Chapter Three

The Trouble with Nigeria

Nigeria has long been seen as a project that has failed or is failing. However, scholars disagree about the nature of the problem, whether the problem can be fixed or is worth fixing, and the potential consequences of fixing or not fixing the problem. One approach that has been consistently suggested to both understand and fix the problem is to convene a Sovereign National Conference (SNG) of all ethnic nationalities in Nigeria. The criteria for including a group in this dialogue is the group’s maintenance of pre-colonial boundaries wherein every ethnic grouping was a nation state. The use of this criteria is understandable considering that not much has changed from the precolonial era despite the many boundary delimitation projects, the haphazard creation of 36 states, a Federal Capital Territory, and 774 Local Government Councils from three regions in 1960. The pre-colonial ethnic configuration continues to form the bases of national identity with people identifying as Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba, or Ijaw before they identify as Nigerians.

Pro-democracy groups and activists during the long period of military rule from 1983 to 1999 first canvassed the need for a national dialogue, which continues to resonate with segments of the Nigerian population at home and in the diaspora. Many of these groups and the individuals who led them faced intimidation and harassment from military dictators who wanted to extend their rule indefinitely. Many other groups have since joined the clamor for SNG. The desires of the pro- dialogue groups were fulfilled on 1 October 2013, when President Goodluck Jonathan announced that in “response to the yearnings of our people,”1 his administration would conduct a “national conversation”2 to solve some of the country’s more pressing problems. According to him, the conversation could not be convened at a more auspicious time since on 1 January 2014, “Nigeria will be 100 years old as a country following the amalgamation of the protectorates of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914.”3 The president proposed the national conversation to “in this last year of the first century of our union,”4 address “our future as a nation and a people.”5 A nation and people that he believes “are divided in many ways – ethnically, religiously, politically, and materially.”6 These divisions “stoke tension and bring about friction … [and] it makes perfect sense for the interested parties to come together to discuss.”7

In preparation for the national conversation, the president appointed an Advisory Committee “to establish the modalities”8 for the national conference and to “design a framework and come up with recommendations as to the form, structure and mechanism of the process.”9 The president appointed Femi Okunroumu, octogenarian, ethnic Yoruba, former senator, and avowed Awoist,10 as the chairperson of the committee. On October 7, 2013, the president inaugurated the 13-member Advisory Committee on National Dialogue with a commission to “facilitate a most acceptable process”11 for holding the national dialogue. The Committee, which began sitting almost immediately – including a controversial sitting in Benin City that made headline news more for the spat between Governor Adams Oshiomole, a critic of the conference, and Colonel (Rtd) Tony Nyiam, a member of the Committee – submitted its 4,000 page report to President Jonathan on 18 December 2013.12 13 The National Conference (NC) has since held and its report submitted to former President Jonathan, who sat on it, refusing even to present it to the National Assembly that was dominated by his party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). That report is still gathering frost in the cooler despite the hundreds of millions of Naira spent to organize it.

President Jonathan’s decision to convoke the national dialogue is not without precedent. Past governments convoked various forms of national and constitutional conferences with mixed results.14 15 While some of the conferences yielded new constitutions or amendments to existing constitutions, the results of other conferences were either completely discarded or were selectively applied in ways that, overall, made very little impact on the national problematic. President Jonathan’s decision, however, is noteworthy in many respects. Firstly, it was the first time, especially in an election cycle, that a Nigerian government will publicly acknowledge fundamental problems with the structural foundations of the nation and the need for comprehensive dialogue to fix it. Past presidents denied that Nigeria had deep structural challenges, preferring to blame people, especially political opponents, for the country’s woes. Secondly, the conference was convened at a time of great political ferment and perturbation due to the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and preparations for the 2015 presidential election. Considering that elections are typically fractious in Nigeria and the 2015 presidential elections had shaped up to be even more so with deep divisions – religious, ethnic, economic, cultural, political, etc. – converging on a national scale, the convoking of the national dialogue created fear and panic about the possible breakup of Nigeria. Thirdly, the idea of charting a “future” for Nigeria nearly 100 years after its founding and amid criticism that Nigeria is not a nation but “a mere geographical expression,”16 an “evil entity,”17 and an “artificial creation,”18 made this new effort both promising and fraught with danger. For instance, while the government believed that the conference would help resolve longstanding contradictions that continue to fuel suspicions and tensions, opponents of the conference feared its potential to expose deep frailties, including the national bifurcation between north and south that may conspire to transform such national dialogue into open confrontation with the potential to create instability. In a potentially fractious election cycle, this may create numerous second and third order problems, including the possibility that some members of the elite that are steeped in ethnic and regional politics may exploit the process to push for secession.

Despite these or because of these, there was much skepticism about the national dialogue even among those that clamorously advocated for it in the past.19 Many former advocates, especially those in opposition political parties or movements, questioned President Jonathan’s motivation for convoking the dialogue at the time. More specifically, they questioned the source of the president’s optimism that the dialogue could solve the nation’s many problems considering his staunch opposition to the conference in the past. Thus, without saying so, the president’s opponents saw the move as mere political grandstanding to buy political goodwill from segments of the population, particularly the southwest, that had visceral opposition to the president’s second term push. Indeed, ethno-national groups like the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) and a section of Afenifere bought the president’s idea and saw in it the opportunity to articulate the Yoruba position and conditions for continued partnership in the Nigerian federation.

However, any credit that the president might have earned for convoking the dialogue, which cost tax payers about 7 billion Naira, was vitiated by the president’s decision to withhold the conference results from congress or to implement it; instead, using the report as a campaign tool to win votes. In campaign stumps for 2015 re-election in Lagos, President Jonathan promised to implement the report only if he was given a second presidential term. He lost the election by about 3 million votes, ending the People’s Democratic Party’s 16-years political dominance. The fact that he lost the election with no chance that the incoming administration that boycotted the dialogue, means that the exercise was a huge drain on the country’s lean resources and symbolic of the president’s inability to prioritize governance objectives, needs, and activities. It is because of this inability to prioritize that the president was criticized throughout his rule as “clueless” and “ideologically empty.”

Whatever the case, the desire for a national conversation, whether sovereign or not, is borne out of frustration over the growing divisions, which are producing not just suspicions but also armed violence. The central argument of this chapter is that the roots of the insurgencies in Nigeria are traceable to Nigeria’s foundation, specifically the British colonial statecraft that merged ethnic nationalities without creating the type of behavioral assertions needed to form nationhood.20 This colonial legacy continues to blight opportunities for nationhood, buttressing Margery Perham’s observation that “the day when Nigeria becomes a true federation, still more a nation, is still far away.”21 Over the years, the divisions have deepened with unhealthy competition among Nigeria’s ethnic, regional, religious, and political groups. These problems form the bedrock of issues discussed at the national dialogue and are at the heart of This Troubled Land.

A Brief History of Nigeria

In the beginning, there was no Nigeria. There were:

Kingdoms like Oyo, Lagos, Calabar, Brass, Itsekiri, Benin, Tiv, Borno, Sokoto Caliphate (with loose control over Kano, Ilorin and Zaria etc.), Bonny, Opobo etc. Prior to the British conquest of the different nations making up the present day Nigeria, these nations were independent nation states and communities independent of each other and of Britain.22

Within these kingdoms and communities, there were Ijaws, Igbos, Urhobos, Yorubas, Hausas, Fulanis, Nafes, Kanuris, Ogonis, Gwaris, Katafs, Jukuns, Edos, Esans, Ibibios, Efiks, Idomas, Tivs, Junkuns, Biroms, Angas, Ogojas, and so on; but there were no Nigerians. The various states were, for the most part, remarkable for their size and well developed social and political institutions. For instance, the Benin (Bini) Kingdom, which started as a small city-state on the Benin River, rose to an extensive empire embracing many ethnic groups and states.23 At the peak of its power in the 17th century, the empire stretched from Lagos in the west to Idah in the north and from Idah to the coast. Today, the Bini people who historically worshipped ancestral gods are predominantly Christian although ancestor worship and other animist religious forms are practiced by a small but significant segment of the population.

The story was not different in Yoruba land where Oyo rose from a small and insignificant Yoruba town on the northern border of present Oyo state, to a great empire.24 25 By the middle of the 18th century, Oyo Empire stretched from Benin in the east to the western frontier of Togo in the west, and from Nupe in the north, to the mangrove swamps in the south, becoming the largest of the forest states of West Africa. As an empire, Oyo achieved a very high degree of efficient imperial administration based upon well-fashioned social, cultural, and political institutions that revolved around the “Alafin” or king and traditional executive councils such as the “Oyo Mesi” and the “Ogboni Cult.”

The peoples of the Niger Delta were also independently governed and had states with well- developed social and political structures. It was the great center of trade with Europe and the principal commodities of trade were slaves in the 19th century and palm oil in the 20th century. These trades, particularly the slave trade, led to the emergence of city-states along the coast, which capitalized on the emigration of people from the hinterlands to the Delta fishing villages, to take advantage of trade with Europeans. It was in this manner that the city-states of Sapele and Warri inhabited by the Urhobo, Itsekiri, and Ijaw (in present day Delta State); Brass, Bonny, Akoso, Twoa, and Nembe inhabited by the Kalabari, Ikwerre, and Ibeno (in present day Rivers state); Buguma, Abonnema, and Bakana inhabited by the Ijaw (in present day Bayelsa state); and Creek town, Henshaw town, and Duke town in Calabar inhabited by the Efik (present day Cross River and Akwa Ibom states), arose. The City-States of the Niger-Delta had remarkably sophisticated structures and institutions that regulated commerce, religion, education, health, and family life and ensured group survival.

Unlike the Niger-Delta States, which evolved from the expansion of trade in slaves and palm oil in the 19th century, the occupation of the forest belt area between the Cross River east of the River Niger and Benin, west of the River Niger, and between Igala to the north and the Niger Delta city- states, by the Igbo cannot be known for certain. However, it is estimated that the Igbo have occupied this area since the 9th century AD.26 Onwubiko suggests that Igbo land was the most densely populated area of West Africa, resulting from population movements from Benin in the middle of the 17th century eastward. This internal migration as well as the migration of people fleeing the Fulani slave raids in the north increased the population of Igbo land.27 More importantly, the Igbo had a peculiar system of social and political organization that was largely due to the geographical location of Igbo land in the heart of the tropical forest, which provided immense obstacles against invasions from external enemies. As a result, the Igbo could not be conquered and hence, an empire could not be established in Igbo land. Consequently, the Igbo who are by nature egalitarian and independent never evolved a centralized political structure like the Bini or Yoruba, but maintained small village republics in which every adult male had a direct say in governance. Like the other nation-states, the internal social and political organization of the Igbo took their culture, family life, occupation, and geographic conditions into cognizance, which were sufficient to meet the needs of the people.

Hausa-Fulani peoples populate the northern section of present day Nigeria and their present form is intricately linked to the Fulani Jihad led by Uthman Dan Fodio in Central Sudan in the 19th century. The Fulani are a nomadic, cattle-herding people, who due to their nomadic nature, were the first among the Hausa states to come into contact with Islam and, led by Uthman, sought to Islamize the region through Jihad. The main political consequence of this Jihad was the Fulani conquest of most of what later became northern Nigeria, beginning with Uthman’s victory over the army of Mohammed Yunfa, king of Gobir, in 1804.28 After his defeat, Yunfa warned other Hausa kings of the growing Fulani danger, as the Fulani, excited by Uthman’s victory began to rally round him in large numbers. The resulting preemptive racial attacks on the Fulanis by Hausa states unified the Fulani, leading Uthman in 1805 to issue flags – symbolizing their new authority to conquer unbelievers in their areas and establish true Islam – to leaders of Fulani communities all over the North. Consequently, independent Hausa states such as Kebbi, Zaria, Katsina, Gobir, and Kano were conquered between 1805 and 1809. Following the success of the Fulani Jihadist in Hausa land, the Jihad was extended to non-Muslim, non-Hausa territory with significant concentrations of Fulanis. Thus, Adamawa (1806), Nupe (1810), and Ilorin (1835), all fell to the Fulani Jihadists. At the end of the jihad, Uthman Dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate – a loose confederation of over 30 emirates – in northern Nigeria with headquarters in Sokoto and led unquestionably by the Sultan of Sokoto, who wielded political and theocratic authority. It is important to note that Borno, which has become the main theater of the Boko Haram war, could not be conquered by the jihadists and have continued a rivalry with the Hausa-Fulani to this day.

Colonial Rule 29 It was essentially in this type of combustible environment of more than 350 ethnic nationalities, many of which either had no meaningful relationships with one another or had long histories of mutual antagonism that the British practiced its statecraft after it received the concession to take possession of the territories at the Berlin partition conference of 1885. Apart from allocating areas of influence, the Berlin conference also enunciated the principle of colonial governance otherwise known as the “dual mandate,” which established that the colonization of the independent African states was for the benefit of both Africa and Europe and under which terms, Europe gained unfettered access to Africa for its resources and trade while Africa was expected to benefit “civilization” or to become “civilized.”30 31 32 Under the terms of the Berlin Conference, Britain’s claim to the territory known today as Nigeria was formally acknowledged and it wasted little time in establishing its presence there, but it encountered a major problem.

The physical administration of the vast territory was too large for Britain to directly govern. In this respect, the British encountered at least three major challenges, which encouraged them to adopt the indirect rule system of administration, which critics argue hardened ethno-religious and regional differences and created or deepened suspicions or hostilities among Nigerian nationalities. The first challenge was how to secure native recognition for British authority despite the fierce desire by native rulers to remain in control. For example, when native rulers signed the initial treaties of protection with British colonial officials, they did not understand the full import of the treaties until the British began to set up administration in these territories. Naturally, native rulers who were unwilling to cede their authorities resisted violently. It took the British six years from 1900-1906, for instance, to suppress the Bornu and Fulani resistance in northern Nigeria.33 Secondly, the British met sophisticated social and political institutions that were as diverse as there were ethnic nationalities. In addition to the fact that the “natives” were deeply ambivalent about colonial rule; preferring their own independently evolved, rational administrative systems, the British struggled to enforce control through a central administrative system that coalesced all of the native administrations under British rule. Thirdly, the British lacked adequate British personnel to administer the new territories.

To overcome these serious problems, the British adopted the indirect rule system (IRS), which had been successfully implemented in India and Uganda. Advocating for the adoption of the system after conquering the Emirates of Bida and Ilorin, Sir George Goldie declared: “if the welfare of the native races is to be considered, if dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on African principles must be followed for the present.”34 Thus, the British designed a system that enabled them to rule through traditional rulers who were given limited authority to govern under supervision of British colonial officers. The most important feature of the IRS was that it preserved and adapted the traditional political institutions “under the tutelage and direction of the British administration, to the requirements of modern units of local government.”35 In northern Nigeria, for instance, the British took full advantage of the centralized administrative structure of the Fulani emirates to enforce IRS by making the Sultan of Sokoto subservient to British authority, although the Sultan continued to exercise hegemonic authority over northern peoples.36

Ultimately, the IRS achieved mixed results in Nigeria, ranging from spectacular success to dramatic failure. For example, in the north, the IRS was immensely successful because it leveraged the institutions of the Islam-based Fulani emirates. The emir and his court, a native treasury that supervised the collection of taxes, and a native court that administered justice based on the sharia as well as the religious homogeneity of most northern populations, helped to make the indirect rule system a huge success in the region.

In the west, the IRS achieved limited success. This was because the British, being totally impervious to local concerns, traditions, and history, attempted to restore supreme authority of the entire Yoruba land to the Alafin of Oyo. Unfortunately, the influence of the once revered Alafin had diminished significantly in the 19th century, to make such prospect unacceptable to a section of Yoruba society. For instance, other Yoruba Obas who were independent of the Alafin and had full control of populations within their domains greatly resented and resisted this imposition. This situation was worsened by the fact that the IRS did not incorporate the influential western-educated elite who had returned home and expected to play a major role in local administration. This, coupled with the erroneous belief by the British that Yoruba obas wielded the same level of influence as the Hausa-Fulani emirs, led it to isolate the Yoruba council of chiefs and other traditional institutions such as the Ogboni cult, which in reality shared traditional authority with the oba in both the decision-making process and in the day-to-day administration of local communities.

Finally, in eastern Nigeria, the IRS failed woefully. This was primarily because the British, in trying to replicate the huge success of the IRS in the north and measured success in the west, created “chiefs” by warrant in the east and vested these chiefs with powers and responsibilities previously unknown in Igbo society.37 Prior to this time, traditional Igbo society was stateless with decentralized village republics that were run on egalitarian principles. Each Igbo society or community was autonomous with distinct identifiers and symbolisms and in each community, every adult had a say in how the community was run. This means that Igbo communities did not have the type of centralized administrative structures of the Hausa-Fulani and Yorubas; instead, everyone had near equal stakes in governance and social responsibility.38 But the new chieftaincy institution that was created by the British changed this political landscape and threatened to condense the rights and liberties of the people, a prospect that Igbo populations did not relish. More importantly, in trying to enforce their new authority against massive local resistance, the warrant chiefs, who exercised arbitrary powers, became impossibly tyrannical. The use of these unpopular chiefs to collect taxes from local populations led to the famous Aba Women Riot of 1929, which targeted warrant chiefs and the native courts.39

Creation of Nigeria

Beginning with the 1849 appointment of John Beecroft as the British Consul in Nigeria – in a bid to protect the lives, properties, and interests of British traders – a series of political and social changes occurred that gradually led to the creation of Nigeria from the many independent nation- states under British imperial rule. These include the gunboat diplomacy that enforced the one- sided agreements of protection of British soldiers and the signing of protection treaties that ceded control to the British.40 Armed with the protection treaties and emboldened by the resolutions of the 1885 Berlin conference, Britain took over control of the territories now known as Nigeria. The territories were parceled out and administered as part of “protectorates” and “colonies” such as the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos, which were merged to form the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 190641 and comprised of nationalities in the south.

The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, which was created in 1900 after the British took over control of the territory from the Royal Niger Company (RNC)42 that previously administered it as part of a business empire, agglomerated populations in northern Nigeria including areas now known as the middle belt or north central region. In 1914, the protectorates of Southern Nigeria (which was religiously heterogeneous) and Northern Nigeria (which was overwhelmingly Muslim) were merged to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria with Lord Lugard (the previous High Commissioner for the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria) appointed as its first Governor-General. Thus, the British had succeeded in shoehorning over 250 ethnic nations speaking over 400 distinct languages into one territory despite concrete cultural divisions often overlaps ethnic, religious, social, regional, economic, and political boundaries.43 44

The bringing together of southern Nigeria and northern Nigeria – or the ethnic nationalities abstracted or condensed therein – resulted from the practical exigency of simplifying administration, reducing administrative costs, and increasing the profitability of the territories. The concern was not about unifying the various peoples or creating a strong country from its range of diversity. For example, prior to the amalgamation, efforts by Lord Lugard and his successors to reorganize the finances of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria had failed and its economy, which was dependent on taxation and commerce, had continued to flounder.45 To remedy this in the short- term, the British colonial administration increasingly relied on annual subsidies from southern Nigeria as well as an imperial grant of £300,000 per annum.46 The colonial administration believed that the long-term fix for the perennial funding problem of the Northern Protectorate must involve centralizing the protectorates under a single administration, which would permit the streamlining of administrative costs (allowing for the centralization of infrastructural schemes such as a single railway system and reduction of waste) and allow the central administration to divert resources as it deemed necessary such as allocating southern revenue to the north when necessary.47 Thus, the need to remove the financial burden of administering the north from Britain and to balance out its dwindling economic fortunes with revenue from the expanding southern economy was the primary reason for the 1 January 1914 amalgamation. Describing the event, Lord Harcourt, the British Colonial Secretary at the time, observed:

We have released northern Nigeria from the leading strings of the treasury. The promising and well-conducted youth of the north is now on an allowance on its own and is about to effect an alliance with a southern Lady of means. I have issued the special license and Lord Lugard will perform the ceremony. May the union be fruitful and the couple constant.48

From the onset of this union, the north was to be the dominant, controlling partner and groom, while the south was to be the compliant and submissive bride. It has been argued that the relative ease of the implementation of the IRS in northern Nigeria endeared the northern political elite to the British who proceeded to reward them with “senior partnership” after the amalgamation and national political power at independence.49 Conversely, the resistance that the British encountered in the south sullied their relationship with the southern political elite, most of who ironically, had been educated in Britain and ought to have enjoyed smoother relations – than the northern political elite who for the most part remained reclusive – with the colonialists. For instance, Sir James Robertson, the last colonial Governor-General of Nigeria, justified the British preference for northern leaders by referring to:

Differences in ordinary custom and behavior between the dignified, polite and rather aloof northerner and the uninhibited, vociferous southerner who noisily showed his disagreement in council and parliament without good manner and restraint.50

While the north, for most part of the union, maintained political control and the south latent economic advantage, the emergence of an elected southern president in 1999 fundamentally altered the historical balance of power by unifying political and economic control under southern political elites to the consternation of northern political elites. The sharia movement from 1999 to 2002, which later produced the Boko Haram insurgency, is one form of resistance to the socio-political and economic reordering of forces in Nigeria.

More importantly, after the amalgamation, the British administrative model sort to maintain control and profitability through the promotion of ethnic, religious, cultural, and political differences based on the differential results of its flagship colonial administrative program – the IRS – across Nigeria. The regionalization policy that followed and was adopted at independence – i.e. Western Region (for Yorubas), Eastern Region (for Igbos), and Northern Region (for Hausa- Fulanis) and the later creation of contiguous zones such as the Mid-Western Region to accommodate the interests of ethnic minorities – deepened ethno-religious suspicion and animosity among Nigerians and is blamed for the regional (north versus south) and religious (Christians versus Muslims) bifurcation of Nigeria, today. At the least, this British statecraft, which forced together “inconsistent cognitive elements”51 (or nationalities with little in terms of shared history, culture, values, norms, etc.) without creating the “behavioral assertions”52 such as a strong national ideology and distinctly indigenous symbolism that would have fostered national unity, is believed to have produced a synthetic racial system that has hardened social, political, economic, and religious differences.53 This view reinforces the argument made at the 1948 Legislative Council by Sir Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who would become the First Prime Minister of independent Nigeria, that:

Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite … Nigerian unity is only a British intention for the country.54

The British intent was to exploit differences among ethnic nationalities and religious communities for the propagation and protection of its economic interests. Many people argue that maintaining the system as it is, with all of its foundational defects, continues to privilege Britain and the West to the disadvantage of Nigerians. They argue that the state as presently constituted is an extension of British neo-colonial empire, which is maintained systematically through manipulations within the educational (where a mental condition was entrenched that continues to deprive Nigerian’s of the self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-reliance required to dominate in industry and creativity), political (through the bequeathing of a fundamentally flawed political system that emphasizes ethno-religious cleavages instead of more objective conditions to fill vacant national positions), and economic (especially the perpetuation of raw material export at the expense of industrialization, which has concretized Nigeria’s situation as a rentier state55 susceptible to intense shocks caused by the extreme volatility of global commodity prices including the price of crude oil) systems.56 The long-term consequence of this is that instead of speaking as one nation united by shared values and ideals, the constituents of Nigeria continue to assert historical ethno-national boundaries and identities that make the formation of nationhood difficult if not impossible. This condition has metastasized to virtually every sector of public life in Nigeria and is amplified by poor governance and corruption.

Modern Nigeria

With an estimated population of 190,632,261 people, Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country and the 8th most populous nation in the world.57 Administratively, it consists of a central government with extensive and excessive powers, thirty-six federating states including the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, and 774 local government areas loosely organized under six amorphous regions: north-east, north-west, north-central (northern Nigeria), south-east, south-west, and south- south (southern Nigeria). It has over 350 ethnic groups the largest being the Hausa-Fulani (29%) in the northwest and north east, the Yoruba (21%) in the southwest, and the Igbo (18%) in the southeast.58 A mix of minority ethnic groups populates the south-south, north-central, and north- east regions, including the Ijaw (10%) in the south-south and the Kanuri (3%) in the north-east.59

Geography and Environment

Historically, the main artery of commerce and communication in Nigeria was the River Niger from which Nigeria got her name. It is the third longest River in Africa, flowing 4000 kilometers from Guinea through Mali, Niger, and Benin and entering Nigeria from the north-west state of Kebbi. It empties into the Gulf of Guinea through its many branches and tributaries in the Niger Delta region. A second important river is the Benue, which is the Niger’s largest tributary, flowing 1400 kilometers from Cameroon into Nigeria where it empties into the River Niger. The Niger merges with the Benue in the confluence town of Lokoja in the north-central region. Other important rivers are the Sokoto, Kaduna, and Ethiope (tributaries of the Niger) and Donga, Katsina Ala, Gongola, and Ibi. All of these rivers merge into the Yobe River, which flows along Nigeria’s border with Niger and empties into Lake Chad.

The nationalities that make up present-day Nigeria feature an outstanding amount of geographic, cultural, linguistic, and ethno-religious diversity. For instance, while the area around the Niger Delta contains dense mangrove swamps, the other parts of the south are heavily forested and these forests open up to the hills and plateaus of the middle belt in the north central region. Further north are the plains of the savanna, which lead to the semi-desert region known as the Sahel,60 which continues for thousands of miles through the Central African state of Chad. The eastern region comprises dense forests and mountains that for decades provided natural protection for the inhabitants of the region.

The climate in Nigeria is arid in the north, tropical in the center, and equatorial in the south. Weather variations are determined by the interaction of moist southwest monsoon and dry northeast winds. Mean maximum temperatures are 30O C-32O C in the south and 33O C-35O C in the north. High humidity is present in the south from February to November and from June to September in the north. Low humidity coincides with the dry season. There are two main seasons in Nigeria: the wet season, which lasts from February to October (June to September in the north), and the dry season, which lasts from November to January (October to May in the north). During the dry season, rainfall is very high in the south, ranging from 2000 millimeters in coastal zones to 3550 millimeters in the Niger Delta. While rainfall is very light in the north, ranging from 500 to 750 millimeters, temperatures are very high, typically in the 90’s and 100’s. The dry season begins with the strong cool wind that blows from the Sahara called the “Harmattan.” Although the Harmattan brings relief from the heat, it also brings particles of sand, which causes blindness and increases the desertification of the northern savannas.61

Nigeria is home to a wild array of natural resources some of which have made Nigeria famous. Such mineral wealth as crude oil, natural gas, coal, tin, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, silver, gold, and diamonds are spread across its landscape. However, it is her oil deposits found in small fields in the Niger Delta that have made Nigeria both famous and ignominious. Nigeria has proven oil reserves of 36.2 billion barrels and proven natural gas reserves estimated at 182 trillion cubic. Since the early 1970s, oil has been the single most important cash commodity in Nigeria, replacing agricultural cash crops like cotton, groundnut and cocoa as the dominant cash earner for Nigeria. Today, sale of crude oil constitutes over 90 percent of Nigeria’s export earnings and 80 percent of domestic revenue.62 Dependence on crude oil as the main revenue source has contributed immensely to Nigeria’s economic and political instability since crude oil is susceptible to the vagaries and fluctuations of world petroleum prices. Also, the plunder of oil wealth by local and national leaders have nearly crippled the nation, producing structural underdevelopment and impoverishing the vast majority of the population. Over 70 percent of the Nigerian population lives below the poverty line.63 The lootability of oil has facilitated the rise of new billionaire politicians who get into politics in order to gain access to lootable resources. Typically, politicians use stolen wealth to perpetuate themselves in power. The lootability of oil has also facilitated the rise of local warlords or militants who prey on oil and associated products, critically challenging the coercive authority of the state.

Socio-Political Dynamics

Nigeria’s population is very diverse. It consists of over 350 ethno-linguistic groups speaking over 400 languages. Because of its ethnic diversity and abundant cultural and religious forms, Nigeria is often the theater of violent inter- and intra-ethnic and inter- and intra-religious confrontations. As B.I.C. Ijomah observes, in creating Nigeria, the British were more interested in the economic potentials of the new state and less on the cultural, spiritual, political, social, economic, and cognitive needs of the people.64 Very little attention was paid to the almost irreconcilable cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences among the various nationalities as a result of which, otherwise minor skirmishes and misunderstandings are blown out of proportion. This situation has produced many violent conflicts and associated deaths, social displacement, and destruction of property. This situation is further complicated by the fact that Nigeria’s religious population is split between Islam (50%), Christianity (40%), and indigenous beliefs (10%). This religious configuration frequently produces violent confrontations perpetuated by religious extremists and fanatics, especially in the Muslim-dominated north.

Since independence, there have been over 20 cases of severe ethno-religious conflicts, resulting in over 100,000 deaths, displacement of millions of people, and destruction of property worth billions of naira. The most horrific of these ethno-religious conflicts were those involving the Maitatsine, which started in 1980 in Kano and spread through five northern states, eventually ending in 1985. The Maitatsine was a Muslim extremist sect led by Mohammed Marwa, an immigrant from Cameroon, which went on rampagein the 1980s killing Christians in several northern cities. It began in Kano in 1980 and in only several days of fighting resulted in the death of 4,177 people in Kano alone before spreading to other northern states, including Kaduna (Zaria), Borno (Maiduguri and Bukumkutu), Gongola (Jimeta, Dobeli, Zango, Yelwa, Va’atita, Rumde, and Nassarawa), and Bauchi (Pantami).65 By the time it ended in 1985, over 7000 people (mostly Christians) had been killed. The killings also forced the migration of many Igbo Christians from the north who were the principal targets of the extremists.

Also, within the last five years, another Islamic fundamentalist group Jama’atu Ahliss Sunnah Lidda-awati Wal Jihad (Movement for Sunna and Jihad) otherwise known as Boko Haram, has staged jihadi violence in the north causing the death of over 25,000 people and displacing millions of people. At the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency, President Jonathan had to declare “State of Emergency” in three north-eastern states: Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe as well as the postponement of the 2015 national elections, which were suspended for six weeks in 2015. Though over 20 years separate the Maitatsine from Boko Haram, some of the central premises upon which the Maitatsine built his campaign are strikingly similar to Boko Haram’s, including the deplorable economic and social conditions of the north.66 Beyond that, however, both movements are different in material respects as later chapters reveal.

It is sufficient to note, at this point, that young people perpetrate most of the ethno-religious or ethno-sectarian killings in Nigeria, which partly reflects the fact that the Nigerian population is overwhelmingly youthful. Population estimates suggest that 63.1 percent of Nigeria’s 174.5 million people are less than 24 years.67 This is not surprising since the average life expectancy has been decreasing, now estimated at 51 years. This is mainly due to poverty, malnutrition, inadequate health care, pollution, and the spread of communicable disease, including HIV/AIDS. Still, the average population growth rate (est.) is 2.54 percent, meaning that the ratio of young to middle age and older persons continues to rise.68 While this is a good sign, at least, in terms of the size of the nation’s working population, Nigeria has historically been unable to utilize its abundant human capital for socio-economic and political transformation. In fact, the trouble with Nigeria is most noticeable in the arena of politics where successive governments have used young people as weapons of destruction against perceived opponents or for hijacking the electoral process and stealing electoral victories.

The Issues

At independence on October 1, 1960, the new indigenous ruling elite inherited the British colonial political infrastructure along with its baggage, which includes a much divided people. Lacking any strong national ideology or values around which to unite the people, the “nationalists” as they came to be called, focused on ethno-religious and regional differences, which became their bases for governance. While this served their narrow political vision well, it makes governance extremely fractious and tenuous. For instance, the nationalists adopted the West Minster type of federal government, which is a parliamentary-type system that granted relative political autonomy to federating units such as regions and each region agglomerated the interests of the majority ethnic groups within its territory.

Although this system was adopted in order to prevent divisions (ethnic, cultural, regional, social, and economic) from converging on a national scale, it could not prevent the Nigeria-Biafra civil war of 1967-1970. The war was the result of the national convergence of regional, religious, and ethnic animosities in the absence of concrete buffers – such as a broad integrative national ideology – that would have cushioned the effects of these divisions. Since that war, hopes of forging nationhood has almost evaporated and the situation is worsened by atrocious leadership at all levels of government in Nigeria. The failure of government has provoked many political conflicts such as the Western Region crisis of 1964/65, many military coups and political assassinations since 1966, the 12 June 1993 political conflict that led to the deaths of Chief Moshood Abiola and General (rtd) Shehu Musa Yar’Adua in detention, the 2011 post-election violence in northern Nigeria, and both the Niger Delta and Boko Haram insurgencies.

Many analysts believe that unless something is done to radically alter the structural foundation of conflict in Nigeria, more violent conflicts may occur. In this regard, Arthur Nwankwo’s conclusion about the structural foundation of the Nigeria-Biafra war is prescient. According to him:

It is true that the basic problems that caused the Nigerian crisis remained unresolved ... and there seems to be no consideration for the health of the federation in the pursuit of individual or group interests - from the smuggling rackets to the huge payoffs in bribery and corruption. But it is also true that the traumatic bitterness of the war is rich with lessons for toleration and understandings. These lessons are our only guarantee against instability for they will serve as a buffer to cushion us through the rough times ahead. The mention of rough times ahead may have set some political noses twitching. But if it is realized that the contradictions in Nigeria are yet to be resolved, we will agree that Nigeria has anything but quiet to look to.69

The contradictions are many and Nigerians across ethnic, religious, political, economic, and regional divides agree this much. However, they disagree about how to resolve these contradictions. For instance, the different viewpoints were represented in support for or opposition to the convoking of the Jonathan National Conference. This split, which mirrors national disagreement about almost everything in Nigeria, is also playing out in the Nigerian elections, which will go down as the most divisive elections in the nation’s history. Even the conference report is beginning to gather frost because of the presidents refusal to present the report to the divided congress out of fear that it will be discarded, which makes it emblematic of the national ills. That report has joined countless other reports, which prescriptions for ameliorating the Nigerian condition are routinely ignored while Rome burns.

This section examines some of the problem areas that past constitutional and national conferences have deliberated on without remediation and which are provoking tensions and armed conflict in Nigeria.

The Nigerian Question

Following the series of political and social events that led to the creation of Nigeria, and perhaps, because of these events, Nigerians have continually grappled with the “national question.”70 For instance, the name “Nigeria” was chosen by Flora Shaw, a correspondent of the Times of London and mistress of Lord Lugard, as tribute to the River Niger, which is the third longest river in Africa. The river runs for 730 miles through Nigeria into the Gulf of Guinea and is an important artery of commerce and communication in the West African sub-region. The new unified territory came to cover 356,668 square miles – roughly twice the size of the U.S. state of California or three times the size of the United Kingdom – and is bordered to the south by the Bight of Benin and Biafra, on the west by Benin Republic, on the north by Niger and Chad, and on the east by Cameroon. It stretches roughly for 700 miles from west to east and 650 miles from south to north, covering an area between 3o and 15oE longitude and between 4o and 14oN latitude.71 But seeing that this vast country was created by foreigners, named by foreigners, and bequeathed a new cultural heritage, especially a complex political culture, by foreigners, Nigerians have continued to fulminate about their “Nigerianess” or what it means to be Nigerian. The national question is a series of questions that probe the presence or absence of a meaningful national identity and includes questions such as: What is Nigeria? Who are Nigerians? How can Nigeria and Nigerians develop a meaningful national identity? And why are regional and sectional identities solidifying at the expense of the “Nigerian” identity?

As stated already, the British created the geographic area now known as Nigeria haphazardly in 1914 and the indigenous people had no say in this forced creation. But thereafter, the people embraced within this territory became known externally as Nigerians, although this designation meant (and continues to mean) little or nothing to a large segment of the country. Local people continue to relate according to historical patterns developed over hundreds of years and assert identities based on these historical experiences, and not on the basis of Nigeria. Perhaps, it was to achieve this (ethno-religious suspicion and tensions that prevented any meaningful united action against the colonialists) that the British deftly applied the politics of regionalism, which was adopted by the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa government at independence, further solidifying regional distinctions. More specifically the regional and federal character of the various constitutions adopted in the 1950s undermined the development of a unified national consciousness by basing access to federal power (or power at the national level) on regional power (or power derived at the regional level). Thus, the largest ethnic groups – the Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region, the Yoruba in the Western Region, and the Igbo in the Eastern Region – came to dominate their respective regions and to use that leverage to contest for power at the federal level.72 Even with this arrangement, some of the major ethnicities, especially the Igbo continued to claim marginalization leading to the declaration of cessation in 1967 and the bitter-fought Nigeria-Biafra Civil War, and subsequently to new agitations by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) for the independence of Igbo people under the Republic of Biafra.

Yet, even within each region, ethnic minorities whose interests were condensed under the overwhelming might of the major ethnic groups, continued to assert their own distinct identities, to oppose the political dominance of the major ethnic groups, and to agitate not only for political and social inclusion but in some cases, a separate state (and even a nation-state) that guarantees rights to these ethnicities. While this has led to the proliferation of states (now 36 states from the three regions at independence), it has also created subdivisions of identity that is detracting from the development of a single, encompassing Nigerian national identity despite great efforts in this direction through education and the arts.73 Because the national identity has been weak and the local, ethnic, or religious identity strong, it has been easy for many Nigerian’s – out of fear of domination by other groups – to advocate the creation of more states (or even national disintegration) as a way to protect the interests of particular ethnic and cultural groups. It is the desire of the Nigerian president and many others that the national conference would help to answer the “Nigerian question.”

Hybrid Federalism

Nigeria currently operates a federal system of government. The adoption of this system follows a series of political and social events that disrupted the harmonious working of government and inexorably produced wide scale violence. For example, following the January 1966 failed military coup organized by five southern majors – four of whom were ethnic Igbo – the General Aguiyi Ironsi regime through Decree no. 34 of 24 May 1966, officially abolished the federal system that came with independence and replaced it with a unitary system. In place of the regions, General Ironsi created “groups of provinces”74 and the military and civil service, which previously were administered by the regional governments, were integrated to the federal system and administered from the center. Although Ironsi’s regime was short-lived, the changes that he introduced would outlive him, even though the Colonel Yakubu Gowon regime that ousted him recommitted to a federal structure with respect for regional differences through the abrogation of Decree no. 34. In many ways, every subsequent government has blended General Ironsi’s unitarism with federalism, thereby creating a hybrid federal system that many believe is responsible for some of the country’s more intransigent problems.

For example, Suberu75 argues that the fundamental problem with Nigeria’s federalism is not simply the existence of multiple and deep sectional cleavages but their continued aggravation by the fundamental transformation of the Nigerian economy into an oil state enclave economy with the government appropriating and distributing most public revenue (especially accruing from oil export) irrespective of the nature and location of production. The extreme centralization of control over revenue flows has created and or exacerbated the worst pathologies of Nigerian federalism including the fractious contestation for federal power that has bifurcated Nigeria into north and south. It has made the allocation of revenue (especially the formula for revenue allocation) extremely divisive, at least vertically (between different levels of government) and horizontally (among the states and local governments). One consequence of this is the “resource control” agitations of the oil-producing states, which some hardliners have used to demand secession. Also, the federal government’s ability to infringe on the rights and interests of state governments (including the harassment of non-friendly and opposition state governors) results from this hybrid federalism. In the process, it has eroded the fundamental principles of federalism including the autonomy of federating (lower level) units of government.

While the multistate system helps to disperse conflict and contain it within political subunits, fragments the solidarity of the three major ethnic groups, generates cross-cutting state-based cleavages, and devolves resources to lower levels of government, the hyper-centralization of power at the federal level especially through the appropriation and distribution of oil revenue, has vitiated almost all of the benefits of Nigerian federalism.76Because of it, hopes of developing nationhood has evaporated, leaving a shifting mosaic of ethnic, religious, and regional alignments, which has been the basis for accessing national political power and resources. In true federal systems, the states, regions, ethnic (or racial) groups, and religious groups are not fixated on controlling power at the center because they have (and control) their own resources and the structure of federalism shields them from excessive intervention, abuse, and predation from the center. Instead, what is obtainable in Nigeria is a superficial, vulnerable, and distorted federalism, which promotes fractious ethno-religious contestation for political control at the center and through this control corner the largest chunk of the “national cake.”77 This is what General (rtd) Ibrahim Babangida – a former head of a military junta in Nigeria – calls the “national cake psychosis,”78 which explains the proliferation of states and local governments in Nigeria.79

Centralized Policing

Nigeria’s hybrid federalism has been implicated in the recurring security crisis across Nigeria. For example, while the country claims to run a federal system, which guarantees rights to the federating units, policing, which ought to be localized or controlled at each level of the federation (i.e. federal, state, and local government) is centralized. This has rendered states (and local governments) incapable of dealing with unique security challenges such as the Boko Haram insurgency in Borno and Yobe States, religious conflicts in the north west, kidnappings across the five states of the south east – Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo –, militancy in all Niger Delta states, ethno- sectarian conflict in Plateau and Nassarawa States, and thuggery or the “area boy” syndrome and violent crime across the south west. While the federal government has been unable to adequately fund the police, it has continued to prevent states from establishing their own police or to cede control of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) to states. The situation is such that in some states like Lagos, the federal police have refused to enforce provisions of the state’s Domestic Violence Law,80 and in Kano they refused to enforce provisions of sharia law. This has prompted Lagos to experiment with vigilantes such as the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) and the Kano State Government to establish the Hisbah – a vigilante – to enforce these laws81 amid claims of violation of federal law. As a result of the vacuum created by inadequate federal policing in an era of rising criminality, states have innovated with vigilantes such as Bakassi in the south east, Kick Against Indiscipline (KAI) and OPC in Lagos State, Hisbah in Kano State, Yan Kalare in Gombe State, Sara Suka in Bauchi State, and ECOMOG in Borno State. In states like Edo, the responsibility for protecting government property is given to motor park touts or “agberos” and campus cult-gangs, confirming the inadequacy of federal policing. Often, without proper regulation and supervision, these vigilantes and touts have worsened the security situation and given the federal government and opponents of state policing ammunition to shoot down the clamor for state police.

It goes without saying that because of its size and centralized structure, the Nigeria Police Force has become too large and unwieldy. As a result, it is uncharacteristically slow to respond to security breaches across Nigeria. It is because of this dislocation from the people at the grassroots that the police is unable to detect potential security breaches before they occur but instead has always been reactive; an approach that has been described as the “fire brigade approach.”82 It is also because of the centralization of policing that the police are underfunded, ill-trained and ill-equipped, too impersonal and “soulless,” all of which has allowed corruption to thrive in the force and beg the question of how decentralizing the police might help to improve security in local communities across Nigeria. In its presentation at the 2012 Nigeria Security Conference organized by BEN TV, UK, the 1960 Collective asked, “Should we have state police which is more in tune with our established federal structure? If so, how do we fund it sustainably and how can we insulate it from politics and imbue it with the requisite independence to perform its task?”83 These questions strike to the heart of opposition to state police – that they may be manipulated by ethnic, religious, and political groups in ways that are inimical to peace and progress and that it is in line with Nigeria’s federal structure and makes for a more efficient administration of justice. Whichever way the issue is viewed, it is clear that the issue of state (and local) policing is central to any debate about the “future” of Nigeria.

Politics of State Creation

The politics of state creation in Nigeria is without doubt the politics of ethnicity. Ethnic consciousness continues to play a major role in the political process and in the distribution of political positions, patronages, and rewards. Because of this consciousness, a federal character system, which attempts to balance power, opportunities, and rewards across the complex geo- political divide has been in place for a long time and has pushed merit to the background. Today, the federal character arrangement exists in virtually every aspect of Nigerian life including education where students from particular southern states are expected to score higher than students from northern states in the Joint Matriculation Examination (JME) to assure of places in federal universities. Stemming from a colonial history – especially the early opening of the south to British educational influence, which was closed to the north in deference to the legacy of Islam – states in northern Nigeria are typically designated educationally disadvantaged84 while states in the south are considered educationally advantaged.

Figure 1: Maps showing the creation of states from 1967-197685

Figure 6: Maps showing the creation of states from 1976-199686

Also, in politics, a zoning formula was put in place by the major political parties to ensure that power (at the center) rotated among the six geo-political regions. The politics of zoning is an attempt to resolve the longstanding political dominance of the northern political elite and the perceived political marginalization of the south. Many believe that the disequilibria in power relations between the north and south was facilitated by the British through systemic manipulations including several fraudulent censuses that inflated the northern population, giving it clear numerical advantage over the south. Since 1967, states have been created following agitations by ethnic groups and communities, against the backdrop of criticisms that states are created deliberately to privilege communities in the north over the south. For instance, in the 1991 national census, Lagos (the most populous state in the south and indeed the entire nation) was given a figure of 5,655,751 while Kano (the most populous state in the north) in order to match that, was given a figure of 5,632,040. Yet, numerous independent analyses put the population of Lagos at over 15 million. More importantly, while Lagos is allocated 20 Local Government Councils (LGCs) on the basis of the census, Kano and Jigawa States87 (with a combined population less than that of Lagos) are allocated 71 LGCs. Also, while Lagos has only 24 representatives in the Federal House of Representatives, Kano and Jigawa have a total of 35 federal seats.88 Perceived inequities like this have continued to fuel tension and resentment, creating new agitations for the creation of more states that in all material reality are not in themselves viable or sustainable but must depend on federal allocations, further worsening the fractious political struggle for control of the center. The national confab discussed this issue without resolving it.

Politics of Population

The influence of Britain continues to loom large despite the over five decades of indigenous rule. One area where this influence is felt most is population; that is the politics of it. For instance, after reconstructing the geopolitical map of Nigeria, the British proceeded to conduct a series of censuses, which some scholars say were deliberately rigged in favor of the north. Professor Itse Sagay argues that the first ever Nigeria-wide census, which was conducted in 1931 was rigged to give the north numerical advantage over the south. Out of a population of 19,930,000 the Northern Region was awarded 11,434,000, the population of the Western Region was put at 3,855,000, and that of the Eastern Region was 4,641,000. The Northern Region gained a plurality of 2,938,000 people over the other regions.89 Thus, from the very beginning, a permanent majority in population, which was intended to translate into a permanent majority in the future federal legislature and consequently permanent control of power, was programmed for the Hausa-Fulani political elite. On the basis of this figure, the Northern Region demanded half the seats in the central legislature, during the 1950 National Conference, as a condition for remaining a part of Nigeria. Consequently, according to Sagay, in 1951 colonial officials awarded 68 seats to the Northern Region, 34 seats to the Western Region, and 34 seats to the Eastern Region in the central legislature.

In the 1952 census, the scenario of the 1931 census was repeated. This time, the increase of population in the twenty-one years between 1931 and 1952 was so carefully crafted that the birth and death rates in the three regions were virtually the same, and the difference in population between north and south was similar to the 1931 figure, with the Northern Region with a population of 16,540,000 accounting for more than half of Nigeria’s population total population of 31,540,000. With these results, the colonial government distributed seats that made it possible for the north to gain political control. According to Sagay even if the west and east (collectively known as the south) had polled resources together to challenge the north, they would have failed. 90 For example, in the last nation-wide elections before independence, Sir James Robertson, the Governor-General, recognizing the strategy they had so carefully worked out, invited Sir Tafawa Balewa of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to form the new government even though the counting of votes had only just begun. When the final results were announced, the NPC did not have a simple majority in the House of Representatives. It was clear from the results that the Nnamdi Azikiwe led National Council of Nigerian Citizens (From the east) with 89 seats could have successfully formed a coalition government with the Obafemi Awolowo led Action Group (from the west) with 73 seats and put the NPC with (134 seats) in the opposition. Professor Omo- Omoruyi explains the preemptive action of Sir James Robertson, thus:

Sir James Robertson was a shrewd implementer of the northern rule earlier fashioned by Lords Harcourt and Lugard. Sir James was especially recruited by the British government in 1955 because of his experience in Sudan with an identical situation to Nigeria’s. He is on record as confessing that he did not handle this phase to the satisfaction of Dr Azikiwe and Chief Awolowo. Sir James confessed that he invited Balewa to form the government in 1959 by persuading some of the southern members to support him and after Sir Abubakar had assured him that he will get a southern group to work with him. Sir James did this before the results were announced. He confessed that he did this to appease the Sardauna of Sokoto, the leader of the NPC, to stop him from taking the north out of Nigeria.91

The story of the 1963 census (the first after independence) was not different. The north, imitating their British allies, expertly doctored the figures to achieve pre-determined results.92 The eastern region particularly challenged the result with such venom that the country dangled dangerously on the precipice of anarchy. The unjust manipulation of the census to facilitate permanent northern political control was part of the grievances of the east in their ill-fated attempt to pull out of Nigeria through the creation of the Republic of Biafra. As a result of their declaration (of cessation), a bloody civil war was fought from 1967 to 1970, which resulted in the death of over 1 million easterners and the total destruction of all infrastructures in eastern Nigeria. At the end of the war in 1970, the east was brought back under direct political control and supervision of the north, and permanently shut out of the Nigerian presidency.

The 1991 provisional census was also condensed to maintain the carefully designed colonial program. Out of a total estimated population of 88,504,477, the north was awarded 47,261,962 and the south 41,242,512 (National Population Commission, 1991), thereby maintaining the colonial margin. According to Sagay:

The most absurd aspect of the announced figures is the attempt to equate Kano State with Lagos State. While Lagos is given a figure of 5,655,751, Kano, in order to match that, is given a figure of 5,632,040. Any honest observer knows that the Lagos population cannot be anything less than 15 million. But by the legacy of colonial manipulation, the most populous state in the south must not be allowed to have larger population than the most populous state in the north. That is not all, having kept the population of Lagos state down to just over 5 million, the state is allocated only 20 local governments whilst Kano and Jigawa states (officially with a combined population slightly less than Lagos), are allocated a total of 71 local government councils. Again, while Lagos State has only 24 members in the House of Representatives, Kano and Jigawa (with a smaller combined population), have a total of 35 seats.93

Thus, according to him, it follows logically that no bill can pass through the House without the concurrence of the northern states, even though bills will sail through smoothly even if the whole southern representatives oppose them. He concludes that the implication of this is that “the south is the object of internal colonialism; that the British merely handed over colonial authority to the Arewa north, and the Arewa north is determined to sustain this colonial relationship with the south indefinitely.”94

Sagay is on point especially if the confession of Donald Duke, a former two-time governor of Cross River state, is considered. Speaking before an audience of pro-democracy activists, Duke admitted that the 2006 census was rigged. According to him:

When we conducted the census in 2006 or so, the raw figures said we were over two hundred million; when they went and processed the figures it came down to 140 million. When you look at those figures and compare to those we had in 1991 at a growth rate of 2.1 or something like that, it is really just an extrapolation, because we were too embarrassed to admit our true numbers.95

The question is why did the government tamper with the results? If the government could reduce the census figure unilaterally by about 60 million people because it was embarrassed by Nigeria’s size, could it also have inflated figures for particular communities, states, and regions? Also, how is economic policy made in Nigeria? Is it conceivable that those who design Nigeria’s economic, health, education, and transportation policies act on purely speculative information? What other information about Nigeria and its people are based on this type of fiction? For instance, a recent rebasing or recalculation of Nigeria’s economic and social trajectory puts the Nigerian economy as the largest in Africa, superseding that of South Africa by a stretch. On what bases were these calculations done considering that while the economy is thought to be on the upswing, poverty is also increasing? What data were analyzed? The questions are endless.

Dependence on Oil Revenue

Over the last four decades, the Nigerian economy has increasingly become oil-centered, with dramatic deterioration in the other foreign exchange-earning sectors including agriculture. Located almost exclusively in the Niger Delta, petroleum has become Nigeria’s economic mainstay and chief export earner,96 displacing millions of people who previously depended on agriculture and associated industries for their livelihoods. Rather than contributing to national development and to improved living conditions for Nigerians, oil wealth has been integrated into patronage politics and by corrupt public officials, especially politicians, to enrich themselves and their cronies while the majority of the people languished in poverty. The result is that oil production (and the appropriation and distribution of oil wealth) has created dissociation between the people, the natural wealth that they own but do not possess, and the appropriating state. This disconnection has continued to afflict Nigeria.97

Commercial scale oil was first discovered in 1956 in Oloibiri, a small rural community in the heart of present-day Bayelsa State, by Shell-BP Development Company, a joint venture of Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum.98 Two years later, commercial drilling began and since then, hundreds of wells have been exploited. As more oil deposits were discovered, crude oil became the country’s primary export commodity replacing cocoa (produced mainly in the west), groundnut and cotton (produced mainly in the north), coal (mined mainly in the east), and palm oil and rubber (produced mainly in the Niger Delta).99 By the 1970s, crude oil production (and the revenue generated from it) had grown exponentially, accounting for about 50 percent of all exports. For instance, in 1958 – the first year of commercial production – revenue from crude was only 200,000 Naira. By 1970, revenue from crude had increased to 166 million Naira and then to 5.3 billion by 1976.100 Of course, the growth of the Nigerian petroleum sector was caused by the global petroleum scarcity that followed the 1973 embargo placed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on sale to Western countries over their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. The resulting scarcity pushed the price of crude oil from $3.80 per barrel (bpd) in October 1973 to $14.70 bpd by January 1974.101 By 1981, the price per barrel of crude oil had reached a high of $38.77 and has been increasing ever since. Today, Nigeria is the sixth-largest producer of crude oil within OPEC producing an average of 2.5 million bpd of crude oil,102 which constitutes over 40 percent of Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP), over 80 percent of annual revenue, and 95 percent of foreign exchange.103 104

However, corresponding to an increase in revenue is an increase in the nation’s dependence on oil revenue. Because petroleum revenue was relatively easy to appropriate, it was easy for government to condition itself exclusively on it. Also, because this revenue source was relatively constant, especially since Nigeria’s deposit of crude oil – put at about 37.2 billion barrels105 – is expected to last another 35 years at current levels of exploitation, it was convenient for the government to divest itself from developing and exploiting other revenue streams. For instance, traditional mechanisms for generating revenue such as taxation and customs duties were neglected and these became exclusive cash cows for corrupt high-level government officials. More importantly, agriculture, which was the prevalent economic activity in Nigeria prior to the discovery of oil, was neglected and overnight Nigeria became a country dependent upon a single exportable natural resource. Between 1975 and 1978, for instance, the total area under cultivation fell from 18.8 million to 11.05 million hectares at the same time that food imports rose from $353.7 million to over $1 billion.106 Such was the seriousness of the neglect that “oil palm, rubber, groundnut, for which Nigeria was once among the world’s leading producers, was being imported to offset local shortfalls.”107 Other sectors that were necessary to stabilize and balance the economy were similarly neglected. For example, manufacturing, which in 1970 accounted for 9.4 percent of GDP fell to 7.0 percent in 1974108 and has been decreasing since.

The effect of the overdependence on oil is not only that the Nigerian economy became increasingly vulnerable to the fluctuations and shocks of the world market109 but also that it caused dramatic negative transformation in the living standards of the people. This development is the result of multiple policy changes that altered the revenue appropriation and allocation regimes of the state. For instance, based on the recommendations of the Dina Commission of 1970,110 the Gowon administration jettisoned the historical approach to revenue allocation as a constitutional exercise and adopted an approach that treated revenue allocation as an instrument of development planning and national integration. Because of the Dina Commission report, the federal government assumed control over disbursements of the expanded Distributable Pool Account (DPA), all principal tax receipts, and major share of royalties from oil. In terms of oil revenue, the government made a distinction between onshore and offshore oil, which meant that these states and communities were to be excluded from any share of offshore royalties – the federal government would get 60 percent, DPA 30 percent, and a Special Contingency Account 10 percent – and would receive 40 percent less from onshore royalties under the principle of derivation.111 In essence, the proportion of oil revenue allocated on a derivation basis “declined from 50 percent of mining rents and royalties in 1969, through 2 percent of the Federation Account in 1981, to only 1 percent of mineral revenues in the account during the period from 1989 to 1999112 dealing a fatal blow to the oil-producing states and communities and eroding the living standards of the people.

Because the federal might had burgeoned following the oil boom and the Dina commission report, the government began to spend heavily on defense and prestige projects to the neglect of agriculture, housing, manufacturing, water resources, and energy, which had direct bearing on the people’s standard of living. For example, defense expenditure rose rapidly from 1972 and hit the N1 billion marks for the first time in 1975.113 Also, Nigeria became Africa’s big brother and gave aid to the following countries for different purposes: Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mozambique at independence; Mali, Senegal, Upper Volta or Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia for drought and natural disasters; and Niger, Zambia, Sudan, Sao Tome and Principe for undisclosed purposes.114 The total estimated expenditure for the country rose from N2 billion in the second National Development Plan (1970- 1974) to N43 billion in the third national Development Plan (1975-1980). Because the boom was expected to continue in the 1980s, the planners of the third national Development Plan footnoted that “finance is unlikely to be a major problem during the third national development plan period.”115

While the new structure expanded the federal government’s influence as the sole allocative and distributive authority, it heightened concern about the expanding federal government role. More importantly, the new structure grossly undermined the oil producing communities and paid inadequate attention to problems like pollution and widespread ecological damage that destroyed the productive capacities of the Niger Delta peasant and their forced conversion to unskilled, unemployed, and unemployable migrant applicants in large cities like Warri, Port Harcourt, Benin, and Lagos. The new structure was seen by members of oil-producing communities as a deliberate policy to oppress minorities since the principle of population (which favored the ethnic majorities) took precedence over that of derivation. This perceived injustice, which has produced a mass society of impoverished, critically ill, unskilled, disenfranchised, and powerless people and communities,116 is cited by militants as one of the primary reasons they are up in arms against the state and multinational oil companies. Following violent agitation by oil-producing communities and deft political lobbying by sundry groups, the allocation to oil-producing states was increased to 13 percent in 2000.

Yet, community groups including women associations in the oil producing region have faulted the practice of paying the oil derivation revenue to state governments instead of oil-producing communities directly. They say this is a contravention of section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution, which makes 13 percent derivation fund a “first charge” on the Federation Account. According to two women groups – 13% Derivation Amazons and 13% Derivation Women Foundation – “as a first charge, 13 percent derivation fund must not be paid through a third party or any state government account.”117 The controversy surrounding payment of the derivation fund through state governments – which often are misappropriated by state government officials without communities receiving any benefits – may spark the next round of non-election violence in the Niger Delta region.118 119 It is clear, therefore, that overreliance on oil exports in disregard to other sectors of the economy, continues to polarize communities across Nigeria and has been directly and indirectly behind calls for national disintegration and fears about the potential consequences of national disintegration, which must form a core part of the proposed national dialogue.

Civil-Military Relations

It is impossible to discuss modern Nigeria or its series of political transformations without discussing the role played by the military. Today, Nigeria is in its Fourth Republic and is experiencing the longest uninterrupted period of civilian rule in its history. For most of that history, the military has been in power influenced principally by two Key variables. The first is the colonial roots of the military, which has had tremendous impact on the way the military perceived, or used to perceive, its role, types of issues around which defense policy should be structured and its strategic and tactical doctrines. The second variable is based on the requirement of law enforcement and territorial defense. These two variables made the Nigerian armed forces militaristic in orientation and design as an instrument of control rather than an institution for the development of society.

Since 1970 (the end of the Nigerian civil war which was fought between forces loyal to the Biafran leader Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu and the federal forces led by Colonel Yakubu Gowon, the Head of State and Commander in Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces) all significant political power has been concentrated in Nigeria’s military. Following the first coup, which brought General Aguiyi-Ironsi to power in 1966, various configurations of military governments have controlled the political destiny of Nigeria. Between 1966 and 1975, power was concentrated in the Federal Military Government headed by Yakubu Gowon (a Christian northerner) whose position as chairman of the Supreme Military Council was unassailable. Gowon’s regime was criticized principally for corruption that had become widespread, inefficiency (which saw the government squandering an oil boom), and for growing criminality among the population. Gowon was eventually toppled in a bloodless military coup in July 1975 and replaced with Brigadier Murtala Ramat Muhammed, a Muslim northerner. Muhammed, a military hothead and ethnic conscious soldier was one of the masterminds of the 1966 counter-coup and a principal player in the Nigerian-Biafran Civil War of 1967-1970. He supervised the pogrom that occurred in Asaba where thousands of defenseless Asaba men and boys were brutally murdered because of suspicion that they would be more loyal to Biafran forces than federal forces. Mohammed’s regime was short-lived despite the little promise he showed in the few months he occupied power in a coup attempt by middle belt officers led by Colonel Buka Suka Dimka. In that coup, Mohammed, along with his ADC Lieutenant Akinsehinwa, his orderly and driver, was assassinated on his way to work at the junction in front of the Federal Secretariat in Ikoyi, Lagos, on 13 February 1976. The hit team that carried out the assassination included Lieutenant William Seri.

Muhammed was succeeded by a reluctant Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo, a southern Christian of Yoruba extraction, who pledged to hand over power to civilians in 1979. Obasanjo kept Muhammed’s structure and continued with his reform agenda. In 1979, Obasanjo approved a new constitution for Nigeria, which was modeled after the constitution of the United States. The constitution provided for a separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Thereafter, Obasanjo supervised an imperfect election that ushered in the Second Republic led by President Shehu Shagari a northern Muslim from Sokoto state. Obasanjo also began implementing Mohammed’s agenda to move the federal capital (and seat of government) from Lagos to Abuja.

The Second Republic was short-lived. In December 1983, the military led by General Muhammadu Buhari a northern Muslim, overthrew the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari. The principal reason given by the military for the coup was Shagari’s profligacy and the dwindling oil fortunes. The military promised several reforms including the reduction of corruption in government, a drastic trimming of the federal budget, and “war against indiscipline.” The government emphasized hard work, discipline, patriotism, and environmental hygiene. While these appeared to be lofty programs, the gains were slow in coming and Buhari’s regime was eventually toppled in what many consider a palace coup in August 1985. General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida a northern Muslim headed the new regime.

Babangida’s regime faced stiff opposition from civil society groups notably the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) and the labor movement. Under Babangida, Nigeria’s economic recession appeared to worsen. To address this, Babangida introduced the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which obtained about $4.2 billion in support from the World Bank and the IMF and rescheduled Nigeria’s foreign debts. The support given by the global finance power houses was conditioned to a series of monetary policy changes, including the devaluation of the currency and the enforcement of a new regime of trade liberalization. As a result of the SAP, Nigeria experienced dramatically declining productivity, decline in real income, rising unemployment, increasing levels of poverty and associated increases in crime. Also, Babangida presided over a transition program that was considered one of the longest and most expensive in Africa. From 1985 until 1993 when he left office almost in disgrace, Babangida promised a series of political reforms that would culminate in the handover of political power to civilians. Critics insisted that Babangida had no desire to handover and labeled him a “fox” or a “Maradona” who kept fiddling while “Rome” burned. An evidence for this charge was the 1992 presidential election that he organized and which was ostensibly won by Bashorun Moshood Kashimawo Olalekan Abiola but which he annulled for no good reason. Babangida was eventually forced to “step aside” in 1993 by a coalition of local and international pro-democracy and rights groups, but not before emplacing an extremely weak Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, a southern Christian who held power in proxy for General Sani Abacha, the defense minister.

In November 1993, General Abacha sacked the Interim National Government and proceeded to rule unchallenged till 1998 when he died suddenly. During his time in power, General Abacha suppressed dissent, orchestrated phantom coups (in order to jail or kill opponents) and perpetrated countless human rights violations that resulted in the imposition of stiff economic and social sanctions on Nigeria. Abacha also presided over a transition program that saw the registration of five political parties all of which adopted Abacha as their sole presidential candidate. Under Abacha, amorphous groups such as the Youths Earnestly Ask for Abacha (YEAA) dotted the political landscape and benefitted immensely from Abacha’s largesse. Corruption was also taken to whole new levels such that following Abacha’s death in 1998 he was believed to have siphoned over US $10 billion into foreign accounts. Upon Abacha’s death, General Abdulsalam Abubakar a northern Muslim and next in command to Abacha took over control of government and immediately commenced a transition to civilian rule. To actualize that process, he released all of the political leaders incarcerated by General Abacha including General Olusegun Obasanjo (rtd) but not before the death of Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola and retired General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua in custody. General Obasanjo eventually won the presidential elections and was sworn-in in April 2007. He remained in office till April 2007 and was succeeded by Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (younger brother to the late General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua) who died in office in 2009.

Today, retired soldiers continue to play major roles in the nation’s nascent democracy due principally to the enormous resources that they accumulated from plundering the treasury during their many years of authoritarian rule. The negative impact of military rule on Nigeria’s political development has been well documented.120 The most telling effect has been in the relations between the military and civilian populations.121 The frosty relationship between the military and civilians was caused not only by the arbitrariness of military rule, which curtailed freedoms, limited democratic expectations and aspirations, solidified corruption and nepotism, and physically and mentally traumatized local populations; but also by the perception, on the part of the population, that the military lacked a clear mission. It is this last point, the absence of a mission that led the military to seek new mandates in the field of civil governance and institutionalized the looting of political power.

With the upsurge in violent challenges to the state across Nigeria and following the various missteps and misspeaks of the military in reaction to these enormous security challenges, Nigerians must begin to contemplate the role of the military in the new Nigeria that they desire. If it is assumed that a good civil-military relation is a pre-requisite for national security, democratic growth, and national stability, then, Nigerians must ask the question, what should be the role of the military in a democracy? Also, what mission do Nigerians want their military to pursue? And who should design, implement, and control this mission? These are questions that the NC may help answer including the development of a research and training agenda with the goal of understanding the socio-cultural motions driving praetorian armies, especially as they relate to Nigeria, but drawing from the global context.

Corruption

When the multi-faceted problems of Nigeria are being discussed, corruption is typically the elephant in the room. The pervasive effect of corruption on the fortunes of the state cannot be overemphasized. In fact, even the tragically inept way Nigeria’s military has engaged the Boko Haram insurgents, reeks of monumental corruption, especially the embezzlement of funds meant to purchase modern war-fighting equipment as well as the short-payment of allowances to soldiers on the frontline of the war with Boko Haram. Since independence, the problem of corruption has been the greatest single destroyer of the Nigerian economy, and with each succeeding administration, the problem keeps expanding outward from the domain of government to the entire society. What started among a small clique of top government officials has gradually, but inexplicably, become a national pandemic involving everyone who negotiates a government asset, including employee time. Its pervasive corrosive influence has permeated the heart of the Nigerian society, warping institutions and decaying the collective moral fabric. Today, corruption has become a national ideology, a tragic national ideology, indoctrinating everyone, including children on ways to steal public resources by exploiting countless loopholes or by brazenly taking what belongs to the state without the requirement for accountability. More importantly, everyone, including children, are also daily being indoctrinated in the logics for avoiding accountability, even through recourse to the primordial.

As part of the logic for avoiding accountability or for minimizing the impact of corruption, which costs the government about 60 percent of its revenue and increases with the expansion of the public sector, Nigerian leaders have carefully created a definitional challenge for corruption. For instance, in a presidential media chat in February 2015, President Goodluck Jonathan, modified his earlier ignominious definition of corruption as “mere stealing” by defining it as “two unmarried men sleeping together.” The president believes that corruption is over hyped and has lost its meaning in the loose sense in which people apply it in Nigeria, thereby conflating it with “common” stealing. The president argues that a “thief is a thief,” suggesting that the term corruption should be reserved for “immoral” acts as when “two unmarried men sleep together” and not for describing the acts of government officials who steal billions from the public till.

The eminent constitutional lawyer, Professor Itse Sagay, disagrees with the president’s attempt to create a legal dichotomy for the terms “corruption” and “stealing.” According to him:

Ultimately, every act of corruption is an act of stealing. There is no question about it. There is no moral or ethical difference between them. Both are criminal, immoral and anti-social acts and nobody should attempt to make one look lighter than the other. People who commit either should be dealt with seriously.

Many people believe that President Jonathan’s attempt to redefine corruption is because his government is steeped in corruption. For instance, Festus Keyamo, an activist lawyer engaged by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to prosecute corruption cases, says President Jonathan’s administration is notoriously corrupt. He accuses the president of paying lip service to corruption by, for example, appointing Femi Fani-Kayode, the garrulous former minister of aviation who is facing an amended 40-count charge for corruption,122 as the chairman of the publicity committee of his re-election campaign. The president also pardoned his former boss, Chief D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, who was convicted of stealing millions of dollars from the Bayelsa State government.123

But the most damning rebuke of the Jonathan administration comes from Professor Charles Soludo, the cerebral former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank. In a spat with the administration’s minister for finance and coordinating minister for the economy, Ngozi Okonjo- Iweala, Soludo suggested that about 30 trillion Naira had either been stolen or mismanaged by the Jonathan administration. According to him, “our public finance is hemorrhaging to the point that estimated over N30tn is missing, or stolen, or unaccounted for, or simply mismanaged.”124

But corruption is not exclusively confined to the Jonathan administration. Indeed, all prior governments were steeped in corruption, only the Jonathan government may have taken corruption to a different level. Many who criticize President Jonathan blame him for his inability to supervise his staff or to reign in rogue elements of his government who exploit the president’s weakness to steal from government. While it is typically elements within the Jonathan administration that give the administration its dismal corruption rating, past presidents and state governors were mainly responsible for the corruption in their administrations.

For instance, during the Obasanjo administration (1999-2007), monumental acts of corruption took place. Almost all state governors were accused and charged for corruption, although only a few like D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha and Lucky Igbinedion were ever successfully prosecuted and convicted for corruption. James Ibori, a former governor of the oil-rich Delta State, successfully staved off prosecution in Nigeria but was convicted and jailed for laundering stolen funds in Britain. During the period, corrupt officials of government used stolen funds to acquire choice estates in Nigeria and overseas and paraded the social clime with much bombast. Although President Obasanjo created the EFCC and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to fight corruption, the agencies became a tool for harassing critics or opponents of the president, while many others that had cases to answer but who enjoyed cozy relations with the president, were never prosecuted. During the twilight of the administration, the president tried to buy tenure extension with public money, but opponents in the government, including Atiku Abubakar, the Vice-President, and anti-corruption activists, foiled the plot. On 16 May 2007, only 13 days to the end of his administration, President Obasanjo awarded N756 billion in contracts for projects that critics say the president never intended to execute. The critics say the entire money was stolen and have not been accounted for till date.125

Similarly, the General Sani Abacha and General Ibrahim Babangida military regimes were also plagued by monumental corruption. For instance, General Sani Abacha is believed to have embezzled over $10 billion in only five years of rule. After his death, the successor regime retrieved about $5 billion, which critics say were subsequently stolen by officials of the new regime. When Abacha took office in 1993, he also feigned concern about the levels of corruption in the country, going on to commission the renowned (now deceased) economist, Dr. Pius Okigbo, to probe how the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) functioned during Babangida’s rule (1985-1993). Critics accuse the Babangida regime of institutionalizing corruption in Nigeria, although the criticisms were never directly substantiated.126 In his report, Okigbo accused Babangida and members of his government of gross corruption, stating that:

Between September 1988 and 30 June 1994, US$12.2 billion of the $12.4 billion [in the dedicated accounts] was liquidated in less than six years … they were spent on what could neither be adjudged genuine high priority nor truly regenerative investment; neither the president nor the Central Bank Governor accounted to anyone for these massive extra-budgetary expenditures … these disbursements were clandestinely undertaken while the country was openly reeling with a crushing external debt overhang.127

Losses like this that are due to corruption total more than Nigeria's foreign debt and create huge deficiencies in local governance as well as dramatically increase the number of people living below poverty, which the National Bureau of Statistics put at 110 million people in 2010. The vicious corruption circle has kept the formal private sector small, public institutions weak, rules and regulations complex, resource distribution inequitable, law enforcement arbitrary, and violence rampant. In this type of environment, social decay spreads and the young who have neither political nor economic opportunities become disillusioned and turn to crime and violence.

The Quandary of Succession

Since the January 15, 1966, military coup that ousted the civilian regime of Alhaji (Sir) Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria has been plagued perennially by a crisis of succession. Within ten years (1966-1976), there were four regime changes, some of which were violent. After the ouster of the Second Republic on December 31, 1983, successive military governments also contended with this crisis. For instance, General Babangida supervised a long transition to find a “credible” successor only to annul the result of the nation-wide elections considered by local and international monitors as free and fair. Similarly, General Sani Abacha aborted Nigeria’s short-lived Third Republic on November 17, 1993, and supervised a transition program from 1993 to 1998, which sole purpose was to enable him transmute from a military dictator to a civilian president. At the height of his dictatorship, all five existing state-funded political parties adopted General Abacha as their presidential candidate, while opponents who could not be coerced or bought were framed for phantom coups and jailed. The Abacha self-succession plan was interrupted by his death while holding office on June 8, 1998.

Nigeria’s Fourth Republic that began on May 29, 1999, with retired General Olusegun Obasanjo as president has also been plagued by the crisis of succession. For example, towards the end of his second term in 2006, President Obasanjo supervised an attempt to use congress to extend his rule to three terms instead of the constitutional two terms. It is widely believed that his inability to extract a third presidential term Obasanjo persuaded him to systematically derail the presidential ambitions of his vice-president, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar who was part of the movement to stop the third-term plot, and to settle for a dying Alhaji Umaru Yar’Adua. The death of Yar’Adua in 2010 while holding office created a political impasse that almost led to the return of the military. Yar’Adua’s succession by President Jonathan, first under the nebulous “doctrine of necessity” – an alien legislative principle – and then in his own right following his electoral victory in the 2011 presidential election, helped to divide the country throughout Jonathan’s administration.

At some point during Jonathan’s rule, politicians started to canvass divergent viewpoints in efforts to resolve the succession crisis. For instance, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, the Deputy Senate President of the Nigerian senate, proposed a single term of six years as a way to resolve the crisis. His proposal, which was debated on the floor of the Nigerian senate, was heavily criticized because many perceived it to be an attempt to extend President Jonathan’s administration without holding elections. Yet, Senator Ekweremadu may have been motivated by a genuine concern that the succession crisis under Jonathan had effectively paralyzed government by focusing Jonathan’s attention on issues outside of governance. Because of this, the economy stagnated and funds meant to provide infrastructures were used to make patronage payments to individuals and groups that held the president (and his government) hostage. Others, including Obasanjo were convinced that the only way to solve the succession crisis was for President Jonathan to step down after his first term. In an open letter to President Jonathan on December 11, 2013, Obasanjo advised President Jonathan to abide by his own 2011 pledge to do only one term, a move that pro-Jonathan politicians condemned.

Thus, it is clear that the matter of presidential succession is one of the thorny issues that threaten national unity, peace, and stability, including the armed insurgencies across Nigeria. Instead of the nation fielding its best candidates irrespective of their religious, ethnic, or regional affiliations, zoning or what Bode George calls the “turn-by-turn”128 syndrome has become the single most important succession criteria and is behind the tensions in the country, which may escalate as the 2015 elections nears. So, in trying to understand Nigeria’s conflict infrastructure, focus must turn to the political system including the type of government (presidential or parliamentary), and the tenure of officials (i.e. part-time versus full-time legislators, four-year versus six-year term, one presidential term versus two presidential terms, etc.). More than anything else, attention must be paid to the looting of political power, which has complicated the succession crisis and is directly and indirectly responsible for much of the contemporary violence in Nigeria.

The Lootability of Political Power

Scholars of conflict in Africa have often focused on the predatory tendencies of warlords who fight to control territories that have natural resource wealth such as diamond, gold, oil, and more recently animal parts.129 Demonstrating the existence of significant and positive statistical association between lootable resources and political disorder, they suggest that the lootability of natural resource wealth fuels insurgencies in collapsed states, especially in Africa.130 While this attention is justified and natural resource wealth explains a significant portion of African conflicts, there is a great deal more that is unexplained by resource predation. As Snyder131 observes, the relationship between lootable wealth and insurgency is “far more complex.” In many instances where association have been made between natural resource predation and conflict, the interaction between both is more often indirect, being itself dependent on a broader political context. In this sense, natural resource predation is contingent upon the looting of political power, which becomes the basis for controlling legitimate and illegitimate resources in African societies. To put it in statistical terms, the relationship between resource predation and insurgency in Nigeria is at best spurious. In order to demonstrate how it is that scholars have missed this important element in insurgencies in Nigeria, it is necessary to elaborate on the statistical concept of spuriousness.

A spurious relationship or spurious correlation occurs when two occurrences have a causal connection only because of the presence of a third “unseen” factor often referred to as a “cofounding” factor. The spurious relationship gives the impression of a linkage between the two occurrences such as between resource predation and armed conflict; a link which when thoroughly examined dissipate. The misleading correlation between resource predation (X) and armed conflict (Y) is produced through the operation of a third causal variable, the lootability of political power (Z). The non-causal correlation between X and Y may have been caused by the antecedent Z which causes both X and Y in which case we have the causal logic:

Z → X and Y

Or by an intervening Z which mediates the relationship between X and Y, thus: X → Z → Y

If Z is undetected, it may make the indirect relationship between X and Y to appear direct. Davis132 suggests some rules about direct and indirect causation. According to him, several conditions must exist before one can conclude that X causes Y directly or indirectly, including: X must precede Y Y must not occur when X does not occur Y must occur whenever X occurs

When any of these conditions are violated as they have been in Nigeria, a spurious relationship exists between X and Y. Based on these conditions, the assumed relationship between resource predation and insurgency actually exists because of the desire by politicians to loot political power, which should be considered as a natural resource. This can be seen from the fact that when natural resource predation (X) has not occurred, armed conflict (Y) has occurred in Nigeria. Or in many instances, when X has occurred, Y did not occur. This clearly indicates that X has no direct relationship with Y. Yet, the possibility of an indirect relationship between X and Y may not be ruled out.

According to Davis, when X changes it can have as many indirect effects as there are paths from X to Y via intervening variables. Thus if Z is an intervening variable, X can have an indirect effect on Y through Z. When X changes, Z changes, causing changes in Y. Davis argues that indirect effects are not “phony”; instead they are intricate parts of the causal process which effects are seen in the correlations or associations between or among variables. This is crucial especially as Paul Vogt has defined spurious relation as a “situation in which measures of two or more variables are statistically related but are not in fact causally linked.”133 While X may be statistically related to Y due to Z, X and Y are not causally linked, thus eliminating any direct relationship between X and Y.

The presence of Z also introduces the issue of control. The direct effect of X on Y can only be truly known when one controls or “partial out” Z or any other variable that might have a confounding effect on the relationship between X and Y. These other variable(s) or Z may confound the relationship between X and Y as prior or as intervening variable, hence they or Z must be controlled. This is in consonance with Davis’s rule 7:

When estimating the effect of Xi on Xj, control all prior and intervening variables; that is control all variables not consequent on Xj.134

Thus, to test whether X has a direct relationship on Y, Z must be held constant. If the original bivariate relationship between X and Y remains strong, then it can be concluded that Y is caused directly by X. But if as this book suggests controlling for Z removes the original bivariate relationship between X and Y, then, it may be concluded with a high degree of confidence that the relationship between X and Y is spurious; due, in fact, to the confounding effects of Z. Z thus, has a much stronger direct relationship with Y pending the introduction of further controls on the relationship between Z, X and Y. Davis suggests, however, that any conclusion about direct effects must be made with caution and caveat. Such conclusion must depend more on the structure of the system (the signs, paths, components, and intervening factors) than on the magnitude of the direct association.

Table 1. Estimated Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Analyses of Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict. Self-Reported Causes of the Niger Delta Conflict Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Causes of Conflict Pollution Ref Ref Ref Federalism 2.236 2.297 4.126* Poverty .639 .628 .597 Racism 1.531 1.413 2.608 Resource Control 1.103 1.163 1.775 Economic Exploitation 1.625 1.695 1.126 Infrastructural Deficits 5.775** 5.611** 3.026 Arms Proliferation 2.187 2.421 1.443 Corruption 2.333 2.329 5.543* Greed 9.917** 0.734** 16.550** Triangulation 2.135* 2.750*

Demographics Age 18-24 Ref Age 25-34 2.005 Age 35-44 3.220 Age 45-54 4.306 Ijaw .919 Married .869 Delta Ref Bayelsa 2.947* Rivers 2.521* Employed .322* No Income Ref Less than 50,000 .228** 50,000 – 99,999 .182* 100,000 – 149,999 .323 Above 150,000 .349 Exposure 2.401 Violence .022**

N 346 346 346 -2 Log Likelihood 407.615 403.306 256.268 Nagelkerke R2 .156 .171 .588

*p <0.05 ** p <0.01

One effective strategy for “partialing out” the impact of X on Y or Z on X and Y is to apply the elaboration or explanation model proposed by Paul Lazarsfeld.135 He suggests that researchers must first observe the bivariate relationship between X and Y, after which they may propose a hypothesis that Z accounts for the relationship or correlation between X and Y. Then they elaborate the analysis by introducing Z into the calculation. Finally, they examine the correlation between X and Y after Z has been introduced or controlled. If the partial association between X and Y becomes zero, they may conclude that Z explains the X and Y correlation. Davis suggests that the main value of elaboration is its ability to compress complicated matters into two numbers (bivariate and partial relationship) thus making it very persuasive. Yet, he suggests that a drawback is that it is seldom perfect. According to him, it is difficult to reduce a correlation to zero and when that happens, there is usually a small bivariate correlation in the first place. In any event, the initial bivariate correlation between X and Y may disappear by elaborating the analysis to include the Z variable.

The implication of this is that in Nigeria, the lootability of political power explains both resource predation (such as oil bunkering) and armed conflict (such as the Niger Delta insurgency). A regression analysis on the cause of the Niger Delta insurgency (see table 1 above) shows clearly that grievance (conceptualized and operationalized as pollution, lack of resource control, poverty, racism/ethnicity, economic exploitation, and infrastructural deficits) has limited utility for explaining the transformation of a protest movement into an armed insurgency. Instead, a significant predictor for the conflict is triangulation defined as the tendency by politicians to artificially graft idle youth into their destructive “zero-sum” struggle to appropriate political power by any means, which then becomes the basis for looting both natural resource wealth and government revenue. Thus, the looting of political power is the basis for setting up insurgent groups and networks, which are linked to existing cult-gang infrastructure, and for equipping these groups. This fact is further buttressed by the insurgency in northern Nigeria, which occurs despite the near absence of lootable natural resources (other than national political power), which is silhouetted within and condenses the dominant religion – Islam. This permits the conclusion, with a high degree of confidence, that X has no direct relationship with Y in northern Nigeria.

This book treats political power in Nigeria as a natural resource wealth. Just like diamond, gold, crude oil and natural gas, zinc, ore, coal, etc., political power in Nigeria is a natural resource with profoundly enormous negotiability. First, its lootability is a generic social condition in which there is widespread belief or recognition that Nigerian democracy like Nigeria’s “light sweet” crude is conceptually and materially different from the Western variant. Western oil (or for that matter, most crude oil deposits around the world), for instance, have very high sulphur content, making it more expensive to refine compared to Nigeria’s light sweet crude that is significantly low in sulphur. Similarly, in the West, democracy is both a material social condition and a way of seeing and organizing the world that emphasizes rules, processes, interaction, change, accountability, and responsibility; a dialectic process. One aspect of the systematization and institutionalization of democracy is the electoral system (and process) where every person that has attained the age of suffrage has rights. The right inheres in their ability to vote with the reasonable expectation that their votes would count. In the Nigerian variant, democracy is linear; devoid of its associated life and process. It materially and conceptually becomes nothing more than a perverse system of elections, where the winner takes all. In this condition, the rules of elections do not apply and citizens and leaders come to fully expect to fill political positions outside of the electoral system. As a result, the mass have no personal or institutional guarantees in regard to the value of participating in the electoral process or in politics generally. The people’s votes are routinely stolen with the effect that only successful politicians (and their hirelings) enjoy any benefits from the political system. To make it worse, there are few cultural or legal constraints to prevent them from using stolen electoral mandates for their personal benefits. This suggests that political power in Nigeria is a lootable resource.

Second, like natural resource wealth such as diamond and oil, political power is raw until it is refined. Unlike crude oil that is refined through a chemical process, political power is refined in the process of governance. The creation of natural resources (including political power) is a historical process of social construction,136 which is why Zimmerman argues, “Resources are not; they become.”137 Thus, whether or not political power in its raw form is transformed into democratic is determined by “human desires, needs, and practices.”138 In its raw form, political power tends only to the interests of the possessor, which includes the basic instincts for survival, political survival that is, as well as fulfilling the material aspirations of the possessor. In its raw form, political power is tended towards avarice; to make gains quick as a way to maintain its possessor and entrench his/her regime, which may only be achieved by diminishing the stature of likely rivals as well as the mass. In its refined form, however, political power anticipates the needs of the mass and collaborates with the mass (and rivals) to improve their conditions. It is the process of refinement that builds schools, bridges, roads, hospitals, markets, and entertainment. The process of refinement also develops a critical mass that demands accountability and responsibility from the occupier of political power. Note that in its refined form, political power is not possessed (as in its unrefined form) but occupied. This means that power is never truly owned but utilized by those who occupy positions until they are replaced. But in Nigeria, political power has become the exclusive property of a few who must deploy force to preserve it, permanently.

Third, like natural resource wealth, political power may be sold, purchased, loaned, or stolen; it is a commodity, like any other, that has negotiability and variability. It is because of this property that politicians and political parties over time have evolved from negotiating political positions with the mass through the system of elections to actually stealing these positions using violence. The first act of power looting was perpetrated by Nigeria’s military beginning on January 15 1966, when the five majors usurped political power from elected representatives. Although General Ironsi quashed the coup, he never returned power to the elected political class even though a system of political succession was already in place. Since then, many military coups have occurred, some impeaching civilians and others impeaching soldiers. Yet, the effect is the same as today where politicians steal electoral ‘mandates’ using hirelings that they arm and shield with stolen power. For example, in the 2003 national elections, politicians across Nigeria but especially in the south- south and south-east regions, including Rivers, Cross Rivers, Edo, Delta, Enugu, Anambra, Abia, and Imo states, disenfranchised citizens and literally seized political power using a combination of violence and voter intimidation.139 In some states like Edo, it was achieved relatively peacefully through the manipulation of electoral processes, especially during vote collation. In places where the favored or moneyed candidates lost, votes were simply assigned on collation sheets by compromised collation and returning officers. It was as simple as that. In other states such as Rivers, political thugs or in contemporary parlance, ‘militants,’ were recruited and deployed to harass political rivals, their supporters, and voters with the active support of security officials. In addition to the intimidation of rivals, votes were also indiscriminately and outrageously assigned as to make any form of legal challenges unnecessary. It was in this manner that incumbent governor Peter Odili retained his position with 2,098,692 votes out of a possible total of 2,272,238 votes (number of registered voters)140 while his popular challenger, Sergeant Awuse, was assigned a mere 10,000 votes. The elections in Rivers and several other southern states were so flawed that the European Union Election Observation Mission concluded that “minimum standards for democratic elections were not met.”141

Fourth, the extreme mutability of international commodity prices and structural adjustments of the late 1980s and 1990s has produced corresponding adjustments in the strategies adopted by local elites for the appropriation and accumulation of political power through which they control formal economies, including illegitimate economies and privatized companies.142 Thus, through the looting of political power, local elites come to control state assets within the public and private sphere and illegitimate opportunities, including the clandestine oil smuggling trade, kidnapping for ransom, protection rackets, the mercy industrial complex (or diversion of humanitarian aid including HIV/AIDS support and assistance), Diaspora remittances, and revenues from trading in elective and appointive political offices. This means that like natural resource wealth, political power increases the risk of armed conflict in Nigeria by financing and motivating belligerence and conflict.

Finally, apart from financing and motivating armed conflict, the looting of political power in Nigeria increases the vulnerability of the state and its federating units to armed conflict by weakening the political institutions and their legitimate conflict resolution mechanisms, just like natural resource predation. Whereas it is assumed that the centralization of political power helps prevent the segmentation of society and builds nationhood, there is strong evidence to the contrary in Nigeria. That is, it increases the risk for insurgency as it becomes the basis for looting power, which violates the fundamental rights of local peoples to freely choose their representatives or to offer themselves for leadership positions. The violation of electoral rights exacerbates identity politics and precipitates violence, including armed insurgency. Access to legitimate and illegitimate opportunities, including control of the lucrative illegal bunkering trade, makes politics in Nigeria a zero-sum, winner-takes-all game and becomes the basis for perverting the electoral process and stealing votes and electoral mandates through violence where both the incumbent and his detractor are maintained and activated by violence.

End Notes

Chapter 3: The Trouble with Nigeria

1 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.” Vanguard, [last accessed on 08 October 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/jonathans- 53rd-independence-anniversary-national-broadcast/

2 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

3 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

4 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

5 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

6 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

7 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

8 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

9 Vanguard Nigeria 2013. “Read Jonathan’s Independence Day address.”

10 Awoists are people – mainly politicians – who espouse the philosophy and ideas of the late sage, politician, and nationalists, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, an ethnic Yoruba. In the first republic, Chief Awolowo or “Awo” as he was popularly known was the premier of the Western Region. He initiated many policies that form the bedrock of his philosophy including free education at all levels that helped the Yoruba states attain remarkably heights in education and industry. See Oladesu, E. 2012. “25 years after: Can Awoists reunite?” The Nation. [Last accessed on 9 October 2013], available from: http://www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/politics/49320-25-years-after-can-awoists- reunite.html.

11 Abati, R. 2013. “SPEECH: President Goodluck Jonathan Inaugurates Advisory Committee on National Dialogue.” Sahara Reporters, [last accessed on 8 October 2013]. Available from: http://saharareporters.com/press-release/speech-president-goodluck-jonathan-inaugurates- advisory-committee-national-dialogue.

12 Vanguard 2013. “Nigeria: Confab Committee Submits Report to Jonathan.” All Africa [last accessed on 20 December 2013]. Available from http://allafrica.com/stories/201312190748.html?viewall=1.

13 See Ebefgbulem, S. 2013. “Confab: Nyiam resigns after shouting match with Oshiomole.” Vanguard [last accessed on 20 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/confab-nyiam-resigns-after-shouting-match-with- oshiomhole/.

14 Ndujihe, C. 2013. “How effective will this national confab be?” Vanguard [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/effective-will-national- confab/.

15 Punch 2013. “National Conference: We’re not afraid of Nigeria’s break-up – Northern Elders, National Assembly backs Jonathan.” Punch [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: www.punchng.com/news/national-conference-were-not-afraid-of-nigerias-break-up- northern-elders.

16 Awolowo, O. (1947). Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber.

17 Vasagar, J. 2005. “Militants threaten Nigerian oil stations after leader’s arrest.” The Guardian, [last accessed on 14 October 2013]. Available from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/24/oil.business.

18 Omoruyi, O. 2002. “Who created Nigeria: God or the British.” Nigeria World [last accessed on 14 October 2013.] Available at http://nigeriaworld.com/feature/publication/omoruyi/071302.html.

19 Akinloye, L. 2013. “Nigeria’s National Dialogue Conference – Enhancing the Debate or Killing it?” Think Africa Press [last accessed on 11 November 2013]. Available from: www.allafrica.com/stories/201311111387.html?viewall=1.

20 See Ijomah, B.I.C. 1988. Afrocracy. Benin City: Idodo-Umeh Press.

21 Margery Perham (1947)

22 Sagay, Itse. 2008 "Federalism, the Constitution and Resource Control." Pp 350 in Oil, Democracy, and the Promise of True Federalism in Nigeria edited by A.A. Ikein, D.S.P. Alamieyeseigha, and S. Azaiki. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America.

23 Today, the Benin Kingdom encompasses the Bini speaking people of Edo State in mid-west Nigeria. The capital of the state – Benin City – was the ancient capital of the Benin Empire and the Oba of Benin sits in royal majesty at the palace located in the center of the city. The Oba of Benin is one of the most powerful kings in modern Nigeria and the present Oba is the direct descendant of all of the past Obas spanning many centuries.

24 Today, the Yoruba people are located in the south west of Nigeria, which comprise of six states: Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Osun, and Ekiti. A significant Yoruba population is also spread across Kwara and Kogi states in Nigeria’s north central zone.

25 Like the Benin Empire, the Oyo Empire was large and extended well beyond Nigeria into neighboring states including the Republic of Benin, Ghana, and Togo. Today, the Alafin of Oyo whose palace is located in the ancient city of Ibadan, continues to exact enormous influence in Nigeria.

26 Onwubiko, K.B.C. 1982. History of West Africa: AD 1000-1800. Onitsha: Africana-Fep Publishers Limited.

27 Onwubiko, K.B.C. 1982. History of West Africa: AD 1000-1800.

28 Usman, Y.B. (ed.) 1979. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press.

30 See Lugard, F. 1972. “Summary of the Dual mandate in British Tropical Africa.” In E.V. Rich and Immanuel Wallestein (eds.) African Tradition and Change. New York: Random House, Inc., 272-73.

31 Perham, M. 1956. Lugard. Volume 1: The Years of Adventure 1858-1898. London: Collins. Also see Perham, Margery. 1960. Lugard. Volume 2: The Years of Authority 1989-1945. London: Collins. Piven, F.F. and R.A. Cloward. 1977. Poor People's Movements. New York: Vintage.

32 Taiwo, O. 1999. “Reading the Colonizer’s Mind: Lord Lugard and the Philosophical Foundations of British Colonialism. Pp. 157-188 in Racism and Philosophy edited by S.E. Babbitt and S. Campbell. London: Cornell University Press.

33 Onwubiko, K.B.C. 1982. History of West Africa: AD 1000-1800.

34 Perham, M. 1937. Native Administration in Nigeria. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, pg. 175.

35 Coalman, James. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.

36 Apter, A.1999. “The Subvention of Tradition: A Genealogy of the Nigerian Durbar” in George Steinmetz (ed) State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. New York: Cornell University Press.

37 See Afigbo, A.E. 1972. The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern Nigeria, 1891-1929. London: Longman.

38 See Isichei, L. 1976. A History of the Igbo People. London: Macmillan.

39 Van Allen, Judith. 1971. Aba Riots or Women's War? British Ideology and Eastern Nigerian Women's Political Activism. Waltham, MA.: African Studies Association. Also see Mba, Nina E. 1982. Nigerian Women Mobilized: Women's Political Activity in Southern Nigeria, 1900-1965. Berkeley: University of California Press.

40 Sagay, I. 2008. Federalism, the constitution and resource control. In A. A. Ikein, D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha, & S. Azaiki (Eds.), Oil, democracy, and the promise of true federalism in Nigeria (pp. 351-378). Lanham, MD: University Press.

41 The Protectorate of Southern Nigeria had been the official name of the Niger Coast Protectorate since 1900. See 41 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

42 The Royal Niger Company transferred its territories to the British government for the sum of 865,000 pounds.

43 Human Rights Watch 2007. “Criminal Politics: Violence, “Godfathers” and corruption in Nigeria.” Human Rights Watch, Vol. 19, No. 16(A), pp 1-125.

44 Abdulkadir, A. 2013. “100 years after: Zungeru and the Relics of Lord Lugard.” Citizens Platform [last accessed on 26 December 2013]. Available from: http://citizensplatform.net/2013/02/100-years-after-zungeru-and-the-relics-of-lord-lugard/.

45 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

46 Crowder, M. 1982. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber.

47 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

48 Sagay, I. 2008. Federalism, the constitution and resource control. Pg. 365.

49 Sagay, I. 2008. Federalism, the constitution and resource control.

50 Deng, F. M. 1996. War of visions: Conflicts of Identities in the Sudan (1st ed.). New York, NY: Brookings Institution Press. Pg.62.

51 Ijomah, B.I.C. 1988. Afrocracy.

52 Ijomah, B.I.C. 1988. Afrocracy.

53 See Okonofua, B.A. 2013. “Who Rules Papa’s Land? C. Wright Mills and the Nigerian Power Elite.” Sage Open Vol. 3, No. 3 pp. 1-11. DOI: 10.1177/2158244013502494.

54 David-West, T. 2002. “Nigeria: The State of the Nation.” Text of a speech delivered at the Gamji Annual Conference at the Arewa House Auditorium in Kaduna on 12 June 2002.

55 In a rentier state, the bulk of government revenue comes from outside the country through “rent” payments from licenses and royalties from multinational petroleum corporations such as Shell, BP, ExxonMobil, etc. In non-rentier states, government revenue is generated mainly within the country from taxes on individuals and organizations, internal borrowing, and service provision.

56 See Abdulahi, A. 2012. “Nigeria – 1914 to Date: The chequered journey so far.” Vanguard [last accessed on 18 November 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/05/nigeria-1914-to-date-the-chequered-journey-so-far/.

57 CIA World Fact Book, 2017

58 CIA World Fact Book, 2017

59 CIA World Factbook 2010

60 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

61 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

62 See Osaghae, E.O. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Also see Watts, M. (ed.) 2009. Curse of the Black Gold: 50 Years of Oil in the Niger Delta. New York: PowerHouse Books.

63 Ijomah, B.I.C. 1988. Afrocracy: Bases for Partyless Democracy. Benin City: Idodo-Umeh.

64 Ijomah, B.I.C. 1988. Afrocracy: Bases for Partyless Democracy. Benin City: Idodo-Umeh.

65 Okonofua, B.A. 2011. Paths to Peacebuilding: Amnesty and the Niger Delta Violence. Sociology Dissertations paper 62.

66 Okonofua Forthcoming

67 CIA World Factbook, 2013

68 CIA World Factbook, 2013

69 Nwankwo, A.A. 1972. Nigeria: The Challenge of Biafra. London: R. Collings.

70 See Momoh, A. and Adejumobi, S (eds.) 2002. The National Question in Nigeria: Comparative Perspectives. Aldershot, UK, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

71 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

72 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

73 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

74 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

75 Suberu, T. 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

76 Suberu, T. 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria.

77 Suberu, T. 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria.

78 See TCP 2010. “Antidote to Violence? Lessons for the Nigerian Federal Government’s ten percent community royalty from the oil company experience.” Transnational Crisis Group [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.crisisproject.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/09/Antidote-to-Violence-Niger-Delta-Report-no.1.pdf.

79 Osaghae, E.E. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence. London: C. Hurst.

80 CSO Panel 2012. “Constitutional Angle to De-centralizing the Nigeria Police.” Premium Times [last accessed on 18 December 2013]. Available from: http://premiumtimesng.com/opinion/112058-constitutional-angle-to-de-centralizing-the-nigeria- police-by-cso-panel.html.

81 CSO Panel 2012. “Constitutional Angle to De-centralizing the Nigeria Police.”

82 See Aderounmu, A. 2007. “What is Fire Brigade Approach?” The Glory of Nigeria Blog [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from:http://aderinola.wordpress.com/2007/06/23/what-is-fire-brigade-approach/.

83 Emetelu, K. 2012. “Presentation of The 1960 Collective at the BEN TV Security Conference on Nigeria.” Sahara Reporters [last accessed on 21 December 2013]. Available from: http://saharareporters.dekodesign.com/press-release/presentation-1960-collective-ben-tv- security-conference-nigeria.

84 The cumulative result of British colonial policy that shielded the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria from the “civilizing” influence of Christianity by preserving the prevailing Islamic culture with its madrasa systems at the same time that the south was fully exposed to Christian missions and their Western educational forms.

85 Source: Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

86 Source: Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

87 Jigawa State was carved out of Kano State in 1996.

88 See Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.” In A. A. Ikein, D. S. P. Alamieyeseigha, & S. Azaiki (Eds.),Oil, democracy, and the promise of true federalism in Nigeria (pp. 351-378). Lanham, MD: University Press.

89 Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.”

90 Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.”

91 Omoruyi 1999: 25.

92 Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.”

93 Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.”

94 Sagay, I. 2008. “ Federalism, the constitution and resource control.”

95 Duke, D. 2010.

96 Okonta, I. and Douglas, O. 2003. Where vultures feast. London, England: Verso.

97 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

98 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

99 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

100 Forest, T. 1995. Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

101 Falola, T. and M. Heaton. 2008. A History of Nigeria.

102 Bala-Gbogbo, E. 2011. “OPEC may reassess oil Demand after Japan Quake, Nigeria says.” Bloomberg [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-16/opec-may-reassess-oil-demand-after-japan-quake- nigeria-says-1-.html.

103 Osaghae, E.E. 1998. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence.

104 Okonofua, B.A. 2013. “Triangulation, Emotional Reactivity, and Violence in the Niger Delta.” Sage Open DOI: 10.1177/2158244013483758.

105 KPMG Africa, 2013. “Oil and Gas in Africa: Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects.” KPMG Africa [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles- Publications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf. Also see EIA 2012. “Nigeria.” U.S. Energy Information Administration [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/nigeria.pdf.

106 Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

107 Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

108 Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

109 Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

110 The Dina Commission was set up by the General Yakubu Gowon administration shortly after the nearly 3-year Nigeria-Biafra Civil War to among other things review the existing system of administration and make recommendations on how to make it better and more acceptable. The Dina Report led to the burgeoning of the federal might, which led to increased defense spending as well as spending on prestige projects to the disadvantage of agriculture, housing, manufacturing, water resources, and water resources, which have direct bearing on the living standards of the people. For instance, Nigeria became Africa’s “big brother” and gave financial aid to Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mozambique (at independence); Mali, Senegal, Upper Volta or Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (for drought and natural disasters); and Niger, Zambia, Sudan, Sao Tome and Principe (for undisclosed purposes). See Akinyemi, B. 1979.

111 Osaghae, E.E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

112 Suberu, T. 2001. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria.

113 Adekanye, J.B. 1981. Nigeria in Search of a Stable Civil-Military System. Aldershot, Hampshire: Gower.

114 See Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

115 Osaghae, E. 1998. Crippled Giant.

116 USAID 2006.

117 See Ojogo, K. and Alu, K. 2013. “13 Percent Oil Derivation – FG, States may Clash over Fund.” Leadership [last accessed on 26 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.allafrica.com/stories/201311250373.html.

118 See Ebegbulem, S. 2013. “13% oil derivation will cause another round of crisis in N-Delta – Senator Okpozo.” Vanguard [last accessed on 26 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/13-oil-derivation-will-cause-another-round-of -crisis-in- n-delta-senator-okpozo/.

119 See Amaize, E. 2013. “13% Oil Derivation War.” Vanguard [last accessed on 26 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/01/13-oil-derivation-war/.

120 See Adekanye, J.B. 1992. Military Occupation and Social Stratification. Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press.

121 For a full analysis of civil-military relations in Nigeria, see J. Bayo Adekanye, Nigeria: In Search of a Stable Civil-Military Relations. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1981.

122 See “EFCC closes case in trial of Fani-Kayode over alleged money laundering.” Vanguard, July 10, 2014. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/07/efcc-closes-case-trial-fani-kayode-alleged-money-laundering/.

123 See “Nigeria pardons Goodluck Jonathan ally, Alamieyeseigha.” BBC March 13, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21769047.

124 See Oyetunde Abioye 2015. “Over N30tn stolen under Okonjo-Iweala – Soludo.” Punch, February 2, 2015. http://www.punchng.com/news/over-n30tn-stolen-under-okonjo-iweala-soludo/.

125 See Stephen Dieseruvwe 2015. “Obasanjo’s monumental corruption exposed – The News Magazine,” Stephen Dieseruvwe’s Blog, January 10, 2015. http://stephendieseruvwe.com/2014/01/10/obasanjos-monumental- corruption-exposed-the-news-magazine/.

126 Okonta, I. and Douglas, O. 2003. Where vultures feast. London, England: Verso.

127 Kayode Fayemi 1995.

128 See Fani-Kayode, F. 2013. “A time to think.” Vanguard [last accessed on 23 December 2013]. Available from: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/time-think-femi-fani-kayode/.

129 Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563- 595. Also see Keen, D. 2005. Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone. UK: James Currey/Palgrave.

130 Snyder, R. 2006. “Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder? : A Political Economy of Extraction Framework.” Comparative Political Studies 39: 944.

132 See Davis, J. 1985. The Logic of Causal Order: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Sage Publications Inc.

133 Davis, J. 1985. The Logic of Causal Order: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Sage Publications Inc.

134 See Davis, J. 1985. The Logic of Causal Order: Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Sage Publications inc.

135 Le Billion, P. 2001. “The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflict. Political Geography 20, 565.

136 Zimmerman, E.W. 1951. World Resources and Industries: A functional appraisal of the availability of agricultural and industrial materials. Revised Edition. New York: Harper and Brothers.

137 Zimmerman, E.W. 1951. World Resources and Industries: A functional appraisal of the availability of agricultural and industrial materials. Revised Edition. New York: Harper and Brothers.

138 Le Billion, P. 2001. “The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflict. Political Geography 20, 565.

139 Human Rights Watch 2004. “Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledge Violence.” Available from: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604/nigeria0604.pdf.

140 Akinyele, T.A. 2004. “The 2003 Elections in Nigeria: Views from a Policy Maker.” Africa Update Vol. Xi(4), available from: http://web.ccsu.edu/afstudy/upd11-4.html.

141 EUEOM 2003. “Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections Marred by Serious Irregularities and Fraud in Many States.” EU Election Observation Mission, Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20030520/Nigeria%202nd%20Preliminary%20 Statement.pdf.

142 Le Billion, P. 2001. “The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflict. Political Geography 20, 561-584.