Mars Und Minerva
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320 Erdkunde Band 54/2000 MARS AND MINERVA: CENTRES OF GEOGRAPHICAL CALCULATION IN AN AGE OF TOTAL WAR With 2 figures and 1 table MICHAEL HEFFERNAN*' Zusammenfassung: Mars und Minerva: Zentren geographischer Kalkulation im Zeitalter des totalen Krieges In dem Beitrag werden die politische und strategische Bedeutung geographischer Forschung während des Ersten Weltkriegs untersucht und verschiedene, sich daraus ergebende Konsequenzen für die Entwicklung der Geographie als Disziplin her- ausgestellt. Aufbauend auf jüngsten Arbeiten zur Geschichte der Geographie und der sozialen und kulturellen Kriegsge- schichte wird gezeigt, wie in den drei Alliierten Nationen Großbritannien, Frankreich und den USA die Expertise anerkann- ter Geographen von politischen und militärischen Führern für eigene Zwecke ,mobilisiert' wurde. Da die große Bedeutung geographischen Wissens sowohl für die Entwicklung der strategischen und militärischen Nahziele als auch für die Formulie- rung weiterführender geopolitischer Kriegsziele erkannt worden war, wurden in allen drei Staaten, unter Führung der wich- tigsten Geographischen Gesellschaften, Forschungsprojekte koordiniert und neue Forschungsinitiativen entwickelt, um die militärische und politische Führung zu unterstützen. Die Rhetorik der Vorkriegszeit, die einen unparteiischen, objektiven und internationalen Charakter geographischer Forschung betonte, erfuhr dabei jeweils eine vehemente Ablehnung. Obgleich angeblich einer gemeinsamen Sache verpflichtet, spiegeln die auf den Krieg bezogenen Arbeiten britischer, französischer und amerikanischer Geographen auch divergierende nationale Traditionen intellektueller Auseinandersetzung sowie verschiedene strategische und geopolitische Absichten der jeweiligen Staaten wider. Abschließend erfolgt eine Diskussion der moralischen und ethischen Fragen, die sich aus einer Kriegsbeteiligung der Wissenschaften ergeben. Summary. This article examines both the political and strategic significance of geographical research during World War I and the wider impact of this period on the development of the discipline. Drawing on recent work on the history of geography and on the social and cultural history of war, the essay considers how the expertise of renowned geographers was 'mobilised' by the political and military leaderships in three Allied nations: Britain, France and the USA. Geographical knowledge was clearly recognised as important both for the development of strategic military objectives and in the formulation of wider geopolitical war aims. As a result, co-ordinated projects and new research initiatives were developed in each of these three states, centred on the principal geographical societies, to assist the military and political authorities. In each case, a pre-war scientific rhetoric that had emphasised the disinterested, objective and international nature of geographical inquiry was firmly rejected. Although ostensibly committed to a common cause, the war-time activities of British, French and American geographers also reflected divergent national intellectual traditions and the very different strategic and geopolitical objectives of each state. The essay concludes with a discussion of the moral and ethical questions raised by deployment of science in time of war. Introduction von Clausewitz's essay On War had inaugurated the modern, 'scientific' study of war. The intervening In 1932, Albert Einstein was asked by the League of decades had been the bloodiest and most violent in Nations' Permanent Committee for Literature and the world history and events in Germany, Einstein's native Arts to initiate a public debate with an intellectual of land, suggested that the martial impulse was about to his choosing on a topic pertinent to the cause of inter- plunge the world into yet another episode of total national peace. Einstein suggested a deceptively simple war. The idea that 1914—18 had been "a war to end question - Why War? and proposed to debate this all war", as H. G. Wells (WELLS 1917) had famously with none other than Sigmund Freud. Thus it was that asserted, seemed hopelessly optimistic. A century of "physics wrote a letter to psychoanalysis" seeking an unheralded scientific advance in the natural and physi- answer to a central conundrum of the modern era cal sciences had transformed our understanding of the (PICK 1993, 270). Behind Einstein's choice of topic world and its place in the cosmos, implied Einstein, but was a simple rationale: exactly a century earlier, Carl had singularly failed to explain the human capacity for violence. Perhaps Freudian psychoanalysis, the new * This paper was first presented at the International Sym- science of the human consciousness, might shed some posium "Knowledge, Education and Space" in September 1999 in Heidelberg. The symposium was funded by the Klaus light on humanity's seemingly irrational and inexpli- Tschira Foundation and the German Research Foundation. cable blood-lust? Michael Heffernan: Mars and Minerva: centres of geographical calculation in an age of total war 321 The text of this debate, which was published the much to Paul Fussell's pioneering analysis of World following year, just as Hitler came to power, did not War I (FUSSELL 1975; see also EKSTEINS 1989; HYNES make for cheerful reading (EINSTEIN a. FREUD 1978; 1985; LEED 1979; PICK 1993; THEWELEIT 1987/88; PICK 1993, 214—227). War, it appeared, was a problem VLRLLLO a. LOTRINGER 1989). The themes explored in neither physics nor psychoanalysis could solve. Indeed, these admittedly diverse texts - violence, modernity, both men recognised a tragic irony at the core of their masculinity and place — connect, in turn, with recent discussion. Modern science had not only failed to path-breaking feminist critiques of militarism and the understand war, it had actually become a central political economy of warfare (see, for example, BOURKE component of what a later generation would call 1996, 1999; COOKE a. WOOLLACOTT 1993; ENLOE the 'military-industrial complex'. Despite the peaceful 1988; HIGONNET et al. 1987; MELMAN 1998; TYLEE intentions of most scientists, the fruits of scientific 1990). One of the most interesting features of this work endeavour always seemed to escape the grasp of its is its explicit engagement with the spaces of warfare, a creators. Like Frankenstein's monster, an increasingly theme that has inspired fresh analysis of the geogra- effective 'war machine' seemed to stalk the earth phies of violence, past and present (O TUATHAIL 1996; beyond the control of those who had created it. In the see also BLUNT 2000; CAMPBELL 1998; SHAPIRO 1997; struggle to end war, science was no longer a potential WATTS 2000). solution; it was part of the problem. There is much that could be written here but I want This irony has inspired a good deal of critical simply to emphasise that a greater awareness of the research on the historical relationship between war interwoven intellectual histories of the discipline of and science, between Mars and Minerva if it can be so geography and the practice of war is urgently necessary expressed (GRUBER 1976). There is now an impressive if we are to understand how space and territory have literature on the military and political manipulation functioned both in the perpetuation of violence and in of science, with research on Germany during World attempts to resolve conflict. I want to try to demon- War II having particular importance (BEYERCHEN strate this by considering how the discipline of geog- 1977; BURLEIGH 1994; BURLEIGH a. WIPPERMANN raphy was implicated in the crisis of World War I (for 1991; GEISSLER a. POPP 1988; HAMMERSTEIN 1999; studies of other disciplines, see HABER 1986; JOHNSON MACRAKIS 1993; MULLER-HILL 1988; WEINDLING 1990; SCHWABE 1969). In so doing, I want to tell a tale 1989). The historical relationship between geography of three cities - London, Paris and New York - as as an academic discipline and warfare has also begun centres of distinct forms of geographical theory and to receive critical attention (for an early study, see practice each sustained by war-time exigencies. I shall LACOSTE 1976). We now have outstanding recent be concerned, in particular, with the major geogra- studies of this relationship for various war-torn eras phical societies in these cities - the Royal Geographical from the age of Napoleon (GODLEWSKA 1994, 1999, Society in London (RGS), the Société de Géographie de esp. 149-190) through the early years of the twentieth Paris (SGP), and the American Geographical Society in century (STODDART 1992) and World War II (BALCHIN New York (AGS). These august institutions displayed 1987; BASSIN 1987; EBELING 1994; FAHLBUSCH et al. many of the characteristics that the sociologist of science 1989; HARRIS 1997; HERB 1997; HESKE 1986, 1987; Bruno Latour (LATOUR 1987, 215-257) attributes to HIPPLER 1996; KIRBY 1994; KORINMAN 1990; KOST 'centres of calculation', a concept broadly comparable 1989; MURPHY 1997; ROSSLER 1989; SMITH 1986) with the idea of an 'imperial archive' proposed by the to the post 1945 period of the Cold War where work literary critic Thomas Richards (RICHARDS 1993). on the origins and early history of Remote Sensing 'Centres of calculation' (which might include learned and Geographical Information Systems have added societies, museums, even specific individuals) were new dimensions to our understanding of the martial the clearing houses for what Latour calls 'immutable aspects, and disturbing social implications, of modern mobiles', those items of stored, catalogued