Pe.Eu No 1(X)/2014

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No 1(X)/2014 Price 19 PLN (w tym 5% VAT) 10 EUR 12 USD 7 GBP ISSN: 2083-7372 quarterly January-March www.neweasterneurope.eu

BOOKS & REVIEWS: ANDRZEJ WAJDA, LYUDMILA ULITSKAYA, ROMAN SZPORLUK, SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK & SREĆ KO HORVAT

Victoria Narizhna Mykola Riabchuk Igor Lyubashenko Taras Voznyak

RUSSIA ISSN 2083-7372 A Dress Rehearsal for Democracy? www.neweasterneurope.eu / 141 (X) Ayder Muzhdabayev On learned helplessness Alexander Snegirev

Dear Reader, The beginning of every year, unavoidably, brings refl ection over what has happened in the year before and what consequences it could have on the year to come. However, while we all tend to agree that history matters, we also know how impossible it is to foresee the course of the future based on the past. And indeed, we fi nished 2013 with an incomplete chapter in Ukraine along with some disappointment with the European Union’s limited success in integration with the East. Recent events show that when it comes to this region nothing can be taken for granted, including Russia and its geopolitical aspirations. As two Lithuanian analysts, Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, write in a summary of the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit: “decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is qualitatively different from all previous integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space”. A painful truth, but also one that the EU should not disregard, especially in light of the arguments made by Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, Polish security experts, who state that: “Eastern Europe has become an ‘unwanted child’ for some western countries, one they would prefer to forget about.” Considering the limited attention span on this issue, we want to present you with analyses of one of the countries which probably represents the biggest victim of western misconceptions. Belarus is often easily assigned the label of “Europe’s last dictatorship”, yet seen by many others as located in the heart of Europe. While explaining the complexities of its current situation, the authors of this issue, who don’t question Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule, point to the EU policies that poorly address the Belarusian people who, as an intellectual and oppositionist Alyaksandr Milinkevich writes, are not only entrepreneurial but also pro-European. The articles aim to present Belarus from various viewpoints and allow us to ask a question why we overlook this key nation too often. This issue also includes an essay by Alexander Snegirev, a Russian writer, who tackles the problem of learned hopelessness in post-Soviet societies as well as and an insightful interview with Ayder Muzhdabayev, the deputy editor- in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets. Lastly, in the review section, we point to the newest fi lm directed by Andrzej Wajda presenting the story of the Polish communist fi ghter – Lech Wałęsa. As always, we encourage you to join us online and via our social networks (Twitter and Facebook).

The Editors 4 Contents

Opinion and Analysis

8 Lessons from Vilnius 48 The Russian Orphanage Model Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas Alexander Snegirev The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity 52 After the Crash to review the goals of Europe’s policy in Mykola Riabchuk the region. Thus far, the policy has been understood as the spread of European 58 Georgia’s Choice values and norms in the neighbourhood. Nika Sikharulidze But, the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that competing integration projects could reduce the EU’s abilities to tie the 65 What Gives Us Strength? neighbouring states to Europe. Alyaksandr Milinkevich The current times cannot be called favourable for Belarus, but it is on this 14 A New Kind of Revolution anvil that the Belarusian identity is being Victoria Narizhna tempered. The Belarusians are a people with a European past and capable of 23 Euromaidan. Chronicles preserving their identity. of networked revolt Igor Lyubashenko 76 The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness The period between November 21st and Dzmitry Hurnevich December 1st 2013 marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian politics. It is now possible to say with confi dence that one 84 Redefi ning Identity of the main things that took place is the Jędrzej Czerep political initiation of the new generation. 91 Between Collaboration and Confl ict 28 Europe with a View to the Future Andrzej Poczobut Adam Reichardt In Belarus, there is an economic crisis; there is social discontent; there are trade unions, but there are no worker protests. 33 The Eastern European Winter Why haven’t the trade unions become Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak the main agent of the change and social resistance in Belarus? 41 The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia 99 In Search of One Voice Adam Balcer Alena Zuikova Despite Russia’s goal to create a Eurasian Union to reintegrate the countries of the 109 Challenging Cooperation former Soviet Union, this vision will most on the Local Level likely remain on paper. The rise of China’s Miroslav Kobasa role in the region clearly demonstrates that the Eurasian Union does not constitute a 112 The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration serious obstacle to economic and political Anna Maria Dyner cooperation between countries in the post- Soviet space and other regional powers. 5

People, Ideas, Inspiration

118 Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus 161 Happiness Is Near? Andrei Liakhovich Aleksandra Eriksson Relations with Belarus are not a high The Russian city of Perm recently priority for the European Union. The underwent a revolutionary change from a majority of its policy is based on rusting industrial city to a cultural hot spot. containing Russia’s inﬂ uence. The EU could have a greater impact on Belarus 169 The Evolution of the Central European City relations, but only if it wants to. For now, A Conversation with Jan Sucháček it seems to be perfectly satisﬁ ed with the status quo. Books and Reviews

125 So close, yet so far away 175 Ryszard Jabłoński – A Different Wajda? Evgeny Treshchenkov Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei (Wałęsa. Man of Hope). A fi lm directed by Andrzej Wajda Interviews 177 Filip Mazurczak – Beyond the Cold Warrior On Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Edited by Charles Gati 131 Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev 180 Ida Orzechowska – Europe “I do not believe that Navalny is a hope in the Time of Cholera of Russian democracy and a European On Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat’s What type politician on the whole. And this Does Europe Want? The Union and its may also be in Putin’s interests, as he Discontents may demonstrate to the West: look 183 Andrey Miroshkin – Letters here, in case of democratisation, I could on a Post-War Country be replaced by people who encourage On Lyudmila Ulitskaya’s Детство 45–53: а Muscovites to join Nazi processions.” завтра будет счастье (Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness) 137 The Ukrainian Window to Europe 186 Anna Kotaleichuk An interview with Taras Voznyak – Reading Szporluk on Maidan On Roman Szporluk’s Формування модерних Reports націй:Україна – Росія – Польща (The Formation of Modern Nations: 142 Human Traffi cking in Romania Ukraine – Russia – Poland) Misha Hofl and 189 Zośka Papużanka – Unravelling the Past History On Wiesław Myśliwski’s Ostatnie rozdanie (The Last Deal) 148 Eastern Galicia Revisited 192 Dorota Sieroń-Galusek Tadeusz Iwański – The Ethos of Bridge Builders On a Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity. 156 Surviving Totalitarian Regimes 194 Philip Palmer – Reframing the Debate An oral history interview On Magdalena Waligórska’s Klezmer’s with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková Afterlife: An Ethnography of the Jewish Music Revival in Poland and Germany 198 Grzegorz Nurek – Around Polish Cinema On a series dedicated to Polish fi lm directors published Krytyka Polityczna www.neweasterneurope.eu Content with the notation (CC) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER All attempts are made to give proper The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College and appropriate attribution of Eastern Europe in Wrocław to the author and source. offi [email protected] www.kew.org.pl The Editors do not return submitted texts unless requested. The Editors reserve the right to edit and shorten submitted texts. CO-EDITOR European Solidarity Centre [email protected] www.ecs.gda.pl New Eastern Europe is co-fi nanced by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education EDITORIAL BOARD Leonidas Donskis, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paweł Kowal, Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, The project is co-fi nanced by the Department Cornelius Ochmann, Eugeniusz Smolar, of Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the Lilia Shevtsova, Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the framework of the grant programme – Cooperation EDITORIAL TEAM in the Area of Public Diplomacy 2013 Adam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief Iwona Reichardt, Deputy Editor, Lead Translator All works published with grant funded from the Ministry of Foreign Giacomo Manca, Contributing Editor Affairs are published under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC by 3.0). Any republication of materials EDITORIAL INTERN funded under this grant must be attributed in the manner Martina Cebecauerova specifi ed by the author or licensor. COPYEDITING AND PROOFREADING Circulating texts without the Editors’ permit is strictly Gina Kuhn, Filip Mazurczak forbidden. The Editors bear no responsibility for the content of advertisements. CONTRIBUTING ARTIST Andrzej Zaręba Copyright © by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław ADVERTISING (Kolegium Europy Wschodniej Wiesława Nowosad im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu), 2014 SUBSCRIPTION Circulation: 6000 [email protected]

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Lessons from Vilnius

LAURYNAS KASČIŪNAS AND VYTAUTAS KERŠANSKAS

Th e Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals of Europe’s policy in the region. Th us far, the policy has been understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But, the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that competing integration projects could further reduce the EU’s abilities to tie the neighbouring states to Europe.

Th e Vilnius Summit was neither a victory nor a failure for the European Union’s Eastern Partnership policy. It is an important milestone because the original mission to give a European perspective to the region has been accomplished. On the other hand, however, no agreement with Ukraine that we could call the “point of no return” was reached during the summit. Th e biggest achievement of the summit is not very inspiring – the initialling of the Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia, and, to some extent, a “green light” for the visa-free regime with Moldova. Of course the big disappointment of Ukraine’s slap in the face to EU made these achievements look even better. Ukraine’s signing of the Association Agreement with EU would have meant that the Ukrainian multi-dimensional foreign policy would be practically over, ending the country’s possibility to enter into the Customs Union. However, this round was lost and the competition between the integration spaces continues. Winners and losers

Decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is qualitatively diff erent from all previous integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space. Th e Eurasian Customs Union means deeper integration, Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius Opinion and Analysis 9 because, apart from a free trade area, it also includes a single imports taxation system, a uniform external customs tariff and other harmonised standards. Once a country joins the Eurasian Union, it loses its independence in the area of external trade policy. Members of the Eurasian Customs Union have to both agree on the common customs tariff and jointly develop a common trade regime with third countries. Should EU partner countries join the Eurasian An alternative view states Union, this would mean that Russia would gain leverage in the external trade policy of the other that Yanukovych, not countries in the Eurasian Union and will be able to Russia, is the winner aff ect their relations with the EU. For instance, it of this geopolitical game. could foreclose their negotiations with the EU on enhanced free trade agreements. Th us, the current situation in Ukraine becomes a zero-sum game: for Russia it is a win or lose question in the context of the possibility to dominate in the biggest and economically strongest post-Soviet state. At the same time, the EU may win or lose momentum, after which the political and civil will to integrate may decrease dramatically (the lessons of the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 must be considered). So, why didn’t the EU and Ukraine sign the Association Agreement? Who are the winners and losers of this political challenge? Th e dominant interpretation states that the EU has lost this round, not only diplomatically but also geopolitically, while it is the third victory in a row for Russia if we consider Syria and Edward Snowden to be the fi rst two. It is quite obvious that the EU was trapped by its normative policy – playing the Tymoshenko card and not recognising early enough that the EU is not the only player in town. Th e overly high requirements in the fi elds of selective justice and democratic reforms for Ukraine were not fl exible enough to react to the changing situation. Th us, this normativity only pushed Ukraine into Russia’s fi eld of interest and, automatically, created a greater dependence on anti-democratic internal and external political powers. Viktor Yanukovych’s decision was also determined by the enormous economic and political pressure from Russia, which the EU did not manage to react to. However, there is an alternative view that states that Yanukovych, not Russia, is the winner of this geopolitical game. Given that Yanukovych did not even plan to sign the Association Agreement, his bargaining to the EU was only intended to “raise his price” and use the perspective of the Association Agreement as leverage in the relations with Russia, especially in the fi elds of gas prices and credit rates. So, it was not the traditional question of Ukraine’s participation in the Russia- led Customs Union, but the question of (not) signing the Association Agreement 10 Opinion and Analysis Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

that was on the table during the negotiations with Russia. According to this view, Yanukovych is the absolute winner of this game exactly because of this achievement. Th is situation is a perfect example of Kyiv’s well-known West-or-East balancing, supplemented with the Ukrainian belief that it is possible to fool both sides. However, this time it looks that Yanukovych came to a deadlock when hundreds of thousands protesters came to the streets. Th ere were some presumptions which stated that Ukraine is inevitably dependant on Russia. According to this position, the oligarchic economic model that is anchored in Ukraine along with the adhesion of business and politics and the domination of informal rules in respect to the principle of supremacy of law are the invisible leashes that tie these two countries together. Trying to escape this situation has been programmed for failure since the beginning, and the unsuccessful agreement with the EU only proves this once again.

Different views

Regardless of one’s point of view, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals and implementation of this policy and shape its future. What lessons should be learnt? So far, the EaP policy has been understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that the alternative integration projects competing with the EU do not rely on the principle of formal conditionality, off ering a stimulus package which could further reduce the EU’s abilities to “tie” neighbouring states to European rules. Th is means that the strategic planning for the Eastern Partnership policy should more deeply assume the geopolitical situation. Th is is necessary, as the EU Eastern Partnership policy is not the only player in town. In Vilnius, it became clear that the six partner Th e common Eastern countries had diff erent views and capacities for Partnership model does adopting the European rules of the game and not satisfy the interests of choosing the EU as their main geopolitical direction. all six countries. It is therefore possible to distinguish two blocks of EaP countries in regards to their diff erent progress in implementing the programme’s provisions. Th e “advanced” or simply potential associated partners are Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Meanwhile Azerbaijan “does not want”, Armenia “cannot”, and Belarus “does not want and cannot” choose rapprochement with the EU as off ered by the Eastern Partnership programme. It has become clear that the common Eastern Partnership model does not satisfy the interests of all six countries and, although the de facto implementation of the Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius Opinion and Analysis 11

Photo: Giacomo Manca

Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was greeted at the Vilnius Summit by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso. Ukraine’s decision not to sign the Association Agreement has led to much speculation as to what is next in this geopolitical game. programme continued at a diff erent pace, the adaptation of the programme of multi- speed integration into the EU is a reality. It is important to provide conditions for the three guiding principles – individual progress, catching up and diff erentiation – to further serve as driving motives behind the Eastern Partnership. In this case, the dilemma is what the EU can off er to the “advanced” partnership countries so that they will continue to seek adoption of European rules and move closer to the EU. Another important question is the type of relationship model that the EU should apply to the rest of the EaP countries, for those who cannot (Belarus) or those who do not (Azerbaijan and Armenia) seek to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Obviously, diff erentiation trends in modelling the future of the Eastern Partnership makes us think of applying more fl exible, thus, dissimilar instruments to the countries that have made progress. Th e current EaP content consists of two main pillars: 1) the Association Agreement and integration into the EU domestic market through an enhanced free trade agreement and 2) a gradual movement towards a visa-free regime as well as various facilities. Visa liberalisation is considered the most urgent issue for ordinary citizens. In order to retain less advanced countries in the fi eld of EU interests, the prospect of visa-free travel should not be denied despite the reluctance of these countries to sign the Association Agreement. Although visa liberalisation is still a future issue, its advocates believe that visa-free travel would create opportunities for 12 Opinion and Analysis Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

the development of human contacts among partner countries and the EU. Th is could stimulate public opinion on European integration and bottom-up support for transition. Also, the story of success, to which Moldova stands closest, would prove that the Eastern Partnership is not something unrealistic and it may beneﬁ t every-day citizens directly.

Bigger demands, bolder vision

Although the EaP can ensure partner countries their participation in the EU domestic market, it fails to off er any kind of involvement in the EU decision- shaping process. Th us, the post-Vilnius phase should fi nd a tool for involving EaP countries and making them feel more like co-owners of the integration process. Th is means that a new phase in the Eastern Partnership policy, for example, could be directed towards the model of deep integration without membership – such as the European Economic Area – with the scope of EU integration. Most importantly, bigger demands must Th e prospect of visa-free travel come with bolder vision. Th is is the main should not be denied despite lesson that should be learnt from Vilnius. While there is no prospect of membership, the reluctance of countries to political expectations should be based on the sign an Association Agreement. realities on the ground. Partner countries will essentially pass through the same adaptive barrier as in the case of membership, but at this stage there is no incentive. Th us, the “more for more” principle must work more precisely as a proof that a post- Vilnius Eastern Partnership is able to react to the reality in the partner countries and benefi t them for tangible results. Th e Vilnius Summit provided an opportunity to move away from the membership debate by focusing on the association process. At the same time, the EU needs to strengthen its interconnectivity through infrastructural and greater economic convergence with the Eastern partners into the EU domestic market. Th e experience of EU integration shows that the economic “convergence” was the most attractive during the enlargement process and one that echoes a better life in the Eastern Partnership countries. Economic convergence has the potential of “spilling-over” into the political sphere. Th is is particularly important due to the fact that the EU Eastern Partnership policy is competing with other integration projects. Th e set of incentives and conditions off ered by the EU to partner countries should be seen in this geopolitical context. Th e formula of “deeper integration – higher conditionality” with more intermediate stops may be used in this case. Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius Opinion and Analysis 13

In other words, the association process should be treated as a step towards integration. Consequently, the EU should not only state that the door for membership in the Eastern Partnership remains open, but should also clearly articulate that depending on domestic reforms and the development direction of partner countries, the EU is quite willing to start membership negotiations. Considering that Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that any European state may apply to become a member of the Union, was adopted into the Association Agreement with Moldova is a good start. In the case of the EaP countries, this means that the EU enlargement process would consist of more Th e association process than two stages (the Association Agreement with the EU and accession negotiations), while additional should be treated as a step transitional periods would be introduced between towards integration. these two stages as safeguards allowing to defer or suspend candidates’ accession. Such a shift would allow EU countries that are sceptical about enlargement to control the integration process of new candidate countries (and, in the case of negative negotiation outcomes, to suspend it). On the other hand, this would create conditions for countries participating in the Eastern Partnership to feel that there is a possibility, depending on the results of the implementation of EU terms and conditions, to move to a higher EU integration league. Th e Association Agreements should not be seen as the end but the very start of the process.

Laurynas Kasčiūnas is the head of the policy analysis and research division of the Lithuanian Eastern Europe Studies Centre.

Vytautas Keršanskas is a project assistant with the policy analysis and research division of the Lithuanian Eastern Europe Studies Centre. A New Kind of Revolution

VICTORIA NARIZHNA

Th e Euromaidan protest in Ukraine is signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent than that of the Orange Revolution in 2004. Unlike in 2004, the 2013 protesters do not rely on opposition funding and organisation. To most of the protesters, the only acceptable outcome would be a complete replacement of the political elites.

Th e revolution of 2013 — and at the moment we have every reason to call it a revolution – diff ers signifi cantly from the Orange Revolution of 2004. One dimension of this diff erence is the nature of the public protests. Of course, the Orange Revolution had the element of spontaneity. I repeatedly heard witnesses of the previous Maidan protests say that even the leaders had been surprised by the scale of the protests. In the case of the Euromaidan, the trend has even deepened. Th anks to the development of the internet in Ukraine and the proliferation of social networks in 2013, the opposition is not only surprised by the scale of the protests, it can barely keep up with the pace of the protesters’ self-organisation. Although the opposition offi cially encouraged people to gather on November 24th, the Euromaidan began spontaneously on the evening of November 21st, after an appeal of the well-known Ukrainian journalist Mustafa Nayyem. Th is fact is an indication of probably the most important change in Ukrainian society. A category of new infl uential individuals have appeared. Th ey do not plan to make a career in politics, but they have a great impact on public opinion. Th e Euromaidan is generally more sceptical towards politicians, than its Orange predecessor, mostly as a result of the negative experience of Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, during which the hope that a month of standing in the streets can change the country forever was gradually destroyed.

Victoria Narizhna, A New Kind of Revolution Opinion and Analysis 15

New, powerful tools In fact, this negative experience is the main prism, through which one should assess the Euromaidan events. On the one hand, few expected that after nine years of frustration, stagnation and apathy, people would join such a mass protest. Obviously neither the authorities nor the opposition nor the society expected it. On the other hand, Euromaidan’s cautious attitude towards opposition politicians caused by these negative experiences entails some consequences that are positive and constructive. A clear understanding emerged. Introducing opposition politicians into government By using violence, the oﬃ ces on the shoulders of mass protests is not enough government has passed for real change. It is necessary to control the actions of “our people” with the same strength as protesting a point of no return. against the actions of our “enemies”. It seems that a new speciﬁ c kind of protester has appeared (we can call it a middle class one, if this term can generally be applied to Ukrainian society), who is seeking mechanisms of such control. Everyone is aware that in comparison to 2004 we now own new, powerful tools (the internet, social media and crowdfunding) which allow us to reach entirely new levels of development in civil society and the public’s control over the government. However, there are no ready-made strategies.

Photo: Wojciech Koźmic

The protests in Kyiv at the end of 2013 came somewhat as a surprise. Few expected that after nine years of frustration, stagnation and apathy people would join such a mass protest. 16 Opinion and Analysis Victoria Narizhna, A New Kind of Revolution

Experience in other countries is not always applicable and not many Ukrainians are familiar with these new tools. But everyone agrees that the willingness to take responsibility, instead of transferring it to politicians, has grown dramatically in the society. Ukrainians gradually cease to regard politicians as messianic or parental fi gures and begin to treat them as hired managers or tools to infl uence the process of change in the country. Th e level of self-organisation on the Maidan refl ects the changes in society as a whole. In 2004 there were many individual initiatives as well. People brought protesters hot drink and food, warm clothing and raincoats. But it was the opposition parties who fi nancially supplied the protesting camp and organised their activities. In the Euromaidan protests, the infrastructure was created in a spontaneous manner, very quickly and very effi ciently. Food, hot beverages, tents, the settling of newcomers, medical volunteers, collection points for warm clothes and security – all these basic needs are provided by the community and are fi nanced by the community. Crowdfunding, a new way to raise money through social media and internet, proved to be very eff ective in providing the material basis of the protests. And the engagement of many competent managers into the organisational process has designed and strengthened its infrastructure. Of course, there is one more important feature specifi c to the current protests, they experienced violence from the security forces. Th is is the fi rst such experience in the history of Ukrainian independence. Although dispersals of demonstrations, even quite hard ones, have happened (remember the case of “Ukraine without Kuchma” action in 2001), there were never any incidents of brutal beating that looked more like a punitive operation. In addition, those still unidentifi ed persons who gave commands to the “Berkut” special police units apparently have not included in their analysis the huge step in the development of video-streaming technology that took place in recent years.

Unprecedented levels

After the events of November 30th at the Independence Square and December 1st on Bankova Street, the internet was ﬂ ooded by detailed videos of the unlawful acts by the Berkut forces. Th ey seem to have decided to break all rules that regulate the use of force against demonstrations. Especially shocking for the Ukrainian community were the numerous reports that even medical workers and journalists had been beaten. Th e latter were reported to suﬀ er even harder when they tried to show their badges or IDs. It is hard to say what caused such an obviously barbaric situation. But undoubtedly, such behaviour of the security forces has elevated the aggressive mood in the Ukrainian society to unprecedented levels. What was meant to be a Christmas tree in the centre of Kyiv, turned out to be a place for protesters to hang banners and fl ags.

Photo: Wojciech Koźmic

The visible frustration among Ukrainians was due not only to the fact that the government decided against the Association Agreement with the EU, but also the fact that, for the fi rst time in the history of independent Ukraine, it used physical force to break up protesters.

Photo: Wojciech Koźmic A protester holds up a sign calling for action against the violence of the police force used against the protesters in Kyiv.

Photo: Wojciech Koźmic Victoria Narizhna, A New Kind of Revolution Opinion and Analysis 21

Obviously, from the perspective of western citizens and even those western politicians who are aware of the situation in Ukraine, it is diffi cult to understand how hard it is to turn the whole revolutionary story into a diplomatic happy ending. If you want a full image of it, you must have the experience of living in a country where the judicial system does not work because it has been transformed into an entirely commercial structure providing only decisions for a fee. Ukraine is a country where it is often diffi cult to distinguish representatives of law enforcement from members of criminal gangs because their manners and slang are similar. Ukraine is a country where corruption often replaces the normal legal framework and is so ubiquitous that the whole functioning of the state and the market would be at risk without said corruption. In such circumstances, citizens feel unprotected. It provokes a great mistrust towards the other ordinary citizens and towards those who hold power. In terms of total public distrust in politicians from both camps, any attempt to start negotiations can be regarded as a betrayal. Obviously, this puts the opposition leaders in a very diffi cult situation. On the one hand, they lack resources to exert eff ective pressure on the current government, for which the mass civil protest is not a reason to respond to any demands. On the other hand, negotiations and a search for a more or less constructive compromise will obviously not be received by the demonstrators in a favourable way. By using violence, the government has passed a point of no return. Th e number of protesters increased immediately. Additionally, the quality of the protests has changed. Previously, only those interested in the issue of European integration were on the streets. After the students were beaten, they were joined by those who were indiff erent to a rapprochement with Europe, and perhaps even by those who did not support the pro-European course. Th e protests changed its tone and purpose dramatically. A promise to get back on the course of European integration and minimal steps in this direction would calm the protesters in the beginning. But after the use of force, many consider the resignation of the president and the government as well as a dissolution of the parliament and early presidential and parliamentary elections as the only acceptable outcome of the demonstrations. In other words – a complete replacement of the political elites. But how to achieve this result is unknown and complicated by the fact that the implementation of these requirements in the current legal framework is virtually impossible.

Translated by Igor Lyubashenko

Victoria Narizhna is a Ukrainian writer, poet, psychoanalyst and translator. ADVERTISEMENT

22 Euromaidan Chronicles of a networked revolt

IGOR LYUBASHENKO

Th e period between November 21st and December 1st 2013 marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian politics. It is now possible to say with conﬁ dence that one of the main things that took place is the political initiation of the new generation.

I do not know whether the winged children of the Euromaidan, who still can’t stay ﬁ rmly on their feet, can teach us how to ﬂ y. I hope they will teach some of us how to walk with our backs straight. And I am sure that they will help many get rid of the bad habit of creeping. (Sergey Rahmanin, deputy editor-in-chief of the Zerkalo Nedeli weekly)

According to the most recent data provided by the International Telecommunication Th e core of what brought Union, about 34 per cent of Ukraine’s the protesters together is population use the internet. Th is number dissatisfaction with the general has grown dynamically over the last years. situation in the country. Not surprisingly, the internet audience is dominated by the young. Furthermore, in 2013, GFK Ukraine reported that social networking had become the most popular online activity among Ukrainians. Th is information may not be the most exciting data, especially if we take into account that general patterns of Ukrainians’ online activities do not diff er signifi cantly from other countries. Access to the internet does not increase society’s general interest in politics. Furthermore, much has been written about the possible negative eff ects of the internet on democracy and democratisation. 24 Opinion and Analysis Igor Lyubashenko, Euromaidan Chronicles of a networked revolt

Network society On the other hand, the internet and social media have provided a signifi cant number of Ukrainians with something more than mundane possibilities to share photos of favourite cats or raise jealousy among friends by “checking-in” at cool restaurants and clubs. It provided one-third of Ukrainians with digital connectivity. It triggered the process of changing the very structure of Ukraine’s society and facilitated its transformation to what is described in the literature as a network society. From this perspective, its most important features include new communication patterns, which are decentralised, customisable and less oriented on traditional authorities. According to the latest study by Manuel Th e reactions of authorities Castells, a theorist of the network society lead to signifi cant change in (Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, Polity Press the nature of the movement. 2013), for a social movement to form in this new type of society, two things should happen: a cognitive consonance (similar assessment of reality by a signifi cant number of individuals) and an eff ective communication channel, creating a sort of resonance chamber where individuals can share their emotions. Th e Euromaidan movement (utilising the hashtags euromaidan and євромайдан) started on November 21st 2013, when the government of Ukraine declared its decision to postpone the process of signing the long-negotiated Association Agreement with the EU – just one week before Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. Th is fact is cited as proof that the goal of the protest is to support Ukraine’s further integration with the EU. However, such an interpretation is an oversimplifi cation. Th e notion of a country’s “European future” is too vague to drive a mass social movement that would be ready to occupy the public space for a long period of time. Furthermore, Ukrainians’ perception of European integration is complex. One should not forget that the process of negotiations over the Association Agreement was rocky, and even on November 20th 2013 the openness of “European doors” for Ukraine was far from obvious. Th e roots of society’s dissatisfaction should be sought deeper. Th e core of the narrative that grouped the minds of the protesters is dissatisfaction with the general situation in the country. A recent opinion poll showed that 65 per cent of respondents were sure that the developments in Ukraine were heading in the wrong direction (Razumkov Center, October 2013). President Viktor Yanukovych continued to be the most popular candidate for the presidency ahead of 2015, but only 19 per cent of voters declared support for him and the rest of the potential candidates gained even less trust. Th e situation was predominantly described as social apathy and growing alienation between the political class and ordinary Igor Lyubashenko, Euromaidan Chronicles of a networked revolt Opinion and Analysis 25

Photo: Wojciech Koźmic

The driving factor behind the protests in Ukraine was the dissatisfaction with the general situation in the country. A recent opinion poll showed that 65 per cent of Ukrainians believed the country was heading in the wrong direction. citizens. Looking from today’s perspective, it would probably be more appropriate to characterise the situation as a growing level of frustration, especially among young, educated people facing political stagnation and the diffi cult economic situation in the country. As for communication, digital channels played a primary role in the whole process. According to public opinion polls, only 43 per cent of Ukrainians declared their trust in traditional media, while 36 per cent announced their distrust in it (Razumkov Center, March 2013). For about 21 per cent of Ukrainians, the internet has become the primary source of information (Democratic Initiatives Foundation, June 2013). Online media was the fi rst to inform the public about the government’s decision on the Association Agreement. According to Watcher, a web-portal devoted to internet- related issues, this led to the highest levels of visits to Ukrainian news sites in the history of its research. Th e fi rst calls to conduct a demonstration appeared in social media, particularly on Facebook. Th e specifi city of the Ukrainian segment of this social networking site is that it is used by a number of popular opinion-makers as a sort of blogging and community-building platform. Th e message spread quickly and the reaction was immediate. 26 Opinion and Analysis Igor Lyubashenko, Euromaidan Chronicles of a networked revolt

Point of no return Th e people gathered in the centre of Kyiv in the evening of the same day. During the next few days, “Euromaidans” appeared in many Ukrainian cities and towns. Th e technology of video streaming, allowing a constant view right from the centre of events, was essential. Th e mix of these digital communication technologies created a network of resonating opinions that fi nally led more and more people into the streets. According to Castells, the peaceful character of a networked social movement depends largely on the reaction of the authorities. Th e decision to disperse a peaceful demonstration in Kyiv’s Independence Square on the morning of November 30th should be regarded as the most important milestone in the development of the movement. Once again, digital communication played a crucial role here. Online media and text messaging became instantaneous channels of spreading the news. Th e riot police action took place at 4:00 AM, by 9:00 AM communication in social media was focussed on this event. Even superfi cial observations of the dynamics of Ukraine has entered the the online conversations taking place in Ukraine showed the quick evolution of its emotional load. era of post-politics. Th e fi rst messages were full of concerns: “We went to sleep in Ukraine and woke up in Belarus.” Very soon, fear was replaced with anger and a call to action and participation in mass protests on December 1st. Th e violent reaction of the state has thus enforced the movement’s counter-narrative of alienating authorities not in line with citizens’ opinions. Th e scale of protests on December 1st confi rmed that rage outweighed fear, to large extent thanks to resonating eff ects of opinion sharing provided by digital connectivity. On the other hand, the reactions of the authorities led to a signifi cant change in the nature of the movement. While the demonstrators at Euromaidan were distrustful towards politicians since its inception, the crackdown opened up for the participation of opposition leaders on December 1st. Its long-term goals and vague slogans of a European future sharpened into precise demands that the government and president resign. From this perspective, November 30th 2013 became the point of no return for Ukraine’s networked revolt in the sense of its explicit politicisation.

New era

Th e period between November 21st and December 1st marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian politics. It is now possible to say with conﬁ dence that one of the main things that took place was the political initiation of the new generation Igor Lyubashenko, Euromaidan Chronicles of a networked revolt Opinion and Analysis 27 of the country’s citizens. It is they – students, young people who do not remember life in the Soviet Union – who became the critical mass for the movement. Th is generation does not diﬀ er much from its foreign counterparts. It is not interested in politics, it is predominantly not interested in ideas, it is often focussed on consumerism and simple amusements (of course, these are generalisations, not necessarily referring to particular Ukrainian young people). It showed, however, that it is able to respond when politicians try to outline their future without their agreement, closing the way to what is perceived as a source of a high-quality, comfortable life. It is a connected generation, not trusting of traditional authorities. Whoever will hold power in Ukraine in the years to come will have to learn how to legitimise his or her authority in the eyes of this generation, how to translate traditional narratives into language understood and accepted by this generation. It will not be an easy task; there are no simple recipes. Ukraine has entered the era of post-politics. It is important to emphasise that the change should not be evaluated as simply “good” or “bad”. It will go on despite our opinion. What is essential is that we understand its essence in order to apply it in our further attempts to analyse the Ukrainian political reality. Unfortunately, this change does not provide an analytical framework to foresee further developments in Ukraine. Th e politicisation of the Euromaidan movement means that it started as a struggle against what can be called an ancien régime. Borderlines between the old and the new will not always be obvious, but unless the country takes an extremely non-democratic path of development, the new rules of the game will spread.

Igor Lyubashenko is an international relations analyst and new media expert. He has a PhD in political science from the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Lublin. He is also the co-ordinator of New Eastern Europe’s online column “Digital Eastern Europe”. Europe with a View to the Future

ADAM REICHARDT

What the events in Ukraine have shown us is that there is still much more to the region of Eastern Europe than meets the eye. Th e protests are just one more signal that we do not know in which direction the countries of the post-Soviet states are heading. Th e East of Europe is going to continue to be one of the most important chapters in the future of Europe.

Th e events that unfolded in the end of November 2013 clearly demonstrate that our understanding of contemporary times is far from certain. It all started with the 180 degree about-face by the leaders of Ukraine when they announced that there would be no signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union at the Vilnius Summit. Th e argument given was economic – Ukraine’s leaders have calculated that the country, and its people, stand to lose more (economically) in the short-term vis-à-vis the Association Agreement, which included establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. Russian pressure also played a signiﬁ cant role in the decision, demonstrating Russian tenacity in not wanting to lose any more of its sphere of inﬂ uence, especially such a large country as Ukraine.

Turning point

Many (not only in Ukraine) were taken by surprise. Th ousands of angry protesters took to the streets in protest. Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) became the epicentre of the demonstrations. Maidan, appropriating the name Adam Reichardt, Europe with a View to the Future Opinion and Analysis 29

“Euromaidan”, was the same location of the 2004 Orange Revolution which brought a signifi cant change in the political direction of Ukraine, if not only temporarily. Th e 2013 protests took place at the same time as the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius – to show to Europe that there still is support among the people for building stronger ties with Europe. Th e turning point in the demonstrations was on Saturday morning November 30th, when special Berkut police forces broke up the demonstrators at 4:30 AM; when the group was sleepy, festive and, most importantly, non-violent. Th e police violence was unusual for Ukraine, and the use of such force brought even more protesters to the streets – demanding an explanation. Th e protests, which had at fi rst been about European integration, had now transformed into a movement in defence of the society and the people’s freedom to demonstrate. What the events in Ukraine have shown us is that there is still much more to the region of Eastern Europe than meets the eye. Th e protests, but especially the society’s response, are just one more signal that we do not know in which direction the countries of the post-Soviet states are heading. During intense debates in November 2013 in the city of Gdańsk Poland, hosted by the Transition and integration European Solidarity Centre, this idea that Europe’s future is yet unknown was emphasised. requires more than putting Leonidas Donskis, a Lithuanian philosopher initials on a piece of paper. and member of New Eastern Europe’s editorial board, poignantly said: “We should not equate the Ukrainian nation with its political class … Ukraine appears as a fl awed and weak democracy, but still much preferable to authoritarianism.” Th is statement was challenged when the use of force was employed on November 30th, many commentators even began asking the question – is this the beginning of Ukraine’s “Belarusianisation”? Ukrainian political scientist, Volodymyr Pavliv, spoke even more foretelling words in Gdańsk, when he added: “It is important to remember the fact that the Ukrainian authorities and the people (or society) do not feel as if they are partners. Even in such important issues as the choice of the direction of the development of the nation.” Pavliv made this statement two weeks before the decision in Ukraine not to sign with the EU, but it obviously touches on a core element of what we saw in Kyiv. Th e demonstrations represents a disconnect between the elites and the society. Th e people are not only on the streets in defence of “European integration”; this may have been the trigger. What’s more it also shows the Ukrainian authorities’ lack of respect of the people that they claim to represent. Th e protests illustrate the lack of partnership, as Pavliv noted almost a month prior. 30 Opinion and Analysis Adam Reichardt, Europe with a View to the Future

Road signs Th e Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partnership concluded with some failure and with some success. Th is event represents a road sign for the future of Europe. But it is important not to look at it as the only sign. Th e Vilnius Summit was a success for the EU in the sense that the Association Agreements were initialled with Moldova and Georgia. Th ese agreements will pave the way for future European integration, modernise the countries’ institutions and strengthen their economies. But transition and integration requires more than putting initials on a piece of paper. Such profound changes will need to also take place in the mentality of the society. Th e implementation of these agreements will not be an easy task for both the states and the European Union as there is still strong resistance in the post-Soviet societies to move towards Europe. Transition needs to take place on all levels of the society, from the workers, to the students, to the elites. Without the participation of one, there will not be success. What’s more, there is no promise of EU At any moment, we could membership for the Eastern Partnership states, which means the road towards a future with see what happened in Europe could be long and treacherous. At Ukraine happen in any of any moment, we could see what happened in the other countries of the Ukraine happen in any of the other countries Eastern Partnership. of the Eastern Partnership. Th e EU should be more concrete in its off er to the partners, understand that there are other forces at play and fi nd a way to not only engage the elites, but get closer to the people as well and communicate the off er in such a way that the people understand what kind of future they could have in Europe. Unquestionably, Europe is also about values. How to spread this message in a post-Soviet society is not an easy task. As Pavliv noted in Gdańsk, quoting Ukrainian economist Aleksander Pauschauer, “In [the Ukrainian] system, informal relations play a much greater role than formal relations. Th e behaviour of the average Ukrainian is determined by the need to survive, and it includes features such as distrust of everyone, in addition to his or her own family and a tolerant attitude to corruption.” We should not expect a change in such behaviour in a short period of time. However, paying more attention to the society could help address this change. Th e modest success in the civil society engagement vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership framework gives some evidence of this. In Vilnius members of Ukraine’s civil society even signed a symbolic “Association Agreement” on behalf of the society. Perhaps many of the demonstrators came out to protest, thanks in part to the growing awareness among the civil society. Adam Reichardt, Europe with a View to the Future Opinion and Analysis 31

Bridging the divide What’s more, Europe should also be about solidarity. And this is the challenge of Europe today. Donskis suggested in Gdańsk that perhaps Europe’s problem is not the Eastern Partnership countries, but in fact Europe itself. He added that “it is in our best interest, as well that of our Eastern partners, that [Europeans] are not too Eurosceptic.” Attitudes within the European Union, especially in the face of the Eurozone crisis, do not project a union that is harmonious and satisfi ed. European trust in EU institutions, for example, have dropped; from 50 per cent in 2004 (the year of integration with Central Europe) to 31 per cent in September 2013. Europe’s future, hence, will be defi ned by what happens internally as well as externally, with the countries in the East. What is certain and needed is a stronger dialogue between the East and the West. Th ere is still a vast Th ere is still a vast divide in terms of ideas and debates when comparing divide in terms ideas Europe’s western half versus the eastern one. How and debates between to bridge those gaps is going to be the continuing challenge for the coming years – despite the fact that Europe’s East and its we are twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union. West. Central Europe is and will continue to play a key role in building this bridge, but it cannot be done without the support of the whole of Europe. Creating a stronger common understanding among all peoples of Europe (no matter if it leads to integration or not) should be the goal. Europe’s future is unwritten. A new generation is coming of age. Th is is a generation that is more interconnected across borders than, perhaps, the elites that represent them. Th e East of Europe is going to continue to be one of the most important chapters on the future of Europe. A serious, sober refl ection internally in Europe will also be an important part of this process. Th e Association Agreements and the Eastern Partnership are tools and forums for dialogue between Europe and its partners. Putting these tools to work for eff ective results, however, will require more than summits and signatures. A change in the mentality of society plus a stronger sense of belonging to a wider Europe is needed; this change is possible and would come with time. What will Europe look like in 10, 15 or 20 years? Th is is a question that we cannot answer today, but one that will be continuously debated in Gdańsk for the years to come.

Adam Reichardt is the editor-in-chief of New Eastern Europe. 32 Opinion and Analysis Adam Reichardt, Europe with a View to the Future

Photo courtesy of the European Solidarity Centre

The offi cial launch of the book Ukrainian Palimpsest: Oksana Zabuzhko in conversation with Iza Chruslinska published by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław.

Th e conference “Europe with a View to the Future” took place in Gdańsk Poland on November 7-8th 2013, organised by the European Solidarity Centre. Co-organizers of the conference were: the College of Eastern Europe, the Solidarity Fund, the City of Gdańsk and the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Th e 2013 symbolic round table discussions focused on two topics: evaluation of the eﬀ ectiveness of the Eastern Partnership programme from the Western and Eastern perspective and sought answer to the question about idealism and realism in the EU neighbourhood policy in the South and East.

International experts participating included: Leonidas Donskis, Nilgün Arisan Eralp, Ghia Nodia, Marc Pierini, Alexander Pumpyansky, Wacław Radziwinowicz and Manuel Sarrazin. During the conference, the 2013 Ambassador of New Europe Award was presented. Th e conference also oﬃ cially launched the book Ukrainian Palimpsest: Oksana Zabuzhko in conversation with Iza Chruslinska. The Eastern European Winter

DOMINIK P. JANKOWSKI AND PAWEŁ ŚWIEŻAK

Eastern Europe has become an “unwanted child” for some western countries, one they would prefer to forget about. From their perspective, the Eastern Partnership will absorb attention and ﬁ nancial resources as well as capabilities that should be exploited in the south of Europe. And yet the paradox is that success in Eastern Europe will be much easier to achieve.

Eastern Europe is a mysterious area. It appears from time to time on the radar of world politics only to disappear again. Th is phenomenon was already noted by the eminent Polish historian Oskar Halecki in the famous speech he delivered in Brussels in 1923, titled L’histoire de l’Europeorientale, sa division en époques, son milieu géographique et ses problèmes fondamentaux (A history of Eastern Europe, its division into epochs, its geographical location, and its fundamental problems). Today, the European Union’s external policy serves as an excellent example. In April 2002, the United Kingdom and Denmark proposed a “New Neighbours Initiative”, created for the purposes of increasing integration with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. By March 2003, however, Eastern Europe had already melted into the European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy, which also encompassed North Africa and a part of the Middle East. In May 2004, based on the EU perspective, the region of Eastern Europe was widened to include the states of the South Caucasus – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – but it still could not be regarded as an autonomous entity. It remains unknown what would have happened to the Polish-Swedish proposal of June 2008 (solely dedicated to Eastern Europe) had it not been for the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008. Ultimately, the result of this conﬂ ict was that six Eastern European countries came under the umbrella of the Eastern Partnership programme. 34 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter

Attention elsewhere Just as one security issue led to the birth of the Eastern Partnership, others may lead to its burial. Since 2011, the EU has allocated a total of 600 million euros (and these are the optimistic estimates) for programmes carried out in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. Meanwhile, support for war-torn Syria alone has amounted to more than two billion euros. In view of the dramatic events taking place in the South (the war in Libya in 2011, the confl ict in Mali in 2012, the increase of the terrorist threat in the Sahel, the unstable situation on the border between Sudan and South Sudan, tensions in the Arabian European interest beyond Peninsula, the unstable situation in Egypt and the eastern borders has the Maghreb countries, the smouldering Israeli- Arab confl ict, the deadlock over Iran’s nuclear largely dwindled. programme, the waves of migrants fl ooding into France, Spain, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria), most European interest in what goes on beyond its eastern borders has dwindled to a large extent. Completing the picture is the general uncertainty over economic developments, which, since autumn 2008, have absorbed the attention of the majority of the Western powers. Th e economic crisis prompted most EU countries and the United States to look for savings, with the sphere of defence becoming the fi rst victim. Th e crisis has also reduced the tendency of the West to pursue an active security policy in areas not considered a priority. Eastern Europe has become an “unwanted child” for some western countries, one they would prefer to forget about. From their perspective, the EaP will absorb not only attention and fi nancial resources, but also capabilities that should be exploited in a region that actually needs them, i.e. the South. In May 2011, it seemed that a marriage of the East and South was, if only for a short time, again under consideration by Brussels. Th e European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aff airs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, published A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. A Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, a paper designed to respond to the democratisation trends in the Arab countries. Th is amendment to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) involved the introduction of the “more for more” principle, which was to promote those states showing progress towards democratic reforms. Th e hidden expectation was that this would mostly aff ect the countries from the South. Th at, however, has not materialised. To the contrary, despite all reservations, the East has demonstrated, if not progress, then at least a lack of regress. At the same time, the South poses a growing challenge in terms of security. Th e situation in the Southern Neighbourhood is such that the region has become an area of an increased EU civil and military operational involvement within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter Opinion and Analysis 35

Tangible testaments to progress Simultaneously, the East has modernised in order to meet the requirements of the principle of “more for more”. Th e examination of the most important events in the eastern part of Europe would reveal: democratic transfers of power in Georgia (the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012 and presidential elections in 2013); the election of a pluralist parliament in Ukraine in October 2012, where the opposition is an equal opponent for the ruling Party of Regions; the election of a president in Moldova in 2012 that led to the end of a political crisis that had lasted for several months and, when problems returned in early 2013, they were resolved by parliamentary compromise, rather than on the streets. Moreover, the tectonic political changes in Georgia did not bring any revolution to the direction of its foreign policy, which is still focussed on integration with the EU and NATO. Moldova has also strongly reaffi rmed its commitment to European integration; an improvement of relations with both its neighbours (Romania and Ukraine) was, therefore, met with general recognition. A tangible testament to the positive evolution in Eastern Europe has been the EU’s progress in its dialogue with the countries of the region. While the negotiations of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with Ukraine lasted for almost fi ve years, the other countries with the Russia’s policy in Eastern exception of Belarus have achieved these results Europe has contributed to even faster. Moldova and Georgia completed the the West’s increasing lack talks between 2010 and 2013. Armenia was also very close and negotiations for a political agreement of interest in the region. with Azerbaijan are in progress, although as a non-member of the World Trade Organisation, Azerbaijan cannot enter a DCFTA. Th e remaining country, Belarus, decided to create stronger integration with Russia – which came as no surprise to Western and Central European states. To some extent, the West could feel reassured by the almost quiescent state of unresolved confl icts in Eastern Europe. Th e most optimistic signals came from Transnistria. With the resumption of negotiations in the 5+2 format in late 2011 (5 + 2 refers to the members of the negotiations: Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE as members and the US and EU as observers – editor’s note), the EU engaged itself in supporting confi dence-building measures and funding a number of projects designed to increase trust between the parties. Although the negotiations did not lead to any major breakthroughs, they certainly were not a failure. In addition, the Meseberg initiative, a German-led project designed to engage Russia in the resolution of the Transnistrian situation, is still waiting for a better moment to be implemented. And while the confl ict in Georgia is locked 36 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter

in a stalemate, with very little prospect for a solution, there were at least no new incidents between 2009 and 2013 threatening a resumption of full-scale military activity. Th ere is, however, a lack of positive developments in the case of Nagorno- Karabakh and some worrying signs in the confl ict: numerous fatalities on the border (especially as a result of sniper fi re exchange), the increase in military budgets (spectacularly so in the case of Azerbaijan) Th e Arab Spring presents as well as war rhetoric on both sides including both an opportunity numerous military exercises. In the case of as well as a challenge to Nagorno-Karabakh, however, there were silent hopes for Russia’s stabilising role, which, on the Eastern Europe. eve of the Olympic Games in Sochi, is particularly interested in safety on its southern borders. Nagorno-Karabakh is a perfect example that this region still needs considerable engagement. In fact, the uncertain progress of democratisation in Armenia and Azerbaijan, political apathy in Belarus, and the unresolved confl icts and numerous challenges – oligarchisation, corruption – facing all countries in the region have only strengthened the level of insecurity.

Solution, not the problem

Nevertheless, a positive perception of the region, even if somewhat exaggerated, is important. What place does the region play in the European way of thinking about security as 2014 begins? A partial answer has been given in Catherine Ashton’s report of October 15th 2013 in preparation for the European Council in December 2013 that was devoted to, among other matters, the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Th is document underlines that the security challenges in Europe stem from the South; the confl icts in Eastern Europe are only mentioned in passing. Th e East is implicitly treated more as a domain of development policy, while the natural area of CSDP activities concentrates on the South. Th e partners from Eastern Europe are considered contributors to crisis management missions and operations. Th erefore, they are off ered assistance in security sector reform, a dialogue on security and participation in CSDP training and courses. Th e fi rst two training sessions, co-hosted by Poland and Sweden for high-ranking offi cials from the countries of the Eastern Partnership, took place in 2012-2013. Catherine Ashton’s report mentions the Framework Partnership Agreements, which allow partners to participate in EU missions and operations. Indeed, the East is to gradually become a part of the “solution, not the problem” in EU security policy. In keeping with this principle, Moldovan troops will contribute to the peacekeeping Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter Opinion and Analysis 37 missions in the Balkans, while Ukrainian soldiers have participated in the EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission, conducted off the coast of the Horn of Africa. In fact, this illustrates the role the East as being actively involved in solving the problems of the South. However, as already noted, the West’s willingness to consider security issues in Eastern Europe as second-tier is premature. Th ere is one more important factor co-defi ning the situation in the region: Russia. Unfortunately, its role cannot always be described as constructive. A turning point in Russia’s policy towards Eastern Europe was undoubtedly the 2008 war with Georgia and the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Th e confl ict confi rmed that Russia has set its own “red lines” in Eastern Europe, and recognised the area as lying within its “zone of privileged interests” (a term used by President Dmitry Medvedev at the end of August 2008). Th e qualitative change in Russia’s approach to international relations was made evident in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept (a document which outlines Russia’s strategic interests) adopted by the Russian Federation. Th ere is no doubt that the intensifi cation of Russia’s integration activities after 2008 (the Customs Union of 2010, the Common Economic Space of 2012, the announcement of the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015) was a response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme. In fact, the importance of the integration processes within the CIS was heavily evident in the subsequent Russian Foreign Policy Concept adopted at the beginning of 2013. It has become clear: the Russian integration concepts and the EU’s Eastern Partnership are in direct competition. For a short time, it appeared that changes in Russia’s foreign policy, particularly towards the Eastern Partnership countries, would be brought about by the Arab Spring of 2011-2012. Being unable to prevent friendly regimes from collapsing and getting closer to being trapped in its costly and damaging role of a supplier to Syria, Russia was losing its momentum and international authority. Russian diplomacy recovered, however, and the spectre of failure was transformed into a success. Th e agreement negotiated in September 2013 in Geneva by the United States and Russia, staved off the prospect of international confl ict in Syria and led to an increase in Russia’s prestige on the international stage. Th is has also demonstrated Russia’s ability to achieve its objectives – in this case, defence of an allied regime. During the crisis in Syria, Eastern European countries also off ered concrete solutions. Th ey were unable, however, to do much to move their own agenda. Th e proposal by Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovych, in September 2013 recommending the participation of specialists from Ukraine in the liquidation of Syrian chemical weapons went largely unnoticed. Instead, Eastern Europe became 38 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter

a centre of international concern as it was reported that some of the most radical Islamist forces involved in Syria were recruited from Ukraine (Crimea), Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Opportunities and threats

Th e analysis of the events of 2012 and 2013 shows Russia’s growing confi dence in international aff airs may not be benefi cial in terms of stability and security in Eastern Europe. For the past two years in the South Caucasus, Russia has continued its risky policy of maintaining balance in confl ict-torn Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia has increased its direct military presence in Armenia, taking part in an exercise simulating confl ict with Azerbaijan. In addition, it forced Yerevan to resign from the Association Agreement with the EU and convinced Armenia to join its Customs Union. In Georgia, the process of “borderisation” continues. Russian forces have been building barbed wire fences that separate the “real” Georgia from the territories beyond Tbilisi’s control, namely South Ossetia. Consequently, no serious peace initiative seems likely. Th reats and pressure were also directed at Moldova. In September 2013, during his visit to Chişinău, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin warned Moldova not to “lose its wagons”, while integrating with the EU. By saying so he made a clear allusion to Transnistria and, as some observers would also say, Gagauzia. With Russia’s blessing, Tiraspol passed a Foreign Policy Concept (in autumn 2012) as well as a Law on State Borders which led to the worsening of relations with Chişinău. Finally, 2013 saw not only the joint Russian-Belarusian Zapad-2013 exercise but the announcement of the creation of a Russian airbase in Belarus (probably in Lida), which is to join Russia’s existing military installations in the country. In turn, Ukraine found itself in the uncomfortable position of functioning as a supply base, ensuring the possibility of Russia’s “projection of power” on the Mediterranean region, thanks to its Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, while having very little to say in the matter. It seems, therefore, that this assertive Russian policy has had a negative impact on Eastern Europe in 2012 and 2013, and has contributed to the West’s increasing lack of interest in the security situation in the region. Th e socio-political turmoil in the Middle East, commonly known as the Arab Spring, presents both an opportunity as well as a challenge to Eastern Europe. It is an opportunity because it has positioned the region in favourable contrast to the unstable South, and showed that the EU Neighbourhood Policy and NATO’s Partnership Policy Ukraine and Georgia have advanced forms of cooperation within Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter Opinion and Analysis 39 the Annual National Programmes, while Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan have slightly less ambitious Individual Partnership Action Plans. Eastern Europe has proved that it is able to modernise (obviously at an individual pace) in accordance with the requirements of the EU rule of “more for more”. Th e EU carrot has, in this case, worked. At the same time, it is a challenge because the belt of instability in Eastern Europe, stretching from the Caucasus to Transnistria, has not disappeared. Meanwhile, the events in the Middle East have led many western capitals to simply forget about Eastern Eastern Europe should be Europe. Some countries – which until very a place where the instruments recently were supportive and actively engaged of security policy and in the Eastern Partnership – have already modernisation are combined. begun to shift their priorities. Austria has decided to become more operationally engaged in Africa (EUTM Mali) and foresees the creation of a special Africa competence centre. Germany has put forward an initiative called Enable and Enhance (E2I), which aims at strengthening EU cooperation with regional international organisations, primarily on the African continent.

Holistic approach

Th e situation in Europe’s neighbourhood is an argument for the use of a comprehensive and holistic approach by the West, fi rst and foremost by the EU and its member states. Neither a focus on security omitting elements of sustainable development nor the opposite policy, i.e. the promotion of democracy without paying proper attention to security, are the suitable approaches. Th ere is a region where the EU has recently applied a holistic approach with success: the Western Balkans. A part of the political mix in this case is the prospect of membership. In April 2013, with the support of EU diplomacy and Catherine Ashton herself, Serbia and Kosovo took the very fi rst steps towards normalising their bilateral relations. In June 2013, Serbia received a promise to start accession negotiations with the EU, while Kosovo was authorised to open talks on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. An analogy between the situation in Eastern Europe and Cyprus is also tempting. Th is case, though still in its infancy, shows the benefi ts of the right combination of tools – security policy, modernisation, and, eventually, integration. In fact, there is no reason, apart from psychological, why the Eastern Partnership countries should still be deprived of the possibility, however distant, of a European perspective. 40 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Eastern European Winter

At any rate, Eastern Europe should be a place where the instruments of security policy and modernisation are combined. Giving assistance to the Eastern Partnership countries with the aim of creating the conditions for sustainable social-economic development is the best security policy for the EU and the countries of the region. However, the development of this modernisation policy requires a special protective cushion that the security policy tools can provide. Th ose worth mentioning here would include: an in-depth dialogue in the sphere of security policy with the Eastern Partnership countries, both in a multilateral and bilateral format, depending on the level of ambition and the quality of cooperation off ered by a given partner; maintaining the EUMM in Georgia and the EUBAM in Ukraine and Moldova; inclusion within EU crisis management planning of realistic scenarios for the development of the situation in Eastern Europe; involving Eastern European countries in EU crisis management missions; support for security sector reforms; and taking into account the Eastern European security agenda in discussions with external partners. Finally, it should be emphasised that the Eastern Partnership constitutes an opportunity for the EU. Success in Eastern Europe will be much easier to achieve than in the South. Th is is important at a time when the EU wants to restore its external image, so tarnished by the economic crisis. Brussels wants to be seen as an eff ective mediator and negotiator, as well as an actor setting the international agenda. Th e outside magnetism and glamour of the EU can only be enhanced through eff ective and successful activity in its immediate surroundings. Eastern Europe off ers such a prospect to the EU. Anyone who fails to see this is strategically blind.

Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak are expert analysts with the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland.

Th e opinions, ﬁndings and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂ ect those of the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland. The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia

ADAM BALCER

Despite Russia’s goal to create a Eurasian Union to reintegrate the countries of the former Soviet Union, this vision will most likely remain on paper. Th e rise of China’s role in the region clearly demonstrates that the Eurasian Union does not constitute a serious obstacle to the development of economic and political cooperation between countries in the post-Soviet space and other regional powers.

Russia launched the idea of the Eurasian Union to reverse the tectonic shift in the balance of power taking place in the post-Soviet space since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Despite the growing institutionalisation of the Union and the perspective of new accessions, Russia’s vision of the reintegration of the former Soviet Union under Moscow’s tutelage will remain mostly on paper. Th e main challenge is an enormous increase of third players’ engagement in the area, and the reestablishment of old ties with regions surrounding the post-Soviet space. Th e most spectacular exempliﬁ cation of that trend is the spectacular rise of China’s leverage in Central Asia.

Back to the future

Russian inﬂ uence in the post-Soviet space has signiﬁ cantly weakened since the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia had a monopolistic position in this part of the world in the early 1990s. Now, the game on the “post-Soviet chessboard” is being played by several players. Th ey are the four giants: Russia, China, the European Union and the United States. Th e two neighbouring middle powers, Turkey, and, to a lesser degree, Iran are also 42 Opinion and Analysis Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia

infl uential in this part of the world.1 Last, but not least, India, Japan and South Korea should be perceived as relatively important stakeholders in Central Asia. Russia employs multiple instruments to counter these trends, but it seems that they are irreversible in the long term. Th e continuation of the decreasing trend in the scope of Russia’s leverage in the coming decades can be expected. Nevertheless, Russia will probably remain one of the most important players in the post-Soviet space. Another important geopolitical phenomenon is the rise of multidimensional ties and similarities between three post-Soviet regions: Russia’s rule over the post- Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Soviet space is a rather Asia, respectively, and their neighbourhoods. Eastern Europe (excluding Belarus) and the South recent phenomenon from Caucasus have emerged gradually as a part of the point of view of history. the wider Black Sea, covering the Balkans and Turkey. Th e south-western part of Ukraine is gravitating towards Central Europe. On the other hand, northern Turkey and, to a lesser degree, northern Iran have become more and more integral parts of the Caucasus. Central Asia is also starting to be perceived in a wider sense as a region covering Xinjiang in China, Afghanistan, northern Iran and even Mongolia. Consequently, more than ever before in contemporary history, internal developments in Central Europe, China, Turkey, Iran or Afghanistan can have positive and negative spill-over eff ects into the post-Soviet space and, to a certain degree, vice versa. Th is restoration of interdependency can be described as a return to the patterns that existed in the period before the Russian conquest. It should be recalled that Russia’s rule over the post-Soviet space, though having an enormous legacy, is a rather recent phenomenon from the point of view of long-term processes. More importantly, Russian cultural, social, economic and geopolitical predomination is slowly fading away, step-by-step. Indeed, Russia annexed most of Ukraine and Belarus at the end of the 18th century. Moreover, certain parts of Ukraine found themselves under the Russian-Soviet control very late, after the end of the Second World War. For many centuries, they were within the infl uence of Central European political and cultural space. Th e Russian conquest of the South Caucasus and Moldova took place at the beginning of 19th century. Most of Moldova and Belarus and a large part of Ukraine belonged to Central European countries in the interwar period. For centuries, the countries of South Caucasus and Moldova

1 In the case of Iran, its leverage is greatly below its potential due to the character of its political regime. On the other hand, taking into account social and economic environment, political change in Iran should not be excluded in medium term. Most probably, this scenario would have a considerable impact on the balance of power in the post-Soviet space (e.g. transit of energy, competition on European markets). Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia Opinion and Analysis 43

The border between China and Kazakhstan at Khorgas. Further integration between Central Asia and China is decreasing the region’s ties with Russia.

Photo: Purplepumpkins (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

were submitted to Persia and/or the Ottoman Empire’s inﬂ uence. Last but not least, Russia conquered Central Asia at the end of the 19th century and until then vast parts of the region were under Iran and China’s control. Hence, we could say that Russia’s quest for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space to a large degree is based on nostalgia for the Soviet Union, and is faced by the emergence of substantially older patterns in Eurasia.

The case of China

No other great power has so rapidly and spectacularly increased its infl uence recently in the post-Soviet space as China has done in the recent decade. Chinese engagement in the post-Soviet space is met with approval by many local politicians inclined towards a multi-polar foreign policy based on manoeuvring between superpowers in order to benefi t from the diff erences between them. China is an attractive vector for local elites as it is not as demanding as the European Union and not as imposing as Russia. China, which is currently gaining the status of the most important player in Central Asia, undermined Russia’s idea of the post-Soviet space as its own exclusive sphere of infl uence. China declares that it wishes to avoid direct competition with Russia, but it is also eff ectively and successfully working to integrate Central Asia 44 Opinion and Analysis Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia

with itself through its own energy and infrastructure projects. From a global perspective, Chinese engagement in Central Asia strives to reduce external powers’ infl uences on its western fl ank in order to focus on the Pacifi c Rim. Th e engagement of China in Central Asia results mainly from its energy security strategy; geopolitical calculations the transit routes to Europe, Afghanistan and to the Indian Ocean passing round the Malacca Straits; and last, but not least, protection of the Chinese underbelly (Xinjiang) from negative spillovers from Central Asia or Afghanistan. Xinjiang, an autonomous province that No other great power has so makes up approximately 17 per cent of the entire Chinese territory, is an integral part rapidly increased its einfl uenc of Central Asia. Nearly 60 per cent of the in the post-Soviet space as province’s inhabitants are Muslim, mostly China has done recently. Turkic Uyghurs. Their number due to high population growth rates will increase substantially in the coming decades. Ethnic separatism and Islamic extremism in Xinjiang strengthened by Chinese colonisation politics constitutes the most serious challenge for China’s internal security. In Xinjiang, there are also 1.5 million Kazakhs and 190,000 Kyrgyz people. On the other hand, Central Asia is home to around 300,000 Uyghurs. Th is is the largest Uyghur diaspora in the world. Xinjiang’s importance for China also derives from its huge natural reserves. It contains approximately 40 per cent of Chinese coal reserves (5.2 per cent of the world’s known reserves), 35 per cent of its natural gas reserves (0.6 per cent of the world’s known reserves) and 30 per cent of its oil reserves (0.3 per cent of the world’s proven reserves). Equally important is the fact that Xinjiang has 3.5 per cent of the world’s estimated reserves of technically recoverable shale gas and almost 6 per cent of the world’s deposits of technically recoverable shale oil, according to preliminary estimates. Finally, Xinjiang has huge deposits of rare earth elements. Th e recent, substantial increase of Chinese leverage in the region is related to its economic expansion in the post-crisis conditions. In 2011, China gained the position of the largest trader in Central Asia for the fi rst time time, including gas exported to Russia via a Swiss branch of Gazprom. On the other hand, just 10 years ago, Russia’s trade volume was over twice that of the Chinese one. China’s key importance for the economies of the region is confi rmed by very large loans provided by Beijing to Central Asian countries. In fact, after the Chinese president’s visit to the region which took place in September 2013, China became “the majority shareholder” of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan’s external debts. In the case of Turkmenistan, China owns almost all of the country’s external debt. Chinese companies have a huge share in the region’s construction sector, carrying out Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia Opinion and Analysis 45 strategic infrastructural projects aimed at diversifying transport routes between China and Europe, implicitly undermining Russia’s role. A railway line from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan was constructed in 2011, and in 2012 a second railway line was opened from China to Kazakhstan. In May 2013, the fi rst direct railway connection in history between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan was inaugurated as part of the North-South Project. Th e last section of the line between Iran and Turkmenistan should be completed by early 2014. Th ese railways act to both further integrate Central Asia with China and the Middle East, and decreases its ties with Russia.

Turning point

Chinese investment in Central Asia has also increased considerably in recent years. Existing Chinese investment in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan is estimated at around 30 billion US dollars. However, in September 2013 China signed contracts concerning new investments and credits with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan whose value exceeds 50 billion dollars. China’s takeover of almost 8.5 per cent of the stakes in Kashagan, Kazakhstan’s largest oil deposit, is particularly important. Th is event constitutes a turning point in Chinese involvement in the oil sector in Central Asia. Oil exports from Kazakhstan to China will most likely rise signifi cantly, and will hinder the EU’s plans to receive oil supplies from Kazakhstan via the Caucasus. Th e agreements signed in September 2013 mainly concerned the energy sector, but also – in what is a new phenomenon – the modern technology sector (i.e. credits worth eight billion dollars for the newly created state institution in Kazakhstan that is responsible for economic modernisation). Th e most important pillar of Chinese leverage in Central Asia is its dominant position in the importation of energy. Th e most glaring symbol of Beijing’s predominance in this fi eld was the building of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline. Th e construction of the two branches of Central Asia-China pipeline (A & B) was completed with supersonic speed and was a game changer as far as the gas sector is concerned. Branch C is under construction and the decision to launch the construction of Branch D was undertaken in September 2013. Th e overall capacity of the pipeline will increase to 85 billion cubic metres of gas. Th e construction of the pipeline means that the Kremlin has permanently lost its almost exclusive monopoly on the import of gas from Central Asia. In 2013, the Central Asian countries exported more gas to China than to Russia for the fi rst time. Chinese shares in the region’s gas export approaches 45 per cent. In terms of oil, the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline that connects the Caspian Sea to the Chinese border became operational in 2012. Th e pipeline is currently being expanded to increase its capacity from 12 million 46 Opinion and Analysis Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia

to 20 million tonnes annually. China’s share in Kazakh oil exports will increase from the current 15 per cent to almost 30 per cent. China has also become the most important partner for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in terms of the import of uranium. Kazakhstan has around 12 per cent of the world’s uranium deposits and Uzbekistan two per cent. China’s share in the Kazakh export of uranium exceeds 55 per cent, and, in the case of Uzbekistan, China constitutes the sole destination of its uranium exports. Th e strong position of Beijing in Central Asia is not the result of economic power alone, but it is also based on the region’s dependence on water resources coming from China. For example, in the case of Kazakhstan, one-third of potable water originates in China. Last but not least, September 2013 China decisively entered the educational sphere for the ﬁ rst time by oﬀ ering scholarships for 30,000 students from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Th e rise of China in Central Asia together with the assumed decrease of the US engagement in the area following its upcoming exit from Afghanistan is perceived by certain experts as a source of potential tensions between China and Russia. However, it should be emphasised that Russia’s position in bilateral relations with China has substantially weakened due to deepening asymmetric ties. Moscow and Beijing cooperate closely in the global arena, and they share common challenges in Central Asia, such as radical Islam. Moreover, Russia needs China’s economic engagement badly in the region because it is unable to stabilise the economies of the Central Asia alone.

China and the Eastern Partnership

In the case of countries of the Eastern Partnership, the position of China is much weaker than in Central Asia. In fact, the Eastern Partnership countries are one of the last regions of the world with which Beijing is intensifying cooperation. In the Eastern Partnership area, Beijing behaves in a substantially more cautious way than in Central Asia because China is fully aware of the region’s key importance for Moscow, its geographical distance and its relatively limited economic importance. Beijing sees its partnership with Moscow as one of the key foundations of its position in the world. Th erefore, it will not off er the Eastern Partnership countries support in their diffi cult relations with Moscow. Nevertheless, the increase of China’s engagement in the region in recent years should not be underestimated. An important factor behind China’s involvement is an aspiration to strengthen Chinese infl uence in the buff er zone between Russia and the EU, which are essential players in Eurasia. Th e region’s location can also facilitate its expansion to the EU and the Customs Union markets. China has lately become a rather important economic partner for all the Adam Balcer, The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia Opinion and Analysis 47 states in the Eastern Partnership, except Azerbaijan. Its share in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine’s trade balances varies from six per cent to eight per cent. China’s readiness to provide regional states with large long-term loans could be deemed as another sign of new Chinese interest in the states of the Eastern Partnership. In recent years, China and Belarus have agreed on loans worth at least 6.5 billion dollars. Th is means that in the medium term, Beijing may become a major economic player in Eastern Europe. In the long term, this economic rise could translate into political infl uence. Nevertheless, the region will never occupy a particularly high position in Chinese foreign policy as compared to that of Central Asia. After the offi cial launch of the Eastern Partnership, Russian politicians joked that it is just BUMAGA With new pipelines to (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, China, the Kremlin has Azerbaijan), a joke referring to a bureaucratic lost its almost exclusive document in Russian. However, the Eurasian Union promoted by Russia seems to be a spectre haunting monopoly on the import Eurasia. Russia behaves more as a bankruptcy trustee of gas from Central Asia. trying to save as much as possible of the assets from the Soviet Union than a dynamic manager of an emerging company. Th e rise of ties between the regions of the post-Soviet space and its neighbourhood confi rms that a new approach to this part of the world is needed in the West. It should shift from Russia-centrism towards a substantially more pluralistic defi nition of the area. China’s rising involvement in the post-Soviet space demonstrates very clearly that the Eurasian Union does not constitute a serious obstacle to the development of practical economic and political cooperation between third states and the region. A decrease of Russia’s leverage in the former Soviet Union would be substantially faster if western actors (the US, the EU and Turkey) cooperated closely and showed more commitment and assertiveness. In fact, western infl uence in the post-Soviet space taken together exceeds China’s leverage. Fortunately for Russia, a Chinese- style engagement of the united West in the post-Soviet space is rather unlikely.

Adam Balcer is an advisor at demos EUROPA – Centre for European Strategy, as well as an advisor in the oﬃ ce of the President of the Republic of Poland. He also lectures in the Eastern European Studies programme at the University of Warsaw. The Russian Orphanage Model

ALEXANDER SNEGIREV

Little has changed in Russia in the last century. Despite the abolition of serfdom, people today have become accustomed to having a substantial part of their problems resolved by someone else. Because of the lack of necessity to make a choice, we have all become extremely lazy.

My wife and I want to adopt a child from an orphanage. In order to do this we had to attend a course for adoptive parents; which we have done for already a month and a half. Th e lessons are organised by the state and are free of charge. Th e goal is to educate those who are willing to adopt children. It is necessary that the adoptive parents treat the issue responsibly and understand the diffi culties that they will have to face. Such a programme must reduce the amount of confl icts in families with adopted children and minimise the chances of adoptive parents abandoning their adopted children. Whilst attending the lessons, it is interesting to observe the others as well as oneself. Some potential adoptive parents leave their ultimate doubts behind and confi dently prepare for the challenge of adoption. Others, in contrast, gradually decide to postpone the idea and rethink it all over again. Sometimes couples quarrel, a wife is eager to adopt a child, while a husband is not. Or vice versa. During each lesson for potential adoptive parents, a psychologist describes the various scenes of life with a child from the orphanage. She quotes statistics, describes the types of children in need of adoption, etc. Quite often, it happens that the course participants recognise themselves in these portraits, their own unresolved problems and their own sorrows. Th ey completely forget that they want to take care of someone else, as they are the ones who received little kindness and attention. One simple fact particularly startled me. Th e reality is that the majority of teenagers turn out to be completely dependent as they leave an orphanage at the age of eighteen. No matter how good or bad the life in orphanage is nowadays, and Alexander Snegirev, The Russian Orphanage Model Opinion and Analysis 49

due to cash infusions from the state and other eff orts by charitable organisations (many orphanages are well-fi nanced), the truth is that the majority of those who leave the orphanage at the age of eighteen are totally unprepared for life. Of course, it is easier to lavish gifts on children, to buy trips and clothing for them, and sleep easily with the satisfaction of doing a good deed. However, by stuffi ng the children in orphanages with material goods, the Russian community has unknowingly created the model of itself. When children from orphanages, who are fully dependent on others until eighteen, fi nd themselves in the real world, they demonstrate total helplessness. Th ey do not understand how to pay bills; do not know where products come from, or where to buy and how to choose clothing; or how to start a relationship. Th ey have been taught dependency and irresponsibility. Th ey did not have to fi ght for survival and did not want for anything; they are absolutely unprepared to resolve daily routine tasks. Th eir only habit is living collectively. Th at is precisely why such young people often huddle up together in one of the apartments provided to them by the state. Th ey then sublease the other apartments and live off the dividends. Th ey can be easily deceived; cannot fi nd a job and often abuse drugs or go to prison, which in turn is a model of an orphanage and a whole community in itself. In prison, there is no need to think about what to do and where to get food, you 50 Opinion and Analysis Alexander Snegirev, The Russian Orphanage Model

just need to blend in with the majority and avoid sticking out your neck. Perhaps the high percentage of Russian prisoners is a result of an unconscious desire of a part of the population to get into custody and hide under the wing of someone strong? Is it this epidemic infantilism that gives rise to a need of the myth of the great power? Little has changed in Russia in the last century. Russia is not the only Our compatriots a century ago put an end to country where unhealthy serfdom. But as before as it is today, the people have become accustomed to having a substantial part of paternalism has been their problems resolved by “chiefs”, while little is under cultivation. required from them. Serfs were restrained in their earnings, movement and choice of profession; the choice was made for them by the nobility or party bosses. Because of the lack of necessity to make a choice, we have all become extremely lazy. I do not disapprove of such a mentality, especially because people have it by no fault of their own. Russia is not the only country where unhealthy paternalism has been, and partly still is, under cultivation; it is merely a form of a community’s organisation. However, when living in such a community, and being its representative, it is important to be conscious of oneself and one’s own role. We are all like the forty-year-old loons living with our parents at their expense. We are the kind that would not get married if our mommy does not allow us to, that would not smoke because our daddy forbade it. We are obedient on the outside but secretly watch porn, hidden under our blankets. We have to realise that discontent with the system might come not from the system’s faults, but from our imperfections, and also that a lack of work is not the result of someone’s practices, but our own inability to learn the necessary trade. We have to realise that the bad guys in power are not bad guys per se, but largely due to the fact that we called them, handed them a whip and asked them to beat us. Even more, if it weren’t for us being such deadheads, perhaps these bad guys against whom we rebel would not have become bad guys altogether and could have taken a diff erent road. You never know; one day they might even end up being kind souls and saints. We have tempted them with our dullness and obedience and allow their sins of unhindered ruling and uncontained robbery. Involuntarily, a paradoxical thought crosses my mind. Th e state, which has recently seemed to patronise us in all things and now, year-by-year, renounces more of its social obligations, acts like my own father once did when he got sick and tired of my swimming coaches’ failures and decided to teach me to do the crawl, the breast stroke and how to dive at the same time. To do it, he used a radical method: he Alexander Snegirev, The Russian Orphanage Model Opinion and Analysis 51 shoved me into the lake. Since then, I am not much fond of algae and seaweed, but I managed to swim ashore on my own. Today, the Russian community has slowly started to self-organise. Citizens fi ght for their rights at district meetings, seek criminals with the aid of volunteers, repair apartment blocks at their own expense. I do not know whether this is good or bad. However, this will defi nitely lead to the nation becoming more mature. Th e central power has become increasingly nominal. It appears rarely, only in cases of global disasters or for disciplinary reasons. Dealing with routine problems is increasingly imposed on the Today, Russian people. Eventually, this civic independence may communities are slowly result in a strengthened independence of separate starting to self-organise. regions and even districts. Th ese will not be national autonomies, but enclaves created based on economic and cultural interests. Strictly speaking, Russia here keeps up with Europe as a whole, which is entering the stage where ideology ultimately loses ground to consumption. When there is no free access to medical care, education, pensions and benefi ts, then why on earth do we need a state? Why should we pay taxes if we can team up and repair roads, maintain public order and educate our children on our own? Independence always leads to disillusionment, the loss of faith and frustration. However, this is freedom, where the wind whistles, where the drafts are all around and the birds weave nests under the domes of temples. Freedom always means a lack of comfort and freedom is always a road. And it looks like, to me, that this road will soon open to us.

Alexander Snegirev is a Russian writer. His short novel How We Bombed America won the Crown Prize of the Writers’ Union in 2007. His novel Petroleum Venus was shortlisted for the National Bestseller Prize, nominated for the Russian Booker, and was on the ozon.ru bestseller list for a year. His latest novel, Vanity, was named the best book of 2010. After the Crash

MYKOLA RIABCHUK

During the night of June 27th 2013, Iryna Krashkova, a grocery store seller in the small town of Vradiyivka in the Mykolayiv region of Ukraine, was picked up or, rather, hijacked by two police oﬃ cers and their friend, a taxi-driver. Th ey brought her to the forest, severely beat, raped and left her with a torn lip, a fractured skull and many other injuries. Against all odds, she survived.

Th e attackers were detained, and, three days later, two of them were sentenced to two months in prison for “hooliganism”, whereas the third (the captain) was released as he was arguably on duty at the police station when the incident happened. Th e event and especially the cynicism of the local authorities who mishandled the issue infuriated the Vradiyivka inhabitants to such a degree that they stormed the police headquarters and threatened to lynch the culprits if they were not duly punished. Only at this point did the central authorities interfere, dismissing the local prosecutor and police chief and ordering a new investigation.

Encouraged lawlessness

As the mass media dug deeper into the problem, it appeared that the local police had for years terrorised the citizens under tacit permission from, or even in cooperation with, the local authorities, degrading and degenerating thoroughly in the conditions of permissiveness and impunity. Still worse, the case was hardly exceptional. Each year, the Ukrainian mass media and human rights groups persistently report on all sorts of lawlessness condoned, encouraged and even practised by the Ukrainian authorities and law-enforcement agencies in particular. As a result, popular trust in all state institutions has reached an all-time low since Mykola Riabchuk, After the Crash Opinion and Analysis 53 independence and, remarkably, law-enforcement agencies are rated the worst. As a May 2013 survey revealed, only three per cent of respondents fully trust the police while 20 per cent trust it only to a certain degree. Ironically, the former fi gure largely coincides with the number of people who serve in the police (more than 300,000) and their close friends and relatives. Around 70 per cent of Ukrainians have no trust in the police – a 12 per cent increase since 2010, and up 20 per cent since 2005. In 2006, 19 per cent of respondents considered meeting a policeman at night on the street as a danger; whereas 30 per cent perceived it positively, Th e primary concerns as a sign of security. Five years later the situation of Ukrainians are social had reversed. Only 21 per cent consider meeting a policeman as enhancing security; 31 per cent see it and economic issues. as a potential threat. Th e popular attitude towards other agencies is equally bad. Th e balance of trust/ mistrust in the Ukrainian courts is 16 versus 72 per cent, in prosecutor offi ces – 21 vs. 64 per cent; in the Constitutional Court (notorious for its servility and odd decisions) – 21 vs. 60 per cent; in the Security Service (similarly corrupt but less visible in the public space) – 34 vs. 49 per cent. Th e government has the balance of trust/mistrust 22 vs. 71 per cent, the president has 26 vs. 70 per cent, and parliament has 17 vs. 77 per cent. All these fi gures correlate conspicuously with the number of respondents who are satisfi ed/dissatisfi ed with the current situation in Ukraine – 21 per cent versus 74 per cent. Th irty to 40 percent of respondents contend they would participate in a mass protest if the current situation deteriorates further. Th eir primary concerns are social and economic, while corruption and lawlessness come second, and political and civic rights come third. Only 13 per cent of respondents are ready to go to the streets to defend the last category. Sociologists argue, however, that the latter fi gure is not that low: exactly the same number of people participated actively back in 2004 during the Orange Revolution and today we see how things have changed. Th e Orange upheaval raised very high expectations that led to equally high disappointment. Popular trust in the opposition is nearly as low (18 per cent) as in the ruling party. Only 48 per cent believe democracy is the best form of government for Ukraine, whereas 23 per cent prefer authoritarian rule, and 17 per cent do not care. In addition, not only the political class but society at large has become increasingly polarised. Since 2001 and especially 2010, hate speech has penetrated the mainstream political discourse. Whereas one side depicts the authorities wholesale as crooks and bandits, the other side labels all the opponents as fascists and extremists. Both sides share responsibility for the escalation of “othering”, even though the 54 Opinion and Analysis Mykola Riabchuk, After the Crash

authorities’ contribution is certainly weightier – partly because they have much stronger power and the ability to use mass media; but also partly because of the deeply embedded Soviet and Russian imperial myths and stereotypes they exploit. Th e most disturbing phenomenon is an unusually high number of people who support mob justice: 31 per cent of respondents claim it acceptable under some circumstances and 15 per cent believe it is the only way to get things right. Less than half of the people surveyed, 48 per cent, say that lynching is deﬁ nitely unacceptable.

Profound mistrust

Th e increasing support for mob rule seems not only a genuinely emotional reaction to the rampant corruption, lawlessness and dysfunction of the state apparatus. Increasingly, it is becoming translated into practical actions; be it a Vradiyivka- style attack on police stations, units and cars, or a personal revenge on judges and policemen who have arguably committed the most apparent, cynical, and outrageous acts of injustice. Slogans like “kill the cops” or “all judges are scum” have become widespread on the internet. And despite tough police measures, Banksy-style graffi ti with the president’s face recognisable in the centre of a sniper’s target has emerged on the city walls as a menacing sign of society’s radicalisation. One could argue that the profound Extortion, bribery, robbery, mistrust in state institutions is part of the Soviet legacy that prioritised the blackmail and coercion is now the party-state over its citizens, treating them regular business of the police. actually as the subjects, the party-state serfs. Even the language refl ects these peculiar relations between the state and the people: what is called “civil servants” in English or French is called literally “state servants” in Ukrainian or Russian. Th e state has always been a potential source of threat, of repression or terror. And the police have been its most visible and the most dangerous (after the KGB) part. From its very inception it was assigned to punish rather than protect citizens, to care much more about the regime than about its subjects. Th e only signifi cant change that occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union was a gradual “privatisation” of the police and other state agencies formerly owned by the Communist Party, by the new masters from the business/criminal world. Th is made all the post-Soviet institutions (police in particular) even less effi cient in their formal duties, but much more assertive and unscrupulous in their informal activities that had been previously restrained, to a certain degree, by the party. Now extortion, bribery, robbery, blackmail and coercion have become the regular Mykola Riabchuk, After the Crash Opinion and Analysis 55 business of the police, including the most lucrative part of it – protection (the so called “roofi ng” – крышевание) of criminals. Th is peculiar laissez-faire system worked relatively well in Ukraine as long as some sort of social contract was observed: people were ready to pay bribes to the authorities but they were not ready to be beaten, raped, robbed, demeaned and humiliated. Since 2010, after Viktor Yanukovych’s accession to the presidency and the fi rm concentration of power in the hands of his close associates – the so-called “family” – the red line was crossed. Th e violent protests that spread in Ukraine refl ect not A radical shake-up and only the radicalisation of political infi ghting reconstruction of dysfunctional (including the worrisome proliferation of institutions is still possible. hate speech), but also look like desperate responses to extremely unscrupulous political practices of incumbents, their unchecked greediness combined with incompetence, intolerance and inadequacy. Th e very fact that up to 75 per cent of the top positions in various Ukrainian agencies, ministries, courts and administrations are occupied by people from Donbas (Yanukovych’s native region), says a lot about the principles upon which the incumbents select their team. Yet, the results of this team’s activity are even more illustrative. On August 24th 2013, during the celebrations of national Independence Day, the president announced a long list of people awarded with various orders and medals for their presumed contribution to the development of the country. Most of them, predictably, belong to the ruling party with very close ties to the “family”. Some of them deserve a separate story – such as the notorious Ukrainophobe (in private) and minister of education (in public), Dmytro Tabachnyk, or the two murky businessmen allegedly in co-operation with organised crime – Artem Pshonka (the son of Ukraine’s prosecutor general) and Yuriy Ivaniushchenko (the president’s friend and sponsor). Th e presidential awardee list also features the name of Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the minister of the interior. Zakharchenko is also the top boss of the same servicemen who daily rob, rape and torture their co-citizens while failing, at the same time, to do anything against the rampant corruption, embezzlement of state funds, smuggling of people or the narcotics trade. From the president’s point of view, this might be of little importance. In the offi cial presentation, Zakharchenko was granted the Medal of Merit for his “strengthening of the rule of law, high professionalism, and conscientious fulfi lment of his duties”. Th e president clearly appreciates his personal service to the regime, including the use of riot police against peaceful protesters and round-the-clock guarding of his huge private estate – which offi cially belongs to some murky company and therefore is defi nitely not a subject of protection at a cost to the taxpayer. 56 Opinion and Analysis Mykola Riabchuk, After the Crash

Silver lining Alexander Motyl, a shrewd observer and commentator of Ukrainian political life, alleges that Yanukovych and his Party of Regions “have eff ectively destroyed Ukraine’s post-Soviet political institutions”, and Ukrainians therefore will have to reconstruct a political regime from scratch, from top to bottom. “Mere reform will no longer be enough. Even ‘radical reform’ may not quite accurately capture the magnitude of change that Ukraine will have to endure to emerge from the ‘Yanukovych Ruin’ politically energised and rejuvenated, rather than enervated and ossifi ed.” Th e task might really be tremendous but hardly unbearable. One may remember that there was a short period of time after the Orange Revolution – just a few months – when public trust in state institutions turned out to be unusually high. It was a real window of opportunity to make Ukraine’s 2004 a rough equivalent of Eastern Europe’s 1989. A radical shake-up and reconstruction of dysfunctional institutions was possible then and is still possible in the future. It requires, of course, a more committed, competent and responsible leadership; a more assertive and mobilised civil society; and probably more coherent and comprehensive international assistance. Th ere are still problems with leadership, meaning not only the hopeless incumbents but also the opposition that apparently has not recovered yet from the Orange disaster and has not rebuilt its positive image in people’s minds. Th e international milieu is also ambiguous, especially after Ukrainian authorities failed to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius. Th e rather gloomy opinion polls reveal, however, some silver lining – unusually high popular trust towards two institutions besides the Church, which is split in Ukraine for many competing confessions, so that each of them is probably much less popular than the Church in general. Th ese two institutions are the independent mass media and civic organisations. Th eir popularity, indeed, has been growing steadily since 2010. Th is largely refl ects their public stance and grass-roots activity. As we have seen, not all the energy of the Orange Revolution was wasted and some lessons of the past might still be helpful in the future.

Mykola Riabchuk is a Ukrainian writer and a senior research fellow with the Institute of Political and Nationalities’ Studies, Academy of Sciences, Kyiv. ADVERTISEMENT

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NIKA SIKHARULIDZE

Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili has been in charge of the country now for over a year. His coalition rules in the parliament and his candidate won the October 2013 presidential elections. With the complete change of political power in Georgia, what does this now mean for the future of its western-oriented foreign policy?

Before coming to power, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the Georgian billionaire and previous prime minister, was blamed by hardliners from the United National Movement (UNM) for being a Russian puppet. Th ey worried that when he would be in power he would change the direction of Georgian foreign policy from its current western orientation towards Russia. At ﬁ rst glance, the accusations by Ivanishvili’s opponents were valid. Ivanishvili was the richest Georgian and had earned his fortune in Russia. He looked like a classic Russian oligarch, possessing a signiﬁ cant number of shares in many large Russian companies, including Gazprom. Before making his debut on the Georgian political scene two years ago, Ivanishvili had given only one interview in his whole life. He rarely appeared in public and therefore nobody knew anything about his political views, beliefs and values. In Georgia, he was known only as a rich man from the tiny village of Chorvila. His story looked very similar to that of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s mystical Great Gatsby who suddenly appeared out of nowhere to “save his country from dictatorship and injustice”.

Consolidating power

Despite the fact that there are some NATO sceptics in the Georgian Dream, a political coalition founded by Bidzina Ivanishvili consisting of ﬁ ve parties, it has been declared that the coalition’s foreign policy priority is Euro-Atlantic integration. Th e biggest players within the coalition are the Republican Party and Our Georgia–Free Democrats. Both the Republicans and the Free Democrats are distinguished in the Nika Sikharulidze, Georgia’s Choice Opinion and Analysis 59

Photo: Michał Koziczyński / Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (CC) commons.wikimedia.org Some critics and experts have speculated that after quitting politics, Georgia billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili will still remain the most infl uential person in Georgia.

Georgian political proscenium by their pro-western oriented players. Th e Republicans are considered an intellectuals’ party and have solid political experience – they had previously been in a coalition with the UNM (United National Movement). Th e Free Democrats are led by Irakli Alasania, one of the most popular young Georgian politicians who previously served as Georgia’s ambassador to the United Nations. Alasania and his party are known among the public as the ambassadors’ party, since many of the members have served as diplomats. After winning the parliamentary elections in October 2012, the Georgian Dream Coalition came to power and distributed governmental functions among its members. Th e key positions went to the above-mentioned two main parties within the coalition. David Usupashvili, the chairman of the Republican Party, became the speaker of the parliament. Irakli Alasania was given the portfolio of Minister of Defence. Th e seat of the Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs went to Alasania’s sister-in- law, and the portfolio of Justice Minister also went to Alasania’s Free Democrats. Th e presidential elections held on October 27th 2013 resulted in victory for the Georgian Dream’s candidate, putting an end to the process of the so-called cohabitation between the Georgian Dream and the UNM. Giorgi Margvelashvili, who won the presidential elections in the ﬁ rst round, was supported by Ivanishvili and the coalition. While Margvelashvili has very little political experience, he is known to be a supporter of Georgia’s integration with western institutions. For 60 Opinion and Analysis Nika Sikharulidze, Georgia’s Choice

a long time, Margvelashvili was the head of the Georgian-American Institute of Public Aff airs, an educational institution that has produced public offi cials in Georgia by providing them with quality education that meets western standards. Nevertheless, he is considered an “appointee” of Ivanishvili, as opponents of the Georgian Dream argue that Ivanishvili left his “puppet” in power in order to maintain control over the country. Th e powers of the president, however, have been signifi cantly reduced since the new constitution has been in force following the November 17th inauguration of the new president. Th e country has transformed into a semi-parliamentary model with limited presidential powers. Th e president’s role is now confi ned to representing the state on the international scene and dealing with the national defence issues. Despite the worries of Ivanishvili’s Georgia’s ruling coalition can opponents about Georgian foreign policy generally be distinguished by its shift, there have been no signs of any pro-western political personalities. signifi cant changes in Georgia’s foreign vector yet. Th e new government declares that Georgia shall continue its active engagement towards convergence in the EU and NATO. Th e United States still remains a main strategic partner for Georgia, despite the fact that the Ivanishvili never paid an offi cial visit to the US during his time as prime minister. He explained that even though he had been invited by the White House, he did not see any necessity to do so. As for Russian-Georgian relations, Ivanishvili came to power with several promises, including the restoration of relations between the two countries by establishing a direct dialogue that does not eliminate the Geneva format of negotiations; reopening the Russian market for Georgian goods; and “convincing” the Russians to solve the problem of Georgia’s territorial integrity. After the 2012 parliamentary elections, Ivanishvili appointed a special representative for Russian issues. Th e fi rst task was restoring direct communication with Russia. Work on trade with Russia was also on the top of the list. Since the end of 2012, the Russian market has become partially opened for Georgian goods, with strong control by the rospotrebnadzor, a Russian agency in charge of sanitary inspection and consumer protection.

Peaceful nature

At the beginning of 2013, during a visit to Armenia, Ivanishvili gave an interview to an Armenian radio station that provoked waves of criticism and concern within Georgia. Ivanishvili said: “the question to ask is, is it possible to combine the restoration of relations with Russia and good relations with NATO and Georgia’s NATO aspirations? …I think that Armenia is a good example of this. Armenia has Nika Sikharulidze, Georgia’s Choice Opinion and Analysis 61 perfect relations with Russia and with the US and NATO as well, therefore it is possible.” It should be noted that Armenia is a member of Russian-led organisations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and ﬁ nally in September of this year the president of Armenia announced its readiness to also join the Russian-led Customs Union. Besides, it is worth mentioning that the Russian 102nd military base is deployed in Gyumri and Armenia does not have any NATO aspirations. Ivanishvili’s critics fundamentally disagreed with the statement that his ruling Th e new foreign policy of coalition made in a recent foreign policy Georgia can be described declaration stating: “It is in the interest of Georgia that it no longer plays a role in the as pragmatic with signs of contradictions between the West and Russia uncertainty and contradictions. …Georgian policy should not be aimed at becoming a strategic player in the processes of confrontations between regional and world powers.” As argued by the critics, the question as to whether Georgia should remove its own problems from the international agenda and not pressure Russia through its western partners and international organisations on the issue of de-occupation of Georgian territories from the Russian occupational troops is nonsense and is inconsistent with Georgia’s national interests and its aspirations. Th e most alarming statement, which provoked serious political tensions in Georgia, was made by Ivanishvili this September in his interview with Reuters. In response to the question about what he thinks of Putin’s Eurasian Union aspirations, which according to experts is a modernised version of the Soviet Union with Russian domination, Ivanishvili answered: “If I see in the long term that the Eurasian Union is good for our country, then why not?” Giga Bokeria, the former Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia, commented on this statement evaluating it as “something very dangerous and worrying that damages Georgia’s national interests”. Th e biggest challenge for Georgia’s new government is the continuing Russian occupation of Georgian territory. Russians have repeatedly moved the ABL (administrative borderlines) of the South Ossetia territory deep into the Georgian- controlled territories and have put up barbed wire fencing. Th ese actions, which have happened several times and still continue to happen, are conducted in a very oﬀ ensive manner, forcing people to demolish their homes and giving them only 24 hours to collect all the harvest from their land. Th e Russian-installed barbed wire fencing goes beyond the occupation line, depriving people of the possibility to visit the graves of their families and relatives. Th is is a classic example of a “traditional” Russian-style violation of fundamental human rights and international norms. 62 Opinion and Analysis Nika Sikharulidze, Georgia’s Choice

Th e latest “surprise” by the Russians is connected to the Winter Olympic Games planned for Sochi in 2014. Th e honour to carry the fi rst Olympic torch was given to Ivan Nechaev, a Russian pilot, who after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war had been awarded with the title of “Hero of Russia” for his military accomplishments during missions in Georgia in the August 2008 war. Th is symbolic act provoked a public campaign in Georgia, demanding that Georgia not participate in the Sochi Olympics. Ivanishvili’s response to the public protests, however, was that he does not see any reason to boycott the Olympics, stating: “How will it look if only we boycott the Olympics games?” Th e prime minister was supported by others in the new cabinet of ministers. “As of today there is no evidence to suggest that we would boycott our participation,” Paata Zaqareishvili, Critics claim that despite Georgia’s state minister for reintegration issues quitting politics, Ivanishvili said in his interview with the Interpressnews. To make a short summary of the new still remains the most government’s foreign policy, we can say that infl uential person in Georgia. it is pragmatic with many signs of uncertainty and contradictions, and in some cases shows inertness from the past government’s policy. Ivanishvili might not fully share western values and, in fact, it could be that he even does not completely understand some of them. He himself has admitted that moderate rhetoric and direct communication with Russia would solve Georgia’s problems. He is a pragmatic businessman who knows that everything comes at a price and that in international relations, as in business, it is important to know how to make a good trade-off without harming one’s own interests and remaining a reliable partner at the same time.

Behind the scenes

Uncertainty in Georgian politics is reinforced by the fact that Ivanishvili has stepped down as prime minister. In his place is the young 31-year-old Irakli Garibashvili. Garbashvili recently held the post of minister of the interior and before that was a close colleague of Ivanishvili, working for charities or businesses affi liated with the former prime minister. Critics and some experts have speculated that after quitting politics, Ivanishvili will still remain the most infl uential person in Georgia by controlling Georgian politics from behind the scenes. Ivanishvili has categorically rejected these speculations, stating that he will now focus on strengthening the Georgian civil society (most interpret this in the fi nancial sense). Luckily, however, alongside the presence of personalities shaping politics, there are some other determinants that shall defi ne Georgia’s foreign policy path. One such factor is the EU Vilnius Summit in November 2013, when the Association Nika Sikharulidze, Georgia’s Choice Opinion and Analysis 63

Agreement (including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement) was initialled between Georgia and the EU. For many reasons, this agreement will play a signiﬁ cant role in accelerating the further development of Georgia’s integration into the global world. At the same time, Russia’s increasingly aggressive behaviour, manifested in “the barbed wire policy”, trade games and other destructive actions, will stabilise and further shape Georgia’s western-oriented foreign policy. Russia’s reactions towards the Vilnius summit were an alarming display of its attempt to use every leverage tool available to stop the process of EU engagement with the states of the former Soviet Union. In this regard, creative Ukrainians circulated through social networks a picture of a dog found somewhere in Kyiv that very much resembled the face of the Russian president. A second picture was then spread around social networks with the image of the dog captured on a billboard installed on the highway from the Boryspil airport to the city Kyiv with the following statement: “Europe – Our Home… the dog barks, but the caravan moves on …”. Th ere is a hope that this allegoric sign reﬂ ects a reality in which the “barking dog” symbolises the impossibility to hinder the process of globalisation in this region.

Nika Sikharulidze is a department director at the Oﬃ ce of the National Security Council of Georgia. ADVERTISEMENT What Gives Us Strength?

ALYAKSANDR MILINKEVICH

Th e current times cannot be called favourable for Belarus, but it is on this anvil that the Belarusian identity is being tempered. Th e Belarusians are a people with a European past and capable of preserving their identity.

More than 19 years of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule have turned many Belarusians from optimists to pessimists. In recent years, political life has almost completely disappeared, economic conditions have been deteriorating and people are leaving the country in increasing numbers. In the early 1990s, the post- communist functionaries were saying one after another that Belarus would soon disappear, and the independence of the country was a frightening absurdity for them. In fact, we were not told this only in the 1990s, but over the past two centuries. Th e processes within society, however, give us hope and show that Belarus is pregnant with Belarus is a country changes. Today is, surely, not the best time of partisans, where events for our country, but Belarus is a country of may develop contrary partisans, where events may develop contrary to the regime’s plans. to the regime’s plans. Offi cials have put a lot of eff ort into distorting the Belarusian people’s self-identity, but with little result. Th e largely popular rock group Lyapis Trubetskoy has released a Belarusian-language album despite the propaganda against the popularisation of the Belarusian language. Belarusians want to join the EU despite the fact that the authorities have been conducting continuous anti-western propaganda campaigns. Th e World of Tanks video game that has been building a successful international career is becoming Belarus’s hallmark, contrary to offi cial assurances that one cannot become wealthy without natural resources. 66 Opinion and Analysis Alyaksandr Milinkevich, What Gives Us Strength?

Overcoming Soviet history Th e development of the Belarusian identity is like underground waters that very few people have reached yet. Its current identity is being built on contradictory grounds – on Sovietness and Belarusianness. Th e Soviet component is imposed by the authorities, while the Belarusian component has been in the hearts of the people for centuries. It is like a statue of Lenin in a square, but with European people who do not notice this statue in the streets. When people come to Belarus, they immediately notice two things. On the one hand, there is Belarus’s Belarusian national Sovietness – the statues and streets named in identity is still being built. honour of communist butchers, the surprising similarity of the Belarusian and Soviet military uniforms and passers-by with their eyes cast downwards. On the other hand is the Belarusianness – beautiful and very clean streets, active and friendly people. Unfortunately, foreigners sometimes pay more attention to the statue of Lenin than to the Belarusians. However, this fi gure is increasingly giving way to the faces of today’s Belarusians. Th e authoritarian regime has pushed many bright people abroad, and has made Belarus almost an isolated and even a closed country, but our identity has survived and has been developing. Th is is what gives us strength. When in 1994 Lukashenka, a “Soviet creature”, came to power, he immediately began the struggle against the Belarusian identity, Belarusian national symbols and language, and Belarusian history. Th e authorities have turned Belarusian-language schools into Russian-language schools; a referendum returned the communist coat of arms and fl ag; and the teaching of history returned to the Soviet canon. Th erefore, national identity became the nucleus of confrontation between the democrats and autocrats in Belarus. Although the authorities believe that Belarusian history began only in 1917, and Lukashenka calls Belarusians “Russians with the quality mark”, the offi cials have not been able to completely rewrite history. School textbooks, though mostly written in Russian, still discuss prominent Belarusian fi gures of the Middle Ages, the greatness of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, one of the world’s fi rst printed Bibles in a national language – the Belarusian Bible, the glorious victories of the Belarusians against the Teutonic Order or Muscovy, Soviet repressions, etc. Governmental circles are already talking about the importance of the Belarusian Democratic Republic that was destroyed by the Soviet Union. And this is being done by a team led by an authoritarian ruler who, at the beginning of his rule, was opposed to the independence of Belarus and stood for the restoration of the Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Party used Alyaksandr Milinkevich, What Gives Us Strength? Opinion and Analysis 67 the slogan “For Belarus”, which for the majority of the homo sovieticus sounded quite nationalistic. During the presidential election of 2006, when I challenged Lukashenka, he used this slogan himself. Th e main problem is that the Belarusian national identity is still being built, while this process has gone far forward in all the neighbouring countries. Our remarkable heroic and tragic past still has little eff ect on today’s reality. Belarusian history is the legacy of a European people, but contrary to this, the authorities want to join the Eurasian Union under the direction of the Kremlin. The Belarusian identity has been tempered amid the confrontation of the Belarus’s pro-European potential Belarusian and Soviet ethoses. Th e Soviet has been accumulating, and the approach allegedly is winning at the offi cial level; however, it has almost no heroes or greater it becomes, the harder it events of which to be proud. Th e weakness will be to oppose it. of Sovietness and its emptiness promise solid prospects to a Belarusian Belarus because the Soviet history has to use much of the national history. Strange as it may seem, state patriotism is tempered even under the brand of offi cial Sovietness – this patriotism unites those who perceive Belarusian as their native language and those who perceive Moscow just as a capital of a neighbouring state, not a close ally. Belarusian was often perceived as a rural and backward language at the end of the Soviet Union’s existence. Today, it is the language of intellectuals and of engaged youth. It has become a symbol of our country’s independence. Th is has two consequences: on the one hand, this shows the elite nature of the language, but this also gives some isolation from other layers of society. Most importantly, however, the language has not only been surviving, but it is indeed a living language. Many Belarusians tell me at meetings that it is hard for them to switch to Belarusian, but that they like to hear their native language. In fact, most of the offi cials are already thinking in the Belarusian categories “without Moscow in their heads”. Th e experience of the Belarusianisation of the 1920s and 1990s clearly shows that Belarusians positively accepted attempts of the state to return to the national culture and roots. It is very important, however, to act delicately and without coercion when re-introducing the native language to our country. It is obvious for me that there is a fertile ground for the return of the Belarusian language, and it will yet bear fruit. Th e current times cannot be called favourable for Belarus, but it is on this anvil that the Belarusian identity is being tempered. As time has shown, Belarusians are a people with a European past and capable of preserving their identity through tough times. Th e last 200 years have been a hard test for Belarus when our national 68 Opinion and Analysis Alyaksandr Milinkevich, What Gives Us Strength?

identity was heavily damaged, but it is gradually replacing the Soviet identity even in the current quite unfavourable conditions.

Belarus wants to return to Europe

Th e desire of a signifi cant part of Belarusians to join the European Union proves that Belarusians have retained their European identity. Russia has provided multi- billion dollar subsidies for many years, and the offi cial media talk every day about eternal friendship with our eastern neighbour, but pro-European sentiments have steady growth trends: Belarus’s accession to the European Union is supported by 40 per cent to 45 per cent of citizens, while the Eurasian Union is supported by 35 per cent to 40 per cent. Most Belarusians do not want the Russian wars in the Caucasus, its bandits and oligarchs. Th ey see the decaying state of the villages and towns across the eastern border, and realise that in the union we won’t be a second Moscow, but a second Smolensk. Th e number of people in Belarus who want to return to the Soviet Union is much lower than in Russia and even in Ukraine, though after the collapse of the Soviet Union we were the champions of the desire to return “back to the USSR”. Th is is true even now, when the EU’s Frankly speaking, Belarusians do condition is far from perfect, even despite not diff er much from Poles or the fact that the EU has never articulated its interest in Belarus’s accession, and Lithuanians, we were just unlucky when Lukashenka is constantly scaring during a short period in history. the patriarchal Belarusians that the West only dreams of forcing us to legalise same-sex marriages and to buy out all of our factories with their workers. Belarusians are as European as water is wet, however much the Eurasian Union’s architects desire the contrary. Belarusians are aware of the benefi ts of European integration. Th ose who have the opportunity to visit Poland or Lithuania notice the positive changes that have occurred in these countries in less than 10 years of membership in the EU. It is very important, therefore, that the European leaders openly say: “We are waiting for Belarus in Europe, but a democratic Belarus, not a dictatorial one.” If it isn’t possible today to reduce visa fees, which are almost twice as high as those for Russians and Ukrainians, the European countries should at least make the procedure more comfortable and quick, and to issue visas for longer periods. Our citizens still perceive the EU as an example of success. Despite the current problems, Belarusians are attracted by the EU’s economic and social model, high living standards, the possibility to travel without restrictions, etc. The Polish PEN Club ADVERTISEMENT The Royal Castle in Warsaw The Ukrainian PEN Club

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When I’m asked about the geopolitical orientation – whether a Belarusian is “a person from the East” or “a person from the West”, I reply that Belarusians are Europeans. Geopolitics and identity are closely interrelated. At this time, the authoritarian regime doesn’t allow Belarusian identity to develop fully, which would be manifested in the European choice of the people. However, pro-European potential has been accumulating, and the greater it becomes, the harder it will be for the authorities and Moscow to oppose it. It was hard to imagine ten years ago that the majority of Belarusians would support membership in the EU. If we manage to preserve this trend, then in ten years the pro-European geopolitical orientation of Belarusians will become a natural thing, as it really is.

A country of enterprising people

Th e current Belarusian authorities did much to destroy the horizontal links between people, “atomise” society and make people dependent on the state. However, studies show that after the 2011 fi nancial crisis, Belarusian society places less and less hope on the state and counts more on itself. Th e regime has for a long time resisted individual entrepreneurship as a challenge to the state monopoly. In the mid-1990s, Lukashenka treated private business as “lousy fl eas” and promised to “soon shake hands with the last entrepreneur”. Only with the beginning of the fi nancial crisis have the authorities alleviated pressure on businesses, which has brought huge benefi ts. As a result, in a matter of only a few years, the share of small business in the GDP has doubled. Belarus is now known more in the world for successes in creating computer programs rather than by Belarus tractors or MAZ trucks. Belarus is a country of highly educated and enterprising people. When the time comes to implement structural reforms in the Belarusian economy, the country has people on whom to rely. Th e younger generation feels increasingly independent from the state. It is the youth, growing like grass through asphalt that is more eager to operate in a market economy and opposes the Soviet mentality. Unfortunately, the government has forced many young smart people to leave the country, but I personally see it less of a problem. Th e main challenge is that at the moment of the return of freedom, how do we manage get these people back to Belarus. Th ese are people who lead well-known European companies and banks, have been taught in the best EU and American universities. A few years ago it was hard to imagine that so many Belarusians would cease to hope for the state and to increasingly take their future into their own hands. If this trend continues, Belarus will have a brighter future. Th e fi nancial crisis has 74 Opinion and Analysis Alyaksandr Milinkevich, What Gives Us Strength?

tempered Belarusians, made them become more independent and responsible. Paternalism dies in their minds and hope upon oneself is becoming stronger.

A normal society

In contrast to its neighbours, the nation-building process in Belarus has not been completed yet, therefore we very often return to this issue. But there are many other processes that infl uence and aff ect one’s civic position; for example, the metro explosion on April 11th 2011, when 15 people died and two were shot later following the court’s decision. Belarusians then showed their solidarity and compassion. As in any developed society, after the terror attack, taxi drivers and ordinary car owners provided free rides for the victims and their relatives and friends to anywhere in Minsk. Th ey were not seized by the absolute desire for revenge, and they did not believe in extremely fast criminal investigations and court theatrics, when the regime tried to raise another wave of fear in society. People did not fi nally believe that the accused persons had been the genuine organisers of the attack. When the mother of one of the executed persons came to the court hearings in Minsk, she stayed at the fl at of one of the relatives of the victims. After the terrorist attack, people began to speak up louder that the death penalty should be abolished. In recent years, Belarusians on many occasions have showed their unity when transferring money and food to prison detainees after the brutal crackdown of the Square protest in 2010, even if it was necessary to register your passport. Th anks to a private initiative, we raised money to return to Belarus a sacred book for our history – the Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Certainly, we have problems that we do not talk about, but this proves that we are an ordinary people, although with specifi c problems for a country in the heart of 21st century Europe. Th ere is too much talk about Lukashenka and too much defeatist attitude in Belarus, even though the trends in favour of independent democratic Belarus are also visible. In general, there is too much talk about politics and too little about society. At the same time, Belarusians have proven that they are a nation that needs more Europe and a nation that is ready to take responsibility for their own lives. Frankly speaking, Belarusians do not diff er much from Poles or Lithuanians, the peoples with whom we shared a common history for centuries. We were just unlucky during a short period in history. I think, fi rst of all, that this is due to the fact that in the Soviet Union we were one of the most de-nationalised and the most sovietised republics. But East Germany used to be just as unlucky. We simply have to catch up. Belarusian society is completely diff erent from what it used to be when Lukashenka came to power. In the mid-1990s Belarusians treated the war in Chechnya almost Alyaksandr Milinkevich, What Gives Us Strength? Opinion and Analysis 75 as their war and they were mostly afraid of the country’s independence. Today, the idea of the restoration of the Soviet Union is marginal; nobody cares about the problems in Russia. Belarusians have changed in spite of the authoritarian regime and the Eastern infl uence on mass media and politics. We have to think less about Lukashenka; we know all about him and we are tired of him. We should simply think about Belarus. Th e opposition has to love Belarus more than to hate Lukashenka. Belarusians are looking for an alternative, for somebody to entrust the future of their country. Th e absolute majority of people want change, they have lost trust in their former “father”, but lately the opposition has lost trust as well. We have to re-establish our infl uence on the society, to provide answers to people’s questions, to prove that democrats know how to conduct the necessary reforms and have the persons capable of implementing them. As for the relations between Belarus and Europe: there should be more Europe in Belarus, not less, regardless of the regime. Th e European countries should get in contact not only with the authorities, but also, and foremost, with ordinary Belarusians. Th ere is a need for wider economic cooperation, for joint ventures, for common cultural festivals and an urgent need for a visa-free regime. Economic and cultural cooperation is a big investment in Belarusian identity; it is Europe’s contribution to the struggle of Belarusians against the Soviet past. I am an optimist and I am confi dent in the future of Belarus. However, the current challenges should be treated with due attention. Th e Kremlin is restoring its empire; its actions are tough and cynical. One of Moscow’s aims is to change the Belarusian European identity into a Eurasian one. If that happens, instead of the future we would have the Soviet past. Th e fate of Belarus will be decided in the fi rst post-Lukashenka election. It is going to be the time when the country chooses not only its economic and geopolitical, but also civilisational future. Our work today determines in what condition our society will have to meet this challenge. Today’s trends, as the identity itself, work in favour of a European Belarus and give us strength to continue fi ghting for democracy in our country. But in order not to get to Eurasia, it is not enough to fi ght for human rights and civil society development, we need to strengthen our national and historical identity, promote our native language and culture. Th en there will be another spring in Belarus. An irrevocable one.

Translated by Alaksandr Lahviniec

Alyaksandr Milinkevich is a Belarusian opposition politician. He ran in the 2006 presidential elections against Alyaksandr Lukashenka. In 2006 he was also awarded the Sakharov Prize by the European Parliament. The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness

DZMITRY HURNEVICH

In Belarus, with a population of 9.5 million, less than a quarter speaks Belarusian. Year after year, this ﬁ gure decreases. Paradoxically, Russiﬁ cation, which began under the Russian tsars and continued by the communists, reached its peak in independent Belarus. If this continues, in a few decades the Belarusian language will cease to exist.

“Do you speak Belarusian?” “Not often, because I do not have time.” Th is absurd answer from a Minsk street goer was recently given to a journalist. It perfectly illustrates the situation with the Belarusian language. For the majority of Belarusians, their native language is an element of tradition that, from time to time, can be pulled oﬀ a dusty shelf. One can sing a Belarusian song at a wedding, recite a passage from a poem of a classic author, and sometimes go to see a play at a theatre to ﬁ nally talk about the language’s poor condition. Th e Belarusian language is attributed the role of a decorative archaic phenomenon, and nothing more. In the 2009 census, only 53 per cent of respondents named Belarusian as their native language and only 23 per cent as the language they use at home. In 1999, Belarusian was considered native by 73.6 per cent of the population and it was used daily by 37 per cent of families. Belarusian has been driven into the catacombs where its existence depends on several thousand intransigent defenders.

Language of peasants

It was not always this way. Th e Old Belarusian language became the third Slavic language, after Czech and Polish, to be used for printing books in Europe. It was the language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It was spoken by the elite, city and village dwellers, it was used to write documents, produce literature and to pray to Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Opinion and Analysis 77

God. But in the 17th century, the Old Belarusian language was replaced by Polish in the Commonwealth. Its decline led to the 1696 decision banning the use of Belarusian. Losing its written value, Belarusian became the language of the peasants. Th e Partitions of the Polish Republic (which had been the Grand Duchy) and the incorporation of contemporary Belarusian lands by the Russian Empire only worsened the condition of the Belarusian language. Russian became the offi cial language. In offi cial documentation it was forbidden to use the words “Belarus” and “Belarusians”. To accelerate the process of Russifi cation, the authorities fi red “their shots from the inner Russian provinces”. Th e motto of the Russian policy in Belarus became the formula: “What the Russian bayonet has not fi nished will be done by the Russian school and church.” Th e Russian Governor-General Mikhail Muravyov, known in Belarus as the “Hangman”, openly wrote and said that “the Belarusian language must be destroyed because it will always inspire the idea of a separate Belarusian state and the right of its people to their ethnic identity.” Th e Belarusian language has Sometimes it was possible to outwit taken on the role of a decorative censorship. In 1903, several Belarusian archaic phenomenon. students in St. Petersburg published a collection of poems by a Belarusian poet Janka Lucina, titled Viazanka (5000 copies). Many of their friends could not believe their eyes. In fact, these young Belarusian students presented the book to the censors as a collection of poems in Bulgarian. Th e censor read and praised the author: “Yes, indeed, good Bulgarian poetry.” Th is policy continued until 1905, when the Russian Empire allowed the use of national languages. An avalanche of activism emerged. New writers sprang up like mushrooms after a rainstorm. Belarusian newspapers and magazines were printed, books published, communities created, theatre and national Belarusian art developed; and, as rightly predicted by Muravyov, it gave Belarusians the impetus of moving forward with political slogans. Th at wave of national revival launched by the legalisation of the language in 1905 created an elite which promoted Belarusian statehood: fi rst, with the proclamation of a Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR) in 1918, and, after its dissolution by the Bolsheviks, the creation of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) in 1919. It was the Belarusian language that became a uniting factor for the then Belarusian elite. Th e fi rst years of the BSSR gave hope that the Belarusian language would move “from the village to the city”. Th e process of Belarusianisation was launched in Soviet Belarus. Government agencies and even the Red Army units were switched into the Belarusian language. Full transition of educational institutions and organisations to Belarusian was planned to be completed within one to three years. In 1927, the 78 Opinion and Analysis Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness

Belarusian language was spoken by 80 per cent of public offi cials, less than half of whom, by the way, were Belarusians. Eighty per cent of schools also operated in Belarusian. Th e Belarusian national idea was embraced by not only the previously passive part of the Belarusian population, but also by representatives of national minorities. Th e cohort of Belarusian writers, artists, After the Second World War scientists, public and political fi gures was the Belarusian elite was born joined by Russians, Poles, Jews, Tatars and again in the sterile conditions others. It is no wonder that very soon some in Moscow realised that the party was losing of the Soviet reality. control over Belarusianisation and there was a growing sense among Belarusians of their national identity and diff erence from the Russian people. In 1929, the campaign against the national democrats began. On false charges, more than 110 academic and cultural fi gures were arrested. Th e use of the Belarusian language began to be restricted. In 1933, a spelling reform was adopted aiming at artifi cially bringing the Belarusian language closer to Russian. Next came one of the most tragic pages in the history of Belarus – the Great Terror. Virtually until the Soviet-German war in 1941, the BSSR was a playground for the mass murder of the national intelligentsia and peasantry. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians perished. Th e scale of the drama in the 1930s is illustrated by the tragedy that occurred on October 29th 1937. To commemorate the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, an unprecedented action took place in Minsk. Over one night in the basement of the inner NKVD prison, more than 100 representatives of the intellectual elite of the BSSR – its most famous writers, statesmen and scholars – were shot.

Soviet reality

Within just a few years, the Belarus national elites was suff ered such a blow that it still has not entirely recovered. Th e current state of the Belarusian language and the level of democracy are largely explained by the consequences of Stalin’s terror. Belarus did not experience a change of generations or change of elites: they were destroyed in the 1930s. After the Second World War, the elite was born again in the sterile conditions of the Soviet reality. After the war, the Kremlin set a task that Belarus was to be the fi rst in the USSR to build communism. A prerequisite for this was the renunciation of the national language. Th is task was pursued consistently. No wonder that Nikita Khrushchev praised the BSSR leadership during his visit to Minsk in the late 1950s, saying that Belarus was the fi rst to build communism because nowhere else were there such advances from switching to Russian. Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Opinion and Analysis 79

Photo: Ilya Kuzniatsou (CC) www.fl ickr.com A Belarusian in Minsk shows her support for the opposition by fl ying the white-red-white fl ag, a pre-Soviet symbol of Belarus.

Th e Belarusian language was marginalised. Th e native language could bring only trouble to Belarusians. Speakers of Belarusian could be accused of nationalism, interrogated by the KGB, expelled from universities or work. For the communists, it was obvious that the Belarusian language was all about politics. But even they could not completely ban the use of the Belarusian language. Th erefore, there were a number of spheres where the language could be used without diffi culty: in literature, a certain percentage on radio and television, and in folklore. Th e only place where Belarusian was largely used throughout this time was the village, whose population was slowly yielding to the process of Russifi cation. But, in the city streets, speaking Belarusian was tantamount to a miracle. In the 1980s, when perestroika began, the few Belarusian-speakers in Minsk joked that they could all fi t on a single bus. But in urban families, Belarusian continued to struggle for survival. Th e fact is that almost the entire population of Belarusian cities comes from the provinces and from the villages. Arriving in the city, they sought to master the Russian language. Th is meant prestige. Belarusian was a kind of unwanted burden that reminded them of their peasant origins. And who wanted to look like a peasant in city? Switching from Russian to Belarusian, however, was not that easy. As a result, there appeared a “Frankenstein language”, a Belarusian- Russian mini-language, called trasianka by experts. Th e drama of the Belarusian language changed radically in 1990, when the communist Supreme Council expanded the scope of its use. A year later, Belarus became an independent state. Th e situation began slowly to change for the better: Belarusian classes opened in urban schools, the number of publications in Belarusian grew, offi cials, including the highest state offi cials, started speaking Belarusian. 80 Opinion and Analysis Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness

Th e engine of change was the Belarusian Popular Front, a national-democratic movement for which the revival of the language was one of the main points of its political programme. Th e situation of the beginning of the 20th century when the language had become a uniting factor for the Belarusian elite was reproduced. And now, as then, these elite became the vanguard of change. It was the BPF parliamentarians who, in 1991, made possible the vote for independence of Belarus and managed to initiate the adoption of a number of laws that laid the foundations of the young republic. In Belarus in the early 1990s, there were Not everyone is ready to all the prerequisites for the development of reject comforts provided national culture and language. But the ruling by the Russian language. elites remained Soviet. Not only was Belarus the most de-nationalised of all post-Soviet countries, but it also was the most hateful towards language, culture and history. Th e revival of the language was very slow, lagging behind that in the Baltic states or even Ukraine. Th e communist nomenklatura was unwilling to carry out the Belarusianisation from the top down, but it did not impede the process that started from the bottom. And that would have been enough to gradually stop the Russiﬁ cation, started by the Russian tsars.

Primitive phobia

In 1994 the fi rst and, so far, only Belarusian president came to power, a person with extraordinary political intuition who positioned himself as a talented administrator and a fi ghter against corruption. However, after taking offi ce he did not start with economic reforms and democratic changes. Instead, he immediately started destroying the fragile sprouts of Belarusianness that had emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Twenty years ago, he took the oath in the Belarusian language, with his hand on the Belarusian constitution decorated with the historic Belarusian coat of arms, the Pahonia; he kissed a white-red-white fl ag. But, in just a year, he declared war on the Belarusian language. Giving the status of the offi cial language to Russian was the fi rst step, as in the conditions of that time it meant the marginalisation of the Belarusian language. During his fi rst term, he abandoned national symbols and changed them to Soviet ones. He brought troops to the democratically elected Parliament, dispersed the MPs and adopted a new constitution giving him unlimited authority. During his rule, Alyaksandr Lukashenka carried out Russian colonial policy à la Muravyov against the Belarusian language. Th e fi ght against Belarusianness became Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Opinion and Analysis 81 his political fl ag. Lukashenka many times publically disgraced the Belarusian language, calling it “not beautiful and undeveloped”. He said, “it is impossible to express high feelings in Belarusian”. He accused his Belarusian-speaking compatriots of “being unable to do anything else apart from speaking in Belarusian”. Lukashenka included Belarusian words in his speeches only to reinforce negative points, only to make fun of his opponents for whom the revival of the Belarusian language was one of their political priorities. By the way, Lukashenka himself cannot speak any language. He can hardly put a few words together in Belarusian, and his Russian language sounds like trasianka rather than the language of Pushkin and Solzhenitsyn. Lukashenka’s policy is a primitive phobia of Belarusianness. He made the entire country laugh at his statement that he was fond of poetry by famous Belarusian classical author Vasil Bykaŭ. Th e problem is that Bykaŭ only wrote prose; he did not have a single piece of poetry. According to Lukashenka, the fi rst Belarusian book printers, Francysk Skaryna, who published the Bible in Belarusian in 1517, lived in Saint Petersburg (Saint Petersburg was founded 150 years after Skaryna’s death). Lukashenka constantly claims that there is no diff erence between Belarusians and Russians, he promises that Belarusians would give their lives for Russia in case of a NATO off ensive. His words would cause nothing but a smile if there were no concrete actions and results following them. Th e marginalisation of the Belarusian language caused a reduction in the number of schools with the Belarusian as the language of instruction from 32.9 per cent in 1997 to 16 per cent last year. Th is number will inevitably become even smaller as Belarusian schools operate mostly in villages, where the population is either dying out or running away to the cities. Each year, around 100 schools shut down in Belarus, and only a few new are opened. It is similar to the situation with the Catholic Church in the Soviet Union, where the believers were occasionally allowed to visit churches, but it was strictly prohibited to repair them or to build new ones. It was believed that when the last church fell to ruin, the religion would disappear. It is hard to believe, but in Belarus there is not a single university with Belarusian as its language of instruction. In Minsk, inhabited by two million people, only around 2,000 pupils study in Belarusian. In the other fi ve largest Belarusian cities, the situation is even more dramatic. In Mahilyow, inhabited by 250,000 people, there is only one schoolgirl who studies in Belarusian. Th e rest of the pupils study Belarusian as a foreign language, a couple of lessons a week like English or German. According to the Belarusian School Association (a non-governmental organisation), there are no more than six per cent of schools with Belarusian as the language of instruction in Belarus. 82 Opinion and Analysis Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness

Forced out Th e situation with publishing books in Belarusian is also critical. In 2011, only 8.5 per cent of the total number of books published in Belarus was in Belarusian; compare this to about fi ve per cent of books at the same time were published in English. State radio and television broadcasting is almost totally carried out in Russian, especially during the last years. In 2011, only 317 broadcasting hours, out of 6745 (4.7 per cent), were given to the programmes in Belarusian. Th ere is only one daily newspaper in Belarusian. If the state publishers want to cut their expenses, their victims are always found among the Belarusian language media, as it is considered to be less in demand. Belarusian has been forced out from almost all spheres of life. Lukashenka’s propaganda regards a Belarusian who speaks the Belarusian language as a representative of the “fi fth column”, a foreign spy who would betray his motherland as soon as there is a lucrative off er. It is clear that people are rational; they understand that they live in an authoritarian country, and nobody wants additional problems because of the language. Th e choice is evidently in favour of Russian. Th ere are a few people who are ready to fi ght for the Belarusian schools for their children. Th e majority do not understand why one should study a language that is dying out, that was abandoned by its own state. But the state cynically points out that if Belarusians do not use this language, they should not be forced to do so. Saying this, the offi cials forget to add that it was their policy that led to the situation when Belarusians do not speak Belarusian. Th e protection and the revival of the Belarusian language remains the cause of nationally-oriented intellectuals and part of the divided democratic opposition. Th e language-based division of the elites has a negative eff ect on popularising the Belarusian language. Many think that the language issue makes democratisation even more diffi cult, as it leads to deeper divisions in society. Sometimes there appear funny appeals to abandon defending the language because the intransigence of Belarusian speakers might scare away Russian speakers, as the former would treat it as an attempt to impose the Belarusian language as the only language that should be used. Others agree that the Belarusian language should be revived, but they are not ready to make the fi rst step forward – to start using it. “We should get the language back, gradually, little by little,” they say. But time passes by and it never goes backwards. For the youngest generation, Belarusian may be less familiar than English. In Minsk, a person who speaks Belarusian can be treated as a Pole or a Ukrainian. People are simply forgetting their language. To start using Belarusian demands a number of sacrifi ces. Not everyone is ready to reject the comforts provided by the Russian language. Dzmitry Hurnevich, The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Opinion and Analysis 83

A good example of the fi ght for the Belarusian language is the Yakub Kolas Belarusian Humanities Lyceum. From 1990 to 2003, the lyceum was an elite educational establishment with Belarusian as its language of instruction. Ten years ago, the lyceum was closed down and the pupils had to leave the building in the centre of Minsk. Now, in its building there is a court where opposition activists are tried. After all attempts to save the lyceum were exhausted, the teachers, the pupils and their parents made an uncommon step: they started underground teaching. Th e lessons were carried out at secret addresses, in opposition parties’ headquarters, and recently they have moved abroad. From time to time, spontaneous initiatives aimed at popularising the Belarusian language do appear. Th ey take place in diff erent Belarusian cities and towns and include free language courses, clubs for children, newspapers, books, civic activism, blogging, appeals to the local authorities and even law suits against linguistic discrimination. While the attitude towards the Belarusian language has changed, it has also contributed to its wider usage. If 15-20 years ago people could react aggressively when they heard someone speaking Belarusian, now using this language indicates the speakers’ high level of education and culture. In social networks, there are many examples showing how the Belarusian language makes the everyday life easier: one person did not have to pay a fi ne for speeding, a second person got a discount for coff ee, a third got a free taxi ride, etc. Th ese examples make us more optimistic, but one should understand that a true fi ght for the survival of the language is possible only at the state level. Th e Belarusian nation is still in the process of defi ning itself. And this process will not be completed until the language is back. Language is a basis for identity that builds a community of feeling, self-respect and understanding of national interests. All European nations passed this way. It is an objective process: Belarusians will not be able to avoid it if they want to become a nation. Th ere is another way out – to abandon our native language and take the issue off the table once and for all. Th is will fulfi l the dreams of Russian tsars and communists, and the aspirations of today’s Belarusian authorities. Th e Belarusian language will revive only when all Belarusians fi nd the answer to the question: why invaders and enemies of the Belarusian state saw the extinction of the Belarusian language as one of their primary tasks.

Translated by Alaksandr Lahviniec

Dzmitry Hurnevich is a journalist for Belsat TV and the Belarusian section of Polish Radio - External Service. Redeﬁ ning Identity

JĘDRZEJ CZEREP

Is the model of Belarusian identity, as promoted by the revivalists of the early 1990s, deﬁ ned by language and the rejection of the Soviet and Russian heritage still relevant today? Many activists, mostly from the younger generation, openly redeﬁ ne this model’s priorities when thinking about Belarusian self-consciousness in the current political, social and cultural reality.

In the wake of Russia’s increasing interest to rebuild its former empire, and with the growing political dependence of Belarus on Russia, the question of Belarusian identity, of “Belarusianness”, remains essential for the country’s survival. Th e main questions posed here are how to inspire the people to take ownership over their country; and how to develop a sense of pride and a readiness to defend national identity so that it doesn’t evaporate in an environment dominated by Russian pop culture, language and political infl uence. Th e Belarusian revival movement has always suff ered from its selectiveness. It failed to inspire a single consciousness. In the early 1990s, attempts to impose Belarusian as the dominant language were unsuccessful. During the linguistic referendum of 1995, the vast majority of Belarusian citizens voted for reinstalling Russian as the second offi cial language (in practice, this meant reinstating its leading status). Th e voters also rejected symbols derived from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as well as the revivalists’ white-red-white fl ag, which were sacred notions of the country’s rich, pre-Soviet history. For most Belarusians, these symbols were artifi cial and connected to the small group of “hot-heads” from the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF). Th e Belarusian people did not accept the top-down Belarusisation, mainly because its content and its aesthetics seemed alien. Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity Opinion and Analysis 85

Dramatic decline In subsequent national censuses, a dramatic decline of identifi cation with the Belarusian language can be observed. In 1999, 73.6 per cent of the Belarusians called it their mother tongue. Th at number fell by over 20 per cent in 2009. Th e common economic space built with Russia and Kazakhstan in the last years has caused a mass emigration of young Belarusians to Moscow. Th e possibilities to study and shop in the West incited a parallel exodus to Europe. At the same time, a new generation that was born and raised in an independent Belarus came of age. Th eir perspective is extremely diff erent than the one from the early 1990s, when the revivalists promoted a national-romantic vision. It would be hard to expect that the off er to adopt a conscious Belarusian identity today were the same as it was 20 years ago. A new reality requires a renewed sensitivity, a new approach as well as the readiness to admit predecessors’ errors. For many older activists, this barrier is too diffi cult to cross. For the nationalists of the previous generation, questioning the very principles of the movement, such as the It is not important which Belarusian language, is often unacceptable. language one uses to write, At the same time, not raising this and other issues paralyses hopes for the formulation of but does the writing carry an intellectually inspiring project that could profoundly Belarusian content? respond to the needs of the 21st century. In the wake of the repeated questions regarding the future of the Belarusian project, Radio Svoboda journalist Jan Maksymiuk published a controversial article titled “Th e Younger Brother Syndrome” on July 26th 2012. Th e author decided to break several taboos prevailing among Belarusian national activists of the white- red-white tradition. He took a simple, but also daring approach. He described the Belarusians as they are, not as how they wished they were. First, Maksymiuk raised the question on when should one describe an artist as a creator of Belarusian culture and, subsequently, identity. He stated that the revivalists were answering this question incorrectly by only accepting those who use the Belarusian language . He assumed it was the fear of the victory of the mighty “older brother”, along with Russian language and culture, that prevented Belarusian activists from examining and describing their own nation and culture in a fair way. Maksymiuk asked: “Does Ales Adamovich (one of the leaders of the early revival from the 1980s who mostly wrote in Russian) belong to the Belarusian culture?” His simple answer is obviously yes. He admits that Adamovich and the many others who wrote in Russian are on the same side. Th ey are allies, not enemies in the struggle for the survival of Belarusian culture. What is most important is not 86 Opinion and Analysis Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity

which language one uses to write, but rather whether or not the writing contains valuable, profoundly Belarusian content. Th e author vowed to take a revolutionary step, which had already been done by itself, but was never clearly formulated: to take the main gun from the Russian culture, its language and make it part of the Belarusians’ own arsenal! But let’s make it consciously this time as creators of our own history and not its passive subjects like in the times of the Soviet Union. Maksymiuk wrote: “With Russia, let’s behave like the Irish in the face of the English. Th ey adopted the language of their ‘older brother,’ and used it to create their own unique culture.” Maksymiuk concludes squarely that the Russian language can become the language of Belarusian national culture in the future. And this perspective should be approached constructively and optimistically, without fading into an increasing mental isolation.

Shedding complexes

It is true that Maksymiuk looks for the positive aspects of the generally grim situation of the rapid regression of the Belarusian language. But his voice is also a call to shed the existing complexes and to believe in the Belarusians’ own value and strength. What has to be noted here is that this is also the voice of a great connoisseur and admirer of the Belarusian language and its revival. He doesn’t speak in line with any ideology, but analyses cold facts. Maksymiuk concedes that if any Belarusian writer will receive a Nobel Prize in Literature, it won’t be for writing in Belarusian, but for writing good books. He laughs at the ideas of the administrative parties to help the Belarusian language with linguistic quotas, which would create linguistic ghettoes, but not necessarily improve the quality of Belarusian literature. In the strongest part of his essay, he indicates that he hopes that the Belarusian language will never disappear from Belarus (as the generation of the revivalists say), but he also expresses hope that the Russian language will never disappear from Belarus. By rejecting any of these two, Belarus would reject a part of itself. Th e novelty of the discussion on Belarusian identity is the idea to quell the fear of the consequences of the decline of the Belarusian language. With admitting this undeniable fact and accepting the equal role of the Russian language as a transmitter of national culture, Maksymiuk calls for ending hypocrisy and the artifi cial divisions that never worked in favour of strengthening Belarusian identity in society at large. In the debate initiated by the article, there were voices condemning the author, calling his attitude treasonous and blasphemous. But there were also many enthusiastic responses supporting his frankness and the fresh air he provided Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity Opinion and Analysis 87 to the discussion on Belarusian identity. Among the positive voices was Victor Martynovich, a young writer, the deputy editor-in-chief of BelGazeta and a lecturer at the European Humanities University. Martynovich gained “celebrity” status in 2009 with his novel Paranoia, which was translated into English and published in the United States. It was one of the biggest successes of Belarusian literature in the past decade. Th e novel was written in Russian. Martynovich, in an article titled “Our Nation Won’t Die without the Language” published on In the last 15 years, the Budzma.org, described the controversies surrounding majority of publications Maksymiuk’s text. “All that was written [on identity] in Belarusian were about until now reeked of the vapid pathos of the 1990s. Th e arguments of those who attacked [Maksymiuk] don’t the language itself. seem to be wrong or inconsistent, but anachronistic. Th ey are only valid in the framework of their paradigm. Th e problem is that the paradigm [of the nation] itself grew old.” Th is paradigm was created in the time of modernism and industrialisation and no longer applies to the post-modernist reality. Apart from that, he adds, the paradigm was never able to describe the Belarusian situation properly. Speaking of inaccurate theories, Martynovich refers to Anthony D. Smith, a modern British ethnographer and researcher on nationalism. Smith’s concept of ethnosymbolism was often used to justify the central role of the Belarusian language in shaping a mature nation. He notes, however, that in the case of Belarus, one cannot speak about Smith’s “ethnia” based on ethnic memory, common myths and symbols. In the Soviet times, collective memory became a notion of ideology, not ethnic tradition. Th e Belarusian language, after 200 years of Russifi cation, ceased to be a transmitter of memory. Martynovich concludes that Smith’s theory is unable to describe the Soviet ethnia, from which most present-day Belarusians originate. More relevant to Belarus is the theory of the American historian and political scientist Benedict Anderson, who analysed the creation of national ties in the new states. His vision is free from ethnicism. For the nation to be created, three factors are needed: a census, a map and a museum. In Belarus, there was neither a language nor an ethnicity, as in the case of the United States, New Zealand, Australia or Latin America. Martynovich fi nds this mechanism adequate to describe the Belarusian reality. Th at is why he concludes that “the nation won’t die without the language.” To say more, he fi nds the sponsoring of the museum of the Belarusian statehood by the state in line with Anderson’s ideas to strengthen the consolidation of consciousness. 88 Opinion and Analysis Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity

Linguistic codes Like Maksymiuk, Martynovich argues that the content of cultural texts is more important for shaping the identity than their linguistic codes. He sadly concludes that in the past 15 years, most Belarusian-language publications were about the language itself. Martynovich admits that what Belarusians need today is a novel that would relate to their lives, which would tell a story “about love and betrayal, about life and death in this country”. He has said that he used Russian to write Paranoia because he found it the most suitable for this type of text (his subsequent novel, on rediscovering roots, was written in Belarusian). Martynovich explains he uses linguistic codes like diff erent types of paint, depending on the eff ect he wishes to achieve. For some, Russian is more adequate; for others, it is Belarusian only. Th e value of his article is that he has added some theoretical construction to what Maksymiuk touched upon and called for taking down some of the “holiness” of the Belarusian narrative, stripping it of unnecessary pathos and bringing it closer to the people’s thoughts and needs. In subsequent discussions between Maksymiuk and Martynovich on Radio Svoboda (June 2013), the two authors went further with a new dimension of the Belarusian identity. Th e latter presented his and Maksymiuk’s thesis that young people who consciously use Belarusian among themselves don’t feel any complexes against Russian. Th ey are driven by very diff erent motives than the members of the revivalist generation of the 1980s and 1990s. “A new generation of Belarusian speakers has appeared. For them, the language is not something that makes you suff er, but is a question of fashion, a notion of a person’s quality, a notion that one is not a kalkhozan [peasant],” Martynovich said. Th e circle of people to which Martynovich belongs looks at the reality after the 1995 linguistic referendum diff erently than the generation of revivalists from the early 1990s. For the people who viewed the Belarusian language as the most important component of identity, it was a traumatic experience, an unexplainable defeat from which many have yet to recover. “In 1995, language was an attribute of the people with whom I couldn’t identify. It was an attribute of the revivalists who sympathise with Zianon Pazniak, whom I didn’t support at the time,” explains Martynovich as he describes his path to Belarusian identity. He doesn’t agree with the logic of “all or nothing”, and sees the calls to reverse history as unrealistic. He says for himself, and many others with a similar background, that language does not equate with the Belarusian National Front or the pain after electoral defeat. Today, the Belarusian language is an attribute of being in the know, or of savoir-faire. A Belarusian speaker is not a frustrated nationalist who lives surrounded by myths, but an educated, fashionable Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity Opinion and Analysis 89 person with whom one can speak. He or she is a member of the young elite, who intrigues and attracts with his or her appearance and behaviour. For the younger generation, language should be something to be relished, not something to be suff ered. Does this approach come with any visible eff ects? Martynovich says yes and gives the example of his latest novel Sphagnum (2013), which was written in Russian, but later excellently translated into Belarusian by Vytal Ryzhkou. While the electronic version of the book in Russian is available for a free download online, the Belarusian edition was only issued on a properly prepared, exclusive paper edition and is being sold. One is tempted to think that the paper version, which is more costly in terms of money and time, could never compete with the free PDF version. However, it appeared that the traditional book quickly became one of the most demanded Belarusian-language publications listed in the Belkniga catalogue. Th e most interesting new movement whose Today, a Belarusian speaker goal is to shape Belarusian identity is a society established five years ago called Budzma is not a frustrated nationalist Bielarusami (Let’s Be Belarusians). Its main who lives surrounded by quest is to make citizens more active, to make myths, but an educated, young people join the cultural circuit and to help with grassroots initiatives. It sticks to the fashionable person. promotion of the use of the Belarusian language among the young people at the core of its mission, but it doesn’t want to be identifi ed with any particular political opinion and doesn’t want to close the door on constructive cooperation with the authorities. Budzma promotes an open, modern idea of Belarusianness, which is meant to be attractive to young people and respond to their needs and expectations. It sees the community it is building as a community of open-minded, active citizens rather than based on a political element. Its primary tool is incentive, as in the title of one of the campaigns: “Culture makes life better”. Th e most successful project by Budzma is an annual festival of Belarusian-language advertisements, “Ad.Nak!” It promoted the use of Belarusian in marketing, proving that it can compete with Russian not by administrative orders, but by its attractive form and content. In a talk show-style debate organised by Budzma in November 2013, the identity of the city of Vitebsk was discussed. Th e participants of diff erent ages and professions took the Belarusian reality as a starting point: the lives of most Belarusians are now defi ned by the dynamics of living in the city. Vitebsk, as we understand from the debate, like Belarus as a whole, is not the same as it was 30 years ago. It has redefi ned itself and is in search of re-branding itself. Th e city must adapt to the changes in urban life, such as developing an infrastructure for bicycle traffi c. Th e 90 Opinion and Analysis Jędrzej Czerep, Redefi ning Identity

participants proposed local historical place names to be revived – not only in the street names, but also in the names of cafés and shops. Th e discussion became a brainstorming session about the creation of a new brand for Vitebsk with which people could really identify, a brand that combines history and its future potential. Budzma is an example of how to respect tradition, but also to give it an attractive form. Again, it shifts away from pathos and the “one and only option”, moving towards diversity and the issues which touch young people’s daily lives. Here, a conscious Belarusian is a leader of the local community, an organiser, someone who knows all the novelties and who feels comfortable in the modern world. Belarusian self-consciousness evolves and dynamically adapts to the changes of the surrounding world. Th e type of the Belarusian identity that is being chosen by many young people today places diﬀ erent accents than that promoted by the revivalist generation (and its descendants), who remember the Soviet Union and were active in the Belarusian movement in the early 1990s. Th e future will only tell if this new approach succeeds.

Jędrzej Czerep is a Polish journalist and international relations expert. He specialises in Eastern Europe.

ADVERTISEMENT Between Collaboration and Conﬂ ict

ANDRZEJ POCZOBUT

In Belarus, there is an economic crisis; there is social discontent; there are trade unions, but there are no worker protests. Why haven’t the trade unions become the main agent of change and social resistance in Belarus?

In December 2011, around 400 workers of a Belarusian company called Granit, located in the southern city of Mikashevichy, announced that they would leave the offi cial Federation of the Trade Unions of Belarus (FPB) and create a cell of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union. Granit is a state-owned company involved in chipping and gravel extraction. It employs around 3,000 people. In the small town of Mikashevichy, Granit is the most important employer. Nearly every family has a member who is either working for Granit now or has worked there in the past. Th at is why nobody could stay indiff erent to what had happened. What’s more, this local confl ict, which took place because of the deterioration of working conditions and pay decreases, soon became an event with national implications.

The loyalists and the rebels

In 2011, the Belarusian rouble lost almost three times its value to the US dollar. Inﬂ ation reached 108 per cent and the average income had fallen from around 500 dollars to 300 dollars. Th is situation led to discontent and numerous local strikes and protests throughout the country. Th e outraged employees at Granit decided then to set up an independent trade union in order to defend workers’ rights. Th e protest was led by a driver named Aleh Stachayevich. 92 Opinion and Analysis Andrzej Poczobut, Between Collaboration and Conﬂ ict

At fi rst, the authorities made some concessions to the workers. Salaries were increased and changes were made in the management structure. Permission to register the trade union as an independent organisation, however, was not given. With time, the majority of the workers were also threatened and forced to return to the offi cial FPB. In the months that followed, the protest leaders were, for various reasons, laid off . By 2013, not a single one of them worked for the company. Naturally, the fi rst to be sacked was Stachayevich. Th e Mikashevichy story is quite common Th e workers’ movement, in Belarus. Acting in this way, the regime of like any other Belarusian Alyaksandr Lukashenka is able to keep control of the workers’ movement and prevent infl uential movement, is divided leaders from emerging. depending on its attitude “An independent workers’ movement is being towards Lukashenka. decimated with lay-off s and repressions, the authorities are aware of our potential and that is why they have been so determined to fi ght us,” Alexander Yaroshuk, the leader of the independent headquarters of the Belarusian Congress of Independent Trade Unions, said exclusively to New Eastern Europe. Th e workers’ movement, just like any other Belarusian social or political movement, is divided depending on its attitude towards Lukashenka. Hence, there are those who are “for” and those who are “against”. Formally, the strongest and (in terms of numbers) the largest organisation is the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FPB). Th e Federation supports Lukashenka. Its current leader, Leonid Kozik, is the former deputy head of the presidential administration. “Th e Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus has always supported and will continue to support Lukashenka’s ideas of building a socialist society. Th is idea was, for the fi rst time, announced to the world by nobody else but the Belarusian president himself and it is an idea with global importance,” Kozik claims. According to the estimations of the FPB leadership, the membership base of the federation is around four million, which means that 98 per cent of the working Belarusians are its members. Th e federation has units in all state-owned companies, as well as its own media outlets: the weekly Our Time (Наш Час) and the radio station Th e New Radio (Новае радыё). It even has its own university, “MISTO” (Международный университет “МИТСО”). Another Belarusian organisation gathering independent trade unions is the Belarusian Independent Congress of Democratic Trade Unions. In its ranks, it unites the Belarusian Independent Trade Union, the Belarusian Free Trade Union, the Belarusian Trade Union of the Radio-Electronic Industry, and the Belarusian Free Trade Union of Metal Workers. Andrzej Poczobut, Between Collaboration and Confl ict Opinion and Analysis 93

Th e membership base of all these trade unions is estimated at around 10,000 people. Th e leaders of the Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions have not hidden their negative attitude towards the authorities and cooperate with opposition movements and political parties. Divisions in the workers’ movements resulting from political preferences are nothing unusual. In the context of the authoritarian regime, however, they carry a very important meaning. By supporting the Lukashenka regime, the FPB agrees to the place and ways of operation assigned to the movement by the Belarusian president in his power system.

Lukashenka and the trade unions

Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who has been ruling Belarus with an iron fi st since 1994, likes to have everything under control. In the case of the trade unions, however, the issue is not only control over their organisational structures, but also additional instruments that the authorities use to pacify social discontent. Based on Lukashenka’s thinking, the trade unions are there to help him carry out his policies among the blue-collar workers, extinguish social discontent among the working class and mitigate all confl icts. Th e FPB has become such a tool in Lukashenka’s hands. In 2002, the president’s administration took control over the largest union headquarters. Upon Lukashenka’s direct and publically-made demand, the FPB 94 Opinion and Analysis Andrzej Poczobut, Between Collaboration and Confl ict

dismissed its then-president, Uladzimir Hancharyk. Hancharyk had challenged Lukashenka in 2001 when he submitted his candidature in the presidential elections. After the elections, which Lukashenka won decisively, the Belarusian president decided to put an end to the FPB’s independence. When a coordinated media attack led by the president’s administration aimed at breaking the federation internally and intimidating its activists had not brought about the expected results, the authorities threatened a takeover of the FPB’s property and restricting opportunities for fi nancially supporting the trade unions. Th is was a strong blow to the unions’ bureaucracy and led to massive lay-off s of full-time employees who were members of the FPB. As a result, Hancharyk resigned. Th e apolitical Based on Lukashenka’s Franco Vitko led the organisation for a short thinking, the trade unions period, but was quickly replaced by Leonid Kozik who came straight out of the president’s are there to help him carry administration (where he held the position of out his policies. deputy head and was one of the coordinators of the attacks on the trade unions). When talking to the unionists Lukashenka said directly: “In the process of renewal we can include you in the system of the state power … We don’t have a ruling party and that’s why the trade unions could partially play the same role which was once played by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.” Eleven years have passed since that moment, and it is now quite clear that Lukashenka’s plan has been successful. Th e FPB has become an obedient tool for the authorities. In 2011, Kozik came up with an initiative to award Lukashenka with the Nobel Prize in economics. In his opinion, the Belarusian leader had deserved the award for his extraordinary success in developing the Belarusian economy. Th e timing of Kozik’s initiative, however, coincided with an unprecedented collapse of the economy in Belarus; and workers’ strikes were breaking out in diff erent parts of the country. Th e main task of the FPB at that time was to mitigate the reactions of the workers. “It is quite obvious that the federation is not independent and it cannot be called a trade union. Its task is to manipulate the workers as the authorities are aware of the power of the workers,” claims Yaroshuk. Logically, it would seem that a situation where the pro-Lukashenka trade unions are clearly interested in only servicing the government and not defending the workers’ rights would create the right conditions for independent trade unions to gather strength. However, this has not happened in Belarus. Th e offi cial unions’ membership, and consequently its infl uence among the workers, is only growing. And the Belarusian authorities continue to nurture the offi cial union as well. Andrzej Poczobut, Between Collaboration and Confl ict Opinion and Analysis 95

Lukashenka has always seen an independent workers movement as a threat, and rightly so. Belarus still has many large state-owned enterprises inherited from the Soviet Union including factories with tens of thousands of employees. Th at is why anyone who has been trying to organise outside the pro-Lukashenka FPB is treated like a public enemy, with all its consequences. Lukashenka demonises unionists operating outside the FPB trying to create independent trade unions with names like “a ﬁ fth column” or “traitors”. “A worker is aware of the fact that membership in an independent trade union can lead to dismissal. Th ere are many similar cases. Th is is exactly the reason why we can’t see an increase in the number of members of the independent unions,” explains Lukashenka. Practically, there is no cooperation between the FPB and the independent trade unions. Th ey treat each other as competition or even political enemies. Kozik has even claimed that “Europe is paying over 100 dollars for [workers] to leave our Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus and join the independent unions.” Alexander Bukhovstau, a veteran of the independent workers’ movement, counters by saying: “Th e Federation is only an extension of the presidential administration which is being used to manipulate the workers and lie to them.”

Posthumous children of the system

According to the results of a September 2013 opinion poll carried out by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), every fourth Belarusian admits that in the last three months his or her material situation has worsened. “Social tension is constantly increasing in Belarus, and it is quite clear that the authorities have no strategy on how to get out of the crisis. I believe that it is the workers who will become the power which will eventually change the situation in Belarus,” Yaroshuk says. Th e example of the Polish Solidarność (Solidarity movement), an independent trade union which led to the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, has for years been an inspiration for the Belarusian unionists who are not losing their hope that, sooner or later, a similar change will take place in Belarus. Th ey are waiting for the patience of the Belarusian workers to end. Th en, they will rise up and the wave of discontent will sweep Lukashenka and his authoritarian regime away. Th is optimism, however, is not shared by Valery Karbalevich, a political scientist with the Strategy analytical centre. “In Belarus there are no trade unions in the western understanding of the word. Th e FPB is a state structure that cannot be called a trade union as its goals are very 96 Opinion and Analysis Andrzej Poczobut, Between Collaboration and Conﬂ ict

diff erent. Independent trade unions are, indeed, trade unions but they are so weak and barely exist that they can’t mobilise people to protest in defence of their own rights,” Karbalevich said exclusively for New Eastern Europe. Karbalevich admits that social tension is indeed increasing and yet he does not see any greater chances for an increase of the infl uence of the trade unions. “Th e example of the Polish Solidarity does not necessarily need to be repeated here. In each country changes take place in their own way. In Czechoslovakia, for example, it was the intelligentsia that played the role of motor for the Velvet Revolution. Authoritarian regimes fell like a house of cards and it is impossible to make a prognosis what specifi cally will push a nation to protest. For example the Arab Spring was started with an act of self-immolation by a small entrepreneur in Tunisia. How will things turn out in Belarus? I don’t think that as of today anybody knows,” Karbalevich admits. “When we started our protest, the monthly salary In Belarus there are in Granit was around three million roubles (an no trade unions in the equivalent of around 320 US dollars). Today a driver western understanding makes around 17 million roubles (an equivalent of 1,800 US dollars) and they all know that this is a result of the word. of our protests,” says Aleh Stachayevich. Today, the would-be leader of the independent trade union in Granit does not work. Together with his closest colleagues, he was laid off . Other workers, despite feeling sorry for them, did nothing to defend them. Some were scared, others trusted the propaganda message that the unionists had been bought in by the West and are now getting big money. None of those who were laid-off in Mikashevichy have been able to fi nd new work; not even blue-collar jobs. But none of them has broken down. Each of them manages somehow. One left for Russia, another found a job in a diff erent city, others try their chances in business. Stachayevich, even though he is not working for Granit, still keeps in touch with the workers and follows what’s been going on with the company. “I don’t regret anything. Our example showed to all workers in Belarus that it is possible to force the authorities to concede; and that success is possible. And even though it is true that we have not yet completed our fi ght and an independent trade union has not been established in Granit, I believe that, sooner or later, things will turn our way,” Stachayevich says.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Andrzej Poczobut is a Belarusian and Polish journalist and a member of the Polish minority in Belarus. He is also a foreign correspondent for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. ADVERTISEMENT

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98 In Search of One Voice

ALENA ZUIKOVA

Change in Belarus will only become possible with the full participation of the civil society in national decision-making. But getting to this point is not an easy task. It requires civil society organisations to consolidate and become a respectable counterpart to the national authorities and external actors.

Year after year, Belarus receives the lowest scores on various indices measuring diff erent dimensions of democracy, despite all the eff orts and resources that western countries invest in democratisation. Th e absence of any positive dynamics leads some to say that Belarus is not only a backward country, but an incurable case and it is hopeless to infl uence the situation. We adhere to the opposite point of view, which may seem provocative: Belarus is one of the most modern countries in the world. By this provocative point, we mean that Belarus is far from being backward. On the contrary, the fact that Belarus appears on the bottom of indices concerning rights and freedoms, corruption and economic reforms (but at the same time remains surprisingly sustainable) shows that the Belarusian regime represents the most advanced challenge for the international community. Consequently, it means that there are no pre-made models available to solve the problems in Belarus. Furthermore, it is impossible to approach Belarus as a well-known and easily understandable case. Only innovative solutions should be applied to the Belarusian situation.

Two strategies

In the Eastern Partnership region, Belarus is the least developed country in almost all indices of Europeanisation and democracy development. Even according to technical criteria, Belarus is the furthest country from the European Union among the six partners. Th e EU and Belarus have not signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Belarus does not participate in the bilateral dimension 100 Opinion and Analysis Alena Zuikova, In Search of One Voice

of the Eastern Partnership programme and there are no negotiations on visa liberalisation. Th e case of EU-Belarus relations reveals the weaknesses of European policy in the region, which are partly masked by democratic “overtures” in other countries. Th e European Neighbourhood Policy stands on the same grounds as its enlargement policy does, where the “more for more” principle implicitly means the interest of the partner countries in cooperation, democratic reforms and integration with the EU. However, there is no unconditional European Th e consolidation of civil orientation among the Eastern Partnership society in Belarus is the countries, as opposed to the countries that passport to success. entered the EU in 2004. EU-Belarus relations most vividly demonstrate that the European Neighbourhood Policy approach is not well adapted to the political situation in the region. Th e “failures” of European integration in other countries (selective justice and the Tymoshenko case in Ukraine; relations between Armenia and the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan; ambivalent development trends in the Southern neighbourhood) prove just that. Regarding the indices of rights, freedoms and democracy in Belarus, the absence of any positive dynamic means that the Belarusian government does not use the results of such rankings for “error correction” – there are no reforms implemented to improve the situation in these spheres. According to the CIVICUS Enabling Environment Index, in 2013 Belarus ranked 93 out of 109 countries. Th e CIVICUS Index shows that the main problems of the civil society in Belarus lay in the sphere of its relations with the government. Belarus ranked 107 in governance where such things as civil society infrastructure, policy dialogue, political rights and freedoms, media freedom, freedom of association, legal framework for NGOs, the rule of law etc. are taken into consideration. Th e deplorable level of democracy and conditions of the civil society in Belarus are well known both by external actors working in Belarus and by Belarusians themselves. However, the stakeholders choose diff erent strategies to approach the situation. Among civil society organisations in Belarus two main strategies dominate: the “grassroots strategy” and the “structural reforms strategy”. Supporters of both approaches agree that the status quo is unacceptable, but the grassroots strategy is based on the principle that “constant dropping wears away a stone” and trust that small concrete improvements will fi nally lead to large-scale changes. Organisations acting in this paradigm most often have concrete benefi ciaries who even can be known personally: these are small groups of people (or even individuals) who received any kind of help – problems solved with housing and public utilities, improvement of infrastructure in their neighbourhood, organisation Alena Zuikova, In Search of One Voice Opinion and Analysis 101 of any awareness-raising or educational events etc. Th e grassroots strategy solves problems of individual people, but it does not challenge systemic issues or address the reason why such problems arise. It only makes adjustments to the imbalances in the functioning of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime. Ideologically, however, it states that such activities in the long term will contribute to a change in political culture and by consequence erode the grounds on which the regime stands. It should be mentioned that such an approach dominates among international organisations, in the offi ces of the European development programmes, in the approaches of main donors and, absolutely, the majority of Belarusian civil society organisations. Th e strategy of the EuroBelarus International Consortium is very diff erent from the approach described above. It is based on the understanding that the solution of any problems existing to date in Belarusian society is only possible when the framework for civil society is altered. As for changing the framework, it only becomes Th e democratisation of Belarus possible with the full participation of civil cannot be performed via society in national decision-making where its counterpart is the government. Certainly, we bilateral relations between understand that the Belarusian government donors and the government. is not interested in democratisation and will not introduce democratic standards and extend civil society participation on its own. In a sense, the Belarusian government has to be forced to do so under social pressure and via public dialogue. Th erefore, in our work we tend to emancipate civil society; it has to get out of its subordinate situation and has to be cured of its deformation. Civil society needs to take its equal place in the development of Belarus along with the national authorities and external development actors.

Consolidation

Accordingly, with such a strategy it is accepted that every organisation works in its specifi c fi eld – the rights of people with disabilities, women’s rights, rights of employers and employees, informal education, the protection of environment, etc. However, its activities have to be directed in such a way that it not only aff ects offi cial policy by the government, but transforms its particular fi eld according to the standards to which the organisation adheres. In Belarus, the government has a monopoly almost everywhere and our task should be to de-monopolise life. In order to achieve our goals, our eff orts have to be carried out at both the national and international levels. In Belarus, the consolidation of civil society, which would allow it to become a respectable counterpart in the dialogue, is the passport to 102 Opinion and Analysis Alena Zuikova, In Search of One Voice

success. Th e creation of the National Platform of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum was an important step towards this consolidation. Th e National Platform has been established as a communication space to coordinate the eff orts of dozens of civil society organisations and to build a common position in order for Belarusian civil society to speak with one voice inside the country and on the international level. Certainly, this has not eliminated confl icts, contradictions or discords between its varied members on the further development of the platform. Nevertheless, the National Platform has entrenched itself as a legitimate nationwide space to initiate actions, defend common interests of civil society groups in Belarus and infl uence important political decisions. Obviously, where there is brutal Th e Belarusian authorities have oppression of any form of independent civic undertaken many attempts to activities, the place for a national platform is limited. Building this space, however, substitute the civil society with has been a huge step for Belarusian civil fi ctitious structures. society. It has opened new perspectives for the development and the extension of infl uence on new issues. In principle, the national platform has led to overcoming the exclusion of the civil society and citizens from political decision-making. Th e tasks for civil society on the international level arise from the same statement that Belarusian authorities are not interested in democratic reforms. Consequently, the democratisation of Belarus cannot be performed via bilateral dialogue between donors (the EU, the US, Poland, Sweden, Germany, etc.) on one side and the Belarusian government on the other. More than 15 years of unsuccessful attempts to do so prove this. In order to make this process successful, to make it respond to the interests of society, Belarus’ international relations should be “de-statised”. According to the principles fi xed in the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Agreement (2011), international relations must involve national non-state actors – the Parliament, local authorities and civil society organisations. Only together will these stakeholders have the right and ability to defi ne national development strategies.

Certain obstacles

One of the main fi elds we focus our eff orts on is the Eastern Policy of the European Union and European countries, since these are the donors most actively contributing to the development of Belarus. Recently, the European Neighbourhood Policy has been giving more and more opportunities to civil society. Still, there is a long way to go before reaching a full-fl edged multi-stakeholder dialogue. In Alena Zuikova, In Search of One Voice Opinion and Analysis 103 order to implement this model, we have to overcome certain obstacles such as the narrow-mindedness of European politicians, counter-measures by the Belarusian government and the unwillingness of many Belarusian organisations to participate in the dialogue. New and unprecedented opportunities for the civil society became available in 2009 when the EU launched the Eastern Partnership programme. Unlike the institutional framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership includes a number of parallel platforms for cooperation among diff erent stakeholders: Summits at the governmental level; ministerial meetings; thematic platforms for high-level offi cial meetings; Euronest for the parliaments; CORLEAP for the local authorities, etc. Following this logic, the civil societies of the partner countries have its own special space – the Civil Society Forum. Originally, it was designed for horizontal thematic cooperation and organised in four thematic groups according to four thematic platforms of intergovernmental cooperation. But already during the fi rst Forum in 2009 in Brussels, the need arose to institute the national dimension by creating national platforms for each partner country. Th e initial resistance to the idea of national platforms by the European Commission and the governments of some partner countries was alleviated by 2011. Relying on the national platforms, the Civil Society Forum has become more sustainable and has received more political infl uence within the Eastern Partnership programme. As for Belarusian civil society, it creates an institutionalised voice regarding European policy towards our country through the Forum and the National Platform. Th e Belarusian authorities have undertaken a number of attempts to substitute true civil society in the framework of the Eastern Partnership by fi ctitious structures controlled by the government. In 2009-2010 the Belarusian National Platform had to resist attempts made to substitute it with the “public consultative council” and the so-called “Nation-wide Platform of NGOs” under the auspices of the presidential administration. In fact, the authorities tried to build a vertical hierarchy of all civil society in Belarus and deprive it of its initiative at national level. Th e National Platform member organisations by their consolidated actions were not only able to defend their independence, but also block any further attempts of such simulation. In 2012, Štefan Füle, the Commissioner for EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, launched a new initiative called European Dialogue on Modernisation with Belarusian Society. Th is initiative is completely in line with the multi-stakeholder dialogue model. It is a platform for a round-table dialogue between representatives of the Belarusian authorities (under the condition of the release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners), the opposition, the civil society and the EU. Understanding 104 Opinion and Analysis Alena Zuikova, In Search of One Voice

the huge potential of the Dialogue on Modernisation since the very beginning, we have been making every eff ort to turn it into an effi cient tool to modernise Belarus. However, the Dialogue has become an exercise for experts rather than a format for cooperation between diff erent socio-political forces. Th ere are two main reasons why this is the case. Firstly it was the insistence of the European Commission and the European External Action Service that governmental experts be involved in the dialogue at the technical level. According to this thinking, it was assumed that any alternative political forces would not support the participation of the government, even at the technical level. Th erefore, it would be better to eliminate the political level of the Dialogue and keep interactions between experts free from politics. Secondly, the Belarusian civil society and political opposition have shown that they are not a consolidated actor and could not lobby a consistent position regarding the development of the Dialogue on Modernisation. Th e eff orts of the National Platform acting alone to transform the institutional framework of the Dialogue had not been suffi cient and could not stop the trend to limit the Dialogue to just an expert panel. Much work has been done and some improvements have taken place for Belarusian civil society. We still have a long way to go, however, to achieve any real change in the country. Th e transformation of Belarus, like any closed society, is not an easy task and its success depends on the open-mindedness and creativity of all stakeholders involved.

Alena Zuikova is the representative to Brussels for the EuroBelarus International Consortium and a policy analyst at the Centre for European Transformation. 105

ADVERTISEMENT THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTRE The European Solidarity Centre (ECS) is an institution of a new form: it is not only a museum, but also an educational and scientiﬁc establishment aimed at providing a greater understanding of Solidarność and the anti-communist movements in Poland and Europe. The objective of its founders was to create a Central European agora, a meeting place for citizens, who feel responsible for the development of democracy in Europe. The European Solidarity Centre supports reﬂection on the state of an open society, the role of a country, the identity of democratic communities and the issue of social justice.

ECS was created in 2007 by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage, the City of Gdańsk, the self- governing body of the Pomorskie Voivodeship, NSZZ Solidarność and the Solidarity Centre Foundation. The ﬂoor space of the newly-built building of ECS covers nearly 26 thousand square meters. A permanent exhibition dedicated to the history of Solidarność will be the heart of the centre. There will also be a library and reading room, a media library, archives, a scientiﬁc-research centre, an educational training centre, creative youth workshops as well as space for special exhibitions.

ADVERTISEMENT THE MISSION of the European Solidarity Centre We aspire to ensure the ideals of Solidarność – democracy, an open solidary society and the culture of dialogue – maintain a modern perspective and appeal. We want to preserve, in the memory of Poles and Europeans, the experience of Solidarność as a peaceful revolution, so that Solidarność, throughout European democracies, is remembered as a key part of the story of the establishment of Europe. We want Solidarność to be a source of inspiration and hope for those who do not live in open and democratic societies. THE WEIGHT of responisbility Iryna Sheiko-Ivankiv, 25 years old, works at the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in Kiev in the Ukraine. She is writing her PHD thesis on solidarity and is also a social activist. - The Solidarity Academy in Gdańsk uncovered some very important details of the Polish road to real freedom, which I was previously unaware of. Having taken part in the workshop dedicated to leadership, I have begun to feel the weight of responsibility of a social leader. Thanks to the Solidarity Academy my understanding of Solidarność has broadened not only theoretically, but also with a view to its practical application.

THIS IS WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT Adam Pypan, an 12 year-old pupil from primary school No 12 in Elbląg, last year winner of the ‘My Little Solidarity’ competition. Solidary means that everyone gets together To clean, play and help, With the diﬃculties we do not tackle on our own. Because when people love each other, they give solidary support to each other, And this is what it is all about, that solidary are the old and the young.

UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE of Solidarność Basil Kerski, director of ECS -For the past ﬁve years ECS has carried out an extensive programme promoting the heritage of Solidarność throughout Poland and Europe. I feel that the most important task of ECS is to work with the young generation. We will not reach this generation through forceful monologue; instead we need to undertake arduous educational work. ADVERTISEMENT 108 2014 ECS moves into the new building The building is currently under construction close to the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard Workers, the historical gate No 2 of the Gdańsk Shipyard and the BHP Hall where on 31 August 1980, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee signed an agreement with the communist government in Poland (PRL). The heart of the building will house a permanent exhibition, dedicated to the phenomenon of Solidarność and the changes which it inﬂuenced in the Central and Eastern Europe.

ADVERTISEMENT Challenging Cooperation on the Local Level

MIROSLAV KOBASA

Th e success of civil society organisations in Belarus depends upon many factors. One signiﬁ cant factor is the role of the local authorities in accepting an organisation and its projects. But interaction is possible and can lead to some positive examples of cooperation.

According to the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Belarus, on April 1st 2013 our country had 2,487 registered NGOs, including 229 international, 691 national, and 1,567 local NGOs; 31 unions (associations), and 139 foundations. About 40 per cent of them are sport- and leisure-oriented organisations, and their work does not consist of social or political activities. Unfortunately, there have been serious problems in the relations between the local authorities and NGOs from the very beginning of civil society in Belarus. During this short time, the relationship went through a period of cooperation and a period of mutual enmity – during which the highest echelons of centralised power stigmatised NGOs as “agents of the West”, and the “enemies of the Belarusian people”. Nowadays, the relationship remains controversial and problematic.

Total control

Th e problems are largely due to the rigid centralisation of power in the country and the resulting total dependence of local authorities on the centre. Centralised, politically-motivated decisions fall on NGOs and aim to retaining total control over them, opposing the development of civil society and minimising its impact on the nation’s social and political processes. Th e attitude of the centre towards NGOs is a key issue, both for local authorities and for the NGOs. Local authorities willing 110 Opinion and Analysis Miroslav Kobasa, Challenging Cooperation on the Local Level

to cooperate with the NGOs risk being punished by the central authorities; while NGOs collaborating with the authorities risk their image and will be perceived as collaborators with the dictatorial regime. Beyond this, there are several other problems negatively infl uencing the cooperation of local authorities and NGOs. Th e main ones include: registration of projects, the lack of competition among NGOs, areas of cooperation and the politicisation of relationships. According to national legislation, all It is very diffi cult to fi nd a balance international funding allocated by the between the interests of the local European Commission due to receipt authorities and that of an NGO. of foreign donations should be offi cially registered. Not only is the registration procedure time-consuming, but it is also used by the authorities as a fi lter for ideas, views and sponsors. If an NGO, in the opinion of the registering organisation, belongs to the fi eld of the democratic opposition or its activity is in confl ict with the interests and attitudes of the current government, the project will not be registered. Even projects involving local authorities among their partners experience trouble with registration. In this case, the standard reason of refusal to register the project is its “unreasonableness” without any further specifi c explanation. As previously mentioned, there are 1,567 NGOs in Belarus with local status. Th is means that on average every region can count on 270 NGOs, and every local area (an average area of 1,750 square kilometres with 65,000 inhabitants) has only 15 NGOs. Th is is defi nitely too low, and, again, one of the reasons is the registration process. Not only is registering a project an issue, NGOs can also be refused registration under any pretext. As a result, de facto there is no competition at the local level among NGOs which negatively aff ects the quality of their proposed projects and services. Furthermore, citizens have very little information about the activities of NGOs. Th ey have diffi culties accessing media, and the NGOs’ lack of skills and motivation in the dissemination of information about their activities does not help.

Cooperation

Local authorities come in contact and interact with NGOs only on non-socio- political issues such as the development of small and medium businesses, animal welfare, environmental protection, historical and cultural issues, and combating drug abuse, HIV infection, human traffi cking, etc. It is also very diffi cult to fi nd a balance between the interests of the local authorities and NGOs because they use diff erent approaches in the evaluation of the projects’ usefulness and eff ectiveness. Local authorities are more interested in the infrastructure components of the project Miroslav Kobasa, Challenging Cooperation on the Local Level Opinion and Analysis 111

(construction, investment, equipment), while NGOs tend to focus on intangible assets such as the development of democracy, the protection of the rights and interests of citizens, the transfer of knowledge to improve citizen participation in the decision-making process at the local level or improving the quality of services. If we look at the local authorities, there is no doubt that the head of the local authorities carries a lot of weight – so his or her worldview, life experience, management style, ability to make decisions and take responsibility for them, and his perception and understanding of the importance and role of civil society will strongly impact any possible cooperation. On the side of the NGOs, their loyalty to the current government, together with an evaluation of the partners and sponsor organisations, is crucial. As a result of this approach, many projects are blocked by the authorities. Th e problems mentioned above do not imply that interaction between the local Th e local leader’s worldview and authorities and NGOs is impossible. Th ere life experience strongly impacts are, in fact, positive examples of on-going any possible cooperation with an collaboration. Of course, successful joint NGO at the local level. projects were and are being implemented only in areas in which the authorities do not perceive as sensitive. It is not the same case for a variety of key issues for NGOs and citizens, including human rights, of the abolition of the death penalty, freedom of the media, access to and the free ﬂ ow of information, the development of local self-government or an independence of the judicial system. However, interaction and cooperation give both parties extremely valuable experience, improve their mutual understanding, build conﬁ dence and demonstrate the desire of both parties to cooperate. Maybe this is exactly what the central government fears. We could reach a point where local authorities and NGOs will understand that working in partnership is necessary and a practice that takes place in all democratic countries. It may turn out that the only obstacle to better cooperation between NGOs and the local authorities in Belarus is the current political system.

Miroslav Kobasa is president of the Lev Sapieha Foundation, one of the oldest civil society organisations in Belarus. The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration

ANNA MARIA DYNER

Th e participation of Belarus in Russian integration projects was meant to be a panacea to at least to some of the country’s economic problems. Th e plan of the Belarusian authorities was simple: make money by getting cheap resources from Russia and having them processed by Belarusian ﬁ rms. Integration with the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, however, had several conditions written in the ﬁ ne print.

Th e diffi culties that have recently been faced by the Belarusian economy are primarily of a fi nancial nature. In part, they have been caused by the global fi nancial crisis, but are also a result of a lack of structural reforms. Th ese reforms are necessary to improve the functioning of unprofi table Belarusian enterprises. When adopting plans for economic development in 2013, the Belarusian government anticipated an 8.5 per cent increase in the GDP and a 12 per cent increase in infl ation. However, it is already quite clear that these predictions will not be reached. In the fi rst half of 2013, infl ation stood at 7 per cent and it was predicted that by the end of the year it could exceed 15 per cent. Th e World Bank forecast is also not the most optimistic, anticipating a mere one per cent increase in Belarus’s GDP in 2013. Th e artifi cial propulsion of the GDP growth in order to execute the government’s plan also meant that the vast majority of Belarusian production has remained warehoused. One way of solving the problem could be another devaluation of the Belarusian rouble – a situation that the National Bank of Belarus claims it wants to avoid. However, these reassurances are not convincible to the Belarusian society which is increasingly storming currency exchange bureaus to purchase US dollars or euros. Anna Maria Dyner, The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration Opinion and Analysis 113

Ailing economy In contrast to the fi rst half of 2012, Belarus has also been facing greater problems with its trade balance. Th ere are no indications that this could change in the near future, mainly since the eff ects of the 2011 rouble devaluation have already faded away. Between January-August 2013, the export of Belarusian goods, when compared to the same period in 2012, decreased by 22.7 per cent and imports decreased by 10.4 per cent. As a result, Belarus’s foreign trade defi cit amounted to two billion US dollars, approximately 2.8 per cent of the country’s annual GDP. If this is added to the lack of profi ts (compared to the previous year) from sales of petroleum products as well as the Structural reforms in the need for regular transfers to the Russian budget of custom fees for petrol sold abroad, it turns out Belarusian economy are that the defi cit for current operations amounts to becoming increasingly three billion US dollars. To save the situation, the necessary. Belarusian government has been trying to reduce its currency reserves, which have fallen to 5.5 billion US dollars. Th is corresponds to merely 1.6 months of imported goods, whilst a three-month level is considered safe. Th e ineff ectiveness of the Belarusian economy is another problem, with the private sector generating only 30 per cent of the GDP (as compared to, for example, Poland’s 70 per cent) and state-owned enterprises suff ering from a lack of good management allowing them adapt their production to market needs. Another ailment is “cross-subsidisation”, which means revenue transfers from profi table enterprises to those that are generating losses. Th e best example here is the chemical sector supporting collective farms. Th e damage is doubled: the profi ts cannot be invested and the enterprises, which in a free market economy would either be restructured or liquidated, are kept on life support. In addition, the growth of Belarus’s economy is also limited by such factors as: low productivity, insuffi cient development of the fi nancial sector and a lack of geographical diversifi cation in the structure of exports. Nearly 75 per cent of all Belarusian goods are sent to only fi ve countries; offi cially Belarus has trade relations with 170 countries. As if that were not enough, the 2013 budget revenues were overestimated and the government ran out of money for social spending before the year’s end. Th is, in turn, could mean a sharp deterioration in the society’s fi nancial situation. Structural reforms are therefore becoming more and more necessary. Th e International Monetary Fund insists on them, implying that without such reforms Belarus could not count on another loan programme. Th e authorities in Minsk, however, have been postponing reform year after year, each time hoping to that they will manage on their own and, ultimately, counting on aid from Russia. 114 Opinion and Analysis Anna Maria Dyner, The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration

Eurasian economic integration Even a few years ago it seemed that the solution to the majority of Belarus’s economic problems would be the country’s membership in the Common Economic Space (CES) with Russia. Th e decision to join this economic integration project together with Russia and Kazakhstan was also enforced by the 2011 economic crisis as well as the need to obtain cheap energy resources. Among the biggest advantages of Belarus’s membership in the CES is the reduction of prices for Russian energy resources. Th e numbers here speak for themselves: oil prices fell by approximately 30 US dollars per tonne while natural gas by 100 US dollars per 1000 cubic metres. It is also estimated that in a gas contract for 2012-2015 Belarus gained 7.5 billion US dollars, a signifi cant amount for its economy. And it is mainly thanks to this reduction that the Belarusian economy could overcome the 2011 crisis. At the same time, however, Belarus has stopped importing energy resources (mainly crude oil) from other countries, which, in turn, has led to its increased dependence on Russia. Another benefi t to Belarus being Belarus’s economic situation, as in the Customs Union and the CES well as open borders with Russia, is the opening of borders within the framework of the customs union. have led to the mass emigration of Although in each of the fi rst two years the Belarusian labour force. of the functioning of the Customs Union trade between the three founding countries increased by approximately 30 per cent; in 2012 (which was also the fi rst year of the CES) it only increased by 8.7 per cent. Th e most important export commodity for all three countries in the Customs Union were mineral resources, which accounted for 77.9 per cent of Kazakhstan’s exports, 72.4 per cent of Russian exports and 55.9 per cent of Belarusian exports. Th is structuring of exports could be dangerous, particularly at a time when commodity prices for raw materials (crude oil, gas, chemical fertilisers) are falling very quickly. It has also led to a situation where the eff ects of open borders have faded away very quickly. Economic integration with Russia and Kazakhstan will also have other consequences, namely the tightening of monetary policy, a reduction of public spending and decreased budget fi nancing for state enterprises. Th e situation is further complicated as from all three countries members of the CES Belarus is the least attractive for foreign investors, particularly because of Russia’s membership in the WTO and the close possibility of Kazakhstan’s accession. Th e CES, which ultimately will turn into a Eurasian Union (EaU), was created, in part, based on the European Union model. Even its “founding” documents contain direct references to the four European freedoms: movement of persons, services, goods and capital. It also anticipates an increasingly greater coordination among Anna Maria Dyner, The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration Opinion and Analysis 115 member countries in regards to their macro-fi nancial policies, which will eventually lead to the creation of a single currency. Indicators which were partially modelled on the EU requirements include: budget defi cit should not be greater than three per cent of the GDP, public debt no larger than 50 per cent, and the diff erence between the lowest and highest infl ation levels cannot exceed fi ve per cent. As a participant in the integration process, Belarus would also lose the opportunity to stimulate exports by devaluing its national currency. Th ere will also be a problem meeting the requirement of the public debt level. In July 2013, this indicator reached almost 20 billion dollars and exceeded 62 per cent of the GDP, well above the norm laid down in the CES. Belarus’s deteriorating economic situation as well as the open borders with Russia also have their own consequences on the emigration of the Belarusian labour force. Independent estimates suggest that each year approximately 150,000 people (three per cent of the working population) leave Belarus to look for work abroad. Russia is an attractive destination, as Belarusians do not need a work permit there nor are limited by language or cultural barriers. Th is trend will most likely continue in the coming years, mainly because of diff erences in earnings. Th e average Belarusian salary is an equivalent to 60 per cent of the average salary in Russia. Such a large diff erence will force the Belarusian authorities to increase pay, which is not proportionate to an increase in labour productivity. Not surprisingly, Belarusian enterprises continue losing their competitiveness. All in all, the profi ts from the Eurasian integration have already proved to be quite limited. Th ey could even be viewed as harmful in the long run. Th e seemingly benefi cial gain of cheap Russian raw materials has again delayed the implementation of essential reforms. Hence, the next challenge for the Belarusian authorities will be adjusting their economic policies to the framework of the Eurasian integration.

Quasi-membership

Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2012 also had an impact on Belarus and Kazakhstan. One can even say that the authorities of these two countries gained quasi-membership in the WTO because of Russia’s promotion eﬀ orts. Th is is because, since the very beginning, customs duties of the CES were adjusted to Russian customs, which consequently meant those required by the WTO. Th e lowering of customs barriers by Russia also resulted in an increased competition on the local market, which adversely aﬀ ected Belarusian enterprises. Th is is the situation that forced the authorities in Minsk to return to the negotiations with the WTO that had been launched in 1993 and later suspended for several times (mainly for political reasons). Th ey were resumed in May 2013 at the working 116 Opinion and Analysis Anna Maria Dyner, The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration

group level. Th is, however, does not mean that the negotiators were going to come across new challenges. Th e most problematic issue for Belarus will be the need to limit, or even completely eliminate, subsidies for state enterprises, especially in agriculture. Th e Belarusian government will also have to make changes in areas such as privatisation, competition policy and intellectual property rights, as well as provide mechanisms for equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors. For the WTO, it will also be important what role the Eurasian Economic Commission will play in shaping of Belarus’s foreign trade. Th e return of Belarus to talks with the WTO Contrary to expectations, suggests that the benefi ts of joining the WTO will the Eurasian Union may be greater than the costs of adjusting its economy. Th e long-term eff ect may be positive, as the majority become a curse for the of export-producing enterprises – particularly Belarusian government. to the Russian and Kazakh markets – will have to improve production in order to adapt to the requirements of increasing competition. Also, in case of a confl ict with any other country that is a member of the WTO, Belarus will be able to use the organisation’s existing framework for arbitration procedures. Importantly, for those within the current Belarusian government who are aware of the need for reforms, this could be a way of introducing the necessary macroeconomic reforms by using the WTO as a sort of “back door”.

Contrary to expectations

Looking at the current activities of the Belarusian authorities, it is clear that they are operating in a time horizon that extends until 2015, meaning the next presidential elections. Clearly, until that time, the government will do its best not to break the social contract with the Belarusian people, avoiding necessary but socially costly reforms such as privatisation and employment realignment. Th e year 2015 is also the projected date for the establishment of the Eurasian Union. Th e Union, which – contrary to expectations – may become a curse for the Belarusian government. First of all, the Belarusian authorities will have to fulﬁ l their integration obligations, which will increasingly force them to carry out reforms such as privatisation. A progressive dependency on Russia may prove to be no less painful. And the issue in question here is not only energy resources, but also the capital market (Russia is the largest foreign investor in Belarus and there is no indication that this will change in the near future). Anna Maria Dyner, The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration Opinion and Analysis 117

Clearly, Moscow does not pay for merely keeping Belarus in its sphere of infl uence. It also has its own interests in the country’s increasing economic dependency, and is eyeing a takeover of several Belarusian enterprises. Besides that, having infl uence over the Belarusian economy increases its ability to infl uence political activities. It is this scenario that should be the most worrisome for Belarusian leaders.

Translated by Gina Kuhn

Anna Maria Dyner is an analyst with the Polish Institute of International Aﬀ airs (PISM). Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus

ANDREI LIAKHOVICH

Relations with Belarus are not a high priority for the European Union. Th e majority of its policy is based on containing Russia’s inﬂ uence . Th e EU could have a greater impact on Belarus relations, but only if it wants to. For now, it seems to be perfectly satisﬁ ed with the status quo.

Relations with Belarus are not a pressing issue of EU foreign policy. Th e EU focuses its attention in Eastern European on its relations with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which have shown aspirations for EU membership in the future. While the EU has leverage over Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, it does not use it, as it fears pushing Belarus more towards Russia. Such fears are groundless. Lukashenka’s regime will not cross the dangerous line of integration with Russia under any circumstances.

A deferred issue

Th e EU is still going through a stage of inner formation. Discussions about the best model of power sharing among the EU bodies and the governments of its member states are an ongoing process. EU budget donors pay a heavy price for the participation of countries with troubled economies in the EU. Hence, the existence of signifi cant internal problems restricts the EU’s capacity to deal with foreign policy issues. Th e EU is composed of 28 countries which have not only common, but also diff erent foreign policy interests. For some large EU states (Italy, France and Spain), the important issues of foreign policy are relations with Mediterranean countries. Th e problems of Eastern Europe interest them to a lesser degree. Despite this, Andrei Liakhovich, Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus Opinion and Analysis 119 the EU can reach some consensus on issues of long-term foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. Th e EU knows which of its tools can have an effi cient impact on these countries. Belarus, however, has no aspirations to become an EU member and hence falls lower on the radar screen of EU foreign policy. What’s more, Belarus’s own foreign policy is more focused on relations with Russia. It participates in Russia’s integration projects such as the Union of Belarus and Russia, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community. When analysing EU policy towards Belarus, one can identify two goals. Th e fi rst goal is to ensure at Conventional wisdom least a formal independence of Belarus from Russia. says that the EU has no Not only Warsaw and Vilnius, but also Paris and Madrid would not want to see the Russian tricolour strategy towards Belarus. fl ag to the east of Brest. Lukashenka’s actions in this regard do not inspire signifi cant concern in the EU. Experts often debate the question: will Lukashenka’s regime continue to manoeuvre between Russia and the West or does Minsk’s foreign policy have only one vector - Russia? Belarus is not a constituent entity of the Russian Federation and will not become one in the future. Belarus does not recognise the independence of the separatist regions of Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). And, to the dismay of Russia, it participates in the Eastern Partnership programme at least formally. Belarus refuses to sell its major enterprises to Russian companies (the sale of Beltransgaz to Russia was under necessity taking into account the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipe line by Russia) and invites Western companies to do business with Belarus. Lukashenka tries to negotiate with Russia on his terms and to restore the foreign policy balance tilted after the presidential election of December 2010. Th e second goal of the EU towards Belarus is to ensure a reliable transit of goods and energy through the territory of Belarus and that it serves as a barrier in the way of illegal migration. Conventional wisdom says that the EU does not have a strategy towards Belarus. It is true that the EU is interested in the other countries of Eastern Europe, Ukraine in particular. Th e more steps that countries of the former Soviet Union, such as Ukraine (which is in doubt at the moment), Georgia and Moldova make towards the EU, the more reasons the EU will have to defer on its Belarusian aspect of foreign policy. Th e movement of these countries on the long and complex path of European integration keeps relations with Russia in check. Moscow has already made it clear that it will not easily give up on the countries that it is accustomed to seeing as its prey – the decision in Ukraine is clear evidence of that. 120 Opinion and Analysis Andrei Liakhovich, Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus

Status quo and limitations Obviously, the EU would like to see Belarus as a diff erent country without authoritarian rule. However, fundamentally, the status quo in relations with Belarus now satisfi es the EU. Th e EU speaks out against the “last dictator of Europe”. Human rights are violated in Belarus. Political prisoners are tortured. Elections became a “one-man show” a long time ago. However, the EU does not do enough to make any impact in order to change the situation in Belarus. Th e visa sanctions towards Lukashenka’s regime do not have any eff ect. Th ere is no question that the introduction and application of economic sanctions would deal a blow to Lukashenka’s regime, but EU policy towards Lukashenka is separated from its economic policy, limiting the possibility and application of any real sanctions that could be damaging. It goes without saying that sports are out Lukashenka artistically plays of politics. Minsk is preparing to host the World Hockey Championship in 2014. Th e on western fears of pushing authorities will try to make the World Hockey Belarus towards Russia. Championship look to the Belarusian laymen like a tournament for the prize of the President of Belarus. Lukashenka plays hockey. He will take part in the opening and closing ceremonies of the tournament. State media will surely point out that the “nonsense” about alleged political prisoners does impede real international cooperation. Belarus is a diffi cult and not a mainstream issue for the EU. As it is not a mainstream issue, the EU, as a rule, has rather a cursory view of what is happening in Belarus and the motives of actions of Lukashenka’s team. In the EU, it is widely believed that Belarus’s dependence on Russia will considerably and irreversibly increase in case of added pressure on the Lukashenka regime. In determining the degree of dependence on Russia, three factors are stressed: the high level of economic cooperation between Belarus and Russia; the participation of Belarus in Russian integration projects; and the fact that Russia recognises the results of elections in Belarus, which, to a certain extent, ensures political support for Lukashenka’s regime from some other countries. If one takes into account the economic factor, it is diffi cult to imagine that the Belarusian authorities are not a puppet of Russia. In June 2002, Putin said that for Russia, the most obvious option of development of integration with Belarus was for the latter to become a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. Other options are less obvious: the GDP of Belarus, as Putin noted, constitutes about three per cent of Russia’s GDP. Putin had also said that “fl ies should be separated from hamburgers”, i.e. the potential of Russia and Belarus should be considered from an economic point of view. Andrei Liakhovich, Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus Opinion and Analysis 121

In 2012, Russia’s share of the foreign trade turnover amounted to 47.4 per cent. Russia accounted for about 40 per cent of Belarusian exports and more than 50 per cent of its imports. Russia’s subsidies to Belarus through low prices on crude oil and gas amounted to about ﬁ ve billion US dollars, while Belarusian GDP was about 65 billion dollars. More than 40 per cent of Belarusian exports consist of exports of reﬁ ned oil products produced from Russian crude oil. Th e share of gas supplied from Russia amounts to more than 90 per cent in the fuel balance of Belarus.

Fears

Before 2001, it was widely believed in the West that Russia would follow the democratic path of development. Hans Georg Wieck, a highly experienced German diplomat and chairman of the OSCE Control and Monitoring Group in Belarus, said that the West should persuade Russia into exerting positive infl uence on Belarus. Doctor Putin, however, cured the West from the illness of treating Russia as a potentially democratic state. Th e West does not think that Russia can exert positive infl uence on Belarus anymore. However, the opinion that Russia, unlike the West, has leverage over Lukashenka is still common. Th e West fears pushing Belarus towards Russia. Lukashenka artistically plays on these fears. A decisive economic According to materials published on Wikileaks, policy with Belarus could the US and the EU estimated Belarus recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent a signifi cant as highly probable. To decrease Russia’s pressure on tool for the EU. this issue, the US and the EU used their infl uence in the IMF to provide Belarus with a credit of 3.5 billion dollars within a stand-by programme in 2008–2009. Th e fi rst round was paid to Belarus in January 2009. In February 2009, after a short break, Belarus once again became a country with political prisoners and repressions against the opposition as a commonplace practice. Th e Lukashenka administration gives the EU chills from time to time. Belarusian offi cials make claims about Belarus’s exit from the Eastern Partnership. Belarus threatens to redirect its cargo transit routes from Lithuanian and Latvian ports to Russian ports. Belarus also promises to deploy Russian Tactical Ballistic Missile Systems against Poland. Th e message is clear: the West must turn a blind eye on the human rights violations in Belarus in order to cooperate with Lukashenka. Russia indeed has leverage over Belarus. However, each time Russia applied this leverage (seizing gas supplies, cutting down on oil deliveries, introducing limitations on Belarusian exports during the “milk and meat trade wars”) and demanded that Lukashenka take real steps towards integration, as the Kremlin understands it, 122 Opinion and Analysis Andrei Liakhovich, Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus

Photo: European Commission

Vladimir Makei, Belarusian Minister for Foreign Aff airs (left) with Štefan Füle and Edward Nalbandian. In June 2013, Makei was removed from the EU’s entry ban in order to facilitate diplomatic contacts between the EU and Belarus.

Lukashenka in turn used all possibilities to exert pressure on Russia. And Russia has usually given in to the pressure. Th e West views Belarus’s military cooperation with Russia as well as Belarus’s participation in integration projects of Russia as signs of its dependence on Russia. However, this is a weak spot, the Achilles’ heel, in the Russian standing regarding Belarus. Lukashenka often claims that whereas Belarus depends on Russia in terms of economy, Russia depends on Belarus in terms of security. His fi rst reaction to cuts on gas and oil supplies was to seize cooperation with Russia in the sphere of air defence and to introduce restrictions on communications between Russia and its Kaliningrad enclave. Belarusian offi cials also declared a plan to phase out Russian military bases. Th ese are of great signifi cance for Russia, including the Volga anti-ballistic missile radar near Hantsavichy, and the Antey VLF transmitter for submarine communications near Vileyka. In response to Russian limitations on exports of Belarusian dairy products, Lukashenka once refused to take part in a CSTO Summit and threatened to restrict Belarusian participation in the organisation. A status quo has been established for a long time between Belarus and Russia. Lukashenka does not make concessions to Russia on issues related to true integration, as the Kremlin understands it. He refuses to sell large enterprises to Russian companies, he declines the off er to make a unifi ed currency system and he refuses to deploy more Russian military bases in Belarus (in addition to the already existing two). Th e level of Belarus’s involvement in cooperation with the West does not bear much signifi cance in this regard. It is important that Lukashenka and Andrei Liakhovich, Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus Opinion and Analysis 123 those surrounding him not become puppets in Russian hands. Th ey do not want to be dependent on Moscow, which could be able to remove them at any time. Th e independence of Belarus has become a guarantee of Lukashenka’s personal security. He understands that he will be destroyed if he crosses the safety line in relations with Russia, either by Putin who hates him or by the oligarchs to whom he did not sell the nice bits of Belarusian public property.

Possibilities and perspectives

High-ranking EU offi cials underline that the EU does not have leverage over Lukashenko and cannot off er a “carrot” comparable to the Russian one. In November 2010, the media reported that Belarus could get aid equal to three billion euros from the EU if the presidential elections were held in compliance with democratic standards. Th ese claims, however, were astonishing. It was clear that the presidential elections on December 19th 2010 would be held according to the old scenario of total falsifi cation. Representatives of the opposition and of non-governmental organisations were not allowed to even work in the election commissions. It is unlikely that such fi nancial support would result in serious changes towards liberalisation of the political regime in Belarus. One set of political prisoners who are released would only be replaced by another set. A decisive economic policy, however, could represent a signifi cant tool for EU policy with Belarus. In 2012 Belarusian exports to the EU made up more than 29 per cent of its total exports. A signifi cant part of Belarusian exports to Europe is oil production. Th e EU has great infl uence with international fi nancial institutions (including the IMF) regarding signifi cantly important credit for Belarus. A threat of economic sanctions would force the Lukashenka regime to follow a road map of political changes in Belarus. However, taking into account the abovementioned reasons, it is unlikely that the EU would use such possibilities to pressure Lukashenka. Hence in the absence of any real attention and pressure from the EU, the Lukashenka regime will most likely continue its somewhat successful policy of manoeuvring between Russia and the West.

Andrei Liakhovich is the director of the Centre for Political Education in Minsk. ADVERTISEMENT So close, yet so far away

EVGENY TRESHCHENKOV

Russians predominantly stand in solidarity with Belarus. Taking into account the extremely painful reforms of the 1990s, many Russians considered the Belarusian model as the most attractive option of post-Soviet development. Hence, it is no coincidence that Lukashenka quickly became more popular among Russians than Boris Yeltsin.

From the perspective of a signiﬁ cant number of Europeans, the Republic of Belarus is regarded through the prism of such stereotypes as “the last dictatorship of Europe” and “a splinter of the Soviet Union”. Th ese images carry a negative emotional load for Europeans. At the same time, the evaluation of Belarusians themselves as well as of Russians – their partners in the common Union State – is not so clear. When choosing between the “democracy of the 1990s” and a “strong authoritarian regime”, many people residing in the territory of the former Soviet Union tend to prefer the latter if it ensures stability and a minimal level of material comfort. Together with a lack of experience in critically rethinking the Soviet period, this leads to a stabilisation of nostalgia for the Soviet socio-economic model. When compared with the expenses of market reforms, such a system is considered to be socially and economically “fair” by a signiﬁ cant part of the post-Soviet population.

The attractiveness of Belarusian socialism

Th e socio-economic model that has been implemented in Belarus since the early 1990s is characterised with the term “fairness”. Sometimes it is called “Belarusian socialism”. Five-year economic development plans, price controls, income redistribution, the construction of public housing, relatively free education and health care, and work placement for graduates of public higher education institutions are obligatory components of rhetoric and, in part, of the actions of the Belarusian authorities. 126 Opinion and Analysis Evgeny Treshchenkov, So close, yet so far away

“Belarusian socialism” as a model in which all of the state’s major resources are concentrated in the hands of the president and his inner circle, has, of course, little to do with the European model of “state socialism”. Th e Belarus system was formed under the infl uence of a number of external and internal factors. Th e leftover Belarusian segment of the Soviet economic system that was focussed on the fi nal stage of production of high-tech goods was completely dependent on the resources and markets of the other Soviet republics. Reforming such an economy is a hard task and requires heavy external In the 1990s, many Russians support. It could also lead to the imminent considered the Belarusian model collapse of any political force in power that as the most attractive option decided to carry out such major reforms. Th ere was no suffi cient external support of post-Soviet development. to Belarus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Coupled with the economic diffi culties experienced by the country, it made slogans of rapprochement with Russia more popular. Alyaksandr Lukashenka even won his fi rst presidential election thanks to this kind of rhetoric. Th e policy of the country’s isolation by the EU and the United States after the 1995 and 1996 referenda only strengthened the political regime in Belarus. Maintaining a modernised, but still Soviet-style economy was consistent with the needs of President Lukashenka. In order to stay in power, the populist politician had to follow the expectations of the electorate. Th ese expectations were mostly paternalistic and did not contain an agreement to a sharp decline in living standards as a result of far-reaching reforms. In such circumstances, the preservation of the economy and the conservation of many Soviet-style economic practices appeared to be the only possible option in the eyes of the Belarusian authorities. Even now, 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 45 per cent of Belarusians are ready to give up part of their rights and freedoms in exchange for material wealth. In this regard, Russians predominantly stand in solidarity with Belarusians. Taking into account the extremely painful reforms of the 1990s, many Russians considered the Belarusian model as the most correct and attractive option of post-Soviet development. It is no coincidence that Lukashenka quickly became more popular among Russians than Boris Yeltsin. Th e image of the “people’s president” – a good manager, a fi ghter against corruption and oligarchs – promoted by Lukashenka in his own country quickly evoked sympathy among the Russian electorate as well, especially among the most vulnerable groups (pensioners and public-sector employees), the rural population and employees of state-owned enterprises. Even despite the growth of the Russian economy based on oil and gas, and, accordingly, the growth of income of the average Russian and despite the Belarusian economic crisis, this positive image has not faded in the eyes of some social and age Evgeny Treshchenkov, So close, yet so far away Opinion and Analysis 127 groups. Time and again one can hear Russian pensioners referring to the Belarusian president “Lukashenochka” (an aff ectionate way of describing Lukashenka). Th e image of the “people’s president” is always reinforced by certain achievements. Th e Republic of Belarus has the most positive statistical indicators of social stratifi cation among all post-Soviet states. Most industrial companies continue to operate, providing people with jobs. Agriculture is more productive than in neighbouring Russia or Ukraine. Due to its tough immigration policy, Belarusians don’t face labour migration from Central Asia. Against this background, the Belarusian industrial, agricultural and socio-economic policy is often adored by a number of Russian economists and politicians.

Closest nation

Ordinary Russians have little interest in the causes and factors supporting the existence of “Belarusian socialism”; they are attracted by the concept of “fairness” and its Belarusian interpretation. In reality, however, the Republic of Belarus is not a welfare state, but centralised and not always effi cient in its allocation of scarce resources. Th e stability of the political regime depends on the stability of its socio-economic model. Its stability, in turn, is strongly infl uenced by the external environment. Signifi cant social spending is only possible due to the access of Belarusian exporters to markets in Russia and some other former Soviet republics, as well as due to the specifi c mediation functions in energy trade between Russia and the EU. Russian attitudes towards the Republic of Belarus depend on political preference, age, social status and experience in economic and cultural contacts with Belarus. It also depends on whether we analyse the attitude towards the country or towards Lukashenka. Th us, according to the Russian Communists (KPRF), the Belarusian regime has the full support of the population and Lukashenka has managed to preserve all the best that was in the Soviet Union. Russian liberals tend to regard Belarusian regime as non-democratic, and its economic model as a kind of deviation. Th e dominant idea is, however, that in many ways Belarusians are the closest nation to Russia. Th is idea of historical, cultural and linguistic affi nity is refl ected in how the Republic of Belarus is being included into the virtual space of the “Russian world”. A special fund headed by political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov promotes a special interpretation of this concept, emphasising the fact of cultural and linguistic proximity. For example, Belarus is the only country among the former Soviet republics in which the Russian language has the status of “state language” (Article 17 of the Constitution). 128 Opinion and Analysis Evgeny Treshchenkov, So close, yet so far away

Another version of the “Russian world”, promoted by Russian Patriarch Kirill, focuses on the religious aspects of East Slavic unity. According to this view, Th e Belarusian Orthodox Church is an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, and Belarusians are a part of the Russian Orthodox world. Lukashenka is ready to accept both concepts of the “Russian World” as long as it does not threaten his power. For example, he has a cautious attitude to the Belarusian Orthodox Church due to its perception as an agent of inﬂ uence of the Russian Orthodox Church and thus of Russia.

Closer integration

Attempts to reintegrate the former Soviet Union have always been supported by Russians, especially when it comes to the Republic of Belarus, which has an image as one of the most developed economies in the region. However, the participation of Belarus in integration processes in the post-Soviet space is characterised by contradictions. On the one hand, the choice of closer trade, economic, military and political cooperation with Russia that was made in the early 1990’s determined the subsequent steps of Belarusian authorities to participate in integration projects such as the formation of the Union State and its participation in the Customs Union of the Eurasian Economic Community. On the other hand, any actions by Russian partners that could undermine Belarusian authorities’ control over the political and economic life in the country could lead to a strong opposition. Russian-Belarusian integration is thus a complex process full of confl ict. Russia considers the space that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union as its natural sphere of interest. After Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet space gained new momentum. To some extent, it became a refl ection of eff orts to strengthen the “vertical of power” within the country. Resistance of some states in the region, coupled with Photo: Presidential Press and Information Offi ce the intensification of of the Russian Federation (CC) commons.wikimedia.org the EU’s activities, only Russian President Vladimir Putin with Belarusian embittered Moscow’s President Alyaksandr Lukashenka during policies. To a large extent, the Zapad-2013 joint military exercise. the establishment of the Evgeny Treshchenkov, So close, yet so far away Opinion and Analysis 129

Eurasian Economic Union is a response to the initiative of the Eastern Partnership and European integration of a number of former Soviet republics. Russia cannot accept the rules of the game off ered by the EU, but it also does not want to remain in isolation. In this context, every partner is invaluable, Attempts to reintegrate the even the most diffi cult ones. Th is applies to the Republic of Belarus. Moscow is ready former Soviet Union are to forgive Minsk for its refusal to recognise supported by Russians, especially the independence of South Ossetia and when it comes to Belarus. Abkhazia, its friendship with Georgia and much more in return for its participation in the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, the Customs Union and other Russian-led initiatives. Furthermore, despite regular political and economic confl icts in bilateral relations, Russia has always provided Belarus with signifi cant political support in the international arena. It is exemplifi ed not only by the regular recognition of Belarusian elections, but also by voting in the UN Human Rights Council and other international forums on the situation in Belarus. Despite the fact that the Union State of Russia and Belarus appeared in the shadow of the project of the Eurasian Economic Union, it remains signifi cant for Russia as well. Th e development of the Union State appeared to be a hostage of Russian-Belarusian disputes over the distribution of power. However, much has been achieved. Th e Union State has a budget, a unifi ed system of air defence and reciprocal social guarantees for citizens of both countries. When crossing the border into Belarus (without any passport control) Russian citizens notice the well-ploughed lands and smooth roads that suddenly appear. Sometimes such a contrast is superfi cial, but it does not dismiss the general positive impression it makes on the guests coming to Belarus from Russia. Th ere are even fi eld studies of Russian supporters of the Belarusian model of development available online, demonstrating the complete desolation of rural areas on the Russian side of the border and contrasting it with the “agricultural paradise” on the Belarusian side.

Information wars

Russian-Belarusian relations are a popular subject for politicians in both states often because of the potential for conﬂ ict between the two states. Political conﬂ icts are usually accompanied by information wars. It is important to note that less than 20 per cent of Russians have ever visited Belarus, even if we take the Soviet period into consideration. Th eir perception of the Belarusian reality thus consists of myths from the Soviet era, media reports and stories told by relatives and friends. 130 Opinion and Analysis Evgeny Treshchenkov, So close, yet so far away

Th e impact of the media on the Russians’ views regarding diff erent domestic and foreign policy issues is signifi cant. Th e main role is played by Russian television, which is the primary source of information in Russia. All Russian TV channels in fact express the offi cial state position and periodically are used to carry out propaganda campaigns. Such campaigns have led to a distortion in the perception of Belarus by Russians. During the period before Vladmir Putin’s presidency Russian-Belarusian in Russia, Lukashenka tried to improve relations integration is a complex with Russian politicians, regional elites, business process full of confl ict. and society by sidestepping the Kremlin. After Putin came to power in Russia, however, it became much harder to conduct such a policy. Th e Russian media became less hospitable to the Belarusian leader. It is no coincidence that it was exactly in this period that Lukashenka introduced the habit of regular meetings with representatives of the Russian federal and regional media. However, that has not always helped. In 2010, during one of the regular waves of political disputes, a real information war emerged in the Russian and Belarusian media. For example, Russian TV channel NTV aired a series of documentaries called Krestniy Batka (Th e Godfather). Th e fi lm presented an extremely negative image of the Belarusian president. In 2011, immediately after the confl ict, Belarus was named an “enemy of Russia” for the fi rst time in history in the regular opinion poll “Friends and Enemies of Russia” conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (POF survey, 2011). Both of Belarus’ major neighbours – Poland and Russia – tend to see only a part of Belarus that fi ts into their own geopolitical imagination and historical memory. Th e other part is usually rejected. For Russians, Belarus means the Belarusian partisans of the Great Patriotic War, an integral part of the Russian Empire and of the “family of nations” of the Soviet Union. Belarus means political stability and a specifi c type of socio-economic model. Belarus, as a part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the modern Belarusian opposition and the prospect of country’s rapprochement with Europe, is an image that does not generally exist in the minds of most Russians. Th e quality of Belarusian-Russian relations, hence, largely depends on how these diff erent parts of the Belarusian image will be aggregated in the Russian consciousness.

Translated by Igor Lyubashenko

Evgeny Treshchenkov is an associate professor at the School of International Relations with St. Petersburg State University. He has a PhD in the history of international relations.

Dress Rehearsal Democracy?

A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev, deputy editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets Interviewer: Giuseppe D’Amato

GIUSEPPE D’AMATO: The “single voting voted in Moscow. Does this mean that day”, a day where all Russian municipal Russians are tired of politics? and regional elections are held, took I think that initially this day at the place in Russia for the fi rst time in beginning of September 2013 was planned September 2013. Were these elections so that as few people as possible would indeed freer than in the past? Were attend the elections. Th e minimum voter they a dress rehearsal of future voting turnout was abolished, meaning that it at the federal level? did not matter how many people turned AYDER MUZHDABAYEV: First of out: in any event, the right candidate all, it is certainly very good that the would be elected. With a low turnout, opponents of the government participated it is easier to rig an election. However, in these elections for the ﬁ rst time – as is often the case, if you’re digging a this has not occurred very often. Th ere hole for someone else, you will fall into was real political competition at the it yourself, according to the Russian executive-municipal level, including in proverb. In this case, the government Moscow. Th is is good. However, this fell into its own trap, at least in two is the very outset, and one should not cities: Moscow and Yekaterinburg. In think that the Russian government has Moscow the turnout was low, but this suddenly decided to restore absolutely time it worked against the government. free democratic competition. Th is is a People purposefully came to the polling kind of experiment conducted by the stations and brought their friends. government in order to see what comes Th ere were also a large number out of it and to decide how to act later. of observers. And even though the election campaign was certainly Was it a good idea to have the “single disproportionate, the counting of votes voting day”? Only 30 per cent of citizens was practically fair. 132 Opinion and Analysis Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev

How would you describe the benefi cial for Russia, perhaps with more relationship between Russians and powers vested in the president than, national federal politics? say, in the Czech Republic or any other In my opinion, there is currently a very state with strong parliaments. But, in high percentage of Russians, including any case, a parliament should act as a Muscovites, who are indiff erent to politics. signifi cant lever limiting the powers of One shouldn’t think that there are many a chief executive. people in Russia who are ready not only However on the other hand, Russia to actively attend meetings, but also has a strong tradition of commitment to actively vote. We have just found out how a single leader. And I think that even if many people in Moscow want to have an a law were adopted, according to which impact on changes to federal politics, as all the matters have to be resolved by they were, of course, voting not for the parliament, there would still arise ruling Mayor of Moscow, but against the ruling parties within parliament that would put power in government. Several hundreds forward their own leaders. And the same of thousands people came out to vote. thing would happen: power would be However, the majority, both in Moscow usurped by a single political group to the and in the provinces, apparently doesn’t detriment of the others. A parliamentary care. Th ey are not active participants in government gives a better chance that the political process. In principle, life in this doesn’t happen. Russia is rather good now, people have never lived better fi nancially, and for this reason The international mass media were there is probably some fear of change. Th ey heavily focused on the results of Alexei believe it’s better to let things be as they Navalny’s role in the Moscow elections. are. But surely this will not last forever. He received 27 per cent of the votes Economic and political situations change, in Moscow. Is this a victory or failure and sometimes quite rapidly. for him? Of course it is a victory. I think that In your opinion, what government becoming the Mayor of Moscow was is the best for Russia: presidential or not part of his plans. In my opinion, parliamentary? he is not ready for this as a person who In my view, the system of the super- has only recently become a politician. president government, which has been After all, prior to this he was an internet established in Russia since 1993 after blogger. I think he is, of course, satisfi ed. the eff ective constitution was adopted, He practically said this at the meeting, demonstrates that this is the easiest way declaring himself the only real leader of to establish an authoritarian regime. For the opposition. No other leaders of the this reason, as I see it, the variant of a opposition from recent years went to parliamentary republic would be more any of the pro-Navalny rallies. Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev Interview 133

Photo courtesy of Ayder Muzhdabayev

Ayder Muzhdabayev, deputy editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets, Moscow’s largest daily newspaper with a circulation of almost one million copies.

Why is the Russian opposition so exploit this aspiration. If a politician split? This seems to be something the feels that he has gained in popularity West cannot fully understand. (and Navalny did so), perhaps he will Th is is because Russian politics is decide that he does not need anyone else generally based on personality. Unlike in and can manage on his own. We don’t the West where the programmes, policies have a culture of mutual agreements and and ideas are more important, here a lot consensus, either within the government of people look at politicians’ personalities. or the opposition. Th is is very sad, as it And many politicians, especially strong would be much better if the opposition politicians (such as Alexei Navalny), leaders coordinated their eﬀ orts and understand that the aspiration to ﬁ nd the people would focus on the idea of a leader, which is inherent in people, reforming Russia instead of changing is very powerful. Russian politicians its leader. 134 Opinion and Analysis Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev

Does Navalny have the chance to Taking into account Navalny’s become an ideological leader of the statements about national minorities, opposition in Russia? can he be compared to similar I think he will try to do so. Basically, politicians in the West, such as Austria’s he has already declared this. In my Jörg Haider and France’s Marine Le opinion, he is rather too controversial and Pen? ambiguous of a person to be accepted by Th ese do seem to be quite acceptable all partisans of the reforms. Suffi ce it to comparisons. With his rhetoric, he is say that he is not hiding his nationalism, indeed similar to these politicians, but I which is not appreciated by many of those think he is even harsher in his rhetoric, as who are against Vladimir Putin. Many it is not known how he would act once he people consider his nationalistic accent attains power. Frankly speaking, it would dangerous to his future political life. be desirable to have clarity in respect to a politician who seeks power regarding In the West, many observers were his future actions in our country. If there surprised by Navalny’s statements, is no such certainty (and we do not have such as those with respect to ethnic it so far) and the issue is only to dent minorities. Putin’s regime, than such uncertainty In the course of his electoral campaign, is no good for society; it is fraught with Alexei Navalny opposed US and NATO danger that a new elite with a new leader intervention in the Syria confl ict. In will come, instead of the democratic other words, he actually repeated Putin’s government we dream about. position in this matter. Th erefore, the West should not assume that should a Riots on national and ethnic politician like Alexei Navalny take offi ce grounds are becoming more common in Russia he will be totally loyal to the throughout Russia. Are federal politics West, committed to democratic values able to stop them or are there parties and share their attitudes. It is a very and politicians who heat them up? complex issue and categorical judgements If Vladimir Putin is willing to put an cannot be made. It is clearly positive end to them, I think he would be able to that Navalny is a bright opponent of the do this. Not the least because he is the government, and he is shaking this system only one who has real power. However, up, this whole swamp that has evolved this requires not only severe suppression over the years. In the future, however, I of the nationalists’ violent actions, but also would like to see political competition propaganda of tolerance at the state level. not be limited to one leader on one side, I believe that a great role here belongs to and one leader on the other. It would be television, which is under control of the better if all political powers and views state. If only Putin prohibited broadcasters were represented. to heat up nationalistic attitudes and Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev Interview 135 instead ordered to present people of non- the events in Russia today with what Russian ethnicity in a positive way, then was happening in Germany in the 1930s? nationalism in Russia would diminish. In my view, the danger is high. And Th is is how the Russian society functions; this comparison is absolutely permissible, it remains greatly infl uenced by state as the very similar things happen, propaganda. although, fortunately, so far less bloody. However, as long as state TV promotes First of all, it is bad that the society the “rise of the Russian spirit” this will has started to justify riots, ethnical unfortunately result in radical nationalism. cleansings and document checks of I am not sure whether Putin would wish people of non-Russian appearance in the to change this situation or not. As to some street. Th ere are proposals to banish all extent, it might be convenient for him. It “blacks” from Russia, deny education to is in the interest of the authorities when their children and medical care along popular majority transfers its discontent with other inhumane ideas and racist with life from the authorities to people slogans. And the society is accepting of other nationalities. However, they are this as a norm. People, including many on thin ice. If the nationalistic attitude intellectuals and offi cials, see nothing in the society continues to grow and special about this. Th ey say, “We need to radicalise, there is a risk of losing control bring discipline into relations with non- over the situation in the state in future. Russian migrants.” Was this not the same Th e problem, however, is not limited to the attitude in Germany towards the Jewish authorities. From the political perspective people? Th is is very dangerous. At some Navalny is a Russian nationalist and he point, tension of nationalistic attitudes makes no secret of that. He has been may escalate into riots with lives lost. fi lmed in political videos comparing Individual victims occur almost every migrants to animals and insects. day: neo-Nazis beat and even kill in the I do not believe that Navalny is a hope streets not only migrants, but also Russian of Russian democracy and a European- people that look like migrants to them. type politician on the whole. And this Th ese attacks are growing and the state may also be in Putin’s interests, as he may seems to turn a blind eye to this problem. demonstrate to the West: look here, in Police chiefs keep on publicly lying that case of democratisation of the political major criminals in Russia are migrants, system, I could be replaced by people although their share in the total number who encourage Muscovites to join Nazi of crimes committed is only around one processions, and this is exactly what and a half percent. Navalny has done recently. An important, yet overlooked What danger do these riots pose to point of the September elections was the Russian society? Can we compare the victory of Yevgeny Roizman in 136 Opinion and Analysis Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev

Yekaterinburg, the homeland of Boris today. So leaders such as Roizman may Yeltsin. How do you see his victory? be good opponents and fi ght against this It is important not because Yeltsin monopoly of the government. Th e only was born there, but because today question is how eff ective as a politician Yekaterinburg is the largest industrial and manager he will turn out to be. Th is centre of the Urals, a very powerful is diffi cult, there is not enough money for region. Roizman is also ambiguous; we everything: money is tied to the regional cannot call him a European democrat budget, the regional budget is owned by or a liberal as Europeans conceive it. those who are the members of the ruling He engages in the rather controversial party. All of this is very complex. practice of forcefully curing drug addicts. He has an entourage of, let’s say, dodgy These elections have indicated a people, who follow him in this city. As change in Russia’s politics. Does that is the case with Navalny, many other mean we can expect more change for issues remain open. So far it is unclear Russia, or will Vladimir Putin be an how this politician will act as a mayor. eternal president? I hope for the best, but anything can I think that Putin will not be an eternal happen. Th ere are videotapes where president, and everything will change Roizman, for example, states that it is in Russia. However, it is not clear how mostly homosexuals who are on drugs. fast. If the forecasts are not working in And this is dangerous. relation to the Arab states, similarly no long-term forecasts will work in relation Some foreign observers noted to Russia. Here everything may change Roizman’s request for the people to very rapidly. I would once again emphasise be proactive instead of waiting for the that Russia now is having a comfortable roads and houses etc. to be repaired. economic period; people are well-off and Is this a new approach, a fi ght against not interested in aggressively demanding general apathy in Russia? change. If the situation itself changes, Of course, you can fight. The however, then the people will become government is unpopular among the more active. people. United Russia, which represents the government, is extremely unpopular Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Ayder Muzhdabayev is the deputy editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets, Moscow’s largest daily newspaper. He is also a well-known blogger whose posts are published by Echo of Moscow. Giuseppe D’Amato is an Italian journalist and historian who specialises in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union. The Ukrainian Window to Europe

An interview with Taras Voznyak, editor-in-chief and founder of the Ukrainian cultural journal Ї (Yi) Interviewer: Annabelle Chapman

ANNABELLE CHAPMAN: The last few don’t have this. It is much more about months have been a time of intense “What can Europe give us?”, and “What discussions about the future of Ukraine, can we give Europe?” whether it will move towards the European Union or Russia. Would you Maybe this is a part of the wider say that there was a genuine debate crisis in the EU, not only an economic about this in Ukraine? one, but in some ways, a metaphysical TARAS VOZNYAK: When we one as well. What does Europe want speak about a “return to Europe”, we to be today? immediately enter abstract spheres. First we need to ask: what is Europe? Over the last twenty years, I initially had Is it just the EU or a wider area? We some enthusiastic illusions about Europe can say proudly, or idiotically, that it is as a community of nations, forming a something wider. Is Albania, Serbia or community of values. But now we see that Montenegro Europe? Right now, they there are more pragmatic issues linked are not in the EU, but they are Europe. to economics, security and so on. I think For now, however, in an ordinary Ukraine approaches this subject more person’s mind, Europe generally equates pragmatically than Poland or Hungary to the EU. Europe will be changing, and did ten years ago, which seemed to focus it may be more drastic than we expect. much more on cultural factors. Each project – and the EU is a project – A completely diﬀ erent logic is at work is expanding or shrinking. Th e EU will in Ukraine. Th e cultural slogans such as be successful if it is dynamic, if it has “We are returning to Europe”, “We are interests in Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, and Europe”, “Europe is incomplete without also in Turkey and North Africa. Unless us” worked in Poland. In Ukraine, we the EU is expansive, then it is hard to 138 Opinion and Analysis The Ukrainian Window to Europe, An interview with Taras Voznyak

speak about its survival. Th at’s because How do you mean? it’s competing with other projects such At the start of the 1990s we had a as the United States, China and so on. sense of mission, that something is lying ahead of us. Th en came the fi rst Is Ukraine the same as North Africa disappointments. Hope returned in 2004 in this sense, then? with the Orange Revolution, and then we On the one hand, yes. But on the other were faced with more disappointments. hand, if you visit Ukraine even just once Th at hoped seemed to be returning, but – be it Kyiv or Odessa or Lviv – you’ll again disappointments. probably feel a diff erence. As the editor of a cultural journal How does your milieu of Lviv in Ukraine, have you ever had trouble intellectuals see this? from the authorities or even part of We’re doing what we can. Another society? question is how much can we do; how I haven’t had any problems with the much our city or region, Galicia, can authorities during these past 25 years, do? In some ways, Lviv and Galicia lift though we began as an underground journal. Ukraine towards the European project. If there were any problems, they were the discussions with Ukrainian nationalists, In the late 1980s you founded but I think their time is coming to an end. the journal Ї (corresponding to the Ukrainian letter “ї”), which you edit to What is the idea behind the journal? this day. What was it like in Lviv at the Th at’s a diffi cult question. On my time of the fall of the Soviet Union? desk at home, there is a photo of Jerzy In some sense it was very grey. I Giedroyc (the editor of Kultura, a Polish fi rst visited Przemyśl and Kraków in émigré journal during the communist 1985 or 1986 and, even for me, these period - editor’s note).When he died, the cities seemed very gloomy. Th ere was journal died with him. He was a great a strange smell. Now I understand that editor. I’m not as great an editor as he it’s because Poland burnt coal, while the was, but I think the point of my existence Soviet Union used gas. It was similar depends on it. in Ukraine in the early 1990s. But there was a major diff erence. On the one hand, Giedroyc had a powerful vision. there was this smell of gloomy Polish What is yours? towns from the 1980s. But on the other Someone has to do the hard work, hand, there was more in the people’s like he did. His life probably wasn’t that eyes; there was more life. Perhaps more sweet. I hear now that there may be some than even now. Now there is routine: re-conceptualisation of Giedroyc’s vision family, money and work. in Poland. In any case, I like doing this dirty work. The Ukrainian Window to Europe, An interview with Taras Voznyak Interview 139

Photo courtesy of Ї magazine.

Taras Voznyak is the founder of the independent Ukrainian cultural Journal Ї (Yi), the fi rst issue was published in 1989.

There were issues of Ї looking at In this sense, it seems to me that Lviv’s diff erent cities or regions of Ukraine, colourfulness has survived – only in but also ones with titles such as “Jewish other forms. Lviv”. Lviv was once a multi-ethnic city, but was it ever multi-cultural? Have you noticed a growing interest I think it was. Th ere were Jews and in the diff erent cultures from Lviv’s past? Ukrainians and Poles each cultivating Th is has always been the case, on their traditions. Sometimes we don’t diﬀ erent scales. It has become quite see this. We notice the 5,000 or so Jews fashionable now. It is also a brand that can living in Lviv today and respect them be sold: a Jewish restaurant, Armenian as a national minority, but ignore the cuisine, and so on. Th ere has not been 100,000 Russians who live here, who are any problem with this in Lviv. also maintaining their traditions. Th is can be drastic because there really are Is this a sort of nostalgia; for these 100,000 people in Lviv right now; Habsburg times, for instance? in independent, Ukrainian Lviv, which Th e Habsburg times are a diﬀ erent is ruled by Svoboda, a nationalist party. subject altogether. There is a lot of 140 Opinion and Analysis The Ukrainian Window to Europe, An interview with Taras Voznyak

sentiment for those times. In Chernivtsi, closer than relations between other they unveiled a statue of Franz Joseph I. regions or cities of Ukraine and Poland. Can you imagine a statue of Tsar Nicholas II in Warsaw or Kaiser Wilhelm II in Did the Euro 2012 football championship Gdańsk? In Lviv there’s a discussion about have an impact here? Has it aff ected where we should erect a statue of Franz Lviv’s contact with the world? Joseph I. Since they already have one in In terms of contacts, not really. But as Chernivtsi, they’re more loyal than we are. far as Lviv is concerned, then yes. Th e It may sound funny, but that is how it is. In championship left behind a new airport some sense, the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Lviv and the situation with roads and lives on in a positive way. Th e Ukrainian hotels have improved. In that sense, it perspective is diff erent from the Polish had a positive impact. one. For the Poles, it was their country being divided up, while for Ukrainians it What, in your opinion, is the most was a chance for self-realisation. interesting thing about this city? I would say that Lviv has this special One of the issues of Ї is entitled sense of merriness. Sometimes you arrive “trans-border Galicia”, referring to in a city and it’s gloomy and strange. the area around Lviv that was once Th ere’s a story by Hermann Brock, an Eastern Galicia. Why “trans-border”? Austrian writer, in which someone arrives Galicia, the former Austro-Hungarian in a city, maybe in Moravia. And he province, is now on both sides of the EU immediately understands that he wants border. It is in Ukraine and in Poland. to live there. It’s something mystical. Like When I travel to Poland, in Przemyśl with a girl: all the girls seem alike, until or Kraków I feel at home. In Łódź or, you see that one. It works with her, not even more so in Szczecin, I already feel with the other one. Th e same goes for a diff erent. Th e streets, houses, coff ee and city. Lviv is a city that’s suitable for loving. beer are not the same. Th is does not just apply to Galicia, but to the whole Do you think that Lviv can play a zone of Austro-Hungarian infl uence. special role in bringing Ukraine closer And this is what links Eastern Galicia to the EU? and Western Galicia, Lviv and Kraków. Lviv is a Ukrainian window to Europe. We can be Ukrainian or Polish patriots, Th e political trends in Lviv, however, but we can also look for a common are not ideal. Th e nationalists have a platform based on our Austro-Hungarian majority in the city council, which is heritage. And we can the relations today not too good for contacts with cities between the three Ukrainian regions in the EU. In any case, I would say that used to be part of Galicia with that Kyiv is actually the main driver of its corresponding ones in Poland are the pro-European trends in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Window to Europe, An interview with Taras Voznyak Interview 141

This year marks ten years since the What hope do you see in the young Orange Revolution of 2004. How is it generation of Ukrainians who were perceived now in your milieu? Is it a born around the time of independence, source of hope or disappointment? who are now 20 to 25 years old? Something fantastic happened to this Each person builds their own happiness. country. Expectations were one thing, I don’t expect anything from them. I am the results were another. But it will taking care of my own life. But if they want remain one of the biggest events in the to be independent, successful people with history of Ukraine. Looking back now, some objective, then they need to take it is still too early to assess what really their own steps – little steps – towards it. happened. Regardless of how President Viktor Yushchenko behaved afterwards, How important is the issue of and all that has happened since. Th is language in Ukraine? is not about Yushchenko; it’s about a Unlike some countries, our country is country of 45 million people. bilingual or even trilingual. In fact, it is nothing special; it’s the absolute norm. Do you think the Orange Revolution It only stands out in countries that were could be repeated, for example during harmonised by force, like Poland, where only the 2015 presidential elections? Polish is spoken. In Ukraine we can speak Nothing is ever repeated. Th ere will be Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian or Romanian. other forms of political activity or struggles for freedom. Poland’s Solidarity movement Should these differences be will never be repeated with the same encouraged or should Ukrainian, as atmosphere of solidarity and freedom it the national language, be promoted? had in the 1980s. Th e same applies to the I think that we need to cultivate our Orange Revolution. I don’t know whether I multilingualism. Th e more languages will live to see such promising events again. that people can speak, the better for us. Sociological research shows, however, But it was a revolution? that the language issue is far down Of course it was. What’s more, I took the list of issues that interest average part in it, in Lviv and Kyiv. And I’m Ukrainians. We speak how we speak; proud of it. Not because I’m proud, but what does it matter? Ukrainians are because I’m happy that I took part, that much more concerned about issues like this happened during my lifetime. unemployment, the economy, pensions and independence.

Taras Voznyak is a Lviv-based Ukrainian cultural expert and political scientist. He is the editor-in-chief and founder of the independent cultural journal Ї (Yi). Annabelle Chapman is a journalist writing from Poland and Ukraine. Human Trafﬁ cking in Romania

MISHA HOFLAND

Human traﬃ cking and the sexual exploitation of Romanian women to Europe continue to be a serious problem, despite Romania’s accession to the European Union in 2007. Many non-governmental organisations in Romania are working to address this problem, but despite their dedication and hard work, the availability of funding is still too low.

Since its accession to the European Union in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria have been the weakest countries of the union in many ways. While countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary substantially improved their economic position since their accession, Romania and Bulgaria continue to struggle with corruption, declining economic circumstances and shortcomings in the judicial system. Some see promising developments on the horizon, but the fact that the two relatively new member states have many issues left to deal with before approaching Western European standards seems undeniable. One of the major issues the country of former dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu is struggling with is human traﬃ cking.

The numbers

According to a report by the European Commission in 2013, most of the victims of human traffi cking detected in EU member states are citizens of Romania and Bulgaria. Unfortunately, precise data is diffi cult to obtain. Due to diff erences between the Member States’ reporting systems, there is a lack of reliable and comparable statistical information on human traffi cking. What makes it even more diffi cult is the fact that most of these criminal activities are hard to track down. According to the same report however, the majority (62 per cent) of the identifi ed and presumed Misha Hofl and, Human Traffi cking in Romania Report 143 victims over the three years are being traffi cked for sexual exploitation. Th e other victims are being used for forced labour and a variety of other activities such as forced begging, criminal activities and so on. Th e profi le of victims by gender and age was 68 percent women, 17 percent men; 12 percent girls and three percent boys. Th e numbers show that the biggest problem when it comes to human traffi cking in Europe is sexual exploitation of women and young girls, mainly from the Balkans. Although Th e biggest problem of the issue has received widespread attention in the human traffi cking in Europe last decade, there does not seem to be a decrease in the trends thus far. On the contrary: “Th e is sexually exploited women very high rate [of women involved as victims and young girls, mainly in human traffi cking] in Eastern Europe and from the Balkans. Central Asia is exceptional, ”according to the Global Report on Traffi cking in Persons by theUnited Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Some poignant examples of this sexual exploitation of Romanian women were described by Iana Matei in her book A vendre: Mariana, 15 ans. Matei started a non- governmental organisation called Reaching Out and has been working tirelessly since to get girls out of their narrow situation, off er them the prospectof a new future and prosecute those who are responsible for sexual exploitation. “I’m talking here about girls, in many cases mi nors, who are being sold as ordinary pieces of meat; girls who are being torn from their roots, tortured, psychologically broken and physically abused, raped and forced into sexual slavery. [Th is is being] committed here in Europe, on a large scale, in the 21st century,” writes Matei in her book. Matei started sheltering young women in Pitești, Romania in 1999 and helped several hundreds of them over the years. Young women are quite often sold for a relatively low price compared to the profi ts that the traffi ckers make. Sometimes there are large criminal networks involved, Matei explains, but small-time criminals also want a piece of the action. “Nobody resists the pressure of a human traffi cker, nobody can say no to a brute that beats you and threatens to kill you if you don’t obey. And abroad the girls have even less to hold on to: they’re separated from their families, their offi cial documents are seized, they have nothing to orientate themselves in an unknown environment and they have no one to go to,” Matei adds. Th ese traffi ckers use several tactics to avoid detection, “Th ey often send the women all across Europe and make sure that they don’t stay in one country too long, in order to prevent them getting acquainted to where they are, make personal contact or even gain some knowledge on the local legislation.” 144 Report Misha Hofl and, Human Traffi cking in Romania

Lack of awareness Th e question is why has Romania become such a big source of sexually exploited women, both domestic and abroad? Poverty would be the obvious explanation, and that certainly is a factor. Although cities such as Bucharest, Timișoara and Clujhave become rather westernised over the last two decades, regions like north-western Maramureş and north-eastern Moldova look as though nothing has changed since the last century. Incredible poverty combined with outdated infrastructure, high unemployment and a poor education system create generations of young women and men who will do almost anything to improve their perspectives and therefore are vulnerable to human traffi cking. However this is only one of the factors. Matei acknowledges: “In my shelter I’ve seen a lot of diff erent personalities. Girls from all ages, some of them from very developed environments. What they all have in common is a dysfunctional family. Th at vulnerability creates a bigger chance of meeting the wrong people. I’ve seen a couple of cases of abduction in the middle of Romania has become one of the street, but most of the time girls are being the main sources of sexually lured by the promise of work.” A young American, Ryan Crozier, moved exploited women, both to Bucharest with his wife about a year ago domestic and abroad. to dedicate his life to the fi ght against human traffi cking. At the age of twelve, he and his father visited Romania for the fi rst time to help the thousands of children that lived in orphanages and on the streets. After many visits, the younger Crozier made the decision to move from Indiana to Bucharest indefi nitely to work on the prevention of human traffi cking with his NGO, eLiberare. From a small offi ce in the outskirts of Bucharest, Crozier and his team educate young Romanians about the dangers of the human traffi cking, mostly through online campaigns. “Th ere is still a lack of awareness in Romania when it comes to this. Government and civil society are doing something, but we need to address this issue more drastically. Th e pressure to do something about it comes mainly from western countries right now. On a societal level we can make it much more diffi cult for traffi ckers,” Crozier says. “Right now, it is still way too easy for them.” Crozier considers poverty to be one of the factors driving Romania’s leading role in traffi cking. “But there are hundreds of issues that allow it to maintain. I hope that men will start valuing women more. We are also trying to help build a support system around women by involving schools and parents. And we made a checklist of the things that you could do when travelling abroad to prevent falling into the wrong hands. Th e problem is also that a lot of Romanians really do fi nd Misha Hofl and, Human Traffi cking in Romania Report 145 legitimate work in other countries; so when a girl is being off ered a job she will not always be suspicious right away.” A major problem in the fi ght against human traffi cking in Romania is funding. A small NGO like Crozier’s eLiberare is dependent upon donations from the United States. Besides prevention, Crozier is also planning on starting a fund for NGO’s that are involved in sheltering victims. “Th ere is enough money available for prevention, but not for direct help. Some people combine their work with other part-time jobs in order to pay the bills. We want to create the necessary recourses, because there is defi nitely a lack of it in Romania.”

Shockingly young

Gina Maria Stoian is an example of a hardworking aid worker without many resources. From a small unmarked apartment in the centre of Bucharest she runs the NGO ADPARE (Association for the Development of Alternative Practices for Education and Reintegration), together with some psychologists and social workers. ADPARE shelters several women in the apartment, but mainly focuses on long-term assistance programmes for victims returning home. Th e location of the apartment is not publicly known, as traffi ckers often try to track down women who have escaped. “Usually the fi rst contact with a victim is established when she is still abroad. We make a risk assessment and evaluate their medical condition, because a lot of women have medical problems due to a life of stress, a weakened immune system and physical abuse,” admits Stoian. “We see a lot of women who have been used as a mixed-type of slave, where they are not only sexually exploited, but also forced to clean the club where they work, for example. Many of them only get a couple of hours sleep each night. I even know an example where a woman was babysitting the children of the traffi cker.” Th e girls that ADPARE assists are sometimes shockingly young: even 12 years old. Many of them were forced to have twenty to even thirty clients a night. Obviously medical care is not enough after such horrifi c experiences. “We are taking care of a girl who is in the hospital right now because she jumped from the third fl oor to escape. It wasn’t a suicide attempt, but she was that desperate to get away,” Stoian says. “Th ese girls often have severe trauma and are in need of psychological help. I’m always surprised though by their willingness to fi ght for their future. Th ey use the survival skills they developed for good things.” Despite their dedication and hard work, ADPARE is permanently struggling fi nancially. “We never received any money from the state, though we are used by 146 Report Misha Hofl and, Human Traffi cking in Romania

them as a good example,” Stoian adds. “Last year we decided we had to stop, but at the last moment we found a new fund that keeps us going for another year.” Th e embassy of the United States in Bucharest stated in its annual report on the country: “For a fourth consecutive year, the government did not provide funding to NGOs off ering assistance to traffi cking victims, and did not off er specialised shelter services in Bucharest for adults and children.” Th e lack of funding is not the only problem in the fi ght against human traffi cking in Romania. A lack of a sense of urgency among government offi cials and law enforcement, corruption, a lack of protection for victims Poverty is one of the main and social stigmas are also counterproductive elements. Th e same US embassy report states: factors that causes Romania’s “Th e government of Romania does not fully leading role in traffi cking. comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of traffi cking; however, it is making signifi cant eff orts to do so… the government gave specialised anti-traffi cking training to police offi cers, although reports indicated that the training did not adequately emphasise that traffi cking victims should not be prosecuted for any unlawful acts they commit as part of being traffi cked.” It further claims, “Th e Government of Romania demonstrated weak eff orts to protect and assist victims of traffi cking during the reporting period, although victim identifi cation remained high.” Protection of victims seems to be a recurring problem. Th e National Agency Against Traffi cking of Persons (ANITP) has 41 offi ces throughout the country with interrogation rooms. Th e interrogators, however, often lack proper training and the government shelters lack funding and require registration of the victims: something that many of them do not want as they fear that the traffi ckers will get hold of this information. Th is fear is not unjustifi ed, as some government offi cials in the past reportedly have been complicit in human traffi cking. Prosecution and trials against the traffi ckers are often a problem as well. Gina Maria Stoian’s ADPARE has made their own lawyer available to the victims and assists them with the preparation of their statement if necessary. “Th e laws on human traffi cking in Romania are ok, but trials take a long time and it’s hard to get the traffi ckers convicted. A lot of girls therefore choose not to report their case; they just want to go on with their lives, ”Stoian says. Despite all these problems women are facing, the social stigma is perhaps the biggest one of all. ADPARE tries to reintegrate women in their original social environment, but this is a diffi cult process much of the time. According to Stoian, “Th ere are cases where women are being exploited or sold by their own families or husbands. In those cases reintegration is obviously not an option. Traffi ckers are often known by the victims, they try to establish Misha Hofl and, Human Traffi cking in Romania Report 147 a relationship in order to control them later. Th ere’s a big problem in Romania with gender identity. Fathers sometimes get aggressive, which causes attachment problems. Th ese girls are more vulnerable to anyone who does give them some positive attention. Th at’s how the well-known loverboy principle works.” In the cases where ADPARE does try to reintegrate women they advise them to talk to friends and family about what happened to them. “But often they keep a lot to themselves because of the social stigma. Th ey don’t want the neighbours to talk about it. Sometimes a completely new start is necessary.”

Misha Hoﬂ and is a Dutch freelance journalist who specialises in Central and Eastern Europe.

ADVERTISEMENT Eastern Galicia Revisited

TADEUSZ IWAŃSKI

After the First World War, Poland once again became an independent state. Th e Treaty of Versailles not only guaranteed Polish independence, but also granted Eastern Galicia – an area that had a strong ethnic Ukrainian population – to Poland. Th roughout the interwar period, Poland passionately debated how to deal with this ﬁ ve million-strong minority, which at the same time attempted to build its own state.

Following the end of the First World War, Th e Treaty of Versailles, drawn up in June 1919 by the Entente Powers – including the British Empire, France and the United States – addressed, among other matters, the question of the Polish frontier. In the treaty, it was decided that the Council of Ambassadors would regulate this issue. On March 15th, 1923 the Council decided “to recognise the Polish border with Russia… a line drawn and delimited by agreement between the two States and on their responsibility on November 23, 1922”, and decided “to assign to Poland, [which] accepts the decision, all [the] rights of sovereignty over the territories situated within the frontiers deﬁ ned above, and the other frontiers of Polish territory, subject to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace of St. Germain- en-Laye regarding the duties and obligations incumbent on the States to which any territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is transferred.” Th is decision put an end to the eﬀ orts of Ukrainians to gain an independent state between the San and Zbruch Rivers. Since the end of the First World War, these attempts had been made both on the military front, during the 1918-1919 Polish-Ukrainian War for Lviv, and on the diplomatic one, when, as a result of the military defeat, the Ukrainian elite of Galicia led by Yevhen Petrushevych attempted extensive diplomacy in various European capitals. Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited History 149

Unresolved status Th e decision in favour of Poland was not the result of the recognition of the rights of the Poles or the denial of the Ukrainians’ rights to Eastern Galicia. It was primarily the result of geopolitical calculations made by the Allied powers. Towards the end of 1922, when it became clear that the restoration of Tsarist Russia would be impossible, London and Paris supported strengthening the position of Poland. Warsaw, in turn, despite its still unresolved territorial status, included Eastern Galicia in a general census and called elections to the Sejm and the Senate, which were boycotted by Ukrainian pro-independence political parties. Meanwhile, the Parliament, thanks to the votes of the right-wing parties, passed an act creating a provincial government, which abolished the distinct legal and political system in Eastern Galicia. Th e decision of the Council of Ambassadors Th e decision to give Eastern was welcomed in Poland by all the political forces except the Communists. However, Galicia to Poland after the First this consensus lasted for only a few hours. World War was the result of As early as the next day, various political geopolitical calculations. milieus launched massive attacks in the press, claiming their own diplomatic victory in Paris and attempting to impose their own national policy towards the newly acquired province. Impassioned debates also concerned the problem of the fi ve million-strong Ukrainian minority in Poland. In Eastern Galicia, the vast majority of those living outside the cities were Ukrainians. Th e main dividing line of the debates ran between the broadly understood political right and left. Both sides of the political scene agreed on the most fundamental issue: that Eastern Galicia must become a part of Poland and that it was necessary to prevent the emergence of an independent Ukraine between the San and Zbruch rivers. However, there was a disagreement as to the degree of autonomy for Eastern Galicia and the range of rights for Ukrainians in the new Poland. Th ese discussions were held at various levels, from the ideological to the political and economic. Th e National Democracy movement, the Christian Democrats and the Piast faction of the Polish Peasant Party led by Wincenty Witos opted for the national assimilation of Ruthenian peoples. Th ey argued for “winning them back” to the Polish nation through Polonisation and conversion to Catholicism, and did not provide for specifi c administrative and cultural concessions in Eastern Galicia. In contrast, the Socialists, the Wyzwolenie fraction of the Polish Peasant Party and the politicians who can be described as sympathetic towards Ukraine, or the future advocates of Prometheism, adopted a diff erent approach. Th ey included Tadeusz Hołówko, a politician and journalist affi liated with the Polish Socialist 150 History Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited

Party; Henryk Józewski, a former member of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic; Piotr Dunin-Borkowski as well as Leon Wasilewski. Th e Socialists were willing to grant Galicia territorial autonomy and respect Ukrainians’ cultural and national rights. Th e political platform included institutional assimilation through winning the Ukrainians for the Polish state and granting Eastern Galicia territorial autonomy, which was opposed by the Polish Socialists in Galicia who, feeling the more and more overwhelming presence of their Ukrainian neighbours, opted for a strictly centralised state. Th e Polish Socialist Party proposed the idea of territorial autonomy for the region, according to which the area should be named Województwo Ruskie (the Ruthenian Province) and be comprised of the three voivodships and have its own parliament. Th e right-wing parliamentary majority, however, repealed the project in 1922.

Debates in the press

Th e Ukrainian political elite was also divided over what course of action to take. Th ere were three major political groups: independence milieus striving for a sovereign Ukraine; advocates calling for compromise and cooperation with Poland in the name of real guarantees of national, religious and linguistic rights for Ukrainians; and the Communists who openly intended An independent and objective to attach Eastern Galicia to Soviet Ukraine. press practically did not exist Th e infl uence of the last two groups, however, in interwar Poland. was insignifi cant. A compromise with the independence activists, the most infl uential group among Galicia’s Ukrainian society, was almost impossible to achieve, at least in the period following the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. Th at decision acted as a catalyst for the further shaping of the Ukrainian political scene in Galicia. Yevhen Petrushevych’s Viennese followers, for example, adopted an openly pro-Soviet position and lost their infl uence. In 1925, the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), a party that advocated for the independence of Ukraine and enjoyed the greatest support among the Galician Ukrainians for the years to come, was born. An analysis of the disputes held in the Polish press just before and after the decision of the Council could be an interesting contribution to the study of the political imagination of the Polish elites and the dividing lines between opinions on the image and role of Ukrainians in the Second Polish Republic (1918-1939). It is, in fact, a unique period when all the ideological foundations were confronted by political events. Th is, in turn, led to sharper arguments, clearer stances and a tendency to publish articles characteristic of programme manifestos. Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited History 151

It is also worth pointing out that an “independent and objective press” practically did not exist in the interwar period. Th e press that addressed political issues had political affi liations with specifi c groups and expressed their interests. Modern standards of political correctness were rarely used, hence the language which might be shocking today constituted a part of the standard discourse of political struggle (which does not mean that this language was not off ensive or humiliating). On March 16th 1923, one day after the Council’s decision was announced, the authors of Gazeta Warszawska (Th e Warsaw Gazette) triumphantly interpreted the word “autonomy” used in the decision as the law on provincial government introduced a year earlier by the Parliament. Th ree days later, in an editorial the decision of the Council is used in internal political struggles: “Th e resolution adopted in Paris fi nally removes these unfortunate objective conditions due to which in the bosom of Polish society emerged a group explicitly seeking the transformation of Poland from a nation state to an ethnic state. Th e uncertain frontiers have led to this abnormal situation in which the leftist and Masonic elements can grow the bacilli of federal and autonomous concepts with impunity… Th e time is ripe for us to Th e main dividing line of the break with this disastrous and suicidal politics ... And that’s why we need to win the Eastern debate on Eastern Galicia Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie) through the long in Poland ran between the and persistent work of assimilation. Far from political right and left. any thoughts of oppression against national minorities, we must fully realise that the safety and interests of the country call for the improvement of our national possessions in the east, which were so much depleted during the Russian rule.” Next, the authors outline specifi c changes to implement: “Th e most important thing is the colonisation of the eastern borderlands… Capricious and deceptive military policy on the settlement requires a revision as soon as possible. In the pursuit of the quick and effi cient colonisation of the eastern borderlands, some agrarian policy issues must give way to the interests of the state and the nation.” Th erefore, colonisation is necessary for political, rather than for economic reasons. In addition to the long-term aim of the reinforcement of the Polish character of the eastern provinces, colonisation also had a short-term political objective, which was to stand up to the local Ukrainian communities. On March 23rd 1923, the authors of the editorial continue their argument: “Hostile propaganda here is extensive and widespread. Th e crime rates show murder, mugging, assassinations and arson against the Poles. Th ese violent acts are fuelled by the government headed by Petrushevych, who has reached an agreement with the Soviet government, 152 History Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited

moved to Kharkiv and will work with it. Th is enemy propaganda is supported by the generally hostile attitude to Poland manifested by the Greek-Catholic clergy and all the Ruthenian political parties, both Ukrainian or Russophile.”

Ultra-nationalist vision

Th e Polish national daily Rzeczpospolita, which then was quite inﬂ uential and associated with the Christian National Party and Ignacy Jan Paderewski, published similar news regarding Eastern Galicia. In the evening issue from March 14th, Stanisław Stroński summed up the decision of the Council as evidence of historical justice, and argued that the fathers of this success were neither Władysław Sikorski nor Alexander Skrzyński, but Paderewski and Roman Dmowski, who laid the foundations for this success during the Paris Peace Conference. Th e next issue brings a lengthy article by Leon Radziejowski titled “Małopolska wschodnia” (“Eastern Małopolska”), and is an ultra-nationalist vision of this region. “Th e old land of Czerwień, organically and tribally linked with Poland from the beginning of its history, in the times of the weak Polish state under the Piast dynasty came under the rule of the greedy Rurik dynasty, izgoi princes (in this context, the word refers to a prince without land) for whom there was no place in Ruthenia proper … Th e Rurik dynasty managed to impose the Eastern Rite on this territory and reinforce the fading inﬂ uence of Byzantium. Despite the Th e second half of the 1930s strenuous Ruthenian colonisation they did not, saw the implementation however, manage to change the social structure of the country, which has been forever the land of national concepts of of the Poles, who abhor the lawlessness of the assimilation. knyaz (princes), but love pre-Slavic freedom, glowing all the time in independent Poland.” Next, Radziejowski presents an interpretation of the history of the territory from the Polish perspective: “Th ere was nothing more natural than the transition of the land, once seized by Maria Th eresa, after the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy, to the rule of the resurrected Poland without bloodshed or a suppressed rebellion. If such things did happen, then the fault does not lie with Poland and the Polish people confronted by sick ambitions of the Ukrainian ringleaders, led astray long and persistently by Berlin and Vienna and all evil forces hostile to us. It is thanks to the courage of the children and women of Lviv that eastern Małopolska owes its survival in the Republic at that sad moment when Ukrainian bullets hit the churches of the city, and Warsaw was silent.” All actions taken by the Polish people are interpreted only in terms of the exclusive interests of Poland. Th e September 1922 law “provided the Ruthenians Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited History 153 from Małopolska national and cultural development,” and the elections to the Sejm and the Senate “despite the terror spread by Petrushevych’s envoys, clearly indicated that the masses of the Ruthenian population in eastern Małopolska are by no means hostile to Poland and can no longer be subject to propaganda.” At the end of his article, Radziejowski promises “the Ruthenian people” strictly rationed cultural freedoms. “One is the Republic, where there has been enough room for the national development of Ruthenia, which only under the Polish eagle’s wings can live and thrive culturally.”

Counter-arguments

Th e left looked upon these issues diff erently, but its voice was less audible. At that time the nationalist press was richer, larger in size and better organised. In Robotnik (Th e Worker), the offi cial organ of the Polish Socialist Party, there is little information about the progress of talks in Paris. Robotnik, unlike Gazeta Warszawska, did not have a correspondent in Paris and based its information mainly on dispatches from the Polish Telegraphic Agency. Striking are the diff erent vocabulary and diff erent attitude to the newly acquired province and its inhabitants. In the article of March 16th 1923, Jan Maurycy Borski draws attention to the Soviet attempts to incite the Ukrainian population to rebel against Poland, the possible irredentism from Soviet Ukraine and a boycott of the Polish state declared by Petrushevych’s supporters. Borski asks: “If we want the Polish eastern Galicia and the Eastern Borderlands belonging to Poland to be much more than a military conquest sanctioned by a peace treaty and the resolution of the western powers and if these territories are to signifi cantly strengthen their bonds with Poland, it must be based on the free and full consent of the non-Polish population. One cannot win these people for the Polish state by treating [them] as the mulch for the foundation of the nation with a sense of physical superiority or cultural superiority of Poland … We have written many times that respecting the legitimate national rights of the non-Polish population is of paramount importance for the future and the successful development of Poland … And now our native imitators of Hakata1 blow their battle trumpets and warn, God forbid, not to make any concessions to other nations. Th e same group whose representatives signed a national minorities treaty gave Cieszyn and Vilnius to the Entente, and Eastern Galicia to Tsarist Russia – now shake their fi sts, threatening that they will not give up what they have not won after all.”

1 This is a reference to the German Eastern Marches Society, a German nationalist organisation. In Poland, it was sometimes known acronymically as Hakata or H-K-T after its founders von Hansemann, Kennemann and von Tiedemann. 154 History Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited

Tadeusz Hołówko put similar arguments forward on the pages of this daily in the article “Zasługi Narodowej Demokracji w dyplomacji” (“Th e Diplomatic Merits of National Democracy”). In the text, Hołówko criticised both the National Democrats for misunderstanding the Ukrainian problem and Roman Dmowski for his mistakes during the Versailles Treaty negotiations. By contrast, Marian Uzdowski, a pro-Piłsudski journalist, analysed the decision of the Ambassadors in a broader geopolitical context. In the pro-Piłsudski journal Droga (Th e Path), he wrote “If the left seeks to enable nations of the Eastern Borderlands to use their national and cultural rights more extensively, if it wishes to lead these nations to the voluntary recognition of the Polish state as their own statehood – then it is probably not so much about the triumph of a noble theory as about the future of Poland … If we consider that the present or future Russia will always strive to decrease our borders, then we have to adopt such an attitude to the borderland nations that will not harm us in the future, and that will not force the Ukrainians and Belarusians to turn to Russia.” Addressing the appeals for expansion towards the northeast of Poland, Uzdowski argues that ﬁ rst it is necessary to safeguard against the danger from Russia, which can be achieved by supporting the independence aspirations of the peoples subjugated by Russia.

A new conﬂ ict

Th e Polish elite discussed the Ukrainian issue in Poland throughout the whole interwar period. Meanwhile, the government policy in Warsaw evolved, from the relative thaw after the May 1926 Coup to “experiments” in Volhynia (Wołyń) and attempts to reach a compromise with the Ukrainian elites in Galicia. However, government policy also included the “pacifi cation” of this region. Th e second half of the 1930s brought about the implementation of national concepts of assimilation. Th e decision of the Council of Ambassadors only formally ended the dispute between the Poles and Ukrainian Galicians about the status of Eastern Galicia after the turmoil of the First World War and the collapse of the multinational empires of Central Europe. In fact, it triggered a new confl ict within the Republic of Poland between Poland’s largest ethnic minority and the state, which was treated as an occupying administration by the Ukrainian elite of Galicia. In the interwar period, this confl ict had been developing with diff erent intensity on many levels. Along with the growing awareness of the ineffi ciency of the Versailles system and a sharp swing towards the right-wing ideology presented by the political elite of Europe, including that of Poland and of Ukraine, the positions of both sides were becoming more and more radical. Tadeusz Iwański, Eastern Galicia Revisited History 155

Th e Second World War brought about an escalation of the conﬂ ict. It was disastrous for the Poles from Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, and for almost half a century it precluded the Ukrainians’ chances of creating an independent state.

Translated by Tomasz Gąssowski

Tadeusz Iwański is an analyst with the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and editor of the journal Nowy Prometeusz (New Prometheus). Surviving Totalitarian Regimes

An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková Interviewer: Josette Baer

Eva ‘Mimi’ Jiránkova (born 1921 in London, too, and invited her niece to stay Prague) and Nataša Lišková (born 1949 in 1968. Th at was when we met. in Prague) are two ladies of outstanding NATAŠA LIŠKOVÁ: In 1967, I fi nished charm, beauty, intelligence and wit. my secondary schooling and, as the Th ey experienced the most brutal times state authorities were generous, I was of Czechoslovak history: Mimi lived allowed to travel to England. Later, as through the Protectorate of Bohemia and a student at the London Polytechnic, I Moravia (1939–1945) and fl ed communist even got permission to stay till the end Czechoslovakia in 1948. Nataša grew up of my course in June 1968. I had the in Prague under communist rule, where great advantage of having well-situated she watched Warsaw Pact troops invade relatives in London: Natasha Fisher was Czechoslovakia in 1968 to put an end to my aunt; she and my mother were born in the Prague Spring and Alexander Dubček’s Russia and fl ed the Soviet Union on false attempt to reform the Stalinist communist passports in 1929. After attempts to settle system. Both friends witnessed the Velvet in Constantinople, Athens and Paris, they Revolution, which started on November at last found some comfort in Prague. 17th 1989 – Mimi from her Devon home John Fisher, my aunt’s husband, was and Nataša in Prague. born in the Moravian town of Ostrava; it is diffi cult to say what nationality he JOSETTE BAER: Mimi and Nataša, how considered himself to be, since he was do you remember the beginning of the eldest son of a Jewish family, born your friendship? In what circumstances in 1917 in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. did you fi rst meet? He managed to escape from Prague MIMI JIRÁNKOVA: I met Nataša before 1939. through my daughter Tina; they were Th is background may explain some friends. Nataša’s aunt, Nataša Fišerova, of my later decisions. I fi rst met Mimi was a close friend of mine. She lived in and Tina in 1967. My aunt had a lot Surviving Totalitarian Regimes, An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková History 157 of friends among the Czechoslovak swimming, skiing – it was all talk to émigré community in London and tried us. Now, it was reality. What shocked to introduce me to some of the young us most was that we had to give up our people who were my age. Mimi and her army, and that concentration camps husband could not imagine ever returning were established. to Czechoslovakia, but they managed Th e second most signifi cant event in to teach Tina Czech and, in the 1960s, my life was my marriage to Miloš Jiránek English society defi ned their social class (1909–1989), who was a doctor of law and as “Bohemian”. What a relief and chance the stepson of Jaroslav Stránský (Stránský for me to meet a Czech-speaking girl left with the former Czechoslovak who was my age. government for the United Kingdom Th e Beatles, Jimmy Hendrix or love in October 1938. In the fi rst post-war at fi rst sight were nothing compared Czechoslovak government of 1945, he with the Prague Spring. I left London was the Minister of Justice), the owner after my studies, passed my entrance of Lidové Noviny, the newspaper that exams at the Faculty of Journalism at was close to the Castle, i.e. the former Charles University in Prague and joined, Czechoslovak presidents Tomáš Garrigue in spite of my family’s protests, a group Masaryk (1850–1937) and Edvard Beneš of students who enrolled in a students’ (1884–1948). After fi nishing secondary exchange programme to build cowsheds school in September 1939, I planned in Siberia. to study medicine, but the Germans closed down all the universities in the What is the most signifi cant event protectorate. We were married in dramatic in your life, in terms of Czechoslovak circumstances. After the attempt on history and politics? Reinhard Heydrich’s life in May 1942, MIMI JIRÁNKOVA: Th ere are two. we all prayed that he would die. After First, when the Germans invaded Prague his death, the terror started: the fate on March 15th 1939. Our lawyer, Dr of the village of Lidice is well-known. Karel Zimer, called my father early in the I remember walking past the church morning, which woke me up. My father where the Czechoslovak offi cers were and I stood at the window of our fl at on hiding in the crypt. I was on my way to Masarykovo Nábřeži on the Vltava and visit my grandfather who lived nearby saw the German tanks. It was snowing and witnessed how the Germans were heavily and the tanks were heading to fl ooding the crypt to fl ush the offi cers out. the Prague Castle. I was seventeen years Also, I saw how they picked up people at old. It was the end of our lives, our way random and shot them in the streets. Th e of life. When the Munich Agreement terrible terror lasted until August 1942. was signed in 1938, we teenagers had Miloš and I married on September not thought much about it; we went 15th 1942. We had a big reception in my 158 History Surviving Totalitarian Regimes, An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková

family’s fl at; after the festivities, we went life, since he was originally sentenced to back to our fl at on Národní Třída 9. Miloš work in the stone quarry. was not Jewish. On our wedding day, we NATAŠA LIŠKOVÁ: For me, it was thought that the terror was over, but our the Velvet Revolution, the fall of the friends Rafael Kubelik (1914–1996) and totalitarian regime, and the great belief his wife and her brother, Otakar Španěl, that we shall never be a herd of sheep were arrested. At 4 am, three Gestapo again. men knocked on our door. Miloš opened it and was told to get dressed. Th ey told How would you describe the me that I should stay where I was and that atmosphere in Prague preceding the they would come back. I called my father, Communist Party’s putsch of February who arrived in ten minutes. Dr Zimer also 1948? came and took away all the documents MIMI JIRÁNKOVA: In November that might be dangerous. For three days 1947, Miloš and I were in London. We I did not hear from Miloš. Th en I learnt met Jan Masaryk (1886–1948), then the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, that they had deported him to Svatobořice who warned us not to go home, to stay near Kyjov in Southern Moravia. After in Great Britain. But we went home and one month, I received his fi rst letter; he spent a beautiful Christmas in Prague. asked me to send sugar, bacon, salami Th e journalist and confi dant of Presidents and cigarettes, as he was a heavy smoker. Masaryk and Beneš, Ferdinand Peroutka I was able to visit him in Svatobořice. (1895–1978), was Miloš’s best friend – he After three months, they deported him had spent six years in Buchenwald. After to the Kleine Festung in Th eresienstadt three years, the Germans brought him (Terezín). Around Christmas 1942, a to Prague; Governor Frank, Heydrich’s speech by Jaroslav Stranský was broadcast successor, asked Peroutka to work for by the BBC in London. Th e German- them as editor-in-chief of the German- controlled Czech radio announced a few controlled Lidové Noviny. He declined days later that: “Miloš Jiránek would be the off er and was sent straight back to transferred from the internment camp Buchenwald. to a concentration camp because of the In 1948, Peroutka and his wife escaped Jew Stranský’s speech on the BBC.” Miloš with the help of his students. Th ey had was deported to the Gross Rosen camp found a route through the Šumava (the near Auschwitz. Father and I took the Bohemian Forest). Our daughter Tina was train to Breslau (today Wrocław) and two years old when Miloš and I decided we were allowed to visit him. Th anks to leave. We left on May 1st because the to my father’s intervention, Miloš was Communist festivities provided a good able to get a position in the Schreibstube cover. We took the train to Klatovy and (administrative offi ce), which saved his our contact person waited for us in a Surviving Totalitarian Regimes, An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková History 159 villa in the woods. At midnight, we were analyst; it was the Cold War. We found arrested by the police. We never found a fl at in Hammersmith and I worked as a out who betrayed us. Th ey imprisoned fashion consultant for Liberty’s. In 1989, me in the local prison in Klatovy, without we moved to Devon, where our daughter my daughter. Miloš told the authorities Tina and her husband Paul had opened that it was all a mistake; that we had an art gallery. Miloš died on October 18th just been on a holiday trip to the woods. 1989. I applied for a Czechoslovak visa Th e worst moment was when that old at the end of 1989 and met my brother woman, the prison guard, told me that in February 1990 in Prague. I was fi nally I would never again see my child, that able to go home after forty years in exile. my daughter would be brought up in a proper Communist family. Two days Was the invasion of the Warsaw later, the police from Prague came. Miloš Pact troops on August 23rd 1968 a was sent to the Pankrác prison; and I complete surprise or did ordinary to the infamous Bartolomejšska 4 in citizens suspect that the Soviets would downtown Prague, the political prison. intervene? And how did you conceive After a couple of days, they released me of the normalisation of the 1970s? and I got my daughter back. NATAŠA LIŠKOVÁ: Who could believe Th anks to the amnesty of President that in peacetime, fi ve civilised European Gottwald in June 1948, Miloš was released. countries could invade their neighbour As so often in Central Europe, politics are with tanks and troops (Bulgarian, East absurd: Miloš heard in Pankrác prison German, Hungarian, Polish and Soviet that Prime Minister Antonín Zapotocký troops participated in the invasion in (1884–1957) announced on the radio that 1968)? I heard the news of the invasion, everybody who did not want to live in “the friendly assistance in diffi cult times”, Communist Czechoslovakia could apply on the radio while I was on a four-day for an emigration pass! We sold our trip with friends, travelling by train from Prague fl at and applied for passports to Novosibirsk to Leningrad. By paying a France. Our friend Hubert Ripka (1895– huge amount of money, we managed 1958) arranged for visas and we left for to get air tickets and landed in Prague Paris around Christmas 1948. My father on August 30th. None of us could have accompanied us to the train; it was the imagined then that the troops would stay last time I saw him. in our country for more then twenty years! We lived in terrible poverty in Paris, we In my “history” of surviving under were often hungry. I sold my gold bangles the totalitarian regime, the question was to buy food because, as Czechoslovak not one of “life or death”, but of “better refugees, we were not allowed to work. or worse”. So the most diffi cult decision After three years, Miloš got a job in was whether I should emigrate or stay. the British Foreign Offi ce as a political Should I immigrate to England whilst 160 History Surviving Totalitarian Regimes, An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková

pregnant and stay with a man who could am not religious – I rarely go to church. not understand why my relatives wanted But I do think that there is something to stay in Czechoslovakia? Or should I like a divine principle, a God or a moral stay in Prague, join the party, and try principle above us – something bigger to make our lives better? Do I want to than man, something beyond man. be a refugee? No, I thought, and made NATAŠA LIŠKOVÁ: Surrounded by a decision: let’s fi ght together, with my people we could trust, with a shared sense family in Prague. of humour and absurdity, we were able to With regard to the “normalisation”, fi ght idiocy, evil, violence and humiliation. the loss of illusion would be a suitable Our greatest wish was that, one day, the explanation for persons of my age, but Communists would disappear. the loss of reliability or even credibility was such a disillusion; it taught us to What would you tell the younger be cautious. generation to be concerned with? What can young people learn from How did you, personally, cope your experience? with these diffi cult times? What kept MIMI JIRÁNKOVA: Read the you going: religion, your families, newspapers! Don’t waste time in the your children, political beliefs – or shopping malls or on social websites – something else? read books and newspapers, follow the MIMI JIRÁNKOVA: For me, it was news closely, learn and stand up for your the feeling of freedom, the freedom to civil rights. move, the freedom of the press. We lost NATAŠA LIŠKOVÁ: Don’t be ignorant. everything when we emigrated, but we Th ink. Be humble, but fi ght for the right were free and did not have to live in fear to have your opinion. any longer. I was raised a Catholic, but I

Prof. Dr. Josette Baer is a lecturer in political theory with a focus on Eastern Europe at the University of Zurich UZH, Switzerland. Happiness is Near?

ALEKSANDRA ERIKSSON

Th e Russian city of Perm recently underwent a revolutionary change from a rusting industrial city to a cultural hot spot. But politics and clashes with the city’s inhabitants has put to question the future of this “special project”.

Perm is a Russian city located 1,386 kilometres east of Moscow. It is the last European stop on the Trans-Siberian railroad. With a population hovering around one million, Perm is the thirteenth largest city of Russia, but ﬁ fth in terms of surface, sprawling for more than 70 kilometres along both banks of the Kama River. Th e Lonely Planet travel guide to Russia states that Perm is a place that can easily be skipped. Th ere is indeed no picturesque old town, no landmark buildings or famous restaurants. Th ere is not even a city centre to speak of; people tend to meet up around the McDonalds. Due to the lack of tourist traps, newly arriving visitors usually walk through Perm following the “Green Line”, a tour of historical buildings linked together by a green strip painted on the ground.

Legacy

I start by going down Komsomolysky prospekt, the city’s main thoroughfare, and turn left onto Lenin street. Th e tram tracks are framed by low buildings painted yellow, red or blue, some with white window-frames and stucco details, some stained with graffi ti. Th ere is the Pushkin library; the Ural department of Russia’s Academy of Sciences; and the steamboat central, which is now a business centre. Next is a former merchant’s house that became a bank and a former bank that currently hosts the local FSB as well as the opera and the regional museum. Perm’s fi rst railway station still stands, but few trains stop there since a larger station west of the city took over most of the traffi c. Perm’s fi rst cinema is now barred and abandoned after losing its audience to silver screens in shopping malls. 162 People, Ideas, Inspiration Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near?

A former banya is now host to a gentlemen’s club (it is probably a brothel). Th e post offi ce still functions. Th ese modest examples of neoclassic and Russian modern architecture bring back a bygone world of tea merchants, steamboat captains, gloomy hierarchs and bearded poets whose writings nobody reads today. Th ere is more to Perm Indeed, the people of Perm widely believe that Chekov, than meets the eye. who stayed here for two nights, based the setting of Th ree Sisters, the genteel hinterland that Irina is so eager to leave, on their town at the turn of the century. Perm is cute, but what a contrast to Moscow. Moscow is abuzz with its Gazprom board members, property developers, Chechen taxi drivers speeding down ten-lane riverfront highways; its palaces, concrete compounds, bell towers, brick chimneys, golden copulas and skyscrapers so high that one’s neck hurts from looking up. Moscow is the epicentre of capitalist realism with rush hours, high heels, fast food and coff ee to go. But Moscow is not Russia, and there is more to Perm than meets the eye at fi rst glance. While a settlement located where the Yegoshikha fl ows into the Kama can be traced back to at least 1647, and Perm received its current name and city status in 1780, it is May 4th 1723 that as considered its offi cial birthday. Th is was when the fi rst building blocks of a copper factory were laid, kick-starting the exploitation of the Ural region’s massive natural resources. Incidentally, this factory was mastered by a Swedish offi cer taken captive at the battle of Poltava and brought to the Urals because of his skills in smelting. In the course of the 19th century, copper ores were depleted and Perm eventually developed into a whistle-stop trading in candles, earthenware, leather and soap. Soviet rule, however, reconfi rmed its legacy as a gorod-zavod, a factory-city specialising in nuclear ballistic missiles, petrochemicals, tanks and other necessaries for the Soviet space programme. Because of the sensitive nature of its military production, Perm became a semi-closed city from which foreigners were banned and locals needed special permits to leave. Russian visitors were allowed in, if they could fi nd it: Perm and the roads leading towards it were not always featured on Soviet maps. Th e Soviet times also bestowed Perm with a second heritage, as part of the Gulag Archipelago. Forced labour camps in nearby villages at times provided as much as a third of the region’s total working population. Used as a means of mass repression during Stalinism, their scale eventually diminished to contain dissidents and prisoners of conscience under merciless conditions. Perm’s last camp was closed only in 1992. Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near? People, Ideas, Inspiration 163

Photo: Aleksandr Zykov (CC) www.fl ickr.com

Winter in Perm Russia. With a population of around one million, Perm is the thirteenth largest city of Russia, but fi fth in terms of surface area, sprawling for more than 70 kilometres along both banks of the Kama River. 164 People, Ideas, Inspiration Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near?

New brand Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, industries were either closed down or restructured, adapting new technologies and operating procedures less dependent on labour. Perm, in particular, suff ered from massive job loss. Th e population declined by some 200,000 from 1989 to 2010, falling below the million mark. Today, the number of inhabitants has stabilised as outfl ows are matched by people leaving nearby towns and villages to try their luck in Perm. But rural fl ight is not a reason to rest on laurels, and Perm has faced the challenge of reinventing itself as a city all over again. In 2008, Perm’s inhabitants woke up to Perm has faced the challenge the news that their town had started to build of reinventing itself as a city. itself a brand as the “Bilbao of the East”. Th eir governor, Oleg Chirkunov, proclaimed that a cultural revolution had taken hold of the city and also launched an initiative to make Perm the cultural capital of Europe in 2016. (Th e fact that this designation is only awarded to cities in the EU and candidate countries never stopped his people from trying.) Brussels even saw the opening of the Perm Krai representation offi ce, but the cultural policy’s greatest achievement is without a doubt PERMM, the only Russian museum of contemporary art outside Moscow and St. Petersburg. Th e museum was founded in 2009 by Muscovite gallerist and former political consultant to the Kremlin, Marat Guelman, who also curated a series of noteworthy exhibitions for his new townsmen’s enjoyment. Th e one on Russian Poor or national arte povera, featured artworks made of substandard materials such as duct tape, cardboard, wood scraps, soap and even the ashes from a book burning, and later went on tour to Red October (once Moscow’s brashest gallery, which recently closed) and to the Padiglione d’Arte Contemporanea in Milan. Th e subsequent Gop Art show focussed on a Russian subculture reminiscent of British chavs or Polish dresy (wearing counterfeit Adidas track-suits and indulging in cheap beer, gopniks squat rather than stand, wear slippers instead of running shoes and constantly chew on sunfl ower seeds). Th e museum also held seminars for the young and hip art crowd and creative classes for children, but PERMM’s activities were not limited to those within its white museum walls. In summertime, the city was rocked by Vivid Perm and White Nights, two outdoor art and culture celebrations modelled on the Edinburgh Festival. Perm’s urban art programme, the fi rst offi cial one in Russia, spiced up public spaces by commissioning site-specifi c works from famous and up-and-coming artists. Th e park adjacent to Perm’s central train station was decorated with an arch shaped like the Cyrillic letter P (for Perm) signed by Moscow land artist Nikolay Pollisky. Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near? People, Ideas, Inspiration 165

Boris Matrosov’s Schastey ne za gorami (“happiness is not beyond the mountains” or happiness is near), a giant letter installation at the Kama embankment, became the city’s unoffi cial slogan. A half-eaten apple sculpture was placed in front of the Gorki library. Th e grey concrete palisades shielding power plants and forsaken factories from the rest of the city were painted in bright colours. Guelman became the fi rst director of Perm Centre for Design Development, which was Perm’s cultural zeitgeist put supposed to help local businesses to re-brand it on the map as a laboratory themselves. Russia’s leading web design studio, for urban renewal. Art. Lebedev, was invited to develop Perm’s fi rst visual identity including a logo, street signs and bus shelters as well as a dedicated typeface whose use outside of Perm was forbidden. And all this took place in less than fi ve years thanks to Guelman’s skills and connections, the governor’s endorsement and 2.7 per cent of the regional budget. Perm’s cultural zeitgeist put it on the map as a laboratory for urban renewal. It won rankings of Russia’s best or most promising city and was repeatedly featured in the New York Times. Culture as a magic bullet

However, Guelman was fi red from his offi cial functions in June 2013 and moved back to Moscow during the summer. His dismissal took place shortly after an exhibition critical of the upcoming Sochi Olympic Games was opened during the White Nights, but this was claimed to be a coincidence (the show, for that matter, was very poor). His successor, Elena Oleynikova, resigned within a month, making it publicly known that during her holidays the local authorities tried to cancel a political debate she agreed to host in the museum (other people say she was fi red, and in either case, after Gorbachev’s 1991 debacle Russians know never to go on vacation in tense moments). Th e future of PERMM remains uncertain, as does the city’s cultural policy. In a prior interview for New Eastern Europe, Guelman explained that the cultural revolution aimed to redefi ne the role of the city today, when it is neither a thick- walled fortress protecting townsmen from the enemy, nor a marketplace where peasants could trade their surplus as in medieval times. Nor is Perm the gorod- zavod organising work at local factories. Instead, the city has become the place for spending free time. “So the task of providing people with a rich cultural life is no less important than building roads or providing electricity. [In the lack thereof], people will simply leave for a more interesting place, for a better life ... this is especially true for Russia, where salaries and work conditions are pretty much the same everywhere.” 166 People, Ideas, Inspiration Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near?

During my stay in Perm, I met with Dima, an architect, who enthusiastically told me about the day he bumped into Peter Zumthor at a street crossing: the starchitect and Pritzker Prize laureate was in town to hand in his proposal for Perm’s new gallery. I also spoke with Ilya, who studied icon painting when the revolution came to town. Once barely aware that such a thing as contemporary art existed, Ilya has since become a budding artist that participated in Moscow’s recent art biennale. However, strengthening the local art community never seemed to be one of Guelman’s preoccupations. He mostly worked with artists known from his gallery days in Moscow or from abroad. Furthermore, never one to shy away from the provocative, he seemed to have wilfully divided the city into two camps: those for and those against him, and only those who accepted his leadership were allowed to take part in the Perm project. From a certain point of view, the cultural revolution in Perm thus became a one- man-show, albeit an interesting one, where Guelman distributed roles, dictated the plot and never discussed performances with the public. Th is worked fairly well as long as Chirkunov was in power, but when the Chirkunov stepped down in 2012 and his successor showed less sympathy to the art experiment, Guelman found himself lacking both public and political support.

Gherkins and spaceships

During a panel discussion this October, Perm’s public art curator, Nailya Allakhverdieva, admitted that it was the fi rst time she participated in a public debate about her programme. During the same meeting, local art critic Julia Batalina was asked to present the project’s benefi ts and drawbacks and viciously announced that there was only a great deal of the second. She blamed Guelman’s gang for graffi ti on her waste container and even for the murder of a neighbour (her reasoning was that the Gop Show had encouraged local If you ask the citizens of Perm what chavs to act as they pleased). they need, they respond with one Other participants were less voice: new roads and pavements. belligerent, but nonetheless lengthy in their comments. Despite the moderator’s attempts to steer the discussion otherwise, members of the audience took to the fl oor to point out where Pollisky’s gates really should have been placed, or suggest that outdoor art works are preferably inaugurated in the summer when the weather is better and called for sculptures of gherkins and spaceships instead of a half- eaten apple. Allakhverdieva, a fi ne curator whose work for PERMM has been awarded by her peers, spent a better part of the time looking at her hands and texting. As the Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near? People, Ideas, Inspiration 167 room fi lled with increasing resentments, somebody suggested a group hug. Th e disconcerted panellists from Moscow could only recognise the palpable need for locals to have their voice heard. Sergey Poydo, a Moscow-based urban planning pundit that over the years has participated in several public discussions on Perm’s future, pinpointed the project’s lack of communication as a factor of its failure. “It is not possible to ignore public opinion, if only for technical reasons. When Perm’s citizens, who have a legitimate right to be involved, felt that their city did not belong to them anymore they gathered on the internet [and fi ercely attacked the project in blogs].” Actually, some also tried to burn down the outdoor sculptures, which had to be covered with non-infl ammable coating. What is art, if it does not cause a discussion? A broad debate rarely happens without the fl ow of some bile. But whether art should lead, or rather adapt to, public taste was not the true bone of contention. If you ask the people of Perm what their city needs, they will respond with one voice: new roads and pavements. It is easy to dismiss this request as boring. Pavements do nothing for your city’s brand. Pavements don’t give you a spotlight in the New York Times, probably not even in the Russian press. But many streets and spaces in Perm have not been renovated since the 1980s. Every rainy day, people fi ght to steer clear of potholes and puddles. Kids cannot play without getting covered in mud. Grandmothers are forced to stay at home when the temperature drops, the icy roads are too slippery to risk a venture outside. Th e local demand for rubber boots is high. From this perspective, urban installations come across as insulting to the citizens of Perm.

Uncertain future

Furthermore, Guelman may have left the city, but the culture has not. Perm is buzzing with classy events competing for audiences. A documentary fi lm festival has just fi nished as well as the VIII International Festival of Organ Music. Sir Kenneth McMillan’s Romeo & Julia recently premiered at Perm’s opera and ballet and so did Henry Purcell’s Indian Queen. In parallel, a number of creative souls have set up their own shop. One of Russia’s best bookshops, Piotrovski (named after an exiled Polish insurgent that founded the city’s fi rst pro-democratic bookshop) recently celebrated its fourth birthday. Th ere are vegetarian stores and restaurants, and even a Korean-style café fi lled to the brim with kittens. I attend a meeting where local artists discussed the need of a space of their own. Th ings are happening. Th ere is some kind of movement. 168 People, Ideas, Inspiration Aleksandra Eriksson, Happiness is Near?

But the relations between citizens and their rulers remain as hostile as ever. During budget discussions earlier this year, the dire straits of infrastructure were once again ignored. Investments in culture were slashed while the governor forced out a special tax cut for the beneﬁ t of Lukoil. Because of Russia’s political system, Perm has not had free elections for years. Its leaders are only accountable to Moscow (the involvement of federal powers in Perm’s project is unclear. Th ere are accounts of Guelman’s contacts with Putin’s main ideologist, Vladislav Surkov. It is highly unlikely that the Russian government would have let a revolution go on without its agreement). But Perm’s experience shows that people nevertheless expect to have their say about the city they live in. Th ey want to decide on how their tax roubles are spent (the current governor is criticised for giving out oﬃ ce building contracts to his friends). Th ey have had enough of Moscow-led grand plans and back-seat driving. Th ey want democracy.

Aleksandra Eriksson is the co-founder of POPPOSITIONS, a contemporary art fair that explores how art inﬂ uences urban development. The Evolution of the Central European City

A Conversation with Jan Sucháček, Department of Regional and Environmental Economics, Technical University of Ostrava Interviewer: Maja Drexler

MAJA DREXLER: In your work you focus we take into account the fact that the on the changes that have been taking Central European territory has been place in European cities, especially in criss-crossed by dozens of national, the region of Central Europe. Would administrative and cultural boundaries you say that in Europe we can make throughout history. a clear distinction between Western, At the same time, it is necessary to Central and Eastern European cities? state that Central European borders JAN SUCHÁČEK: The notion of were almost constantly moving and very “Central Europe” has traditionally often they were easily penetrable. Th is attracted large attention. It should be contributed signifi cantly to the specifi c stated that as defi ned by Milan Kundera, charisma of Central European culture the area was “geographically in the Centre, and could be succinctly labelled as the culturally in the West, and politically in “relativity of borders in Central Europe”. the East”. Central Europe can also be Th e less fi xed borders or semi-borders grasped as an interface between East in Central Europe in connection with and West, which reinforces its specifi c the geopolitical position of this region character. Cultural diversity is certainly were the genesis of numerous important a specifi c strength of Central Europe. In historical events. Essentially, the inherent spite of unfavourable developments in qualities of Central Europe would not recent history, the multicultural tradition exist without its historical semi-borders, still forms an intrinsic part of the Central and the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian European identity. Th is multicultural Empire refl ected these attributes. “melting pot” becomes even richer when 170 People, Ideas, Inspiration The Evolution of the Central European City , A Conversation with Jan Sucháček

Currently, we are witnessing a new within these societies as well as their transformation of the Central European diff erent cultures. Th e unfavourable entity. Th e disappearance of borders, heritage of socialism, which lasted over which is leading towards an “opening 40 years, will be remedied over at least of space”, has complex eff ects for the the next 40 years. developmental possibilities of particular Another common denominator territories that are exposed to innumerable which links cities in Central Europe new socio-economic factors and trends. and distinguishes them from the cities We are witnessing a qualitative move in the West is the application of foreign from a passive and clumsy space of solutions in urban development, which places towards an active and dynamic are perceived as a remedy to our many space of fl ows. problems; almost like a perfect model Th e diff erence between Western, for our local development. Th is is what Central and Eastern European cities is I call a “cookbook” approach. You take a no longer limited to physical borders; certain policy that has worked somewhere it is better understood when looked at else and apply it locally hoping for the from the perspective of identity. However, same eff ect. Examples show that this the atmosphere, identity and sense of approach doesn’t always work. Many belonging to a place, is something which solutions which worked well in the West is very diffi cult to measure using scientifi c may not fi t perfectly here. One reason methods. In science, we tend to rely on behind this is the much lower level of numbers and quite often underestimate social trust that can be found in the feelings, which is a mistake. To sum it cities of our region. up and succinctly answer your question: Th e other thing which aff ects the quality it is diffi cult to make a clear distinction of life in Central and Eastern European among Western, Central and Eastern cities is the lack of standardisation. In the European cities. West, urban development is driven by the principles of effi ciency and economisation; So, can we no longer draw a changes that are introduced are quite borderline to clearly mark where predictable and standardised. Here, Central European cities start and end? predictability is still questionable as Th is is a very diffi cult, perhaps even legislation is changing at a much faster impossible, question to answer. Various rate. Not surprisingly, people are under studies on Central European cities more pressure to adapt to these changes. suggest that people living there share It is also very important to stress that similar problems, which, nevertheless, there is a noticeable lack of long-term are diff erent from those experienced by strategies in Central and Eastern Europe residents of Western European cities. Th is in terms of urban development. We indicates a diff erent stage of development don’t ask ourselves where we are right The Evolution of the Central European City , A Conversation with Jan Sucháček People, Ideas, Inspiration 171 now and where we want to be in, say, 20 period as well as the transition to the years. Again it shows that the recipes market economy. from western “cookbooks” often don’t This is the eternal question of work here. Th ey simply can’t because development and relates to the issue people are diff erent, culture is diff erent, of sustainability. Th e challenge we are but also because nobody thinks that we faced with in Central Europe is the should fi nd our own recipes for our own search for balance between economic development. progress and social and environmental needs. In our region, environmental Would you agree with the statement issues were, for quite some time, at the that some cities in Europe can be called bottom level of the priority list. Several both Eastern and Central European cities in Central Europe are known for at the same time? Lviv, for example? their serious problems with air pollution. Lviv, indeed, has components of both a Th e main polluter is often a local factory Central and Eastern European city, which which is owned by a global company. is why I keep saying that the historical Since the owners don’t live in the area of factors have had such an important impact the industry’s operation it is much easier on cities in this region and the way they for them to neglect the environmental look today. Also, we need to keep in mind factors, which are so important to the that transformation hasn’t been fully local population. If we moved them from completed yet; and in many countries large metropolitan areas and forced changes are still taking place. However, I them to live in the industrial areas of also don’t like to simplify the categories our region, then maybe they would start as black or white: Central European or seeing the need to change the methods Eastern European. I prefer to talk more of production and look at them from the about an East-West gradient. Just like environmental point of view. colours, urban development also can be Th is is a problem of the global economy seen in terms of a spectrum. It would be in general and may be diffi cult to solve. better to create a taxonomy based on Th ere is no doubt that today many fi rms gradients than simple opposites, although are more powerful than the cities or even this is extremely diffi cult. the states that they operate in. Th us, they are able to implement what is actually a You mention that development of very simple strategy. Th ey register their Central European cities is at a diff erent operations in what we call tax havens, sell stage than in Western Europe. One products in places where the purchasing of the biggest challenges of this power is the highest, but produce these area has been the negative social products in places where the labour costs and environmental eff ects of rapid are low. Th eir mobility also gives them industrialisation during the communist the power to “blackmail” cities or regions 172 People, Ideas, Inspiration The Evolution of the Central European City , A Conversation with Jan Sucháček

that are not metropolitan and hence helpful. Perhaps a better solution would have smaller investment opportunities. be to raise certain fees as a disincentive Illustratively put, they say: “If you don’t to the high volume of traffi c in a city comply with our strategy, we can fi nd centre. But since a domino eff ect can somewhere else to go.” And this is what very often take place we should be very we also see in many industrial cities of careful. Last but not least, there is also Central Europe. the sensitive question of parking.

However, it is not only industry (local How do you see cities in this region or foreign), but the cities themselves, developing? Will we go on our own which have an impact on the state of path or follow the path of Western environmental protection, for instance European cities? in regards to the large increase in the Unfortunately, I do not see anything use of auto-mobiles. on the horizon for the cities themselves. Since 1989, the use of cars in cities of Th ese cities are rather in the hands this region has increased signifi cantly, of the global powers. Moreover, one as people naturally want to be more should bear in mind that towns and cities mobile. However, evidence from more always constitute a rather peculiar space. developed countries, for example the Intense and complex social, economic, Netherlands, shows that cycling is a cultural and other factors and relations very good alternative, not only from are concentrated on a very small territory. an ecological point of view but also for We are entitled to consider cities as a health reasons. Cycling and walking as “created environment”. And I don’t think an alternative to the excessive use of cars we will follow the Western examples. is indeed being recognised as a viable Th ere are, of course, material components option. But of course it will take time of the cities. But the people diff er. Th e to change the people’ s mentality and tangible side of the city is the same, but develop public spaces, which are often the people, society and culture is what very diffi cult considering the historical is really diff erent. parts of the city. Th is is why I believe these two types of cities will go in two diff erent ways. Some cities are even considering If you look at the way western cities completely prohibiting traffi c from have developed, you generally notice city centres. Is this a good idea? a steady evolution. In the countries of It depends on the situation, but in our region, this development has been many cities the people would be very very diff erent. Taking the example of angry with such a decision. Revolutionary my own country, the Czech Republic, changes, such as prohibiting traffi c in we see that that every 20 years or so, city centres could be more harmful than a serious change takes place: in 1918, The Evolution of the Central European City , A Conversation with Jan Sucháček People, Ideas, Inspiration 173

Czechoslovakia became an independent, future should slowly dissolve. Th is is why democratic state; then 20 years later it the interconnectedness among European was aff ected by the Second World War; cities should eventually become stronger ten years later, in 1948, it introduced than it is today. To achieve this, we have a new form of political and economic to build better highways, railways, and system, it became a socialist republic invest in order to overcome current closely linked with the Soviet Union; in diffi culties in bringing people closer. 1968 we had the Prague Spring; and in Cities as natural meeting points and 1989 we returned to political democracy spaces of dialogue play a pivotal role in and a market economy. these positive processes. Now we are members of the EU but what will happen next? Th ere is a lot What would your advice be to of tension in society, which is very decision-makers of Central and Eastern dissatisfi ed with its politicians and European cities? apparently searching for alternatives. My advice would be to look at the best However, so far nothing promising has yet solutions of cities in the West and rethink appeared on the horizon. And naturally, whether they really are applicable in our cities refl ect societal developments. What cities. In recent years our cities have do cities and societies in Central and been looking to the cities in the West Eastern Europe need is continuous and and asking for the “best practices”, and peaceful development. how those practices can be applicable. Interestingly, these western cities don’t So what will the future bring? Are often disclose their best practices in you optimistic or pessimistic about it? detail, as this could lead to an increase Without a doubt we have to admit in competition from the cities in the that, in many aspects, the European eastern part of the European Union. integration is one of greatest civilisational Most of all, people should identify achievements. Despite its many problems themselves with their city. If people and the euroscepticism, it still looks like their city then they are entitled like the only way for the coming years. to talk about their own identity and Wars in the past were strongly linked autonomy. Th e next thing is to promote to the system of nation-states. To be a self-governing structures. We still don’t competitive power in this global economy have enough autonomy in fi nance and Europe must act together. But to answer manoeuvring space in our cities and your question, let me say this: what I regions. But it is beyond self-government, expect for the future is that even though it is also self-governance – which means we have the Schengen regime and a it stems from the people, who create a seemingly border-free Europe, there are local identity of which people are proud still visible mental borders, which, in the of their city or region. Identifi cation is the 174 People, Ideas, Inspiration The Evolution of the Central European City , A Conversation with Jan Sucháček

best solution in order to develop. If people of great importance in this context as only take the city as a place of work and our cities should be able to “sell” their not for life, nor for interacting, then we unique features to precisely delimitated will remain at an impasse. Cities should target groups. Openness in the widest be treated as a nice place for family life. sense plays an indispensable role in this Last but not least, our cities need an context. appropriate marketing. Positioning is

Jan Sucháček is a professor at the Department of Regional and Environmental Economics of the Technical University of Ostrava in the Czech Republic.

Maja Drexler is a Polish freelance journalist. Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei, Andrzej Wajda Books and Reviews 175

A Different Wajda? seriously even by the communist authorities, upon whom he was completely dependent. At Wałęsa. Człowiek the same time, there is an increase in the number z nadziei (Wałęsa. of people who despise Wajda’s work. Among Man of Hope). A fi lm his most fi erce opponents (even enemies) directed by Andrzej are people from fi lm and literary circles; they Wajda, Poland, 2013. include people who were close to him, having either worked for him in the past or were his assistants. But Wajda is above that, and he still holds one of the most important, if not central, Andrzej Wajda’s fi lms tend to spark heated positions in Polish cinematography. debates among Poles. Since Poles are a nation Wajda’s 1974 fi lm Ziemia obiecana (The interested in politics, Wajda’s fi lms cause Poles Promised Land) was nominated for an Oscar. to refl ect on issues such as their homeland, Even today, many international cinema experts Poland’s tragic history, national vices, betrayals, think that the members of the American heroes and renegades. Wajda’s fi lms quite often Academy made a big mistake and showed themselves become very important events, great ignorance by not awarding Wajda back artisitically, culturally and also politically. then. Wajda might not have received the Oscar, Andrzej Wajda is not your average director. but was recognised and received proposals He is a professional who is involved solely in to work in France, West Germany and other fi lmmaking or staging theatre plays. Since the countries. At the time when Wajda was at the mid-1950s, particularly since the release of his peak of his artistic abilities, communist Poland Kanał (Kanal,1956) and Popiół i diament (Ashes was heading towards its own collapse. and Diamonds, 1958), viewers (in Poland, but, In 1976, Wajda made another fi lm, Człowiek over time, also worldwide) as well as professional z marmuru (Man of Marble). In this fi lm, the fi lm critics have been impatiently waiting for director clearly shows his political affi liations: Wajda’s subsequent productions. In fact, in Wajda became the main “bard” of the democratic Poland Wajda has become somewhat of a opposition. The communist authorities felt prophet: a fi gure who speaks for his nation, to betrayed and cheated, but also quite powerless. his nation and on behalf of his nation. Wajda History began to accelerate. has performed this role elegantly. In that same year, after the June What’s more, Wajda is attracting more demonstrations in Radom, the Workers’ Defence and more supporters and “followers”. He is Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR) surrounded by people who are deeply devoted was established. Its goal was to fi ght oppression to him and his fi lms. Over time, Wajda has and support the workers. The intelligentsia and become not only a professional but also a the artists opted for the side of those oppressed political and moral authority. One can say that by the government. In 1978, a Polish Cardinal, he is his own “institution”. Wajda is considered a Karol Wojtyła, became Pope John Paul II. A key fi gure of the Polish School and was treated year later, the Polish poet Czesław Miłosz was 176 Books and Reviews Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei, Andrzej Wajda

awarded with the Nobel Prize in Literature, from the August 1980 strikes, became the fi rst while Wojtyła paid his fi rst papal visit to Poland. prime minister of democratic Poland. Wałęsa In August 1980, Poland was swamped was still the leader of Solidarity; he and the with strikes. The Olympic Games took place trade union turned into a support base for in Moscow. Polish TV reported that the Polish Mazowiecki’s government. The government athlete, Władysław Kozakiewicz, won the gold introduced many necessary, but socially painful medal in the pole vault. Shortly after, the anchor reforms, and faced drastic consequences. The announced that an electrician, Lech Wałęsa, was Solidarity activists once again turned to Wałęsa the leader of a strike at the Gdańsk Shipyard. for help. As a result, the paths of Mazowiecki This was also the fi rst time, when Poland and and Wałęsa began to separate. Wałęsa became the world learnt the name of a man who, for uncomfortable with Mazowiecki’s advisors, a years, was to remain one of the most important tight circle of intelligentsia gathered around persons in Poland and in Europe as a whole. Gazeta Wyborcza. A new party, called the In 1981, Wajda made another fi lm, Człowiek z Citizens’ Movement for Democratic Action żelaza (Man of Iron). It talked about the August (Ruch Obywatelski Akcja Demokratyczna) 1980 events and the creation of Solidarity. One of was created and soon turned into another the heroes is Lech Wałęsa who even personally political organization that became known as took part in the fi lm, playing a minor role. In this the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności) – a party way, Wajda became Wałęsa’s personal friend and that disavowed Lech Wałęsa. a strong supporter of Solidarity. On December In the new political reality, there did not seem 13th of that year, Poland’s leader General Wojciech to be a place for Wałęsa. He was too simple and Jaruzelski announced Martial Law. For the key uneducated. He was good for the strikes but fi gures in the democratic opposition, including there came a time for him to leave. During the Wałęsa, it meant imprisonment. presidential campaign, Wałęsa and Mazowiecki For Poland and its citizens, the 1980s were fought against each other. The actions of the a wasted decade, one that came to an end Freedom Union brought about the so-called with the Round Table compromise in 1989 “war at the top”. Wałęsa’s path and the paths and the fi rst free elections in June of that of his advisers parted for good. year. These elections were like no other, but Solidarity’s base then fell into the hands of also ones where anybody who had ever their two brothers: Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński: the picture taken with Lech Wałęsa had a high architects of Wałęsa’s presidential campaign. chance to win a seat in the Polish Parliament. The campaign was a successful one, and in In those elections, Andrzej Wajda was elected 1990 Wałęsa became the President of Poland. a Senator of the Third Republic of Poland and However, this offi ce and function turned out became one of the owners of the daily Gazeta to be too diffi cult for an electrician. This time, Wyborcza, whose editor-in-chief was (and still Wałęsa and Kaczyński brothers parted. Wałęsa is) Adam Michnik. was left with poor advisors. Alone and wounded As a result of the elections, the late Tadeusz he returned to Gdańsk. He did not understand Mazowiecki, the head of Lech Wałęsa’s advisors why things had turned out the way they had. Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charles Gati Books and Reviews 177

He was disappointed with everyone. The post- The distance is too small and the historical communists began to triumph. Five years after perspective too short. I was raised on Wajda’s the Solidarity’s victory, the leader of the new fi lms. If I was shown any excerpt from any left, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, became the of his fi lms, I would recognise his style right president of Poland. All oppositionists, the entire away. Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei is a fi lm that democratic opposition, felt sad and stupid. in no way resembles Wajda’s old fi lms. This is All this, in a nutshell and with some completely diff erent cinematography; it is a simplifi cation, is the political context for Andrzej diff erent Wajda. Un-Wajda-like. Wajda’s most recent fi lm Wałęsa. Człowiek z I would like the world to understand this piece nadziei (Wałęsa. Man of Hope). Without this of work. I believe it can help one understand context, understanding of the fi lm is nearly the Polish soul. However, I fear that this task impossible. When the news was announced could be slightly too diffi cult. that Wajda was planning to make a new fi lm about Lech Wałęsa, I asked myself two simple Ryszard Jabłoński questions: “Why?” and “What for?” Translated by Iwona Reichardt Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei is a better fi lm than we could have expected. Its strength is the actors: the fantastic Robert Więckiewicz as the title hero and the charming Agnieszka Grochowska Beyond the Cold Warrior in the role of his wife, Danuta. The backbone of the fi lm is an interview that the Solidarity Zbig: The Strategy leader gives to the Italian journalist Oriana and Statecraft of Fallaci (played by an expressive Maria Rosaria Zbigniew Brzezinski. Omaggio). Thanks to the applied structure Edited by Charles of the fi lm, the fl ash-like narration becomes Gati. Publisher: Johns seriously disciplined and makes an impression Hopkins University of a cohesive whole. In the fi lm we see an Press, Balitmore energetic and feisty worker whose fate puts him Maryland, USA, 2013. in a highly complicated political and historical context. In Poland, we have already forgotten In the introductory chapter to Zbig: The the unsuccessful presidency of Lech Wałęsa. Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the As president, he lost the aff ection he enjoyed book’s editor Charles Gati – a participant in the from the society. In one of the scenes, Wajda Hungarian Uprising of 1956, a professor at Johns prophesises that this will one day take place. Hopkins University, and a friend and colleague of After having seen the fi lm, I got to like Zbigniew Brzezinski – writes that while Brzezinski Wałęsa. And if this was Wajda’s goal, he has is one of the few academics whose books can achieved it. But this fi lm certainly does not top the bestseller lists and is one of the most present anything new or revealing about infl uential American statesmen of the last the main fi gure of the Solidarity movement. century, no previous book exclusively devoted 178 Books and Reviews Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charles Gati

to him has been available to American readers. of time. Brzezinski did not consider Hussein’s While this statement is not entirely true (Patrick Iraq to be a totalitarian state in the same way Vaughan had previously published Brzezinski: that the Soviet Union was (or that the Third A Life on the Grand Chessboard of Power) Zbig Reich, which Bush compared Iraq to, much to – a highly readable volume of refl ections on Brzezinski’s irritation, was). Also, while Brzezinski the legendary Cold Warrior by academics, saw growing Soviet power to be a threat to journalists and Brzezinski’s colleagues that American interests, he did not consider Iraq nonetheless avoids the dryness of a classical – which he described as a poor country of 22 academic tract – is a welcome addition to the million – to be such. On the contrary, Brzezinski fi eld of political science, simultaneously being correctly predicted that the war would cause a portrait of a complex, intellectually rigorous, the United States to lose much of its prestige and self-confi dent Polish-American academic abroad and thus hurt its foreign policy potential. and national security advisor in the Carter Zbig is also notable in that, while administration, as well as a refl ection upon unquestionably admiring its subject, it is no American foreign policy in the post-war era. hagiography and discusses his fl aws. Also, while Like all brilliant minds, Brzezinski cannot Brzezinski often appears as an arrogant professor, be pigeonholed into narrow “left” or “right” this book does exonerate him to some extent, categories. A lifelong Democrat, Brzezinski documenting that while he initially supported enjoyed friendly relations with Ronald Reagan, American engagement in Indochina as an with whom he shared a determination to see advisor to the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, Europe reunited. Reagan read and was infl uenced Brzezinski did ultimately become a critic of by Brzezinski. Brzezinski refused to support his the war after travelling to Vietnam and seeing party’s 1972 presidential candidate, George the absurd carnage of the confl ict fi rst-hand. McGovern, whom he saw as an idealistic, naïve The chapter “Beijing’s Friend, Moscow’s Foe” pacifi st out of touch with reality and endorsed probably comes closest to criticising Brzezinski Republican George H. W. Bush over his own outright. The chapter correctly notes that party’s Michael Dukakis in the 1988 elections, while few Cold Warriors were as anti-Soviet as believing that the former would be tougher Brzezinski, he has downplayed human rights on Communism. Meanwhile, while Brzezinski abuses in the People’s Republic of China and was part of the Democratic Party’s “foreign has refused to recognise Taiwan, believing that policy right wing” and made no compromises amicable relations with the Chinese must take in fi ghting Soviet hegemony during the Cold precedence over such concerns. The chapter’s War, he became a dove in the post-Cold War authors do not pass judgment on Brzezinski; era and one of the most outspoken opponents rather, they explain his point of view. of the United States’ invasion of Iraq during the That chapter would be even more interesting George W. Bush administration. if it made mention of Tibet, which like Brzezinski’s However, Zbig’s authors eff ectively show beloved Poland in the 20th century was a that Brzezinski’s views on foreign policy have deeply religious land with an ancient culture been remarkably consistent with the passage whose struggle for freedom was embodied by Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charles Gati Books and Reviews 179 a charismatic, world-famous religious leader makes perfectly logical arguments, showing his (in Poland, he was Pope John Paul II and in Kremlin interlocutors that their empty nostalgia Tibet, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama; both men for Lenin is anachronistic and that, contrary to shared very friendly relations); devastated by Gorbachev-era propaganda, Lenin was not a Communism; a victim to its more powerful benevolent founding father of the revolution neighbour. If Brzezinski was so committed to a whose message was distorted by his successors. democratic Poland, why was he mum on Tibet? Rather, Brzezinski argues, Lenin was a murderous Unquestionably, the chapter of Zbig of the ideologue and fanatic who paved the way for greatest interest to readers of New Eastern Europe Stalinism. The Moscow bureaucrats Brzezinski is “Brzezinski, the Pope, and the ‘Plot’ to Free meets come off as intellectually dull and symbolic Poland,” written by Patrick Vaughan, an American of a Communist ideology that was burned out, professor at Kraków’s Jagiellonian University. while Brzezinski is at his intellectual best. The chapter discusses the silly conspiracy As mentioned before, Gati’s Zbig is not a theory promoted by the KGB that Brzezinski biography. However, Brzezinski’s youth is scarcely and another Polish-American – the Archbishop mentioned. For example, it is only in the last of Philadelphia Cardinal John Król, who along chapter of the book – in Gati’s conversation with with Cardinal Franz Konig of Vienna indeed was the subject of his book–does the reader learn one of the two main kingmakers who helped that Tadeusz Brzezinski, Zbigniew’s father, saved elect Karol Wojtyła to the papacy – orchestrated the lives of many German Jews by facilitating an elaborate scheme to elect an obscure their escape from the Third Reich by issuing Polish cardinal as Pope John Paul II and thus them forged visas when he was working for destabilise the situation in Poland, weakening the Polish diplomatic corps in Leipzig in the Moscow’s control over its involuntary allies. 1930s. This bit of information would have been With regards to Solidarity, Brzezinski – much very useful in the context of the absurd and like Ronald Reagan – saw that Poland was the behind-the-belt attacks on Brzezinski that as a least obedient of all of Moscow’s satellites, and Catholic of Polish origins he must be a crypto- could greatly upset the Kremlin’s hegemony anti-Semite, and that his adamant support for in Eastern Europe. As a result, Brzezinski and Palestinian statehood results from this. While John Paul II developed a close friendship (the this accusation – as well as Brzezinski’s views Polish pope frequently made joking references on the Arab-Israeli confl ict more generally – to thank Brzezinski for electing him) and spent is discussed frequently in previous chapters, hundreds of hours talking over the phone on the subject’s father’s noble activities to help how to defend human rights behind the Iron German Jews are only mentioned at the very Curtain and how to bolster Poland’s growing end of the book. dissident movement. Another part of Brzezinski’s early life that Also of note is Marin Strmecki’s chapter is completely omitted from Zbig yet would titled “Witnessing the Grand Failure in Moscow, be helpful in understanding his staunch 1989.” The chapter shows Brzezinski at his best. anti-communism is his father’s diplomatic The Polish-American academic and statesman service in the Soviet Union. Throughout 180 Books and Reviews What Does Europe Want? The Union and its Discontents, Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat

Zbig, it is suggested that Brzezinski’s status Europe in the Time of Cholera as a Cold Warrior and anti-Soviet hawk in the Carter White House result from his Polish What Does Europe background. Everyone knows that the Poles Want? The Union draw anti-communism and distrust of their and its Discontents. powerful eastern neighbour with their mothers’ By: Slavoj Žižek milk, the authors write. However, that is a and Srećko Horvat. simplifi cation. While it is true that most Poles Publisher: Istros Books, are anti-communists and that in the past United Kingdom, 2013. two centuries Poland was often a captive of Russia, the country had its own red butchers. Feliks Dzierżyński – a Polish nobleman and the fi rst head of the Cheka, the fi rst Soviet secret The new book by Slavoj Žižek, a Slovenian police and the prototype for the NKVD and professor known as “the Elvis of cultural studies”, KGB – comes to mind. and Srećko Horvat, a philosopher, publicist Equating Brzezinski’s battle against the and star among Croatian intellectuals, is an Soviet Union with his Polish-American identity immense critique of the European Union’s is thus simplistic. It is worth noting that in current neoliberal path. This path, according to 1936-1937 Tadeusz Brzezinski was posted in the authors, is leading to a permanent civil war Kharkiv, Ukraine, and saw Stalin’s man-made both outside and inside the EU. Joined by Alexis famine that led to the deaths of seven million Tsipras, the leader of the Greek Coalition of the Ukrainians from starvation fi rst-hand. At the time, Radical Left-Unitary Social Front (SYRIZA), they Zbigniew Brzezinski was a child of eight and develop a critical assessment of the absence of nine, but the experience was formative and led ideas for Europe’s future among political elites, to his opposition to the Soviet Union perhaps who try to fi ll the gap with austerity measures as much as his Polish identity. Unfortunately, and structural adjustments. They reformulate Zbig makes no reference to Kharkiv. the famous Freudian question “What does Nonetheless, Zbig is a necessary portrait of a woman want?” asking “What does Europe a hawk who gave Washington the necessary want?” and admit some perplexity when faced ammunition in the fi ght against Communism with the enigma of Europe’s soul. during the Cold War (after all, Brzezinski was a For everyone who has seen Horvat and key player in the United States’ role in defeating Žižek speaking with each other in public, it is the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the American obvious that they act in conversation like two boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in brilliant jazz musicians – capable of listening Moscow was his idea). It is a shame that to each other, improvising and answering with Anglophone readers have had to wait so the right tune at the right moment. The energy, long for such a volume. the wisdom and the unexpectedness of their Filip Mazurczak dialogue makes the expectations related to their new book quite high. Despite its energy, What Does Europe Want? The Union and its Discontents, Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat Books and Reviews 181 wisdom and unexpectedness, the actual lack the soul of Europe. They refer to the words of of dialogue is slightly disappointing. Jacques Derrida expressed in his last interview The book is a collection of 18 essays given before his death: “Europe is under an accompanied by an interview and a debate obligation to take on a new responsibility”and transcript. Although the structure makes it add that it does not refer to the “European diffi cult to see the book as a whole, the authors Union as it is today, or the one conceived by have succeeded in creating several main today’s neo-liberal majority, but a Europe that characters in a very consistent way. Greece is coming”. The authors draw attention to the and Croatia, just like Hansel and Gretel, are crucial distinction between the perception walking down the uncertain path deep in the of the European Union as Europe and Europe European forest; the left is lost but courageous itself, which gains even more importance in the and fast learning just like Alice in Wonderland; context of the peripheral origin of both authors the Europe of today – ruled by the bankers – is and the uncertain future of EU enlargement. just like The Land of Cockaigne ruled by the The objection to the fragmentation of Snow’s Queen, whereas the Europe of tomorrow Europe is also represented in the interesting – ruled by society – seems to be the diverse, re-construction of the Balkans through the solidary and egalitarian land of Narnia. re-inclusion of Greece, which has been The considerations of the authors sometimes excluded from the region in the European astonish the reader with their naïve dichotomy political narrative on the Western Balkans of perception. They distinguish only good and since the late 1990s. The fact that both Žižek bad, the left and the right, society and the and Horvat see the Greek case as a testing fi nancial elites, as well as with the unrefl ective ground that allows Europe to examine its belief that Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and ideas for battling the crisis inevitably brings Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez are shining examples to mind the already classic metaphor of the of socio-economic transformation from the Old Balkans as the Europe’s political laboratory. The World and that SYRIZA will totally change the reintegration of Europe as a whole, emphasising future of the European left. Nevertheless, readers its strong interconnections, seems to be a will be amazed by the authors’ knowledge very fundamental point the authors make and intensity. Two crucial points were made in the book. This idea of reintegration and by the authors, making the work a valuable interconnectedness has essential consequences and important insight to the debate on the for discussing the remedy for the economic future of Europe. crisis, such as the idea of equating mutualisation First, they underline the value of Europe. of sovereignty with mutualisation of debt or They highlight what Žižek has been pleading the strict opposition to the commonly shared for years now, but which gain a totally diff erent belief that the decision about the future of meaning in these times of continuous crisis: Europe will be made within the Eurozone. The namely, the Leftist-Eurocentrism that should book follows to a great extent a very Balkan be the answer to the question on the future way of perceiving time: where the future is of Europe. They claim the need to fi ght for relatively clear and known (the bright future 182 Books and Reviews What Does Europe Want? The Union and its Discontents, Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat

belongs to the left) and it is the past that While the authors admit that the idea remains uncertain. of shifting Europe beyond the EU is highly The second extremely valuable element important, they remain silent when it comes of the book is bringing up the issue of the to the crucial question of “how?” Horvat, consequences of Croatia’s accession to the Žižek and Tsipras blame those in Brussels and EU. Horvat justly claims that Croatia joined Frankfurt for the negative consequences of the the EU at a point when this was the EU that neoliberal order. The victimised societies are needed Croatia more than Croatia needed it. both inside and outside the EU. The omission of He cites data that may be quite surprising for the question of further EU enlargement makes a European reader who joined the EU with the it unclear as to how trans-border relationships great enthusiasm in the early 2000s. Twenty between the societies should be established million euros, for example, were paid by the and developed. One could assume that social European Commission to a London-based PR solidarity should be the answer. This, however, agency to break the myths and misconceptions remains at least possible in the context of the about EU enlargement and to ensure that diminishing working class and the progressive Croatia’s accession is smooth. More importantly individualisation of European nations. though, Horvat draws attention to an issue The crisis should have benefited the that has been consequently ignored by the European left, but instead it has only exposed new Member States so far: the question of its weakness. This time, the authors do not ask legal and illegal immigration. Croatia fi nds the fundamental question “why?” The answer itself in a very vulnerable situation due to its that one can conclude from the book is that it geographic location. It has an enormously long is because of the lack of Thatcher-like political sea border and as well as long land borders leaders on the Left and the oppressive behaviour with some less-than-stable countries. The of the fi nancial elites. But that is still a little terms of signing the Schengen Agreement vague. This ambitious book makes no attempt with Croatia and its border security are part to ask the Gramscian question on whether the of the ongoing discussion in Brussels. Horvat, left can still win the culture war and makes no however, poses a much more important eff ort to discuss the challenges of meritocracy question: are the Member States ready for the and the precariat’s ability to act in solidarity. increasing numbers of immigrants from Eastern What Does Europe Want? is an incredibly Europe, the Middle East and Africa? While the interesting book that has been written by two institutional dimension of the question – the thinkers who come from the countries which legal solutions, the number of shelters, the seceded from Yugoslavia shortly after it had training of personnel – are important, the experienced the fatal economic and societal crucial question is how the recent ethno- consequences of the IMF-imposed austerity religious confl ict and nationalist experiences measures in the 1980s. As they are arguing for will transform and evolve when confronted with Europe to survive – in contrast to Yugoslavia cultures, ethnicities and races from territories – the authors make a more or less successful, even more distant. and valuable, attempt to overcome the eternal Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness, Lyudmila Ulitskaya Books and Reviews 183 left-wing challenge of the determinate negation. Ulitskaya writes in the foreword: “As put together, They raise the crucial question on what new the passages from letters written by people order should replace the old; instead of asking of diff erent ages, social and educational the same question that everybody asks right backgrounds will change your attitude to the now in Europe - how to fi ght the crisis. events from the past … [these stories] show us the reverse side of the Soviet myth, the true life Ida Orzechowska of an average man … I have spent many hours with these frank and honest documents and encountered great examples of compassion and mercy in them. Having read and searched Letters on a Post-War Country through the letters over and over, I developed a feeling of deep agreement of opinion and Детство 45–53: а emotions with the people among whom I live. завтра будет счастье Maybe for the fi rst time in my life.” (Childhood 45-53: And This is a wonderful and honourable idea Tomorrow There Will Be – to collect and publish people’s memoirs Happiness). By: Lyudmila about times that seem to be not so remote Ulitskaya. Publisher: АСТ, from us, but so richly covered with myths and Russia, 2013 speculations. This epoch was very politically charged and turned into literature. The book Childhood 45-53, however, shows the life of Memoirs devoted to an epoch or a person the ordinary people of that time in the way will not surprise anyone. However, this book it really was; adjusted, of course, through the of memoirs has been composed in a very lens of each of the letters’ authors. curious manner. Following the trail of Lyudmila This lens is not simple: the authors tell about Ulitskaya’s Childhood-49 stories, a writing contest their childhood, unwittingly embedding into called “After the Great Victory” was announced. these memories facts which they actually The editorial staff called for people who were learned much later – in the 1960s or even children in the post-war decade to write a short the 1990s – from their relatives, friends, from (or not very short) memoir essay about the most books and newspapers. It is certainly easy to interesting, typical, important, amazing or sad tell the personal from the embedded. But things that happened to them – something the multi-layered structure of such texts is that would never be forgotten. There was an extremely interesting. They tell us much more overwhelming response with more than a about the psychology of the Russian people thousand entries from people not only living in in perceiving the past. Russia, but also in the former Soviet republics, The editors admit that without Ulitskaya’s the USA, Israel, Germany and even Australia. participation, the contest “would not have The present book contains only a small happened”: the authors of memoirs needed number of these contributions. Lyudmila a dialogue with a writer they trust. There are 184 Books and Reviews Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness, Lyudmila Ulitskaya

no biographical references about the authors Ration stamps were cancelled in 1947, but of the memoirs. According to Ulitskaya, it is famine remained in many regions of the country. not so important who these people are now, “Burdock stem, dock, ground elder, linden what is important is how they remembered leaves, sedges, saltbush, nettles” these are not the remote events and honestly describe them. quotations from a schoolbook on botany, but This book is a kind of “private encyclopaedia” the list of plants eaten in the Moscow Oblast. of the Soviet way of life and reality (or a sketch “Here is a post-war recipe: burdock stem of such encyclopaedia). Out of the pile of notes and root were peeled, cooked and eaten.” rises a collective novel about joyful, strange People queued for bread overnight, in order and horrible times. Memoirists speak about to buy, with a bit of luck, a precious loaf – the characteristic and now forgotten details, the only one, before afternoon the next day. and signs of an epoch, habits, expressions and Generally life was poor, cramped, and diffi cult. manners. Here, every minor detail has a historical Adults, after paying all dues, taxes and loans, meaning. There are short episodes of everyday hardly had any money left to buy bread, salt life, and voluminous autobiographical stories or matches. Such nuances of life in those with characters and psychology. days as poverty, alcohol abuse, fi ghts in the Ulitskaya arranged the texts into groups communal apartments, backstreets and bars are according to the themes (the outdoors, the also described abundantly. Many combatants kommunalka [life in a communal apartment], that liberated half of Europe could not make school, Victory Day, fear etc.), and wrote a a peaceful life, and soon lost themselves to foreword to each chapter with background and drinking or went to prison. And still people context. For example, she provides numbers on lived with hope. They were glad when they got child mortality in the post-war Soviet Union, their fi rst gas stove, or fi rst TV set or refrigerator or the amounts of grain exported by the at home. They watched new movies, went state in those years. The archive documents to football matches and listened to foreign and the real human witnesses complement records played on a trophy gramophone. The each other and enter into a special relation. word “happiness” stands in the title of the book Numerous family photos sent by the authors for a reason, and the photos exude optimism. of memories and features in the book create Many of the everyday activities described the eff ect of a documentary. in the book are long gone from today’s urban If we imagine that Childhood 45-53 would life. The Soviet industry was behind demand come into the hands of someone who knows and citizens were encouraged to make a lot of absolutely nothing about that era, these things themselves such as clothes, household memoirs will provide a vivid and clear insight items, etc. Six decades ago, standing in line into the life of those days. The book describes for shopping served as a main source of what Soviet people sang and which sports they information for ordinary people. Private nurses played, how they cooked food in a common and housemaids worked hard in the big cities – kitchen, or bought things at the fl ea markets these were often women from villages that fl ed thronging with people “with thievish faces”. “the kolkhoz paradise”. However, movements Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness, Lyudmila Ulitskaya Books and Reviews 185 of population were watched vigilantly: district The post-war Soviet Union also meant police offi cers and superintendents regularly German prisoners, war treasures and parents’ made the rounds of apartments by night. service in occupied Germany. The soldiers left Starting in the late 1940s, there was a fi ght everything that could not be transported to against “cosmopolitan” teachers in schools. the Motherland at the border in Brest-Litovsk. Separating boys and girls in school was a “Grand and upright pianos and even harps practise cancelled soon after Stalin’s death. hulked up like a captured herd of rhinos!” the However, in some schools, pupils attending the daughter of a Soviet offi cer recalls. “Adults said tenth grade continued to study separately and that the cleverest and smartest ones carried when teachers suggested the reunion of boys suitcases packed with needles for sewing and and girls, some directors opposed vigorously: gramophones instead of junk.” People did “Do you want me to open a maternity ward feel sympathy for the prisoners, even though at our school?” they were former Wehrmacht soldiers, and All the letters sent to the publishing house even gave them some food from their scarce for this book were regarded as equal; celebrities supplies. A jazz band of German prisoners, did not receive any privileges. Still, there are professional musicians from Berlin that were several big names among the authors of the mobilised during the last months of war, played book. In particular, writer Aleksandr Kabakov at the town dance hall in Vologda. However, (who has reconstructed many details of post- the Berliners were soon replaced by Soviet war life in his novels) wrote about his family’s trumpet-players; according to the author of life in the military station at Kapustin Yar, where this recollection: “There were people that went his father a railroad engineer and a recent ‘to the right shop’ saying that the Soviet youth combatant, had served. ought not to dance to the Fascist pipes.” Only The world shown in the book is very much later did the children of the post-war years diff erent from the world depicted on posters learn that the former prisoners of the Red or in books and fi lms of that time (some of Army who returned home had even tougher these fi lms continue to enjoy great popularity). times than German prisoners. Propaganda proclaimed the growing welfare Stalinism gradually intruded on private life. of the people and the tireless care of the party Holes stared out from family albums: the faces in relation to each Soviet worker, even when of dead, repressed relatives were blacked out at the same time 40 babies in a nursery were in order to protect those who were alive. But attacked by rats. The lives of only 10 of them how can you explain to a child the origin of were saved, but their faces and necks were such an ink-spot? In one family, the parents deformed with bites. That was not written about persuaded a doctor to change the birthday in the newspapers (and even today not every of a child from March 5th 1953 to March 6th: media outlet would mention this). According they did not want such a happy day to be to tradition, everything was attributed to the associated with the death of their adored diffi culties of the post-war period and the “Father of Nations”. damages caused by Nazi aggressors to our state. 186 Books and Reviews The Formation of Modern Nations: Ukraine – Russia – Poland, Roman Szporluk

Families that raised these future authors subject to proper adaption. However, all these were scattered around the Soviet Union. In wrinkles add to the immediacy and authenticity fact, this book is like a fi ctionalised atlas of the of the book of memories prepared by Lyudmila Soviet Union: Samarkand, Chelyabinsk and Ulitskaya; ones that can be rarely found even Pskov Oblasts, Tbilisi, Leningrad, Karaganda. in the most talented fi ction books. Naturally there are plenty of Moscow memories as well. “I have lived at Staraya Basmannaya Andrey Miroshkin Street, in Basmannaya Sloboda for all my life. Translated by Olena Shynkarenko I like this name a lot, and I am very much fond of this place. Razgulyay Square, Lefortovo Park, Pokrovka Street, Syromyatnicheskiy Lane are all within a stone’s throw…” If we take away the politics, there are plenty Reading Szporluk on Maidan of touching and almost nostalgic stories about particular collectivism of that time, family Формування модерних relationships and home routines. “Family націй:Україна – Росія – behaviours were astonishing. Everyone had his Польща (The Formation or her duty for which he or she was responsible of Modern Nations: before the family. One was responsible for Ukraine – Russia – kerosene and garbage, another for bread Poland). and medicine. And nobody ever reminded By Roman Szporluk. the boys that something was not done. The Publisher: Duh i litera, boys themselves controlled the status of their Kyiv Ukraine, 2013. assignments. And how well they studied, how much they knew, how much they read, how Recently published in Ukraine, the renowned intelligent they were! From the very outset Ukrainian historian Roman Szporluk’s of the war the boys followed the enemy’s Формування модерних націй:Україна – Росія expansion and marked occupied towns with – Польща (The Formation of Modern Nations: fl ags. And how they were oriented at the Ukraine – Russia – Poland) is a journey through present moment. A map hung on the wall of the history of the formation of modern nations our house, and our father could randomly ask in Eastern Europe. With essays depicting the a question on geography. You’d better answer contemporary history of Ukraine, Russia and that question! Otherwise three extra duties!” Poland presented in the context of the entire Some of the memoirs are close to being region and its complicated past, this book off ers off ensively short; others seem to end abruptly a deep insight into each of these countries (these were written or dictated to relatives by and their close interactions. At the same time, seniors, some of whom did not live to see the the collection is a summary of over fi fty years book’s publication). There are some storylines of Professor Szporluk’s academic work and that could make good “fi ction” stories or novels, research. The Formation of Modern Nations: Ukraine – Russia – Poland, Roman Szporluk Books and Reviews 187

The key concept of the book of essays is book titled Communism and Nationalism: Karl nationalism, which is presented here in its Marx versus Friedrich List in 1988. broadest sense. Szporluk explains how this Szporluk himself admits that he belongs movement contributed to the key political and to another generation, that his story “ended territorial changes of the twentieth century in 1991”. Thus, the events that took place and played a particularly important role in in the 20th century are much closer to his the shaping of modern societies. Being a heart than the present. This is probably why revolutionary force that broke up once very it is more the younger generation, which has powerful empires, nationalism has led to a never experienced directly many of the events creation of nation states and helped move Szporluk describes in his essays, that feels the mankind from the agrarian to the industrial era. most that it can dare make some criticisms In his analysis, however, Szporluk, points and may agree or disagree with some of his to one more factor which has proved crucial statements published in the book. Having said to the shaping of societies in the region of that, it is important to note that the book is a translation of his previously published essays Eastern Europe – communism. In a rather (never published as a compilation), but that unique way, Szporluk attempts at presenting does not by any means lower its value or these two ideologies as equal phenomena importance. In fact, the feeling here in Ukraine that share something in common. And indeed, is that it may give us more answers to some as he argues, they do. Both of these concepts questions than we have even expected. presented a means to change the world As said before, The Formation of Modern through industrialisation and they both made Nations is a collection of articles previously a signifi cant contribution to the formation of published in English written by Szporluk modern nations in Eastern Europe. between 1973 and 2009. As a piece of the Readers of this book should be ready larger puzzle, each essay is a completed text. for an intellectual challenge. An easy read Grouped thematically, not chronologically, the it is not. Unquestionably, as a respected essays gradually pull the reader deeper and professor emeritus of Ukrainian history at deeper into the issues, complex history and Harvard University, Szporluk has a full right to its consequences. But the book also has a very a complicated narration with the intertwining clear structure: it is divided into three parts. of facts, opinions and emotions. A graduate of In the fi rst chapter, the author introduces the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, concepts of both the nation and nationalism. Oxford University and Stanford University, where The chapter focuses on the formation of nations he studied law, social sciences and history, in modern times, which is here understood as Szporluk received the position of professor of the period of transition from the agrarian epoch history at the University of Michigan in the mid- to the industrial era. The second chapter deals 1960s. Since 1991, he has worked at Harvard with the history of empires in Eastern Europe. University. Always interested in the topic of Here, the centre of the analysis is the formation nationalism, Szporluk published his seminal of the Russian and Polish nations. Finally, the 188 Books and Reviews The Formation of Modern Nations: Ukraine – Russia – Poland, Roman Szporluk

third chapter deals with Ukraine. In a typical Russian nation and its privileged position in way for Szporluk, the analysis is not presented the Soviet Union. Szporluk was also not afraid from the perspective of one country, closed to depict the horrors which took place, based within its territory and isolated from others, on Stalin’s orders, in the late 1930s, including but rather put in a broader context of that the arrests and targeted killing of intellectuals country’s close relations with its neighbours. as well as deportations of the disagreeable Throughout the book, Szporluk repeats that nations – Germans from the Volga region, the nations are never formed in isolation, but are a Kalmyks, the Balkars or the Crimean Tatars. result of diff erent types of cultural and political Pointing to these facts, Szporluk argues that infl uences: “making one nation is the unmaking in the Soviet Union, as a result of the offi cial of another,” he poignantly writes. policy of the communist party, non-Russians In the chapter titled Dilemmas of the Empire, were replaced by either Russians or those who Szporluk shows the Russian path from empire, had been successfully Russifi ed. Today, even through the Soviet times, to the present. though we have much better knowledge The main question he asks refers to Russia’s of these tragic events and the eff ects of the modernity. In other words: has the Russian imposed Russifi cation, it is still worth refl ecting nation already been formed, or is it still in the on Szporluk’s questions regarding the future process of formation? The question that follows of the nations in the region, including how is how does the imperial heritage aff ect the will Russia continue to live with its imperial worldview of today’s Russians and what is their and Soviet experiences? perception of the countries of the former Soviet In the essay titled “After the Empire: What’s Union? While attempting to answer these very Next,” Szporluk makes his own predictions relevant questions, Szporluk notes that today’s regarding the future. While discussing the problems in Russia are still deeply rooted in collapse of the Soviet Union he assigns a special the past. Claiming that the Russian Empire role to his homeland of Ukraine. His way of did not lead to the creation of a nation state, argumentation is the following: the unity of he argues that the main idea of the Tsarist the Soviet Union was broken because of the regime was based on Orthodox values and annexation of the Baltic states and western not a community based on Russian language Ukraine after the Second World War. For these or culture. It was later, during the Soviet times, new citizens, the Soviet system was something when the communist party propagated the alien and even hostile. so-called “national Russocentrism”. While reading Szporluk’s book, one has a Unlike many of his colleagues, historians feeling that even though the author was writing who lived in the Soviet Union, Szporluk had about these issues 20 or 30 years ago, they are the opportunity to tell the Western world the still quite relevant today. This is particularly true truth about communism and the tragic events in the case of Ukraine. For example, in 1994, that occurred in the Soviet Union. And he when writing on the economic, moral, social used it, especially in the essays he wrote in the and even environmental problems that Ukraine 1970s focussing on the issue of the “leading” was facing, Szporluk already noted that they The Last Deal, Wiesław Myśliwski Books and Reviews 189 were closely related to the remains of the Soviet in these three countries. Hence, he stresses, in system, the Soviet social institutions and values today’s international relations, Ukraine should and, thus, drew a division line inside Ukraine. He be considered more than merely an object of then presented two viewpoints: one being of others’ actions. “those who are for the Soviet system (or what Szporluk’s book is not an “ethnic or national they remember as the Soviet system)” and the autobiography”. Neither is it a history textbook other being of “those who want to move from or a guide to nationalism. It is, however, an Soviet Union towards ‘Europe’”. Reading these extremely valuable resource for anyone who words today we can clearly see how little has wants to better understand modern Polish- changed. Ukrainian or Ukrainian-Russian relations and While discussing the formation of modern learn from a very unique perspective something Ukraine, a topic of the third chapter, the historian about the history of the whole region. In other examines the Ukrainian path from the “imperial words, it is a must-read for anyone interested periphery” to an independent state. He stresses in Ukraine, Russia and Poland. the Austrian, Polish and Russian infl uences on the nation of Ukraine. Szporluk attempts Anna Kotaleichuk to destroy a common stereotype that the formation of modern Ukraine was linked to it being under Russian domination for about Unravelling the Past three centuries and argues that what has had a much stronger impact on modern Ukraine Ostatnie rozdanie was its being part of the Polish-Lithuanian (The Last Deal) Commonwealth and the Austro-Hungarian By: Wiesław Myśliwski Empire. This thesis is in clear contradiction Publisher: Wydawnictwo with the “three fraternal nations” (Ukrainians, Znak, Kraków Poland, 2013. Russians and Belarusians) concept strongly propagated in Russian historiography and which has clearly infl uenced public opinion in Ukraine. Additionally, it has also impacted Dariusz Nowacki, one of the most highly the perception of Ukraine in the West. Tackling valued and infl uential critics of contemporary the problem of the misperception of Ukraine’s Polish literature, wrote in his review of Wiesław roots, Szporluk tries to explain from a historical Myśliwski’s recent novel Ostatnie rozdanie (The perspective why for Russians Ukraine is still Last Deal) that the need for a masterpiece is so a part of their territory. Arguing against this immense that it has become a driving force. misconception, Szporluk concludes that the The largest publishers have a tendency to formation of modern Ukraine chronologically place laudatory slogans on newly-published coincided with the formation of modern Poland, books, slogans that acclaim a book that has Germany and Russia. Independent Ukraine been neither read nor reviewed as the work of emerged in 1991 as a result of the major changes the century. It is true that a real masterpiece is 190 Books and Reviews The Last Deal, Wiesław Myśliwski

always awaited and anticipated. It is also true, on a straight road. He talks about human however, that we have waited long enough life unhurriedly, with details. Similarly to his for Wiesław Myśliwski’s latest novel to expect a previous novels, he argues over the problem of masterpiece. But the truth is also that Ostatnie people’s attitudes when confronted with their rozdanie is not a masterpiece. We cannot own fate; the human sense of responsibility or exaggerate. But it certainly was worth the wait. passivity; endless choices and malfunctions, It was worth the wait even for the mere necessities and incidents. The main character pleasure of holding this book in our hands; of Myśliwski’s most famous novel, Kamień na for the moment of fulfi lment that was yet to kamieniu (Stone Upon Stone1), wishing to build come; and also for the story itself that Myśliwski a family tomb, runs through his whole life but has mastered, no matter what story he tells. none of his memories gives him peace of mind Myśliwski defi nes his literary works as having and only evokes others. In Widnokrąg (Horizon), roots in the peasant theme. A number of his awarded the prestigious Polish NIKE Literary characters have peasant origins; the background Award in 1997, the main character and his son for the story is often the Polish countryside and arrive at the family home in the countryside, the history, or consciousness-related changes and he thinks back on his entire past, recalling occurring there. Myśliwski’s prose, however, the colourful characters of his close and distant is not only about that. It is about the way of relatives. And it turns out that going back is telling a story, about the story itself. The culture possible; memory saves our humanity, the it originates from and then overcomes used to one that defi nes us.Traktat o łuskaniu fasoli (A be the culture of verbal communication and Treatise on Shelling Beans) is a great monologue storytelling. Before writing became popular, the of an elderly man, a monologue in the rhythm only way to remember important things was of shelling grains, one that evokes the past. to memorise them and then listen to a story. The present in Myśliwski’s prose is exclusively Hence, the story must be good enough a story about the past. There is no future. for the teller to carry on telling it, to go on Similarly, in The Last Deal everything belongs to forever; to pass it on to others, and, more than the past and is carried around in a thick address anything, to be willing to listen. This is the case book that is falling apart. It turns out that many with Myśliwski’s prose. You want to listen to it. names and addresses that the main character Even if the storyteller is making it longer and has been collecting for years have ceased to inserting some digressions, and even, at times, mean anything – in his memory, they have no when it becomes a bit of a bore – these are connection with any face or position. They are the rights of the story. Myśliwski is very well either addresses of the dead or ones we are not aware of these rights and has mastered using sure if they are associated with the correct names. them. What is more, he enforces their respect. Listening to Myśliwski is a pleasure to which one needs to mature. His prose is demanding 1 The book was translated into English by Bill Johnston but, at the same time, it shapes the reader and received in 2012 the PEN Translation Award and the and takes them by the hand, although not Best Translated Book Award. The Last Deal, Wiesław Myśliwski Books and Reviews 191

The paradox is that the people from the who is passionate about his game of cards. address book, both the known and already The main character (nameless; all the others forgotten, those cemented in memory or have names or nicknames, he is the only one mere acquaintances, become important for deprived of either) plays a last game of poker our hero only after they are gone: when they on his grave. And perhaps he plays with the depart from his life, when he leaves them, dead Mateja with more ease than with the when they pass. When they are close, alive and living one. present, when they need his presence, he treats There is also Maria, his sweetheart from them as if they were not important. He does school; his love, forsaken like everyone else. not get attached to women. He did not visit He had been receiving letters from her for his mother for years. He returns to her house years. Maria settled down, started a family, only when the building becomes a ruin. He got an education and a good job, but she does not understand a suicidal person trying never stopped loving him all those years to draw attention to himself by any means and that is why she kept writing to him. The possible. He buys a camera to take photos of narration moves smoothly from his story into the place where his best friend, whom he had her letter as if that letter was a continuation of not seen for many years, died in a car accident. his monologue, or, to be more exact, a dialogue When talking about memory he says: “it that remains unanswered as he does not reply may change the most painful event that has to her letters. Never. He begins searching for happened to us into the sense that we have Maria only when she reveals in one of her experienced it.” He cannot live with people letters that she is going to take her own life. and behaves as if he was waiting for them He himself does not have an easy life either. to become a memory. As if human life was He is constantly moving and fl eeing places. valuable only when it becomes history; or an He drops out of university where he studied address in a notebook. A narration. It is easier painting, abandons his apprenticeship at to talk about people than to mix with them. the tailor’s, sells garden gnomes, clothes and But people are out there. Each story has antiques. He gains a lot: a position, wealth and extremely colourful characters, where every independence. It is easy for him to connect with single one is an individual. We might wonder women, though he dislikes staying too long at the indiff erence of the main character in one place. There are constantly recurring towards them. It is enough to mention the tailor refl ections about him not knowing himself, his apprentice sprinkled with Romeo fragrance sense of alienation, the diffi culty with being (hence his name), a man of many talents and with himself, perceptions about ourselves that burdened with some kind of hatred towards we have and that usually are far from the truth. the world, which he refers to using the worst What hurts him is himself. possible cursing. Or a wonderful fi gure of the Perhaps the reason why readers also fi nd mother concealing the past from her son his story painful is that it is deprived of oddity. and forbidding him from cutting any of her There is an ordinariness that concerns us. There favourite roses. Or fi nally Mateja, a shoemaker is an endless inability to live with oneself and 192 Books and Reviews A Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Joanna Kulas

others that concerns us. There is a tattered was sure I had been playing cards with Mateja.” notebook with memories, a notebook with a Unravelling soon shows the character’s attitude past that is carefully recreated even though towards the world. He does not attempt to it does not concern anyone any longer. One build from scratch but wishes to re-sew and cannot build a relationship on it. One can only alter old things. However, he does not alter build a narration which is both beautiful and as them because he will never learn to sew. All idle as rewriting the addresses of dead people. he can do is unravel. Apart from rewriting and remembering, Even though The Last Deal is strongly located the book is predominantly occupied with in post-war and contemporary Poland, and, another activity: unravelling. While learning the in our Polish unravelling, it could be read profession from a tailor named Radzikowski, anywhere and in any language since memory our character starts with unravelling clothes collectors are everywhere; as are those who for alterations. Radzikowski reveals the secrets are distant and close to others, as well as those of his profession only to his most talented who simply wish to listen. apprentices, while he assigns the others the most basic and boring tasks. Therefore, our Zośka Papużanka character ends his adventure with tailoring Translated by Justyna Chada by unravelling clothes. Radzikowski represents the old, pre-war tailoring that knows neither clichés nor The Ethos of Bridge Builders repetition, which is based on knowledge of the human psyche and a sense of the value that lies in individuality. After the war, Poles would have a lot of their clothes altered, as there was neither fabric nor money for new ones. Therefore, a father’s trousers would be altered into a son’s or a military coat into a jacket. There is some type of art in unravelling and re-sewing. There is some fraud to it too. “Even though I tried not to show it, after a Podręcznik dialogu. Zaufanie i tożsamość, few months I could barely lift my head from red. Krzysztof Czyżewski, Joanna Kulas, unravelling, my neck would be cracking and Mikołaj Golubiewski, Sejny 2012; my head would be pulled down while inside A Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity, I felt that alternately anger or despair would Eds. Krzysztof Czyżewski, Joanna Kulas, swell. However, as soon as a Sunday came it was Mikołaj Golubiewski, Sejny 2011. as if I missed the unravelling. In the wardrobe, I once looked for an old overcoat that I had Published by the Borderland Centre of grown out of and took it to the attic. It took Arts, Cultures and Nations (Pogranicze – me three Sundays to unravel it. My mother sztuk, kultur, narodów) and the Borderland A Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Joanna Kulas Books and Reviews 193

Foundation (Fundacja Pogranicze), both by Pogranicze were real discussions in which operating in Sejny (Poland), the bilingual openness and learning about other points of (Polish and English) Handbook of Dialogue view were considered the utmost value. It is also is a result of several years of work, meetings, for this reason that the reviewed publication and discussions that took place as part of deserves its title, A Handbook of Dialogue. the New Agora International Symposia and However, some might be a bit surprised the Intercultural Dialogue Colloquium. This why this book is even called a handbook. It wandering academy held debates both in clearly does not off er any pieces of advice or Europe (Sarajevo 2006, Wrocław 2007, Sejny ready recipes on how to carry out a dialogue. 2008, Berlin 2009) and in the Southern Caucuses It does not include any defi ned conditions that (Tbilis 2005). Not surprisingly, the publication should be met to create a dialogic situation. The refl ects the geographic and cultural diversity authors, however, undertake an attempt to make of these encounters. But what was the subject an encyclopaedic order. Throughout its pages, of this series of debates? we fi nd boxes with defi nitions of key concepts Among issues discussed were multiculturalism or a presentation of some facts relevant to the and interculturalism, pedagogy and the role debate. And, above all, there is the Bordeland of social and cultural animation, relations Glossary, which is a kind of a dictionary of between politics and religion, and the politics dialogue explaining such important phrases as of remembrance. However, such issues as agora, borderlander, connective tissue, derwish, community and responsibility were also encounter, galut, hospitality, interculturalism, heatedly discussed. In this wide spectrum, one maidan, neimar, other, stari most and tarika. thing is common: all of the above-mentioned The authors consciously avoid ready recipes. problems are extremely timely, if not to say In their view, the “handbook” is meant to be burning. an inspiration for further independent search. And that is why this bilingual publication is It is meant to encourage the readers to ask an interesting voice, and its dialogic nature also their own questions regarding which features refl ects its interdisciplinary approach. Within the and abilities should someone working in a debates, the problem in question is addressed multicultural environment master. It is meant by philosophers, sociologists, language and to be an invitation to refl ection on the ethos of teaching specialists, and psychologists. In the borderlanders, a re-consideration on the addition, the discussions were joined by both role and meaning of culture in the building the theoreticians and practitioners, which is of a democratic society that is open to others. actually quite rare even nowadays. This is of Some readers will probably ask the question great value, as it is an attempt to bring these – isn’t a dialogue a utopian postulate or is it two worlds together. Academics and social a possible social practice? To the sceptics I and cultural activists, while often together would recommend reading Edwin Bendyk’s during various conferences or congresses, rarely text included in the publication in which have a chance to go beyond the lectures and he explains two diff erent understandings monologues. In contrast, the debates organised of the word “utopia”. Bendyk also writes that 194 Books and Reviews Klezmer’s Afterlife, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Magdalena Waligórska

while there is a common perception of what Reframing the Debate prosperity means, with its measures being the speed and scale of development, we Klezmer’s Afterlife: are also stuck at an impasse and the world, An Ethnography of the which constantly faces new and emerging Jewish Music Revival in threats and on-going confl icts, seems nearly Poland and Germany. By: impossible to understand. In this context, Magdalena Waligórska. Bendyk brings about the view of the academic Publisher: Oxford director of the Museum of Europe in Brussels, University Press, 2013. Krzysztof Pomian, who wrote in the 1980s that humanity was facing a crisis of the future as It is not easy for many Jews to visit Germany the idea of prosperity and wealth turned out or Poland, two countries that were once home to to be a superfi cial utopia and, hence, what the thriving Jewish communities. The vast majority contemporary man needs more and more is of these Polish and German Jews were ruthlessly a new, truly utopic vision. annihilated in a historical blink of an eye. Yet Such a vision is the proposal of the people for many Jewish visitors, the restless ghosts of gathered around Pogranicze. It is written into ancestors murdered in the Holocaust appear the idea of a new agora, the ethos of bridge to linger in the wonderfully preserved Jewish builders, the attitude that is focussed on meeting district of Kazimierz in Kraków. For others, the the other, the formula of dialogue. More than spirits of great uncles and aunts throng the fancy anything, however – as Tadeusz Sławek, one boutiques and art galleries of the completely of the participants in the symposia, writes – rebuilt district of Scheunenviertel in Berlin, such a utopia gives us a sense of direction as once a place where Orthodox Jews rubbed it does not mean a denial of reality. It off ers shoulders with the criminal underworld, a the prospect of the transformation of the real. stop-off point that became a “promised land” It is a dream, but a dream into which reason for many Jews from the East fl eeing the Russian and deep refl ection are written. pogroms of the First World War. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Russian Dorota Sieroń-Galusek Jews have fl ocked to Berlin, which currently has Translated by Iwona Reichardt the highest population of Jews in Germany. But in Kraków, Jewish visitors are greeted by an eerie silence. Unless, that is, they happen to encounter one of the hundred or so practising Jews that currently reside in the city, or decide to visit one of the Jewish-style restaurants on Szeroka Street. Here, they are more than likely to be assailed by non-Jews belting out a modern approximation of the primarily instrumental music that once accompanied the social rituals Klezmer’s Afterlife, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Magdalena Waligórska Books and Reviews 195 of the Jewish shtetl, particularly weddings. The of the manner in which the debate has been same could happen in Berlin, where as many framed to date. She argues that appropriation as 20 klezmer bands currently ply their trade. is often actually a healthy natural process Again, many of the musicians are not Jewish. that attends practically any form of creative Clearly, the contemporary performance of endeavour, especially those produced at klezmer by non-Jews is about much more than “contact zones” where cultures interconnect music. This is the basic premise of Magdalena and collide or negotiate tentative boundaries Waligórska’s provocatively titled Klezmer’s with each other. In fact, she argues that klezmer Afterlife. An Ethnography of the Jewish Music was originally a highly hybridised art form that Revival in Poland and Germany. To some critics of liberally borrowed from other cultures, especially the Jewish music revival, which really gathered Roma and local folk music. And it wasn’t only pace in Germany and Poland since the early performed by Jews for Jewish events. Klezmer 1990s, the music performed by these non- kapelye of the past apparently performed at Jewish imposters, rather than reanimating Christian as well as Jewish weddings and a long lost tradition, is a grossly inferior occasionally contained a mixture of musicians version of the original, which has no claim of diff erent ethnic backgrounds. to authenticity and is therefore of negligible Having concluded that appropriation per se aesthetic value. Some Jewish academics have is not necessarily a bad thing, Waligórska takes created ingenious metaphors to depict what has a classical ethnological fi eldwork approach to been the dominant discourse for the last two her research, focusing on the workings of a decades – the appropriation and consumption group that is composed of (mainly) non-Jewish of their Jewish culture, or even identity, by non- musicians and cultural organisers, “living among” Jews in spaces that once contained thriving her quarry and asking precise questions at Jewish communities. To some of them, this opportune moments about their motivations is “virtually Jewish”, a “Jewish Disneyland” or and how they feel about what they do. By “cultural necrophilia”. They are particularly catching musicians after concerts, when they disturbed by what some view as a creepy are often most lucid, and guaranteeing their kind of philo-Semitism amongst non-Jewish anonymity when broaching personal subjects, audiences and musicians, which appears to she managed to capture candid statements off er solace for feelings of profound collective that would suggest, on the whole, that klezmer guilt over the atrocities committed during the performed by non-Jews is much more than Holocaust or mask latent antisemitism based commercial exploitation. on damaging stereotypes. For many of her interviewees, performing Rather than wading into this understandably klezmer in “Jewish spaces” caused them to emotive debate armed with a collection of refl ect on dark periods of their nation’s past. The choice metaphors, Waligórska’s meticulously comparative ignorance of some of the Polish researched book dissects the basic premises on musicians could be attributed in some cases to which this debate has been taking place. What an educational system that unfortunately still emerges is an appeal for a radical reformulation fails to adequately recognise the contribution 196 Books and Reviews Klezmer’s Afterlife, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Magdalena Waligórska

and suff ering of the Jews during the war. A the reader into new chapters by starting with young musician refl ects that the revelations a little story or anecdote before gradually contained in Jan T. Gross book Neighbours building an argument. For example, the fi rst (2000), which contained an account of the chapter starts with a charming vignette of Jedwabne pogrom of July 1941, during which at Chopin improvising on wedding dances with least 340 Jews were rounded up and murdered such skill that “fl abbergasted Jews could not by their Polish neighbours, felt like a “cold resist dancing”, hailing the young prodigy shower” to musicians brought up on the “Poles “as a born Jew”, before going on to trace the as victims” martyrology narrative that still history of klezmer and the klezmer revival, dominates public discourse. Despite a frequent from the early days when musicians in Kraków reluctance to open up on the subject, as many would deliver self-printed fl iers on bicycles and as a third of the Polish and German musicians the late 1990s boom to the current scene in confessed to being victims of antisemitism, Berlin and Kraków, where many musicians are episodes that eff ectively forced them to consider seeking to fi nd their own voice by disassociating what it might feel like to be Jewish. Others were themselves from the tradition. The second concerned that their activities were sometimes chapter provides an overview of critical literature being manipulated for political ends. Some based on “the paradigm of appropriation” as a musicians felt like outsiders caught between two “dominant descriptive framework.” In the third worlds, ashamed of the antisemitic behaviour of and fourth chapters, she presents a positive members of their own ethnic group yet rejected image of the klezmer revival as a space of by members of the Jewish community. One occasionally painful but ultimately life-affi rming German musician told of how he had been negotiation between cultures and examines “congratulated” a few times by Arabs while how the klezmer revivalists are creating their on tour for being German, as his nation had own language. Chapter fi ve examines the murdered Jews and another mentioned that politicisation of klezmer and the fi nal two while performing in Israel, some Orthodox chapters ask why non-Jews play klezmer and Jews had asked for their money back when how it aff ects their identity within groups and they found out that he wasn’t Jewish. Other as individuals. The chapters are bound together musicians fi nd that Jewish audiences project by a dynamic counterpoint that encourages the Jewishness onto them during concerts and reader to compare and contrast developments refuse to accept that they are ethnic Poles in Europe’s two most important centres of or Germans. One musician from Berlin even klezmer, Kraków and Berlin. recalled how an audience member had pleaded In many ways, Waligórska is a perfect guide with her: “some grandfather of yours must have through the exhausting treadmill of the concert had an adventure.” circuit. Currently, an assistant professor of East The book is exceptionally readable European History and Culture at the University considering the complexity of the heavily of Bremen in Germany, she is a native Pole, who nuanced subject area. This is partly due to its studied English at Jagiellonian University in reader-friendly structure. Waligórska invites Kraków before picking up an MA in European Klezmer’s Afterlife, Krzysztof Czyżewski, Magdalena Waligórska Books and Reviews 197

Political Sociology from a Swedish university and as well as non-Jews, comments: “The idea of a doctorate from Florence along the way. Her authenticity in music is extremely reactionary fl uency in German, Polish and English clearly and problematic... The only authenticity I am granted her access to a wide range of sources interested in is a personal authenticity.” as well as allowing her to interview musicians In the fi nal chapter, she limns portraits of from a range of backgrounds without the the “marginal Jew”, a non-Jew who identifi es potential distraction of an interpreter. But it as Jewish and the “situational Jew”, who is her multidisciplinary background that really (temporarily) identifi es with Jews in certain enables her to clarify her argumentation in what contexts. This approach even enables her to is her fi rst full-length book. She draws from accommodate Janusz Makuch, founder of the a wide range of disciplines, including social Jewish Festival of Culture in Kraków, whose psychology and ethnomusicology, and even complex identity has puzzled the media for turns to legal theory to defi ne “collective guilt”. years. Hardly surprising, as he portrays himself This leaves the reader in absolutely no doubt as a non-Jew who attends synagogue as well as about how she is employing nuanced terms a cultural facilitator “knocking on Jews’ window and concepts and sets an excellent model for shutters in the morning... and inviting them to students and academics wishing to delve into the greatest and most beautiful synagogue highly complex areas of cultural behaviour. in the world.” However, it is her profound understanding The author’s application of identity theory of group identity theory that really allows her also ties in well with another theory that to make sense of the vast amount of materials plays a prominent role in the book – Oswald she had at her disposal. Contemporary identity de Andrade’s cultural anthropophagism, theory not only allows for multiple identities the symbolic eating of another culture. This but also makes clear that boundaries between implies careful selection of the “raw material” groups are often fl uid or permeable. This of culture (here Jewish heritage) and mixing assumption not only allows her to question the with other cultural infl uences to regurgitate validity of such rigid and potentially harmful a completely new product or even a novel dichotomies as “Jew” and “non-Jew”, but proves language of creative expression (or “creole”). to be a very useful framework for understanding De Andrade takes this further, making the the complex identities that klezmer musicians radical but attractive proposition that “only sometimes choose to adopt. It also enables her by absorbing and digesting the culture of the to undermine the assumptions of critics who other... are we ultimately able to articulate the question the authenticity of klezmer-infl uenced self”. This would suggest that, for non-Jewish music made by non-Jews. Claims of ethnic klezmer musicians, klezmer is a lens that not ownership would appear to be, at best, an only “magnifi es otherness”, but sharpens their unhelpful hindrance if identities are as malleable “perception of self”. The fact that cultural as she is suggesting, and could in fact impede anthropophagism creates a completely new, the creative impulse. As Berlin-based musician, innovative product not only validates the Daniel Kahn, a Jew who works with fellow Jews eff orts of musicians who choose to remember 198 Books and Reviews Wajda. Political Critique Guide, Holland. Political Critique Guide, Skolimowski. Political Critique Guide

the past by participating in an act of creation, a critical, outside the box, but also lends weight to the assumption of look at the legacy of three musicians on the fringes, like Daniel Kahn, that of them (Polański has not Jewish culture needs to continually innovate yet been granted his own if it is to survive: “the culture was murdered, so guide) sounds marvellous. we have to do a kind of Frankenstein thing”. Krytyka Polityczna (Political This book is a good read not only for social Crtique) – a circle of left- science scholars, especially those involved in wing intellectuals from multi-disciplinary research, but also anyone Warsaw – has been interested in cultural history, in particular the publishing this series of fi lm historical and contemporary relations between guides for three years now. Germans, Poles and ethnic Jews. The interview The books are printed in extracts and examination of how group identity pocket-sized format. Some theory can enable us to understand the complex of them contain interviews dynamics of creative decision-making will be with directors, as well as of interest to thoughtful musicians involved essays written from a variety of perspectives: in almost any genre. Finally, cultural organisers sociological, anthropological or political. Now operating within multi-ethnic environments and then, fi lm analyses from the feminist point will undoubtedly be inspired by the positive of view might also be spotted there. message this book sends. Currently, the whole series is made up of a dozen or so guidebooks. I have selected Philip Palmer three samples for this review; the others deal with Polish documentary cinema, TV series, independent cinema, Far East cinema, an Around Polish Cinema extended interview with the director Andrzej Żuławski and a book on Werner Herzog’s fi lms. Wajda. Political Critique The latest publication is a guide to Andrzej Guide (Warsaw 2013); Wajda’s works. The very cover seems to be quite Holland. Political Critique noteworthy as it shows a fi gure of a young Guide (Warsaw 2012); man dressed in white with a red blindfold. and Skolimowski. Political Yet, if we take a closer look, we notice that Critique Guide (Gdańsk- what really covers the man’s eyes is a Polish Warsaw 2010). Part of white and red fl ag. On the back cover of the a series published by guide, the creed of the series is presented: “We Krytyka Polityczna. say ‘Wajda’ and we think ‘Master’, ‘Classic’, or ‘National artist’. We have built him a memorial Andrzej Wajda, Agnieszka Holland, Jerzy at whose feet fl owers are laid. We want to look Skolimowski and Roman Polański are the best the artist into his eyes. We do not push him known living Polish directors. The initiative to cast down from the pedestal. Therefore, we put a Wajda. Political Critique Guide, Holland. Political Critique Guide, Skolimowski. Political Critique Guide Books and Reviews 199 ladder against the pedestal … Because Wajda have been cast by Wajda several times.” These equals Polish cinema, the strongest pictures of observations, although very interesting, are not the Polish form. It is civil cinema that for half a the rule: viewers remember very distinctly the century now has been touching upon the most strongly sketched roles of Krystyna Janda in Man fundamental topics for us as a political entity. of Marble and Sweet Rush, or Beata Tyszkiewicz What Poland does Wajda show? What Poland in Ashes and Everything for Sale. does he project in his fi lms? While taking out A few screenplays of Wajda’s fi lms were written Wajda’s fi lms from the museum display cases, by two protagonists of the other fi lm guides: wiping the dust off them, we ask about their Agnieszka Holland and Jerzy Skolimowski. relevance for us – not only as fi lm fans, but The utterly exceptional fi lm in Wajda’s legacy also as citizens.” The guide doesn’t cover an is Innocent Sorcerers in 1960 (Wajda’s debut analysis of the latest fi lmWałęsa. Man of Hope was nine years earlier). The screenplay for this (which is a shame) since its global premiere is fi lm (which became a cult fi lm in Poland) was to take place during the Venice International written by Jerzy Andrzejewski and the young Film Festival later in 2013. Jerzy Skolimowski, then a student. It is worth Joanna Ostrowska, in an essay on Jewish remembering that Skolimowski was also co- threads in Wajda’s works, reminds us that author of the screenplay to the fi rm full-length such fi lms as Korczak or The Promised Land, fi lm by Roman Polański – Knife in the Water. In and Holy Week were boycotted in the United Innocent Sorcerers, Skolimowski also played the States. They also aroused emotions among role of a boxer. It is a totally non-political fi lm French critics or were critically reviewed by and it doesn’t resemble any of Wajda’s later fi lms. Claude Lanzmann. Ostrowska writes: “Korczak’s It is a very intimate fi lm of longing for love and adversaries attacked the fi lm fi rst of all because intimacy, and was illustrated with wonderful of the alleged Christianisation of the Jewish jazz music by Krzysztof Komeda. fate and Jewish character.” Adam Kruk, Piotr Today, Jerzy Skolimowski is best known Forecki and Krzysztof Tomasik in their essays around the world as the director of the famous point at the question of feminine presence fi lms Four Nights with Anna and Essential in Wajda’s fi lms: “The viewer is forced every Killing (with the memorable roles of Vincent time to identify with a male character. The Gallo and Emmanuelle Seigner), the fi lm female characters are not suitable for any that was awarded at the Venice International serious identifi cation ... One might say that in Film Festival in 2010. Few fi lm fans from the general, women play secondary roles by the West realise that Skolimowski became an man’s side. They are not subjects of historical outstanding director of cult fi lms in Poland acts and events since the centre of attention is thanks to fi lms created in the 1960s, such as on the male, his activity and domination. The Identifi cation Marks: None, Walkover, Barrier instrumental approach is also proven by the and Hands up. These fi lms, often telling stories fact that young actresses playing major roles about outsiders not only became outdated, but in Wajda’s early fi lms do not appear in his fi lms are still youthfully cheeky, uncompromising at a later stage ... whereas their male partners and simply brilliant. 200 Books and Reviews Wajda. Political Critique Guide, Holland. Political Critique Guide, Skolimowski. Political Critique Guide

“The Skolimowski Guide” includes an what people about to be shot or gassed were interview with the director, who tells us about feeling!? … I am in a sense not interested if his long-term absence in Polish cinematography: Agnieszka Holland made a good or bad fi lm. I “In Cannes, I said on stage that after 17 years generally oppose feature fi lms to enter into such after making ‘an average’ fi lm (Ferdydurke) I situations. It is as if someone wished to write promised myself to return with a fi lm that about the Holocaust and wrote a novel about a would at least be good. It sounded a bit cheeky. person getting into a concentration camp and But I truly wished to reconstruct myself as an going into the gas chamber. Borowski had the artist throughout those years. I seriously took right to write about Auschwitz as he was there. to painting. I have had a range of exhibitions The same with Primo Levi. I cannot understand on both hemispheres.” the boldness, others might say ‘conceit’, of an On the other hand, from an interview with artist who wishes to penetrate the mystery of Agnieszka Holland in “The Holland Guide”, we the shot and the ones who were gassed.” learn about work on the series Burning Bush On the other hand, music critics in the Holland and Prague Spring, and the fi gure of Jan Palach, guide touch upon the issue of presenting the which was well received by fi lm critics. creative process through fi lm. In their opinion, Agnieszka Holland is known to wider audience one of the most successful fi lms of this type as the director of Oscar-nominated In Darkness, in the history of cinema is Amadeus by Miloš and earlier fi lms: Copying Beethoven, Washington Forman because the artist (specifi cally Mozart) Square, Total Eclipse and Europa, Europa. is not portrayed as a national monument to Similar to the guidebook on Wajda’s legacy, be admired, but instead he is “banal, vain, and the authors of Holland: The Guide touch upon childish” and therefore interesting for the viewers. the issue of presence and meaning of Jewish Critics were sceptical about Holland’s Copying and feminist threads in her fi lms. The authors Beethoven (the fi lm tells a story of Beethoven’s attempt to quote the debate which took place last years), raising issues of following Hollywood after the premiere of In Darkness, concerning the patterns too closely and fl attening the topic. issue of the Holocaust and whether or not it is It is important to note that the guide authors decent to show the Holocaust in entertainment don’t cherish the directors that much, but rather fi lms. However, one of the most critical voices ask uncomfortable and diffi cult questions, emerging on the occasion of Holland’s fi lm and search for the answers. The guides are a premiere, also referring to many diff erent fi lms challenging read; one can easily get lost in the being currently shot worldwide, was the voice jungle of interpretations without knowledge of Paweł Śpiewak, the president of the Jewish of all fi lms. On the other hand, they are a great Historical Institute in Warsaw: “I believe that incentive to watch the fi lms again in order to changing the Holocaust into the entertainment develop one’s own opinion, and to share or industry, as it takes place in the fi lm, is telling dismiss the criticism. a lie. How on earth is it possible to penetrate Grzegorz Nurek and reproduce the psyche of human beings Translated by Justyna Chada being chased like animals! How can we know ADVERTISEMENT

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