The Dynamics of Russian Foreign Policy in the 2014 Crimean Crisis

CEU eTD Collection

THE A SSESSING THE EMPIRIC

DYNAMICS Master Artsof Department ofInternational Relations and European Studies In partialIn fulfilment ofrequirements the for the degree of Supervisor: Professor Michael Merlingen THE

International Relations and European Studies Central European University

2014 OF Word Count: 15,342 Budapest, Hungary

RUSSIAN AL AND THEORETICAL C Salman Tahir

Submitted to CRIMEAN 2015 By

FOREIGN

CRISIS

OMPLEXITIES

POLICY

CEU eTD Collection explanations liberalism that anddisclosethe are variationscomplexities inherent and crisis Crimea in underinternational the theories and constructivism relations of neorealism, This paper willtherelative explore theoretical decision Putin’s and empiricalandCrimea. explain toannex nuances help thatcan complexities competingeconomic interests facedfrom after radicals Ukrainian Euromaidan andextremists West Eastern blame the Constructivists Europe. historyofho response to Western policiesEU ofexpansion, enlargement NATO and in democracy promotion foreignRussian policy Neorealists War. led tothe 2014Crimean arguewasthat this that a multifaceted. There amountrelations ofinternational isextensive litera the territory toRussia.

shaping mentality a War Cold Inearlyafter forces 2014,Russian annexeda and entered successful Crimea referendum, , as discussed by politicalexper intellectuals, The dynamics foreign ofRussian and are Crimea complex policy towards

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di Elmar Mustafayev, “Ukraine in Crisis,” in Mustafayev,“Ukraine Elmar di http://www.geopolitica.info/ukraine Thegrabbed developments Ukraineglobal in theheadlines of media the since ever - speaking ethnic minorities inUk minorities speaking ethnic

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owever, Yanukovych’s disappointed the decision raine, particularlyIn inthe Crimean region. , Feb 4, 2015, accessed May 22, 22, May 2015, accessed 4, Feb , 1

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Waltz, Waltz, in Realism,” “Structural ed., J.Mearsheimer, John Waltz, Theory,” Neorealist in War of Origins “The Waltz N. Kenneth - 28, accessed May 22, 2015, 22, May accessed 28, The OriginsThe War, of OriginsThe War, of 6

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subsections by literature: internationalrelations defensive

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Chris Dunnett, “A Reply to John Mearsheimer: Putin is Not a Realist,” a Not is Mearsheimer: Putin John to Reply “A Chris Dunnett, Waltz, - sum game because it presentssum game by because ofaffairs… it an“uneasy state exacerbated thefamiliar The OriginsThe War, of Jervis describes the the Jervis describes However, therea difference isthetwocategoriesofneorealists regarding between the Majority The OriginsThe War, of 8

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Oksana Antonenko and Bastian Giegerich, “Rebooting NATO “Rebooting Giegerich, Bastian and Antonenko Oksana Fault,” West’s Is the Crisis Ukraine the “Why J.Mearsheimer, John Affairs Foreign J.Mearsheimer, John - 21, accessed May 25, 2015, 25, May accessed 21, - west Russia continuesRussia toperceive the Alliancean anti as nlargement, and in recent years,in recentnlargement, and made standby clear not they it they have would that - s - fault

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Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’sWhy the theUkraine is Crisis Fault

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Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.” West’s the Crisis Is Ukraine the “Why Mearsheimer, integrate and asUkraine such countries in prosperity foster to program a Initiativeis Partnership The Eastern ‘Take’ to Trying By War a Provoke NATO Did Russia: Threat to West’s the of “The Myth J. Alexander Motyl, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new Thus, according of line realist argument, foreign policy towards totheMoscow’s

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Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovich, and John J. Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who Started Who Powers: J.Mearsheimer, “Faulty John and Sestanovich, Stephen McFaul, Michael Mearsheimer.” John to According Crisis “The Ukraine Motyl, observers, regard rational all that claims words, Motyl’s in realism, of The theory .1 The Role of Neoclassical Realism https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ea Foreign Affairs Foreign The application of neo It ofthe be can neorealist observed thatmuch argumen

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rfere in Eastern Ukraine. This gap inEasternrfere Ukraine.This explanation can inthe neorealist be 34

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CEU eTD Collection 2015, 22, May accessed 1, 2008), Press, University Princeton N.J.: Politics and (Princeton, History International 37 72. 36 2015, 35 elementstowards Ukraine, thoughoftheother tw and vulnerability among these, foreign Moscow’s regime bestexpansionist can explain policy neoclassical include These elite consensus,regime realism. social vulnerability cohesion and external threatsofto the theoreti these andeach factors conform Inenvironment. model, heprovides this factors three key response thatdetermineato state’s certain toadequately arenotable threat their adjusttoanystrategic changes dangerous in Schwellera provides modelof domestic structureélites’ and andpsychology refractdetermine politics responses”. international policies that are far more own goalsare andpreferences. Therefore, powerfulwillprosecute that more foreign states security; use to their powertodirect states attempt system instead, the international their towards in the following words:the “neoclassicalreject realists opportunities forThe upby summed thesetheory is actors. ofneoclassicalrealism Gideon Rose systems government thenatureand ofthe society that determines ofboundaries and canattributed tothe bepreferences political actors and ofthe as social wel many some toseemingly states which wouldrespond in variations challenges similar and these isa that it theoretically away degenerative effort toexplain for butRatburnargues anomalies neorealism”, is essential. “Neoclassical realism often is criticized by non per made Toexplore this more it expansionist.

Randall L. Schweller, L. Randall Policy,” Foreign of Theories and Realism “Neoclassical Rose, Gideon Name,” Any Other Rose by “A Rathbun, Brian

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctt7rkxt http://dx.doi.org/10.1 logical and necessary theadvancement extension for tool of neorealism.

Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints On the Balance of Power of Balance the On Constraints Threats: Political Unanswered

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CEU eTD Collection 44 43 42 domestic 2015, 26, May 2014, accessed 41 what thatthecurrent thelikelihood is berem leadershipwill government realism orregime vulnerabilityas inneoclassical canseen something be that “asks callof regime whatIn neoclassical vulnerability. realists general aconcept, very ofthe meaning interests inthe region. driven Ukraine Westernsecurity closer securitywhichisatoRussia’s direct tothe system threat flexibilityandeventually might threatenthe country’s terri ofpolitical mix has tensions engendereda combustible thatundermines strategic Russia’s cultural Putin interests.Russia, “Byforces in unleashing ofhypernationalism theandseparatism separate inUkraine itselffrom athat counterproductive is econom situation political, toits tendenciesgiven theability haslimited nationalist at this impetusto home and ofRussia to actually threatens the secur personal politicalmotives”. madethat “Putin impulsive decisionsRussia’s nationalinterest that subordinated own his to not pro isamyopicPutin and actionsautocrat” thathis Ukraine in canas best “pro bedescribed of Dunnett as Russia argues astate. from Chris realist being that“far a policy Vladimir maker, from society civil ofat compromising home,thesecurity evenexpense at came if it int the operation successfully inCrimea, Putin capability regainedany the tocrushdissent oropposition interests”.

Dunnett, “A Reply to John Mearsheimer.” John to Reply “A Dunnett, Powers.” “Faulty etal., McFaul, Mearsheimer.” John to Reply “A Dunnett, 13, March Post, TheWashington Behavior,” Russia’s Explains Audience Domestic Putin’s “How Boris Barkanov, - The role indeterminingforeign of an Putin expansionist can seen be case policy thus as a - Russian”. audience 41

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Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International “Constructing Wendt, Alexander rationalism opposes A claimthat mater opposes A claimthat identities and rather theiridentities interests, behavior”. just than Wendt’s conceptionWendt’s of modern The constructivist argument oftheUkrainenuances crisis some new of introduces the weaknesses of these

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539217

constructivism thatpresent whichconstructivism discursive in theconflict contexts be can ialism CHAPTER 2 MODERN CONSTRUCTIVISM

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20, no. 1 (Summer 71 1995): no. 20,

comprises of the these identity - 81,

CEU eTD Collection 52 160 2006), Press, University Oxford (London: 51 50 relativewould identifyLooking totheother. themselves at the historyofinteractions between many others, states inthesystem. thatrepetitions determines ofpast theidentity tothe interactions other ofthe state inrelation q state survivalhe andmaterial capabilities, issaying butrather thattheidentity ofthe state in international disproving not is system,theneorealism the importance Wendt about argument of the domestic actors st of the behavior onthe ideas,beliefsa as stateas ofnormsand depends sharedunderstandings well of affairs world fallsarealmand social within ofhuman where thatthis consciousness external the social reality, which isnon argueto addressthelensConstructivists ofconstructivism. that theidea through issues ofa br purposive actorsare byconstructed given these thannature”. rather shared ideas by primarily rather and bythattheidentities shared thanmaterialforces, ideas and interests of order in whichcase a involve process wouldalso it of construction also and face theytransformationsdue can tothe social practices and interactions, nature about that the idea of power politics uestion is essential interactsuestion is tohowit the social with world order and isthe of thatit politics

Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International “Constructing Wendt, in Constructivism,” “Social G.Sorensen, JacksonR. and Wendt, Alexander eakthrough paved theway withconstructivism many for internationalrelations scholars more

to adjust tothe changes.to adjust , but Wendt argued thateven, butWendt such ideas realist Inconstructivists way, this

would lookattheUkrainiancrisis terms in ofhowthe involved actors inthe crisis Social Theory of International Politics International Theory of Social

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CEU eTD Collection 2015, 26, May of Ukraine,” The Ministry in Situation the About 54 2015, 53 Ukraine. that ofRussia argues politics defines external towards its thedomestic aggression is thatit thereof, foreign inhowRussian Ukraine was policy towards The shaped. international crisis inUkraine. to thehelps Crimean explain case,manyconstructivism aspects behavior inthe ofMoscow’s well as s which ofshared we many have ages history”. geopoliticalgames western for then politicians, for individual afraternal is usit country, with MinistryRussian Foreign Affairs, of it changes throughentirecountry during went the our 20thcentury”. from generation togeneration, over time,any under despiteall circumstances, thedramatic inseparable of part Thisfirmconviction Russia. based is ontru Russia with FederationRussian theRepublic onthereunification of andthecity ofCrimea ofSevastopol behavioractions towards ortaken eachForexample, inan other. relations states haveindividual and betweenidentities inturn,their thetwo definedtheir a Russia

“Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the Statements by the Us Secretary of State State of Us the Secretary by Statements the Regarding Affairs Foreign of Ministry Russian the by “Statement 26, May accessed 2014, 18, Kremlin, March Federation,” Russian of the President “Address by Vladimir Putin, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

nd Ukraine as well asnd Ukraine andconstructivistsas Russia can thatthese theEU, well past argue hared experiences ofnorms andvalues

, Putin saidthat Crimea “inpeople’s minds, has and always hearts an been

http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/3CCDD7E24055793344257C92001E21F8

Firstly, we focus on theinfluenceFirstly, focus identi we on of

wasthat “if aterritory Ukraine stated isjust for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 3, 2014, accessed accessed 2014, 3, March Federation, Russian the of Foreign Affairs 54 23

that shape theidentity Thus, constructivismaccounts for thehistoryThus, as .

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CEU eTD Collection 56 2015, 2014 3, March Federation, Russian the Affairs of Foreign of Ministry The Ukraine,” in Situation the On Council Nato of the Statement the About Mass the Media by Put Question 55 constructed itself relative for toUkraine,evenand the theUS. EU behavior Ukraine. ofThis comprises ofthe towards social Russia order identity has Russia discrimination placed inUkrainemarginalization, theRussianethnics unfair indangerof treatment and two states felt inthatinterests Russia its werebecausewith the revolution threatened it being is underlined withthe strong connectiontha origin nation and thecivilization”. myth Russian of emphasized orthodox Russian thatUkraine wassacred a lay very“at place that of heart the the due towhichwhen tookastrategicUSSR, Putin electoral turntothe right elements Ukraine. in Ukraine Ministry ofForeignrespondedhasnointerest theinternal Affairs of in thattheKremlin politics intensification of militaryactivity ofinternational inCrimealaw, the violation indirect Russian the remarks the Councilon NATO of In inUkraine,minorities might define who themselves beUkrainianresponse but asRussians. to armed by forces region motivated totheCrimean thedesireRussian toprotect was 2014 revolution Ukraine overthrewgovernme in Yanukovych’s prompted Crimea a ofTherefore, tomake voteinfavor duringafter Russia referendum. the the 2.1

Boris Barkanov, “How Putin’s Domestic Audience Explains Russia’s Behavio Russia’s Explains Audience Domestic Putin’s “How Boris Barkanov, Informa the by “Comment TheRole of Identity in Russian http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/BCD6844687A85A1F44257C92004F35FE Primarily, wouldargue of notion a constructivists was identity Russian thatit the that , but they must protect the Russian citizens in Crimea in protectthecitizens Russian from, butthey must theextremistandradical . In. way, this determining see we structures ofinternational politics thesocial the 55

Ukraine anda have Russia long tion and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the the Affairs Regarding Foreign of Ministry Russian of the Press Department and tion

Foreign Policy 2 March, 2014 that Moscow is responsible for2 March, thatMoscow isresponsible the 2014 t historically exists between social thet historicallyexists orders the of 24

Moscow’s foreign Ukraine policytowards - standing history of co standing historyof , accessed May 26, 26, May accessed , nt, Moscow’s decisionnt, Moscow’s tosend r.”

, the nationalists and nationalists , the - existence under the - speaking CEU eTD Collection 59 58 2015, 57 identity crisis adifferent tells. tells story theone Putin than identitywhich inaccordanceato dealthreats.formed policy external could to with be which has had region, was it about somethingentirely. else policywas or minorities abouttheRussian theirin Ukraine not identities protecting towards waspetition signed people. by 140,000 ofUkraine citizens Russian toleave asks problem; owntosolvethis Putin Ukraineonits In to getfact, for Timothy Russia. protection Snyder bringsinwhichthe tolight apetition take living citizens Russian matters in the further, Ukrainet have denied that that theyare discrimination orindeedthey to subject that withthestate”. Russian identify course them dosee their identity “Some theSoviet UnionthancitizensofUkraine Russia. hadtodowith more of the issueof which people ofthese inUkraineactuallysince identifyRussians, themselves as mean thatall Russian was fighting revolution. inUkraine’s because the Ukrainian oppressionrather but bulletwhilehe of protestors, from toasniper’s due to indicate that was asingle it just off killed th Russianwhowas inUkraineand Ukraine fault isfraught with

Timothy Snyder, “Crimea”. Snyder, Timothy “Crimea”. Snyder, Timothy Vs.Reality,” Putin “Crimea: Snyder, Timothy

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblo However,

a negative impact of foreign a onthe shaping national policy orthe of definition P selves as Russians selves utin’s rhetoric that Crimea was an attempt toprotectutin’s rhetoricthatCrimeaan in wasattempt thecitizens Russian

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Post 25 ingare and oppressed threat. There isalso under -

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but this doesmean not but this hey any made claim at was too not This 58

To CEU eTD Collection 62 war Times (LA) Treaty.,” Nuclear Finalize ComesasNations Speech PowerHungry. U.S.of Being Accuses President 61 60 believingcollapse vindicated that hadbeencreated thattheSoviet notonlytheinstitutions to consi deserves,especiallyafter theRusso resentfulness reluctance the USA toacknowledge ofthe towards thestatustowhichitfeels it and emerged Russia as S what and instead an “uneven onEurope imposed peace” was disintegrated inwhichthe USSR in1991 conference major thattookplaceaftertheEurope wars most end ofthe that ofhas seen, one ever broaden toplunge“col a threatens NATO into Europe President 1994when Boris in the planofadministration heto saidthat theClinton N.Yeltsin wasexpansion key from one by theview ofthose stress asevident points, presented theRussian in 2014producedwe theinternational earthquake callc that theUkraine EuropeanEuropean imbued withpower system security internationalpolitics stress which points, Frontline from the European allianceview system.This issupportedby Richard book Sakwainhis with inconsistenciesasymmetries and and between Russia alienated theWest, such thatit Russia crisis Europe in c since the an internal andeventually ledtoone level ofthe serious faced that most internationalization 2.1.1 Iden

Sakwa, Kempster Norman Sakwa, Richard .

derpower, itself a(but) notprevent defeated did this after the allegedvictors War theCold The crisis Ukraine ofthosewhich in was at instancesit isone thetensionsthat existed in

Frontline Ukraine. Frontline , Dec 6, 1994, accessed May 23, 2015, 23, May accessed 1994, Dec6, , tity Crisis and Russian Foreign Policy

Ukraine

Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands Crisis the in Ukraine: Frontline

and Dean E. Murphy, “Broader NATO May Bring 'Cold Peace,' Yeltsin Warns Europe: Russian Russian Europe: Warns Yeltsin 'ColdPeace,' Bring May NATO “Broader Murphy, E. Dean and where hegenuinely writeswhere failure inclusive toestablishaand that“the equal

ulmination of the Cold War. The ofthe War. ulmination Cold post

akwa a‘continuer state’. calls - Georgian in2008andCrimea War in2014.“Russiadidnot

http://articles.latimes.com/1994

(London: I.B. Tauris, 2015). I.B. (London: d peace”. 62

Since has 1991,Russia shown 61 -

Cold War order War Cold wasfraught Therenot even was a peace - 12 - risis”. 06/news/mn

NATO

- Los Angeles Angeles Los 5629_1_cold - CEU eTD Collection (ed.) (2007). Orbis 65 2015, Relations International of Sociology 64 63 foreign the war, was policy thatprompted inthatPutin forge tryinga national distinct identity to Inadd factor when itself conflict, isfacing at intheRussia Crimean adomes an crisis identity constructivist argument identity thattheprotection inpost of Russian by of a Tsyganko including scholars number can be observed thatpost socialand foreign lookatthedomesticconstructionnational of policy Russian andidentity, it 2.1.1.1 Forging a National Identity out of Foreign Policy West. national identity ofRussia involving process) this involves image”. constr part of political leaders,intellectuals others, and whoengage countless inthe process of of collective onthestate through identity level the thediscourseonpart areassessed studying crisis nowbe thatwill examinedth straightforward as thefaced Union,Russia that.After Soviet disintegrationan of identity the way itselfinrelationinternational theWest in identified to thatRussia politics notas is wage name allabove theideology itha inwhose thestruggle but

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ucting, manipulating for negotiating, response oraffirming a a tothedemand… collective ition, acounterition, Ifbetweenrelation we fromWest andaconstructivi lookatthe Russia the

64 Frontline Ukraine. Frontline

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Cambridge Studies in International in Studies Cambridge

- argument canargument was be thatit made precisely crisisRussian identity in this

- Soviet Russia is victim to isvictim Russia anSoviet identityThishasbeen crisis. pointed out and Russia’s whether identity ismoreEurasia or inclinedtowards the

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See for example, K. Eggert, Eggert, K. example, See for Ru the of Assembly Federal Address the to “Annual Vladimir Putin, as aswell Piontkovsky Andrei Light, Margot Legvold, Robert Evans, B. Alfred of works from the This evident is

http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml Many have and engaged intellectuals politicians inwide

were of the opinion thatdefiningwereopinion of theof principles foreign Russian policy would

identity crisis it faces over the crisisfacesidentity foreign it over ideaa Russian of policy, butthe Izvestiya ractions ofpast and relations hostility and Russia theWest between

, 7 Aug. 1992. Aug. 7 , r theand rolea position of globalat level. thecountry Many 66

The breakup the Unionwasgeopolitical Soviet a of - citizens andcitizens compat

in April 2005, Putin said:“thein April2005,Putin collapse Soviet of the 28

ssian Federation,” Kremlin, April 25, 2005, 25, April Kremlin, Federation,” ssian riots found themselves outside outside riots foundthemselves rative ofprotectingrative Russian - ranging debates about Russia’s ranging Russia’s about debates Annual Addresstot Annual

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he s CEU eTD Collection 72 2015, 71 2015, Discourse,” 70 2015, St 69 Evenup suspendingconstitution. though the theprocessa onanational ofreaching consensus economic in 1993, such led thatPresiden and toapolitical political crisis matters agreementnew post regarding the Nationalists. groups:to threeLiberal the thePragmatic Westernists, Fundamentalist Nationalists and the agendasgroups.In have ofthese scholars of inRussia, studies discourse identity broken down it accordance totheir ideologytrace i and this then collective identity isconcerned, the divide political Russian intellectuals societygroups in into enoughare changes to flexible and toadjust transformations. have certain characteristicslike culturalthatmay attributesseemingly stable, be evolution such andconstruction, thatidentity as isseen anever approach const of consideredas anessential variableof makingforeign inthe process policies. foreign policy might imbued withidentity be take account into co the alleged between linkage foreignvarious thatexists theidentityand analysis policythat present and a withthe channelexternal of engagement environment, AllaKassianova says thatthe conceptual foundation.

udies and Transition Politics Transition and udies Details on these groups can be found found be can groups Details these on Castells, Manuel Ev West? the to Open Still “Russia: Alla Kassianova, Ideology,” of End the and Policy Russian Foreign Identity: an of Search “In Light, Margot http://www.myilibrary.com?id=246108 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0966813012007 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523270300660017 A

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Robert Legvold, “Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy,” Foreign Unformed “Russia's Legvold, Robert Russia's Identity,” and Legacy “Putin's Evans, Russia's Identity,” and Legacy “Putin's AlfredEvans, B.

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51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 516, accessed May 23, May 516,accessed 1997): 4 (Autumn no. 51, - 97 interested groups existing within agroups within state existing as interested well as inter hip of the states to the domestic and transnational social context in which in they tothe domesticare andsocialhip ofthe states transnational context

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International International 95

Liberals, ket CEU eTD Collection 100 fride.org/descarga/23.06.2014_WorldCommerceReview_OO.pdf. 99 2015, Politics 98 states, theEU asaofwhich result policy EasternUkraine. towards main factors actions Russian Crimea in defining thatprompted and foreign Russian are still Ukraine intoafuelexporter”. of therichestgasunconventional dependentcan) ofimport sources (and inEurope transform separatistsRussian a the fact Ukraine that thein region fightconducted wherebetween ofthe pro most being is becausegas evident toremainthe key ofandThisis toUkraine itwanted from provider theEU. signingbetweenagreement ofanand the Ukraine supplier ofthishugeenergyand Moscow Ukrainethestepstowards level perceived into the territory, makes thelargest country it for transit hydrocarbons intoEurope”. transportation recently network,comprising until 4,600km ofpipelines runn involving inthe Russia agreement isakey of energy process.theEU Ukraine partner inthat“its economic these became when competing interests even EUtoacquire prominent attempted more further competing over EuropeanUkraineeconomic Unionandat ofthe Russia interests an level and benefitsall parties forinvolved”. liberal “mutualand means dependence,notnecessarily system it which brings symmetric,

Olesia Ogryzko, “The E “The OlesiaOgryzko, eds., Moravcsik, Andrew and Helen Milner V.

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Maxime H.A. Larivé “Crimea or the Future of the Liberal World Order,” World Liberal the of Future the or “Crimea Larivé Maxime H.A. - order/ mic losses and gains betweenmic losses and twostatesconflict during dependent make a state can the . n the list and severity of the sanctions, but theambassadors andseverityofthebut n thelist sanctions, and Political at the

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and experts tofind experts and CEU eTD Collection Larivé,LiberalFuture H.A. the orthe “Crimea Maxime of Foreign Order.” World Policy OpenKassianova, tothe West?“Russia: Still Identity Alla oftheEvolution State inthe Foreign and R., G.Sorensen.Jackson, In “Social Constructivism.” I.S.Ivanov, “TheNew LeeGoodman, LegacyEvans, Identity.”“Putin's AlfredB.and Russia's Dunnett Dovere, Edward Dempsey, Judy.Prepared “IsWest Move inUkraine?” Next the Putin’s for April 9,2014. ManuelCastells, Barkanov,Boris. Domestic Putin’s “How BastianAntonenko, Oksana,and Gieg world 2015. Association. MarchAccessed M 16,2014. Accesse Policy and Security Discourse.” Rela 2015. 7 war_n_5032963.html 2015. MarchPost. 26,2014.Accessed 27, May 2008): 899 mearsheimer Center 2015. 8,2013.AccessedPolitico. June May vladimir Accessed May 23,2015. 23, 2015 domestic 2015. Washington13, 2014.Accessed March26, Post. May 2015. no. 2(May 2009): 13 , Chris. “A Reply to John Mearsheimer: “A NotaRealist.”, Chris. Replyis toJohn Putin - 13. Accessed May 23, tions andApproaches tions https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v024/24.3ivanov.pdf - http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/03/16/crimea http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2014/03/26/harper http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/barack http://w http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860751 order/ . September 11, 2014. Accessed. September 11, May2014. 22,2015. - d May 23,2015. “HarperAnne. Trapped toGermany: Mentality.” Putin War inCold Huffington - . - - putin http://www.myilibrary.com?id=246108 Isaac. Obama “President Http//www.politico.com/story/2013/08/barack audience The PowerofIdentity - 912. Accessed May912. Accessed 23,2015. . -

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