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Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

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Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Organization Attributes Sheet: Al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); aka the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) Author: Matthew Blood Review: Phil Williams A. When the organization was formed + brief history Formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), al-Qa‘ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originated as a splinter faction of the Islamic insurgency in the Algerian civil war of the 1990s.1 By the end of the war, AQIM’s national focus on fighting the secular Algerian government had broadened to include regional and international terrorist activities. AQIM declared its allegiance to al-Qa‘ida in 2003. The group adopted its current name and was officially sanctioned by Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2006.2 The mid-2000s witnessed a marked increase in attacks against Western nationals in the African Sahel and elsewhere. AQIM regularly targets tourist locations, Western embassies, and foreign energy companies in addition to regional African state security forces.3 Algerian counterterrorism operations have been successful in disrupting AQIM activities and are largely credited with reducing the group’s numbers from a height of 30,000 as the GSPC to less than 1,000 to 4,000 today. Despite these advances, 2009 witnessed an upsurge in North African terrorist activity, possibly sparked by the return of battle-hardened militants from the war in Iraq.4 In addition to its Algerian bases, AQIM now operates throughout the Sahel region, taking advantage of the remote, difficult to police terrain. This expansion has occurred in parallel with the growing transshipment of Latin American cocaine through West Africa, an increasing amount of which is trafficked northward along overland routes through the center of AQIM areas of operation. AQIM is increasingly involved, both directly and indirectly, in the highly lucrative transport of cocaine across the Saharan Desert toward Europe. AQIM terrorist cells have been discovered in France and Italy and are known to exist elsewhere throughout Europe as well.5 EU officials consider the group to be among the most significant terrorist threats presently facing the continent.6 The current revolutionary unrest across North Africa and the Middle East will likely provide new opportunities for the expansion of AQIM and similar groups, but reports differ on AQIM’s exact role in the uprisings.7 While acknowledging elevated risks, in the view of European authorities AQIM has not yet significantly benefited from the regional turmoil and has thus far proven “incapable of influencing events in any significant fashion.”8 The Algerian government is concerned about the possibility of Libyan arms being smuggled into Algeria by AQIM operatives.9 Some sources do indicate a recent increase in Sahel/Sahara trafficking.10 Tunisian security forces have reported the infiltration of several dozen AQIM operatives into their territory.11 Beyond these initial reports, however, it is too early to assess the degree to which AQIM will be capable of exploiting the ongoing unrest. Future developments will merit close attention. In the wake of the recent killing of Usama bin Laden, AQIM’s top leadership has threatened retaliatory attacks against United States citizens in West Africa, prompting U.S. embassies to issue travel warnings.12 Thus far, however, no new attacks have materialized. B. Types of illegal activities engaged in, a. In general Terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, document forgery, money counterfeiting Information derived from several sources and searchable databases. All research conducted according to the project manual. b. Specific detail: types of illicit trafficking activities engaged in Drug trafficking: AQIM generates a significant share of its revenue through the smuggling of illicit drugs. While the group has long been involved in the drug trade, analysts note a significant increase in AQIM’s narcotic trafficking since 2008.13 Cigarettes (the most commonly smuggled item in the region) and Moroccan-produced marijuana and hashish are regularly trafficked south, west, and east along traditional smuggling routes. Latin American cocaine and other narcotics are increasingly transported north across the Saharan Desert toward European markets. At the North African coast, AQIM delivers the drugs to criminal organizations specializing in illicit sea transportation across the Mediterranean to Southern European coasts.14 Weapons trafficking: AQIM is a significant source of illegal arms transport and sales throughout the Sahel.15 It is believed that the southern AQIM faction smuggles arms and other materiel to the North Algerian grouping within the larger flow of illicit traffic.16 Protection for trafficking organizations: in addition to its own direct involvement, AQIM is tied to the broader smuggling of drugs, weapons, persons, and cigarettes in the Sahel. EU authorities report “low level, individual and tribal contacts” between specific AQIM cells and West African drug trafficking organizations.17 AQIM maintains agreements under which criminal groups pay in exchange for safe passage and other assistance.18 The terrorist organization provides physical protection, geographical guidance, and transport to criminal groups.19 In one incident, the Mauritanian military intercepted a drug trafficking convoy accompanied by armed AQIM escorts.20 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that 50-60 tons of Latin American cocaine are now being transported through the Sahel each year.21 As greater quantities of illicit drugs are transshipped through West Africa, land routes across North Africa to the Mediterranean and Europe will continue to gain in importance. AQIM is currently positioned to benefit considerably from these developments.22 However, the entry of new criminal organizations into the lucrative regional drug trade also carries greater risks of conflict among competing groups, and violent incidents between AQIM and other drug traffickers have been documented.23 Nonetheless, at least for the immediate future, it is highly probable that the growing organized criminal penetration of West Africa, particularly by traffickers of Latin American cocaine, will generate an expansion of the current cooperation between AQIM and other criminal groups seeking to transport the increasing volumes of illicit drugs.24 C. Scope and Size a. Estimated size of network and membership At its height, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, a faction of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the organizational predecessor to AQIM, constituted the largest and most active terrorist organization in Algeria with some 30,000 members. Estimates of AQIM’s current membership range from less than 1,000 to as many as 4,000.25 This decline in strength is largely attributed to the counterterrorism efforts of the Algerian government. b. Countries / regions group is known to have operated in. (i.e. the group’s operating area) Africa: Algeria,26 Morocco,27 Mali,28 Mauritania,29 Niger,30 Ghana,31 Chad,32 Nigeria,33 Senegal,34 Tunisia,35 Libya,36 Sudan37 Middle East: Syria,38 Iraq,39 Afghanistan40 Europe: France,41 Italy,42 Spain,43 Germany,44 Portugal,45 the United Kingdom,46 Information derived from several sources and searchable databases. All research conducted according to the project manual. Belgium,47 Switzerland,48 the Netherlands,49 Norway,50 Bosnia51 North America: the United States52 Canada53 D. Leader Characteristics a. Who is/are the leader(s) Abdelmalek Droukdal: aka Abu Musab Abdul Wadoud, top leader of the AQIM North Algerian faction, a university-educated scientist known for his bomb-making abilities.54 Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Mali-based head of the AQIM Sahel faction, said to be a “counterbalance to Droukdal’s leadership” and a critical link to al-Qa‘ida.55 Mebarek Yazid: aka Abou Obeida Youcef, senior AQIM figure, viewed as a possible successor to Droukdal.56 Abdelhamid Abu Zeid: senior cell leader in Mali.57 Amari Saifi: aka Abderrazak el-Para, influential AQIM figure, currently jailed and sentenced to death in Algeria.58 b. Leadership timeline The GSPC was founded in 1998 by Hassan Hattab and other disaffected GIA members. Hattab led the group until 2001 when he resigned or was deposed by Nabil Sahraoui who subsequently declared the organization’s allegiance to al-Qa‘ida.59 With Hattab’s replacement, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a senior commander and one of the group’s founding members, grew increasingly distant from the mainstream GSPC leadership. Belmokhtar was further alienated by the 2004 selection of the relatively inexperienced Abdelmalek Droukdal for the top leadership position following the death of Sahraoui in a gunfight with Algerian security forces.60 In response, Belmokhtar began the consolidation and expansion of his organization in the Sahel region, creating AQIM’s southern faction and positioning himself as a counterbalance to Droukdal. Droukdal maintains control of AQIM’s northern grouping and is considered the overall organizational head. Despite tensions among the leadership, cooperation between the two sections remains significant.61 c. Leadership style (autocratic, diffuse, etc.) Autocratic: individual cell leaders or sub-commanders possess considerable operational autonomy within the overall AQIM structure but exert control over their subordinates. E. Organizational Structure a. Topology (cellular, hierarchical, etc.) Cellular: the group operates through a network of autonomous or semi-autonomous
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