Al-Qaida Und Ihr Umfeld in Deutschland –

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Al-Qaida Und Ihr Umfeld in Deutschland – Gerhard Piper Al-Qaida und ihr Umfeld in Deutschland – Who´s Who? Berlin September 2008 1 Impressum: Gerhard Piper c/o BITS Rykestraße 13 10405 Berlin Tel: 030 / 44 68 58 25 Fax: 030 / 441 02 21 Email: [email protected] Druck: Eigendruck Alle Rechte vorbehalten Berlin August 2008 2 Inhaltsverzeichnis Vorwort 4 Zur Einschätzung der Terrorgefahr in Deutschland 5 Anmerkungen zur Namensliste 16 Die Namensliste 19 Ortsverteilung 98 Chronologie 104 Organisationszugehörigkeit 107 Bedrohungsperzeption seit dem 11. September: 123 Drohungen, (Ent-)warnungen, (Fehl-) Alarme und Waffenstillstandangebote Anschläge, Anschlagsversuche und Kampfhandlungen 130 AQ-Todesfälle (im Ausland) 132 Deutsche Mordopfer des AQ-Netzwerkes (im Ausland) 133 Opfer des deutschen Angriffs auf Afghanistan 137 Nachrichtendienstliche Aufklärung 138 Verurteilungen 142 Abschiebungen, Ausweisungen und Auslieferungen 144 Staatsschutzapparat 145 Literaturverzeichnis 172 3 Vorwort Unter den deutschen „Terrorexperten“ heißt es, die Frage sei nicht mehr, ob es in der Bundesrepublik zu einem Terroranschlag kommt, sondern nur wann, wo und wie. Zwar vertritt nur ein Bruchteil der 3,4 Millionen Muslime in der BRD radikal-islamistische Ansichten, aber die Zahl der Terrorverdächtigen hat in den letzten Jahren erheblich zugenommen. Gegenwärtig sind bei den Behörden 187 Ermittlungsverfahren anhängig. Seitdem die Sicherheitsbehörden am 11. September 2001 „Tabula rasa“ machten, um ihre bis dahin gesammelten Informationen über radikale Muslime zu sichten, mussten sie ihr Bild vom „Schläfer“ erheblich überarbeiten. Als Gefährder gilt heute nicht mehr der immigrierte Akademiker arabischer Provenienz, sondern das Gastarbeiterkind mit einschlägigen Erfahrungen in der Straßen- und Kleinkriminalität. Deutsche Konvertiten sind als neuer Bedrohungsfaktor hinzu gekommen. Trotz aller Anstrengungen und dem fortschreitenden Ausbau des Sicherheitsapparates haben die Staatsschützer nach wie vor Schwierigkeiten, die tatsächlich gefährlichen Leute zu identifizieren. Die Summe der namentlich bekannt gewordenen „Terrorverdächtigen“ beträgt mittlerweile rund 180 Personen, so dass es manchmal schwer fällt zu unterscheiden, wer ist wer. Eine Übersicht über die Ortsverteilung zeigt, dass dieser Personenkreis über die gesamte Bundesrepublik verteilt ist – von Aachen bis Wuppertal. Dabei ist der Schwerpunkt der Aktivitäten in den alten Bundesländern zu finden. Besonders die Großstädte Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, Stuttgart und München, aber auch die Flächenstaaten Nordrhein-Westfalen, Baden- Württemberg und Bayern sind betroffen. Es handelt sich nicht nur Personen, die man als direktes „Mitglied“ der traditionellen Kerngruppe von al-Qaida zurechnen muss, vielmehr gehören die meisten einer der bis zu dreißig Unterorganisationen dieses Netzwerkes an, wie z. B. der Ansar al-Islam oder der Islamic Jihad Union. Andere Personen zählen nicht diesem Netzwerk, aber zu dessen Umfeld, wobei eine klare Unterscheidung auf Grund der Quellenlage nicht immer möglich ist. Zu nennen ist hier u.a. die an sich gewaltfreie, aber radikale Gruppierung al-Tawhid. Wiederum Andere gehören nur möglicherweise dem Umfeld an oder sind gänzlich unschuldig, wobei auch in diesen Fällen eine genaue Differenzierung manchmal schwierig ist: Manche sind de facto unschuldig, bei anderen Personen fehlt lediglich eine für eine Verurteilung ausreichende Beweislage. Die Fälle Murat Kurnaz und Khalid el-Masri machten jahrelang Schlagzeilen, andere Fälle wurden von der Öffentlichkeit kaum beachtet. Der Vollständigkeit halber wurden auch diese Personen mit einem entsprechenden Hinweis in die Liste aufgenommen. Aber in diesen Fällen muss der juristische Grundsatz gelten, im Zweifel für den Angeklagten. Zur Einschätzung der Gefahr, die von den militanten Islamisten ausgeht, gab es in den letzten Jahren von Seiten der deutschen Politiker und staatlichen Behördenvertreter zahlreiche Warnungen, die die Terrorgefahr beschworen, sich aber allesamt nicht bewahrheitet haben. Bereits im Januar 1995 warnte der damalige Präsident des Bundeskriminalamtes vor der Gefahr des militanten Islamismus: „Wir müssen uns auf das Schlimmste einstellen“, erklärte Hans-Ludwig Zachert damals. Zur Entwarnung besteht dennoch kein Anlaß, in mehreren Fällen konnten die deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden einen Terroranschlag nur knapp verhindern. Im Rahmen ihrer polizeilichen oder nachrichtendienstlichen Aufklärung konnten die Sicherheitsbehörden mehrere Terrorverdächtige als V-Leute oder zumindest als Kronzeugen anwerben (José B., „Omar Nasiri“, Yahia Yusuf und Murat Y., sowie Shadi Mohamed Mustafa Abdalla und Lokman Amin Mohammed). So gelang es, zahlreiche Terrorverdächtige festzunehmen. Wie diese Übersicht zeigt, wurden mindestens 29 Terrorverdächtige verurteilt, weitere Ausländer (hier sind 28 Personen namentlich aufgeführt) wurden abgeschoben oder ausgewiesen. Einige Islamisten haben von sich aus die Bundesrepublik verlassen, um sich in ihren Heimatländern am Dschihad zu beteiligen. Dabei sind mindestens zehn dieser Kämpfer ums Leben gekommen. Zwar hat es in Deutschland noch keinen Terroranschlag mit Toten gegeben, aber wiederholt wurden deutsche Staatsbürger im Ausland Opfer von Anschlägen. Seit der Ermordung einer deutschen Touristin am 4. März 1994 in Ägypten kamen mindestens 63 Deutsche durch militante Islamisten ums Leben; davon wurden 47 Personen das Opfer von Aktionen des al-Qaida-Netzwerkes. Eine Übersicht über die Organisationsstruktur der Sicherheitsorgane von Bund und Ländern in der BRD (Clearing-Stellen, Landeskriminalämter und Landesämter für Verfassungsschutz etc.) mit ihren Abhöreinheiten und Sondereinsatzkommandos rundet den Überblick ab. 4 Zur Einschätzung der Terrorgefahr in Deutschland Schulter an Schulter mit den Völkern, die dem Rufe des Kalifen folgen, kämpfen auch wir für unsere Zukunft und für die der mohammedanischen Welt, die heute weiß, dass ihr Heiliger Krieg auch der unserige ist. Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 14. November 1914 Die Auseinandersetzung, die wir mit den gottlosen Regimes fordern, kennt keine sokratischen Debatten, platonischen Ideale oder aristotelische Diplomatie. Sie kennt den Dialog der Kugeln, die Ideale der Ermordungen, Bombenanschläge und Zerstörung und die Diplomatie der Kanone und des Maschinengewehrs. Islamische Regierungen wurden nie und werden niemals auf friedlichem Weg oder durch Kooperativräte errichtet. Al Qaida: Declaration of Jihad against the Country´s Tyrants1 Seit Jahren beschwören die deutschen Sicherheitsapologeten die Sicherheitslage, indem sie ständig auf deren Gefährdung durch den modernen Terrorismus verweisen. Aber bisher ist keine Bombe detoniert, kein Tropfen Blut geflossen! „Unsere“ Dschihadisten wurden vor allem im Ausland aktiv. Wenn sie tatsächlich einmal hierzulande zuschlagen wollten, klickten vorher die Handschellen oder die Bomben funktionierten nicht. Andererseits ist die Zahl der Dschihadisten in den letzten Jahren stark angewachsen. Außerdem wächst die Terrorgefahr durch die zunehmende Verstrickung der Bundeswehr in den Anti-Terrorkrieg in Afghanistan. „Deutschland ist in der Hierarchie der Anschlagsziele nach oben gerückt,“ heißt es in einer aktuellen Analyse des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz.2 Dabei sieht der Vorsitzende des Bundes deutscher Kriminalbeamter, Klaus Jansen, die Erfolge der eigenen Polizeiarbeit eher skeptisch. Schon 2003 bekannte er: „Dass wir auf deutschen Boden noch keinen Anschlag hatten, ist eher eine gnädige Laune des Schicksals.“3 Im Focus der Medien stehen vor allem die spektakulären Fälle. Aber es sind nicht mehr nur die drei „Todespiloten“ aus Hamburg, die beiden „Kofferbomber“ aus Köln und die drei „007-Terroristen“ aus dem Sauerland. Längst hat sich das Netzwerk der al-Qaida wie ein Spinnennetz über die gesamte Bundesrepublik ausgebreitet. Zwar gibt es immer noch kein „sunnitisches Dreieck“ Hamburg-Berlin-Stuttgart, aber bereits heute hat die Front des Dschihad hat längst solche Kleinstädte wie Beckum, Neunkirchen und Oberschledorn erreicht. Al-Qaida (andere Schreibweise: al-Kaida, al-Qaeda) hat während ihres Aufstiegs zur bedeutendsten Terrorbewegung in den letzten zwanzig Jahren eine dramatische Entwicklung durchgemacht: Ursprünglich nur eine Datenbank zur Erfassung von kriegsfreiwilligen Frontkämpfern im Afghanistankonflikt (1988/89), entwickelte sich al-Qaida zunächst zu einer politisch-militärischen Organisation mit hierarchischen Strukturen. Die Truppe unter Führung von Osama Bin Mohammad Bin Awad Bin Laden (andere Schreibweise: Usama bin Ladin) umfasste Mitte der neunziger Jahre maximal 5.000 Kämpfer.4 Damit stellte al-Qaida gerademal 5 Prozent der internationalen Afghanistankämpfer. Am 23 Februar 1998 schloss sich al-Qaida mit fünf weiteren kleineren Gruppierungen aus Ägypten, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Bangladesch zu einer so genannten Islamistischen Weltfront für den Dschihad gegen Kreuzfahrer und Juden zusammen.5 In ihrem Manifest wird insbesondere zum 1 Theveßen, Elmar: Schläfer mitten unter uns – Das Netzwerk des Terrors und der hilflose Aktionismus des Westens, Droemer, München, 2002, S. 79 2 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus aus der Perspektive des Verfassungsschutzes, bfv-themenreihe, Köln, März 2008, S. 11. Allein seit Januar 2008 gab es 25 Anschläge auf die Bw-Truppen in Nordafghanistan. 3 Mascolo, Georg: Leben im Gefahrenraum, Spiegel, Hamburg, 1. Dezember 2003, S. 48 4 Nach einer Auflistung der pakistanischen Behörden aus dem Jahre 1995 hatte al-Qaida damals nicht mehr als 5.000 Kämpfer: 1.142 Ägypter, 981 Saudis, 946 Algerier,
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