leaders, would be an unknown quantity. Prom out point of view no better solution to the Canal Zone problem can be expected from either the V/afd or the Brotherhood. The concessions we have offered to the C.R.C. would be equally required to secure an agreement from tho others. The implementation of any agreement reached with the. V/afd would depend on the hazards of a pseudo-parliamentary Government; or with the Brotherhood on experiments in Islamic theocratic rule. Neither prospect is attractive after the experience we have had in the last eight years hero and neither holds out much hope of stability or progress for Egypt. Perhaps the most serious risk, however, comes from the probability that neither tho "Vafd nor the Brotherhood could come to power except after a period of severe internal strain, amounting possibly to civil war. C.R.C. supporters in the Army can hardly be expected to give up without a struggle, and clashes between various factions in the armed forces would be almost inevitable. In such circumstances the police could not be relied upon to restrain the city mobs and a chaotic situation, which the communists would not fail to exploit, might easily ensue. Loss of life and property among foreign communities would presumably make pressure- for British intervention almost irresis- tible. This may of course happen anyhow. It is one of the risks we take in offering to remove our troops from this disorderly country. But from what has been said I think it is clear that little or no hope can be attached to a better outcome for British interests as a result of action by other political parties or groups such as the Wafd or the Moslem Brotherhood. Conclusions. 26. The following are the main elements in the present situation:- (1) The better and more moderate elements in the C.R.C. aro in control. (2) The Army as a whole is loyal to tho C.R.C. COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH!CALLY WITHOUT PERM I SSI ON"
(3) The Li"beration Rally has so far failed to provide the Army Movement with adequate political support. (4) The Moslem Brotherhood is divided with one section • (the present leadership) critical of the Council for the Revolutionary Command "but hesitating to force a "break, and a second "but probably smaller section supporting the C.R.G. partly no doubt in an effort to wrest control from the first. The attitude of the Brotherhood as a whole is one of caution and reserve* (5) 'The former political parties, especially the Wafd, supported "by vested interest and with some penetration by Communists and fellow-travellers» arc exploiting the difficulties of the regime but with only partial success. (6) The fellahin are apathetic and the urban masses have lost much of their enthusiasm for the regime. The former do not constitute a serious danger nor do the unorganised sections of the latter, at least'until the Army loses its grip and until organised elements, not least the communists, are able to exploit than. Industrial labour is, however, in varying degrees hostile and there is a constant risk of strike action, though probably not mass strikes. (?) Many of the regime's difficulties and much of the discontent is economic in origin. Though hardship, particularly in tho towns, undoubtedly exists, the poorer classes have not reached starvation limit .(which, rarely if ever happens in Egypt). Spontaneous explosion, as a result of desperation can in present circumstances, probably be discounted. 27. As regards the future, it is extremely perilous to forecast the future of Egyptian politics. Full allowance must be made for the notorious imponderables and for possible accidents such as tho assassination of General Neguib or Colonel Nasser or. some other mad aberration typical of Egypt. Assuming however that agreement on tho principles of Canal Zone Agreement is reached within the next few weeks, t'hat this is followed reasonably shortly by formal agreement and that as a result substantial but not excessive, economic aid is forthcoming quickly to strengthen the Government, then so far as can now be foreseen tho situation may be expected to develop on the following general lines '•- (1) The better elements in tho C.R.C. (particularly Colonel Nasser) will probably increase their hold ' on the Committee. (2) The loyalty of the ^rmed Forces to Colonel Nasser will probably be strengthened, (3) The Liberation Rally may make more headway and the political vacuum may be partially filled. , (4) Initially at least Army-Moslem Brotherhood relations, are likely to improve. Nothing succeeds like success. This is on the whole probable whether Hodeibi retains control of the Brotherhood or not. At a later stage, the Brotherhood can be expected to exert increasing
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- 10 - pressure for the realization of its own policy "but probably not to the point of breaking with the Council of the Revolutionary Command unless for other reasons the latter begin to lose control. (5) The old political parties and vested interests will probably lose heart and the tendency to compromise with the new order will be accentuated*
(6) With the prospect of increasing prosperity and the hope of falling food prices the masses in town and country will probably become reconciled to the regime, at least for a time. This would give the C.R.C* time to make good, if by then they have the political experience and administrative ability to make proper use of foreign aid and expert assistance. (7) Political rivalries, both within and without the .irmy Movement, will obviously continue and as in the past the British connection, however tenuous, will be used, if not by the C.R.C., then by their opponents, as a subject of reproach and condemnation in internal politics. (8) Developments in the event of a return to some form of parliamentary life, such as the present regime say they favour, cannot at this stage bo foreseen at all. All that can be said with any degree of certainty is that members of the C.R.C., or at least the more dynamic of them, are likely to continue to play a part in politics. There is only a remote possibility of a full return to constitutional government, involving the complete withdrawal of the Army from politics in the foreseeable future. 28. In general the economic factor is likely to bo decisive.. Continuing economic difficulties will certainly spell anxious times, for the regime, and also for Her Majesty's Government since they may well endanger the implementation by Egypt of any new Canal Zone agreement. Adequate economic assistance will, there- fore, be essential, and in view of the poverty and growing pressure of population the need is obviously now for a big long term programme for extending agriculture and industry even if it requires the investment of large sums of money. This programme, backed with promises of foreign help dependent on continued implementation of the new Canal Zone Agreement, would also keep a big carrot held in front of the Egyptian donkey's nose for years to come. Excessive lump sum generosity or anything resulting in an approach to boom conditions, might on the other hand have the opposite effect. The -Egyptian is apt to be most recalcitrant both in home and foreign affairs, when his pocket is full, and the dangers of this recalcitrance are accentuated by the gross disparity in the distribution of wealth which tends to put great power in the hands of a small number of often irresponsible •people. As the "old hands" used to put it, "When the price of cotton is high, look out for trouble in Egypt."
(SGD) T.E. EVANS, BRITISH EMB.ASSY, CAIRO. No. 210 . ./ ffij BRITISH EMBASSY, (1011/97/53) x^ [^ Y/o. CAIRO. CONFIDENTIAL^^ September 29, 1953-
My Lord Marquess, Egypt's foreign policy tends to be dominated to an embarrassing degree by the day-to-day exigencies of Internal politics. Now thst we are proposing to • conclude a defence agreement involving, for the first time for 71 years, the removal of British fighting troops from this country end to entrust our interests here to a very large extent to the goodwill or otherwise of I Egyptian governments, It seems particularly desirable to i analyse the present trend of Egyptian internal politics ! and the interplay of the various forces involved. 2. I have already-endeavoured in my telegram No, 1273 "to send you a general appreciation of the political considerations involved in this question* I now have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a most informative memorandum by lir. Trefor Evans, Oriental Counsellor at this Embassy, analysing in further detail the political position of the Council.for the Revolutionary Command (C.R.C.), which forms the government of this country, and the forces opposed to It. 3« As you will see from Mr. Evans1 memorandum, the opposition to the C.R.C. may be regarded as partly political and partly due to economic discontent. We can do nothing to help overcome the political opposition. Egyptian politicians will I fear always try to outdo each other in patriotism; to misquote the old saying, it is ^surtout pas d'onnomi a droite*' in Egypt. When we made the 1936 Treaty, we took the wise precaution of getting virtually every political leader of importance into a coalition government and having his signature on the treaty. This procedure is out of the question to-day, In the present political situation it seems really impossible to get the Wafd or even the Moslem Brotherhood to share responsibility with the present Government. In eny case even the procedure we adopted in 1936 did not stop the Wafd in general or Nahas Pasha personally from attacking the agreement they had signed or even from abrogating it altogether. This is a sobering reflexion for any who are tempted to believe that we can ever place much trust in the Egyptians. It also shows that a treaty concluded with an Egyptian government based on overwhelming popular support is not paradoxically, any more likely to endure than one concluded with a military / Junta. (() MC fvuj£ been forced to adopt the policy of neutralising hostile si ,.. , elements and discrediting their leaders, most of whom ; have certainly provided plenty of sensational material t for this purpose by their past misdeeds. Neither the : , Wafd nor the Hoslem Brotherhood under their present i leadership would appear to be in a position to fill the | vacuum i/hich has been created. Whether the Liberation K Rally can do so remains to be seen. Various extreme left-wing organisations are actively trying to develop an underground movement. 6. This is hardly a favourable political background for concluding a treaty of such importance, but I do not see what we can'do to alter it. Inexperienced as the C.R.C. are, no better government than the present one can be foreseen, and certainly none with a better understanding of basic strategic realities. The alternative is likely to be either an obscurantist Moslem Brotherhood G-overnment or a demagogic Wafdist Government. Neither would be at all conducive to our interests. If however the C.R.C. conclude a defence' agreement with us end receive adequate economic aid in time, they are likely to receive the support of many Egyptians who will try to climb on to the band waggon. They may then last for a few years. This is not saying much, and if we really want a new Defence Agreement, the risk of the C.R.C. falling and of v their successors denouncing the agreement is one which ,v we have to face. We must find means of making it more in Egypt's interest to keep the agreement than to . denounce it. / 7 1 rUBt.li; KtXvniJ Vf-flSS 21 3 4 51 «| ! Deference:- * 1 | | f^O^^lhoA^fOd ^11^(^1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
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7. To sum up, it is in my opinion only worth Her Majesty's Government taking the groat political risks involved in removing British troops, if we make a vigorous, determined and sincere effort to win the friendship of Egypt and to make this event the beginning of a big new deal not only in Egypt but in the Middle East as a whole, in close cooperation with the United States. The removal of British troops must appear not as the end of an epoch but as the beginning of a new era in which the Western European countries will have a big part to play, 5. I am sending copies of this despatch- to the Head of the British Middle Erst Office and to Her Majesty Representatives at Baghdad, Jedda, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Ankara, Paris and Washington* I have fo 'with the
R. M. A. HANKEY Hy uaua'l 'JaturOny morning in-sating vvith Jalah Snleti was postpone! or; in 5 to the opening of the ttovrt of the Revolution, Qfjtlei'i therefore n?we ae an yeaterday morning. 2. Spotting of the Internal oitnstion " 3 slew Bttlfl that ('. "'..0. h'icl hR'l p,n nnxionn tli.ie during the p ,at ir'onth or two. Fr»oe.1 with incrQ'uUng opposition nativities they had t« considerdthe possibility of hoi ing irmeaiate elections nn I hftd even fat one time thought of throflina their hand in and leaving the country. the forthco-nln.: trlala, r.ajor that they had eeriouu evidence againat Ibrahim Abaci iiaJ.1. The latter hod had tv»cj jneotlnj;a at hie hoaae with university teacheru and atuclei?ta wnd had inlornie>l Lhe:a the P^^iao vraa on ita Inat laaa. He h?.\a even racntioned tiic dete October £.;th whiah would be doci3ive. abael U-iai haa ^ono to ooy that ^^yptlaus abroad i.e. monarchist elmenta had been auaured of toreica support including Bp;,ar»cntly thnt of il. ;!. 0. liajor QalCii attia that ,\bdel Hudi'o speech hatl eotually been recorded anl woall be played baofc to him in the ciourae of the trial. > "ajor Galen a<*ll that, for our own linforuHitlon, they nlao had e JTurlca were in touoh with the I eeiil th«jit I woa artre thnt th<* C. r<. C. did not believe thnt II. "\n. were In nny way Involved oni mentioned thnt Colonel Oruv.al Abdel fi»st'?er h^/i in fnot tol'l me that this waa the case. ?!»3or Snlen ani.1 thnt he too aid not believe it. lie went ont however, to any thrjt if the present r^^i ".e collapnod there -were only two poonibilitica, either the "'oalern Prothorhoo't or the Coin uni ito would co«»e to poi'^er ftii." we certainly could not come to ten.ia with either of theae. (lie Aid not in nt^fi the "rifl;. I £0t the Impreaiiion that^lfic was convince;! th^t II. ;.', fJ. were not i»lvin;i the opposition f».ny encourago;:.ent^ he poaoibly had the idea that aosne opposition elerientn Ir:^ been in touch with British authorities. A8 re gar do the alleged luntiiih aotivitioa, X toll hiiti thai I thought th
that there had been aorsis improve u;nt in tho ultuation fran the point of view of UK! re^iue. HocSeibi hn.i been uevorcly ohe!ten rnd vzaa now Bhor*ins sifjna of bcln;; roaay to cooiK?rate. lie hod been /eeve rely. . . . . PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 9 4 8 Reference:-
, 1 t-o^l I\DL Yd?£ °il£&1 J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION
cly critlclaed at a recent uwcting of the .-ace council. I asfced him about Shelfch Mohaffleft Farghaly (about whom there had been recent report*; and he said that ho too had criticised Hodeibi at the meeting but had in the end given faiia hie support.
Major 3*1 era eaid that he proposed to auapend "Guwhour el Uiari" and that if the . paper miafcehaved again he would close it down for .{jood. The preaent opportunity was too good to raiaa. I took him t (T.K.8vana), 28.9.53. II. of 0. H.M.Ch.d'A. AFRICAN DEPARTMENT a ^' ^ Received in Registry— Reference* to former relevant papen MINUTES This is an exceedingly useful report. 2. Mr. Evans concludes that;both. the pld political parties and vested interests will show a tendency to come to terms with the regime once a solution to the Anglo/Egyptian problem is reached. The industrial proletariat and the ii'elaheen are apathetic at best. Meanwhile, the main support for the C.fi.C. lies in the Army (in spite of growing disaffection) and in the professional and middle classes. They are still (Print) without adequate political backing and in the last resort must depend on their own vigilance and determination. (How disposed of) 3. The report is summarised at paragraphs 26 - 28. Mr. Evans considers that provided the C.H.C. receive* sufficient economic support* they have a good chance of survival, but he foresees no early return to constitutional government under their guidance. I li. Perhaps the dispatch can be printed? The enclosure is presumably too long, (H. H. H. Tenison) Ooiober 9, 1953. (Action (Index) completed) T-V- References to later relevant papers PUBLIC RCORD OFFIC Reference:- !T ; 1 1 J II II I I J COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION ,•*.. ^i*»W •> <*>•- : (1011/96/53) BRITISH EMBASSY, ':• CONFIDENTIAL. CAIRO. .- ^ September,, 28, 1953. I enclose a record of a conversation that the Oriental Counsellor had with Major Salah Salem yesterday which I thinK you will find of interest. (C R.T.D. Ledward Esq., African Department, Foreign Office, LONDON. S.W.I... » i ' . ,W inditing tai3 note 1 <*a i:itcr«ssteu ' yaloly la drawing a eoaparisoi of coaaitloua i* £011*1%! .iu i*»ir^\ tflf-^t*/ as uepict* in tttft 'jparicua ir*»as and r«a i!i '*y. rne.re is a ainor &et* in tna iir.Ui.dn &ew«£4.j>er feorld to idealise .tfcs '^vuii* r^ioe if only to Atwwwr'iM*^ . lat* JCio& .c'arouk «oil:ps0 ^xac airdoio^a. •' io 't*i.oa«i • quarters iu iintain vuere,la *,aa paa8r 'kua wall -oi* a *ki«UMiia fiArLncU-i or an l^*.*U-u j.lj}«£t' to erusU a upon twscau«a IncJcin^; tuat .aid^wure • of 'popular* '*Rd hi» awrry men under in5ly ea /oyed, t«er« exists an un4 vTCurraiiV o^r ajraijatay for the oiutinears who ousted au JIR^. ocular urely an altitude iaapireu i»y taa eonvictloji tfii^t ttidr je4s,lrtatn now roost cuai deliver thc< ^ouUs w.ioro a c ironical lyfecaici trail ltd to«» In* iiurely tue one reason, t/i*re fein^ tto of com,try-wicl« &u^^ort in tae ^enae tziat the A'fu:/ in tfttt o«aria ol tb« tuwnworite'r «u*ri JTAlli*^, roy resents In Ui« ii&ture oi' tuia^a i ^c- urutware ol" tiie iiae of J^olicy in- viT»tM» iiri tain's a^^roaeii, ur»avare,ittd«a«ii, wai actimiiy calls ior a »>stwi«»aent or » ia otaer tne fttatut' t quo in tn* C<&nal ^on«t i«» 'at of tiie i^yii'Vton ^o^ulation, in or i/rovince, ar« heartily &nd ^euuiuel/ lod-ap wita poUtica in and fcae National Crusaxlo against tn£ Jiatec itriti^ in purticul voice aa opinion iy>arply at variance with an ac£ti# tod picture in ruling circles. ' ':'.-'. •-. v-. ' ;^,,- - *•* "".1- eapitaaia 1 ai'fira timt tno widely ^aolicl^vd pro- of r«l"ora in adu^iuia. ration and pro^resst in tb*> ao^i&l aaaouucii*a & cor et & cri by tnci prcacnt Uuver^ii-eut ia so ^ch a i-oaa in iaut tuat but a uouUi or ao's aore pro^saic Gavcniacnt - 1 ira^r a atoatla or so 'a proaaic uwora-iyat uot punctuated b/ to artificially provoked int«ruatiouuJL critKja - will r«tvaal; as is himrd of A^rariua i«ionsv tne ai^^ossessUt;: of i>uaal (sic) landlord and tn6 ju&t rtiuistriUution of tiic agricultural aocjaln«s* fvaoag feii« ma&ll folk* Iruiy euoufcii the big estafcea are be- ing niboled at by Goveni%cut jjepartiaentti. to the r.coo:-j>^oiiaan« of much beatiu^ of drutaft find olic^ine of cameras and 'soared* *t$ang tho fow, naadpiC£«*i by Provincial Uovarnora to ftarfc J: r«*iaQiitial In suort, no act Oi social justice but tiia ^irew-lsat of at tno ouiin source of (#afalst*.&i&tOQri,&c«) political the provincial landowner (not neco^.c'jily the o^r<$ ae is now to b» or»in «^yptv t/i» callous absentee oblivious to what on on aia own eaiatas}» ALr&riaii rafora* Undoubtedly good pro- ^ Uganda for for i*i^n consumption and sound atrate^y* ^>ound strategy in t«»at o^t*iittttious wieiuiu^; of pti^udo^ficcial jortioa aia^rds coavoui- cat cover to tn« disruption of t.urty odd yaars of — tai& is all too eerily for^otvea — ^onuine uoiocratic ur^e« uo*^>ore li.u^r'a record in kaifi respect vi &h t.iiit of a«tr aoar a«?i«>ioour3« ite^o.usXwilty for lalluro in tna field of po^itic^xi tiavaiiceac-i.it &aaulii 03 as^i^nsd to it bolon^s ,...... :. r to Palace plot and intrigue* As i»A;U<£ to the writer in vctobar lost *Aay cnild can use & £ua*t tuat Jfc.iUt wi*y wo» op«*a to tu«$a all* \ -;A recently aarHJUucoJL '».,*JUuiC<»u.' fcud^tat &a£ ^aiaed dasorveu because ui.taiated by the ,arly -r-olitioinna1''- propensity to ward suitably supporters *t tne taxpayers* axponod, a not entirely iir.tural pencutmt. Irue it ia taat tuc poor scan* p'roaised a year ago cueapaeas aad pl«*uty» aow ^ots a smaller l ii«iiurictioti3lt)Qrsocutioii C^etty but r^^jant), who wurliae^a of iowor rcuiiti ia tae Oivil aorvice (luj^^uturily deprivud oi' tlc3 of ayate^atio rooicing) ana the u^eii anou;j:ice ,1" tuo Oi*icor provide a superficial picture of a brit>aded» orderly And all this in twelve ai.ort mouths ? i'er aoaally, 1 fix the border lino at tnat Saturday ia Juiiuuxu lbt>2 waou vuiro burned and caany diod* Here « in tuu.t duy's evouta - ia to be traced ^ not much bulked of woakneaa of the aen in power today* politically, taa Raid's rosijonsibility is uutiuoationable* Tneir craven abaicution in tae face of onarcuy boyou& taoir control r^ us a Oovomuvint, us taen. But, who fired tue train ? rino burned ejiu killed, ? 1 trust o.^at 1 ahull not be taxed with u»ing yaoXf if 1 be ^emitted the rciVexion t;.at uaiori^ tuoae in power todayv sitting at tho Conference taolc with Ilitr Britaimie tvaje8ty*8 Auib^iioador -nd Ueueral &lr iirian Uobertaon sit taon wiio uixed the coup frota A* to L* It requires no ^rcat powers of recollection to conjare up eventti tuat coiuOiued|ii^o siuiatcr a aunuer, concentration on tho ni^nt nauuta i of tue lute iiing with determined onslau^nts on the Jtoroigner* \ twelve months alter* The olu tuctica,tao old -aise en ; the need for protection squads anu uurobbing motor-bicycle \ all -he parapiieraalia of armed Protection Police (with wnich the Un< , loved was re^rouciied) are t/iore for all to see today* s uoue the much advertised 'approacauuility1, uue never closed door, the lietiuib of the early days* tfith us _ a drab ii^ypt, a ^oyloas Land parading outward concern for tue we Hoeing of the .foreigner whib b row- beat in^ i.inoritiea ix.to playing a share in national politics, a new ' i departure of wuich no politick jarty has bean guilty in the past* Jfaii speeches on the hi^h level waiio juaiora t^oad the humbler type of i-o- roi^n kosiuont into eiuioratln^ ti^ut even Ui^U sounding legislation con no longer ualt or iu >ede. Ihe ratuer sorry fact e&erges (anu hus to be faced) tu.it tho ; Jaid und the Wafd alone still -uoldo sway tiirou^iout tae land from Ao- ' W/U* to oJAhliuiTA. laat t..rou^h sheer cupidity I'uad oorajj cl Jine ' Pasha and otuors who ill-serve tueir vouutry iigypt was brought to the vor^e of utter ruin, taut sheer adoiiai^trutive iucou^ctonco brou^it cuaos auu disorder^ n tuese arc cou^idor atioas lost upon the simple • folk wao»despito the Party's uuch publicized decline, would vote to- uorrow in their millions JAl-'Ji in caan^ed circuoaatances* We have not to go bey nd the coluuuu. of the rii-^o in l^^u to fiud evidence of • disbelief in tae powers of resurgence of tho one party to wuich tho ' luasaes iustiuctively,uareaaQain^ly, turned taou ( and will - 1 assert1 it uiuiositatio^ly -)tum tomorrow • 1^. ressed by the uiu0u ur eaao with waich .taeir li^ht was put out by the .^eatloucn with uui^o ^ua uuc -iae guno ti^ro io a natural toaduucy to forgot ti»a,t political Icuuerfii wao uave btr ne tue brunt of Britiui opposition for the last tairty ; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, i i 3 4 5 « Jleference:- t» i 2 /— p'S^/ //£> or more cui^iu^tin^ on tno o^ilows or proLoii^cu i^.ri^ouuionb or exile ..ce scuit reason to Tear tno rouououtaaey of their javeuilo fal- low countrymen ______in the Ion*, run. lines are written lor tno few - surely the vary few - vn< for a moment taut Cue Aruiy i^ovotut iu i^jypt l1^3 taa UoiUibry it, it> truly aud genuinely re^rtiosutativo in tno senso tuat the nd,i;iven die opportunity v still is) ropreacatativo oi' tno obbcu] c..ucTieii oi the population* Tor those who ullow themselves ior u mouu to uoiievo taat •diaarmea1 bj a wave of a wand taey would find one man otsaiud theoi* i'his report does not seek: to condone uy implication tac foiuies and aaiiy ranic lujuaticoa jjcr;>etriited by a «viutj who dechroni in tae ro^poct of the nation lori^ uefur^ tho Amy reiaovoU nim j auch (aijit be written of tao aaocKin^ c.^reuce of political leodi of all parties wuo could and should have loosed lueir will had taey couceiitxutcd on tueir iCiu^ un iota of the ui^uidod vonoia tr^at convert on the hu^loss i'he writer uoeo aoolc,iu all difiicience, to au^^est taat an with the patriotic ues^eradoes now so pretentious uu to sit at, tuo satuo table as tue Adjutant General of the uriti^u Army coimot -will not * survive tne OuJbttintfi of the pd^tlia^juib maelstrom* The wiuely held conviction i^at Jo0uiti d. Cy. were outaunoevred by the Brit: iie&otiator over the oudan issue accounts, in uo small measure, for the periodical outbursts of verbal anofcjaace cum intrunsigeanco inuul^ed ii by i-eaibera of tne h^ypDitai Negotiating iiudy to the Juez Cuiial wuojtion Reference:- p 1 1 i > i i i 2 1 1 1 i 1_L Jj LI 1 1 1 • COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION ** Registry No. ; Secret. Thank: you ror your letter of October 3 enclosing Naldrett-Jays1 essay on the political XJfftX situation in Egypt, which had also reached us Draft, letter to Sir £. Chapman- from another source. There ia of course a Andrewa, 9 ^ ^ vj T . great deal in what he says about the contrast from between the fantasy Negulb regime as seen by Mr. Allen. the more starry-eyed of its American admirers, and the very Egyptian reality; but he does*t get us much nearer Egyptian realities with his talk of "thirty years of genuine democratic 8 urge' Stripped of this sort of thing, his piece comes down to the old tfafd blackmail - PV A/ fo&^SwS I* R L JICJ' A~«~« *i.*2i *' f PUBLIC RECORD OFF i Reference:- COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERM SSION 1011/94/53 BRITISH EMBASSY, CONFIDENTIAL CAIRO. September, 24, 1953. One sometimes sees references in England to "Dictator Naguib". I think the following story may Illustrate how very clipped the wings of this particular dictator are. 2. General Naguib has, according to our Information, had an acute disagreement with the other members of the Council for the Revolutionary Command because he wants to go and live in the Tahra Palace, a fairly large house which is at present reserved for visiting notables. The other members of the Council for the Revolutionary Command are at the moment unwilling that he should magnify himself even to this degree although he Is President, and meanwhile the General has to live In his little house which is surrounded by arid wastes and is a relatively humble affair. , . 3. Some time ago in order to set a good example to the country, President Naguib was also made to surrender half his salary. He now receives a net salary of £B.3000 per annum but he recently confided to the Americans that they make him pay tax on the whole lot! 4. This I think Is typical of the minor jealousies Inside the Council for the Revolutionary Command. However they still remain pretty honest and in spite of murmurings which have been heard about one or two contracts and kindred matters, their standard of integrity is very much higher than anything that has been known in Egypt for years. R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G. , African Department, Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.I. aejerencei- i I "I 1 1 1 1 1 2 |_^ ...... 1 COPYft GHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION TOP TftB 3ITOA7IOH Iff J3SEPT AUGOSEC 1953 after a year's absence* 1. People seen more interested in the deteriorating internal situation than in foreign affairs* There is a surprifing lack of interest in many circles of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations ovur the Suez Base* A number of people feel that the British, who have been on Hgyptian soil for 7^ years, are due to go anyway in 1556 and that a couple of years are not all that important and not worth chaos and bloodshed* The official reticence about the present talks and the continual insistence by the Evolution Council on the need for war-like preparations have caused much speculation however and some people fear that the gap between the twp sides may still be wide* Public opinion generally expects the fievolution Council to get better terms than were previously refused by Nahas .iasha who is still a popular and respected figure* Unless the Revolution Council get what seeds a satisfactory agreement this nay spell their down-fall since they have no large internal successes to show to the people. A satisfactory agreement without bloodshed would be well received; recruiting offices for the liberation ^tuy >eem pretty empty* All the snne so many of the poorer classes are very badly off that itwould be at a pinch-easy to hire largo num era of" men with li;tle to lose. Internally the people have bean led to expect drastic and swift improvements in thair living conditions and they are at present disappointed and discontent* For example, the price of rice is higher than last year and it is more difficult to get* Ilationed sugar was 7*5 P^s. a kilo last ye&r - ihis year it is unr«tioned and 14 pts* a kilo* General Heguib and his companions are still popular with the masses but many recent demonstrations have been artifically worked up and the prevailing mood is one of disillusion* The Revolution Council have the situation well in hand and there is no danger of any popular uprising - but tho possibility is frequently talked of a further military coup by discontent Army officers* .Amongst the Egyptian masses there is no strong anti-British feeling* The main cry is for "food and clothes". The Revolution Council is definitely less popular and the general atmosphere is more strained and unhappy than at this time in 1952. Political Parties. 2, (a) Wafd. The Wafd still possess the strongest political organisation in 2gypt, Many people consider that if there were free elections to-morrow the Wafd Party would win, Althou|#i there has been much criticism of the manner in which the Republic was proclaimed and Neguib made President, the Wafd are delighted at the move itself, since they themselves did not dare to try and overthrow the monachy* They have always felt, hoover, that they could succeed much better in popular elections if they had not got to face "Palace" intrigue. They feel therefore that their power has been enhanced by the declaration of the Republic. Wafd leaders are however all quiet at the moment and are /watching * watching the failure of the Revolution Committee to Improve the internal situation. Tho Revolution Council are trying to fet Party leaders to go to help them; but the tiafd axe not inclined to co-operate* They believo there is a rooted objection in many classes of Egyptians to bo ruled by an Egyptian military dictatorship, which is a new development. They believe also that half of the Axiay are at heart Wafdists, and that sooner or later the wafd will come into power again* (b) Ikhwan al Muslimin* This Party although sfflp.ll is hi$ily organised and fanatic and its support is very valuable* The Party feels no gratitude towards the Wafd, which did nothing for them when In power; nor Ao they at present support the R volution Council which has not yet done anything substantial for theia. * General Hassan Salama, a menber of the I.M»» told ma that the I.il* had carried out a purse of sympathisers of the Communists and loyalists* In fact the General believed that the CoBBSunist elements previously in tho I.U. were "agents provocateurs" infiltrated by King .'.Tarouk in order to discredit the any. The 1*K* «-ro particularly concerned about the internal situation and feel that tho Revolution Council should concontrate 6Sf this* This tarty is trying to recruit as many members as possible and nro in close touch with tho masses. They favour •woeping/rBr'c'fJSs, e.£. imposition of adequate taxation on the rich, enforcement of the law for revealing sources of wealth, and the setting in train of big development schemes to combat unemployment together with regulations for proper na^es and working conditions for workmen* If the Revolution Council improve their internal programme the I*M» nay support thorn. There seeias no immediate possibility of tho I«H* trying to oust tho Revolution Council from power* (o) The Communist; Party* This is snail and weak, mainly because successive governments have taken repressive measures a^aint it* Under the present regime special military courts deal with Ccmnunists and everyone is frightened of any connexion with this Party* furthermore, Egypt is a religious country and the Moslem leaders have denounced Communism. Thero is little possibility of any of the existing political parties in Egypt attempting to fora a Popular Front with tho Communists. It is of course possible that if Russian armies appeared on the frontiers of -£ypt many of the poor people would welcome them saying that they could not eat less than they do at the moment, since "hunger is the road to denial of (rod". Many Egyptians also would accept arms from Russia, but they would not accept any Russian experts and they do no expect Russia to help then in any way* The only member of the R volution Council who is said to havo Communist leanings, Yousef Siddik? has been put under house arrest. In spite of the weakness of the local Communist Party, however, the general situation of tho masses in Egypt makes the country a suitable breeding ground for Conaunian* Tho Army 3» The key to the present situation is the -.rmy. General Hassan 3alama, previously Head of the Personnel Section of the Arny, who retired last yoar, spoke very freely to me on Army affairs since ho is suffering under a sense of grievance. General Neguib had sanctioned up to £3 2,000 for General Hassan Salama to go to the U.K. for a difficult operation necessitated by wounds received in the Palestine war. To General Hassan 3alama'a fury, underlings of the Revolution Council have held up implementation of this* General Salama also felt insulted when 15 Army officers searched every corner of his houso baforo General Heguib visited him a month ago* General Salama says that under the surfaco there la a.big split in Army circles, on the following linesj- Supporters of General Xfeguib. Supporters of CoBtonel Abdul Hassar. The "Joaloua Officers". The Retired Officers who are without exception anti-Revolution Council* / (*) (*) Supporters of Neguib. About a quarter of the Aray support General Neguib, some because they like him and regard him as a moderate element, others because they expect individual benefits* (b) Supporters of Abdul Ijassar. The morj extreme elements regard Abdul Naasar as the real leader. Many of thorn would be TJ ill ing to open active hostilities against the British if there is no agreement on the Suez Base,^ Perhaps a quarter of the Amy support Abdul Nassar. (c) "Jealous Officers". About half of the Aiioy is resentful of inexperienced young officers aspiring to conduct the policy of the nation. Jealousy is not directed against Necuib who ia personally vary popular and who is a senior oi'ficer anyway* Jjalousy is against young officers, e.£. the new Ccnrcander-in-Ghiaf. This section consider that the Revolution Council audit to call in civilian advisers from all political parties in the country :ind dkould not run a purely military dictatorship. This section ia not actively anti-British and do not feal very deeply on the Sups I&sa issue. They beliave that there vdll be no active hostilities against the British and they would be luke warm if in fact there were any. They consMor that the :S*yp tians cannot throw 80,000 British soldiers out of the Canal Zone and they doubt > whether, even if the British occupied th« whole of .:£ypt, any other ' country would physically come to their help - Russia cor! ainly wouldn't start world War III to holp thorn* The main resentment of this bunch is againut the present system of government. An important factor in the situation ia that the ordinary "Egyptian Private soldier is dissatisfied, Bioatty because of the worsening living conditions of his relatives in the villages. It is possible that the "Jealous Officers" may exploit the discontent of the rank and file and attempt another ooup to throw out Abdul Kaasar. The latter is well aware of this and the Revolution \ Council is watching every move of suspected officers* \ (d) Retired, Officer^. Theso comprise the older officers who have retired in the nomal course of events and a number of younger officers who were coapulsorily retired earty by the Revolution Council. They still have sosao influence in tho Army through relatives arid old comrades. Thi» bunch have a sneaking sentiment for Kinm ;;arouk« They probably do not ho interfer- wish to have him back, sincy! they still feol s6me affection for him and rod too much aoae nostalgia for the old days, when there *as more freedom. They do in Amy not regard the present bunch as any better than J'^arouk, and they affect promotions, to believe that the Revolution Council was actually brought into pov/erV etc., but by the British who were fed-up with the unreliability of FaroukJ* and because hia unpopularity with the people had caused him to lose hia ;> ^ influence and usefulness as a tool anyway.' ITeguib particularly they ; \ allege to be very pro-British. The coup ia said to have been arranged \ ' with the British by HaidaHasha, an ex-Minister of Defence, alleged to be *%ery pro-British, who is uncle of General Aamir the present Ccraaander-in-i, Chief. Exponents of this theory point out that although Keguib and hia \ \ comrades attack the British in speeches, the British are refrained from \ attacking them back, l&ny of these officers find it Impossible to believe that any big movo in any Middle East country has not got a government behind it. In Egypt France is out of the running, and they believe that the -jaericans lack Britiah access to channels for influenc" political affairs in ligypt. Therefore the British must be the paople behind Keguib. The Hetired Officers generally believe that the prejont split in the Axsay may Lsad to a serious civil ICUP with much bloodshed. On the whole) they would Join the 'Jealous Officers", and there is a strong link betwe n them and the Wafd* General Altitude to tha 4« Tnere is widespre-d suspicion of .'estern financial aid such s»| , Point I? as being another method of political interference. There ia ' ouch disappointment against America since it is now reluctantly believed that .'imerioan policy is more e£ less consistent with British policy* A number of Egyptians profess to think that Egyptian resources if properly /handled ..... PUBLIC RECOUP OFFICE, 1 2 3 4 6 « » Jteference:- \—r\ ^.^?-l///-i1v-//o/ O/l Jt^f • 1 2 / o b-f / IIOcL7Ob nf '<^Q / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | | 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION handled are sufficient to finance bi£ schemes of developnrmt v/ithoufc foreign financial aid. ^hoy believe they could have 'dona tiiis before but for the inequitable taxation system and tha grip on Egypt's econany hold by the British. There is great suspicion of "foroi^n experts" and- any financial aid aoist be'wi'hou' emy strings. i'any Sgyptians think that Britain is at present deliberately obstructing Crypt's export trade Just as Britain is deliberate^ bankrupting Iran. fi^yptians generally have the psychological attitude common to the Middle East of wanting to shake themselves frea of v: eat era control and interference. If financial aid could be without conditions and without foreign "experts* they would however welcome it* ta oter Arab count ri^a. 5« In spite of >ypti/m lip sorvice to tho ideals of ^U'ab brothorhoo re 1 ligyptifln interest in the affairs of otlur Arab countries is very superficial; Egyptians are o irccr^od first and last with tha interests of ii£ypt» Only a faw years ago .luisseiii Sittl Faaha declared that the Egyptians were the desoendents of tho Ihsiroahs and not Arabs, and moat Egyptians still feel this in their hearts* (3gd.) T. (August 26, 1953) 1 1 II ! 1 t--* ^J 1 1 tiff rJ / f^f L*. »•'• I J /"X 1 1 2 1 ^^ * 1 ^''^ OV* * ^-^ tr' 1 • /Jx tj I 1 l_J COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOORAPHI OLL'Twi THOUT PERM "SSIOH " "" BRITISH lilBAoSi, CAIRO. ', No.1011/69/53. August 26, 1953. CONFIDENTIAL . •--...- ^&?%* J E IOI5///5- $^ Dear Department, : ...... '.-.... ? u-v'-c , 5 An interesting sequel to IVJor Salah Salem's recent visit to Khartoum has bean his unwanted silance on his return to Cairo and his rather unexpected departure on the pilgrimage. 2. During the three days which he spent in Egypt between returning from Khartoum and leaving for Mecca, I'1 a3or Salem hardly opened his mouth in public. On August 15 he went with Lieutenant-Colonel Gamal Abdjul Nasser, \Ving Commander Abdul Latif Bagdad! and liajor Kamal Hussein to open the Liberation Rally centre in Beni 3uef. Nona of the officers \vas verbose on this occasion but Abdul Ilasser delivered three or four short speeches. Salah Salem, however, spoke only once and then for no more than three rrinutes. His own reference to the Sudan was very brief and was given no prominence in the press 30 The censorship suppressed accounts cf the conference in Khartoum at which IJajor Salem initiall••*-jy admitted the failure of his mission. Vague statements ababouo t 'full support' having been accorded by the Hand! and oayed Ali were issued and then no further reports of the nij ssion were published. On August 16 Al A.hra.tn announced that Major Salem had curtailed his visit to Beni Suef because of illness. This was contradicted by the other press accounts, according to which the whole party returned to Cairo together, and also"by Kajor Salem's apparent good health when he took off for Jedda on August 18. 4. The announcement on August 12, while he was still in Khartoum, that 1'ajor Salem would accompany General Neguib to Mecca was something of a surprise, as it had been previously announced unofficially, but f.lth every appearance of authority, that he would take charge of the Ministry of \Vakfs during the absence of Sheikh al Baquri who was going as the Egyptian "Ernir of the Pilgrimage". 5. We are inclined to think that his unsual flight from the limelight is due partly to chagrin and partly to the opinion of his colleagues that the less attention he attracts for the moment the better. 6. V.'o are sending copies of this letter to the Office of the United Kingdom Trade Commissioner in Khartoum and British Middle East Office Fayid. Yours ever, CHANCERY. African Department, Foreign Office, T nivtr>rMi. 9 ffi l. j | 1 1 1 1 /C? O ~Z^1~\S-f~ I j1 I Ddi,/v~ / G t/> 0 ( 1/ cfT oJH / 1 , 2 1 1 J iiil i 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION British Embassy, BEIRUT BY BAG July 31st, 1953. PERSONAL J)<*>*~ 1*2*004^ f Very many thanks for forwarding Amr's letter. I must say he really would be better advised in his own interest now to return to Egypt. if he waits for better weather he may have to wait for a very long time, and there is something to be said for the view that the longer he puts off his return the more difficult it will be to give a convincing explanation, for that is what he will have to expect. of course he may decide not to return at all. I am so sorry for him, especially knowing how attached he is to his mother and his sisters. Meanwhile I shall do what I can with Egyptian friends in regard to the renewal of his passport. Egyptians keep coming to see me, and some of their wives and daughters come to see my wife. Of half a dozen who have done this since our return only one, and that oddly enough the twenty-year-old daughter of a Coptic doctor in Cairo, has been really enthusiastic about the new regime. All ;the others have had reservations. All have with obvious sincerity expressed hopes that we shall reach a settlement with Egypt, ; and since they have all known something about the diplomatic position, all have thought our attitude a reasonable one. It• may be that people who come to see me or my wife are predis- posed to being sympathetic towards the British viewpoint, but one of them at least was imprisoned by us in the Seychelles in the *2es, and two of the others hold high official appoint- ments to-day. So I believe there exists in Egypt to-day among educated people who discuss things seriously among them- selves, more sympathy and understanding with and of our point of view and what we are trying to secure than was the case when I left Egypt. ' (E. A. Chapman-Andrews) R» Allen, Esq., C.M. G. , African Department, Foreign Office, S. W. 1. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE l 2 3 4 9 tS Ktftrtnctt- 1 : 4 f-ol^lllojtfoL °!I2&1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 | | | | COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION 1 UA \ ;., '.'J ;?*f V1 -*' i , \ , ", . • \ B. fj 'NDEXED Mr. Pannikar.'s Views on Egypt.. I think the Jepa^'tment would agree \vith Mr. Roberts'? conclusion that Pannikar tends to over simplify, but that 'he has excellent contacts in Egypt and has taken the trouble to use them to obtain some, insight into what is going on. 2. We can confirm that the present Egyptian regime want \ an agreement with us. Prora many sourcea we have had . confirmation that the internal difficulties of the regime •;. make it desirable for it to have an agreement which will ; strengthen its position, but this would not be, the case if i the regime agreed to a settlement which could be easily denounced by the regime's opponents as a surrender. *-| i ' 3. Mr. Pannikar presents the alternative^ as being either: (a) that we should get our relations with Egypt on ;to • ' basis where co-operation woul• d b' e mutually :: I '••.''i advantageous, or else* *&**, <*• {<*" H**"*' *******> *j (b) we should haye reoccupied the country, or; h (c) evacuated it. . • :;- There are of course risks, underlined by Mr. Hankey, that ; ,-." . .. ! ' ' ' - '' ' t ' the Egyptians might try to twist us out of our agreement once they: have secured it and the troops have started to go. "-•'•',• ' i , :' They might be led to do this by internal difficulties, or • i :' because the Nazi doctrine of perpetual aggression' in foreign policy is Ingrained in their bones. U. Our analysis.of the regime's internal difficulties is .-•, • - • . ' similar to that of Pannikar. Neguib is suffering from: v S • - (a) the dissension between the Higher Military ,'"':': '.' • • . Ooramittee and the Moslem Brotherhood, particularly , :;; the bitter jealousy of the latter over the ;* ,:: "•:]" liberation units; ','-''.'.'.''.»' " ' (b) the rivalry of Nasr and other members of the Committee such as Sadat; •• ' ' ' /(c) the '.". IN C.0. SSEP1953 the ambitions of Nasr himself to take Heguib's place, Add to lie se the mischief made by the Wafd and the old politicians who do not want to see an Anglo-Bgyptian Agreement, because they , do not want to see a military dictatorship firmly established, and i - '----. - • ,• •< • • • •,. > • •!,.,' there is endless scope for chaotic developments. The Egyptian •",'.''. situation differs from that of Persia in that a chaotic regime ! ; - .:. . ' -• ..'v : '•"•--' •••'-•.'•• .' ; \ • •!-..' :! :' has not been in power long enough to expect the return of something ;i more stable. To that extent I suppose one should say that anything replacing Neguib would probably be worse, but Neguib himself could,: ,. with support from more stable elements to counteract his inexperienced ' - • ' : i ' -. •' ,. ! ; • and ambitious officers, lead a better Government. 'i. l 5. We are inadequately informed on the state of the peasantry and whether Pannikar is correct that!the peasants are "bitterly disillusioned is a matter for conjecture. We have asked the Embassy to try to find out, , ; : 6. Pannikar1s suggestion that, 15 years hence, the Sudan will be more powerful and stable than Egypt, is of course anyone's guess. Much will depend on the relative stability of administration in , i the two countries. " , : . •. / t ' ' •>'••'• :•'.«••'• ' "•" ' ' ' '-'•'' '.''- ; 7. The German Ambassador in Cairo is likely to be moved soon. We are inclined to agree that Dr. Voss is a most dangerous man. He is, however, so firmly entrenched that we have found great \. reluctance on the part of the Germans to do anything about him. I The fact remains that Germany, whether through agents friendly or | hostile, will .continue to strengthen its position, particularly its ''• " ' •- * • '' economic position, in Egypt so long as Anglo-Egyptian relations remain bad. Here again Pannikar is right. 8. He has also put his finger on the fact that our insistence upon a ten year agreement is the point which makes our proposals •.,'...•;"/• '.:''• •. :v " •.•''.•" -• •• • • ••'<'" • ' : •/most. •,.:"' 1 1 I 1 ( I /""io J^ ~"T" III f~) 1 *~/ /o / Of / 0 *"\f , 1 '-^ 1 1 / / c^ot, / c/ fe 7 i c/'O / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION most unacceptable to the Egyptians and that, if it were possible to make a concession on this, we might get a lot further than we have so far. H.T.D. Ledward. September 5* 1953. V J (Li*. faJL- j(Zr~~~t ' tj^JZ, ttjLvi*- J U£jL> 111 PUBLIC RECOI^ flFF|^ I Reference:- i 3 4 i| . / 2 1 1 1 1 I 1 COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH 1 CAtTy wi J-lliLLL ..i 1 ! J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J£.. IOIS" / 117. T EGYPT fc. J. No. Dated Received in Registry— References to former relevant papers MINUTES (PriBt) U (How disposed of) " (Action (Index) 'completed) V*—• 1.H 3i T/•» . tl'^klA/^-//•r//. WWyv^ A. >/ 11 »—"T' . Sir J. Bowker I met last night the Indian Ambassador in Cairo, Sardar Pannikar, whom I used to know in Delhi, and had a l9ng conversation with him about Egypt. You may be meeting him yourself, but the following main points which arose are perhaps worth recording briefly. Sardar Pannikar said he was quite certain that the present Egyptian regime genuinely wanted an agreement with us. He had been optimistic on this score for a long time past. He based his optimism upon what he described as his fortnightly talks with General Neguib on the one hand and Colonel Nasser on the other. Sardar Pannikar said that the present Egyptian rulers at last understood that there was a real problem of parliamentary and public opinion in this country. They however also had their own genuine difficulties on this score. Sardar Pannikar v/as convinced that the only real difficulty now on which the negotiations might founder was that of the duration of the agreement. He thought it was really impossible for the present re'gime to agree to more than three years as a firm commitment for the proposed arrangements in regard to technicians, etc. But he was equally sure that a second period of three years might also be included in the agreement provided it were made to look something rather different from the first three-year period. Beyond this he did not think the regime could go. He felt it was very much in our interest to meet them 9n some such basis. as during the next six years we should either, as he thought probable, have got our relations with Egypt on to such a basis that it would be accepted as mutually advantageous to continue our cooperation, or things would have reached such a pitch that no agreement would be working anyway, i.e. we should either have to reoccupy or evacuate the country. Sardar Pannikar agreed that the present regime v/as the best we were likely to have but we should not delude ourselves into thinking that it was popular or that it enjoyed broad support. General Neguib was personally popular and honest, but he had very serious limitationsas a politician, or even as a national leader. Colonel Nasser was intelligent but the military Junta as a whole completely lacked political or administrative experience but would not admit their deficiencies. The regime could not work over a long period unless it obtained the support of (a) some lap lit icians, and (b) some experienced administrators The onlj/Tman working for them was the; Finance Minister, Emary, wno was constantly threatening to resign. It was very foolish of the re'gime to continue to regard all those who had been in any way connected with politics or administration before it took over power as hostile and therefore to be excluded from Egyptian political life. The regime was not strong enough really to deal with even its most notorious opponents, e.g. Serag-ed-din, but it would be better placed to exclude the return of such /persons persons to public life if it would at least cooperate with the-better elements, e.g. Heykal, Hafez Afifi, Hilali and many of the younger Wafdists. (Sardar Pannikar excluded Ali Maher, of whom he expressed the poorest opinion, from this list.) Sardar Pannikar said that, although the Junta wanted tp make internal improvements once they reached a settlement with us, they were quite incapable of doing so unless they broadened the basis of their support on the above lines. Their present ideas were quite infantile. They had consulted him, on the basis of Indian experience, about a develODinent plan. When he had pointed out that the first essentialvas to make sure that the necessary financial support would be forthcoming and to plan accordingly, they had'been much cast down. Sardar Pannikar said he was convinced that the Wafd still remained,, as always, the main political force in Egypt. If there were a free election tomorrow they would obtain eighty per cent of the seats. Nahas, with whom he kept in fairly close touch, facilitated by Nahas's old friendship with Pandit Nehru, had recovered his spirits. He took the line that the Junta consisted of well-meaning but inexperienced boys who would eventually have to come to him and to the Wafd to get them out of their difficulties. Sardar Pannikar said that the peasants were bitterly disillusioned and were now definitely hostile to the regime. So were the University students. Somewhat to my surprise, Sardar Pannikar did not regard the Moslem Brotherhood as representing a very powerful force or a real danger. Egyptian nationalism was, he thought, a much stronger force than any neo-Islamic movement, more especially as the last thing the Egyptians wanted was to get caught up in some pan-Islamic movement of which Pakistan, or even eventually Turkey, might claim leadership. Sardar Pannikar spoke very hopefully indeed about the future of the Sudan. He said that the Sudan had the same advantage as India, although to a lesser degree, over Egypt in that it had had the benefit of British administration and organisation. The country, although very young and immature, had been educated and organised on one pattern and that the British pattern. We had, unfortunately, never educated or administered Egypt in the same way, with the result that Egypt was a mixture of different languages, religions and cultures - some African, some Asian and some Mediterranean - and, above all, tfefc nu uniform and efficient system of administration. He. was quite convinced that the Sudanese would opt for independence and maintain a close relation with this country. This would inevitably drive the Egyptians in the same direction. Apart from the tie of religion, which he v/as, I thought, apt to underrate, the Sudanese had no common /interest pJiJLJjtfi&COR pPfFlf f 1 i 5 k S 4 Kefergnce:- 1 1 1 I 1 II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION interest with Egypt, more especially as they could neither of them buy each other's cotton crops. He foresaw that in about fifteen years the Sudan would be the more powerful and stable of the two countries and that it would then use its own excess water supplies, restricting the Egyptians to what they now have for irrigation but denying them the water needed for periodical inundation, which has made the wealth of Egyptian agriculture. Sardar Pannikar also told rne that he was in fairly close touch with the German Ambassador in Cairo. He could assure me that the Ambassador was really doing his best to carry out Dr. Adenauer's instructions to prevent the German instructors embarrassing us in any way. He had seen documents which showed quite clearly that, with two exceptions, the German instructors had agreed that they should be withdravm by their Government rather than lend themselves to activities which would handicap Anglo-German relations. The main exception was, of course, Voss, who was in no way under the control of Dr. Adenaue Ar or the German Ambassador. He had been Heydrich's assistant in Czechoslovakia and had also been connected with the Czech armaments works. He was bitterly anti-Western and was determined to do everything he could to weaken the British position in Egypt. Sardar Pannikar's general conclusi9n on all this was that we had everything to gain by reaching early agreement with the Egyptians, even if we had to make some apparent concessions on the duration clauses. Sardar Pannikarfs tendency is of course to over- simplify and to fit the facts of the situation into his own theories. He did however seem to me to have a very thorough knowledge of the Egyptian scene and he clearly has excellent contacts there. Copies to: September 1. 1953 Sir W. Strang Mr. Nutting African Department Central Department 1 1 1 I f J-i I II I I COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY Win b'ilf PERMJ SSI 3N -SAVIJJG . TELEGRAM -.-.. En clair ! FROM 'CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE A D V *• K! C £ C () RY Mr. R.M.A.Hankey 'UNCLASSIFIED ' • No: 206 (g) DATED: September 4, 1953. Acldresscu to Foreign Office Savinp telegram No. 206 of September 4. Repeated Saving to:- Paris No. 369 (S) Washington No. 298 (s) Memin Fayid No. 363 (s) Ahmed Hussein, leader of the dissolved Socialist Party, gave a lecture on September 3 at the Li~beration Rally Headquarters, Cairo. Among those present were General Nagui~b , Fateh Radwan, the Minister of State and members of the dissolved political parties. Hussein reviewed Egypt's recent history and praised the work of the Revolution leaders. He emphasized the importance of development projects Tout said that the Egyptian people regarded the present drive for attracting foreign capital with considerable anxiety, as foreign investment might TDO followed "by detrimental results. ;,,. He then attacked the idea of establishing a. one-party aystuin, stating that tMs would pave tho way for communism, raid than summarised his "constructive criticism" in the following demands:- (i) Abolition of press censorship, (ii) Abolition of martial law. (ill) The end of the "exceptional period" (i.e. the transition period) and an iimiodiato return to constitutional life. (iv) Speeding up of land distribution and tho reduction of the maximum holding to 50 instead of 200 f eddans. (v) The end of propaganda, for foreign investment and Point IV activities in Egypt until such time as tho British forces have withdrawn. (vi) The establishment of heavy industries by means of five-year plan. 3. General Naguih assured Ahmed Hussein that his recommendations were being borne in mind by the Revolutionary leaders. -v? 4. 4 D V *"""£•) ^ T^ I / / /0 .3 ^""3^ /O /!». O¥ / 0 J^t 1 2 1 _i_j COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERM SSION J \ AFRICAN DEPARTMENT FROM & &*^£j£<«>*Z4* /^ / No. */2£/f3. Dated /7. Received in Registry— References to former relevant papers MINUTES ye. ioiv t. (t OA- U (Print) rC (How disposed of) (Action (Index) completed) ' CAIrtO. September 17, 1953. ' In Hankey's letter (1012/18/53) of August 31 (paragraph 3) there was a promise to sound out Lieutenant Colonel Nasser and other members of the Council for the Revolution Command on the subject of their relations with the Moslem Brotherhood. The opportunity arose when Nasser and Major Salah Salem dined with Trefor Evans on September 10. 2. Nasser admitted that he was on personally bad terms with Hodeiby, the Supreme Guide, and his Immediate supporters, including Munir Dalian, Abu Rouqak and Sayed Ramadan. The trouble had come to a head during Bairam when an army officer visiting Behera Province had been involved in some trouble with local members of the Brotherhood. Nasser had sent for Hodeiby and told him that this appeared to be a put up job and that if Hodeiby wanted to use such tactics he was perfectly prepared to follow suit. 3. According to Nasser the Brotherhood is seriously split internally. He himself had the support of the anti- Hodeiby faction headed by Abdul Rahman Banna, (brother of the late Supreme Guide), and Salah Ashmawi, and also that of the followers of Sheikh al Baquri, Minister of uakfs. There was, he said, an inner secret circle within the Brotherhood which had existed from the time of the late Supreme Guide, and of which Hodeiby had no knowledge. The anti-Hodeiby faction was aiming at gaining control of the Guidance Office at the elections in October, and they would probably be successful. 4. Colonel Nasser suggested that Hodeiby was concerned about his position. He had been appointed Supreme Guide for only three years, and at a recent meeting of the Brotherhood's Constituent Assembly he had been severely criticised. Moreover, Nasser had received overtures from Hodeiby, who had sent emissaries not only to him, but also to General Hakim Amer and Major Salah Salem. 5. It is, incidentally, interesting to note that both Hodeiby and Sheikh Abdul Rahman Banna have since made statements stressing that the Brotherhood was supporting the army movement. 6. Nasser seemed to discount the threat to the regime which the Brotherhood is thought by some people to present, on account of the disunity within the Brotherhood itself. It is not yet possible to say how far his appreciation is justified. His reliance on the more extreme elements in the Brotherhood, if seriously meant, has its own dangers. But it seems that it has at least had the effect of frightening Hodeiby. On the whole it is unlikely that Hodeiby will risk a final break with Nasser at this stage and the probability is that the Council for the Revolution Command will be able to continue to count on at least the passive support of the Brotherhood as a whole for some time* Roger Allen, Esq., C.M.G., JL Foreign Office, LONDON, S.W.I. (C.B. r~~ . / 1 , 2 • /-o s^-| // 03^70 & ^Id&l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION °* FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE En Glair*. FORS3M OFFICE. AMD WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Hankey D. 6.25 p.m. September 16, 1953. Ho. 1310 R. 7.55 p.m. September 16, 1953. September 16, 1953. PRIORITY Addressed to Foreign Office telegram Mo. 1310 of September 16. Repeated for information Saving to: Paris Washington B.M.E.O. At a mass meeting organised by Liberation Rally in Republic Square on September 15 important speeohes were made by General Neguib and leading members of C.R.C. 2. General Heguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser insisted on the need for national unity to attain objectives of the revolution. Traitors had profited by their conciliatory policy to try to spread dissension. Severe action would be taken against all such efforts. Principal speech was made by Major Stlah Salem, Minister of National Guidance. Following is summary. (a) The C.R.G. had made a mistake in following a tolerate policy when they came to power and in allov/ing the agents of imperialism to continue their activities unchecked. The country should not forget that these politicians were the people who had caused moral corruption and economic chaos which existed before the revolution. These people were now spreading rumours intended $o create dissension and to strengthen their own position. (b) The politicians of the old regime had trafficked Egypt's rights with the British in the past. (c) There would be no more bargaining with Egypt's, rights. He stated, I hereby declare that we shall never accept joint defence in any form. That is our pledge, and we shall stand by it. I also declare that we shall never agree to join any alliance *s a condition for evacuation. (d) The government had proof that foreign Powers were actively working against the regime. Major Salem read out a document which, he said, had coae into their possession and accordJgfp to /which ..... « 1 j 4 ~ PyiLIC RfGORP OFFICE -1 1 ' * Reference:- 1 1, 1 • £o^ \I\03J~I of, ^IIJ&I _L III 2 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT f ERHISS ON Cairo telegram No. 1310 to Foreign Offi.te . -2- which a programme of action against the C.R.C. was being prepared outside Egypt. A certain Embassy (the Embassy of a government other than the government responsible for preparing the operation) would be one of the channels through which instructions would be sent. Major Salem assured the audience that they would not guess the State to which this Embassy belonged. It was not that of an Arab State. (e) Internal press censorship would remain in full force, since the press continued to harbour elements of corruption and deception. All aspects of Egyptian life would be purged by C.R.C. and press would not escape this. (f) In conclusion, Major Salem said that a court of the revolution would be set up to try persons charged with working against the interests of the country and the existence of the revolution. It would not be bound by the regulations of the ordinary courts. 4-* A communique* issued later announced that the members of the court were W/Cdr Baghdad!, Minister of Defence, Lieutenant Colonel Anwar Sadat and Squadron Leader Hassan Ibrahim. Text follows by bag. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Paris and Washington ai my telegrams Nos. 384 and 3U respectively. [Repeated Saving to Paris and Washington], GCGCC " )-&•*>* \ho^o(, qf/^ ,-lu,1 , , M,,,2 , ,, COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY Win OUT PERMISSION 1 CONFIDENTIAL POM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTp FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Hankey No.1315 D.11.30 p.m. September 16, 1953. September 16, 1953. R.12,43 a.m. September 17, 1953. PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.1315 of September 16 Repeated for information to Paris Washington B.M.E.O, Ankara My telegrams Nos.1310 and 1311. These speeches appear to have been intended to serve three main objects, apart from the general justification of the regime's record to date: (1) to intimidate internal opposition; (2) to demonstrate to the world, end to Her Majesty's Government in particular, that the re*giiae is capable of dealing with trouble-makers, and, therefore, deserving confidence in connexion with any eventual settlement of the Canal Zone problem. (3) Paradoxical as it may seem, to prepare public opinion for any Anglo-Egyptian agreement. 2. It is significant that in the campaign against opposition the attack has been switched from Communists to the old political parties. The Wafd leaders, in particular, though not mentioned by name, are severely criticised for their past action affecting both internal and foreign affairs, and for the patent insincerity of their present attitude. 3. As regards the Anglo-Egyptian settlement, quotation! from the Egyptian "Green Book" (covering 1950-1951 negotiations), are used to show how far the flafd Government were prepared to go. The intention is presumably to disarm Wafdisfc. criticism of any agreement now reached thakjroittijaot directly involve either a /^treaty of alliance 6~ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , 2 rrO_ ^vb -f.~ ///£>«£/ _ /<9 e> a(/<^O / o vf/ 111 III 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION V CONFIDENTIAL Cairo telefiram No.13^ to Foreign Office - 2 - treaty of alliance or joint defence. There *ere relatively few specific references to the British and the usual threats of violent action against our troops in the Canal Zone were ronspicuously absent. Nevertheless, the policy of anti-imperialism is fully maintained. 1. Publication of the alleged secret document on the subject of a monarchist plot, has inevitably given rise to much speculation here, especially regarding the identity of the two foreign power. DrinciDally involved. There is at least doubt in peoples minds as totter Her Majesty's Government are intended. The abetting, Power is even more mysterious, but it is thought conceivable that the C.R.C. have their suspicions of the Turks. 5 It is too early to assess the effect on public opinion of the drastic measures foreshadowed in Major Salah Salem's speech. A purge of, and a tighter grip on, the Press have long been overdue, and if properly carried out can only do good The establishment of the Court of Revolution, whether justified or not by anti-regime activities, is a disturbing development, but judgment must be suspended until it is seen in action. It is not yet clear whether there are cases reedy for the court to try. 6. Members of the C.R.C., and not least Colonel Nasser, have long had their early illusions dispelled. In the early months of the revolution they genuinely believed that all Egyptians would, without distinction, cooperate for the realisations of the ideals of their movement. They have for some time realised that, if they are to succeed, a strong hand will be necessary. The immediate effect of the latest measures is likely to be salutary, but how long it will last is another matter. That depends on the army, an* • in spite of BOA* discontent we still believe the Army to be loyal. Foreign Offie* please pass Paris, Washington and Ankara as my telegrams Nos.12, 3tt and 60 respectively. [Repeated Paris, Washington and Ankara]. B B B I I I | ! I i 2 ! 1 I I i I 1 1 I COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PEIMISSI3* ' *~* I SAVING TELEGRAM g. EN GLAIR FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE UNCLASSIFIED MR. R.M.A. HANKEY No. 207 . DATE: September 8, 1953. Addressed to Foreign Off ice telegram No .207 Saving, of September 8, 1953. Repeated Saving to: - Paris No. 373 Washington No. 302 Memin (Fayid) No .365 In an interview with Al Ahram published on September 7, L't. Col. Zakaria Mohieddine, a member of the C.R.C. and Director of Military Intelligence, denied rumours that certain army officers had been arrested following the discovery of a conspiracy and that a reshuffle was expected in key posts . He said that Egypt was being subjected to a wave of false rumours which were being engineered by experts at great expense and were designed to create unrest . Among those responsible were "professional communists" who were being well paid for this job. The C.R.C. had put people, who were close to members of the dissolved parties, under surveillance as some of them had joined communist organisations. Asked whether the continued press censorship did not encourage rumour-mongering, he said that the censorship safeguarded the country's interests at the present crucial stage in Egypt's fight against imperialism and reactionary elements within the country. 2. In the remainder of the interview Lt . Col. Mohieddin made the following points: (i) With regard to tho regime's attitude to the Moslem Brotherhood he said that they woro anxious that religious teachings should be propagated. The activities of the Moslem Brotherhood in this direction did nrt differ from those of other religious organisations. The regime "welcomed all efforts towards propagation of Islamic principles. (ii) Farouk had been trying to obtain information from many Egyptians who had been abroad but they had all shunned him. (iii) Military Intelligence was actively countering foreign espionage. They did not wait to collect full evidence against spies but simply deported them immediately. /(iv) •; >- Jieferencei- 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 f-o^i lionet, q/«Wr/ II II i i ! i i i i COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION - 2 - ,n's / reported by tho NOVJB Afiencxos . Reference:- ill!! 1 1 i 2 f-o^^-li i /In1 1 C^o) C^~lnL / C' fc? cxnfri( ' t^* O / 1 i i II III 1 1 COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT JL IO/6-//2S 1953 FROM / No. /32t Dated /8. Received in Registry- REFERENCES (MINUTES) 'K •f- "v , -fc.. (Print) -J- -' «-0 V v- (How disposed of) " ' •s v C U. V \_w f ,/ (Action completed) (Index) ^ ~N <^ °\ PUBLIC RtCORD fejerence.:- I I \\U CONFIDENTIAL •< J * FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION Mr, Hankey No. 1327 D. 6.19 p.m. September 18«i 1953 September 18, 1953 R* 8,05 p.m. September 18, 1953 ,' i y PRIOROT y<-;< \ CONFIDENTIAL /A ^., . ,^~.L . ^-.^4*. .*—..«•. --JT— -TT-J^ Addressed to Beirut telegram Ko. 136 of September 18 Repeated for information ;to Foreign Office '** .»•',••'' Your telegram Ne. 116. \ 0 i My telegram No. 1315 to Foreign Office, which is being repeated to you, gives our general assessment of the speeches made at the public meeting here September 15. 2, On internal evidence the alleged document about a monarchist plot is clearly a fabrication and appears to be regarded as such, at any rate by the more sophisticated Egyptians. It is impossible to say however whether it was fabricated by the regime itself or "planted" «n it. 3. Most people seem ready to believe that Her Majesty's Government are meant to be the Power directing the plot, but various embassies here, including the Turks, the Greeks, the Pakistanis and even the Americans are still being cast in the secondary r81o of alleged intermediary. JU In general, this publicity stunt has not attracted much serious attention. Foreign Office please pass Beirut. [Repeated to Beirut] DISTRIBUTED TO; African Department News Department Levant Departisnt ^$ l9 ^ •"V 'T % ?j bbbbb Reference:- J t. 1 I I COPYhlOHT - NOT TO BE REPROOuFETPHoTo^APHinirr^^^ £, /O/s/20, J / SECRET i f»,M. ( ' W» FROM CAIRO TO FORF.IGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP WAR OFFICE DISTRIBUTION Mr. Hankey D. 5.20 p.m. September 9, 1953 No. 1285 R. 7.05 p.m. September 9, 1953 September 9t 1953 PRIORITY Following for War Office (M.I. K (B)) from Military Attache* Cairo. MA/I/236. September 9, 1953. Unrest in Egyptian Army. \. Following latest information further supports my remarks In the August monthly summary paragraph 2. 1. Colonel Ahmed Shawkyqn, Commander Cairo district and President of the tribunal of trial of Communists, hafl, been relieved of both appointments and is reported to be under house surveillance in Alexandria. The new tribunal's president, Lt. Colonel Abdel Moneim el Digwl and the new Commander Cairo District believed Colonel Abdullah Rifaat, late Frontier Corps. 2. Indications that the present Chief of Staff, Major-General Kohamed Ibrahim, shortly being replaced by Colonel Hursein Shafei presumably in order to support the Commander in Chief whose appointment is known to have caused some resentment in the army. 3. D.U.I, (at present in hospital) found it necessary to publish denial in the daily newspapers on September 7 that any officers had been arrested, and warned the public that factions were working against the present regime. i.. Arab News Agency has reported several arrests of V'afdists and journalists on September 7 and 8 for hostility to the regime, but no mention of officers. 5. Above developments give further indications of growing opposition to and the unpopularity of the regime, nevertheless consider they are quite capable of dealing with such difficulties at present. Unlikely that stability of the regime seriously threatened, particularly as the Egyptian Intelligence well Informed as to what is going on. Personal popularity of Neguib appears undiminlshed. Mideast and Egypfor informed. , -ifi$ 10 A. CUIlUb HWJBD OFflQ^ 1 2 j U 5 6 Reference:- /^, ?bf I /, o v-, / an <)\1 1 1 • 2 1 / ^ ' ^ fc* i ' Cr <-J 1 1 f 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 II 1 1 COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMJSSIOH " ' TOP 3ECRi?£ Inf onaution Division, British Middle ISsut Office, o o Ik-it iah Embassy, Beirut. 26, Wany thanks for your hc3p to Dajani* I «a aenulnc separately ft copy ox1 a letter I have written to J-hn i'eck abcut la-Jani's proposals for anti-Caajiuniat writing by Sheikha frtsa Al Azhtur* *-• 1 enclose a copy of a short report Dajaai has written on his inproasions of tho situr.tion In .'Igypt, Ao you know la was in -fypt 3k" years up to Juno 1952 and id tho courao oi" hia special Ini'oraation work had a great ntuiiber of :«ypi.ian contacts, I respect "both his shrewdness of observation and his judgement and since ho talked to a number or Interealinc poopla parhapa his report of an oulaiJer's iraproa.'ii&na looking in on Cairo ol'ter a years absence may lx» of some interest to the Cairo ;jnbassy» 3. Tho Biost interesting people he talked to &port froa a number of ;hoikhs in Al Azhar whoso nnnea are sot out in the enclosure to my letter to John Feck wore f onoral Hassan 3alart| a. aecibor of ISJiwan el MusUain and the S'afct, iir, Joseph 3hialia, ciana£or of Qrosdi-Eack at lloviisfcy, Ibrohim Abdul Tahhab, liiniator of 3tate in Ali . aher'a Cabinet, and Sofchl Abdul Hamid one of the Directors of tho Govenraent Press Durcmu* lie also talked to a number of relatives, friends and ac'iuaintarices* 4. I am copying this letter with enclosure to Arthur Kellas in I«P»D, and to ^tagh Stephonaon at (L.C, J. Murray, Ks^., itfUion Bepoz'tcont, Uritiah liabaasy, PMBLIC R.fc.oRp OFFIC§ ' "i 1 5 3 u SI 6 Reference: - ! 1 1 1 III I1 II 1 1 1 1 i-i i. L COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT"PERHISSI ON J AFRICAN DEPARTMENT J IOI5US-. 1953 EGYPT AND SUDAN FROM No. 10't /6>? / ?3. Dated . 0 Received in Registry- ^2u*.. ff References to former relevant papers MINUTES / 102706 (Priat) ^C. 0«C«*«'» » bJUc i^u*^C^&J2^ ^- °^ (How disposed of) (Action (Index) completed) ^' ^ - PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE i 2 3 u S « Reference:- 1 /-"O^^ft-> ^3 -| |l i//nJV/o/ i c^oL / Cs (Lp Cf/OA'( 1 cr O // 1 1 , 2 1 L 1 Ml 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO 8E REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION - 1 CONFIDENTIAL INWARB SAVING- TELEGR/M. FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE By Bag BEPARTMENTAL •! 'n DISTRIBUTION Mr. Croswoll g, No. 297 Saving ' November 12, 1953 R. November U, 1953 CONFIDENTIAL Addressed to Foreiin Office telogram No. 297 Saving of November 12. Repeated for Information to Paris Washington /B.M.E.O. Hy telegr.. ••. U87^^ T ^ '."' ^// F P FF PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 4 5 3 * , 1 2 'G^>^~\[lD3C7ob Sf 1 cL&l 1 1 1 I i 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION •I J lA AFRICAN DEPARTMENT JEl. 1953 EGYPT AND SUDAN Received in Registry- References to former relevant papers MINUTES Jkc ll$w^ <* fr i^*~- |ta> - C.KX. (Print) %Lt ^ ttr***^! (How disposed of) (Action (Index) compkted) Mitiutts. w 0 q 2. a 4 /taw) « (/ ' I h z Ul LJ ID P z I o z PUBLIC RECORD OFFICq * Reference'-- 1 1 1 1 l l-ol^-l (•l0JC7o(> °(I2&1 1 ! 1 IJ L 1 I 1 I 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION 1012/3V53 BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO. CONFIDENTIAL November 5» 1953. V, !, ', Dear Department, / You will recall that in his letter 1012/22/53 of September 1? to Allen, Duke mentioned Abdel Nasser's^ forecast that the anti-Hodeibi pro-Council for the Revolutionary Command faction of the Moslem Brotherhood would aim at gaining control of the Guidance office at the elections in October, and that Abdel Nasser thought that they would probably be successful. We have now been able to study the results of the elections, which were held on October 8, and at first sight it would appear that Abdel Nasser1s prognostication has been realised to a considerable extent. 2. The new Guidance Office, as compared with the old, appears, according to the press, to be as follows:- Unchanged Members 1. Hassan Ismail Al Hodeibi: Supreme Guide. 2. Dr. Khamis Hamidah: Deputy Supreme Guide (new). . Abdel Hakim Abdin: Secretary-General. . Dr. Hussein Karaal ed-Din: Treasurer (new). 5. Abdel Qader Audah: Former Deputy Supreme Guide. 6. Abdel Rahman Al Banna: Old Members not re-elected New Members 7. Moukhtar Abdel Alim. Abdel Aziz Attia. 8. Abdel Aziz Kamal. Abdel Moez Abdel Sattar 9. Sheikh Mohamed Al Ghazali. Mohamed Farghali. lOJdunir Dallah. Dr. Mohamed Kamal Khalifa, 11 .Saleh Ashmawi. Mohamed Hamed Aboul Nasr. l2.Fahmy Abu Ghadir. Ahmed Sherif. 13.Sheikh Hassan Al Bakhouri. Omar el Telemsani. Hodeibi remains as Supreme Guide. He did not in fact offer himself as a candidate and it was apparently held, despite conflicting reports on the subject, that he had already been elected to the office for life. 3» Colonel Abdel Nasser told the Oriental Counsellor that he was well pleased with the results of the elections. He spoke with approval of the inclusion of Sheikh Farghali and Dr. Hussein Kamal ed-Din. He repeated his former strictures on Abdel Hakim Abdin however, describing him as a thoroughly bad man whom the Brotherhood would some day have to get rid of. He probably considers Abdin1 s influence on Hodeibi is the main cause of the latter* s intransigent attitude over co-operation with the Council for the Revolutionary Command. rUBLIli HtUJKD HI" HUt i 4 Reference:- r 1 1 l-o^l lio^ot? qf/cP-<5rf I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i i 1 1 L 1 1 II 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION - 2 - ij.. It certainly looks as if the Council for the Revolutionary Command have strengthened their hold on the Brotherhood. Five of the new Guidance Office are known to be in favour of collaboration with the regime •(Khamis, Kamal ed-Din, Audah, Al Banna and Farghali). Hodeibi and Abdin appear to have been isolated. But the elimination of Ashmawi, who was a strong supporter of cooperation with the Council for the Revolutionary Command, was however, presumably not according to Abdel Nasser's plan, though he will continue to have influence through his paper "Al Daawa", which has now become the official organ of the Brotherhood. Hodeibi has also somewhat strengthened his position by establishing his title to the office of Supreme Guide for life. Moreover Abdin retains his position as Secretary-General and there are no signs that he is giving up the fight. There are also five new members whose tendencies are as yet unknown and it may well be that some of them will support Hodeibi and Abdin. 5. Dr. Khamis Hamidah1 s promotion to Deputy Supreme Guide is possibly significant. He came quite suddenly into prominence when he was appointed Assistant Deputy Supreme Guide while Abdel Qader Audah was busy on the Constitution Committee, and it was said that he was hand in glove with the Council for the Revolutionary Command and one of their nominees. Abdel Qader Audah is, however, also on good terms with the Council for the " Revolutionary Command. It was always a curious feature of the organisation that the Treasurer was not a member of the Guidance Office. Dr. Hussein Kamal ed-Din*s appointment to this post is interesting since he is closely connected with the Ikhwan para-military organisation, is said to be Head of the Ikhwan Intelli- gence Section and has a reputation as a former terrorist. Sheikh Farghali has similarly long been connected with the para-military organisation in the Canal Zone where he has been the local leader of the Brotherhood. The disappearance of Al Bakhouri1s name presumably settles at last the discussion whether he had or had not resigned on talcing Cabinet office. 6. We are sending a copy of this letter to the British Middle Bast Office at Fayid. Yours ever, CHANCERY. EUfiLIC RECORD Off (eg I 2 4 5 Heference:- 5 1 ' O j ~T" III /") 1 ^7 /O / /^V / ^ £^/ 1 1 / / t'ot, / C' O ^^ 1 sr-Ci 1 J 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - MOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH! CAI 1 v"ui 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 •—VI iJn Clair by Bag. FRCT C.'L-tO TO FOitJlGN OFFICE Mr, M.J. Creswoll No; 285 Saving November 5, 1953.. UNCLASSIFIED Addressed to P.O. telejr.am Wo. 285 Saving of November 5, repeated for information Saving to:- '-.ashington No. 379, Paris No. 482, /.nkara Ho. 65, B.M.JJ.O. (Fa/id) ' *'o. 457. In a speech at Suez-on October 3 after a tour of inspection of the Red bea coast, Lt. Col, ,'bdel Nasser announced that the .i%yptian people had seen the regime negotiating v/ith the British but tliey had been preparing for the final struggle at the same time. 3y them- selves, the regime were poviorless. The revolution needed active support of every citizen to.achieve its objectives. 2. United, ^gypt could overcome ev^ry obstacle. The regime had ont= aim and that was to turn the 22 million inhabitants of the country into soldxers, armed to defend it. The next battle would not be a battle of the Canal Zone only, but one in v.'hich the entire nation would have to engage. 3. But the people must be patient, as it v/as through strength allied with patience that the great battle would be von, should it prove necessary to fight it. ;hatevcr negotiations micht be carried on v/ith the British, the final result v/as certain. The people must show patience and unite in the great effort to build an eternal Egypt, •4. iith regard to the trials being held before the Revolutionary Tribunal, ^t. Col. Nasser admitted with regret that there were traitors in the country who had placed their personal interests above those of the nation. However, ,3gypt was a healthy country, and the traitors could not corrupt the people. 5. He concluded by saying that the regime were only at the beginning of their efforts to achieve the objectives of the revolution. The great development projects could not be carried out overnight. Meanwhile the country must unite to form a single body capable of driving out the.occupiers. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE i i 3 U SI « Jteferencet- 1 r~^v,/ ^ i , 2 O^>~T~\llOci^i(Dk> l/cxO/ I 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION r j AFRICAN DEPARTMENT E. IOIS-/I44 EGYPT AND SUDAN j FROM y <*S*t-0 I No. 7 Received in Registry- REFERENCES (MINUTES) 'i frM+ / : #UJ (Print) jj&cv (How disposed of) 3tt (Action .T , . completed) (Index) J FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP DISTRIBUTION Mr. Hankey \U£ 'Vll^L*-: "^ No. 1W L— —<- "-" D. 9.31 p.ii, October 21, 1953. October 21. 1953. R. 9.56 p.m. October 21. 1953. COHFIDEMTIAL Addressed te Foreign Office telegram No. 1W of October 21 Repeated for information Saying to: Paris B.M.E.O. Washington ' • '\- ^ My telegram No. 246 Saving^' ^ V A further meeting between members of the C.R.C,, including General Ncguib and former politicians who have reputations for honesty and fair dealing, was held on October 2. In addition to Kl-Ganhury and S oilman Hafea who attended the first meeting, there were present: Neguib al Hilaly (Tcrs. 72). ~* / Abdel Salam Gomaa (Pera. 56), V *?^ ** MaUnoudGhaleb (Pers. 53). Mustafa al Shorbaghi (Pers. U3). Abdel Rahman al Rafei (Pers. 115). Ali Abdel Razek (Pers. 120), k All of these, except Ililaly, are members of the Constitutional Committee. Gomaa is known as an "honest Wafdist". Razek and Shorbaghi are better known as lawyers than as politicians. Foreign Office please pass Saving to Washington and Paris as my telegrams Nos. 365 and 463 respectively. [Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris], D3BTRIBTHED TO: African Department News Department PUBLIC RECORD OFFICfc 1 1 4 « Seference:- * ! i /-~r>^^?- ////-> 1 ^//n / O / O^f 1 . 2 ' t-* J T 1 / / £?oL / & h M »t/-o / 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH i CALL Y WITHOUT PERMISSION C - 2 - El-Sanhouri (Personality 130), Has been President of Council of State since I9k9* He joined the Spadists after breaking with the V.'afd in 1938. Khashaba (Personality 86). Is best known for his part in the Khashaba-Campbell talks in 19^8. He broke with the Wafd in 1928 and became a Constitu- tional Liberal. Hafez Took no part in politics before the Revolution. He was then, as a leading lawyer, Deputy President of the State Council. Ho served as Minister of the Interior and Deputy Prime Minister from September 1952 until June 1953. ' He is now legal adviser to the President. SAVING TELEGRAM. En Glair. By Bag. / FROM CAIRO :j?0 FOREIGN OFFICE. Mr. R.M. A. Hankey. No. 21+6 Saving. vA^ 19.10.53. Addressed to P.O. telegram Noc^. 21+6 rSaving of 19.10.53. REPEATED j3ovill£ to:- Paris Ko.U6l(S) Y/ashington Ho.?64/°>) Me rain (Fayid) No.li36(a) COHPIDBSTIAL. It v/as announced on October 17 that Lieutenant Colonel Nasser, Major-General Hakim Amer and Major Salah Salem had held consultations with Maltres Ahmed Lutfi El-Sayed, Aly Sl-Shamsi, "bdel Razzak El-Sanhouri, Ahmed Khashaba and Soliman Hafez regarding the present political situation in Egypt. According to Akhbar ..el Yom, these consultations are to continue and the C.R.C. are to take advantage of the wide experience of former politicians who were not contaminated by the corruption of the old regime. This is an encouraging development* 2. ^he civilians mentioned above were, except Hafez, prominent politicians in the old regime. They have reputations for honesty and independence and though most of them were at one time Wafdists, they all came to oppose Nahas. El-Sayed (Personality 131). Is at present President of the Arab Academy and though for many years dissociated from political partisanship was the leading G onctitut'ional Liberal. As a member ol the Egyptian delegation in I9k6 he opposed the Bevin/Sidky proposals. He is generally respected as an outstanding scholar. El-Shamsi(Personality Is the President of the Board of the Notional Bank of Egypt and Egyptian representative on the Board of the Suez Canal Co. A man of exceptional inde- pendence of mind and o, ,i considerable courage. He .was the most influential member of the group of Wofdists which broke with Nahas in 1932. /-.? 11,11 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPH iTIiTT -OOHFIDWTIAL FROM CAIRO. TO FOREIGN OFFICS Cypher/OTP FOREIGN OFFICE .MID TOTMALL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Iiankey Eo. 1402 D. 1.12 p.m. October 6, 1353. October 6, 1953. R. 1.6 p.m. October 6, 1953. OOHFIDBNTIAL Adclressed. to Foreign Office telerr&n. llo. UfQ2 of October 6. Repeated for information to B.M.E.Oi ./>,ty Washington Paris lly telegram Ho. 1397. "Cabinet Changes. It is generally assumed here that Lieutenant Colonel^ llasser TO.S relieved of his responsibilities as Minister of Interior in order to enable him to devote hiusclf more to higher policy. The regime depends on him to an increasing extent. Whether this ii another step towards his appointnent cs Prime Minister remains to be seen, 2. In view of the considerable and rather sinister position which he has built up as Director of Intelligence, Lt. Col. Sakariah llohieddin was in some ways an obvious choice for the post of Minis- ter of Interior, but he has not, so far as is known, hitherto shown adequate calibre for such a post. 3. . tf/C Gamal ScleFi, now made Minister of Comuni cations, hr»s gained considerable experience cf economic matters during the prst year. He is, however, not only doctrinaire but also inclined to be Impervious to argument. His appointment continues the pro- cess by which iP.CE.bers of the C.R.C. are increasingly accepting administrative'responsibility. Foreign Office please pass Washington and Paris as zsy tele- 390 sind i-3 respectively. [Repeated to Washington and Paris] LLL. Reference:" 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - HOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSIOn ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' BRITISH EMBASSY, BEIRUT. October 3, 1953. J El-Lewa George Naldrett-Jays, Pasha, O.B.E. , of whom you may have heard, at one time commandant of the Alexandria City Police, and who, after his retirement, went into "business in Egypt and is doing very well, came to see me the other day and talked a lot about Egypt. 2. In some ways more of an Egyptian than an Englishman, ("by "blood he is half Levantine any way) , Jays has always "been an enthusiastic Wafdist. He left with me the en- closed paper to read and at my request afterwards agreed to my passing it on to the Foreign Office. Because of Jays' political bias I should not be inclined to take what he says too seriously. I am not sending it to Cairo as in Jays1 interests, I think better not. 3. Abdul Hadi's condemnation to death came as a shock to me. I felt at the time that he was as guilty as hell of compassing the death of Hassan el-Banna and there is no doubt that he took a sadistic delight in torturing members of the Ikhwan el-Muslimin after the assassination of his beloved Nokrashy, but I feel certain that he is not guilty of treason in our sense of the word. He was quite powerless to prevent Farouk and Nokrashy between them ordering the Egyptian Army into Palestine in May 19 U8. I am sorry for him. R. Allen, Esq., C.M.G., Foreign Office, London S.W.I. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 i 3 tt 51 6 Reference:- 1 jCT ?i* 1 /, ,, vy Q / OrH 1 1 , 2 *- -* i ' / ^**- »C-/c> ( ' tx O / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION -J 3 CHESTER STREET, SLOANE 3O41 S.W.I Oecembei/, 1853. forwarded at the request of Colonel Maxwell who is in South .\frica. 3 -7 / VISIT TO EGYPT - 21ST TO 26TH NOVEI-'BFiR. 1933. 1. During this short visit I was able to talk with the British Minister, Members of the Economic and Political Staff at the Embassy, a number of foreign diplomats, the Governor of the National Bank of Egypt, and members cf his staff Egyptians and British, the Chief Representatives in F.gypt of such Companies as I.C.I., Shell, the Anglo Egyptian Oil Company, most of the Bankers, a number of prominent Egyptians and other Members of the British Community. 2. The frameworks of political and official life have been drastically altered by the Revolution of 1952. The party system is dead and in its place is a group of Army Officers, assisted by a number of technical experts, whose honesty is generally accepted, but whose original ideals and plans are naturally being severely influenced by the difficult experiences of Government. 3. Parliament no longer exists and the Monarchy has been abolished; de facto and perhaps de jure authority therefore rests with the Revolutionary Government headed by General Neguib as President and Premier, with a strong Deputy Premier in Colonel Nasser. Much which has been done by the new regime has had popular approval, but lately there have been signs that it is becoming tougher in its attitude to opposition, and it is not unlikely that this harsher character will be intensified as the problems facing an authoritarian group become more defined. The recent seizure of the fortunes of members of the ex-Royal Family has, for instance, caused consternation in some circles and has added to the sense of Political and Economic uncertainty. 4. The major basic reason for uncertainty, however, remains the lack of a solution of the Canal Question. Business has falleri to a low ebb, there is little new investment by Egyptians and none by Foreigners, and the Stock and Commodity Markets are listless. It is likely that an agreement would create immediately a sense of internal confidence which might be associated with some foreign aid or investment thus widening the sphere of recovery. 5. The delay in reaching an agreement with the U.K. has been a surprise to many of the Diplomatic Circle. Now, it is generally felt that no agree- ment is likely before the full results of the Sudan Elections are known. If these favour Egypt, the latter may well feel disposed to make a rapid settlement. If, on the other hand the results are unfavourable to Egypt, her Rulers might be in- clined to postpone settlement. 6. Taking the overall Political and Economical picture, I have found it impossible to disagree with the view held almost universally by the British Colony in Egypt that an agreement on the Canal Question is both highly desirable for both parties and indeed ultimately inevitable. We lack much of the essential support in the Zone, by the Egyptian Government and population, which is needed if it is to remain a permanent and secure base. The cost to H.M.G. is high. Despite excellent morale at present, the effect on our troops can scarcely fail to be adverse over a period. For these reasons, therefore, apart from Economical and Trading considerations, it is felt that an early agreement is desirable and that all reasonable concession should be made by H.M.G. to achieve it. It is quite likely the agreement would lead to an increase of internal activity, and this might well be extended to external operations as well, provided the Revolutionary Government acts with good sense. (Apart from the Canal Question, much depends upon the balance of payments, and I formed the opinion, after discussing matters with Egyptians and British alike, that the short term position on this point would be satisfactory thus allowing some increase in purchases from U.K. It is, however, on the long term economic outlook that anxiety must be felt. The rapidly increasing population, now nearly twenty- two millions and the almost static acreage of agricultural land poses a challenging problem to the Government, It is seeking for a solution along two lines. First a major Nile Scheme to increase agricultural land within say ten years by 50f; this would involve a capital outlay of perhaps three hundred million pounds, of which say seventy million pounds might be required for plant payable in overseas .currencies. The second approach is by minor improvements and increases of irrigation, etc., bringing a little more land here or there but from which the total benefit could only, even in the aggregate, be small. It would seem that the chances of finding the necessary capital for the major project are likely to prove negligible. There is a shortage of capital savings in the country, and with its present demands from other quarters, and the delicate political position in Egypt and the Kiddle East, the International Bank is unlikely to find more than small sums for developments on the Kile. On the other hand, the minor schemes are probably well within the scope of Egypt to finance, but these can do little towards dealing with the Ions; term economic problem of Egypt. They might well fail even to keep up production pro rata to the natural increase of 300,000 - 400,000 per annum. 8. A. view of the industrial and commercial position of Egypt to-day compared with my last knowledge of it during the war shows more similarities than differences. The absence of heavy industry, the shortage of Minerals and the pressure on the narrow cotton and wheat lands, remain apparently permanent features of the Nile Valley. The.low technical skill in commerce and government has not yet shown any appreciable improvement. The need for foreign experts is as necessary as ever, though at present they are probably less likely to be acceptable. 9. The views obtained on the visit may thus be summarised as: - : (a) The Revolutionary Army has shown honesty and courage so far. It is running into difficulties but these could be reduced by • an agreement with U.K. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5 Jieft rencei - * £-~ "? ^2. / V-y f\ i^t , 1 . 2 1 OS "7 / / / £? c>L / & (y ^f / 1?" Of 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION 5. (b) The lack of confidence internally and externally in Egypt would probably be minimised or overcome by such an agreement. (c1) Increased trade with the II.PI. and other countries might well follow, and some moderate investments from the International Bank, Oil Companies, Switzerland, etc., could then be looked for. Foreign expert advice is as much needed as ever. (d) "Even were the abovo to happen, t.he lonn; term outlook of Egypt remains obscure. Politically, there are the alternatives of further revolution or cruder dictatorship; economically, there is the unanswered problem of a rapidly increasing population with no additional productive work for it to do. A.T.M. 28th November, 1953. Johannesburg. AFRICAN DEPARTMENT tJ £. long / FROM o CONFIDENTIAL .No. Dated I u. Received in Registry— References to former relevant papers MINUTES ScS. \0 M%1 » cwt'*i*>y oeyow 17 o ( LL *- (Print) ^ (How disposed of) 0 / (4u4 k fafi&wt****' w~»»« M*& 0vb\ • / . -7 ? f^l I *4v**. . &^~b <*** 0 &$&*$? (Action (Index) /I0 completed) ^v 7T References to later relevant papers ns** 44416 L /Zyfl/fazfa' COtWIPEHTlAL Per sonulity of Al-Etenna . The relation between personalities end events in the VJeat may well be a matter for dispute among philosophical historians; there may be room for divergence of opinion as to whether the time produces the man or the man stapes the time. Uut it is boyoad controversy that in the Middle Eastern world ideas and causes are, and always have been, indissolubly connected with personalities. This fact goes far to explain many other- wise puzzling features in Kiddle Kast history, past and present; it ex- plains, for example, the highly, persona?, nature of Arab politics, in which parties taking thoir steed on a theoretical platform nre almost unknown, the political party being rather a collection of individuals grouped around an outstanding leader. It explains also the astounding fact of the success of the Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hassan al-fJanna, and the recession which followed his denth. \ No matter what view may be taken of the character and achievements of 41-Banna, there is no dispute about the fact that he was a man of out- standing personality, a natural leader of men, a man of magnetic influence comparable tp that exercised by .Adolf Hitler, and a man of such abounding enthusiasm and energy as could inspire those with tvhom he came in contact. • Hassan al-Banna was bom in 1906 and brought up in such a strictly Islamic atmosphere that he could eay vjitli some truth that ''Islam is the only father I ever had". In fact hie father was Shaikh nhmad Abd al- Rahinan al-Banna, popularly known as'Al-sa'ati (The ",'atchmaker), a locally > renowned Islamic, and especially Qur aaic, scholar. The elder Al-Banna ' ' was one of those by no means uncommon Muslims of an aarlier generation who,.for the love of it, gave their days to teaching and study an3 their > nights to plying their ordinary trifle, i;i this case that of clock repair- ing. As the preacher in the local mosque, ar.3 as the proud possessor of a considerable religious library, the father was a man of aoiae consequence in the community, and even appears to have written some works on Islamic i scholarship. . f i ' •• « • . . 'i Under such influence you^ig Hassan cama early to a study of Islam„ t in which his father personally instructed him. At tho local school he vias introduced to the new Arab nationalism which was then becoming power- ful; foreign languages were not used in the curriculum, and emphasis was laid on the Arab heritage of literature and history. .'.•!• i i From school in his fourteenth year (1920) he went on to study at the teachers1 training collage at Damanhur, where he cane under the in- fluence of Sufism, or Islamic mysticism „ and developed certain traits which ' were to be permnent with him* It is recorded of him that he used to fast for three months in the year, in place of the usual one, ate only barley bread, and rejected the wearing of ailk clthin^ or gold rings - all normal enough signs of Sufi asceticism, ! At ths close of his period at bhs Damanhur college he was officially qualified to t^ach, but preferred to pursue a fur- ther course of study at the Cairo Dar al-TJluia, when he graduated in 1937, hav- ing thus spent seven years sLn advanced study. He is said to have bs en a keen end energetic student with an alert mind, but with an extremely conservative bias and a tendency towards mysticism. Thus, almost from the time of his en- tering the Damanhur college ha fell in with the Hasafi tariqa, and advanced through several degrees in that order. 'Vhile he remained a Sufi all his life, wearing the characteristic dross of the order, he appears to have fallen out with the Hasafi order over his very practical applications of their teaching. None the less the Hasafis held him throughout his stay at Damanhur and after- wards in Cairo, until in Ismailiya he cams to the conclusion that the movement which he had in mini was too large an urr-ertaking to be liaited to tha small circle of a Sufi fraternity. J3ut there appears to be some reason to believe that Al-Banna*s original ideaa for the reform of Islam could have been met by the creation of another ;3ufi orderc That this may at one time have been a practical consideration is apparent from hia founding a society for the prop- agation of the Hasafi teachings during his student days. ^\»TH CWJii EUIUb RECORD OfFICI 1 21 3 « 51 « Kcference:- 1 1 rT ^ VL , /. v-, / r> n Jt-f ' OS ~| | //£?o(_/C?fc> ^f / c^ Major M.ft.V.Maude. 5 D.G. THE WAR OFFICE, LONDON, S.W.I. J CONFIDENTIAL 13th October, 1953. -*->•• " I enclose for yoxor information and retention a copy of a Review of the Moslem Brotherhood, which we have received from the Department of Defence in Ottawa. This Review has been written by Ctptain J.B.Hardie, a Canadian officer. R. C. Mackworth-Young, Bsq.., Foreign Office, Whitehall. THE PT5SL1K EROTHMRHUm Aim Since the end of the last century Ilgypt h-is occupied a special position in the world of irab and Islamic nationalisnio Uy virtue of her unique position as tho only lalenic country of piny importance out- side of the Turkish Ttepire of tho Ints eighteenth and early nineteenth , century she was well situated to act as the seed-ground fcr the ideas of resurgent irabism and Isl;w.ism, Thanks to Uritish protection ahc vns freed from the fear of the !I".riirJinn despotism, • - 3 - direction of Snad Saghlul Pasha. Or. November 15th, 1918, this Watt, as it Inter catae to be popularly known, presented a demand to the British Residency through Zaghlul to be allowed to go to London, there to present their case for complete Egyptian independence. The demand was refused, and the implied threat cf disorders with which the ulti- matum had been buttressed, was promptly implemented. Riots broke out throughout the country, and were only quelled by the imposition of mar- tial law. In particular the student body of Cairo demonstrated a po- litical awareness which hns since cone to be regarded as one of their characteristics, and were prominent in their advocacy of immediate and unconditional independence. Among them was a boy of thirteen years of age, named Hassan al-Banna , whose student activities during his formative years were to lead eventually to the formation of the Brotherhood. In March, 1919, Saad Zaghlul, the "father of Egyptian independ- ence", was exiled to Malta, together with three of hie principal support- ers, where thoy were detained for som/s six months. In the same year the Milner Commission visited Egypt to enquire Into and recommend on the fu- ture status of Egypt, Zaghlul visited London to confer with the British Government on the report, but no agreement could be reached* Further negotiations with the naw Egyptian Premiar, Adli Yaghan, also failed, and every failure marked an Intensification of the sporadic violence which was convulsing Egypt. Finally in 1922 Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner, went in person to London and Inaisted on the acceptance of a declar- ation which put a formal termination to the Protectorate and declared Egypt an Independent country, subject to four "reserved points" - in which, of course, lay the catch. These were: the right to defend the Suez Canal, for the maintenance of Empire communications; the defence of Egypt against any and all foreign aggression; the protection of for- eign rights In Scypt; and the control of the Sudan. Y/ith the exception of these points, which were "absolutely reserved" to Britain, pending further discussion, Egypt was allowed sovereignty, Fuad I was made King of Egypt, and in the elections of the following year the Wafd gained a sweeping victory at the polls, and ?.a*hlul became Premier of Egypt. The matter of the "reserved points" vsas taken up afresh In Sept- ember, 1924, when the British Labor Government entertained Zaghlul in London, but the negotiations again failed, and the failure was greeted In Egypt by a fresh outbreak of rioting and demonstration, which cul- minated in the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in Cairo. British re- prisals included a demand for an indemnity of half a million sterling, suppression of all demonstrations, and complete control of the Sudan. The lust point, which involved an indefinite expansion of irrigation for cotton groxvlng in the Jazira erea of the Sudan, gave rise for the first time to Egyptian fears that the Nile waters might be diverted from Egypt, a fear which has evor since bean at the root of much of the Egypt- ian agitation for control of the waters which alone can guarantee Egypt's existence. Zaghlul resigned, to die two years later and to be succeeded as head of the 'Vafd by Mustafa Nahaa. ?or the ten years following there were repeated attempts to solve the problems of the "reserved points" which alone were regarded as hindering the establishment of an Anglo- Egyptian Treaty, but progress was hampered by political instability in Egypt, where the Crown had now entered the political field with a bitter animosity a COHFIT)EMTIAL COPYRIGHT - NOT TO lit KtrKVlUUi-tu rHUluuKArniv.Ai.ui niinuui tenor of Egyptian policies, the outcome of which was an all-rmrty coalition under Nahas and a request for the resumption of nogo-ia-- ions with Britain. This took place in March, 1936, and was quick- ly followed in August by the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. Through sundry vicissitudes this remained In force until October, 1951, when it wan unilaterally abrogated by Egypt t under the leadership of the sane lianas Pasha who had been in- strumental in having it signed in the first place, The same year which saw the signing of the Treaty saw also the death of King Fuad, and the accession of his son, Farouk, at the age of sixteen. Under the new ruler the old Palace hostility to the Ward was retained, and it was not until 1942, in the famous incident of the /Vbdln Palace, that Farouk was constrained to accept Nahas Pasha as his Premier. \nother factor which profoundly influenced the development of events in Egypt was the effect of the radical changes effected in Tur- key by the Kamallst revolution. The abolition of tire fez as the trad- itional head-gear in 1925, tha abolition of all ecclesiastical dress and ceremony, and the suppression of the dervish orders demonstrated for the first time that an Islamic coxriitry was capable of striking direct- ly at Islamic custom, and nurvivins. The modernization which followed in Turkey profoundly affected opinion in Egypt. In 1928 TSuropean num- erals were adopted in place of the -\rabic, and in the following year the Roman alphabet was taken to replace tho Arabic script. Free and com- pulsory secular education vraa introduced on a co-educational basis, the Shari'a was replaced as the basis of law by a "'estern code, women were progressively emancipated, and in a variety of other ways Turkey became almost overnight a complete reversal of her former backward and reaction- ary self. In Egypt this process was followed itfLth breathless interest, and produced two diametrically opposed parties. The libarals saw in the Turkish revolution a possible renaissance for all Muslim countries, and various grades of religious liberalism were divided as to how far Islam could be modernized in conformity with the spirit of the times, as ev- idenced in Turkey. But by a process of reaction there arose also a strong conservative party, which waa ultimately to carry the day. This party was opposed root and branch to all the modernism \vhich was spread- ing such p'renicioua innovations through the Middle Eaat; they represented it as a direct attack on the sanctity of the rjur'en and the Sunna of the Prophet, and the neo-orthocloxy of Islam, latent in every Muslin country since the days of the Wahhabis in .\raMa and the Sanuai in Libya, re- ceived an access of fresh strength In Efsypt. The result was, first, to strengthen many of the roystlc (Sufi) religious orders which have always flourished in figypt, and second, to produce a crop of new religious so- cieties claiming an unconditional reliance on the Qur'an and the Islamic tradition. Prominent in tho younger element attaching to one of th» Sufi orders, and highly thought of by tho shaikh of that order (the Hasafi) waa the same youth, Hassan al-Banna, whom vie have already noticed. The struggle between liberalism and conservatism in Egypt was bitter in the extreme. In the literary field, wh«re its marks are moat enduring, it was represented by the labors of auch as Shaikh Mi \bd al-Raziq (Islam and the Principles of Government) and the famous Taha Hussain (In the Spirit of Ignorance), both of whom ware bitterly attacked by the ulama of the Azhar University. On the conservative side it was this period which saw the em- ergence to fame of such periodicals as Al-?ath, edited by Muhibb al-Din, and .\l-Manar, edited by Shaikh Rashid Rida. This academic activity was par- allelled on a lower level by riots and bloodshed between the rival parties throughout Egypt. Out of this tumultuous period of parturition wore born various move- ments and societies, mostly ephemeral, but including in their number two CONFIDENTIAL which were to be important, the Yours 1'en's Muslim Association, and the Muslim Brotherhood. The similarity in objective between these two is fitly emptomized by th© occurrence of "Muslim" in both titles; both, though especially the former, were originally cultural and re- ligious in origin; both were originally built up on a program of re- ligious reform on conservative lines. Reference has already been mnde in an earlier study (7d. Int. Review, Vol. 1, No. 8, Sept., 1952) to tbe THUdA as the precursor of the Muslim Brotherhood, and little more need be added here about organization. X full treatment of it is available in H.A.R. Gibb's book, "!'>hlther Islam", where it is described in detail by Prof. G. Kampfmeyer. j i One point which does require clarification Is that of the re- lation between the YtlJX and the Brotherhood. The former was founded in Cairo, where the YMCA. had been active since 1933, in December 1927; the latter was established formally in Isma'iliya some eighteen months later. It has often been remarked as strange that two movements so similar should follow one another at such a short interval, and the suspicion has been vended that Al-Banna found cause for dissatisfaction with the YMMA, and decided in consequence to found his own movement. The Brotherhood*s apologists reject this idea unconditionally, claiming that eighteen months was not sufficient for Al-Banna to discover any ! weaknesses in the association. But this defence receives little sup- j port from our knowledge of the character of Al-Banna, who was an in- i veterate founder of movemants. Himself a natural demagogue, he was < naturally inclined to tackle any problem by gathering around him a j nucleus of persons whom ha could dominate, and binding them into sons form of association. In. his student days there is record of at least . four societies which ho founded, none of which were long-lived, and, j like most Egyptian students, he is known to have been a member of many j more. j The essential identity of the two movements has often been claim- < ed by YEM.\ speakers, and has never boea specifically denied by Al-Banna. 1 Thus Salih Ilarb Pasha, the general president of the YKfcU, in a speech in ! the Fayyum in 1946 said: "Tho fundamental aim of the Muslim Brotherhood i and of the YMKA is identical; whoever tries to divide us la opposed to j us". v;hat difference does exist between the two may in all probability be explained by the changes in policy which overtook the TP.iM.-i at the end of 1928. Its universal!3t Islamic alms from that time tended to be over- looked, and to be replaced by a more particulariat gospel aimed at att- racting the allegiance of Egyptian nationalists. lYhere the Association had started on a broad basis of lolEzu for all Muslim countries, it now started to veer towards a position of preoccupation with purely S&yptian affairs. This shift of amphasia certainly resulted in the estrangement of many prominent TttSMA maabers, and it may well be that Al-Banna was slow ilarly disillusioned. Ticre is one further consideration. The work and influence of the YJMA was broadeat among the upper classes, while the results of Al-Banna*a experience froim 1925 to 1929 taught him that it was the middle and lower clasaes rhich wore most likely to listen to his mess- age. Ills attempts to gain a hearing in the upper circles of Cairo during that period were largely ineffectual, and at least from the time of his going to Isma'iliya in 1927 he confined his activities to the masses of Egypt's population.. The Muslim Brotherhood .was formally instituted in Ismailiya in March, 1928, and consisted of U-Banra and six of his immediate adher- ents. Al-Banna himself was only twenty-t-vo years of age, and had graduated as a teacher from the Dor nl-lilum in Cairo in September, 1927. He had been appointed to the elementary school in Ismailiya, where he taught throughout the five years which followed his founding of the Brotherhood, and preceded his transfer to Cairo. COWIDKMTI XL The first field of Brotherhood endeavour was the town of lamaillya itself. The centres of activity \vere the cafea, the renfle%-vouB of all classes in an Eastern community, and in three prominent cafes in Ismail- iya .U-3anna organized a bi-weekly lecture-sermon, followed by discussion, and instruction in the tenets of Islam for such as were intereated. The subjects treated in these meetings were almost exclusively religious, with emphasis on the application of the Qw'anic message to the present day. Dr Ishaq Liusa ul-Hussaini in a book entitled "The Muslim Brotherhood; the Greatest Modern Islamic Movement" (to which I am indebted for much interest- ing information) gives this list of subjects proposed for the coffee-house meetings: the nature of God, the Day of Judgment, temptation, monasticism, together with an exposition of the parables, stories, sayings and verses of the 'jur'an. This program, which was carried on after the cafe hours in secluded mosquss, carries a strong suggestion that it was something of the nature of a secret society which wae being fcurried. The mass of the cafe habitues were no more than the recruiting ground, out of whom could be chosen prom- ising material for further training and instruction, vrtiich was given in the mosque sessions. Although this is speculation, the nature of the Brotherhood's organization, their fanatic^ attachment to the cause and their complete loyalty to the person of their leader - all these and other aspects suggest something similar to the Israailiya sect which arose in Egypt in the Middle \ges. Kisa Clare Eollingwoith, in a new book en- titled "The \rabs and the lest", strikingly compares the Brotterhood with the Iron Guard in Rumania, and although the parallel is far from complete there are interesting similarities. Whatever the precise nature of the Brotherhood organization, there can be no doubt that it was strikingly successful in Ismailiya, and the success gained in the town inspired »l-Banna to extend his activities to the neighboring countryside. Branches of the Brotherhood were gradually established in the vicinity, each inc/opendent of the other, but all owning a common allegiance to the organizational centre which was now established in Ismailiya. Progress in the country was slower than in the town; it took two years before branchas were established and working in Abu Sir, Port Said and \l-Ballah, all within easy distance of lemailiya; after an- other year another branch was operative in Suez, at the farther end of the Canal. When U-Banna left Ismiiliye for Cairo in 1933 he had ten branches of the movement in operation, with a membership of some few thousands, most- ly drawn from the lower classes and the student body. The Ismailiya period mads a profound impression on Al-Banna, and may have influenced the future of the Brotherhood in important ways. It was, for example, now clear that it wa^ ~-"wi the peasants and workers, together with the students, that ho must gain most of his support. It was no less clear that Islamic orthodoxy, fearlessly and uncompromisingly presented, atill had the power to attract certain elements of the Egyptian population. But Ismailiya produced th<» firat improasioa of one major influence which was to shape the policy of the Brotherhood in the future to a great degree, the hatred of European influence in l&ypt. A. small book entitled "Memor- abilia of /U-Banna" bears testimony to this fact (p. 88) when it records the affront to national pride offered by the presence of the British '\rrny, the monoply decree on public utilities issued by the Suez Canal Company, the French way of life which denied *>he workers a living, and the ubiquity of foreign names on shops, "prostituting Egyptian nationhood to commercial profit". In 1933 Al-Banna wis transferred to a teaching post in Cairo, and the control of the Brotherhood movement went with him. Until 1936 the general lines of activity remained tuo same, the only change being an in- crease of intensity of propaganda. In Ismailiya the methods of the group had been largely personal and iramediiate, by conversation and letter, by personal preaching and discussion, together with publication. In Cairo CONFIDENT! & . 6 - broadcasting was added to the technique, and with easier communications and a more heavily popxxlated district accessible tbe tempo of evangel- ization could be increased. The rate of this expansion and the success of the movement may be gauged from the fact that in a broadcast from Cairo In 19M, i«e. only one year after Ma removal thither, ^L-Banna could claim that there wei-e fifty branches of thftftTOtlierl300f ll a 9VWy district of Egypt from TCdfu to Alexandria. The establishments varied somewhat in content, but raoot made provision for worship, education, technical training and sometimes for trade, such as a factory at liah- mudi^tfor the weaving of rugs and prayer-mats. The salient fact about this period of expansion is the amazing vitality displayed by Al-Banna personally. The Egyptian climate does not generally conduce to physical activity among those to whom it is not a necessity, but M-Bonna's daily program was energetic in the ex- treme. Ahmad Anwar al-Jundi, hla biographer, gives this account of his day: He would visit the general centre in the morning very early, leaving there memoranda and orders to be carried out. Thence he went to the school and taught his claeces; if ho WHS on tour through the country he would go direct to the school from whore he had stopped the previous night. At midday he would revisit the centre to deal with any new vjork which had com© in, and in the evening he wouH return to tbe cen- tre for the third time, and would spend the evening meeting deputations, interviewing visitors and sitting on conferences and committees. The same period saw the establishment of the Journal of the Muslim Brother- hood, the official organ of the movement, which was designed to keep the scattered branches in touch vdth one another ^r»d with the general head- quarters, now established in Cairo. Contact between the branches was also served by a new system of periodical conferences at which every branch was represented, and additional solidarity was provided by the personal Activity of the founder, who utilized his weekly and annual vacation, as he had done in Ismailiya, to travel extensively through the country. It was during this period also that the first move was made to expand tbe Brotherhood outside of E«2rpt proper, and by 1939 branches were in existence in the Sudan, Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and the Maghreb, The most important single development of the period which pre- ceded the outbreak of the war in 1939 was the gradual entry of the Brotherhood into the political arena in Egypt. Opinions vary, even among Arabic writers, as to whether or not the Brotherhood was origin- ally founded with tho idea in mind that it would form a powerful pol- itical force. On a consideration of all the facts it appears probable that such was not the ens©. Until 1936 the Brotherhood's aims as in- dicated by their preaching ware purely religious and cultural; that they had a social bearing goes without saying when the Islamic unity of re- ligion and society is kept in mind. But the emphasis throughout these seven years was purely individual, on the responsibility of the individual Muslim to reform his personal beliefs acd organize his own life arounfl a truly Islamic centre. tod that is true, even although the Brotherhood was numerically strong enough to make a public program on political lines long before 1936. This belief is strengthened by the nature of the initial attempts of the Brotherhood to influence politics. In the first instance the movement appears to have wished to do no more then act as an advisory body to successive Egyptian governments; and to this end a religious- social manifesto was despatched to the leaders of each government. In each case the purport of the manifesto was the same; it called for sweep- ing reforms in Egyptian internal affairs in conformity with the spirit of Islamic neo-orthodoxy. It alao contained the veiled outlines of a threat, to the effect that the Brotherhood was already a power in the land, and that therefore the government had better take heed. CONFIDEfflJI'VL , 7 . The general picture thus -presoinfced is of a movement which \uatt fltill inspired by ita zeal for social CONFIDENTIAL recognising the poviar of the Brotherhood, patched up a truce with Al-Banna, by which tb9 Brothei'hood was uot to attack tie Govern- ment, in return for concessions in favov.r of religious and social refoim. The opening period of Manas' Government also witnessed a further step in the progress of tha ;)rothe:?hood towards political powei , M-Banaa decide! to stand for Parliament in Ismailiya, where hla influence v;ae strongest, and was only \-dth difficulty dis- suaded by Hahas, at the pries of tha return of all the privileges of publishing and public assembly fhioh had previously been takec. away. Dooplte frequent changes of heart on tho part of Nahas, this sgree-. ment was maintained substantially throughout the letter's period of government, and sona temporary limitations of DrotVierhcod freedom of action met with only passive resistance from tho members, Nahaa was followed la 1044 by Abmad JJahii , who was opposed to the activity of the 'Brotherhood ia proportion as he favoured the cauae of the Miles. . His declaration of v«r on the Axis was met by ti» Brotherhood with unflagging hostility. Ahmad Mahlr was ae^asiiinatad in th$ following year, ant), the first set of his successor, Jfoqrashl Pasha, was to attempt to Implicate tis.e Brotherhood t and Al-Banaa in particular, in the assassination. Kothing, however, could be proved, and no specific iReaawea war© taken. Bat although Al-Banna paid a formal call on the now Proaior , cenkl r»s to ingratiate himself , Kuqrashi waa so little impressed that he iiamediataly revived the earlier repress- ive msasures v;hich had been taken age inst the movement. Despite this, ttw :.*i(;ht of fiae assembly was still lef-;, and at a gonsral conference in Septcnbsr, 1915, the Brotherhood offlc5.ally laid down a political program, baaed on au exposition of the Brotherhood ' a ideal 3 given by Al-Banna to tha movement a Fifth Conferonce (1930, mark- ing t'ae first decade of tl).Qir work). Tho program embraced tho east* points vrtiich had be«rc r^isetl iK earlier negotiations with the rjoverament iand tiie King, but aade significant mc-ution of tte legality of uains force to achieve the desired <3noa. Apologists for the Brothorliood are quick to maintain that the program did not ;3p3eifically mention a coup d'otat; aor does it, but the implication of tha possible use of violent, means is clear to be seen. It is equally clear that from this point the Brother- hood have practically given xvp V-ope oi? achieving their political refor- mation through the agency of any of tlia accepted political parties, and have decided, although the tin® is loft Indefinite, to attempt such a government themselves. The strength of the Brotb.€rac?>4 at this tlira apjjears to havo great enovxgh to warrant such decisive stops. According to Alp-Banna ths novemunt counted half a Billioa tr.smbera in Egypt alone, organiaed in 1,700 branches; at tha ueme tiwa the London Times more conservatively oatimated the membership at anything b3i\,icea tbrea and six hundred thou- sand. This membership VMS exiireasely active; it liad organized a vurloty of industrial projects in all ports of th© country, it now published fo.r the first time a daily paper, and, mo-^ significant, it had ita om train- ed pai'a-udlitary orsani2;i»tics. A closo crsanization e3d.sted, not only in Egjpt, but also in t Vie other Arab <::ountrles, where local branches were eworn to loyalty to their iJccal chief, und to the found «r, Al-Banivi. In- itiation cerentcnies inelud'od an oath of allegiance nnd unquestioning obed- ience 'to Brotherhood authority, Under pressure Iron Al~Banna e.nd hio supporters Nuqrasti ntiide a formal move to get tho British Gcvornuent to agreo to Egyptian control of the Svdan, but tho effort \;aa half-hearted, and ffdled. luceused by this the Brotherhood organised a campaign of demonstrations and riots which, they fomented by propaganda through proas eiic'i radio, heading tasir demands wi.th e threat of holy war if Egypt c!.i(x not gain complete indepeadenca. Thia continued through tho period of Huqraahi's retireuent , when he *aa auccueded .11. AL • 9 ~ by Sidqi Pasha, and hie return aft a:? the fall of the Sidqi Cabinet in December, 1946. On the ci.ay of SiSqi Te» return to powar Al-Baima mads a highly inflammatory broadcast, which he followed up with an equally provocative issue of his press organ The result was war to tho luxifo between the Brotherhood and the Oov'si-niment , a war which was intensified by tho outbreak of the Palestine hos i-ilitioo , in which the Brotherhood played an active part. Hot only cli-t they provide volunteers for* ths fighting, but on 6 May, 1948, the political committee of the Brother- hood net, with AL-Baana in the chair, and formally approved a petition to tire dovernmont of Sfcypt, -is -well as to all other Arab Goversments to declare a holy war against the Jews. In ':he meantime the question of internal affairs in Egypt was to be reduced to a "paper war". Thosre is no question btafc the Brotherhood volunteers , thanks to thoii- discipline and their t mining, vjere srwmn the cut standing: suceaati- eo of tlis Egyptian !.':il l ten y comp.-iifpi (in which successes ivere coaspicous- ly few). Tbe "Egyptian .for ess ,?ere ..-.'epulssd with heavy losses:, and tha rumovr grew in Broth'sorhcotl circles t'lat tha Saadis* Government v«as dQ- liboiately responsible for the loaa o? Piolherhood forces which it was beginning to sae as a mem- tee to the liability of Egypt - possibly with some justification. The:'© waa a 7i ol«nt outbreiiic of rioting in Cairo, and Fuqraahi seiaed thet opportunity ;:>o issue hia. decree of 8 Isicembor, proscribing the Brotherhood anci c.\os.i^ davn all their ceatrer. AJL- Banna appears to have iina(p7te(l >- oo ni',1 biographer claims - tliat he ooulci. pacify the situation^ btxt Ma Hopes were das'osd by the atsaasination of Nuqrashi on 33 Decent*)'?, IS^e. «:ia the ether band It was claims^ b;/ the Egyptian opposition to tho ;lCGt]b.a>?]iood tfiat tho jnovetnent itaolf , wheth er or not Al-Danna had beon a party '.o ttie plot, bad been regionsibla for Kuqre.aM'a deatih. On Al-Bazaia's bt/.ia.'U'' it can certainly be argaed Shit he w£?.a too shrewd to beliove tliat sc.'.!"n c mcve viould rsoult in any *,d7aa- tage fcr his society, and in ffict Ib.-ahim .\bd al-Eadl, who succeodod Muqrashi, did nothing to iiltigate tfc;) vigour of the ban on the Brother- hood, Tho prescription of tho mo-sem^at sn-3 the death of Kuqpuohi viere followed by a roeetins of ihe cMe:? ni tmbers of tho 3ro therhood ., at y.'hicii the decision was taken to attempt tc t:iJce cnror the gov CC««TD3HTIAL PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 J H s « Reference!' *"o"^-f" / llD&^l&h ^1 1 1-)-&1 1 , 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 MINN 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION GONFXDHNll/lL - 10 - Since the death of Al-Banna the Brotherhood appears to hare suffered something of a recession in Egypt, and to have relied more for its strength on ita branches in other countries, notably in Syria. But the last has almost certainly not been heard of them. Al-Banna has to some extent been replaced by Snlih aL-Ashmawi, a demagogue of the sane pattern, although of leas wj.de acceptance in the society than was the original founder, and slnae the accession to power of General Naguib little has been heard of Al-Aahmawi, or of the Egyptian brother- hood in general. At present tha inUellegontsia of the movement, rep- resenting a considerable influa/ice from tho Azhar and Fuad al-Awwal Ua- iveraities, are producing a series of monographs designed to formulate a set doctrine which the Brotherhood may use as a political plitfcrm. Tho subjects to be treated Include:1 Islam and political'questions, Is- lam and legal questions, Islam and economic questions, Islam and trade\ questions, Islam and socialist theories, and Islam and political .1 t * f - 2 - , \ Apart from Sufiara, and the study of lalam Reuerally, two literary influences played a prominent part in tha lifa of Al~Banna as a student. One was the study of tho old literatux'e, vdth its emphasis on courage and the philosophy of struggle, the "hamaea" literature, with its emphasis on the illustrious history of the Arabs and the demands on modern nationalism. The other was the writing of such men as RashId Rida and Muhibb al-Din, in- fluential figures on the conservative side of the debate to which reference was made in an earlier part of this atudy. : A. summary of Al-Banna's personality during his student doys include four aspects which appear to have impressed his contemporaries. 1. Proficiency in study. He was six months under the regulation agp when he entered the training colle^a, and yet hia work was such as to keep him at the head of the class, i and to make him graduate fifth for all Egypt. .:• V V •.;,:.; •. •': ...'.' '. - ! . ' '; . • - i. ; : ' '\ •':"•• •;•".• ••-..• ! ' :''!,i . 2. A retentive memory. One of hie contempcrarlfla said of him that ,1 be never forgot a name or a face, even fio the end of his life. This is the more surprising when it la remembered that during the period of his work in Isnailiya and Cairo he waa meeting. new people at the rate of hundreds every t : ; weak.'•<;, ;••• ••' ' -. ' ; •, , ' •' ' . ' ,: ; . ; -- [ , • .. .\ ' • ' * ; - " ' ' ' ' i 3. Skill in ths Viandliiig of personal relations. Many stories are told of Al-Baana'e phenomenal insight and instiactiveskill in. dealing with people. He was adept at flattering personal vsnity and gaining hia point without involving the other peroosa in a.iy loss of pride or dignity. This is certainly apparent from his handling of some of the most sensitive elements of Egyptian life, such ae Ashar University personnel, in the later days of his mission. The parallel vdth Hitlor io here exceedingly clear; like Hitler he had a captivating and canpalling manner; unlike Hitler, he made an influence which waa generally lasting, 4. Control of his followers. \like in private conversation and in public utterance Al-3anna had an oratorical power which appeared to hie foil- owers to be quasi-magical. .lit-* gv hia adherents were mainly drawn from the working class, this was by no means universally the case, especially after tho move to Cairo in 1933, and yet- Al-Banna had the gift of making all and sun- dry feel at home in the Brotherhood. Avoiding any literal interpretation of tha Qpr'anic doctrino of the absolut© equality of all believers, ha yot con» . trived to make his hearers feel that there was a place for all within the , movement, *nd that each was perfonniag a. task no leas important than that of his fellows. As a student ho was famed for his ability to impress his mill on his fellows, and the ascendancy tluis gained proved to be permanent. The sane gift was lavished on the Brothorhool, and to this day there are thousands in Egypt who speak of Al-Banna in nvanoianis teros. His rul© was absolute, and al-thour>h he never himself claimed Divine inspiration, tha claim was freely accorded him by many of bin followers. " This last characteristic, which is by far the most important of Al- Barona's endowments, required further ccmmsnt* It we3 compounded of tvro abilities, whose union proved, as it usually does, invincible, a sincere re- ligious belief, and a nastery of oratorical technique,, There is no reasoa to doubt thnt Al-Eanna was a profoundly devout Uualim. Pa-*thermora fee waa an orthodox Muslim, of the school which can. find in Islam the complete ana satlBfactory answer to tho manifold problems of practical life* His favourite speaking tiiomos were the sufficiency cf Islam as a social and political creed; Riusliita had no need of Nanism to ex- press their notional -^lldarity, no nood of^Communism to eaqpreas their in- ternational xvrdiiy; 1 ;I?m contained both those essentials,, Aal lelaoic civil« isation compared favourabl'/ nth any other civilisation t past or prosent, con- stituting at ita best a pattern of social equity and balanced economy which any nation in the world could afford to copy,. - 3 . Set down thus, such a belief scorns dry to the point of triteness, j But whan adorned with the oratorical gifts which Al-Banna could handle so masterfully it was sufficient to inflame T^yptian nationalism and Islam!am to a frenzy. Unfortunately Arabic oratory in translation loses so much as to be almost nonsensical, but of its own genre it is a powerful weapon. And Al-Banna had that weapon tempered to a high pitch. He was a master of the classical, ornamental idioa which the ordinary Egyptian reverences the more because of his own ability to handle it; he could use the rhymed prose which the Prophet used in the lur'an, and by its aid he gave to his own utter- ances an archaic and other-worldly sound which greatly increased their power over the hearers. And he could quote profusely, thanks to his excellent memory, from the ancient and modern poetry of the Arabs, another sure pass- port to the favour of an Arab audience. Al-Banna was endowed, over and above the natural gifts of mind and memory, with a constitution which permitted him to undertake the severest physical exertions, and to maintain a totally unusual (for Egypt) level of activity. For years on end he worked ;>nd travelled almost literally day and night, *aeeting with unflagging ener/jy the demands made on both mind and body by a rigorous program of travelling, speaking and preaching., writing and personal interviews. Both in Ismailiya and in Cairo he personally super- Vised the work of the administrative centre of the movement, and that in add- ition to carrying on his normal work as a teacher. Reference has been made already to the normal program of his day in Cairo; from the same source, his biography by Al-Jundi, comes this itinerary of one week-end in tha Summer of 1359. He left Cairo for Al-Mania, which he reached on Friday evening at 7.00 p.m. Leaving Mania at midnight ho travelled to Edfu, where he arrived * in the early morning, to stay only until midday. Then he went to Qam by sunset, and thence, after c atay of sains five hours, to Naja Hamadi, where he arrived in the morning (Sunday). Thd same afternoon lie went on to Jarja, and after spending the evening there, loft for Cairo at 11.00 p.m., arriving in the city early Monday mcrnirg, just in tin» to resume his work at the school. And that took place, not merely on scattered occasions, but constant- ly. The total distance covered on this Journey was some 1,000 miles. He al- < ways travelled third class, in tho unspeakably uncomfortable accommodation of \ the Egyptian State Railways, in order to save his expenses, and if no cheap ' mode of transport offered, he was known frequently to walk to his destination. Such was Hassan al -Banna, founder and saint of the Muslim Brotherhood. His movement has often been compared with the Nazi and Fascist movements in ! Germany and Italy, and himself with the leaders of those movements. Such a ' comparison appears questionable, except from a superficial point of view* ' The organization of the brotherhood bears a certain resemblance to that of Nasiiam and Fascism, especially in its teaching of absolute and unconditional obedience to the founder, in its aeini-secret society form, and in its will- - ingness to use forceful methods to achieve its ends. But there tho resemb- lance ends. The Brotherhood was, and is, an avowedly religious movenent with > a program of reform as an end in itself; the European dictatorships ware ^rank- | ly anti-religious, and, as Bullock's biography of Hitler shown, xleaigned less i to benefit any nation than to gain power for the dictator,, And when the move- ments are taken as reflecting the character of their founders the comparison breaks down altogether. With Al-Banna there was none of the monomania which characterised Hitler and Mussolini; to tho end of his life he remained a fru- [ gal man, in contrast to the oatentntion and grandeur of tha European dictators; the power which he wielded never seduced him into isolating himself fx-om the people whom he led, as it did with the other two; and he never appears to have suffered from the delusions of grandeur which plagued the German and Italian dictators. } f There has been considerable suspicion, even among Egyptian writers, that ho was an ambitious wan whose real aim was disclosed by the plot of late 1948, when a plan was laid to stags a coup d'etat and proclaim Al-Banna Caliph of Islam. That the coup was discussed after the assassination of - „ jj • . • . f i ' COmKBJTlAL / :' PUBLIC BEC9RP 9FFICE 1 2 3 5 •6. \ * 1 Reference:- . i ' K >• t *' X *«, > »'{ ifr**. > , 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION | . -^p „,„,., , , „ „ -,,„-,... ,.-—,. ,r....r. . • ... - • ..,^-,,1 CONFIDENTI ^L Nuqrashi la certain; that this was to be followed by the establishment of au Islamic state on the old pattern is net eo certain. From the prin- ciples of the Brotherhood it would certainly have been a logical step, but the records of the meeting at which the plan was discussed are so vague and general in terras that it is difficult to believe that any such concrete pro- posal was made, far less that plans were laid to implement it. And even eo, to the mini of the present writer thero is no evidence from the reminder of Al-Banna's life to indicate that he would seek 'such a post for himself. Ho might well have accepted it, if the issue had ever arisen, in the belief that it was for the benefit of Islam In general, ane Egypt in particular, but on the available evidence he may woil bo acquitted of the charge of personal am- bition in either the religious or the political sphere. He exercised a per- sonal and immediate supervision of all tiia Brotherhood organization, with the result that his death was tl» greater a blow to the movement, but he may be believed to have done so in the interests of efficiency and personal interest, rather than of personal ambition. One of his followers paid him this tribute, than which there could be few greater: "The law which governs and organises the Ilchwan is the law of brotherhood, a law which is most fitly exemplified in the character of the founder of the movement." CtHBTDEnTI/iL Teachings aid Principles of the The Kuslim faith rams ins to-aay what it &aa always been in theory, aid occasionally in practice, s relig'.oc. to which nothing whatsoever is irrelevant, a faith which, in ttra viorclo of Its apoli<;ists, "covera alll the aspects of earth and Heaven" . Hence it is no; surprising to finfl that the Muslim Brotherhood, as a specifically religion-baaed society, has a system of teachings and an organisation of priuctples which comprehend all aspects of life in the Middle East. In this respect ib bears the clear imprint of its founder and his views. Al-Banna himself laft no dubiety «o to the scopa o.f his mission; repeatedly he asserted that the piwpooe of the Brotherhood was to gain acceptance for "a program of fvmcia>nent.nl reorganization of society", and a formal statement of principle was adopted by the Brotherhood General Congress of September, 194Ji. The analysis of the movement's principles , which follows is taken largely from this documant. The statement claims explicitly to be a long-term program v;hich have to facu considerable difficulty before it can be realised. To tfcla end three methods of progress ere enjoined on all -nen'bera of the Brotherhood: Teaching and evangelization, preparation, training and discipline., and the establishment of practical projects to illustrate tho alms of the movement. ' \ i f The clarion call of tho Brotherhood is "Back to the Qur an"t wbare, Al-Banna claimed, is to "be fcuntf the tru® rale of life, f»r ^reottir and more comprehensive than any other doctrine which tha world has to offer. Dem- ocracy, Communism and all othor ideologies of ihe world are no more than par- tial interpretations of ^ur'anic teaching. la this connection it is worth while to translate verbatim a quotation of one of Al-Banna1 s speeches, de- livered to an audience of University stwiants in. Cairo: "If the communists ar>3ue to you that 'Our principles are broadly bnimanltarian; we help **•* weak ! and the poor, we establish equal. ity between all men, wo create social, sc- oaoialc »nJ political equality • , then you can say to them: 'That may wall be so „ But our Islamic principles include all of yours, and more. TCSVQ is ; no single belief of which you boast but wd hava in Islam as good und better, and' more1 w. . - . . ' ' . • . ; • / 1 ; _ • i.i'.ii This is a typical erpreeaion of Islamic neo-orthodoxy. .It holds ; the Q»ui'fan in supreme reverence, and looks back to the classic days of Muslim civilisation la the seventh century, which ib ^sraista ia holding as a pattern for Islam in the twentieth century. Of itself this is noth- ing novel; Islam has alwaya been subject to tt.e Influence of such movements which In general have proved no ""^ve than locel and temporary in their si&- ,(| nificance. But the Brotherhood V^vcs gone deeper into tho question of app- i| licatlon of Islamic teachings to contomporary life than have most previous i ! movements; ttey have made a carefu), aol sustained effort to work out a system of Qur'anic doctrine, though sometimes -at ttoa eaqpense of a somewhat strained | exegesis, which will cotrpraheud all the aspect o of modern life. Al~Banna T* himself summed up his position tfhon ia one of Ms speechec he declared: "You can justifiably call the Mualini Brotherhood a coaaervativo movement, a re- ' •._•;_ actionary sect, a mystical religious fraternity, a political committee, an i ;; educational and cultural body, an ocououic venture and a social philosophy - all are true*. /-. ' • • ' | - . ' • •. \ . ,- ; -.. >:- fundatiental principles of the Brotherhood, derived froa the Qur'aa, may be listed under sir main heads!, '•• ; 1. Intellectually th® Brotherhood depends on tbe exposition of the Qur • an in detail, clarifying wliat is doubtful in it, and removing from it the innovations and impurities which generations of scholars have addad to it. 'tl. iVhea the Qur'an ia thus expounded It wiliL be found to be timeless, and as applicable to twentieth, ceatury ISgypt ae to seventh century Arabia. Religion must be made th« Centre of intellectual life. • ; i " " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' CONFIDENTIAL . 3 . 2. Practically this cantrality of roligion must be made the ground for uniting the Egyptinn nation and the nations of the Islamic world in its observance, to form one unity. Religious sectarianism must be abolished, a task which can be accomplished only by the construction of a new Islamic so- ciety on a Qur'anic basis, headed by a recreation of the Caliphate. Ahmad Anas al-Hajaji has a pointed quotation to this end when he says "We shall not rest until we see the Qur'an established as a constitutional program. For that aim me shall live and die". ; .j •'•".r 3. .Economically the party stands for an increase in national pro- duction, in national defenco and in the standard of living. It seeks so- ' clal equality between Individuals and clsfleei - a point which is as attract- ive as it is necessary in E^ypt - with special reference to the advancement : of the working classes, on which the strength of the movement largely depends. Economically the Brotherhood also seeks the termination of foreign economic interests In Egypt, and the talcing over of their place by local national in- terests. :... . .-' /''.. •" •-.'..• ... •". ••: ' . :• .- :. : •:>•! • ' " ! 4. In the field of social service the Brotherhood envisages the j establishment of social service organizations on a national basis, to com- bat the ravages of illiteracy, disease , poverty and immorality. j 5. From the nationalist point of view the Brotherhood believes in achieving the unity of the Nile Valley as an Arab kingdom, and the liber* atlon of the Islamic world from every form of foreign influence. It seeks also to re-establish the unity of the Arab world in a new Islamic state which will be internally united and externally influential. ; : i ' 6* In the international field the movement seeks partnership in ' establishing mutual confidence between the nations. Islam is to be preach- ed as an international religion, the only one capable of demonstrating true brotherhood and achieving it throughout the world. . ' i ' )" : . Towards the realization of these principles Muslim Brotherhood writere have elaborated a variety of methods and approaches, which although they | occur in a variety of forma and combination/! in different writers, generally \ take a fairly uniform direction* The follovdng Hat of steps give an idea j of the practical methods by which the Brotherhood believe that their aims may -, be accomplished. ; ' ', • ' '••; ! " ' • : ' ••'!•<.•'.:: :- ' • ' ,' 'J ' '• ' - - ' '• • • ' • .'. y^ 1. The movement must isolate itself from all forma of the older re- I ligious sectarianism; it is to be the sect to end all sects. The belief underlying this is sound, that adherence to one particular set of doctrines IB liable to obscure the unity of the picture. The Brotherhood are rather ^ to concentrate on finding common ground between divergent opinions which have ' s too often succeeded only in weakening the Islamic cause. It la recognized , that there will always be scholastic dispute over theological points, but the > duty of Brotherhood members is to keep in clear focus the essential truths of ' Qur'anic teaching. I 2. The Brotherhood must not accept support from wealthy or noble or influential persons. It is to remain a working class organization, because otherwise it will be used to exploit personal advantage. (The lesson of the experience of the Wafd is perhaps here to be seen). j 3. There must be no alliance with any political party or political ' influence, because politics engender a spirit of factiousness which will j destroy the brotherhood on which the movement rests. Political doctrine la j divisive, whereas the function of a religious movement is to unite, and in «"• the final resort allegiance is owed to none but the Creator, and to Ilia rev- '•*" elation, rather than to any human political platform. . '.'•'. • • 4. The progress of the Brotherhood is to be regarded as necessarily a long-term policy. Only by gradual advance can it be assured of achieving its alms, and that by evangelization, by teaching and by discussion. CONFIDENT! AL l-Uyi-l 1 KLLUKU VfJtLtt i 31 « 9 JRtftrtnc*:- 1 1 /' ' **f*\ t-7 *^W^ _—/ I ' I1 /f II Jf™ %/V 1/ - J^~/ X*"/ Hf\j / Ln^ f^f^ 1t 0I Jr"^LfiA 1 1 2 III 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION SI*; i*,» % **W4&.*»fctd4. JttSwiUs «*^ A, ^, « ^ '..... ^.. *.-..<•, *„..,..> ''. ... * t. ^.» i ,- t (, *. *. >! 1 I ^ *j ? '"it CONFIDENTIAL - 3 - 5. Various kinds of force may be used to achieve the purposes of \ the movement; these range from the purely religious, in the power of belief and faith, through the organizational, the power of association and the force of an oath of allegiance, and the moral, power of example, to the physical, it being held that armed force is allowable. This is held to be the last resort, all other methods having been previously tried, but if all else fails, then it is permissible to raise an insurrection and to take over the state by violence.. • ••.:' • ' •'. <.•*,•,.•>.... • . I •. • . . • ••:..(', ; ;; .; \ > ; : ' <;\;\' ' • • •' ' '• ' ' ! ' <••:'.•'). 6. " Since the state is one of the pillars of Islam, the ultimate ' aim of the Brotherhood Internally is the establishment of a religious state. In this the authority in all departments, legislative, executive and ad- ministrative v:ould be controlled by religious personnel, preferably under the leadership of one individual, the Caliph. The Brotherhood do not, they say, 5 seek this power for themselves; the Caliphate is to be open to the free election of all Muslims, but the Brotherhood members will constitute themselves the state army, with power to defend the country and to enforce the decisions of the ru- ler. : • - • •; •' .;••;• -: ''.:'••_' 7. The aim of the religious state will be to establish Arab and Islamic unity throughout the East. The first of these is commonly inter- preted in linguistic, rather than ethnic, terms, a fsct which is understand- able in Egypt which ia racially anything but pure Arab. The interpretation . I of Islamic unity includes all countries in which Muslims live, and would therefore comprehend the whole of the North African coast,' the entire Middle East, together with parts of Southern Russia, the whole of the Indian sub- continent, and a large proportion of the Far East - an ambitiout program. This aim is to be realised in two steps. The first is to induce all Muslims to gain independence in their own countries, to expel all foreign influence and, if necessary, to overthrow existing governments; the second is the weld- ing of these Muslim communities into a single unity. The resultant unity is conceived to be something after the federal plan, each country bearing its own local responsibilities, but all acting together under a supreme head, the Cal- iph, in any matter touching the common weal. 8. The final and supreme point of the program is the restoration of the Caliphate, which is held to be the focal point and the guarantee of Islamic unity. But it is always pointed out with some emphasis that the day for the re-establishment of the Caliphate is still very distant, and that it must be preceded by many pi'ior developments» It is realized that the Cal- iphate, however excellent an ideal, has been out of effective existence for too long to be immediately effective. 9. In the field of foreign relations every state which attempts to exploit or enter a Muslim country is an aggressor, and the new Muslim countries must use every endeavour to drive the Europeans out. The Islamic world cannot be satisfied with anything less than complete freedom and in- dependence, and in case of necessity will not hesitate to Invoke the power of jihad, or holy war, In order to free itself. CONFIDENTIAL yhq . cavities of the T'ovement As might be expected from an organization based on a religion which claims to cover the whole of life, the activities of the Brotherhood are as varied and as far-reaching as their religious beliefs, '^hey have in the c > 4rse of their existence become active in nany fields, and in fcach they have left the characteristic stamp of thelr^ beliefs on what- they hnve done. In the initial stages the y ove-ncnt was exclusively ' religious, and its activities were correspondingly evangelistic. This phase has been classically expressed by Al-Banna, thus* "Our aim is" to achieve t: e aims and objectives \vhich are proposed by true religion, to expound the gospel of the noble Qur'an, and to promote a sound understanding of Islam". To the Brother- hood "ind ligypt, and evon the whole ^ast, was far from under- standing Islam, dominated as it was by religious illiteracy, by error &nrt bigotry; the T'uslin world wns q geographical, rather than a religious entity. Hence the ifrst, and for a considerable ti^a, the only-activity of the Brotherhood wan preaching and teaching. It Is also regarded by ^any mem-' rs, even to the present day, as the most important function of the movement, and the moreso an it has proved consistently Influential in the ranks of Egyptian labor, the clnr?s in which Egyptian Islam is strongest in any case, Islam itself is anything but a quietist religion, despite the popular Western belief in its teaching of predestination, and contains many revolutionary note;-, of which tho Brotherhood made full use in their presentation. Some few of these nay be noted. Sriphasis was laid, for example, on the primacy of spiritual valu< s, as opposed to the gross materialism which wns all too apparent in contenporary Egyptian life. To preach to a gathering of peasants and laborers that the ostentatious wealth which is displayed daily by the - jCT-^Vtl/. , vy / Cy/HA-/ , 1 . 2 ^^lil/t/oL/C/t? ( ' CrQ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1! 1 1 1 I COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION 8. all parts of the Tuslim world. To this end a united effort would have to be made by all the Islamic countries, and the outbreak of the Palestine war was actually seen by some of the I'uslira Brotherhood as the beginning of this process. Hence the comparatively large, and compar- atively successful, contribution which the movement made to the iirab cause? hence also the correspondingly bitter rancour wh'.ch was expressed by the Brotherhood against the corruption and the spirit of faction which they believed h-.d **sold them down the river1*. Such is a general outline of the political prof,v <* V At the sa^e time a branch was founded in Jordan, I! which seams to hnve had the approbation of King Abdullah, that shrewd political manipulator. The anman branch is still in existence, but little is heard of it, and even the Brotherhood apologists are content to pass over it in comparative silence. In Lebanon the Brotherhood movement has taken its tone from the conditions of that 'and of "minority parties"} it is much less extremist in its political •and nationalist teachings, relying ^ainly on a doctrine of "every man to his own way". Their principal teach- ing points are domestic reform, and the common interests of Lebanese and Syrian Arals, They specifically reject any interference in the political field, proclaiming . themselves to be merely a social and cultural ^arty without political ambitions, and they h-sve insisted on membership of their number being conditional on complete lack of party affiliation elsewhere. First efforts to found a branch of the Brother- hood in Omdurman in the Sudan were made in June, 1946, and in October of the same year the Cairo headquarters sent two members on a mission to spread the activities of the movement. This delegation went first to Omdurman and thence to Khartum, attenptlng to commend the L'rotherhood to Sudanese religious and political societies and personalities on the twin grounds of its champion- ship, of I'uslim independence and the unity of the Nile Valley. But Sudanese opinion watf by no means con- ^ »' vinced of the value of either of these premises, and i 3! the delegation appears to have been something of a failure,. Only in Omdurman and in some parts of the great cotton-growing area of the Jazlra did they meet with any success. Vublic opinion in the Sudan is so sharply divided as to the political future of the country that it is only natural that the evangelizing efforts of the Brotherhood should have net with only a meagre response in this area- Only one party out of three believes in union with Ugypt, and it is in the area of this <\shi3ja influence that the branches are strong. In addition the hold of Islam in great areas of the Sudan is precarious, to say the least, particularly in the 'South, and therefore it is only in the more ^rabiscd IJorth that the movement can hope to have any real success. At the raiment there Is little indication of much activity, although publication and broadcasting are used to \ress the Brotherhood claims. \ In the remainder of Africa Brotherhood activity started first in Asmara (Eritrea), where the local Islamic societies Initiated a Move to affiliate them- selves with the Egyptian mover-vent. In the ,rest there are branches In ':etouan, Tunis, Algiers and Tripoli, but very little appears to be known about tlielr con- dition or about any activities. In Libya, which is strongly Sanusi, as in Arabia, as s' rongly .,'ahhabl, the Brotherhood has r\a and, so far as can be ascertained, no branches ove . exist in these countries. This is naturalo The existing religious movements have robbed ty\e L-rotrterhood of- the initiative in the Islamic field, and allegiance to an Egyptian nationalist society cannot be expected. In Iraq, again, the movement is secret. Attempts were made in 194?, during the 'oeriocJ of Brotherhood ascendancy in llgypt, by Iraqi sympathizers to open a branch in Baghdad, but permission MI\S refused by the government. None the loss individual supporters of the sect, most of whom had core under its influence while in JjJgypt, appear to have founded a secret society on Brotherhood lines, and this society nay even be semi- officially linked with Egyptian interests and under Egyptian control. The Baghdad riots which followed and protested the signing of the Treaty >f Vortsmouth in 1948 were marked by demonstrations which carried the , signs of Brotherhood activity, and at the close of the demonstrations several individuals were imprisoned on a charge of being associated with the Brotherhood. There is also a school in Baghdad known as the "School of the T"uslir Brotherhood", whose principal rclits a newspaper mttrkcd by the sare type of teaching Triiich the Brotherhood employ. Bo fi. Outside of the Middle East the T'uslim Urotherhood lias effected little. There are claims that they have established or are establishing branches in Pakistan, Ceylon and Indonesia, but these cannot be substantiated. Summary / With the coming to power of '"ajor-General Nagulb in 1952 the Brotherhood received a further check to its rolitical activities, already set back by the death of Al-Eanna. All political parties in ] iigypt have now been proscribed for a three year term of experimental military dictatorship. The result has been that the Brotherhood in ilgypt has ' retreated again to its familiar ground as a religious and social movement, on vmich ground it is busily laying the foundations for future expansion vrhen the military ban is removed. The most recent report which has come to hnnd has this to say: "The Muslim Brotherhood is well disciplined and active. Its weekly meetings in Cairo nre regularly attended by several hundred eager, intent, dedicated, but not predominantly fanatical men. './hat is most marked about them is their sense of brotherho »d and loyalty. The memory of Hassan al-Kanna has assumed v - a messianic character, and the tragedy of his death is recounted in terms wlJ.cn are reminiscent of the •. ? crucifixion of Christ. The energies of the Brother- hood are currently being exerted towards spreading t its organization and influence, both with its members , and in the government. The accent in doctrine is on the purification of the spirit, nt the same time the Brotherhood takes c vital, and, on the \vhole, , ! ? 1 2 {~& ^ *1M 1 / // C'c.3C V/ C' £C> oy( /' c?X rVO / .III 1 I 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSIOM FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE En clair FOREIGN OFFICE AMD WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION Mr. Hankey ,D. 10.53 a.ra. October 5, 1953 No.1397 October 5, 1953 ,^/" R. 11.3*. *.a. October 5, 1953 Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 1397 of October Repeated for infomation Saving to Paris B.M.B.O. The following appointments were announced last night. Lieutenant-Colonel Zakaria Mohieddin, Director of Military Intelligence and aenber of the C.R.C., to ba Minister of the Interior. Wing Commander Ganal Salam, member of the C.R.C., to be Minister of Communications. 2. Lieutenant-Colonel Asdel Naser, former Minister of the Interior, remains Deputy Prime Minister. Foreign Office please pass to Washington and Paris as my Saving telegrams Nos. 33^ and 12Q respectively. [Repeated Saving to Washington and Paris]. PPPP s' PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 1 2 3 4 5 « Jteferen.ee:- /--"t" J^ ^>f / // Of T Jtf 1 2 - ~ ii//c2oL/c/t> 7 / c/ o / 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION CaiFIDKNTIAL FRCM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE Cypher/OTP WAR OFFICE .DISTRIBUTION Mr, Hankey No. 1399 D: i.,52 p.m. October 5, 1953 October 5,1953 R: 5.24 p.m. October 5, 1953 CQJFIDENTIAL ,1 Following for Wtr Office (M. From Military Attache* Cairo. MA/I/236 October 5 1953. Lt. Colonel Zakaria Mohy el Dine appointed Minister of interior vice Gamal Abdul Nasr. Also retains his present post as Head of Directorate of Intelligence. Reason for this appointment considered to be one of internal politics amongst CRC aimed at more even distribution of ministerial responsibilities, possibility also that Nasr considering eventitol post as Prime Minister wishes to reduce his other conmitments. Interesting point is open admission of Zakaria1B powerful influence hitherto kept behind the scenes. G G G G BRITISH EMBASSY,, No. 218 CAIRO. (1011/115/53) October 14, 1953 CONFIDENTIAL. \r Sir, With reference to my telegrams Nos.1373.1376 and 1398 reporting the trial and sentence of Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, former saadist prime Minister, i have the honour to submit an account of the trial based on press reports and on information gleaned from other sources. it seemed worth going into some detail, as this was probably the most important case with which the Tribunal will have to deal and provides a fair example of its methods and procedure. Summaries of the proceedings which appeared in The Egyptian gazette are enclosed. 2. Abdel Hadi appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal composed of three members of the council for the Revolutionary Command (wing/commander Abdul Latif Boghdadi, president, and Lieutenant colonel Anwar1 sadat and squadron/Leader Hassan Ibrahim members), at its first session on September 26. The following charges, of which he had been informed 36 hours earlier, were read out and he pleaded not guilty to each in turn:- (i) Contacting foreign pov/ers during 1953 with the intention of working against the regime and country. (ii) Involving the Egyptian Army in the Palestine battle before it was fully prepared in order to comply with ex-King Forouk's wishes, thereby giving imperialism a firm hold on this country. (ill) Conducting a reign of terror during 1948 and 1949 by arresting and torturing Egyptian citizens and personally supervising the carrying out of his orders. These measures were not Justified by security needs and thereby violated the provisions of the constitution then in force. (iv) preparing the assassination of Sheikh Hassan el Banna, the supreme Guide of the Moslem Brotherhood, and attempting to mislead the investigation so that the criminals might escape punishment. (v) Taking an effective part in having the royal yacht "Al Mahrussa" repaired at great expense, • despite technical advice against it. (vi) Abusing his ministerial influence in the years 1945, 1947, 1948 and 1949, by having roods made serving bis property thereby causing unnecessary expense to the Treasury. Abdel Hadi protested that he had not been interrogated before the trial and that he had had no time to obtain witnesses. /His Right Honourable Anthony Bden, M.C., M.P., Foreign Office, LONDON* 3.YJ. 1.