CHAPTER 2 TERRORISM IN ALGERIA A number of historical developments have influenced the emergence of Algeria as one of the hotspots for terrorism-related activities in Africa. These developments have influenced not only Algeria and its immediate region but also terror networks elsewhere, including Europe. As well as posing a domestic threat, Algerian Islamists have also contributed to transnational terrorism. In addition to these two dimensions, the development of extreme political thought was influenced by internal as well as external developments over a relatively long period. In order to understand and analyse current developments, one needs to consider the historical background of the primary role-players and the underlying factors contributing to these developments. This chapter also corrects the common misconception that the trouble in Algeria started with the return of Algerian Afghan Mujahideen and the cancellation of the elections in 1992. Although the Mujahideen played an important role in the establishment of radical groups such as the GIA and later the GSPC, existing domestic circumstances provided favourable circumstances for Salafi principles to flourish in the political cells of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). As indicated in Chapter 1, the influence of al-Qa’eda is also not a new phenomenon. In addition to the fact that Salafi theory and ideals cut across organisations in providing a common language between organisations throughout the world, the open alignment of the GSPC with al-Qa’eda should rather be seen as a return to an earlier relationship with extremists in Algeria that was tarnished by the GIA during its indiscriminate killing of civilians. It should, indeed, be observed that nothing develops overnight and that an apparently new situation should be seen and studied in context. This includes the open alignment of the GSPC with al-Qa’eda and subsequent changes in its modus operandi and target selection. Through mobile training camps, the impact of this organisation is far- reaching in Africa as well as in Europe and the Middle East, including Iraq. The history of terrorism in Algeria Algeria’s independence from France in 1962 brought the National Liberation Front (FLN) to power after a violent liberation war that most likely also 24 Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terrorism psychologically influenced developments in the 1990s. The ‘Kabyle smile’ – or the slitting of a victim’s throat – which was a tactic used during the liberation struggle, especially against French collaborators, was again used by the GIA. In another example, the liberation war was fought by ‘Patriots’ who, when threatened, installed a culture of public participation. This led to the formation of groupes d’autodéfense (self-defence groups) or Patriotes (Patriots) to counter the terrorists. Political, socio-economic and cultural developments since independence further encouraged the formation of fundamentalist and later extremist parties and movements. These developments can be summarised as follows: • Urbanisation and deteriorating socio-economic conditions. In the late 1970s unemployment began to grow dramatically. In 1985, 72 per cent of the unemployed were under the age of 25 – an age group estimated to make up 65 per cent of the population (Stora 2004:193-194) • The social impact of Colonel Boumediene’s Arabisation process introduced in the early 1970s. In the process of asserting Algeria’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab world, Algeria imported Muslim teachers from Syria and Egypt to ‘Arabise’ the French-speaking country. This process initially started as an initiative to rid Algeria of its French- colonial influence. Its consequences will be referred to later • Unification of the entire population without social, political or cultural distinctions. As part of this initiative, history was rewritten by a commission in order to secure the Algerian recollection of its liberation struggle. Although this process was understandable as a cultivation of an Algerian identity, Stora (2004:189) explained that history was selectively recollected. ‘The aim of the commission was not to research and understand a complex past, but to obey the orders of the regime and the demands of the present. It was used in that way in the FLN’s internal political debates.’ The new history formed part of a search for identity among the youth of both Arabic and Berber heritage. This was a void the Islamists were willing to fill • Islamic identity versus socialism. Islamists in particular rejected the exclusion of a reference to Islam as the state religion in the draft constitution of 1976. For them, this mistake served as an example of the ‘regime’s indifference to Islam and of the influence of Marxist and leftist elements’ (Shahin 1997:122). Al-Muwahhidun (The Monotheists) demanded the ‘adoption of Islam as a way of life and as the basis of the Anneli Botha 25 legislative, economic and political systems in society’. Hamas – referred to later in this discussion – summarised Algerian society as: (…) the adoption of imported ideologies that contradict the religion and values of the Algerian nation; the authoritarian style of government and absence of consultation, dialogue and transparency (…) the absence of a good example and the adoption of regionalism and personal loyalty, instead of merit, integrity and ability in assigning responsibility; the lack of confidence between the people and the government as a result of totalitarianism, tyranny, corruption and the exploitation of influence to achieve personal, regional and party gains (…) (Shahin 1997:122) • Women’s rights. These were protected under the constitution in contradiction to the practice of the day in which women were not permitted to marry non-Muslims and in which women were required to have matrimonial guardians. In reaction, women’s associations, often led by female veterans of the liberation war, called for the practical implementation of the constitution. In reaction to these claims, Islamists called for the implementation of the Shari’a (Stora 2004:192). Islamists subsequently focused their attention on women who acted in contradiction to a rigid interpretation of the Shari’a • The political front. Algeria adopted a single-party system and prevented the younger generation from having access to or influence political developments. Instead of ruling through the FLN, President Houaru Boumedienne focused his attention on the military elite and enforced the ban on political parties and organisations initiated after independence (Shahin 1997:114-115). Conditions deteriorated further under President Chadli Benjedid that led to the formation of Islamic fundamentalist and extremist groups. Due to a lack in leadership and the challenges associated with the fact that significant official positions were reserved for FNL party members, decreasing oil prices in the 1980s further brought severe socio-economic challenges that were compounded by rapid population growth and corruption. Attacking symbols of the government, including government offices and the headquarters of the FLN, the bread riots of 4–10 October 1988 were a watershed in Algerian political development. As a result of growing demands, protesters called for an end to the one-party political system as well as wider democratic freedoms. Subsequently, on 10 October 1988 President Bendjedid announced a referendum to revise the 1976 constitution, and he followed this on 23 October with the introduction of political reforms. These 26 Terrorism in the Maghreb: The transnationalisation of domestic terrorism reforms were based on three principles: separation between the state and the FLN; free participation in municipal and legislative elections; and autonomy for mass movements. Recognising the harm done in the process of rewriting history, a newspaper on 24 November 1988 wrote, inter alia: ‘(…) we must recover our memory, all our memory, without “filters”’ (Stora 2004:197) • The army. This played a leading role in government since independence. It was moved ‘to the centre of authority’ and reinstated ‘as the guarantor of the continuity of the regime and the protector of stability and public order’ (Shahin 1997:128). This development eventually opened the door for the military establishment to intervene after the first round of elections. Prior to the elections, faced with the bread riots, a state of emergency had been declared that included harsh crackdowns. In fear of further political uprisings, the military turned Algeria into a police state, threatening freedom of speech by limiting the development of a political culture and an environment that allowed questioning and dissent. After the bread riots of October 1988, President Bendjedid introduced a new multiparty constitution ‘to open up the political system and prevent further unrest’ (Marlowe 2003). However, an outcome other than the one originally hoped for followed the sudden opening up of the repressive political landscape. What had happened was a form of crisis management rather than a willingness to deal with consequences that included the possibility of being ousted from political power Ideologically, a number of factors influenced the emergence of extremism in Algeria: • Growing calls for a return to Islam and a rejection of the state’s monopoly on religion. It is interesting to note that the Association of Scholars had been the first organisation to be dissolved after independence in 1962. Notwithstanding the fact that it was similar