University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers 2017 Presidential Obstruction of Justice Daniel Hemel Eric A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/ public_law_and_legal_theory Part of the Law Commons Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere. Recommended Citation Hemel, Daniel and Posner, Eric A., "Presidential Obstruction of Justice" (2017). Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. 665. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/public_law_and_legal_theory/665 This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE Daniel J. Hemel* Eric A. Posner** Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from interfering with law enforcement based on a “corrupt” motive. But what about the president of the United States? The president is vested with “executive power,” which includes the power to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that the statutes do not apply to the president because if they did they would violate the president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the president, and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for intervening in an investigation is to further personal, pecuniary, or narrowly partisan interests, rather than to advance the public good.