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An Onerous Endeavour Navigating Libya’S Political Quicksands

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An Onerous Endeavour Navigating Libya’S Political Quicksands An Onerous Endeavour Navigating Libya’s Political Quicksands By Emadeddin Badi November 2018 Emadeddin Badi is a Libyan conflict analyst and researcher. He has worked extensively in the development field in Libya, focusing on main- streaming conflict sensitivity within the framework of implementing post-conflict stabilization initiatives in the country. He is also a fellow with the United Nations Alliance Of Civilizations, with main pillars of expertise in the areas of migration, counter-terrorism and conflict resolution. Emad holds two bachelors in French Language and Business Management and is currently studying towards an MSc in Violence, Conflict and Development at SOAS where his research focuses on Libya’s political economy. Follow him on Twitter at @emad_badi Since 2014, perhaps the only constant of the Secretary-General of the United Nations characterizing the Libyan conflict has been a in Libya. Several other states such as Italy and continuous reassertion of the need for peace the United States shared the same view. In a bid and reconciliation, almost simultaneously to remain in power, the HoR purposely failed to accompanied by actions seeking to perpetuate adopt the referendum law in order to organize a or escalate the intractable conflict. Today, the vote on the Libyan Constitution and end Libya’s country is mainly viewed through the lens transitional process by paving the one for new of national security of EU and neighbouring elections. This would not only have allowed a states due to the perceived potential negative potential unification of the country under one repercussions of Libyan developments on the government, but it would also have de-facto EU and at the global stage. Recently, Libya has rendered the political elite benefiting from the gotten more Western media attention after the status quo redundant. last 6 months saw the main protagonists of (6) its political quagmire hosted by two European Furthermore, a series of clashes in September (7) governments, France in May 2018(1) and Italy(2) in in Tripoli that induced a ministerial reshuffle November 2018. On one side, the Government of the GNA as well as a wider mobilization of of National Accord (GNA) – the Tripoli-based UN- Haftar’s LNA (Libyan National Army) towards the (8) backed government - headed by Fayez El-Sarraj Libyan South (Fezzan) furthered the impression – on the other, Khalifa Haftar, and commander that the situation was not conducive to holding of the Libyan National Army that controls the elections. As virtually no tangible steps were east of the Country. Also taking part in these taken to implement the Paris agreement due to two conferences were Agila Saleh, President of a lack of political will amongst Libyan parties, the House of Representatives (HoR) and Khaled another political roadmap was needed. Al-Mishri, the newly elected head of the High In July 2018, Italian Prime Minister Conte visited State Council. President Trump in the United States and held In May 2018, these Libyan stakeholders a Joint Press Conference during which Trump gathered in Paris and verbally agreed to hold reasserted that Italy has a leadership role in (9) elections in December 2018, a deadline that the stabilizing Libya . In early October, the Italian government of France’s President Macron was government announced it would host another intent on meeting despite the risks of igniting conference that would bring together Libyan a nation-wide conflict(3). The ‘Paris Agreement’(4) stakeholders, this time, in the city of in Palermo. verbally agreed to by the Libyan parties also Though the conference was widely regarded as outlined the need to set a constitutional basis a political maneuver by Italy’s government to for elections and host a national conference. reclaim ownership of the Libyan initiative from However, conditions were not deemed France, it renewed the commitments of Libyan appropriate to hold elections, as explained by parties to hold elections in spring of 2019, as per (10) Ghassan Salamé(5), the Special Representative Salamé’s original UN Action Plan . 1. Wintour, P. (2018) Libyan factions agree to hold elections 6. Elumami, A. (2018) Tripoli clashes leave 115 dead, 383 on 10 December. (www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/ injured – health ministry. (https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya- macron-hosts-libyan-factions-in-paris-in-push-to-secure-elections). security/tripoli-clashes-leave-115-dead-383-injured-health-ministry- idUKKCN1M30PE). 2. Laessing, U. (2018) Libya rivals arrive for Italy summit after December election shelved. (www.reuters.com/article/us-libya- 7. Zaptia, S. (2018) Serraj conducts controversial ministerial security-conference/italy-hosts-libya-conference-to-push-new-u-n- reshuffle. (https://www.libyaherald.com/2018/10/08/serraj- peace-plan-idUSKCN1NH01O). conducts-controversial-ministerial-reshuffle/). 3. Diplomatie – Gouv. (2018) Libya – Visit by Jean-Yves Le Drian 8. Zaptia, S. (2018) Hafter launches Murzuq Basin military (23 July 2018). (www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/libya/ campaign in south. (https://www.libyaherald.com/2018/10/24/ events/2018/article/libya-visit-by-jean-yves-le-drian-23-07-18) hafter-launches-murzuq-basin-military-campaign-in-south/) 4. Irish, J. and Pennetier, M. (2018) Libyan factions agree to 9. White House (2018) Remarks by President Trump and Prime December 10 elections at Paris talks. (www.reuters.com/article/ Minister Conte of Italy in Joint Press Conference. (https://www. us-libya-security-meeting/libyan-factions-agree-to-december-10- whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump- elections-at-paris-talks-idUSKCN1IU188). prime-minister-conte-italy-joint-press-conference/). 5. Mahmoud, K. (2018) Salame affirms difficult to hold 10. Laessing, U. and Lewis, A. (2018) U.N. launches new plan elections in Libya. (aawsat.com/english/home/article/1334201/ to end Libya’s post-revolution turmoil. (https://www.reuters.com/ salame-affirms-difficulty-hold-elections-libya). article/us-libya-security/u-n-launches-new-plan-to-end-libyas-post- revolution-turmoil-idUSKCN1C12QD?il=0). -3- This paper will aim to look at Libya’s political the Palermo communiqué(12) considered process and challenges ahead of potential elections to be the panacea(13) to Libya’s elections as per the sequencing of the UN political deadlock. Action Plan. We look in particular at the viability of elections as a tool for a potential The addition the Palermo Summit brought political solution as well as the National to the Libyan political equation was a Conference and the legislative impediments renewed push for elections in 2019. Unlike associated with it. Will also consider the the Macron-brokered Paris’ Summit, it can potential difficulties that lie ahead in terms be argued that Palermo’s political agenda of unifying the Libyan army and highlights did not seek to subvert the UN Process. the risk of increased militarization in South Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative Libya and the rationale behind it. of the Secretary-General at UNSMIL, used it as a platform to ‘resuscitate’(14) the UN roadmap in 2019 and encourage Libyan actors to commit to supporting A tumultuous political a process that will ultimately lead to process ahead elections being held in the “spring” of 2019(15). The “spring” deadline may be 1) Palermo and elections ambiguous (which can also be said of the a double-edged sword type of elections planned for), but it offers Salamé time to steer the process based on The summit held in Palermo brought contextual developments. Unfortunately, together the head of the Presidential this window of opportunity may also Council Fayez Al-Sarraj, the head of the LNA be used by different parties to sabotage Khalifa Haftar, the head of the High State the process. Nevertheless, the Palermo Council Khaled Mishri, and the President conference was also an opportunity to of Libya’s House of Representatives, Aguila reorient the mediation process based on Saleh. recent developments while renewing the commitments of Libyan parties to a new Different working sessions were held, with a process in 2019. The combination of focus on security arrangements, economic events and processes outlined in Salamé’s reforms, Libya’s political situation and plan to hold elections in mid-2019 is also, a general international conference that in theory, appropriate. It was also another (11) Haftar refused to attend . Instead, the important precedent that UNSMIL and head of the LNA prioritized attending at an Salamé recognized the importance of international security working session held timing the elections appropriately as a at the sidelines of the main conference. stepping stone to transition from political Nevertheless, the communiqué issued instability into democratic governance. at the end of the conference reiterated all participants’ commitments to adopt a referendum law, undertake institutional 12. Palermo Conference For and With Libya Conclusions responsibilities to prepare for elections (2018). (http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/ conference_for_libia_conclusions_0.pdf). and respect their results after they would be held. Not unlike the Paris Agreement, 13. Kristina, I. (2018) Libyan Elections in 2018: A Potentially Ruinous Endeavour. (https://icsr.info/wp-content/ uploads/2018/08/ICSR-Feature-Libyan-Elections-in-2018-A- Potentially-Ruinous-Endeavour-1.pdf). 14. Miller, E. (2018) One Year Later, the UN Action Plan for Libya is Dead. (www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/ one-year-later-the-un-action-plan-for-libya-is-dead). 11. Mada Masr (2018) Haftar invited to Tripoli, plan for 2nd Italian conference to discuss 2019 Libyan elections. 15. Laessing, U. (2018) Libya should start process for (https://madamasr.com/en/2018/11/13/feature/politics/ elections in spring: U.N. envoy (https://www.reuters.com/ palermo-conference-haftar-invited-to-tripoli-plan-for-2nd- article/us-libya-security-un/libya-should-start-process-for- italian-conference-to-discuss-2019-libyan-elections/). elections-in-spring-u-n-envoy-idUSKCN1ND30S).
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