/ O S-f- I / /^oL / CJ fc» "l/o'O/ COPYUlGHT - NOT TO~BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMI3SIOH CONFIDENTIAL. INTSRNAL POLITICS IN EGYPT. The Long-term prospects of the Army Movement. The increase in anti-regime activities during the past weeks and characteristically vigorous counter measures taken "by the Council for the Revolutionary Command point to the need for a re-assessment of the regime's expectation of life. Such an exercise is particularly necessary in view of the fact that there is a possibility that over the next few weeks agreement in principle on tho Canal Zone question may "be reached. Will the regime last long enough for this agreement on principles to "be translated into a formal ^detailed instrument, and if so, what are the chances of the regime surviving for the duration of the latter? 2» Increased opposition activities have taken the form of an organised rumour campaign, the dissemination of pamphlets on a greater scale, more outspoken criticism in certain sections of the press, and possibly incitement of industrial la"bour and even of discontented elements in the Army including N.C.Os. and Junior Officers. Communist and Left Wing influence, in close alliance with that of certain sections of the Wafd, has "been patent. 3. Tho C.R.Cc. reacted "by the removal of certain hostile or unreliable Army Officers (Major Okasha, Editor of the military- inspired paper Al Tahrir, and Colonel Ahmed Shawki, the Commandant of the Cairo garrison), "by the arrest of communist civilians, (including journalists, students and unemployed workmen), "by establishing a tighter grip on the press and "by setting up the Court of the Revolution. At the same time the C.R.C. have continued their indefatigable efforts to gain or regain support "by public appearances, oratory, etc. ~ 4. The present internal crisis is, of course, not the first that tho regime has had to face in the course of its fourteen months in power. The opposition lias raised its head, only'to "bo "beaten down, at almost regularly recurrent two-monthly intervals; in Novctnber 1952 when Wafdist intransigence was dealt with, in January the occasion of Colonel Mehanna's plot, in March when General Nogui"b embarked on his tour of Upper Egypt> in May when the negotiations were "broken off, ?.n July when the Republic was declared and again now in September* 5. Whether the present recrudescence is more serious remains to "be seen. It may well "be that with tho prospect of an Anglo-Egyptian settlcmant in view, old vested interests, landowning, financial and political, are making a desperate effort to "bring down the regime "before its expectations of life are? to say the least, improved "by. the conclusion of an agree- ment with Her Majesty's Government. 6» Present indications arc that the C.R.C. are weathering tho storm. At the samo time there must "be a limit, even for an authoritarian government, to the process of making enemies even, in the "best of cauaes (purge of corruption, financial retrench- ment and sound educational policies etc.) and then suppressing thorn. : 7. Tho present situation and future tendencies may : conveniently "b'e surveyed under the following headings, the conclusions teing in paragraphs 26-28 TDolcwc /Council ... 1 . 2 III11 II I I I I I I I I I I I 1 COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION Council for the Revolutionary Command. 8.« Stresses and strains have inevitably developed in the C.R.C. during the past year. The present position is that throe fairly distinct groups can be discernedJ- (l) a group led "by Colonel Gemal Abdel Nasser and including General Abdol Hakim Amor, Squadron/Leader Boghdadi, Major Salah Salem and Wing/Command or GamDl Salem, (2) a group of wavercrs "but on the whole moderate elements, including probably General Neguib himself, Lieutenant Colonel Shafei, Major Kamal-Eddin Hussein and Lieutenant Colonel Zakaria Mohieddin, (3) a group of stormy petrels, i.e. Lieutenant Colonel Anwar el. Sadat, Major Khaled Mohieddin and Squadron/Leader Hassan Ibrahim. With the support of at least some of the second group, including probably on most issues General Neguib, Colonel Nasser is generally able to control the Committee. There is some rivalry between Colonel Nasser and General Neguib (who naturally dislikes the prospect of at some stage yielding the Premiership to Colonel Nasser and of himself becoming a mere figurehead as President of the Republic), but there is also much mutual respect. The recent dismissal of Colonel Shawki, the Commandant of the Cairo garrison, who was a close associate of General "Neguib and whom the latter and Colonel Zakaria Mohioddin tried to save, is probably an indication that in case of need Colonel Nasser and his group can get a majority in the Committee even without General Neguib's vote. There is a tendency for the Committee to contract. Two members, Lieutenant-Colonel Abdel Moneim ^min and Lieutenant Colonel Yusef Mansur Saddik have already been eliminated and Major Khaled Mohieddin may bo on his way out. This tendency is likely to continue and this will probably serve to increase the dominance of Colonel Nasser and his lieutenants, particularly General Amor and Wing/Commander Boghdadi. The alliance between Colonel Nasser and the Salem brothers is certainly less solid than that between Colonel Nasser and General Amer and Wing/Commander Boghdadi and recent indications were that Colonel Nasser and Major Salah Salem hao\disagreed r.n: that General Neguib himself share"1. Colonel Nasser's growing impatience at Major Salemfs irresponsibility and excessive ambition. In the last resort and barring accidents, Colonel Nasser's determination, patience and strength of character seem most likely to prevail and his promotion in due course to the post of Prime Minister appears as part of an almost inevitable process, which General Neguib may not be able to resist. This would leave General Neguib as President of the Republic, a post for which being inclined to be all things to all men, he is eminently suited. The Army. • 9. The existence of dissident elements in the Army is well known, their strength and capabilities less so. The main centres of discontent are:- • (a) a considerable number of officers (and possibly also N.C.Os.) in the old "Corps d'Elite", the Artillery and the Cavalry (including the Armoured Corps). Many of the Artillery officers were, and probably still are, supporters of Colonel Rashid Mehanna, arrested last January, who has considerable gifts of leader- ship and is believed to have objected to the more radical aspects of the C.R.C. policy. Some officers too have Wafdist sympathies. Major Okasha, the recently dismissed editor of "Al Tahrir" and Major • Khaled Mohieddin, ono of tho "rebels" in the Council for tho Revolutionary Command, are "both Cavalry officers and are "believed to have some influence in the Corps. Tho Armoured Corps obviously holds a key r61e. (b) The friends of Colonel Ahmed Shawki, the Commander of Cairo Area, who was recently dismissed, were mostly in the Infantry. (c) Regimental officers who find training of their units hampered "by the secondment of many good officers for political duties and for Liberation Rally training. (d) Senior officers who are disgruntled at promotion of junior officers, particularly General .\tner, tho Commander-in-Chief, over their hoads. This may apply also to some of the junior officers, jealous of their more fortunate contemporaries. (e) The ever growing body of compulsorily retired officers. Although now out of the Service, many wield considerable influence with their friends still serving. (f). The Moslem Brotherhood has its adherents i(n the Army both among the officers and other ranks. 10. While direct evidence is difficult to obtain, all indica- tions point to a gradually increasing strength and boldness among the opposition elements in the ^rmy. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any successful counter coup d'etat could be mounted solely from within the Army at present. There are two main reasons for this:- (a) It has been clone once, only a little over a year ago, and the all-important element of surprise has been lost, (b) The military intelligence services'have good cover within the Army, and the authorities have shown themselves able and willing to act on their information. 11. The danger of corruption of members of the Army by outside organisations is more difficult to assess. The possibili- ty undoubtedly exists. «t present it would se«ztn th&t there are sufficient loyal spies and informers within the Army to prevent - any large-scale corruption taking place without the regime being warned. As time goes on, however, the loyalty of these people may well waver, and the possibility of successful infiltration will increase, unless the regime can achieve some political success to strengthen their position. IS. ' At' present the Army as a whole is loyal to the regime and it would in our opinion carry out any duties required of it in suppressing internal disorders. Possibly about 30^ of tho officers are completely loyal to the C.R.C.: some 30% are dissatis- fied and potentially disloyal and some may be already actively disloyal: the remaining 40^ are waverers who would always rally to tho stronger faction ancl at present support the C.R.C. Liberation Rally. 13. The Liberation Rally which was established to provide civilian backing for the ^rmy Movement has not been a complete i • /success ... I I • — • "^> » *-• s^ ( f cs *^j i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I. COPYRIGHT - NOT TO BE REPRODUCED PHOTOGRAPHICALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION success, in spite of very great efforts "both "by its organisers and "by members of the Council for the Revolutionary Command anti-regime elements claim that the Rally has "been an utter failure.