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Powelson, Simon J. Title Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No Author(s) Powelson, Simon J. Title Enduring engagement yes, episodic engagement no: lessons for SOF from Mali Publisher Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Issue Date 2013-12 URL http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38996 This document was downloaded on April 22, 2014 at 00:25:57 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ENDURING ENGAGEMENT YES, EPISODIC ENGAGEMENT NO: LESSONS FOR SOF FROM MALI by Simon J. Powelson December 2013 Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons Second Reader: Erik Brown Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2013 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS ENDURING ENGAGEMENT YES, EPISODIC ENGAGEMENT NO: LESSONS FOR SOF FROM MALI 6. AUTHOR(S) Simon J. Powelson 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines SOF’s recent experience in Mali and determines where—or to what extent—it should be considered a failure. In addition to analyzing these encounters, a second aim of this thesis is to make recommendations for how SOF might better build partner capacity and capability in the future. The argument made is that enduring engagement is of enduring value; episodic engagement, on its own, is not. Examples of both types of engagement can be found in United States Special Operations Forces’ recent interactions with the Malian military. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Enduring Engagement Episodic Engagement CFS ETIA 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 91 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ENDURING ENGAGEMENT YES, EPISODIC ENGAGEMENT NO: LESSONS FOR SOF FROM MALI Simon J. Powelson Major, United States Army B.A., University of California at Santa Barbara, 2001 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2013 Author: Simon J. Powelson Approved by: Anna Simons Thesis Advisor Erik Brown Second Reader John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis examines SOF’s recent experience in Mali and determines where—or to what extent—it should be considered a failure. In addition to analyzing these encounters, a second aim of this thesis is to make recommendations for how SOF might better build partner capacity and capability in the future. The argument made is that enduring engagement is of enduring value; episodic engagement, on its own, is not. Examples of both types of engagement can be found in United States Special Operations Forces’ recent interactions with the Malian military. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE .........................................................................................................1 B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 D. RESEARCH GOAL ........................................................................................5 E. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS ROADMAP ...........................................6 II. EPISODIC ENGAGEMENT EXPANDS ..................................................................7 A. INCREASED EFFORT ...................................................................................7 B. ANTI-WESTERN OPERATIONS .................................................................8 C. ATT REACTS TO AQIM ...............................................................................9 D. MALI ON THE OFFENSIVE ......................................................................13 E. SOF TRAINING HAS NO APPARENT OUTCOME ON THE FIGHTING .....................................................................................................14 F. ETIA ................................................................................................................17 G. ETIA EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ...............................................................19 1. Individual Equipment ........................................................................20 2. Unit Equipment ..................................................................................22 3. Overly Complex Equipment (Falcon 3) ...........................................25 H. INDIVIDUAL OR UNIT EQUIPMENT .....................................................26 I. SOF BEGINS TRAINING THE ETIAS ......................................................28 1. ETIAs Found Lacking .......................................................................30 III. ENDURING ENGAGEMENT BEGINS .................................................................33 A. JPAT AND THE 33RD RCP ..........................................................................33 B. PRIOR EPISODIC TRAINING ...................................................................38 C. EQUIPAGE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS ...........................................43 D. THE CFS DEPLOYS FOR COMBAT ........................................................47 1. Background ........................................................................................47 2. CFS Prepares ......................................................................................48 3. CFS Operations in the North ............................................................50 E. CFS vs ETIAs .................................................................................................53 IV. SUM AND SUBSTANCE ..........................................................................................55 A. WHAT HAPPENED IN MALI.....................................................................56 B. WHAT IS AN ENDURING ENGAGEMENT? ..........................................57 C. PARTNER-FOCUSED, NOT ENEMY-FOCUSED ...................................58 D. SMALL FOOTPRINT ...................................................................................60 E. HOW DOES EPISODIC ENGAGEMENT FIT? .......................................61 F. FIELDING OF EQUIPMENT......................................................................62 1. SOCOM Equipment Gap ..................................................................63 G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................64 vii APPENDIX. MAPS................................................................................................................67 LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................71 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................77 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Map of Mali. ....................................................................................................67 Figure 2. Map: Enlarged view of northern Mali taken from Figure 1 .............................68 Figure 3. Map highlighting the regions of Mali. .............................................................69 Figure 4. Map of the Kidal region in northern Mali. .......................................................70 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ACOTA African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative AFRICOM United States Africa Command AQ Al-Qaeda AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AK Avtomat Kalashnikova CF conventional forces CQB close quarters battle CSOR Canadian Special Operations Regiment CT counter-terrorism CTFP Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program DDR disarmament demobilization and reintegration DoD United States Department of Defense DoS United States Department of State EUCOM United States European Command
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