Bulletin N°85 — Spring 2010 concernedafricascholars.org Concerned Africa Scholars US militarization of the Sahara-Sahel Security, Space & Imperialism ACAS Concerned Africa Scholars US militarization of the Sahara-Sahel: Security, Space & Imperialism Bulletin N°85 (Spring 2010) 1-11 Introduction: Securitizing the Sahara Jacob Mundy 12-29 From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qa‘ida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region Stephen Harmon 30-49 War on ‘terror’: Africom, the kleptocratic state and under-class militancy in West Africa-Nigeria Caroline Ifeka 51-62 Counterterrorism and democracy promotion in the Sahel under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama from September 11, 2001, to the Nigerien Coup of February 2010 Alex Thurston 63-71 Western Sahara and the United States’ geographical imaginings Konstantina Isidoros 72-77 The Western Sahara conflict: regional and international repercussions Yahia H Zoubir 78-81 Sahelian blowback: what’s happening in Mali? Vijay Prashad 82-83 All quiet on the West Africa front: terrorism, tourism and poverty in Mauritania Anne E. McDougall 84-90 The origins of AFRICOM: the Obama administration, the Sahara-Sahel and US Militarization of Africa Stephen Chan, Daniel Volman & Jeremy Keenan The Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS) is a network of academics, analysts and activists. ACAS is engaged in critical research and analysis of Africa and U.S. government policy; developing communication and action net- works; and mobilizing concerned communities on critical, current issues related to Africa. ACAS is committed to interrogat- ing the methods and theoretical approaches that shape the study of Africa. http://concernedafricascholars.org Editor’s Introduction Introduction Securitizing the Sahara Jacob Mundy The Threat Since 2002, the US government has been pursuing a TSCTP is described in US government documents as series of counter-terrorism initiatives in Northwest ‘a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeat- Africa’s Sahara-Sahel region. These measures began ing terrorist organizations by strengthening regional with the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), to ‘assist Mali, Ni- counter-terrorism capabilities, enhancing and insti- ger, Mauritania, and Chad in protecting their borders, tutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security thus supporting the U.S. national security interests of forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting waging war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military and security’. In 2005, the United States reformulat- ties with the United States’. Apparently the TSCTP has ed the PSI into the half-billion dollar Trans-Saharan been so successful that its ‘best practices’ have also Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), ‘designed to been adapted to the East Africa Regional Strategic Ini- provide a regional response to terrorism by offering a tiative, a similar counter-terrorism program focusing balanced program of military assistance, intel[ligence] on the Horn. sharing, democratization and good governance sup- port, and humanitarian aid’. The TSCTI also expanded Despite this commitment from the US government the scope of participation, bringing Algeria, Burkina to the Sahara-Sahel, there is no consensus among Faso, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia into the project. policy makers, observers, regional governments and The 2010 budget request for the re-branded Trans- locals on-the-ground as to the ultimate rationale for Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) these security initiatives. The primary justification for was $80.3 million. In the brave new world after 11 the US militarization of the Sahel is the existence of September 2001, this is small beans for a US devel- a small number of self-proclaimed ‘Islamist’ groups opment-security outlay; it represents just two percent operating in the deserts connecting Mauritania, Mali, of the 2010 development budget for Afghanistan (the Burkina, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia, Chad and Libya, not State Department’s side of the civil-military counter- to mention groups already active in northern Moroc- insurgency effort) or what the Pentagon plans to spend co Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Debate has focused on on Iraq and Afghanistan every six hours in 2010. The whether or not these armed groups, individually or taken as a dis-articulated whole, present a potential and significant threat to local and international inter- ests. There are those arguing in the positive (Lyman & Jacob Mundy is a PhD candidate at the University of Morrison 2004; Cline 2007; Hunt 2007; Scheuer 2007; Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. He is co- Mohsen-Finan 2008); those expressing skepticism or author of Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict agnosticism about the existence or extent of the threat Irresolution (Syracuse University Press) with Stephen (International Crisis Group 2005; Obi 2005; Archer, Zunes. 1 BULLETIN N°85 - SPRING 2010 CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS Jacob Mundy Securitizing the Sahara Popovic 2007; see the Ellis & Keenan [2007] debate; Crumpton, former US ambassador for counterterror- Mcdougall 2007b; Mcdougall 2007a; Jourde 2008a; ism, told a US Senate subcommittee in 2006 (i.e., before Jourde 2008b); and those expressing doubt about the the formal GSPC merger with Al-Qa‘idah): ‘Pressed actual existence of any real armed Islamist movement by Algerian counterterrorism successes, the once Al- in the Sahara federated to al-Qa‘idah, besides the one geria-centric GSPC has become a regional terrorist fabricated by regional and extra-regional intelligence organization, recruiting and operating all throughout agencies (Gèze, Mellah 2007; Keenan 2009). the Maghreb — and beyond to Europe itself’ (quoted in Hansen & Vriens 2009). The European Police Office According to the most routine narrative, the presence (Europol) has likewise come to the conclusion that the of terrorists in the Sahara owes to a confluence of (1) GSPC-AQMI poses a potential threat to Europe, espe- spill over from the armed conflict in Algeria in the cially the northern Mediterranean rim (see European 1990s, (2) from ‘Jihad- Police 2008). ists’ fleeing Afghanistan following the 2001 US Recalling the contest- invasion (see Map 1) ed narratives of the and, more recently, (3) GSPC-AQMI geneal- experienced fighters ogy in Algeria, Stephen trained in new terrains Harmon’s contribution of US occupied Iraq to this collection, which and Afghanistan. These serves as an excellent his- groups initially coalesced torical primer, goes well under the already ex- beyond the simplistic isting Salafi Group for accounts found in daily Preaching and Combat news reports and the (GSPC, Groupe salafiste analyses of Washington pour la prédication et le think tanks. Yet Harmon combat), a surprisingly US Marines in Morocco for African Lion 2009 (Source: US military) is no agnostic regard- durable remnant of the ing the potential threat armed conflict in 1990s Algeria. The long insinuated posed by AQMI; he describes with vivid detail the lo- flirtation between the GSPC and al-Qa‘idah was final- cal and international dynamics that contributed to the ly consummated in 2007 with the alleged blessing of trans-regionalization of the armed Islamist movement none other than Osama bin Laden; the GSPC rechris- in Algeria. Harmon nonetheless asks whether or not tened as an official branch of al-Qa‘idah in Northwest there is sufficient warrant for the current array of US Africa. Foreign observers do not seem quite sure counter-terrorism initiatives in Northwest Africa: about their official name, but most have settled upon al-Qa‘idah in the Islamic Maghrib, perhaps because it None of these American securitization initia- makes a nice acronym in French (AQMI, Al-Qaida au tives — not the PSI, nor the TSCTP, nor Africom Maghreb islamique) or in English (AQIM), one that — would have been justifiable on the basis of en- seems to echo the name of other al-Qa‘idah branches ergy concerns or rivalry with China alone. Defense — e.g., AQAP, Al-Qa‘idah in the Arabia Peninsula, and Department lobbyists needed a credible terrorist AQI, Al-Qa‘idah in Iraq.1 threat to pry hundreds of millions of dollars from Congress for these programs. The GSPC/AQIM The putative threat posed by the GSPC metamorpho- provided just the right incentive to make these Af- sis into AQMI goes well beyond the region. Henry A. rican security organs seem necessary. A question remains as to whether the terror threat posed by . ���������Variations ������ ��������� ������������� �� �� �� ����� �� GSPC/AQIM to the region was sufficient to warrant � I��m�� M����b. A ������ ���������� �� �� ����� A��b�� the funding and deployment of these initiatives, or v���� w���� b �B� �� � J��� �� � I��m�� N��� A�����’ �Qaa‘idah al-Jihaad fii al-Maghrib al-Islaamii; �����������y, �� whether the US exaggerated the seriousness of the ���������� ���� � ����p’ ��������� affiliation �� ��������� threat to justify its securitization initiatives. ��v��b� �� ����A��b�� p�k�, w�� al-Qaa‘idah fii al- Maghrib al-Islaamii, ����� ���m F���/E���� �� A��b��, m�k For example, apparent capacity of Saharan armed Is- �� ����. CONCERNED AFRICA SCHOLARS BULLETIN N°85 - SPRING 2010 2 Jacob Mundy Securitizing the Sahara lamist groups to actually inflict any serious damage development discourse and practice entails, in the US on the local security forces or mount any logistically context, the Pentagon’s appropriation of humanitar- sophisticated