De-escalation amid a Total ? An interpretivist-constructivist analysis of ´s involvement (or lack thereof) in the of Leningrad and during the 1941-1944

Margarita Sallinen

Thesis, 15 ECTS (hp) War Studies Master’s Programme in Politics and War Spring 2020 Supervisor: Ilmari Käihkö Word count: 15940 1

Abstract

At the beginning of the Continuation War in 1941, Finnish and German troops commenced a gradual escalation which resulted in swift successive victories against the Soviets. Yet, Finland´s Field Mannerheim unexpectedly turned his back on rationality at Leningrad and Murmansk despite his knowledge of how vitally strategic the locations were to the Soviet war effort. Leningrad was encircled by German and Finnish forces and a successful siege was achievable, yet Mannerheim abruptly discontinued the and chose to assume a stale war lasting until 1944. Likewise, Mannerheim withheld his troops from cutting off Murmansk Railway. These events beckon important inquiries regarding Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate during successful offensives in a and presents a conundrum that few have to date examined holistically. As such, this thesis offers an alternative perspective to the current rational explanations of Finnish warfare in the Continuation War. This thesis discusses specific social processes of Finnish society that rationalist explanations overlook and applies the theory of constructivism to identify that normative factors can complement the prevailing rationalist explanations. This thesis further identifies how the social concepts of identity, shared culture and knowledge, and the norms of the Finnish people, and its leadership, contributed to Mannerheim’s decision to disregard military rationality and de-escalate. Lastly, this thesis determines that norms and ideas matter in war studies and future research should incorporate an interpretivist approach which contemplates social constructions and norms as alternative explanations in complex, multi-casual social phenomena like war.

Key words: Constructivism, Continuation War, de-escalation, escalation, Finland, interpretivism, Mannerheim, total war

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Acknowledgements I wish to express my utmost gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor Ilmari Käihkö for the time he gave me during the planning and writing of this thesis. Without his patience, guidance and encouragement this thesis would not have been accomplished. I also wish to extend my heartfelt gratitude to my supportive and loving fiancé, Michael Daw, for always standing by my side. Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis in honour of my late father, Tauno Sallinen who was born in Finland. Dad, this is for you.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 6 1.1. Research question ...... 7 1.2. Previous research ...... 8 2. Theory ...... 10 2.1. Constructivism ...... 10 2.1.1. Key principles of constructivism ...... 11 2.1.2. Key concepts of constructivism ...... 11 2.2. Limitations – constructivism ...... 12 2.3. Escalation and Total War ...... 13 3. Methodological considerations ...... 14 3.1. Interpretivism ...... 14 3.2. Limitations – methodology ...... 15 3.3. Method ...... 16 3.4. Limitations – method ...... 17 3.5. Ethics ...... 17 4. Empirical results ...... 18 4.1. Background ...... 18 4.2. The escalation begins – 15 months of “peace” ...... 19 4.3. Finland joins the Continuation War ...... 20 4.4. Leningrad ...... 22 4.5. Murmansk ...... 22 4.6. ’s war aims ...... 25 4.7. Finland’s war aims ...... 26 5. Analysis ...... 27 5.1. Shared knowledge, ideas and culture ...... 27 5.2. Norms ...... 28 5.2.1. The lack of shared political norms with ...... 28 5.2.2. Lack of common war aims ...... 30 5.2.3. Values – public opinion on the war changed ...... 31 5.2.4. Moral norms ...... 32 5.2.5. fatigue ...... 32 5.3. Identity ...... 34 5.4. Marshal Gustav Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership ...... 35

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6. Conclusion ...... 39 7. Discussion ...... 41 8. Bibliography ...... 43 9. Appendices ...... 46 9.1. Appendix A ...... 46 9.2. Appendix B ...... 47 9.3. Appendix C ...... 48 9.4. Appendix D ...... 49 9.5. Appendix E ...... 50

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1. Introduction Finland fought as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany against the shortly after the Continuation War broke out on 22 . What began as a German invasion of the Soviet Union – dubbed – saw its forces pursue two major objectives: (1) occupy and demolish Leningrad, and (2); cut off the Murmansk Railway and isolate the port which possessed great symbolic and strategic importance to the Soviets (Forczyk, 2009, p. 91; Lunde, 2011, p. 62). However, when the Nazis advanced towards Leningrad, Finland’s Mannerheim ordered Finnish troops to cease their attack, thereby removing them from directly participating in the . The decision was made to neither Leningrad nor cut off the Murmansk Railway. Once the Finnish troops had reclaimed the territory lost to the Soviets during the – the Winter War was fought 15 months prior to the Continuation War commencing – Finland’s participation as co- belligerents with Nazi Germany slowly preceded to a “dead end” in 1941-1942. Over the next one and a half to two years, Finland’s military refrained from engaging in an offensive strategy and did little to assist the German forces’ attack on the strategically important locations of Leningrad and Murmansk (Ekberg, 2000, p. 27). This gives rise to a theoretical puzzle as what started as a successful that followed progressive escalation, culminated in a sudden de-escalation by Finland’s military leadership. This was despite military rationality – based on logic and rational thought – suggesting that the Finnish forces would have enjoyed two successful offensives. To explain this puzzle, several concepts must be clarified: World War II was a “total war” – a concept with many definitions. Total war is defined in this thesis as “a theoretical concept, implying the use of all available resources and in war, and the elimination of all distinctions between military and civilian targets” (Luttwak, 1991, p. 625). Additionally, the concept of escalation assumes experience “escalation” – defined in this thesis as “an increase in the scope of a given conflict” (Freedman, 1987, p. 109). Critically, a total war expects total escalation, which does not appear to hold true in Finland’s case. Researchers have attempted to provide rational explanations revealing why the Finnish forces discontinued both offensives (Lunde, 2011, p. 70). Rationalism suggests that humans act in material self-interest and relies on material factors in its analysis for its explanations – such as fire power, tactics, numerical superiority etc over ideational (Agius, 2019, p. 75). This thesis argues that Mannerheim´s decision making cannot be explained through rationalism and material factors alone. Additionally, this thesis argues that a greater appreciation of these events is discovered when incorporating

6 normativity and ideational factors in compliance with interpretivism and constructivism, which complement leading explanations. Can underlying non-rational reasons help explain Finland’s decision to de-escalate an event which was fought as part of a “total war”?

1.1. Research question The Second World War is traditionally viewed as a total war. Yet, the Finnish leadership’s decision to forego from participating in the Siege of Leningrad as co-belligerents with Nazi Germany, and to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway, seems to challenge this notion. The exact research question is as follows: How can normative explanations help explain why the Finnish forces did not continue their military escalation upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk, despite possessing the military prerequisites necessary to succeed? This thesis will seek to delve deeply into Finland’s role in the Continuation War and attempt to understand why Mannerheim chose not to pursue an offensive war as co- belligerents with Nazi Germany upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk in 1941. The main actor studied is Finland, it´s leadership and society, within the time frame of the Continuation War from 1941 to 1944. To further clarify the research question, the scope of this thesis will be briefly discussed. Regarding empirics, this thesis will not cover the Soviet’s or Nazi Germany’s point of view. However, Germany’s war aims, demands and its agreement as co- belligerents with Finland will be presented to assist the reader to understand Finland and Germany’s relationship, and the context in which Finland was operating militarily. Regarding theory, it is not this thesis’ aim to present competing viewpoints on the existing rational assumptions. Instead, the purpose for choosing constructivism is to provide a complementary perspective to the rationalist explanations already in existence (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435). Additionally, it is not this thesis’ intention to argue against existing explanations for Finland’s decision-making at the time. Further, this thesis assumes Mannerheim decided to de-escalate and acknowledges it is the author´s interpretation of the solution. Last, this thesis acknowledges the issues that arise from using words such as “Finland” and the “” or “Finnish society” etc, and that it points to an assumption of a unitary state/society. Accordingly, the author of this thesis recognises the problem of condensing a whole society into “one” being. However, due to the limited scope of this thesis, this wordage has been adopted in several parts for convenience.

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1.2. Previous research Extensive research already exists on the Second World War, especially regarding the ideologies of, and the countries they “belonged to” like Nazi Germany and Stalin´s . Despite Finland playing a pivotal role during World War II, most research concerns the Winter War. In contrast, the Continuation War – which proceeded across a greater portion of WWII than the Winter War – and Finland’s participation in it has received significantly less attention (Lunde,2011, p 2). The scarce research that does concern Finland´s role in the Continuation War, largely contemplates the traditional material factors in rationalist theory. Some English examples include, first, Lunde (2011) who primarily focuses on logistical issues and material factors such as fire power, manpower, Finland’s economy, and the army´s rational choices and strategic calculations. Second, Jowett (2006) provides an interesting reading about the organization, tactics and weapons used between 1939-1945. Third, Mann (2002) has written about the difficulties of conducting warfare in the due to the terrain and environmental conditions, which the Finnish and German forces contended with. Fourth, Krosby (1968) has written about the Continuation War and German, Finnish and Soviet relations. Krosby also writes about the importance of the Petsamo mines and its economic importance to all actors involved. Lastly, Vehviläinen (2002) has written comprehensively about Finland and greatly focuses on Finland’s political affairs and its foreign policy for the war. In addition to English sources, Erfurth (1950) has published a comprehensive book about the Continuation War in German called “Der Finnishe Krieg”. Furthermore, the memoirs of Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim (referred to simply as Mannerheim in this thesis henceforth), the Commander-in-Chief of the during the Continuation War, is published in various languages including Finnish, Swedish and English (Lunde, 2011, p. 4). More will be mentioned about the memoirs in 3.4.

Constructivism, as explained below in 2.2., is not a consistent theory. One explanation for this is that there are many ways to contemplate identity and previous research on constructivism was conducted by authors with different understandings of social relations and identity. Furthermore, theoretical research on constructivism already exists but not in compliance with Finland and its role in the Continuation War. Erik Ringmar is one author who strongly advocates constructivism and the importance of identity. Ringmar (1996) writes about the importance of identity as a factor in choosing to go to war, which the author of this thesis argues is important for historical studies and will be used in this thesis. Ringmar, however, criticises rational explanations and argues that the reasons to act for the sake of 8 identity is more fundamental than interest, for example, which is a rational explanation. As mentioned in 1.1., this thesis does not seek to compete or create any tension between rational and constructivist explanations. It is not this thesis; goal to cause any polarization between these views but rather exhibit complementary perspectives since they are built on different epistemological assumptions. Furthermore, there are many published works on constructivism by leading scholar . Wendtian constructivism has likely contributed to the greatest number of debates about state identity and change, and the meaning of anarchy in international relations – Wendt contends anarchy is not a natural feature and suggests that it is “what states make of it” (Agius, 2019, p. 88; Wendt, 1992).

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2. Theory At the heart of any research is a theory. A theory provides the foundation for analysis and interpretation of results and must therefore be carefully and appropriately chosen. In the following , this thesis will highlight two theories used. Constructivism and its limitations will be discussed first. Escalation Theory and total war will then be presented.

2.1. Constructivism The research question in this thesis will be approached through the lens of a social science theory called constructivism. Constructivism can be used to describe both a methodology and a theory. This thesis differentiates between these two meanings and employs constructivism as its theoretical approach (Lamont, 2015, p. p.168-169). Constructivism has taken much inspiration from sociology and offers an alternative school of thought to rational theory. The term constructivism was created in 1989 by Nicholas Onuf and emphasizes the importance of seeing the world as social rather than material, which is fundamental to the traditional and dominant rational theory (Agius, 2019, p. 75). In contrast to constructivism, rationalist theory suggests knowledge is based on logic and reason, and in war studies is often associated with the two century-old writings of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his understanding of war as a rational phenomenon and as a tool to pursue political goals (Clausewitz, 1993, p. 83). From this, several observations can be made. Constructivism does not disregard rationalism completely but considers it incomplete since ideas and norms are necessary to produce meaning for a state’s logic in its pursuits (Zrn & Checkel, 2005, p. 1064). Therefore, this thesis argues that constructivism and normative factors should be implemented in the case of Finland in the Continuation War since it provides important insights that rationalism fail to acknowledge (Tannenwald, 1999, p. 435).

Since the late 1980s, constructivism’s influence as an alternative approach to rationalism in international relations and politics has grown significantly (Agius, 2019, pp. 74-75). When applied in the context of international relation studies, constructivism is often associated with political scientist Alexander Wendt. Wendt has provided important work on the meaning of anarchy from a constructivist point of view in international relations. Constructivism emphasizes understanding the world from the “inside”, since ideational and normative factors (together with material factors), shape society; humans understand the world through experience and meaning making. Hurd (2008, p. 4) writes that “… constructivism suggests

10 that material forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for human life”. To further explain the complex nature of constructivism, three key principles will be presented. Thereafter, three key concepts will be attached to the principles for clarification.

2.1.1. Key principles of constructivism First, human knowledge is constructed rather than given/derived externally. Constructivism argues that knowledge exists in the human mind and the human world is an artifice rather than naturally given (Agius, 2019, p. 75, 79). This means that humans constantly learn from new experiences and construct new knowledge, and their perception of the world is based on precious knowledge and reflection from new knowledge. People use intuition and past experiences to make sense of their current experiences. Second, knowledge is socially constructed, meaning experience and knowledge come from interaction with other people (Agius, 2019, p. 78). Third, identities are open to revision and change since ideas and norms can change (Agius, 2019, p. 76, 83). Critically, the identities of states and other actors are not fixed under constructivist theory. Constructivism contends that “[i]dentities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone” (Wendt, 1999, p. 21). In other words, constructivism not only shapes, but can also reshape socially constructed reality and norms.

2.1.2. Key concepts of constructivism Constructivism focuses on the meaning behind social interactions and the importance of three key concepts: identity, shared culture and norms (Agius, 2019, p. 77. These three concepts will direct this thesis’ analysis to study the world and how the Finnish people and state attached meaning to it. Identity conveys who the actors are and in turn, what interests they have, and these interests inform the actions they choose to take. It argues that shared beliefs and ideas construct identity through historical processes, and that interests are therefore guided by identity and can change over time (Agius, 2019, p. 78). This contrasts with rationalist theory, which claims that a state’s interests and identity is assumed or given and therefore cannot change. In disagreement, constructivism contends that international relations and politics ought to be studied through a deep understanding of the actors and how they operate since identity does not simply occur. Since identities cannot simply exist, they are formed through collective ideas and culture. Therefore, much of constructivism’s focus is on intersubjectivity – the shared understandings or “collective memories” of the society – and emphasizes the importance of relational and social aspects since meanings come from

11 interaction. This contrasts with the rational approach which argues that one thing impacts the other and is called cause and effect, or causality (Agius, 2019, p. 78, 79; Hurd, 2009, p. 3). Lastly, constructivism emphasizes the importance of norms in shaping an identity, since it is the collective ideas that produce norms. Norms can define actors and their identities by constituting part of them and are called constitutive norms. Norms can also serve as a standard for actors to know how to behave appropriately and are known as regulatory norms (Agius, 2019, p. 80).

Constructivism is an appropriate theory to use for this thesis since the author desires to understand to what degree underlying non-rational dimensions including identity, culture and norms did affect Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate the offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk.

2.2. Limitations – constructivism One limitation of constructivism is that it relies on the author’s interpretation of the studied actors and their observations of their experiences in the war. This can impact the research due to (unintended) . Additionally, rationalist scholars criticize constructivist theory for failing to be empirically observable and / or tested since concepts such as values and norms cannot be “seen” (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivist critics also argue that it cannot be said with total certainty what norms are present, i.e., how can one be certain that norms, and which norms specifically, affect different actors and their behaviour? A further limitation of constructivism is that it is not considered a uniform theory due to its diverse views on social relations, which has given rise to much debate (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Constructivism is divided into various approaches that differ significantly and have received different labels from different authors. For example, conventional constructivism (or modern constructivism) differs from critical constructivism (or radical constructivism). Conventional constructivism accepts neo-positivist explanations of phenomena to a degree, such as that state identity is given. Conventional constructivism views constructivism “as a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist approaches enabling both to benefit from the insights of another” (Agius, 2019, p. 85). is an umbrella term for theories opposing rationalism (Lamont, 2015, p. 170). In contrast, critical constructivists argue this notion cannot be realised since it is contradictory and problematic (Agius, 2019, p. 87). Another limitation of constructivism is the criticism that it is not a theory but rather an “approach”. Constructivism has been applied in some research as a methodology rather than as a theory. Due to the confusion stemming 12 from the diverse use of constructivism, the author wants to reiterate that constructivism is the theory in this thesis.

2.3. Escalation and Total War The theory of escalation is largely influenced by Clausewitz. In his book “On War”, Clausewitz suggested that escalation in war is a natural tendency. Escalation theory is largely under-investigated with most contemporary research focusing on material factors and the Great Powers (Freedman, 1987, p. 130; Ångström, 2015, p. 3). This is unsurprising since a large volume of escalation studies have emerged about the dynamics of the and thus possess a Nuclear and refer to escalation as the transformation of limited nuclear war to a total nuclear war (Freedman, 1987, p. 146). Further, Clausewitz identifies the important and related concept of de-escalation. He explains that de-escalation is caused by the dynamics of “friction” – unforeseen events in warfare and politics. These frictions are explained using material factors. De-escalation possess a Great Power and Nuclear bias too and refers to controlling and limiting intensity in a conflict, especially in nuclear warfare since a full-blown nuclear war would end in disaster (Freedman, 1987, pp. 126-133, 143). Most contemporary research concerning escalation and de-escalation focuses on material factors, with few exceptions. One exception is Howard (1979, p. 14) who stresses the importance of morality and norms in de-escalation theory.

Research in escalation is biased towards Great Powers and is therefore interesting to apply in this thesis since its case study concerns a small state, Finland. Additionally, it seems that current theories lack complete legitimacy and fail to complete the puzzle of Mannerheim’s decisions to de-escalate during the Continuation War. Thus, the inadequacies of the current research stress the uniqueness of this thesis’ aim; Finland is not considered a Great Power and its de-escalation occurred prior to the threat of Nuclear Weapons

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3. Methodological considerations The following section will address the methodological considerations of this thesis. This includes philosophical beliefs about the nature of the world, how it is made up and how it shapes research. It concerns the choice of methodology and the questions of ontology and epistemology. This section will also address the limitations of the chosen methodology – interpretivism.

3.1. Interpretivism The methodology chosen for this thesis is compliant with the research paradigm interpretivism. The knowledge comes “from within” meaning it aims to understand “the subjective character of the social world” (Risjord, 2014, p. 44). Schwartz-Shea, (2012, p. 2) explains that interpretivism “focuses on specific, situated meanings and meaning-making practices of actors in a given context”. The epistemological assumption – how one constitutes knowledge and how it is justified – in interpretivism is that knowledge is socially constructed (Risjord, 2014, p. 6). The ontological assumption – what the nature of reality is – is that the world is socially constructed. Interpretivism focuses on the interpretation of research and aims to understand it rather than explain it. This complements constructivism (see 2.1), the chosen theory for this thesis since constructivism is dependent on interpretation. This thesis draws a distinction between interpretivism and constructivism, which is important to stress since it is apt to cause confusion at first glance. To elaborate, in this thesis, interpretivism focuses on the researcher’s interpretation of the research of, for example, actors during a specific time frame and context. In contrast, constructivism focuses on understanding how meaning is constructed by the actor and his or her context in the situation being studied, in this case, Finland and its leadership during the Continuation War.

Interpretivism focuses on flexibility, contextuality and reflexibility. In relation to flexibility, an interpretivist research design is usually abductive, i.e., it is conducted using an open-ended hermeneutic loop that goes back and forth. However, the fixed structure of this thesis means that conducting a flexible research design is limited. Additionally, most research designs are compliant with the neo-positivist paradigm, which is built on hypothesis-testing. Interpretivist research design does not follow (neo)positivism in that it possesses an open- ended approach which lacks both a formalized hypothesis, random sampling and variables (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 3). Accordingly, this thesis will not compose a hypothesis but

14 instead investigate a research question that will be answered by understanding the patterns and underlying values taken from the relevant actors, settings and events of the pertinent time frame (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 53).

Further, this thesis focuses on contextuality and does not aim to generalize to a large population the same way a neo-positivist research would. This thesis’ aim is to understand the implicit case of Finland using an in-depth qualitative analysis to engage with meaning making of that time and context (Lamont, 2015, p. 46; Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 11). Meaning making includes understanding motivations, meanings, and feelings (Risjord, 2014, p. 44). Additionally, interpretivism argues a difference exists between human and non-human behaviour, and in contrast to neo-positivism, the social and natural world are distinct. This can be explained by the importance of human consciousness and normativity in the social world – the social world is partly created by rules, values and norms in human society, which are highly interconnected and can explain state and individual action. In other words, interpretivism holds that scientific and social knowledge are separated – this is known as mind-world dualism. This gives interpretivism the epistemological view of being anti- naturalist, since it disregards that only natural explanations – the naturalist view of the neo- positivist paradigm – are correct (Risjord, 2014, p. 8, 53, 54, 155).

Additionally, the methodological consideration and criterion for interpretive research of reflexivity needs to be addressed. The author recognizes one’s own “presence” in the research such as one’s own biases, background beliefs and presuppositions. The author acknowledges this can affect the research and will attempt to appropriately “self-monitor” what is studied and the understanding produced from one’s own feelings (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5, p. 98; Risjord, 2014, p. 62). Due to the centrality of reflexivity in this research design, the subjective features of the researcher must be addressed to provide transparency and epistemological robustness (Risjord, 2014, p. 59, 62). The author has Finnish and Russian heritage but was born and raised in . Accordingly, this thesis is written from a Western point of view.

3.2. Limitations – methodology Interpretivism is epistemologically anti-naturalist, which is considered a limitation by some researchers like neo-positivists who apply a methodological paradigm based on naturalism in their research (Risjord, 2014, p. 43). Neo-positivist scholars argue that humans are a part of the natural world and should therefore be examined using the same mechanisms 15 applied in the natural sciences. The interpretive anti-naturalist approach is considered a limitation by neo-positivists since interpretivism does not contend that there is only one form of scientific knowledge (Risjord, 2014, p. 53). Furthermore, interpretivism recognizes that no method is methodologically unbiased (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 5). Hence, it is acknowledged there are limitations with the chosen methodology since the author of this thesis is “part of the research”. Since the research is dependent on the author’s interpretation, this thesis cannot achieve total objectivity due to the unintentional biases spawning from one’s own experiences, knowledge and background. Another question asked about interpretivism is whether the norms and values that differ from the authors can be quantified, explained and predicted (Risjord, 2014 p. 34, 64)? Even if achievable, such a process is fraught with difficulty and suggests methodological issues will likely arise. For example, how can the author know what the subject (Finland’s leadership) thought or believed when making decisions at Leningrad and Murmansk? Lastly, since neo-positivism is the dominant research paradigm, it is often compared to interpretivism. This causes confusion as both theories rest on different epistemological and ontological assumptions, and the vocabulary used differ to a degree.

3.3. Method Research requires at least one or more tools – described here as a method – to conduct the investigation (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 4). The chosen methodology in research informs the method, and since this thesis is based on an interpretive research design, the method used will be interpretative-qualitative (Risjord, 2014, p. 57). The method for this thesis is a case study method (Yin, 2009, p. 4). Using Finland, its society and leaderships’ role in the Continuation War as a case study for this thesis is highly relevant – it complies with the theory of constructivism, the methodology of interpretivism and aims to deeply understand complex social phenomena. The material used in this thesis includes various in depth-secondary sources such as books to complement a primary source – Mannerheim´s memoirs. The sources used in this thesis are primarily written in Swedish and English but include an additional German source. This may be of benefit compared to using Finnish sources as it will mitigate source bias since the sources are written by “outsiders”. Due to source criticism and subjectivity, analysing memoirs may produce some limitations owing to the trustworthiness of the text. Despite this, interpretivist research considers memoirs a part of the social setting and a rich source of information that represents Mannerheim and his experiences at a specific point in time and is thus of great value (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 111). 16

3.4. Limitations – method Each method used in research has its limitations, biases and sources of error which can be difficult to detect (Risjord, 2014, p. 16, 24). Accessing certain primary sources for this thesis is a limitation since archived material and protocols are restricted from public access. However, this thesis will make use of Mannerheim´s memoirs as a source which is acknowledged to contain errors – following screening from questions in source criticism and the four principles of reliability: authenticity, time, dependency and tendency (Thurén, 2019, p. 12). It is acknowledged Mannerheim´s memoirs were written after the war and are a political statement. An additional limitation is that the author of this thesis has difficulties reading the , which automatically limits the possibility of using credible Finnish sources. Furthermore, using a case study method, as opposed to interviewing the participants, denies the participants the ability to elaborate their interpretations further. Lastly, methods for analysing data in interpretivist research is different from neo-positivist research and is viewed as a limitation by neo-positivist scholars (Schwartz-Shea, 2012, p. 21). Rather than using a quantitative method, neo-positivists favour research that utilises qualitative analysis in experiments using mathematical models which aim to uncover correlation and causality (Risjord, 2014, p. 9).

3.5. Ethics It is the opinion of this thesis’ author that one cannot conduct war studies without contemplating ethics and engaging in self-reflection and one’s own ethical responsibility. Every step in the enquiry should be informed by research ethics (Lamont, 2015, p. 61). In compliance with Woods (2006) and Lamont (2015, p. 58-59), the researcher should keep ethical guidelines in mind at all times, especially prohibited practices which can be written out as the principle of “do no harm”, including mental and physical harm. The two most paramount ethical considerations for this thesis included: (1) human subjects, such as the victims of war; and, (2) the polarisation in politics as highlighted by the sensitive nature of current academic debates regarding the Second World War. Furthermore, serious ethical issues can arise from politics and , for example, actors can use research as propaganda, and it is therefore essential to be cognisant of such motivations. Actors will use a researcher’s declarations for their own purposes, which can have real life consequences (Käihkö, forthcoming, p. 9).

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4. Empirical results This section offers relevant empirical results used to analyse what happened at Leningrad and Murmansk. A brief background will be presented and then Germany’s war aims will be explained, followed by Finland’s.

4.1. Background Finland broke free from Russia during the Bolshevik in and declared its independence on 6 December 1917. A closely followed between the Finnish “”, led by Mannerheim, and the Finnish “Reds”, who were (Järv, 2006, p. 16). Finland and Germany’s military relations can be traced back to this period; the Whites turned to the for support who willing backed Finland’s independence (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 6). The other two wars proceeded close to one another and took place during World War II. Despite being a “small player”, Finland’s role during the Second World War was nonetheless pivotal. The first of the two remaining wars – called the Winter War – began when the Soviets attacked Finland on 30 . Fortunately for the Finnish forces, led by Mannerheim again, the Soviets underestimated their fighting capabilities and consequently had underprepared (Ekberg, 2000, p. 18). However, as the war progressed, Finland found itself on the verge of collapse and eventually agreed to the Soviet’s demands and acceded to the terms of the Peace Treaty in . The terms of the treaty permitted Finland to maintain its independence but contained numerous other harsh terms. For example, Finland was required to relinquish approximately ten percent of its vital agricultural land (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 109). The Finns living in these areas – approximately 12-13% of the Finnish population – were forced also to abandon their homes, the majority of which were from the (Sandström, 1991, p. 17). Finland agreed to the Soviet’s terms despite harbouring a strong detest for the stipulations. For a visualisation of the annexed areas, please see Appendix A. Shortly after, the Soviets started taking actions beyond the scope of the . For example, the Soviets demanded the use of Finland´s railroad systems to transport its troops. In June-July 1940, the Soviets annexed the Baltic of , and and Finland began to fear it would be next on the Soviet agenda. During this time, Finland found itself under constant threat and aggression from the Soviets. For example, on 14 , the Soviet’s shot down a civilian airplane, killing all nine passengers aboard, the majority of which were Finns (Ekberg, 2000, p. 22). To make matters worse, Finland was isolated from the outside world and not one of its Western

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Allies, including Sweden, reached out to offer support. While this was occurring, Nazi Germany had established itself as the only nation that could offer Finland reciprocal resistance against the Soviets (Lunde, 2011, p. 30; Mann, 2002, pp. 66–67; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 170).

4.2. The escalation begins – 15 months of “peace” It is arguable that the escalation in the Continuation War began long before the launch of Operation Barbarossa. Barbarossa was the for the invasion of the Soviet Union launched by Hitler on 22 June 1941 (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 109; Glantz, 2001, pp. 234–235). The escalation started during the 15 months of “peace” or, as Brunila et al. (2000, p. 19) calls it, a cold war – between the Winter War and the Continuation War. Germany had already factored in Finland’s participation in Operation Barbarossa in December 1940. In May 1941, the Nazis invited the Finnish leadership to send Finland’s military officers to Germany to discuss what actions would be taken if the Soviets attacked Finland. Finland´s society and leadership were exhausted from the Winter War, being isolated from the rest of the world and their fear of becoming a Soviet state, and thus accepted the Nazi’s invitation (Vehviläinen 2002, pp. 88-89). The Finnish leadership went on to accept the Nazis’ offer of security at the cost of participating in their planned attack. Their primary motivation stemmed from the security the German forces offered against the Soviets, who they labelled as the “eternal threat from the east” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 171). The perceived necessity of self-defence prompted Finland´s leadership to collaborate with the Germans who possessed one of the strongest armies of the time. Germany had enjoyed military success from using its -tactic in various parts of central . Whereas, the Soviets had performed poorly during the Winter War and the prediction was that Germany could win a war against the in only a couple of months (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 228). During the interim war years, Germany provided military support to Finland and was the only country selling it military supplies including weapons. Germany also provided the Finns with additional support such as food, economic aid and built important transportation links including roads and railways. Hitler saw value in Finland owing to its strategic geopolitical positioning and his desired transit rights for German troops through Finland and , which was eventually agreed upon through a transit agreement (Ekberg, 2000, p. 23; Krosby, 1968, p. 96; Lunde, 2011, p. 30). Finland also established its own SS ; the SS – short for , which means protection squad – was an institution of the Nazis that represented its ideology (Dear &

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Foot, 1995, p. 1044). Additionally, numerous clandestine meetings took place between both nations in tandem to a steady increase in German troops in Finland’s north.

On 17 June 1941, the German troops stationed in northern Finland began to mobilise. Finland provided the with an additional 475 000 soldiers from its then population of approximately four million people. The Nazis put Operation Barbarossa into action on 22 June 1940, which saw roughly three million German troops, 2000 aircrafts and 3500 initiate the offensive by crossing into Soviet territory through Finnish borders (Mann, 2002, p. 74). Several days later, the Soviets carried out an air offensive against fifteen locations in southern Finland, which comprised six major including . Interestingly, the air offensive was aimed solely at Finnish targets and disregarded German troops stationed in the north of Finland. It is arguable the Soviets saw the German troops in Finland as a threat and were responding accordingly (Sandström, 1991, pp. 10–11). Furthermore, it is likely the Soviet Union was provoked by Finland and its engagements with the Nazis. The Finnish leadership saw the Soviet attack as an opportunity to repair the damage suffered during the Winter War. Thus, following the Soviet bombings on 25 June 1941, Finnish forces launched their offensive against the Red Army, initiating the Continuation War (Please see Appendix C in conjunction with Appendix B). Mannerheim, who led Finnish troops in the and the Winter War, would assume command of them once more.

The Finns have labelled this war the Continuation War since it was a continuation of the Winter War. While some argue that Finland committed an error in joining forces with Germany, others assert that Finland had no choice. It was a matter of survival for Finland, and the Finns would have inevitably been drawn into another losing battle against the Soviets regardless of joining Germany or not (Lunde, 2011, p. 2). Mannerheim already suspected a Soviet offensive and had asked to mobilise in August 1940, which was prior to establishing proof that the Soviets were preparing an attack (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 58). It is arguable the Finns could have fallen victim to the Soviet’s plan in late-1940 had it not been for the agreements their leadership had reached with Germany.

4.3. Finland joins the Continuation War In the beginning of the Finnish military campaign and following the commencement of Operation Barbarossa, the obtained military superiority in their local areas of 20 operations and rapidly advanced. The Finnish soldiers were better equipped than during the Winter War thanks to the weapons received from Germany. Despite suffering many casualties in terrible and bloody combat, the initial stages of the campaign were considered a triumph for Finland (Ekberg, 2000, p. 25). By July 1941, the Finnish forces had reclaimed most of the territories lost during the Winter War in the south of Finland (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). The Karelian Isthmus had been incorporated into the aims in 1941, and the Finnish military continued to enjoy success as its forces retook the city of one month later on August 29. By , the Finnish troops had reached the pre-Winter War borders located in the Karelian Isthmus and were now roughly twenty kilometres away from Leningrad. However, on 9 , Mannerheim made the decision to halt his troops advance despite enjoying a highly successful offensive. Up until now, Finland had fought alongside Germany who were conducting a full-scale total war. The Finnish leadership’s goals in conducting warfare were, however, not the same as the German’s, even after being pressured by them. Similarly, Mannerheim never ordered his troops to cut off the Murmansk Railway, which went against military rationality; the Murmansk Railway was logistically vital to the Soviet war effort. Initially expected as a war of short duration – many called it the “summer war” due to the expectation it would be conducted through the summer months of 1941 only – would continue for three more years. The Finnish leadership experienced difficulties in withdrawing Finland from the war due to the country’s dependence on the Germans for aid, primarily fuel and grain (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 372). The major turning point in the war occurred after the German forces failed to capture . Furthermore, the Finnish population was becoming increasingly resentful towards the war the longer it went on. In August 1944, Mannerheim was chosen as Finland´s president and would oversee the truce arrangements with the Soviets. The Continuation War eventually ended in and saw Finland withdraw its forces and create a agreement with the Soviets called the Moscow . Stalin demanded Finland´s leadership initiate war against Germany. The Finnish leadership, acting in accordance with the , severed all ties with Germany and agreed to disarm and or expel any German troops that remained within Finnish borders (Drakenlordh, 2002, p. 98). This resulted in the Finnish forces escalating warfare against German troops in Finland, which culminated in the War.

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4.4. Leningrad Leningrad held exceptional value, both symbolically and strategically, for the Soviets. During the Continuation War, it was a critical objective of the German forces to obtain, control and demolish. This is clearly demonstrated by the Nazis’ Directive No. 1 which concerns Leningrad and stated that “the Führer has decided to erase the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth. We have no interest in the preservation of even a part of the population of the city” (Forczyk, 2009, p. 11). The German advance occurred on 8 September 1941 and resulted in Leningrad being encircled by Germany’s forces who cut-off all land supply routes in and out of the city. Once encircled, it was expected that Leningrad would fall quickly to the German forces’ siege. The Nazis wanted Finnish troops to participate and assist German troops with the attack via the north of Leningrad (Polvinen, 1969, p. 18). The Finnish troops had positioned themselves defensively about twenty kilometres north of Leningrad in the Karelian Isthmus (Please see Appendix D in conjunction with Appendix D). Yet, despite the predictions that Leningrad would fall swiftly before the spring of 1942, and notwithstanding the from the Nazis to participate, Mannerheim, in accordance with the , refused the participation of Finnish troops in the siege (Jowett, 2006, p. 11; Nenye, 2016, p. 11; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 94–95). The Siege of Leningrad lasted significantly longer than the Nazis had predicted, and it is arguable that after 1942 the siege made no contribution towards the German troops’ survival or the Soviet´s defeat. The siege would continue until and end with Germany’s forces defeated. From the outset of the siege, the Finnish leadership continued to de-escalate and refused to provide any significant assistance. By the end of the war, the Finnish leadership would even refuse to provide German troops with support (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 95). Finland´s leadership severed its ties with the Nazis on 2 September 1944, in accordance with the terms of the Moscow Armistice. The Siege of Leningrad lasted for 900 days and saw more than one million non-combatants die (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 683).

4.5. Murmansk The German forces’ primary objectives in North Finland involved cutting off the Murmansk Railway to isolate the Port of Murmansk. The port provided vital strategic importance to the Soviet Union since it was ice-free year-round, connected the Soviets to the rest of the world and enabled the Soviets to receive essential supplies from the U.S. and Great Britain. The railway was 1,350 kilometres in length and connected Murmansk to Leningrad

22 and provided the Soviets with vital war materials, reinforcements and aid (Erfurth, 1950, p. 47; Lunde, 2011, p. 62; Mann, 2002, p. 70; Nenye, 2016, p. 53). Secondly, Murmansk gave the Red Army the means to threaten the Petsamo nickel mines, which were important to the German war effort (Lunde, 2011, p. 65; Mann, 2002, p. 70). Knowing the significance of these locations, German and Finnish military leaders devised an offensive, dubbed Operation Silver Fox, to be conducted by their troops stationed in Finnish Lapland. Silver Fox required the German and Finnish troops to split into three groups and attack from different directions while simultaneously undertaking separate operations called , Platinum Fox and Arctic Fox (Please see Appendix B in conjunction with Appendix E) German troops would carry out Reindeer and Platinum Fox with assistance from Finnish soldiers and attack from the north via Finland and the Norwegian territories it occupied. While Finnish troops would primarily participate in Operation Arctic Fox and attack from the south (Mann, 2002, p. 69; Nenye, 2016, p.54). The Finnish troops’ task was assigned to one of their divisions and placed under German command but was, however, led by the Finnish Major- Siilasvou (Mann, 2002, p. 87; Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 95–96).

When the Murmansk offensive began on 29 June 1941, the German troops did not expect much Soviet resistance nor did they account for the difficulties of the terrain, which possessed innumerable natural and logistical obstacles. Additionally, the majority of German troops were underprepared as most were raised in urban environments and had never encountered such wilderness before (Brunila, 1980, p. 94; Erfurth, 1950, p. 48; Mann, 2002, p. 70). In contrast, the Finnish soldiers were acclimatised to Northern Finland’s harshness and fared much better than the German troops who found themselves bogged down and unable to progress with their operations and becoming reliant on successful Finnish advancements. The Soviet troops were also prepared thanks to the railway which enable them to mobilise sufficient numbers for their defence (Nenye, 2016, p. 58). The failed advancements at Murmansk caused Hitler to order all operations to stop at the end of September 1941. Despite Hitler’s command, the second advancement on the Murmansk Railway began on 1 November 1941, and the Finnish army was initially successful in breaking through the Soviet’s defences. However, the Finnish forces’ advancement was halted once again due to the German troops’ inability to accomplish their tasks and because Mannerheim refused to send any reinforcements (Nenye, 2016, p. 16, 62-63) The Finnish troops might have succeeded in cutting off the Murmansk Railway without help from German troops, but their efforts in accomplishing this were “half-hearted” at best (Brunila, 1980, p. 95). The lacklustre efforts by

23 the Finnish troops resulted in the loss of 83, roughly one third, of their officers in combat the following week (Brunila, 1980, p. 95; Erfurth, 1950, p. 74). Despite being under German command, when Mannerheim discovered this, he became enraged and immediately ordered the advancement to stop. In fact, Siilasvou had already terminated the advancement before Mannerheim´s order had time to arrive on 17 November 1941. One last operation comprising of German and Finnish troops would be proposed and involved severing the Murmansk Railway in the summer and autumn of 1942. Mannerheim seemed eager to participate and had previously proposed a winter offensive that would have commenced much earlier on 25 September 1941. Mannerheim argued, however, that the German forces’ successful capture of Leningrad was an essential precondition for such an operation to commence. Furthermore, on 4 December 1941, Mannerheim wrote to German Field Marshal Keitel that:

The importance of the Murmansk Railway for the Soviet Union´s ability to wage war is undoubtedly great, not only with respect to the importation of war materials and food from the U.S. and Great Britain, but also by the morale role it plays as the main communication route between Russia and its allies. A prompt severing of this connection is of paramount importance. (Lunde, 2011, p. 217)

After this statement was made, however, Mannerheim cunningly referred to his precondition that Leningrad must fall before an attack on Murmansk could occur, which had yet to transpire (Lunde, 2011, p. 217). On 6 December 1941, the situation quickly changed when Great Britain declared war on Finland, which meant Finland was now officially at war with two super powers (Meinander, 2017, p. 225). This was also a turning point for Mannerheim who began to doubt whether the Germany forces could end the war as victors (Erfurth, 1950, p. 90). The decision to abstain from cutting off the Murmansk Railway proved influential to the outcome of the war, partly owing to the Soviets’ importation of steel and aluminium but mostly from the food supplies it received via the port. The port also provided the Red Army with significant quantities of war materials. Nenye (2016) explains that:

Eventually about one-quarter of all aid that was to reach the Soviet Union arrived via this route, including 5,218 tanks, 7,411 aircraft, 4,932 anti- guns, 4,000 and machine guns, 4,338 radios, 2000 field telephones, 1,803 sets, 473 million projectiles, nine torpedo crafts, four , 14 , 10 and a battle ship. (p. 64)

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On 3 February 1942, Mannerheim and Finland’s President Ryti were now certain that Germany and its army would collapse at any time. Accordingly, Mannerheim indicated to Ryti that he would abandon the proposed Murmansk offensive for 1942 due to the risk of Germany’s forces’ offensive collapsing (Nenye, 2016, p. 17). Mannerheim managed, in a polite and diplomatic way, to negotiate the Finnish troops´ non-participation in the proposed operation, basing his decision on political considerations (Järv, 2006, p. 219, Lunde, 2011, p. 224). Unsurprisingly, the proposed offensive was abruptly halted before it began. Thus, despite coming tantalisingly close, the plan to cut off the Murmansk Railway ended up being nothing more than a dream for the Nazis (Brunila, 1980, p. 94- 95).

4.6. Germany’s war aims During World War II, Nazi Germany conducted a total war and its military – one of the most successful of the time – was already engaging in combat by the time the Continuation War commenced. Hitler composed Germany´s war aims in Directive 21 – the directive for Operation Barbarossa. Hitler’s primary aim was the complete destruction of the Soviet Union and encompassed crippling its economic and military potential. Germany was a totalitarian state and its war aims are thus clearly specifiable since public opinion presented little bearing on its creation (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 35; Lunde, 2011, p. 55). Operation Barbarossa was a voracious war of conquest and destruction. Barbarossa permitted the use of force against both military and civilian targets, and with great severity. Barbarossa violated international law in that no German soldiers would be prosecuted at the time for committing war crimes against Soviet civilians (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 110). The Nazis saw this as an opportunity to wage a war to fulfil its dream of “”, which included annexing vast areas of land in the east that belonged to the Soviets, some of which would be given to Germany’s allies (Lunde, 2011, p. 55). “Lebensraum” – means “living space” used by the Nazis to describe their expansionism in the East and was part of Germany’s war aims in Barbarossa (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 109, p. 675; (Glantz, 2001, p. 210)). Additionally, the Nazis, in compliance with its agenda of National , incorporated the into Germany’s war aims to annihilate all European (Järv, 2006, pp. 208-2090). The Nazis’ squads – – were assigned the task of systematically murdering the Jews, along with many other targeted groups who were deemed inferior to the Nazis, such as . Due to the limited scope of this thesis, the Nazis’ ideology will not be discussed in its entirety. Operation Barbarossa contained two important goals: (1) capture Leningrad; and, (2) cut off the 25

Murmansk Railway to isolate the port city of Murmansk. Throughout the war, the Nazis desired an alliance with Finland. Despite exerting considerable pressure on them, Finland’s leadership did not accept their proposal and the Nazis eventually conceded and agreed to act as co-belligerents instead (Järv, 2006, p. 221).

4.7. Finland’s war aims Finland´s war aims are not as ascertainable as Germany’s (Lunde, 2011, p. 55). The Finnish military’s initial war aims were to reclaim territories lost to the Soviets in the Winter War and under the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland’s leadership also expressed that the war was waged against the (Brunila et al., 2000, p. 142, Järv, 2006, p. 82). Yet, a contradiction exists in their claim: Finnish forces had advanced into Russian territory which they had no legitimate claim over, such as Eastern . To elaborate further, when the old 1939- borders were retaken, Finland’s leadership began entertaining the idea of “The ”. The concept of “Greater Finland” can be traced back to the Peace of and was coined in 1920. This dream, however, became irrelevant when the Soviet Union became a great power during the 1930s. This idea was awakened nevertheless and came into full bloom in 1941 upon the commencement of the Continuation War. It is arguable that the Finnish leadership had possessed expansionist thinking during the Continuation War and may have contemplated incorporating it into Finland’s war aims. It is possible the Finnish leadership was prepared to wage war outside of Finland’s 1939 borders – an idea predominately supported by the far-right. On the one hand, Greater Finland would annex land containing Finnish-speaking people. On the other hand, it would also include territories which had never belonged to Finland, such as Eastern Karelia. Even so, there were still two important reasons for the Finnish leadership to incorporate this goal into their policy: (1) it would be easier to defend a front further to the east; and, (2) the expectation that the Soviet Union would be defeated and the Finnish peoples’ desire to unite with their “ethnic brothers over the border”. (Vehviläinen, 2002, pp. 91–92). This goal was almost achieved when most of East Karelia was occupied by Finnish forces – Finnish soldiers first marched into the city of in the autumn of 1941 and remained there until 1944 (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 247).

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5. Analysis This section will assess Finland’s leadership’s decision to de-escalate through an interpretivist-constructivist analysis. The Finnish peoples’ (1) shared knowledge, ideas and culture; (2) norms; and (3) the identity of Finland, its people and it´s leadership during the Continuation War, will now be discussed. This order has been deliberately selected to demonstrate how shared culture and understandings, and norms, inform and shape identity. The author intends to stress the point that the findings of the analysis should not be read in isolation – the three key concepts of constructivism are highly interconnected, inform one another and often overlap (Agius, 2019, pp. 76-77). For the sake of clarity, however, each concept will be presented separately. Lastly, due to his influence, Mannerheim (and the Finnish leadership) and his role in Finland’s decision making will be presented separately.

5.1. Shared knowledge, ideas and culture Most of the Finnish public supported the war on the condition that it remained defensive (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Finnish novelist Väinö Linna, who had served in the war and had written down his experiences, said: “[f]or many, in its early stages the new war represented a kind of second round, in which Finland would recover the losses it had incurred in the Winter War” (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 89). Vehviläinen (2002, p. 91) expressed that “[t]he offensive operations were not necessarily in conflict with the claim of a defensive war as long as they were aimed at getting back the territory lost in the Peace of Moscow”. In other words, the Finnish public supported entering the war, especially those who were forced to flee the annexed lands during the Winter War. The Finnish people wanted to regain their lost lands and they considered the Soviet’s air offensive as no different from the Soviet’s unprovoked attack at the beginning of the Winter War. The Finnish people saw hope that together with one of the largest armies by their side – the – they would be able to rise and exhibit a strong defence. Many Finnish people deemed the Treaty of Moscow as unfair and were prepared for one more defensive battle (Sandström, 1991, pp. 12–14). When the war broke out, President Ryti told his fellow Finns that it was a defensive war, a “Continuation War”, which he exclaimed to them via radio (Sandstöm, 1991, p. 61). Since the Winter War was a defensive war and this was simply the continuation of it, this war must thus be a defensive war too. When compared to the German forces, Finland’s military was not waging the “same kind of war”. Wanting to take back “what was once yours”, like Finland’s military aimed to do and did initially achieve at Karelia, is one thing. However, if Finland’s military

27 did participate alongside Germany’s troops in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk, it would have been considered an offensive war.

The reason “defensive” is in quotation marks is due to a contradiction with this notion. On the one hand, Finland’s military was officially waging a defensive war, i.e., the continuation on the Winter War. On the other hand, evidence exists suggesting the goal of starting the conflict was to fulfil the idea of a “Greater Finland”, as explained in 4.7. The question whether the Finnish leadership wanted to restore part of Finland’s identity, i.e., reconnect with the Finnish speaking people in Eastern Karelia, or if this was an expansionist idea is beyond the scope of this thesis. The author of this thesis acknowledges that an extensive debate exists regarding the question of the Greater Finland and is a subject of much disagreement. However, the Finnish peoples’ reaction to the idea of achieving the Greater Finland is important to this thesis. To elaborate further, most Finnish people did not want to initiate war beyond the pre-Winter War borders. The Finnish public demonstrated their discontent toward the idea of the Greater Finland when Mannerheim had promised, in accordance with the dream of the “Greater Finland”, to liberate Eastern Karelia. The question concerning Greater Finland might not seem relevant to Leningrad or Murmansk, yet, a clear link is observable by the overall lack of support the Finnish population had for the war, since it was no longer considered defensive. It is arguable that the Finnish leadership would be justified in annexing East Karelia since most of its population was Finnish speaking. Even so, the Finnish people were still not pleased with the idea of annexing that land. Hence, it is easy to comprehend the negative impact an attack on Leningrad or Murmansk would have had on the Finnish people. If Finnish forces had attacked those locations, Finland would have been at risk of losing its national unity, something the Finnish leadership recognized after taking East Karelia. Thus, the shared beliefs of the Finnish people that they should only take back what was once belonged to Finland is significant. This ties back to Finland’s identity which contributed to the de-escalations at Leningrad and Murmansk, since both locations were never a part of the Finnish peoples’ collective knowledge, ideas and culture.

5.2. Norms 5.2.1. The lack of shared political norms with Nazi Germany Suggested previously, Finland’s long-standing underlying norms as a contributed to its leadership´s decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk. This section explains that Finland and Germany did not share strong political traditions and had 28 significantly different world views. Finland became a democratic country after declaring independence in December 1917, after separating from the Soviet Union during the First World War (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). To explain the norms as a democracy, Finland enjoyed a strong military cooperation with Germany during the First World War and the Finnish Civil War too, where Germany advocated Finnish independence. Notwithstanding this, Finnish-German relations changed over the course of the Second World War. The Continuation War was a substantial conflict within the Second World War. It extremely complex and primarily fought as total war that contained numerous actors with differing interests. The Finnish leadership did not want to ruin relationships with other world players in the long run, especially nations who shared similar democratic values such as the . Brunila (1980, p. 95) suggests this explains why Finland’s military did not continue its offensive at the Murmansk Railway despite possessing the capabilities to cut it off successfully. Brunila argues that the Finnish troops´ “half hearted” efforts were due to the Finnish leaderships’ hesitation to demonstrate total commitment to this goal, which required their forces to fight without the Germans and risk aggravating their Western Allies further.

Finland was the only democratic nation who fought alongside the Axis, and was not something the Finnish people had much fondness for. Finland’s values, norms and political dimensions were however agreeable to other Scandinavian and western (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 167). In compliance with Scandinavian policy, Finland sought to maintain neutrality between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and the communist Soviet Union. This links back to the decision to de-escalation at Leningrad – Leningrad was strategically and symbolically important for Nazi Germany to conquer, and for the Soviets to defend. This contributed to a symbolic war of a personal nature that saw a power struggle between Hitler and Stalin, which Mannerheim likely desired no part of. (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 683). Additionally, the Finnish people did not tolerate and despite a small minority of Finns being sympathetic to the Nazis, Nazism never gained a foothold in Finland, nor did Nazi propaganda succeed there (Sandström, 1991, p. 122). It was previously suggested that the Finnish leadership chose to act as co-belligerent with Nazi Germany as it was “the lesser of two evils”. Thus, norms help to explain the Finnish leadership’s decision to de-escalate during the Continuation War and end its cooperation with the Nazis stemmed from a lack of shared political and ideological values, i.e., most Finnish people and their leadership, including Mannerheim, did not support Nazism (Mann, 2002, p. 67). This is connected to the concept of identity too and how the Finns wanted Finland to be seen by other

29 nations. The Finns’ shared ideas and possessing the norms of a democracy contributed to their leadership’s decision making as they wanted to be seen in a certain light, i.e., the Finns wanted to have a neutral identity and not be seen as subscribers of Nazism. This can help explain why the Finnish leadership chose to avoid being too closely associated with the Nazis and Nazism.

5.2.2. Lack of common war aims In addition to lacking shared values, the Finnish government was very clear about waging war separate to Germany and neither state acceded to a formal treaty. Thus, an alliance was never officially established between the two nations in the Second World War. Therefore, in accordance with constructivism, the Finnish leadership changed their view on the war upon their forces reaching the old pre-Winter War borders. Therefore, participating in the Siege of Leningrad and cutting off the Murmansk Railway was never a part of the Finnish government’s true intention, especially since these territories has no connection to Finland. The author of this thesis acknowledges the current debates about this claim. The argument suggests, on the one hand, that the Finland entered the war as co-belligerents with Germany because “they had no choice” and should thus not be considered allies even despite both nations making numerous military arrangements together. Vehviläinen (2002, p. 170) suggests that Finland´s decision was heavily influenced by “[t]he Winter War and the Peace Treaty of Moscow” which “threw Finland into the arms of Germany”. It is arguable that until the Finns reclaimed their lost territories, they would piggyback on Germany and adhere to the motto that “the enemy of my enemy if my friend”. On the other hand, some arguments contend that Finland’s leadership was aware of their role in the war, since they had already anticipated the Soviets attacking and had prepared to counterattack. This would also give Finland’s leadership a legitimate reason to start the war and should therefore be considered as an offensive war waged as allies with Germany, and that the title of co-belligerent was merely a cover. Regardless of which argument is more convincing, there are factual differences between both nations war aims that suggests two separate wars were being waged. Finland’s leadership was clear about being at war with the Soviets for their own reasons and stated that Finland was never by definition allies with Nazi Germany but instead co-belligerents. Additionally, the Finnish leadership never signed a treaty to become allies with Germany and did not endorse Nazism either. The Finnish troops fought under Finnish command too – Mannerheim. Furthermore, despite the Continuation War taking place during the Second World War, Finland´s war aims were solely to achieve its objectives and to reclaim its pre-

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Winter War territories, as discussed in 4.7. In addition, while the Greater Finland idea had Eastern Karelia in mind – which did not extend beyond the old border – as a Finnish objective initially, it did not comply with Germany´s war aims to conduct offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk. Mannerheim also never demonstrated any interest in conducting a total war. For example, he ordered the Finnish troops to stop short of Leningrad and commenced a defensive strategy for the remainder of the Continuation War. In short, since no treaty existed between Nazi Germany and Finland and both nations had different war aims, the Finnish leadership eventually made the decision to de-escalate. Regarding the Murmansk Railway, it is arguable that Mannerheim failed to find a valid enough reason to conduct an attack there. For example, the attack was not even remotely related to Finland’s identity or its war aims and would have aggravated the Western Allies too (Mann, 2002, p. 70).

5.2.3. Values – public opinion on the war changed In accordance with constructivism, the sudden shift in the Finland’s war aims shaped and changed the public opinion and support for the war. This was noticeable within the democratic nation from when the war was first announced, with its initial aims, and then as time went on and the Finns opinion of the war began to shift as it progressed and the started to grow (Sandström, 1991, p. 113). Previously mentioned in 5.1.1., most of the Finnish government knew that announcing the goal of the Greater Finland and annexing East Karelia, would be met with discontent by the Finnish people. The announcement to “liberate” East Karelia by Mannerheim was considered as an embarrassment, especially by the Social Democrats at the time, who came close to resigning follow the release of this statement. Despite never knowing if the Finnish leadership would have gone through with the plan, they understood that such war aims threatened national unity. Additionally, the Finnish leadership quickly realised that the Finnish peoples´ support for the war and will to fight relied on strong national unity. Thus, strong national unity was likely only maintainable by strictly adopting defensive thinking (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). Furthermore, the public opinion on the war shifted the longer it went on, especially once the public started to comprehend the true nature of the Nazis and their ideology. Hence, as the war progressed, the Finnish public opinion became more concerned about what Nazi ideology represented – antisemitism – which opposed democratic values and was incompatible with a democratic nation like Finland. Eventually, Finland became a hostile environment for the Nazis. For example, the Finnish press, despite some censorship, began writing increasingly negatively about the Nazis involvement in the war (Sandström, 1991, p. 142).

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5.2.4. Moral norms Moral norms primarily concern whether killing can be justified (Risjord, 2014, p. 152). Moral norms emerge from shared beliefs and presents interesting insights for this thesis regarding the public opinion in Finland at the time of the Continuation War. For example, would it be morally just for Finnish troops to go beyond the old 1939 boundaries during the war? Should Finland have had the “expansional thinking” akin to the Soviets and Nazi Germany? Mannerheim refused direct involvement in the Siege of Leningrad and Murmansk even after receiving significant pressure from the Nazis to participate. It is arguable that Finland´s military was initially indirectly participating in Nazi Germany’s total war, which meant the distinction between civilian and military targets were removed. However, upon approaching Leningrad, the Finnish troops likely questioned whether it was morally justifiable to slaughter civilians, which was a part of the Nazi’s war aims. This is important since the Finns were fighting for Finland and not for Hitler and Nazi Germany (Ekberg, 2000, p. 41; Lunde, 2011, p. 187). Furthermore, the war was against Bolshevism and not against the civilians living in Leningrad. These thoughts are expressed best by Nissen & Molin (1983, p. 158) quote of President Ryti’s rumination of the Roman’s of Carthage that “such ruins of Carthage shall not remain in history as a deed of the Finns”. This type of thinking seems to demonstrate that the Finnish leadership did not believe it was morally justifiable to join Nazi Germany in a total war. Questioning the morality in war also links back to the importance of identity and could be elaborated when considering Ringmar´s (1996, p. 190) argument that the story of an actor’s deeds reflects their identity. Taken together with constructivism, this can help to explain why Finland´s identity and the Finns desire to be viewed by the outside world a certain way had changed. This seems to suggest that Finland’s forces initially fought for its identity and its fundamental right to exist, regardless of the costs involved. Therefore, Finland joined Nazi Germany with the intention of being considered heroic by the rest of the world, i.e., that the Finns fought for their independence and had liberated Finland from the Soviets and . However, as the dynamics of the war changed, and Finland existence was no longer in jeopardy, the Finns became concerned with how the world would see them as actors once the war had ended; The Finns did not want their country’s story or identity to be associated with Nazism in the future.

5.2.5. Battle fatigue Whereas the previous sections in the analysis have provided non-rational explanations, this section combines material factors and normative explanations. Finland’s military did not

32 prepare for a long war and it has been determined that the lack of shared norms contributed to the decrease in its troop’s psychological preparedness, which in turn contributed to the decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk. When the war began, the Finnish army had great confidence since they were fighting alongside Nazi Germany, who possessed one of the world’s best armies (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 91). The Finns went in with the mindset that it would be a short war, and this hope burned brightly at the beginning of the Continuation War when the offensive enjoyed rapid success (Brunila, 1980, p. 85; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 110). Nissen & Molin(1983, p. 157) confirms this and argues that Finland’s army was only prepared for two months of war. However, as the war progressed, the Finnish leadership began to realize that it would not end as quickly as predicted. It is arguable that the Finns not only lost their morale to fight a war with Nazi Germany but that their psychological preparedness declined upon realising the war would be long too. War takes a toll on mood and nerves and the relationships between the Finnish soldiers and officers became increasingly more hostile than during the Winter War. This is not surprising since the Winter War lasted only three months, whereas the Continuation War continued for three years (Sandström, 1991, p. 94). It is understandable that the Finnish soldiers may not have been psychologically prepared to conduct warfare through another harsh winter, especially after just doing so in the Winter War (Brunila et alt, 2001, p. 149). The spirit invoked by the troops during the Winter War – the quality known as “” – would need to be mustered once again. Sisu is strongly rooted in Finland and the Finnish culture and is an underlying norm which loosely means to be courageous and “have guts” (Paananen, 1992, p. 84). Sisu was achieved during the Winter War, however, since the Continuation War was not considered a similarly defensive war, it was less likely the troops would demonstrate sisu. This is likely true if the Finnish troops were forced to push forward with Nazi Germany’s offensive towards Leningrad since the same sense of pride would not be kindled.

In addition, many Finnish soldiers died during the initial stages of the war – an estimated 547 Finns died each day, which is a catastrophe for a country of only 4 million people (Nenye, 2016, p. 148). By 30 , the number of dead Finnish soldiers almost doubled the number of deaths in the Winter War. This took a significant toll on the soldiers’ psyche and values, which led to the changes in the war aims (Lunde, 2011, pp. 231-232). Vehviläinen (2002, p. 95) explains that the reluctance of the Finns to attack Leningrad “was determined partly by a desire to spare their own troops, but also by political circumspection”. In other words, the Finnish leadership was not prepared to spill Finnish blood on a war that

33 was outside of the country’s agenda and war aims. The Finns were also fatigued from the thousands of coffins they received from the frontlines everyday while the war ensued, which made every day a heavy burden (Sandström, 1991, p. 113). The same is true regarding cutting off the Murmansk Railway – Finland’s forces were battle fatigued and had little motivation to conduct a war which they never intended to fight. During the offensives in the north, the harsh environment had also taken a toll on the Finnish troops’ physical strength and psychological preparedness to continue with the offensives. The Finnish leadership quickly realised that the German soldiers were underprepared and uneducated for this type of warfare. The German troops were consistently unsuccessful in their operations there and the Finnish officers slowly became victims of an offensive which was not in their nations interest (Brunila, 1980, p. 95; Sandström, 1991, p. 87). Such failures equally threated to transform into social turmoil in Finland since morale was not only declining on the frontlines but from within the Finnish society too (Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 236)

5.3. Identity It was previously determined that identity played an important role in Finland’s leadership’s decision to de-escalate both offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk to prevent a future Soviet counterattack. This finding is partly due to reasons of geography and might appear to be a rational reason for the de-escalation. Yet, a constructivist explanation regarding the geostrategic position of the countries involved can complement this view by demonstrating that the Finnish forces sought to protect Finland’s independence/existence, i.e., its identity, by salvaging the nation’s future relations with the Soviets. The German troops could always flee back to Germany, but the Finns would remain neighbours with the much larger Soviet Union once the war ended (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93). Mentioned previously, Finland had lost the Winter War 15 months prior to the commencement of the Continuation War. Finland’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the Finns underlaying fear of a retaliation by their neighbour who had already demonstrated aggressive hostility towards them, makes it hardly surprising that the Finnish forces chose to abstain from attacking Leningrad and Murmansk. The Soviets would have likely considered this to be an unforgiving act by the Finns, due the significance of these locations to them (Järv, 2006, p. 87). Thus, the Finnish leadership was likely apprehensive that such an act might, from a constructivist point of view, result in further (avoidable) consequences for their country in the long run. An appreciation for the situation and how the world is socially constructed enabled the Finns to make sense of the war and their country’s role in it; Finland and its identity needed to survive in the long run 34 too. Nissen & Molin (1983, p. 164) highlights the Finns mentality at the time, explaining that “while the outcome of the Russo-German conflict remained uncertain, the Finnish government maintained its official caution and bore in mind the possibility that Russia would remain Finland´s neighbour in the future.” Furthermore, Finland’s leadership contemplated that they would not be victorious in the war – Germany´s forces’ offensives were starting to fail – and that they would have a better chance of justifying reclaiming Finland’s old borders, as opposed to justifying initiating an offensive in areas which never belonged to it ((Järv, 2006, p. 88). This can, once again be linked back to Ringmar´s (1996, p. 190) argument that an actor is influenced by their story, and without a story there cannot be an identity. i.e., by conducting a defensive war, Finland’s leadership was protecting the country’s identity and fundamental right to exist, regardless of the costs involved. It is arguable that Finland’s leadership was attempting to achieve a balance of power with the Soviets by stopping the offensive close to the old border. To summarize, the role of preserving its (Finland’s) identity was a significant factor in the Finnish leadership’s decision to de-escalate at Leningrad and Murmansk.

5.4. Marshal Gustav Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership Mannerheim (1867-1957) was an essential actor in Finland’s military’s decision-making and is a key figure to analyse to understand the decision to de-escalate in the Continuation War (Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 116). Mannerheim is described as a strategic actor who was influenced by social effects, the pursuit of keeping Finland and its identity alive by comparing costs and benefits. This is a rational explanation, yet, a constructivist view contends that his behaviour was motivated through social interaction and his understanding of the world. For example, Mannerheim’s experiences in the , where he spent most of his military career (1887-1917), meant that he possessed considerable knowledge and understanding about the Russian mentality and knew how difficult it was to beat Russia in its territory (Ahlander, 2016, p. 347; Drakenlordh, 2002, p. 98). This raises the question whether Mannerheim developed respect for Leningrad after having spent much of his career there, as well as knowing how important the city was to the Soviets (Meinander, 2017, p. 81). This is in observance with constructivism, which says that the world is socially constructed and directs this finding to the understanding that “we create the world that we live in and it influences us as well” (Agius, 2019, p. 75).

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The initial phases of the Continuation War were positive for Finland’s forces. Mannerheim enjoyed superior decision making over Finland’s military yet always consulted with President Ryti. Mannerheim clearly states in his memoirs that the Finnish war aims were to conduct a defensive war and that the decision to start the Continuation War with Nazi Germany was in self-defence (Mannerheim, 1954, p. 293,298,299). Divergence in each country´s war aims meant that the Finnish forces did not fight much once they approached the old borders. However, once the discussion moved onto the topic of a potential conquest beyond the 1939 border, the attitude towards the war amongst the Finnish population and government began to shift. One rational explanation for this is that Finland’s economy at the time had struggled to afford retaining the territories outside of the old borders. This also concerns identity since it became a threat to the democratic nature of Finland to start a “war of conquest”. Consequently, the public opinion converted from a will to fight into resistance against the idea of a “Greater Finland”. Upon realising the public’s reaction to his statement, Mannerheim insisted it was a “morale booster” for the army and should not be interpreted literally (Järv, 2006, p. 88; Vehviläinen, 2002, p. 93).

According to his memoirs, Mannerheim’s decision to de-escalate the offensive at Leningrad was political. Mannerheim believed that an offensive at Leningrad could be successful, but in the short run only and would be a political disadvantage too. Mannerheim comments that an attack on Leningrad would confirm the Soviet’s contention that an independent Finland was a major threat to its city (Järv, 2006, p. 77; Norrback & Meinander, 1999, p. 233). Mannerheim mentions that such an attack would not be forgiven by the Soviets when the war ended and makes the point that a counterattack might then be justified by them (Brunila, 1980, p. 99). He further suggests that the offensive towards East Karelia would not be considered aggressive by the Soviets compared to an offensive at Leningrad or Murmansk – Eastern Karelia was not as vital to the Soviets. Mannerheim’s comments further demonstrate that Finland’s war aims were independent of Nazi Germany’s (Brunila, 1980, p. 99). In fact, despite pressure from the Nazis, Mannerheim and President Ryti had already decided in August 1941 that they did not want to participate in the Siege of Leningrad (Nenye, 2016, p. 15).

Mentioned previously in 4.5, cutting of the Murmansk Railway would have had significant consequences for the Soviet war effort. Prior to the Finnish forces ceasing from their approach to Murmansk Railway, Mannerheim had become aware that the Western

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Allies, including Great Britain and the U.S., were pressuring the Finnish leadership to stop the advancements. The most pressing issues where generated by political factors – the offensive threatened the U.S. who was sending aid to the Red Army through the Port of Murmansk. This might have influenced Siilasvou’s decision to discontinue the offensive, although, he most likely had already been instructed by Mannerheim to do so (Nenye, 2016, p. 64). Additionally, Mannerheim did not send Siilasvou any reinforcements during the operation, despite receiving requests. This further highlights the claim that Mannerheim did not identify with Nazi Germany’s war aims and did not see Murmansk as being vital to Finland´s identity. As (Nenye, 2016, p. 62) explains, “… the commander-in-chief was of the opinion that the Germans had to at least be able to handle their own sector of the front”. This demonstrates the importance of Mannerheim´s ability to think ahead and have extreme self-control in demanding situations. He was initially asked to be the commander of the German war effort for Operation Silver Fox but declined. In his memoirs, Mannerheim wrote that he had no desire to be in command of soldiers he knew nothing about and had no interest in being subordinate to German leadership (Mannerheim, 1954, pp. 305–306). Mannerheim understood that German’s forces could not defeat the Soviets with blitzkrieg and especially not while trying to capture Murmansk during the winter months, which were rapidly approaching (Mann, 2002, p. 83). This highlights that Mannerheim was, in accordance with the shared culture and norms of his country and citizens, interested in pursuing Finland´s war aims only and was not interested in waging two separate wars (Polvinen, 1969, p. 29). At the beginning of 1942, the Finnish leadership, including Mannerheim, began to doubt if Nazi Germany could win the war. Mannerheim understood this following the German troops’ failure to accomplish any of their war aims and, as time went by, the increasing likelihood that they would fail to achieve victory at Stalingrad (Polvinen, 1969, p. 149). Thus, the Finnish leadership became aware that their expectation of a swift German victory was far from being realised (Dear & Foot, 1995, p. 373; Erfurth, 1950, p. 81).

It is likely that Mannerheim acquired new insights over time about the situation and the actors. Mannerheim was greatly impacted by political decisions and based his military edicts on them (Lunde, 2011, p. 3). He did not act purely on military rationality, which may indicate he might have participated in the Siege of Leningrad. However, Mannerheim’s long military career and love for his country meant he would likely have utilised his experience and acted on his instinct for Finland’s survival. Mannerheim’s experiences and understanding of the changing situation in Finland and the war influenced his decision to de-escalate at Leningrad

37 and Murmansk. The importance of maintaining Finland’s identity shaped the national interest for abstaining from furthering the offensive – this corresponds with constructivism. A total war against the Soviets was contrary to the Finns’ perception of nation security. Mannerheim’s recognition of the underlying norms to preserve Finland’s national unity and identity was so strong that it is arguable his decisions in both offensives were against Finland’s military self-interest (Risjord, 2014, p. 153). Mannerheim´s understanding of Finland´s shared culture, beliefs, and ideas, including those that changed throughout the war, and the importance of keeping Finland’s identity, has greatly influenced this evaluation. Mannerheim’s influence in the decision to de-escalate is highlighted by the letter he wrote to Hitler on 2 September 1944, as found in Mannerheim’s (1954) memoirs. Mannerheim expresses in this letter that most Finns’ opinion on the war was no longer supportive. He mentions that Finland is a democracy and even if he had a different opinion on the war, he must acknowledge the peoples wishes. He also mentions the importance of Finland’s identity and expresses that any additional blood shed will jeopardize the entire nation (Mannerheim, 1954, pp. 365–366). This clearly highlights the importance of public opinion to Mannerheim, who throughout the war had been exceptionally receptive to the Finns and their opinion on the war. The decisions to de-escalate at Murmansk and Leningrad appear highly interrelated. After taking all non-rational reasons – as mentioned in this analysis section – into consideration, it seems that both decisions overlap and influenced one another. Critically, a very strong link appears to exist between the Finnish society, their opinions, and the military leadership under Mannerheim.

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6. Conclusion This thesis has investigated whether normative and ideational explanations can help comprehend the escalatory dimensions and Mannerheim’s decision to de-escalate the Finnish offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk amid a total war. The research question was articulated as follows: How can normative explanations help explain why the Finnish forces discontinued their escalation upon reaching Leningrad and Murmansk, despite possessing the military prerequisites necessary to succeed? The empirical results of this thesis provide important insights into the Finnish people, their leadership, including Mannerheim, the social world at the time and how these factors influenced Finland’s leadership’s decision making. The Finnish army entered the war as a co-belligerent with Nazi Germany and enjoyed early success in their offensives. Yet, once Finnish forces arrived north of Leningrad, the decision was made to abruptly de-escalate. The Finnish troops would forgo active participation in the siege with Germany. Likewise, Finnish troops had the means to cut off the Murmansk Railway and isolate the strategically important port city of Murmansk, but Mannerheim again chose to de-escalate. As time went by, the public support in Finland for the ‘defensive’ war began to decline and the Finnish leadership was compelled to question if it was right to continue. Existing research has provided explanations for the de-escalation-conundrum by using rationalist explanations. However, a thorough analysis of a complex question such as a total war that involves many actors, does not seem to contain a clearly determinable answer to the research question when applying rational explanations alone. In accordance with interpretivism and constructivism, this thesis suggests that Mannerheim’s decision to de- escalate cannot be fully explained using current rational dimensions. Hence, this thesis suggests that Finland acted partly on normative and ideational reason and stresses the importance of identity, shared culture, and norms. The norms and shared culture of the Finns were present at the beginning of the century and were deeply rooted in Finnish society and helped shape Finland´s identity. As the Continuation War proceeded, however, new norms emerged in the collective understanding of the Finnish people which re-created their understanding of the war and Finland’s role in it. The re-creation of the Finnish peoples’ understanding of the war as it progressed proves one of the key principles of constructivism: identities are not set in stone and can change. The analysis discovered from an interpretivist- constructivist viewpoint, that the strong urge of Finnish society and its leadership to maintain Finland’s identity, further elaborates upon the traditional rational views of expansion and revanche and helps explain why Finland’s forces de-escalated during the Continuation War.

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Thus, the aim of this thesis was achieved, i.e., to give an alternative view to the “timeless wisdom” of rational explanations as providing the only explanations in many war studies, especially in the Continuation War.

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7. Discussion The purpose of this thesis is to contribute theoretical and empirical clarity in Mannerheim´s decision to de-escalate the Finnish offensives in the Continuation War by providing a normative alternative to current rational explanations. At the beginning of the war, much of the Finnish society possessed a desire for justice and wanted to reclaim the pre- Winter War borders. Additionally, most of the Finnish society was vociferous anti- Communists. Both factors contributed to the Finnish government’s decision to initially join forces with Nazi Germany. This thesis demonstrated that such beliefs and norms were enough to convince the Finnish population to support the Finnish leaderships’ decision to join the war as co-belligerent with Germany. It seems both factors were enough to override the ideological differences the Finns had with the Nazis – at least initially (Meinander, 2017, pp. 223–224) Accordingly, the results of the analysis demonstrate that Finland´s leaderships’ decision to join forces with Germany must be read in the context of the time that the decision was made. When the German forces enjoyed success in the war, the morale and confidence of the Finns correspondingly increased. However, once public opinion had shifted and the morale, values and the strive to maintain Finnish identity in the long run was threatened, the Finnish leadership found itself questioning if Nazi Germany could achieve victory in the war. This confirms, from a constructivist perspective and from the principle of “open to change”, that the Finnish leadership’s relationship to the war changed through social processes and from the declining public support from the home front. Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership were greatly influenced by the societal changes and Finland’s historical processes, their democratic values and the public opinion. Hence, as the war progressed, they became increasingly uninterested in waging a war with a co-belligerent that endorsed national socialism – an ideology most Finns did not support. Thus, Finland´s leadership and Mannerheim went against military rationality and de-escalated Finland’s offensives at Leningrad and Murmansk. This thesis demonstrates that their reasoning can be understood using normative explanations including identity, culture and norms – the perception of Finland’s, Nazi Germany’s, and the Soviet Union’s identities and relations changed during the first six months of the Continuation War. Central normative explanations to Mannerheim’s decisions at Leningrad and Murmansk where: (1) identity – wanting to avoid a Soviet retaliation, to secure the existence of the state and the importance of Mannerheim´s underlying norms concerning morals; (2) cultural beliefs – the Finnish society did not align with Nazism; and, (3) norms – concerning Finland´s leadership not waging a war alongside Nazi Germany and the morality behind fighting a war

41 that had no connection to Finnish identity. This thesis revealed the unique characteristics of Finland’s social world during the Continuation War. This thesis’ contribution was made via an interpretivist-constructivist analysis that complements the existing rational explanations. It accomplished this by highlighting the role norms play in a puzzle where dominant theories predicted further escalation by Finland’s military against the Red Army during the Continuation War.

While appreciating context in compliance with the interpretivist research paradigm in this thesis and acknowledging every war is unique, five suggestions for future research are recommended from questions that arose in this thesis’ findings and limitations. First, building upon the key findings of this thesis, future research should consider examining social and normative factors when attempting to understand complex phenomena such as war. Therefore, constructivism can provide an important lens for the interested researcher who desires to understand the world from perspectives beyond rationale and material factors. This might be achieved by using the methodology of interpretivism and the theory of constructivism in other contexts. Second, due to the research limitations regarding time restraints, accessibility to archives and scope of this thesis, secondary sources were primarily used throughout this thesis. Further research concerning Finland’s role in the Continuation War should include archival research and use primary sources such as political statements and directives to conduct a discourse analysis. Ideally, the primary sources should include Finnish sources to avoid anything, especially meaning, being lost in translation. Third, to improve the accuracy of the analysis, future research should investigate how to refer to a society without doing so in a unitary sense, since a society is not indivisible. Fourth, future research should question what might have happened if Mannerheim had decided to continue both offensives. This requires a counter-factual analysis to gauge the outcomes from an absence of Finnish military de-escalation. Lastly, the key concepts and research question of this thesis, such as escalation and de-escalation amid an ongoing conflict, should be applied to other complex scenarios like the case of the Syrian War. Similarly, future research should examine the importance of norms in decision making affected by public opinion.

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8. Bibliography Agius, C. (2019). Contemporary Security Studies (5th Ed.) In Collins. Oxford: Oxford University Press Ahlander, D. S. (2016). Gustaf Mannerheim. Historiska media. Ångström, J. (2015). Contemporary military theory: the dynamics of war (J. Widén (ed.)). Routledge. Brunila, K., Bruun, C.E., Ekman, P.O., Jernström, F., Kronlund, J., Nilsson, O., & Vourenmaa, A. (2000). Finland i krig D. 2, 1940-1944. Schildts förlags AB. Brunila, K. (1980). krig. Finlands Krig. von Clausewitz, C. (1993) On War, translation Michael Howard & Peter Paret (London: Every-man’s Library. Dear, I. C. B., & Foot, M. R. D. (Eds.). (1995). The Oxford companion to the Second World War. Oxford Univ. Press. Drakenlordh, R. (2002). Andra världskrigets aktörer. Historiska media. Ekberg, H. (Ed.). (2000). Ett land i kamp: veteranernas insats i krigen 1939-1945. Ett Land i Kamp: Veteranernas Insats i Krigen 1939-1945. Erfurth, W. (1950). Der finnische Krieg 1941-1944. Limes. Forczyk, R. (2009). Leningrad 1941-44: the epic siege (P. Dennis (Ed.)). Osprey. Freedman, L. (1987). 'On the Tiger´s Back: The Development of the Concept of Escalation', in The Logic of Nuclear Terror, ed. Kolkowitz. Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwil Inc. Glantz, D. M. (2001). Barbarossa: Hitler’s invasion of Russia 1941. Tempus. Holmström, A. (2014). Frontrapport: Finska vinterkriget 1939-1940 och invasionen av Norge 1940. Svenskt militärhistoriskt bibliotek. Howard, M. (1979). 'Tempera Belli: Can War Be Controlled?' in Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hurd, I. (2008). Constructivism. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0017 Järv, H. (2006). Oavgjort i två krig: Finland - Sovjetunionen 1939-1944 (J. Linder (Ed.)). Infomanager förlag Jan Linder. Jowett, P. S. (2006). Finland at war, 1939-45 (B. Snodgrass (Ed.)). Osprey. Krosby, H. P. (Hans P. (1968). Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1940-1941: the Petsamo dispute. Univ. of Wisconsin Press.

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https://doi.org/10.1162/002081899550959 Thurén, T. (2019). Källkritik (J. Werner (Ed.); Fjärde upp). Liber. Vehviläinen, O. (2002). Finland in the Second World War: between Germany and Russia. Palgrave. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. International Organization, 46(2), 391. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027764 Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics. Social Theory of International Politics. Wood, E. (2006). The Ethical Challenges for Field Research in Conflict Zones. Qualitative Sociology, 29(3): 373-86. Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: design and methods (4. ed.). SAGE. Zrn, M., & Checkel, J. T. (2005). Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State. International Organization, 59(4), 1045– 1079. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050356

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9. Appendices 9.1. Appendix A

Note: Swedish map of the ceded territories, as shown in red, of the Moscow Peace Treaty. The author has outlined the following locations for the reader’s convenience: the port city of Murmansk, Murmansk Railway, Petsamo, Rybachi Peninsula and Karelian Isthmus. Adapted from Front rapport Finska vinterkriget 1939-1940 och invasionen av Norge 1940 by A, Holmström, 2014, by Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Bibloteks Förlag 2014. Copyright 2014 by Svenskt Militärhistoriskt Biblioteks Förlag 2014. Reprinted with permission.

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9.2. Appendix B

Note: Legend – the military symbols for reading the maps in Appendices C, D and E. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 10), by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

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9.3. Appendix C

Note: Initial stages of Operation Barbarossa 1941. To view the map´s legend, see Appendix B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 38), by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

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9.4. Appendix D

Note: Initial attacks on the Karelian Isthmus 1941, map showing Leningrad. To view the map´s legend, see Appendix B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 94), by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

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9.5. Appendix E

Note. Operation Silver Fox in the north of Finland 1941. To view the map´s legend, see Appendix B. Adapted from Finland at War: The Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. In P. Munter, T. Wirtanen, & C. Birks (Eds.), Continuation and Lapland Wars 1941-45. (p. 54), by V. Nenye, 2016, Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing. Copyright 2016 Vesa Nenye, Peter Munter, Toni Wirtanen and Chris Birks. Reprinted with permission.

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