Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis

Inside Pages

The War in : Islamists, Tuaregs and French 2 Intervention - Ahmed S. Hashim

Facets of religious violence in Pakistan - 9 Muhammad Feyyaz

Regional Implications of Pakistan’s Changing 14 Militant Landscape - Abdul Basit

Volume 5: Issue 02, February 2013

2 The War in Mali: Islamists, Tuaregs and French Intervention

By Ahmed S. Hashim

In January 2013, the French government of President Francois Hollande found itself involved in an increasingly complicated war against Islamist militants and Tuareg separatists in the remote and dusty country of Mali, a former French colonial possession and one of the poorest countries on the African continent. This intervention – codenamed Operation Serval – came at the culmination of a long chain of events in that hapless country whose current situation is characterized by political in- stability, economic stagnation and longstanding Tuareg separatist sentiment in the north and Islam- ist extremist infiltration via porous and poorly-guarded borders.

Mali and the Sahel Region can drugs pass through this vast and virtually un- policed desert expanse. Mali is in what is referred to as the Sahel, a deso- late and forbidding region in the middle of the The Sahel region separates the Arab-dominated Sahara desert. Although there is some ongoing nations of North Africa (which also contain a debate concerning the geographical extent of the large ethnic group known as Amazigh or Berbers) Sahel region, it is generally considered to extend from those of sub-Saharan Africa. In the minds of from the Western Sahara – a territory whose sov- nineteenth century Orientalists the Semitic (Arab) ereignty is at issue – on the Atlantic to the Horn and Hamitic (Amazigh) constituted the native of Africa on the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. “whites” of Africa whose relations with the “black” Specifically, it includes the following states: West- Africans were marred by manifestations of racial ern Sahara, Mauritania, Mali, , Ni- superiority on the part of the former, mutual sus- ger, Chad, Sudan (North), Eritrea, Ethiopia, So- picions and hatreds, and by the practice of taking maliland and Somalia. The Sahel countries are blacks as slaves by Arab and Berber tribes. among the world’s poorest, and the region overall These mutual racial prejudices have been carried is racked by drought and food shortages. It is into contemporary times. Immediately below the also host to some of the world's busiest smug- Sahel nations are the more prosperous – but also gling routes. People, weapons and South Ameri- conflict-ridden nations (e.g. Nigeria) of West Afri-

Map of the Sahel re- gion.

Source: Qantara

http://en.qantara.de/ files/6973/6874/4b59c b6097ea6_Map_Sahel .jpg

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ca. What happens in the Sahel is not limited to fertile southern region of the country, which also the Sahel as events there – often themselves a includes the capital, Bamako. The northern de- consequence of disruption in North Africa (e.g. sert region which includes the historically im- the Libyan Revolution of 2011 against Colonel portant Islamic centre of learning, Timbuktu, is Gaddafi sent thousands of Africans back into the home to nomadic Arab tribes and another no- Sahel) and witnessed the flooding of the Sahel madic people called Tuaregs (they prefer to call with Libyan arms that are more advanced than themselves Kel Tamasheq). The Tuaregs are a those already in that region. sub-branch of the Amazigh peoples who were already there when the Arabs arrived to claim What of Mali itself? In the late 19th century, the region for Islam. The Arabs and Tuaregs of imposed its control over most of West Mali constitute somewhere between 10-15% of Africa and in the process supplanting and often the total population. The overwhelming majority destroying by military force quite sophisticated of Malians are Muslims (90%). The differences local empires or states; they then set about es- in Mali were not religious, but between the poor- tablishing modern borders for their possessions. er and neglected Tuareg and Arab-inhabited The Mali which emerged from French colonial- north and the more fertile black African southern ism in 1960 nonetheless inherited a very large part of the country. For much of Mali’s modern land area that was over twice the size of modern history as an independent nation, there was no France. Modern Mali is a poor, landlocked na- religious strife or manifestations of extremism; tion of almost 15 million people in the western but there were signs of Tuareg and Arab sepa- part of the Sahel. Its population is composed ratist sentiment from the very beginning of the largely of black Africans who live in the more founding of Mali.

Political map of Mali

Source: Maps of the World

http:// www.mapsofworld.com/ mali/mali-political- map.html

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Tuareg Rebellions, 1963-Present regs and Arabs were under-represented in the government and public sector. What little existed When France granted Mali independence in in the way of public funds was spent in the 1960, the northerners were chagrined that the south. An economically and politically vulnerable colonial power had chosen to include them with- Mali faced a second Tuareg rebellion. By 1991, in a country politically dominated by an “African” alienated by years of discrimination and by mas- government in Bamako far away in the south. sacres in Mali and Niger, Tuaregs in both coun- Many in the ethnically distinct north of Mali tries rebelled. A year later, the Malian Army (along with some in southern Algeria and north- launched bloody reprisals against civilians after ern Niger) expected an independent Tuareg, Tuareg rebel attacks on the city of Gao. Berber, and Arab nation to be formed by the Sahara desert regions when French rule ended. In the latest rebellion which erupted in January The Tuareg rebellion of 1962–1964, sometimes 2012 after months of preparation, the rebels called the First Tuareg Rebellion or the Al- organised themselves under the banner of the fellaga, was a short-lived and amateurish insur- National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad gency by disgruntled Tuareg elements against (MNLA), an organization which was founded at the socialist government of Modibo Keita which the end of 2011 as a result of the fusion of dis- was dominated by southerners. No more than parate rebel groups. Its emergence has been 1,500 poorly-armed anti-government fighters spurred by the return of thousands of well- were ever active, but the ferocious response of armed and experienced Tuareg from fighting for the resulted in a refugee the late Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. In the past, crisis, as thousands fled to Algeria. The subse- many destitute Tuareg men fled to Libya and quent military occupation of the northern region, joined the Libyan army where they received rel- the torture and extra-judicial killings of rebels led atively good training, housing, and good sala- to deep resentment among the northerners. ries. They participated in Qaddafi’s foolhardy and losing wars in sub-Saharan Africa; nonethe- Northern disgruntlement was accentuated by less, these adventures provided them with con- socio-economic marginalization in a country siderable combat experience. These men con- whose rigid socialist policies led to increased stituted the core of the MNLA fighting units and poverty and then bankruptcy by the end of the were under the command Mohammed Ag Najm, 1960s. Keita turned to the West (particularly a former officer in Gaddafi’s army. The MNLA is France) for economic assistance. However, in led by secretary general Bilal Ag Acherif and 1968, before Keita’s new direction bore any fruit, head of the political wing is Mahmoud Ag Aghali. his regime was overthrown by a group of young The MNLA leaders say they want a free, inde- army officers led by Lieutenant (later General) pendent and secular state, which they call Moussa Traore, who expected the West to help Azawad. Mali recover. However, little foreign direct in- vestment made its way to Mali and the country The combat units of the MNLA proved to be bet- was unable to develop worthy national infra- ter and more motivated fighters than the Malian structure. Much of the national budget was eat- soldiers. Mali's regular army consists of approxi- en up by a huge and corrupt public sector that mately 7,500 personnel - mostly mobile infantry had been inherited from the days of socialism. supported by some Special Forces, approxi- Meanwhile, birth rates remained high, and Mali mately 4,000 paramilitary and northern pro- was unable to provide meaningful employment government militia groups that were frequently to its expanding population. The northern region relied upon by Bamako to supplement its efforts. suffered more than the southern region as Tua- Despite a historical need for rapid and mobile

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force projection into the remote desert north Démocratie et la Restauration de l'État: from the southern power base, the Malian gov- CNRDR). The committee denounced the Presi- ernment's military infrastructure in the region dent's incompetence and promised to “hand consisted largely of small garrisons connected power back to a democratically elected Presi- by poorly maintained roads, with larger bases dent as soon as the country is reunified and its maintained at the three regional capitals bearing integrity is no longer threatened.” But the emer- the names of the administrative areas they rep- gence of a military government in Bamako actu- resent: Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. The garrison ally worsened the situation for the Malian mili- mentality of the Malian military was reinforced tary effort in the north. Taking advantage of the by the lack of an air support capability. This seri- turmoil and paralysis in the military high com- ous gap in capabilities prevented the Malian mand and of the orders by the new government military from conducting adequate aerial recon- for troops to retreat to more defensible lines, the naissance to locate rebel forces and from being rebels swept to victory in an astonishing 72 able to take the fight to the rebels. Transport hours after the coup, taking all three northern helicopters and helicopter gunships would have provincial capitals which fell in quick succession constituted a formidable force-multiplier; but the between 30 March and 1 April 2012, sending Malian simply did not have the where- hundreds of demoralized Malian soldiers fled withal to build and sustain an adequate fleet of southwards. The defeats in the north and the helicopters. The sheer size of the region created international outrage that greeted the overthrow a network of vulnerable supply lines, forcing of a democratic government worked to ensure Bamako to resupply its soldiers by means of that the military junta would fail to gain legitima- vulnerable convoys through the desert or cy and it was with alacrity that it accepted the through piecemeal air drops by its tiny air force emergence of an interim government led by ci- which consists mainly of barely serviceable vilians. transport planes. However, all eyes remained on the dire situation Bamako’s war effort in the north became in- in the north. The dynamics there were compli- creasingly undermined by the rapid fall of gov- cated by the fact that several groups were oper- ernment-controlled garrisons to fast moving re- ating in the north and were tacitly allied with one bel forces. These undermanned outposts were another against the Malian government. As soon distant from one another and thus could not mu- as they had defeated the government forces tually reinforce each other when they came un- these groups began to squabble over goals. The der attack. Moreover, these garrisons were short MNLA’s goal is simple: it wants independence of supplies, food and ammunition due to the ap- for the north. There is Ansar al-Din which was palling logistics incapacity of the Malian army. set up by the mercurial and enigmatic Iyad Ag The humiliating defeats and grievous casualty Ghali, himself a Tuareg from an important tribe. levels – including massacres of unarmed sol- Ansar al-Din is anti-separatist and wants to im- diers - set the stage for a political show-down in pose Shariah in Mali. There is Al Qaeda in the Bamako where junior officers under the leader- Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) which is based in the ship of Captain Amadou Sanogo executed a remote regions of Algeria and which sees the coup d’etat on 22 March 2012, overthrowing the rebellion as an opportunity to deepen its pres- democratic government of Amadou Toumani ence in the region. Ansar al-Din and AQIM were Toure (popularly known as “ATT”). Styling them- natural partners; this was reflected in Ag Ghali’s selves the National Committee for the Return of connections with three senior emirs of AQIM: Democracy and the Restoration of the State Abu Zeid, Mokhtar BelMokhtar, and Abu Hama- (Comité National pour le Redressement de la me. In mid-March 2012, after the defeat of the

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Malian army, a large group of Tuareg leaders MNLA. Moreover, the population was becoming held a meeting on the Algerian border; the meet- more incensed by the brutality of the jihadists ing was apparently intended to get Ag Ghali to and their rigid and uncompromising imposition of give up his Islamist aspirations, stop cooperating the Shariah and sporadic protests took place. with AQIM, and to subscribe to the Tuaregs’ goal of an independent state. The Tuareg elders Beau Geste? The French Intervention and leaders of the MNLA were particularly in- censed by the statements of Ag Ghali and his The victory of the separatists and Islamists in lieutenants that the aim of the rebellion was to northern Mali, coupled with the political disarray implement Shariah law in Mali. The outside in Bamako following the military coup, led to a world sat up and took notice, but not in the way flurry of diplomatic activity and military planning that the MNLA wanted. Instead of paying atten- by foreign powers. An imposing array of West- tion to Tuareg aspirations, the outside world was ern and African governments and regional bod- concerned that Al Qaeda and its affiliates were ies, with the blessing of the United Nations making inroads in yet another “ungoverned (UN) , began to draw up detailed military plans space.” Within days of the meeting, the MNLA to eliminate the extremist threat in northern Mali broke with Ag Ghali, branding him a “criminal” and to restore Bamako’s over the whose efforts “to establish a theocratic regime” north. The outside world feared that if the Islam- were anathema “to the foundations of our cul- ists and Al Qaeda entrench themselves in north- ture and civilization.” ern Mali, the area would become yet another haven for terrorists threatening fragile African The political animosity spilled over into violent states and establishing a sanctuary in close clashes between the MNLA and Ansar al-Din proximity to Europe. forces in Kidal in June 2012. The situation dete- riorated further during the last few months of The basic UN plan called for African military 2012; the MNLA was opposed by Ansar al-Din forces to be supported by Western aerial fire- which was well-armed, by a shadowy group power and specialist expertise on the ground to called the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in hit and decisively defeat the rebels. Specifically, West Africa, known by its French acronym, MU- the UN plan proposed that a force of several JAO, whose stronghold is Gao; and by katibas thousand foreign troops from 14 countries of the (battalions) of AQIM, the particularly violent Economic Community of West African States North African franchise of Al Qaeda. Not surpris- (ECOWAS) would arrive in Mali to beef up the ingly, the MNLA lost ground to the religious radi- hopelessly disorganized and demoralized Mali- cals. By late 2012, the political situation in the an military for the forthcoming assault on the north was further complicated by the growing rebels. This African force would be supported by fear on the part of Ag Ghali and Ansar al-Din a contingent of several hundred Western military that the radical foreign jihadists were entrench- advisors and Special Operation Forces, mainly ing themselves at his expense, by the emer- from France and the United States to provide gence of a pro-government militia known as intelligence, logistics, aerial firepower and sur- Ganda Iso in the far north and of a group calling veillance (including drones). The international itself the National Azawad Libération Front approach proved to be a mess. It proceeded at (Front de Liberation Nationale de l'Azawad: a glacial pace; however, events on the ground in FLNA) - which is composed primarily of mem- Mali were moving at lightning speed. The Islam- bers of northern Mali's Arab community and ist rebels had continued to marginalize the sepa- publicly denounces both the presence of the ratist MNLA and by the end of 2012 they Islamists and the secessionist agenda of the seemed ready to implement their promise of

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moving on the southern part of the country. The unwelcome, particularly since he seeks to focus Malian army was judged incapable of holding on the pressing domestic agenda and healing a them back. Second, although better-armed and divided country. trained than the Malian armed forces, there was no guarantee that the promised ECOWAS force France’s strategy going in was to secure Bama- would do much better than the Malian army in a ko, Mali’s capital, and the southern third of the fluid fast-moving mobile warfare in the northern country, then consolidate on the ground while desert. Third, an international force from many African troops, backed by French air power, re- different countries is a disparate force and is- capture the Islamist-controlled northern cities of sues of command, control, and communications Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. French fears concern- take a long time to iron out before such a force ing the efficacy of the international effort were can operate. realized and France began bearing the brunt of the military offensive in January 2013. The Afri- However, as the situation in Mali continued to can force was far from ready to assume its role unravel, France decided to take action. France in coordination with the French effort. Only entered the conflict directly in early January 1,000 African soldiers from five countries had 2013. The French clearly have ambitious goals; made it to Mali by the third week of January French president Hollande stated that the goal 2013. This was simply not an adequate force to was to eliminate the extremist presence in north- capture the vast northern region. Western train- ern Mali and restore the authority of the govern- ers and Special Forces have yet to appear. De- ment in the region. This was reiterated by Jean- spite concerns in France over a possible quag- Yves Le Drian, the French defense minister, mire, the French decided to continue their offen- shortly after France initiated military action: “The sive with the limited forces at their disposal in goal is the total reconquest of Mali. We will not accordance with the eminently logical principle leave any pockets.” But the war in this remote that it is better to keep the rebel forces under region of Africa threatens to draw in an interna- pressure than halt operations which would give tional cast of characters. Britain, and Ger- them time to recover from the pounding they many have offered some help. However, all have recently received. eyes are on the United States to potentially be- come the biggest backer of the French effort. While French troops have made important The transported a 600- gains, it is important for France, the West, and member French mechanized battalion and its the regional states around Mali to understand equipment and Tiger helicopter gunships to Ma- that military success will be fleeting if: a) sub- li, and is providing intelligence information, in- stantial concessions are not made to the Tua- cluding satellite imagery. The US Air Force has regs; b) extensive reforms are not introduced in offered to provide refueling tankers to refuel Mali itself, including rebuilding and re-equipping French Air Force Mirage and Rafale fighter- of the ramshackle Malian security forces; and c) bombers during missions. But this would bring the regional states, including the “giants” of the American involvement to a new level, direct- North Africa, do not implement some form of ly supporting military attacks. For President joint regional security framework to thwart the Obama, who devoted part of his Inaugural Ad- growth of transnational non-state terrorist and dress in January 2013, to a celebration of the criminal networks. While France had seemingly end of a war in Iraq and the winding down of the articulated military objectives to justify its deci- American commitment in Afghanistan, the pro- sion to engage directly in the conflict, it is not spect of getting involved in a conflict against a clear that it has a clean exit strategy. The shadowy enemy far from the United States is French are finding that their ally, the Malian gov-

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ernment, is weak and feckless. It is not clear EDITORIAL STAFF that the Malians can maintain control in the north following a French draw-down after the defeat of the extremists. But France cannot af- Editor ford to maintain large forces in Mali. Mali’s prob- Dr. Arabinda Acharya lems are not purely, indeed, not even primarily military; they are political and socio-economic in Associate Editor origin. Again, France is not going to get involved in a unilateral nation-building effort in Mali. Last Nadisha Sirisena but not least, even if the Islamist extremists are defeated the big question of Tuareg aspirations Editorial Assistant for autonomy or independence will still remain a Chua Zhi Lynne serious political issue.

For inclusion in the CTTA mailing list, please —— Ahmed S. Hashim is an Associate Professor at email your full name and the name of your or- ICPVTR. ganization with the subject “CTTA Subscription” to Kelvinder Singh at the following address: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The views presented in the articles are those of the authors and do not reflect or represent the views of the editors or the organizations to which the editors and authors are affiliated.

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 5, Iss. 02, 2013

9 Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan

By Muhammad Feyyaz

Organized violence is a key characteristic of the security landscape of contemporary Pakistan. The character of religious violence has evolved from sectarianism to talibanization. This paper briefly reviews facets of religious violence by focusing on religious structures, inter-sect and intra-sect par- adigms of the conflict-laden environment. Religious Terror Organizations killing of Bashir Bilour, a front line leader of the Awami National Party and attempts on the life of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the militant or- Malala Yousafzai, an education activist for teen- ganization that has challenged the security of age girls, and leading journalist Hamid Mir alleg- Pakistan on a number of fronts, maintains that its ing their actions as un-Islamic exemplifies this anti-state struggle is influenced by Shariah, which orientation. is evident from the diversity of its targets. Until August 2009, TTP has committed a variety of In the last three years, two distinct but paradoxi- violent acts against human, political, sectarian, cal changes have occurred in the overall struc- strategic, and religious targets. These include ture and operational strategy of TTP. First, it now ideological challengers such as Maulana Hassan boasts to have franchisees in all four provinces of Jan, Maulana Mufti Naeemi, former Prime Minis- the country. Each province has a regional com- ter Benazir Bhutto, scores of social activists, jour- mander who coordinates planning, organization nalists and tribal competitors. Moreover, its reli- and execution of contemplated acts independent- gious propensity is also manifested in trans- ly or in cooperation with other militant groupings. border operations conducted in support of the At the local level, provincial chapters of the TTP Afghan Taliban movement which helped create give primacy to their particular tribal or ethnic the TTP in December 2007. In recent months, the identity, even though they cooperate with other

Political map of Pakistan

Source: Maps of the World

http://www.mapsofworld.com/pakistan/ pakistan-political-map.html

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Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan 10

provincial chapters in terms of operations. when Waziri, Mehsud and Bhittani groups belonging to required. At its peak during 2007-2009, Tehrik-e SWA including the Maulvi Nazir group that main- -Taliban Swat (TTS) under Fazalullah was the tain their distinct identity. There are also numer- principal showpiece of TTP’s religious philoso- ous smaller outfits that are loosely affiliated with phy, which over time has transmuted TTP, operating from diverse locations. These its objectives to embrace elements of terror and include splinter groups who renounced their par- criminality. ent organization for example, renegades of mainstream Kashmiri fighters (Lashkar–e-Taiba Second, sophistication, novelty and combat effi- (LeT)), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), Harkat-ul- ciency are the hallmarks of Taliban’s recent op- Mujahidin al-Alami (HuMA), and possibly Harkat erations. At the same time however, this opera- -ul-Ansar. In addition, foreign fighters of Afro- tional articulation reflects substantial fragmenta- Asian origin belonging to Al Qaeda and its asso- tion in the erstwhile cohesive cadres of the TTP. ciates such as Qaedat al-Jihad and elements of The Taliban has been disintegrating due to con- the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIS) tinued infighting over power and money matters, are also present in FATA. A few others are the especially after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic sustained military operations and mounting al- Jihad Union (IJU), Abdullah Azzam Brigades ienation from the masses. The Shura-e- and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Muraqaba, an anti-US war council consisting of five key Al Qaeda-linked Pakistani and Afghan Inter-sect Milieu Taliban groups based in Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), which was an Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP now Aehle Sun- initiative to repair the Pak-Afghan Taliban rela- nat wal Jamaat-ASWJ) and Tehrik Nifaze Fiqah- tionship, has fallen apart after the November e-Jafria were at the forefront of the sectarian 2012 failed attempt by a TTP suicide bomber to discord during the late 1980s. While Sipah-e- kill Mullah Nazir, a known Taliban leader from Muhammadi, the pro-Shia armed group has vir- South Waziristan Agency (SWA). He was later tually disappeared, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) killed by a drone strike in January 2013. Even remains the most ferocious militant group en- though reports of infighting have been dismissed gaged in full scale sectarian war in Pakistan. It is by Hakimullah Mehsud, the current leader of the believed to be an armed wing of ASWJ, though TTP, it is widely perceived that serious divisions the latter categorically denies its linkage with exist inside this collectivity over the issue of LeJ. LeJ wields strong influence in all regions of leadership on account of the derailed process of the country but most notably in the whole of attending to original objectives of the organiza- Punjab, Quetta and Mastung in Balochistan and tion. Despite these problems, however, the TTP Karachi in Sindh. Jaish-ul-Islam in Quetta is an continues to enjoy sizeable support of jihadi offshoot of the LeJ. LeJ’s transnational outreach constituencies inside Pakistan. was confirmed when it claimed responsibility for the killing of 55 Shias in Kabul in December Several independent Taliban clusters are also 2011. based in FATA. For example, Waziri and Dawar Taliban from North Waziristan Agency (NWA) Tehrik Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) un- comprising of about sixteen major and minor der Sufi Muhamad from Dir joined the sectarian factions led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur, are a formi- stream during the early 1990s. Tehrik-e-Taliban dable grouping that has generally remained Swat (TTS) also has its origin in TNSM owing to away from the TTP due to divergent political Fazullah-Sufi’s familial connections, which later dispositions. Likewise, there are six independent adopted the pan-Islamist narrative. Meanwhile,

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Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan 11

some independent groups have also emerged. jurisprudence (Fiqh) and Ghair Moqalideen For example, in October 2006, Pakhtun militants (deviant of any schools) into a violent competi- who fought against the International Security tion. It is argued that accentuation of Tauheediat Assistance Forces (ISAF), formed a new anti- (oneness of Allah) by Sayyid Ahmad during ear- Shia militant organization led by Mufti Ilyas and ly 19th Century, and the suprahuman exaltation Hazrat Ali of Darra Adam Khel and became ac- attributed to Prophet Muhammad by Ahmed Ra- tive in Quetta, Karachi and other major cities in za Khan who influenced the Barelvi movement Pakistan. Afridi Taliban led by Tariq Afridi start- in India in the early 20th Century, were the cata- ed an identical anti-Shia campaign in Darra Ad- lysts for intra-sect confrontation in Pakistan. am Khel by targeting Shias commuting between Peshawar and Kohat. Media reports suggest Ghair Moqalideen constitute diverse sub-belief that attack in Kabul on Shias was carried out by systems, each pursuing a distinct confession. Tariq Afridi at the behest of Al Qaeda and LeJ. Ahle Hadith construes Quran and Hadith as the Some writers have therefore denoted sectarian only sources of knowledge together with those killers as “Pakistan’s other Taliban”. (Salafis) who besides Quran and Hadith derive inspiration from select companions (sahabas) of Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of sectarianism Prophet as well as but not necessarily later two in Pakistan since its creation. It explains how in generation of their disciples, i.e. Followers") and Tābi‘ al“ التابعون :the period following independence sectarianism Tābi‘ūn (Arabic those after“ تابع التابعين :gradually increased in intensity and spread from -Tābi‘īn (Arabic theological to social planes. It is important to Tabi’un”). In addition, to Ahle Hadith and Salafis, point out that for about 35 years, from 1947 until Hanblis who purportedly claim to follow the the early 1980s; sectarianism was virtually non- Hambali School, are widely perceived as Salafis existent in Pakistan. due to their strict interpretation of Tauheedi practices of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab at- Tamimi (a prominent religious figure in the 18th century from the Arabian Peninsula and Author of Kitab Tawheed). Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Ludhianwi, President of the Punjab Khilafat Committee had written to Muhammad Iqbal on 25 August 1926, quoting a conversation with King Ibn Saud at Hijaz that the Saudis are Moqalideen of Hanbli Fiqh and propaganda against them was articulated by Ahle Hadid Ule- ma (religious scholars) to win over their sympa- thies. Figure 1: Genesis and transformation of sectarianism Wahabis have emerged as a de facto sect, who view the four Sunni schools with disdain and Drivers and contexts of Intra-Sectarian Vio- disapproval. In Pakistan, Wahabis are mostly lence confused with Ahle Hadith, which is historically incorrect. Ahle Hadith assert themselves as a As religious polarization deepened in Pakistani sub-continental movement vaguely beginning in society, hitherto nonviolent ideological cleavag- the 8th Century that grounds its tradition into es among Sunnis kept intensifying to draw ad- belief of advent of Hadith (sayings of Prophet herents (Moqalideen) of major schools of Islamic Muhammad) into this region directly through

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Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan 12

various sahabas during the life time of the The four intra-sectarian conflict paradigms can Prophet. Hence, they are called “Ahle- be inferred within the Sunni sect: Hadith” (bearers of the sayings of the Prophet). Nonetheless, both have tacit agreement on Tau- First, it is essentially Moqalideens are essential- heediat. ly the Ahle Hadith, Salafis, Deobandis, Neoban- dis and Wahabis pitched against the Barelvis. Compared to these three sectarian streams, Pakistan’s “shrine culture” that still thrives in the Deobandis and Barelvis regard themselves as subcontinent is under attack from all of these Moqalideen with subtle variations. Both follow camps. Almost all attacks on shrines in Khyber Hanfi law; but whereas the Barelvis are consid- Agency and Peshawar have been claimed by ered a moderate variant, Deobandis are ortho- Lashkar-e-Islam. dox Hanfis who despise innovations (bida’t) al- leging Barelvis as polytheists due to the latter’s Second, involves the dispute between the reverence to Sufi shrines and saints. In this ori- Moqalideen and Ghair Moqalideen, the most entation, they are joined by all others including pronounced being the intractable violence be- Wahabis, Ahle Hadith and Salafis who also term tween Ansaar ul-Islam (Pakistan), an anti- Barelvis as mushrik and heretics. It may be not- Taliban armed Barelvi group located in FATA ed that Deobandis also believe in the Sufi order with its rival Lashkar-e-Islam. It has caused and revere saints but are opposed to interceding huge loss to human lives and property. Identical- them between God for deliverance and provi- ly, after falling apart from the TTP, Jamait Ahle dence which drives the fundamental conflict. Hadith (JAH - a group of Hadith adherents), is one of its many competitors in Orakzai agency. The Salafis in Pakistan mostly include Arab ele- In an ideological sense, this feud may be classi- ments within the ranks of Al Qaeda who brought fied as Moqalideen versus Ghair Moqalideen but with them strict interpretation of sacred scripts in essence its real contention lies in the TTP’s and have measurably influenced the ideological anti-government violent drive as well as realpoli- orientation of the Taliban. TTP is by and large a tik which is believed to have caused this aliena- Deobandi organization characterized by a tribal tion. This situation can be better understood if social code of conduct with elements drawn the conflict is viewed from the perspective of from Wahabism. For instance, the leadership of intergroup rivalry i.e., Ahle Hadith, Wahabis as the LeT, Hafiz Saeed and his close affiliates, well as Salafis each versus Barelvis. An empiri- personify many characteristics of Salafism. The cal version of this feud can also be seen in the TTS, unlike the TTP, is said to have been influ- 2007 war in SWA between Moulvi Nazir Taliban enced more by the Wahabi school due to Arab against foreign militants, especially Uzbeks Afghan settlement in Swat after the Afghan jihad (generally labeled as Salafis), forcing them to in the 1980s. There are, however, a few other take refuge with Baitullah Mehsud. groups whose sectarian identity is somewhat dubious. For example, the Panjpiris, who origi- Third, in the intra-Moqalideen domain, Deoban- nate from a village in Swabi district of Khyber dis have positioned themselves against Barelvis Pakhtunkhwa and Khyber agency-based militant resulting in violent incidents on the eve of Eid group Lashkar-e-Islam (Mangal Bagh group), Milad un Nabi (birthday celebrations of Prophet) are perceived as Salafis. For some, Lashkar-e- for the last few years. Since 2008, Deobandis Islam follows Deobandi and Panjpiri creeds have also been further split owing to policy or while linkage with Wahabi Islam makes asser- cultural variables rather than religious reasons. tion of it being of the former classification a sus- Fourth, sustained violence between JAH and pect. various factions of the FATA based Salafi mili-

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Facets of Religious Violence in Pakistan 13

tant structures including foreign elements high- light contours of intra Ghair Moqalideen compe- tition.

Conclusion

The variegated scene of violence in Pakistan presents symptoms of nascent anarchy which shows no sign of easing in near future. Absence For the latest reports of a coherent national strategy and lack of politi- and commentaries cal will to counter the same has further com- on terrorism and pounded the situation. Unless addressed effec- political violence, tively and in time, it could augment religious po- please visit larization leading to more instability in a country www.pvtr.org reeling under Taliban militancy, ethno-political violence and other forms of social unrest.

—— Muhammad Feyyaz is a member of the faculty at University of Management and Technology, Lahore, Pakistan.

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

The CTTA: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis is now open for contributions from researchers and practitioners in the field of terrorism research, security, and other related fields.

Topical areas of interest are terrorism and political violence, organized crime, homeland security, religion and violence, internal conflicts and all other areas of security broadly defined.

Article length could be anywhere between 1,000 to 2,000 words. Submissions must be made before the 15th of every month for editing purposes and for inclu- sion in the next month’s edition. Please refer to the guidelines.

Electronic copies of the articles (MS Word format) may be submitted to Kelvinder Singh, at the following address: [email protected]

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 5, Iss. 02, 2013

14 Regional Implications of Pakistan’s Changing Militant Landscape

By Abdul Basit

With the expected US withdrawal from Afghanistan in mid-2014, the militant landscape is changing very fast. It is imperative for both the political and military leaders in Pakistan to take note of these developments and fine-tune their counter-terrorism policies to address the future challenges faced by Pakistan. Many of the current terrorist threat assessments ideological and military levels. emphasize that the epicenter of global terrorism has shifted from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region Unfortunately at the political level, Pakistan still to the Sahel region of North and Central Africa. lacks the will and clarity to take on the Islamist This is based on the assessment that the US militants groups in its north-western tribal region drone campaign in Pakistan’s Federally Adminis- despite losing more than 40,000 civilians and tered Tribal Areas (FATA) has considerably 6,000 security personnel in the fight. Despite the weakened Al Qaeda. Except for Ayman al- recent attacks such as, the October 2012 assas- Zawahiri, the US has eliminated almost all of Al sination attempt on Malala Yousafzai, an educa- Qaeda’s top leaders. However, if the problem of tion activist for teenage girls from Swat, the abor- the Afghan conflict remains unresolved, Al Qaeda tive suicide attempt in the Mohmand tribal region will resurrect itself with the help of its Pakistani, on the late Qazi Hussain Ahmed, the former head Afghan and other regional affiliates. of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and lastly the killing of the senior minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Bashir Regional peace and stability will hinge upon two Biloure, in a suicide attack in Peshawar, there is things: little consensus that the political parties in Paki- stan will launch a full scale retribution against the a) how well the US executes its troops with- militants. On the contrary, it further led to wider drawal from Afghanistan political divisions as some political groups advo- b) and how Pakistan handles the challenge of cate for the elimination of these terror networks, extremism and terrorism in its tribal regions, while others advocate negotiating with the TTP. post-June 2014 Shortcomings of the Pakistani Military Strate- If the situation in Afghanistan deteriorates after gy the withdrawal of International Security Assis- tance Forces (ISAF) in 2014, it will further attract At the military level, the approach so far has been jihadists across the globe to flock to Afghanistan, to contain the threat posed by TTP. However, the similar to the current situation in Syria. containment is counter-productive for four rea- sons: Recently, the umbrella group of the Pakistani Taliban, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has First, TTP does not view jihad/insurgency as a significantly increased their attacks on state sym- modus operandi or a means to a greater end bols and politicians, while stepping up their prop- (Islamic emirate or Islamic caliphate). To them, aganda campaign. It is widely expected that Paki- jihad is an end in itself. It is a way of life, a mis- stan’s campaign again the terrorist elements will sion and a cause worth living and dying for. start only when the US leaves Afghanistan. But it will be a long and hard road which requires a Second, TTP affiliates subscribe to the clear long-term strategy at the social, political, Khurasaan utopia. The Khurasaan utopia relates

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Pakistan’s Changing Militant Landscape 15

to a prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. Ac- Regulation Act 2009 (The System of Justice) in cording to them, “an Islamist movement of black Swat district of Khyber-Pakhkunkhwa, which flags will rise from the land of Khurasaan granted TTP its longstanding demand of Shariah (current day Afghanistan, tribal regions of Paki- law had failed to limit its expansion beyond stan, Xinjiang province of and some parts Swat. In a couple of months after the implemen- of Central Asia and Iran). It will establish the tation of Nizam-e-Adal Act, TTP moved into the system of Islamic caliphate across the globe and neighbouring districts of Shangla and Buner, in no power will be able to stop them.” In their pub- violation of the peace agreement. In Punjab, it lications and speeches both the Al Qaeda and found allies in the province’s southern districts, TTP refer these regions as Khurasaan. Ideologi- known as the “Punjabi Taliban”, and collaborat- cally, they are the convinced that they belong to ed with Sunni sectarian militant groups as well. a promising group of believers who will fulfill the Most recently, it has shown a strong presence in prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. the port city of Karachi as well.

Third, from TTP’s track record it is evident that it Fourth, so far the Pakistani security forces used is expansionist in nature. Neither the peace the policy of “divide and rule” in FATA against agreement nor the disjointed and poorly coordi- TTP along with anti-Taliban tribal militias (locally nated military operations have succeeded in known as lashkars). They took advantage of the limiting its growth beyond FATA. Though, the differences between the Afghan-focused Hafiz Pakistani army has achieved some limited tacti- Gul Bahadur and Mullah Nazir groups; and the cal gains against the group, these are fragile anti-Pakistan TTP affiliated groups. However, and reversible. In retrospect, TTP has used all after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan this the peace deals (nine in total) with the Pakistani policy will not work. The differences between government to buy time to regroup and reorgan- these groups are organizational in nature at the ize itself. The last peace agreement with the tactical and operational level. On the other hand, TTP’s Swat chapter, known as Nizam-e-Adal strategically and ideologically, they agree on

Despite relocation of the epicenter of global jihad from the Af-Pak region to the Sahil region of North and West Africa, Pakistan still remains the most frequently visited destination of aspirant jihadists around the globe. Photo credit: Agence France-Presse. http://dawn.com/2011/12/07/mission-impossible-for-pakistani- progressives/

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Pakistan’s Changing Militant Landscape 16

policies of jihad and Islamization.

TTP’s Regional Aspirations

A matter of grave concern is the TTP’s new found interest in the Kashmir conflict. It is nei- ther accidental nor can its anti-India statements be brushed aside as mere rhetoric. In the last two months, TTP has issued two elaborate A video produced by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP), statements on India. The first statement was Umar Studio in which its leaders threatened to launch issued on 22 November 2012 against India’s jihad in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK). execution of Ajmal Kasab, the lone terrorist in- Photo credit: The Middle East Media Research Institute. volved in the Mumbai attacks in November 2008, to be captured alive. The TTP spokesper- Similarly, in its video speeches and messages son Ehsanullah Ehsan stated, “We have decid- TTP’s leaders frequently talk about extending a ed to target Indians to avenge the killing of helping hand to the suffering ethnic Rohingya Ajmal Kasab.” He threatened, “If they [Indians] Muslims in Myanmar and the Uighur Muslims in don't return his body to us or his family we will China’s Xinjiang province. The TTP also has capture Indians and will not return their bodies." close affiliation with the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIM), a separatist Islamist movement of The second statement was in a 46 minute-long Chinese Xinjiang province. The ETIM supporters video in Pashtu with Urdu subtitles produced by actively participate with TTP in its terrorist oper- TTP’s media wing Umar Media on 8 January ation in FATA. 2013. In this video, TTP’s deputy leader Waliur Rehman criticized Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. He One can undermine TTP’s global ambition of maintained that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy ruined striking the US or Europe in their homelands, the Kashmiris and destroyed everything. He but its regional outreach and networking with stated, “we strongly condemn this policy as other Islamist militants groups cannot be easily much as we do about India’s atrocities.” brushed aside. Regionally, it has the will and capability to strike whenever an opportunity will Waliur Rehman claimed that Pakistan’s efforts present itself. have failed to yield results and therefore, vowed to launch its own jihad in the valley. He stated, More specifically, the TTP’s rhetoric of sending its fighters to fight in Indian Administered Kash- Allah willing, the Mujahideen of TTP will mir is potentially explosive. It can reinvigorate arrive in Kashmir and as per the Islamic the past ghost of Kashmir jihad and can result in Shariah…..As our ancestors sacrificed a partnership between the banned Kashmiri ji- their lives for Kashmir and had got hadi groups and the TTP. Terrorism is already a Kashmir liberated by force [in 1947-48], big stumbling block in the normalization of Indo- the same way walking in the footsteps Pak relations. TTP’s addition as an irritant in the of their forefathers, we will get Kashmir Indo-Pak equation will seriously jeopardize nor- liberated [from India], and will help them malization and the peace process. get their rights. Given the above, the recent overtures on the part of certain political parties which include Im- ran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Movement

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Pakistan’s Changing Militant Landscape 17

for the Justice) to negotiate with the TTP, har- bours on naivety and an oversimplified GLOBAL PATHFINDER worldview. However, Pakistan cannot defeat TTP militarily with the use of force alone. There The ICPVTR Terrorism Data- is a need for a clear and sustainable political base – Global Pathfinder - is a solution which probably could involve negotia- one-stop repository for infor- tion. The upcoming US withdrawal from Afghani- mation on the current and stan places Pakistan at an important cross-road emerging terrorist threats. The of its history. It could be both a challenge and database focuses on terrorism opportunity for Pakistan to rid itself of its jihadist and political violence in the elements. The possible solution is to use all of Asia-Pacific region – compris- its national power and work with its neighbour ing of Southeast Asia, North that share similar threats. If Islamabad fails to do Asia, South Asia, Central Asia that, it could very likely descend into further cha- and Oceania. os. Global Pathfinder is an inte- —— grated database containing Abdul Basit is a Senior Analyst at ICPVTR. comprehensive profiles of ter- rorist groups, key terrorist per- sonalities, terrorist and counter -terrorist incidents as well as terrorist training camps. It also contains specific details and analyses of significant terrorist attacks in the form of terrorist attack profiles.

For further inquiries regarding subscription and access to the Global Pathfinder database, please email Ms. Elena Ho Wei Ling at the following email address: [email protected]

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 5, Iss. 02, 2013

18

The International Centre for Political Violence and Ter- rorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist centre within the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

ICPVTR conducts research, training, and outreach pro- grams aimed at reducing the threat of politically moti- vated violence and at mitigating its effects on the inter- national system. The Centre seeks to integrate academ- ic theory with practical knowledge, which is essential Nanyang Technological University for a complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from politically-motivated groups. Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 The Centre is staffed by academic specialists, religious scholars, as well as personnel from the law enforce- Phone: +65 6316 8925 ment, military and intelligence agencies, among others. Fax: +65 6791 1941 The Centre is culturally and linguistically diverse, com- prising of functional and regional analysts as well as Website: www.pvtr.org Muslim religious scholars from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and North America.

Publications

 The Terrorist Threat from  International Aviation and Thailand : Jihad or Quest for Terrorism: Evolving Threats, Justice? (Dulles, Virginia: Evolving Security Potomac Books, 2013) (Routledge 2009) by Rohan Gunaratna and by Dr. John Harrison Arabinda Acharya.

 Ethnic Identity and National  Terrorist Rehabilitation: Conflict in China The US Experience in Iraq (Palgrave Macmillan 22 June (CRC Press Taylor and 2010) by Dr. Rohan Gunarat- Francis Group, 2011) by na, Dr. Arabinda Acharya Dr. Ami Angell and and Mr. Wang Pengxin Dr. Rohan Gunaratna

 Targeting Terrorist Financing:  Pakistan: Terrorism Ground International Cooperation Zero (Reaktion Books, 2011) and New Regimes by Dr. Rohan Gunaratna and (Routledge 2009) by Dr. Ara- Mr. Khurram Iqbal binda Acharya

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 5, Iss. 02, 2013