What Happened in the South West The Myth of Massive Repudiation Page 1 of 5

What Happened in the South West: The Myth of Massive Repudiation & Enthusiastic Acceptance

By

Mobolji E. Aluko

Burtonsville, MD, USA

INTRODUCTION

On April 12, April 19, and May 3, 2003, electoral earthquakes occurred in the South-West part of , a.k.a Yorubaland, that re-arranged its political deck. From Badagry (in State) through Ode-Ekiti (in Ekiti State) to Okunland (in Kogi State), from Mahin (in ) through Atakumosa (in Osun State) to Okuta (in ), the gale force wind of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), with "General" Olabode George at the fore, and the numbers-machine of "Sief" SM Afolabi in the rear, swept the Alliance for Democracy (AD aka Afenifere) off its feet, leaving (as it sometimes happens in real life) only Lagos (under "Field Marshall" Tinubu) to wonder how only his brigade survived the onslaught.

The South-West was "captured", as Bode George and SM Afolabi had promised. The South-West was "delivered" to "Generallisimo Aare" Obasanjo, as "Oga Olopa" Balogun Tafa clearing the path. Edo Minorities Tony Anenih and Abel Guobadia’s ("mercenary"?) help was invaluable, one might surmise.

The results have generated a cottage industry of pundits, most gloating about the demise, real and imagined, of AD and Afenifere. In the early days, before the discovery of the Rape of the South-East "beautiful bride" – still bleeding with legs wide open – it was some South-Eastern media pundits who were in the fore of that anti-Afenifere/AD punditry. Since then, they have left the stage to denounce their own rape, while many objective and "progressive" Yoruba commentators have now taken over.

NUMBERS, THE NUMBERS

The turnout analysis of the 2003 election results so far are shown in Tables 1 below. In the South-West, the 2003 just by themselves make little sense unless when compared with what they were in 1999, so I also have shown in Table 2 more detailed results comparing the elections of the two years in order to appreciate the difference.

In both Tables, the traditional South-West includes Ekiti, Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, Osun and Oyo Sates. However, I have also included in Table 2, Kwara (90% Yoruba) and Kogi (40% Yoruba) for completeness.

We assume, for the sake of argument, that these figures are reliable.

Then on the whole, Table 1 shows that there was little enthusiasm for the elections IN GENERAL in the South-West, with rates less than 50% except for the presidential elections. Low participation therefore explains low interest in the outcome of the results, one way or the other. In that same table, presidential turnout percentage (almost 87%) relative to other states in the South-West (with an average of 54%), and in relation to the gubernatorial turnout (a difference of 618,017) – continues to stick out like a sore thumb, indicating some electoral malfeasance that is yet to be explained.

From Table 2, in the SouthWest, Obasanjo won 1,092,196 votes in 1999 and 5,042,678 votes in 2003. That remarkable turn around mirrors from 143,564 votes in Ogun State in 1999 to 1,360,170 votes in 2003. Maybe it was because there was no "Yoruba" candidate in 2003? Maybe because he is from Ogun State? Without this turn around, and with the remarkable 618,017 difference observed above, the 675,685 more votes which Obasanjo won in 2003 when compared with Falae in 1999 would have been wiped out significantly. Significantly in Kogi and Kwara, Obasanjo won almost 60,000 votes in 2003 than in 1999.

CONCLUSIONS, CONCLUSIONS

My conclusion from these numbers are as follows:

if there was no rigging, they do not show massive swing of support AS SUCH, even in the absence of credible presidential opposition in the Southwest.

if there was rigging, it was so well-crafted and calibrated as not to attract too much attention, except of those carefully-watching eyes like mine!

So if there was rigging, why is there no outrage in the Southwest? Blame it on the South West governors, who refused to "listen to their elders" Afenifere about care about Obasanjo, and hence got routed in the process. Tinubu’s survival is part-area-boy, part-Atiku-friendship. He would have been swept too otherwise.

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It is what the Yoruba would call "afowofa" – self-inflicted pain, aided and abetted by Obasanjo’s war-plan-like deception (see Appendix for Soboyede’s great piece on deception), and resulting in "insider-abuse" by an "ara ile" (a homeboy) made good thrice. If according to Governor X, Obasanjo was good to be president and he should be voted for, and then Obasanjo comes to your backyard to raise up the hand of your opponent claiming him to be "good to be the next governor," then "o da fun e" (it is good for you) if that opponent wins, rigging or no rigging. "O da fun won!" – the Yoruba would chorus. " Oode! Suegbe!" – the Yoruba would chorus.

And the specter of Buhari put a full-stop to all pretences to pre- and post-election objectivity.

A SIDE ISSUE – PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

There is another issue that these numbers bring up: a need to include proportional representation along with our first-past-the-post (majority winner takes all) clause. For example, a situation where in AD wins 20 seats and PDP wins 2 seats in the House of Representatives, yet AD won 564,601 votes while PDP wins 372,932 votes is palpably unfair. Similarly, in Ekiti, a situation exists where PDP won 5 seats to AD’s 1 seat, yet the vote split was 179,743 to 146,171. In our ethnically diverse situation, one-half of the seats minus one should be by first-past-the-post, while the rest should be divided according to the proportion of the total votes won. In the Lagos case, AD would have won 10 + (564,601/(564,601+372,932))*12 seats or 17 seats to PDP’s 5 seats. In the Ekiti case, PDP would have won 4 seats to AD’s 2 seats.

Note that in practice, it means that the number of first-past-the-posts seats would be contested on a candidates’ basis, while the proportional representation seats would be on a party basis, with each party presenting a slate of candidates from which the final winning candidates would be chosen. The situation improves with a greater number of seats.

Proportional representation should be part of our electoral reform.

Best wishes all.

TABLE 1: Turn-Out Analysis of Nigeria’s 2003 Elections

TURNOUT ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S 2003 ELECTIONS

HOR Senate Gubernatorial Presidential Total Votes % Total Votes % Total Votes % Total Votes %

South-West

Ekiti 981,753 368,035 37.49 369,257 37.61 426,731 43.47 424,056 43.19 Lagos 4,558,216 1,397,650 30.66 1,434,730 31.48 1,965,526 43.12 1,939,191 42.54 Ogun 1,576,875 577,277 36.61 562,236 35.66 747,296 47.39 1,365,367 86.59 Ondo 1,504,181 709,104 47.14 713,708 47.45 960,080 63.83 995,084 66.15 Osun 1,367,627 520,496 38.06 587,595 42.96 801,812 58.63 783,914 57.32 Oyo 2,209,953 922,722 41.75 920,373 41.65 1,130,142 51.14 1,083,806 49.04 TOTAL 12,198,605 4,495,284 36.85 4,587,899 37.61 6,031,587 49.44 6,591,418 54.03

South-East

Abia 1,285,428 442,061 34.39 304,545 23.69 823,347 64.05 769,167 59.84 Anambra 1,859,795 501,633 26.97 678,339 36.47 878,212 47.22 897,245 48.24 Ebonyi 1,002,771 459,546 45.83 475,736 47.44 809,224 80.7 807,767 80.55 Enugu 1,479,542 821,076 55.5 614,614 41.54 1,215,808 82.17 1,144,887 77.38 Imo 1,630,494 778,925 47.77 817,851 50.16 0 0 1,052,885 64.57 TOTAL 7,258,030 3,003,241 41.38 2,891,085 39.83 3,726,591 51.34 4,671,951 64.37

South_South

Akwa Ibom 1,624,495 1,125,612 69.29 1,092,240 67.24 1,338,970 82.42 1,308,326 80.54 Bayelsa 765,472 336,066 43.9 398,924 52.11 745,408 97.38 742,917 97.05 Cross River 1,289,192 995,603 77.23 925,175 71.76 1,074,132 83.32 1,238,175 96.04 Delta 1,607,337 764,079 47.54 832,690 51.81 907,251 56.44 1,171,867 72.91 Edo 1,432,891 711,901 49.68 660,826 46.12 1,142,519 79.74 1,118,322 78.05 Rivers 2,272,238 1,823,252 80.24 1,122,160 49.39 2,111,625 92.93 2,171,215 95.55 TOTAL 8,991,625 5,756,513 64.02 5,032,015 55.96 7,319,905 81.41 7,750,822 86.2

Total South 28,448,260 13,255,038 46.59 12,510,999 43.98 17,078,083 60.03 19,014,191 66.84

North-West

Jigawa 1,636,657 920,591 56.25 895,899 54.74 1,203,692 73.55 1,147,952 70.14 Kaduna 2,620,999 1,585,335 60.49 1,602,897 61.16 2,018,689 77.02 2,192,248 83.64

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Kano 4,000,430 1,645,956 41.14 1,538,560 38.46 1,734,151 43.35 2,339,792 58.49 Katsina 2,567,245 1,125,922 43.86 1,279,704 49.85 1,398,869 54.49 1,711,212 66.66 Kebbi 1,343,549 666,430 49.6 677,705 50.44 886,324 65.97 879,826 65.49 Sokoto 1,476,691 674,451 45.67 679,684 46.03 939,044 63.59 1,017,849 68.93 Zamfara 1,515,622 871,738 57.52 846,356 55.84 1,086,326 71.68 1,106,567 73.01 TOTAL 15,161,193 7,490,423 49.41 7,520,805 49.61 9,267,095 61.12 10,395,446 68.57

North-East

Adamawa 1,280,204 739,449 57.76 793,288 61.97 956,664 74.73 994,033 77.65 Bauchi 2,130,557 1,114,991 52.33 1,162,275 54.55 0 0 1,739,506 81.65 Borno 2,156,019 877,875 40.72 886,742 41.13 817,533 37.92 1,336,480 61.99 Gombe 1,263,287 844,290 66.83 879,502 69.62 0 0 1,010,175 79.96 Taraba 1,026,950 610,850 59.48 808,351 78.71 949,054 92.41 923,603 89.94 Yobe 966,749 506,052 52.35 461,615 47.75 602,119 62.28 643,388 66.55 TOTAL 8,823,766 4,693,507 53.19 4,991,773 56.57 3,325,370 37.69 6,647,185 75.33

North-Central

Benue 1,755,528 1,072,626 61.1 1,089,100 62.04 1,233,522 70.27 1,248,897 71.14 Kogi 1,158,343 679,158 58.63 657,704 56.78 911,265 78.67 898,692 77.58 Kwara 995,882 542,755 54.5 545,702 54.8 628,020 63.06 624,695 62.73 Nassarawa 852,626 661,717 77.61 669,381 78.51 741,590 86.98 741,289 86.94 Niger 1,607,730 879,675 54.72 855,161 53.19 1,020,939 63.5 1,052,789 65.48 Plateau 1,391,594 922,749 66.31 958,371 68.87 1,066,795 76.66 1,120,931 80.55 Abuja FCT 628,100 188,622 30.03 196,175 31.23 0 0 274,620 43.72 TOTAL 8,389,803 4,947,302 58.97 4,971,594 59.26 5,602,131 66.77 5,961,913 71.06

Total North 32,374,762 17,131,232 52.92 17,484,172 54.01 18,194,596 56.20 23,004,544 71.06

TOTAL Country 60,823,022 30,386,270 49.96 29,995,171 49.32 35,272,679 57.99 42,018,735 69.08

TABLE 2: April 12 and April 19 Election Results in The South-West

Registered Voters HOUSE OF REPS SENATE GOVERNORS PRESIDENT Winner/RunnerUp Winner/RunnerUp Ekiti 2003 981,753 AD - 1, PDP – 5 AD - 1, PDP - 2 Fayose (PDP)/Adebayo Obasanjo (PDP)/Gani 146,171; 179,743 155,697; 174,547 219,906 (168,391) 301,185 (11,410)

1999 1,075,278 AD - 6, PDP – 0 AD - 2, PDP - 1 Adebayo (AD)/Adeniran Falae (AD)/Obasanjo 279,730; 129,904 300,118 (112,606) 522,072 (191,618])

Lagos 2003 4,558,216 AD - 20, PDP - 2 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Tinubu (AD)/Williams Obasanjo (PDP)/Ojukwu 564,601; 372,932 603,791; 403,333 911,597 (740,406) 1,129,521(134,764)

1999 4,093,143 AD - 23, APP - 1 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Tinubu (AD)/Sarumi Falae (AD)/Obasanjo 220,106; 124,720 841,732 (184,900) 1,542,969 (209,012)

Ogun 2003 1,576,875 AD - 0, PDP – 9 AD - 0, PDP - 3 Daniel (PDP)/Osoba Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 204,887; 306,613 207,558; 305,884 449,335 (231,982) 1,360,170 (680)

1999 1,592,502 AD - 9, PDP – 0 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Osoba (AD)/Kuye Falae (AD)/Obasanjo 219,791; 123,294 247,154 (122,139) 332,340 (143,564)

Ondo 2003 1,504,181 AD - 1, PDP – 8 AD - 1, PDP - 2 Agagu (PDP)/Adefarati Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 240,769; 399,687 253,172; 420,336 655,968 (233,900) 840,988 (31,994)

1999 1,333,617 AD - 7, APP – 1 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Adefarati (AD)/Agagu Falae (AD)/Obasanjo ?? 328,053 (195,682) 668,474 (133,323)

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Osun 2003 1,367,627 AD - 1, PDP – 7 AD - 0, PDP - 3 Oyinloye (PDP)/Akande Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 173,186; 262,794 199,713; 308,894 493,509 (237,041) 582,089 (14,369)

1999 1,496,058 AD - 9, PDP – 0 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Akande (AD)/Adeleke Falae (AD)/Obasanjo ?? 295,557 (136,105) 607,628 (187,011)

Oyo 2003 2,209,953 AD - 5, PDP – 9 AD - 1, PDP - 2 Ladoja (PDP)/Adesina Obasanjo (PDP) 384,251; 452,244 388,420; 393,048 638,212 (381,310) 828,725 (25,112)

1999 2,397,270 AD - 12, PDP - 2 AD - 3, PDP - 0 Adesina (AD)/Adeojo Falae (AD)/Obasanjo 378,051; 181,987 454,680 (219,220) 693,510 (227,668)

Totals SW – South 2003 12,198,605 AD-28, PDP - 44 AD - 6, PDP - 12 PDP/AD Obasanjo/RunnersUp 3,197,336 (2,164,221) 5,042,678 (218,329)

1999 11,987,868 AD-63, APP-2, AD - 17, PDP - 1 AD/PDP Falae (AD)/Obasanjo PDP-2 2,467,294 (970,652) 4,366,993 (1,092,196)

Difference 675,685 (-873,867)

Kwara 2003 995,882 ANPP - 2, PDP - 4 ANPP - 1, PDP - 2 Saraki (PDP)/Lawal Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 180,123; 242,103 183,182; 242,738 322,242 (199,855) 390,800 (170,325)

1999 940,425 APP - 3, APP - 3 APP - 3, PDP - 0 Lawal (ANPP)/Abdulrasaq Obasanjo (PDP)/Falae 283,136 (174,977) 470,510 (189,088)

Kogi 2003 1,158,343 ANPP - 3, PDP - 6 ANPP - 1, PDP - 2 Idris (PDP)/Audu Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 286,675; 370,113 278,904; 368,850 481,264 (293,089) 528,778 (314,494)

1999 1,265,442 APP - 5, PDP - 4 APP - 1, PDP - 2 Audu (ANPP)/Olorunfemi Obasanjo (PDP)/Falae 608,329 (349,055) 507,903 (476,807 ) Totals SW – North 2003 2,154,225 ANPP-2, PDP - 4 PDP/ANPP Obasanjo (PDP)/Buhari 803,506 (492,944) 919,578 (484,819) 1999 2,205,867 APP - 4, PDP - 2 APP/PDP Obasanjo/Falae 891,465 (524,032) 978,413 (665,895)

Difference -87,959 (-31,088) -58,835 (-181,076)

APPENDIX

THISDAY 5/24 Obasanjo's Finest Hour By Akeem Soboyede ______

For most of his 66 years on earth, Nigerian President has lived a charmed life. No other Nigerian has ruled the country both as an absolute military dictator and an elected President, although many would argue that in both circumstances, Nigeria's ultimate Comeback Kid was "selected" to serve. But serve Obasanjo has. From all indications, the General-turned-democrat has not found the job of "serving" Nigerians too tiresome. If the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is to be believed, Obasanjo earned another four-year mandate from Nigerians last April 19. By 2007, he would have bested Yakubu Gowon's record as Nigeria's longest-serving Head of State. This achievement, surely, will be nothing short of stellar.

So is this Obasanjo's finest hour? It appears to be the case, mainly because he seems to have jettisoned the jinx of a civilian-to-civilian transition in Nigeria by winning a new mandate in an election that has come invested with its own share of controversy. Even Obasanjo's die-hard admirers must concede that the exercise was anything but free and fair in its entirety. This was due in part to the "sea-slide" tactics of governors of backwater states like Peter Odili in Rivers, among others. The fraud in this particular state, according to those who should know, was anything but anonymous or surreptitious. It was brazen and totally in-your-face. (We've got to hand it to these politicians who score close to a 100 percent in elections, or record voter turnouts approaching that figure. They obviously learnt a trick or two from Saddam Hussein).

But then, in the aftermath of Election 2003, Obasanjo managed a feat that can hardly be considered scandalous: he overcame his pariah status among his fellow Yoruba. And he did it in grand style.

When the history of the 2003 presidential election is eventually written, the issue that will draw the most ink will undoubtedly be the electoral blitzkrieg Obasanjo launched on the Southwest, which also happens to be his home area in Nigeria. Four years ago, this was the same geo-political part of the country that had soundly rejected Obasanjo in the 1999 presidential polls. With the death of Chief Moshood Abiola still fresh in many minds then, Obasanjo's pan-Nigerian outlook hardly recommended itself to most members of his

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ethnic Yoruba enclave in the Nigerian territorial space. It also did not help matters that the people perceived as the shadowy hands behind Obasanjo's ambitions were also those who aborted Abiola's presidential aspirations and engineered his untimely death.

Obasanjo's resounding defeat in the Southwest during the presidential elections that ushered in Nigeria's Fourth Republic actually cast a pall of doubt on his victory in that poll. Which African politician, it was asked, would win a national election while losing votes in his home area by such a wide margin? Many saw the development as highly abnormal and attributed Obasanjo's eventual election as President to the machinations of his military sponsors who were hell-bent on installing their puppet in power.

Four years later, just how did Obasanjo manage his comeback? The answer, in three words: deception, deception, deception.

Sure there was wide-spread rigging at all levels in the polls that just concluded in Nigeria; sure, all the parties rigged, and Obasanjo's ruling party only happened to have the most successful rigging juggernaut (no thanks, once again, to the Odilis of this world). But that is not the deception we have in mind here.

Anyone who followed events in the Obasanjo Presidency since its inception in 1999 should have noticed that the President started his campaign for the 2003 elections right after the day he was sworn in on May 29, 1999. Like a good soldier, Obasanjo knew that you start preparing for the next war immediately after the present one is concluded. For a soldier, there can be no respite, even when no war is being fought. So, while those politicians who "disgraced" Obasanjo in the Southwest in 1999 (the Afeniferes and ADs of this world) settled down to enjoy the spoils of office, just like any normal civilian, the soldier in Obasanjo did nothing of the sort. Instead, the General drew up a battle plan and proceeded to implement it. Ruthlessly.

As in all war plans, deception was the key. First, Obasanjo undermined his future opponents with kindness. Of course, the Governors in the Alliance for Democracy states were the primary targets. While they enjoyed the fruits of victory in their first year in office, Obasanjo announced a hike in workers' salaries. This was a good decision on the face of it, especially as it came at a time when the profligacies and thievery of the Abacha years were being exposed on a daily basis. But there was also an underlying sub-plot to the "Father Christmas" policy. If any state government would be forced by its workers to pay an increment that only the Federal government and a handful of states could afford, then that state government would be hard-put to implement the social programmes like free education, health and so on by which it rode to power. No points for guessing that in the AD states, only Lagos would be able to survive this onslaught without any noticeable systemic shock. As it turned out, this eventually came about even in Lagos only after a titanic struggle. Of course, his actions on salary increment made the President popular among workers and future voters; but what did it do to his political opponents in the Southwest?

What followed next was the strategy of exploiting the naivete of those who had considered themselves the gatekeepers of Chief Obafemi Awolowo's legacy in the Yoruba heartland. Obasanjo deftly came up with so-called "anti-North" programmes and policies that proved popular with the electorate in the Southwest; the son of the much-despised Abacha, his Army Chief and Head of Security were all corralled into jail, to popular acclaim largely in the Southwest. Military officers who were seen as tainted by their participation in political activities in the past were retired, and most of them happened to be Northerners. Appointments into public offices at the federal level were filled with people from the South, especially the Southwest, and the Obasanjo government made sure these were well-publicised, or that such officials had high public visibility. What all these, and more, did was to plant the idea in the minds of the electorate in the Southwest that Obasanjo, the man they had shunned in the elections of 1999, was not really a pawn to be used against them by his Northern sponsors.

But it should also be pointed out that, like any good soldier, Obasanjo carefully chose his battles with the North. For instance, while Alhaji Abubakar Rimi greeted him with abuses everyday, Obasanjo elected to retain Sule Lamido, one of Rimi's proteges, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs, the person who serves as the face and voice of Nigeria to the world. And, what happened to the promises of getting to the bottom of the Pius Okigbo Report, and the issue of the first Gulf War Oil Windfall? We can go on and on.

Anyway, Obasanjo did not have to go too far to undermine his quarries. As it turned out, the AD governors actually wanted to be undermined. Or, how could one explain the decision of the AD not to field a candidate in the presidential elections of April 19? Maybe the "hug-them-all" strategy can explain that. Some months to the election, for instance, Obasanjo visited his home state of Ogun. He was received in a very warm manner by the state governor, Chief Olusegun Osoba. The praises heaped on the occasion were even more lavish. Obasanjo described Osoba as a great governor who deserved a second term in office. The latter praised his townsman as a good leader who ought to continue as President. The praises were understandable, since a visitor and a guest owe each other some cordiality. But, why was Osoba surprised that just a few months later, and some hours to the last governorship polls, Obasanjo called on him and his fellow AD governors to start packing their belongings from their respective state houses?

Admittedly, Obasanjo was a war general, and a successful one at that. But Osoba was also a great war reporter. He should have known that deception is a legitimate tool in any war. When Obasanjo came a-visiting, the latter knew his visit would do more good for his own party's flagbearer in the state, and that he would use the warmth of his reception as a yardstick to measure how well the PDP governorship candidate would do in any election conducted in Ogun state. Obasanjo's praise on that occasion was just a "bear-hug" meant to lull Osoba and his fellow AD members into a false sense of comfort and complacency. It worked.

The advantage of hindsight is almost always prescient and convenient; however, one honestly wonders why Obasanjo's opponents in the Southwest did not see their recent electoral rout coming. A close acquaintance here who was on the ground in Abeokuta on the day the governorship and presidential elections were held swears that as far as he is concerned, Obasanjo and the PDP won fair and square in Ogun and, in fact, the entire Southwest. He says the AD governors became complacent and believed the "Awolowo factor" would see them through to re-election. And, of course, everyone knows of the injustices Chief Awolowo suffered at the hands of General Obasanjo when the former was alive.

May 2003

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