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Terrorismo: Giudice Per Le Indagini Preliminari Tribunale Venezia, Ordinanza Di Custodia Cautelare in Carcere N Terrorismo: Giudice per le indagini preliminari Tribunale Venezia, Ordinanza di custodia cautelare in carcere n. 2937/06 R.G. G.I.P. del 10 luglio 2006 Autore: In: Diritto penale ORDINANZA CHE DISPONE LA CUSTODIA CAUTELARE IN CARCERE Il Giudice per le indagini preliminari dr. Giandomenico Gallo esaminata la richiesta del Pubblico Ministero nel procedimento indicato in oggetto per l'applicazione della misura della custodia cautelare in carcere nei confronti di: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 tutti indagati per il seguente reato: a) art. 270 bis c.p., per avere partecipato all’associazione terroristica internazionale di matrice fondamentalista islamica denominata GRUPPO SALAFITA PER LA PREDICAZIONE E IL COMBATTIMENTO (G.S.P.C.), funzionalmente collegata alla rete dell’organizzazione terroristica internazionale denominata Al Quaeda, volta al compimento di atti di violenza con finalità di terrorismo ed eversione dell’ordine democratico in Italia ed all’estero, nella specie operando in un gruppo con base logistica in Vicenza, e collegamenti operativi con gli attivisti operanti in Brescia, Napoli e Salerno, volto alla realizzazione di un programma criminoso contemplante: - la preparazione ed esecuzione di azioni terroristiche o, comunque, violente da attuarsi in Italia o all’estero contro governi, forze militari, istituzioni e civili nel contesto del progetto globale di “Jihad ”, per © 2017 Diritto.it s.r.l. - Tutti i diritti riservati Diritto & Diritti ISSN 1127-8579 Fondatore Francesco Brugaletta P.I. 01214650887 1 di 91 l’affermazione universale dei sacri principi dell’Islam; - la raccolta dei finanziamenti necessari per il raggiungimento degli scopi dell’associazione; - il proselitismo effettuato attraverso video e audiocassette, documenti propagandistici e sermoni incitanti ad azioni violente ed al sacrificio personale in azioni suicide destinate a colpire gli “infedeli”; - il favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina in Italia e verso gli altri Stati dove operano i militanti dell’organizzazione; - © 2017 Diritto.it s.r.l. - Tutti i diritti riservati Diritto & Diritti ISSN 1127-8579 Fondatore Francesco Brugaletta P.I. 01214650887 2 di 91 il procacciamento di falsi documenti d’identità, contratti di lavoro e permessi di soggiorno per i componenti dell’organizzazione; - la predisposizione, comunque, di tutti i mezzi necessari per l’attuazione del programma criminoso dell’associazione e per il sostegno ai “fratelli” ovunque operanti secondo il programma descritto; accertato in Vicenza e altrove dal 2004, permanente al maggio 2006. Tutti, inoltre, ad eccezione di …, in ordine al reato seguente: b) art. 416 c.p., per avere promosso un’organizzazione, attiva in Italia e all’estero, dedita al procacciamento e alla falsificazione di documenti d’identità, permessi di soggiorno e contratti di lavoro tali da consentire anche il favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione e permanenza illecite nel territorio dello Stato Italiano; con l’aggravante di cui all’art. 1 della legge 6/2/1980, n. 15, avcendo commesso il reato per le finalità di terrorismo di cui al capo a); in Brescia, Vicenza e altrove, accertato dal 2004, permanente al maggio 2006 letti gli atti; OSSERVA §1. genesi del procedimento Il presente procedimento ha avuto origine a seguito dell’attività investigativa che è stata avviata nell’aprile 2005 in relazione alle indagini di cui al procedimento penale nr. 44946/03-R-G-N.R. della Procura della Repubblica di Napoli instaurato nei confronti di alcuni algerini, residenti in Italia tra le province di Napoli, Salerno, Vicenza e Brescia, ritenuti organici a cellule eversive internazionali di matrice © 2017 Diritto.it s.r.l. - Tutti i diritti riservati Diritto & Diritti ISSN 1127-8579 Fondatore Francesco Brugaletta P.I. 01214650887 3 di 91 confessionale islamica, riconducibili all’organizzazione terroristica algerina “Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione e il Combattimento” (G.S.P.C.) [1]. Tale organizzazione, attraverso l’uso della violenza, si prefigge di instaurare in Algeria un ordinamento statuale e sociale fondato sulla più rigida interpretazione della Sharia[2], collaborando altresì, come gruppo affiliato, al perseguimento degli obiettivi terroristici fissati dal “Fronte Islamico Internazionale Contro gli Ebrei e i Cristiani”costituito nel 1998 dallo sceicco saudita Osama Bin Laden[3]. Il citato procedimento penale partenopeo costituiva, a sua volta, stralcio di una pregressa iniziativa giudiziaria contro una rete logistica di sostegno al G.S.P.C., operante in Italia ed all’estero, coordinata dal terrorista algerino Lounici Djamel[4]. L’attività investigativa originava dalla necessità di accertare l’esistenza e l’operatività nel Veneto, e segnatamente nella provincia di Vicenza, di una rete di sostegno logistico, costituita da uomini animati da progetti jihadisti in chiave antioccidentale, pronta a collaborare per la realizzazione di azioni delittuose ispirate o collegate al citato “Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione e il Combattimento”. Il G.S.P.C. risulta documentatamente[5] collegato all’organizzazione terroristica internazionale “Al Qaeda”[6] per la realizzazione di un complessivo programma terroristico, sorretto da una maglia di basi, cellule e gruppi affini, presenti in Italia ed in altri Paesi dell’Unione Europea[7], aventi finalità di supporto logistico, di propaganda, proselitismo e di reclutamentodi volontari da destinare al combattimento o al martirio, in nome della jihad [8]. Il 14.11.2005 il P.M. di Napoli emetteva un “Decreto di Fermo di Indiziato di Delitto” nei confronti di L. nonché di B. e S. - indagati anche nel presente procedimento – in quanto accusati per i reati di cui agli artt. 270 bis commi 1, 2 e 3 e 416 c.p.; 81 cpv., 110-482, in relazione agli artt. 476, 477, 468; 81 cpv., 110-648; con l’aggravante della “finalità di terrorismo” di cui all’art. 1 della Legge nr. 15/1980. Ovvero, perché ritenuti organici ad un’associazione con finalità di terrorismo internazionale, in Italia ed all’estero, e referenti in Italia di un’articolazione-rete di sostegno logistico dell’organizzazione terroristica di matrice confessionale denominata “Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione e il Combattimento”, funzionalmente collegata all’organizzazione internazionale denominata “Al Qaeda”; nonché dediti al procacciamento, falsificazione, contraffazione di documenti di identità e permessi di soggiorno, ed al favoreggiamento dell’immigrazione clandestina, con l’aggravante, appunto, della “finalità di terrorismo”. In forza di detto provvedimento i predetti venivano fermati ed il G.I.P. di Napoli convalidava il fermo di B., confermando l’ipotesi associativa ed emetteva nei confronti del fermato una ordinanza di custodia cautelare in carcere. © 2017 Diritto.it s.r.l. - Tutti i diritti riservati Diritto & Diritti ISSN 1127-8579 Fondatore Francesco Brugaletta P.I. 01214650887 4 di 91 Il G.I.P. di Brescia, invece, ratificava il fermo a carico di S. e di L., sanzionando però la custodia cautelare in carcere per i soli reati di associazione per delinquere finalizzata alla falsificazione di documenti, rinviando i relativi atti per competenza alla A.G. partenopea. Il G.I.P. del Tribunale di Napoli, quindi, accogliendo la richiesta del P.M.[9] confermava tutte le ipotesi di reato a carico del S. e del L., compresa quella associativa di cui all’art. 270 bis, disponendo per i due la custodia cautelare in carcere. Qualche giorno dopo, recependo la richiesta inoltrata dal locale P.M., a sua volta il G.I.P. del Tribunale di Salerno emetteva ordinanze di custodia cautelare in carcere nei confronti di B. e di altri due algerini, anch’essi indagati a vario titolo per il reato di cui all’articolo 270 bis c.p. e per il reato di contraffazione di numerosi documenti personali con l’aggravante della “finalità di terrorismo” di cui all’art. 1 della Legge nr. 15/1980. Gli stessi erano ritenuti componenti di una cellula territoriale autonoma, cosiddetta “dormiente”, nonché dediti alla contraffazione di documenti di identità personale, di permessi di soggiorno e di contratti di lavoro, avendo realizzato un’associazione con finalità di terrorismo o di eversione costituente articolazione dell’organizzazione terroristica sopranazionale di matrice confessionale “Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione e il Combattimento”, come si è detto funzionalmente collegata all’organizzazione internazionale denominata “Al Qaeda”. Va precisato che in data 15.02.2006 il Tribunale del Riesame di Napoli ha confermato la custodia cautelare in carcere a carico di B. per le ipotesi delittuose che ne avevano portato al fermo. §2. IL Gruppo Salafita per la Predicazione e il Combattimento Ex colonia francese fino al 1962, l'Algeria ha conosciuto le prime elezioni multipartitiche solo nel 1992, stravinte dal “Fronte Islamico di Salvezza” (F.I.S.). Ne è seguito un golpe dei militari che hanno annullato il risultato elettorale e messo fuori legge il F.I.S. Il partito del "Fronte di Salvezza Islamico" è stato sciolto dal governo algerino ed è da allora sottoposto a persecuzione, tanto che alcuni dei suoi iscritti sono stati accolti da alcune nazioni europee, tra cui anche l'Italia, come rifugiati politici[10]. Esso[11], poi, organizzatosi militarmente nell'Armata Islamica di Salvezza (A.I.S.) e affiancato dal Gruppo Islamico Armato (G.I.A.), ha iniziato una violenta lotta contro il regime, presto degenerata in cruenti atti terroristici contro la popolazione civile. Alla messa al bando del F.I.S., seguita dall'incarcerazione o dall'esilio dei suoi principali dirigenti, ha fatto seguito un'estrema frammentazione del mondo fondamentalista islamico, da cui è emersa l'ala ultra- © 2017 Diritto.it s.r.l. - Tutti i diritti riservati Diritto & Diritti ISSN 1127-8579 Fondatore Francesco Brugaletta P.I. 01214650887 5 di 91 fondamentalista del G.I.A. contrapposta all'A.I.S., esercito islamico di salvezza, che deriva più direttamente dal F.I.S. Il G.I.A. si è impegnato in una guerra, più che decennale, contro il regime di Algeri, nel corso della quale sono morte almeno centomila persone. Nel 1999, dopo 7 anni di guerra, il primo presidente civile, Abdelazaz Bouteflika, ha lanciato il processo di pace, offrendo l'amnistia in cambio del disarmo dei gruppi islamici.
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