CONSTRUCTIVISM AS a BASIS for UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: the CASE of AL QAEDA by DAVID SCHILD 200504766 Dissertation

CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE CASE OF AL QAEDA

by DAVID SCHILD 200504766

Dissertation submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS in POLITICS

in the FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

at the UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG

SUPERVISOR: DR. C.A. GEORGHIOU CO-SUPERVISOR: PROF. D.J. GELDENHUYS

MAY 2011 ii

ABSTRACT

The essential nature of global politics has changed profoundly over the course of the past twenty years, becoming significantly more complex. The international system has evolved in such a way as to often render traditional, materially-determined theoretical approaches to International Relations ill-equipped to compellingly account for action. Increasingly, ideational concerns play a vital role as mobilising influences, causing actors to behave in an unprecedented manner. One of the phenomena most emblematic of this trend towards increased complexity and the rise of the power of ideas is that of contemporary transnational terrorism. Ideologically-motivated and often seemingly irrational, new terrorism confounds mainstream theoretical understandings of anticipated action and reaction and constitutes a particularly salient area of study, as security scholars grapple with effective means of counteraction.

This exploratory study attempts to pave the way towards an appropriate understanding of contemporary transnational terrorism by utilising a theoretical perspective specifically tailored towards embracing the complexities of global political reality and championing the critical importance of ideational determinants of action, viz. constructivism. Constructivism is utilised as a basis to understand the intangible ideational mechanics informing the activities of the most significant contemporary transnational terrorist group, Al Qaeda, thereby simultaneously highlighting the value and appropriateness of constructivist enquiry compared to its outmoded theoretical peers and providing insight into more effective future counter- terrorist policy.

The primary prescriptive finding of the investigation is that the key to combating Al Qaeda and, indeed, contemporary transnational terrorist groups in general, involves, through some intervention, heightening the perceived discordance between the espoused group norms which attract membership and actual group action. Such discordance has been seen in practice – in the case of Al Qaeda in Iraq – to cripple the efficacy and power of terrorist group functioning. Such an approach requires a comprehensive understanding of a terrorist organisation's worldview, coupled with a campaign of carefully directed public diplomacy tactics. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to my supervisors, Dr. Costa Georghiou and Prof. Deon Geldenhuys, for their boundless wisdom, encouragement and patience. Similarly, I am forever indebted to my girlfriend, Nicole, and my long-suffering parents, Barbara and Steve, for their tireless love and support. A special thank you also to Suzanne and Victoria Graham for being my selfless mentors and academic lifeguards over the past six years.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

Glossary ix

Chapter 1: Introduction and research methodology 1 Introduction 1 1. Objective of study 2 2. Assumptions 2 3. Conceptualisation 3 4. Literature review 4 5. Research Design 6 6. Methodology 6 7. Organisation of investigation 8

Chapter 2: An orientation of constructivism within IR 10 Introduction 10 1. Constructivism within the context of the International Relations discipline 11 1.1. The historical context 12 1.2. Mainstream IR theory: neo-realism, neo-liberalism and structuralism 13 1.2.1. Neo-realism 14 1.2.2. Neo-liberalism 16 1.2.3. Structuralism 18 1.2.4. The "neo-neo" debate and prevailing positivism in IR 19 1.3. Post-positivist fringe 22 1.3.1. Critical theory 23 1.3.2. Normative theory 24 1.3.3. Post-modernism 25 1.3.4. Feminism 27 1.3.5. The key post-positivist objection 28 1.4. Constructivism as a third way 29 1.4.1. Key contrasts to mainstream theory 29 1.4.2. Key contrast to post-positivism 31 1.5. A disciplinary topography 32 v

2. The philosophy of science and the basis of constructivist thought 33 3. Constructivism within International Relations 35 3.1. Constructivist factions 36 3.1.1. Modern and post-modern constructivism 36 3.1.2. Systemic constructivism and holistic constructivism 39 3.2. The constructivist thesis 39 3.2.1. Norms and ideas 40 3.2.2. Identities, interests and action 40 3.2.3. The relationship between agents and structures 42 4. Criticisms of the constructivist approach 43 4.1. Constructivism as utopianism 44 4.2. Internally contradictory logic 44 4.3. Insufficient ideational operationalisation 45 5. A Caveat Regarding Conventional Theory and the Role of Ideas 46 5.1. Classical Realism 47 5.2. International Society 47 Conclusion 48

Chapter 3: The emergence of new transnational terror 51 Introduction 51 1. Clarifying the notion of "ideological" terrorism 52 2. Terrorist typologies and the unique nature of new ideological terrorism 54 2.1. Rapoport's four waves of modern terror 54 2.1.1. The anarchist wave 55 2.1.2. The anti-colonial wave 56 2.1.3. The New Left wave 58 2.1.4. The religious wave 60 2.2. Whittaker's motivation typology 62 2.2.1. Rational motivation 63 2.2.2. Psychological motivation 63 2.2.3. Cultural motivation 64 2.3. Cronin's motivation typology 65 2.3.1. Leftist terrorists 66 2.3.2. Rightist terrorists 66 vi

2.3.3. Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists 67 2.3.4. "Sacred" or religious terrorists 67 3. Characteristics of contemporary ideological terrorism 69 3.1. Non-utilitarianism 69 3.2. The role of ideologues 70 3.3. Lack of a discretely identifiable territorial base 71 3.4. Systemic revolution 72 3.5. Immunity to traditional methods of counteraction 72 3.6. Group numbers and sophistication 73 3.7. Attack frequency and lethality 75 3.8. Unquestionable righteousness 75 3.9. Dehumanisation of targets 76 3.10. Compounding influence of certain cultural and social factors 76 Conclusion 77

Chapter 4: The case of Al Qaeda - group norms 79 Introduction 79 1. Al Qaeda as an ideal case study 80 1.1. Background 80 1.1.1. History and context 80 1.1.2. Al Qaeda today 82 1.2. Characteristics of new transnational terrorism exhibited by Al Qaeda 83 1.2.1. Non-utilitarianism 83 1.2.2. The role of ideologues 84 1.2.3. Lack of a discretely identifiable territorial base 85 1.2.4. Systemic revolution 85 1.2.5. Immunity to traditional methods of counteraction 86 1.2.6. Group sophistication 87 1.2.7. Attack frequency and lethality 88 1.2.8. Unquestionable righteousness 89 1.2.9. Dehumanisation of targets 89 1.2.10. Compounding influence of certain cultural and social factors 90 2. Measuring norms 91 2.1. Norm strength 91 vii

2.2. Legro's framework 92 2.3. The exclusion of ideas, identities and interests from discussion 93 3. Al Qaeda's prominent group norms 93 3.1. Anti-Westernism 94 3.1.1. Norm specificity and durability 94 3.1.2. Norm concordance 97 3.2. Militant Islamic fundamentalism 100 3.2.1. Norm specificity 100 3.2.2. Norm durability 101 3.2.3. Norm concordance 102 3.3. The glorification of martyrdom 103 3.3.1. Norm specificity and durability 103 3.3.2. Norm concordance 105 3.4. The necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate 106 3.4.1. Norm specificity and durability 106 3.4.2. Norm concordance 108 Conclusion 108

Chapter 5: The case of Al Qaeda – a constructivist analysis 110 Introduction 110 1. Causation, constitution and constructivism 111 2. Process-tracing 112 2.1. The method 112 2.1.1. Forms of process-tracing 113 2.2. The appropriateness of process-tracing 115 2.3. Adapting process-tracing for the purposes of this study 116 3. Tracing the evolution of Al Qaeda between 2001 and the present day 119 3.1. The 11 September 2001 attacks upon the US 120 3.1.1. Background 120 3.1.2. The enabling context 121 3.1.3. The effect of the context on group norms 123 3.1.4. The manner in which group norms directed consequent action 123 3.1.5. The effect of action upon the enabling context 124 3.1.6. The inability of mainstream theory to account for the attacks 125 viii

3.2. The US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq 126 3.2.1. The effect of the context on group norms 126 3.2.2. The manner in which group norms directed consequent action 126 3.2.3. The effect of action upon the enabling context 127 3.3. The proliferation of Al Qaeda cells and notable terrorist attacks 128 3.3.1. Background 128 3.3.2. The effect of the context on group norms 130 3.3.3. The manner in which group norms have directed consequent action 130 3.4. Al Qaeda in Iraq 131 3.4.1. Background 131 3.4.2. The enabling context 132 3.4.3. The effect of the initial context on group norms 133 3.4.4. The manner in which group norms have directed consequent action 134 3.4.5. The effect of the current context on group norms 134 Conclusion 135

Chapter 6: Conclusion 137 Recommendations for future counter-terrorist policy 139

Bibliography 144

GLOSSARY

Caliphate – An Islamic system of government first established by Muhammad in the 7th century and, following his death, further developed by his disciples in the Rashidun Caliphate on the Arabian Peninsula. The system attempts to establish a basis for a unified Islamic polity. The term is also used to describe a state which implements such a system. din wa dawla – The notion that Islam is at the same time both religious and political and should thus shape individuals' actions in all spheres of activity. fatwa – A decree of Islamic law. jihad – An Islamic religious duty conceptualised as some form of religious struggle; in popular usage, most commonly referring to a physical struggle in the form of holy war. hawala – An ancient clan-based informal money transfer system, consisting of associated brokers who transfer money across the Middle East and Asia. imam – An Islamic spiritual or community leader. mujahideen – A group of Islamic fighters or soldiers pursuing a particular jihad. mushrik – A polytheist; considered heretical in Islamic theology.

Ummah – The combined Islamic religious community or Islamic nation.

Chapter 1: Introduction and research methodology

Introduction

Contemporary transnational terrorism and constructivist theory are two subjects of study at opposite ends of the disciplinary spectrum which have garnered a significant amount of attention over the past decade in International Relations (IR). While, in the case of contemporary terrorism, this is due in part to popular interest in the subject, prolonged academic engagement with the matter has been fuelled by the inability of conventional theory to adequately account for terrorist activity. New transnational terrorist organisations have repeatedly exhibited behaviours wholly unanticipated by traditional theory, making effective counteraction problematic. This sort of phenomenon is emblematic of a broader trend in global politics over the past two decades as, increasingly, complex issues such as the erosion of state sovereignty, the blurring of international and domestic concerns and the rise of non-territorially bound nationalism have emerged, with mainstream, positivist, materially-determined theory unable to provide a compelling explanation for their emergence. This trend has been a significant factor in the recent increased focus upon the utility of constructivist theory in enquiry. Highlighting the important role of non-material, ideational factors in determining action in international relations, constructivism is able to provide far more nuanced accounts of emergent international phenomena than its often overly-parsimonious mainstream theoretical rivals.

With contemporary transnational terrorist groups exhibiting norm-driven, often seemingly irrational behaviour, frequently devoid of material benefit, and constructivism wholly preoccupied with the nature of the influence of normative dimensions in international activity, it seems self-evident that they should be wed in enquiry. Surprisingly, however, despite their mutual compatibility – and, indeed, despite their respective popularity in the literature – constructivism has seldom been utilised in any significant capacity by security scholars in attempting to understand new terrorist group functioning.

1. Objective of study

Contemporary transnational terrorism is a particularly salient area of enquiry with very real policy implications, with myriad states' citizenries being at risk as potential attack victims. A profound understanding of the issue is required, however, before appropriate and effective policy can be formulated in response to new terrorist organisations' activities. Constructivism offers an ideal framework for achieving exactly such an understanding of contemporary terrorist activity, but has been largely marginalised in the relevant discourse, often due to a fundamental misapprehension of its contents and utility. Security scholars, as Cronin (2003:30) notes, often tend towards detrimental conservatism, attempting to understand new transnational terrorism in familiar, traditional theoretical terms, despite the inappropriateness of traditional theory, thereby undermining the efficacy of counter-terrorist initiatives.

This study aims to address each of these issues. By applying constructivist theory to the specific case of Al Qaeda (the largest and most prominent contemporary transnational terrorist organisation) this investigation seeks to provide a detailed understanding of the manner in which non-material factors influence terrorist action. As corollaries, the study will also both illustrate the utility of constructivism compared to rival theories in understanding complex non-materially determined phenomena and, where appropriate, extract broad policy prescriptions for effectively counteracting new transnational terrorism in the future. By achieving a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanics informing terrorist activity, more appropriate counter-measures can begin to be investigated. It will be shown that the key to effective future counter-terrorist policy lies within highlighting the disparity between the desirability of terrorist group ideals and practices.

2. Assumptions

The only significant assumption made by this investigation is that the elimination of contemporary transnational terrorism is something which the majority of governments regard as objectively desirable. This assumption does not place any value-judgement on the phenomenon itself – whether transnational terrorism is

3 fundamentally good or bad – but asserts that the concomitant violence and death is regarded as inherently undesirable by most citizenries.

3. Conceptualisation

As this investigation makes repeated reference to the same key concepts, often under various terms considered synonymous, it is imperative that a clear understanding of usage is established. The usage of the concepts of international relations, positivist theory, new transnational terrorism and constructivist theory will each be clarified in turn.

 In this paper, "international relations", in lower-case, is used interchangeably with the terms "global politics", "international politics" and "world politics" to refer to the various activities of and interactions between relevant actors which fall under the investigative jurisdiction of the discipline of International Relations. The use of “international” here, thus, is in no way indicative of a state-centric conception of global affairs.

 Similarly, the terms "positivist theories", "mainstream theories" and "traditional theories" are conflated in discussion. Each is used to refer to the materially- determined theories most popular in IR: neo-realism, neo-liberalism and, to a lesser extent, structuralism. Additionally, the term "conventional theories" is used specifically in this paper to refer to classical realism, classical liberalism and the English School in addition to neo-realism, neo-liberalism and structuralism; theories that, while not all purely positivist, all enjoy widespread disciplinary acceptance.

 The most crucial point to note regarding the use of the notion of new transnational terrorism is how it differs from traditional terrorism. While terrorism in general can be defined simply as "violence or the threat of violence undertaken to create alarm and fear" (Kegley, 2003:1), the differentiation between traditional and new transnational terrorism is largely one of motive rather than action. What was previously a powerful 4

psychological tool of the rational – those with a utilitarian view of terrorist activity – to forward radical agendas (Rapoport, 2001:419-421), is now "conducted by ideological terrorists with grandiose revolutionary ambitions acting transnationally to transform the international status quo" (Kegley, 2003:2). Ideology here refers not merely to normative commitments of state, but rather group normative commitments which transcend the political sphere alone, usually inspired by some religious orientation or cultural context; a group's worldview. The terms "contemporary transnational terrorism", "new terrorism", "new transnational terrorism", “contemporary ideological terrorism” and "new ideological terrorism" will be used interchangeably over the course of the proceeding discussion.

 Constructivist theory, at the most rudimentary level, is concerned with the role of collective human consciousness – the role of ideas – in international relations activity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:391). It seeks to understand international activity in terms of the interaction of actors and intangible ideational structures (group norms in particular) in order to establish a suitably complex portrait of global political functioning, shying away from the excessively parsimonious behaviouralist tendencies of traditional, mainstream theory. It is worth noting that it is referred to variously in the literature as both "social constructivism" and "constructivism".

4. Literature review

A survey of the relevant literature indicates that this study necessarily requires the use of a significant array of sources, focusing on various, equally pertinent issue- areas and drawing from a number of sub-disciplines and cross-disciplines. The primary issue-areas in the literature upon which this paper builds are: constructivist theory, constructivist methodology and contemporary transnational terrorism.

Contemporary constructivist thought in IR is influenced by a rather small number of seminal texts – most notably those of Wendt (1987, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1999), Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) – each of which provides a somewhat unrefined and disjointed account of the perspective. That being said, there is a wealth of 5 refined and coherent retrospective accounts of the tradition's emergence, development and division by authors such as Price and Reus-Smit (1998), Hopf (1998) Risse and Sikkink (1999), Reus-Smit (2001), Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), Barkin (2003) and Phillips (2007). With the benefit of hindsight, these texts provide more straightforward understandings of the utility and limitations of constructivism in enquiry. This overview of constructivism in IR is also supplemented by a broader understanding of the emergence of constructivism in the philosophy of science, provided by authors such as Kukla (2000).

Because constructivism has very specific methodological requirements yet lacks a clearly favoured method of enquiry, much constructivist-oriented literature is preoccupied with examining appropriate avenues towards systematic investigation. Certain authors, such as Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), Smith (2001) and Farrell (2002), place significant emphasis on the meta-theoretical peculiarities of constructivism and their methodological implications, while others strive to champion their own proposed methodology (George & Bennett, 2005; Pouliot, 2007; Lupovici, 2009). The problem with all the texts on the matter of constructivist methodology is that, while there is consensus on what constructivist investigation requires, there is little consensus regarding the best way to fulfil such requirements. As it stands, the prospective constructivist researcher must adapt existing methodological frameworks to the specific needs of a given study.

As contemporary transnational terrorism is both a complex and popular issue-area, there are myriad texts, focusing on all facets of the phenomenon from various disciplinary orientations. Relevant source texts range from terrorist typologies (Rapoport, 2001, 2002, 2004; Whittaker, 2003; Cronin, 2003) to multi-disciplinary article collections on political, social and psychological factors motivating new terrorist action (Bjørgo, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Pedahzur, 2005), to counter- terrorism texts by security scholars (O'Neil, 2003; Simon, 2003; Aldis & Herd, 2007), to broader overviews of contemporary terrorism in general (Pettiford & Harding, 2003; Mahan & Griset, 2003). While there is individual focus upon achieving a better understanding of new terrorist motivation and upon potential avenues towards effectively combating new terrorist action, seldom are these pursuits coherently and meaningfully coupled in a single text, as this paper, in part, aims to achieve. 6

5. Research Design

In exploring a novel confluence of areas of International Relations study, a novel research design is required by this study. The application of constructivist enquiry to new transnational terrorism, as shall be expanded upon in the next section, requires the use of a case study for appropriate analysis. However, because the ultimate aim of this paper is to illustrate the importance of understanding the role of non-material factors in determining terrorist action, it first need be established that constructivism is indeed the most appropriate analytical lens through which to pursue such investigation. Accordingly, the initial portion of this paper will involve a critical literature study of both constructivism and new transnational terrorism, so as to highlight their compatibility prior to delving into the case study of Al Qaeda. The critical literature study will pay particular attention to the meta-theoretical peculiarities of constructivism in addition to its contents, examining the unique utility of the approach in accounting for the nuances of contemporary transnational terror.

6. Methodology

As mentioned, although there is no favoured constructivist method, constructivist theory's meta-theoretical peculiarities mean that any chosen method does need to fulfil certain requirements. As Phillips (2007:62-63) notes, and as will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, constructivism differs fundamentally from traditional positivist theories of IR with regards to ontology and epistemology. Whereas positivist theories are concerned with unearthing universal "transhistorically or transculturally valid claims" (Phillips, 2007:63) based on directly observable, material fact, constructivism asserts that such universal laws are impossible and such rigid empiricism is restrictive, and thus champions the pursuit of contingent, issue-specific, "small t" truth claims (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394) based on indirectly observable, social fact. Constructivists, thus, strive towards establishing detailed constitutive accounts of specific areas of study, examining "…how norms function in temporal and spatial settings to make some actions possible...and others impossible" (Farrell, 2002:57) in the case of a specific area of enquiry. These specific demands of appropriate constructivist investigation each assist in determining a suitable method of enquiry.

Most significantly, constructivism is best suited to case study examination. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, constructivism's dismissal of universal anticipatory laws means that any generalisations derived from enquiry need be tethered to a clearly defined issue-area; the more specific the issue-area, the greater the opportunity for detailed conclusions with real-world policy value (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394). Secondly, as Pouliot (2007:364) suggests, "[i]nductive analysis – a research strategy that moves from the local to the general – is the necessary starting point for any constructivist [e]nquiry". This is because constructivism is concerned with making sense of international relations through the lens of situated realities intersubjectively constructed through social fact, rather than making sense of these skewed realities through some pre-defined theoretical conception of international relations. Deriving useful conclusions from constructivist analysis, thus, requires attention to a narrowly defined case, establishing truths specific to that case in order to achieve a greater understanding of a broader issue-area. This is why, for the purposes of this study, the specific case of Al Qaeda has been selected for analysis in order to glean valuable insight into the broader issue-area of contemporary terrorism.

The decision to pursue case study analysis, in turn, assists in the selection of an appropriate methodological framework to guide constructivist enquiry. While numerous such frameworks exist, as Tansey (2007:765) notes, the process-tracing method is increasingly recognised as the most effective "within-case" alternative. Process-tracing has been successfully utilised in many previous constructivist studies (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394; Pouliot, 2007:373; Lupovici, 2009:195). The method involves the establishment of a detailed narrative of causation (or, as will be elaborated on in Chapter 5, constitution) so as to explain how a chain of events collude to produce some observed outcome. It is process-tracing, thus, that will be utilised to guide constructivist analysis of Al Qaeda, directing constructivist assertions regarding the agent-structure relationship (as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 5) in such a way as to develop a compelling narrative understanding of the organisation's activities.

Before process-tracing is applied to deciphering Al Qaeda's activities, however, group norms that will necessarily be involved in analysis need to be proven to be of significance (Farrell, 2002:61). This avoids circular argumentation (Legro, 1997:33) 8 where only selected norms are conveniently matched up to observed behaviours in such a way as to bolster a researcher's argument, rather than reflect any observed truth. Legro (1995:15-16; 1997:34-35) provides a useful template for the objective measurement of norm strength that scrutinises evidence of a norm's specificity, durability and concordance – that is, how clearly a norm is articulated, how long it has been upheld and how stringently it has been observed. Utilising Legro's criteria then, norm strength will be clearly operationalised and used as a basis to firmly establish the objective existence of prominent Al Qaeda group norms prior to delving into process-tracing, where they will be utilised in constructivist analysis.

In summation, then, this study will endeavour to establish a detailed constitutive constructivist analysis of the ideational mechanisms informing Al Qaeda's functioning by first objectively establishing prominent Al Qaeda group norms, and then utilising the process-tracing method to guide constructivist analysis of these norms in terms of the agent-structure relationship posited by the theory.

7. Organisation of investigation

Chapter 1 introduced the topic of study, specified the objective of the investigation with reference to the research problem and the significance of the research, and accounted for the selected method of enquiry.

Chapter 2 will concern itself with orienting constructivism within IR theory, so as to stress its unique disciplinary position and utility, and with providing a detailed overview of the constructivist perspective and its tenets. Constructivism will be contrasted with prominent mainstream theories such as neo-realism and neo- liberalism, as well as prominent fringe theories such as post-modernism and critical theory, so as to emphasise its unique position as a middle-ground between IR's two opposing theoretical poles of positivism and post-positivism. Thereafter, the various opposing schools within constructivist theory will be discussed and the central assertions of the paradigm expanded upon.

Chapter 3 will shift focus from constructivism to new ideological terrorism. Rapoport's "four wave" typology and Whittaker's and Cronin's respective motivation- 9 differentiated typologies will be utilised so as to compare new terrorism to previous, conventional terrorist movements, drawing attention to contemporary terrorism's peculiar nature. Thereafter notable characteristics of new terrorism referenced throughout the relevant literature will be synthesised into a clear list of definitive traits, so as to provide a clear portrait of the phenomenon.

Having provided a detailed overview of both constructivism and contemporary transnational terrorism, Chapter 4 will begin with the central task of the study – applying constructivist thought to the examination of Al Qaeda. The chapter will begin with an overview of Al Qaeda and provide the necessary justification of the organisation's selection as a case study. Thereafter, Legro's criteria for norm strength will be utilised to objectively extract Al Qaeda's primary group norms.

These group norms will be utilised in analysis in Chapter 5, as the process-tracing method is used to guide constructivist explanations of Al Qaeda activity. Chapter 5 will involve elaborating upon the process-tracing method and its necessary modifications for this study, and then utilising the method to construct a detailed narrative of the role of ideational factors (including previously established norms) in determining Al Qaeda activities over the past decade.

Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude the investigation by reiterating key issues dealt with in the preceding discussion and providing a summary of the central line of argumentation. Moreover, the chapter will build on the findings of the investigation, extracting broad prescriptions for future, more effective counter-terrorism policy.

Chapter 2: An orientation of constructivism within IR

Introduction

Constructivism, as alluded to earlier, is an approach to IR which, in the broadest terms, is concerned with the notion of socially-constructed, unobservable fact, and, in particular, the role played by such social fact in international political activity (Brown, 2005:49). Constructivism rejects the notion that all international political activity can be accounted for exclusively by a narrow set of material determinants (for example, military and economic capabilities) as posited by traditional approaches to IR. Instead, it contends that each facet of international politics can be explained by ideational factors, including the importance mutually attached to such traditional material determinants. Ideational factors are those intersubjectively established norms associated with a particular group (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:391; Phillips, 2007:62). It is these ideational factors, constructivists assert, that establish the identities and interests of actors involved in international relations activity and, thus, consequently determine the nature of the activity itself (Chandler, 2004:29; Wendt, 1995:71-72).

In order to fully appreciate the significance and uniqueness of the constructivist approach, as well as its inherent utility and value in analysing contemporary transnational terrorism, it is necessary to both place it within a disciplinary context and to fully expand upon its core tenets. This chapter will, thus, concern itself with as much and attempt to orient the constructivist school within the IR discipline, as well as comprehensively discuss the content of the approach itself, with a view to confirming its appropriateness for use in this study and clarifying key constructivist concepts for subsequent utilisation.

The chapter will begin with a detailed exposition of the emergence of constructivism within IR, including a discussion regarding the key tenets of rival approaches in order to clearly orient constructivist theory by way of contrast. Thereafter, the chapter will concern itself with elaborating upon constructivist theory itself, investigating its essential, meta-disciplinary nature, its guise within IR, as well as its various intellectual factions. Finally, the chapter will conclude with both a necessary critique 11 of constructivism to highlight its shortcomings and a synopsis of its utility with regards to this study.

1. Constructivism within the context of the International Relations discipline

The most essential trait of international political activity is its non-static nature (Phillips, 2007:60). Despite its comparative youth as an academic tradition, myriad theoretical ebbs and flows within the IR discipline reflect this elementary characteristic of global politics. Theories have repeatedly proclaimed to have unearthed essential, universal truths regarding global political interaction and functioning, only for the structure and content of the international system upon which they were predicated to suddenly, due to some watershed event, mutate in character, thereby crippling their broad-spectrum analytical utility (Wæver, 2007:289; Barber, 1999:33-35). This phenomenon is perhaps most famously encapsulated in the disciplinary fallout following the unprecedented conclusion of the Cold War, where the bipolar, rational self-interested, state-centric world order which neo-realist theory – the dominant voice in IR at the time – so thoroughly accounted for, ceased to exist in reality (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:265).

The contemporary era of global politics is one in which the international system is devoid of a concrete status quo. The ultimately unknown consequences of globalisation, unipolarity, state failure, the erosion of state sovereignty and the new prominence of anti-communitarian non-state entities (including new transnational terrorist groups), preclude traditional IR theories from providing an adequate disciplinary exemplar (Phillips, 2007:60; Smith, 2001:225). It is in this climate that an approach to IR such as constructivism – which rejects the static determinants of traditional theories, which stresses the inherently volatile nature of global political reality and which does not concern itself with law-like universal generalisations regarding such a reality (Wendt, 1992:392-393; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394; Phillips, 2007:60) – is endowed with substantial utility and worth.

The following discussion will concern itself both with highlighting the rise to prominence of constructivist theory in the wake of the increasingly apparent shortcomings of both traditional approaches and competing, radical alternatives, and 12 with contrasting constructivism with its rivals so as to highlight its appropriateness for the purposes of this study with regards to both its contents and its meta-theoretical assertions.

1.1. The historical context

The origins of constructivism within IR are very much rooted within intra-disciplinary debate which took place in the late 1980s between two of its intellectual competitors (Phillips, 2007:61). This is unsurprising, given certain constructivist proponents' conscious claim of the perspective acting as a bridge (Wendt, 1992:394; Patomaki & Wight, 2000:214) between the two groups involved in the debate – mainstream, positivist theories (neo-realism, neo-liberalism and structuralism) and the radical, post-positivist fringe.

Debate between the two factions centred around meta-theoretical issues of ontology, epistemology, methodology and normative commitments (Smith, 1996:11-12; Phillips, 2007:62; Lapid, 1989:235-236). Post-positivist scholars – from schools diverse in their specific positions, but united in their scepticism – were dismayed that mainstream IR theory's implicit and unquestioned reliance upon a positivist scientific approach went unchallenged. They asserted that the global political system – and, indeed, its very systemic conception – was unequivocally socially constructed and need be studied accordingly. They suggested that the belief in the existence and possibility of neutral observable fact in international activity was severely flawed, and that related, empirically-derived theory served only to reinforce or naturalise existing political structures. The notion of the necessity of empirical justification of knowledge claims, they accordingly suggested, was erroneous.

Given the entrenchment of the Cold War system, a global political reality which almost perfectly mirrored the assertions of mainstream theory, coupled with a common misapprehension of what positivist assumptions actually were, mainstream IR theorists were understandably sceptical of the validity and salience of post- positivist claims (Chandler, 2004:25-26; Smith, 1996:31-32; Phillips, 2007:62). They reasoned, fallaciously, that the criticisms lodged against them could scarcely be considered significant if reality mirrored the positions of their theory. Likewise, not 13 fully understanding the implications of being charged with unquestioned positivist disciplinary leanings, they delegitimised post-positivist attacks on mainstream theory by citing post-positivists' lack of a coherent research programme and testable theories. Thus, while considered a disciplinary debate, there was very little actual debate being conducted; each side of the static argument was obstinate in their dismissal of the other.

As Price and Reus-Smit (1998:265) point out, however, the unprecedented end of the Cold War and, more importantly, the circumstances surrounding its conclusion, served as to disrupt this stalemate between the two poles involved in the debate, discrediting each, and providing an avenue for the ascent of constructivist thought in the decade which followed. Mainstream theories were unable to anticipate or, indeed, adequately account for the end of the conflict. The Cold War's conclusion fundamentally changed the essential nature of the international system, yet was peaceful, did not involve a significant redistribution of capabilities and was largely precipitated by domestic political developments within the Soviet Union – all contrary to many fundamental assumptions of mainstream theory, which will later be elaborated upon. Likewise, the end of the conflict suggested that post-positivist assertions regarding the power of theory to constitute and reinforce global political reality were overstated and, accordingly, that the division between observer and reality was more clearly defined than post-positivists supposed.

This disciplinary disarray provided constructivist scholars with the opportunity to entrench the approach within IR as a middle-ground between these two flawed extremes, attempting to provide a third way which negotiated the strengths and weaknesses of each. Before elaborating upon the emergence of constructivism and its unique approach, however, it is necessary to provide a brief exposition of both mainstream and post-positivist IR theory so as to clearly orient and contextualise constructivist thought.

1.2. Mainstream IR theory: neo-realism, neo-liberalism and structuralism

In contemporary IR study, the terms "mainstream approaches" or "mainstream theory" generally refer to neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Lamy, 2001:182-184); 14 approaches with broad scholarly acceptance and adherence within the discipline. That being said, despite having already waned towards the fringes of international theory over the course of the 1980s, structuralism (more specifically, Marxist structuralism), can still be considered a mainstream theory of IR largely because of its positivist underpinnings (Smith, 1996:11). That is to say, despite its somewhat radical assertions, structuralism is still widely regarded as a legitimate dissident voice in IR because of certain ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions which mirror neo-realism and neo-liberalism. Accordingly, in addition to a discussion of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, structuralism will also be given a brief exposition for the purposes of highlighting such meta-theoretical congruence, despite its exclusion from the "neo-neo" debate; an issue more pertinent to understanding constructivism than the individual contents of the mainstream theories themselves.

1.2.1. Neo-realism

While neo-realism is, in fact, a banner term for a number of modern theoretical reinterpretations of classical realism (Lamy, 2001:183), this discussion of the perspective will concern itself with the stream most readily associated with the neo- realist label in IR literature – that of structural neo-realism, pioneered by Waltz. "Modern" realism and "offensive" and "defensive" realism, the other streams associated with neo-realism, are significantly less relevant to analysis. The modern realism of Grieco, as the name suggests, is more a contemporary rehashing of classical realism, devoid of the same radical reconceptualisation inherent in structural neo-realism, while offensive and defensive realism are generally more pragmatic approaches adopted in the realm of policy-making rather than academia (Lamy, 2001:186-187).

With his theory of structural neo-realism (referred to hereafter simply as "neo- realism"), Waltz shifted the locus of causation and the meta-theoretical foundations of classical realism by drawing focus away from the state and individual and placing it on the global political system, in an attempt to endow the tradition with a parsimony, empirical integrity and predictive utility reminiscent of the behavioural sciences (Shimko, 1992:292-293; Ashley, 1984:228) – a shift towards narrow 15 positivism. The shift in focus from unit level or "bottom-up explanation" (Shimko, 1992:293; Lamy, 2001:185) of action towards a systemic account of action – the defining feature of neo-realism – is, thus, a significant evolution.

Classical realism looked towards the state, regarding it, like the individual, as an innately self-interested actor pursuing power as an end in itself, defining power primarily in military terms and regarding systemic anarchy as that which enabled such pursuit of power to proceed unchecked (Fozouni, 1995:480-481). The fundamental nature of the state was thus the chief determinant of action. By shifting focus from the state to the system itself as a determinant of action, neo-realism wholly alters the fundamental assumptions of the tradition. Neo-realists no longer see anarchy as a condition of the system which enables some presupposed propensity, but regard it as the defining characteristic of the system which is the root determinant of all activity (Shimko, 1992:293). The global political system is conceived by neo-realists not as some vague heuristic analogy, but rather, much like a system in the natural sciences, as a hierarchical collection of "functionally similar units" (Lamy, 2001:186) differentiated by power understood in terms of individual aggregate capabilities. This hierarchical structure, coupled with the condition of anarchy, are considered the source of causation. Thus, no longer is the pursuit of power considered an inherent trait and an end in itself, but rather a necessity of a disparity of power in an anarchical system. The nature of the distribution of power throughout the global system, neo-realists suggest, will determine, in a predictable and patterned manner, the actions of any given state as they necessarily pursue power as a means of ensuring national security within a climate of anarchy. According to the neo-realist, states pursue power not because they want to or because they do so naturally, but rather because the nature of the global political system is such that they are forced to, under certain circumstances.

While, as alluded to earlier, the specific contents of the theory are not of paramount importance, there are three implicit positions of neo-realism that are of importance to the understanding of the unique nature of constructivism. Firstly, that only material dimensions – state capabilities – need be attended to in order to determine action. Secondly, that only one level of analysis need be attended to in order to determine action. And lastly, that such examination of a solitary criterion on a single level of 16 analysis provides sufficiently robust predictive insight to establish universal laws governing global political action.

These positions are excessively parsimonious and, in stark contrast to the constructivist approach, severely limit the type of global political action which can be analysed. As will be elaborated upon in Chapters 3 and 5, neo-realism, is wholly unable to account for the rise to prominence of ideologically-driven, non-utilitarian transnational terrorist activity – military action (supposedly the realm of neo-realist analysis) taken by a non-state entity (unconstrained by a power hierarchy necessitated by anarchy) against a state entity with no strategic benefit inherent in the act (an act that is an end in itself, devoid of security enhancement).

1.2.2. Neo-liberalism

Like neo-realism, neo-liberalism is a banner term for a number of streams of neo- liberal thought (Jackson & Sorenson, 1999:48-50; Moravcsik, 1999:524;528-533; Jervis, 1999:53-54; Lamy, 2001:188-189). These include: commercial liberalism (concerned with global free-market economic integration and economic institutions as a means of fostering cooperation); republican liberalism (based on democratic peace theory and concerned with the proliferation of liberal democracy as a means of fostering peace and cooperation); sociological liberalism (concerned with growing transnational linkages between both governments and individuals within civil society, as well as the corollary interdependence and its utility in fostering cooperation and community); and neo-liberal institutionalism (concerned with the utility of transnational institutions and regional integration in facilitating and stimulating cooperation).

Again, however, these theories are of subordinate importance to the stream most readily associated with the neo-liberal label in IR literature – that of complex interdependence theory, pioneered by Keohane and Nye (1997:122-132). It will be this prominent sub-strain of neo-liberal thought which will be discussed here, and which will be directly associated with the neo-liberal moniker for the purposes of this study.

Neo-liberalism, in its complex interdependence theory guise, is simultaneously preoccupied with the possibilities for cooperation engendered by transnational institutions and regional integration on the one hand, and the consequences of globalisation on the international political system on the other (Nye, 2007:210-223; Lamy, 2001:189). It is thus, in part, influenced by earlier liberal institutionalist thought concerned with the utility of institutionally-mediated cooperation in lessening systemic anarchy; the notion that, in return for forsaking absolute sovereignty, states can band together through a formal supra-governmental structure, which regularises interactions and regulates political activity in certain spheres, pooling resources for the purposes of mutual cooperation and prosperity. Coupling such beliefs with an acknowledgement of the effects of globalisation in the realm of politics, and hence drawing from sociological liberalism, complex interdependence theory adopts a perspective on the evolution of the international system which can be summarised as four interrelated assertions (Lamy, 2001:189). Firstly, that there are ever-increasing linkages between states and non-state actors, as international relations becomes defined by pluralism and the erosion of absolute state primacy. Secondly, that global politics is increasingly characterised by a shared global agenda, with a waning distinction, or at least hierarchy, between high and low politics. Thirdly, that there are now multiple channels available for realising transnational interaction between actors and, thus, further entrenching interdependence. And, finally, that military power is a waning concern, or at least a concern amongst many, within international relations.

Thus, the central claims of complex interdependence theory are actually rather straightforward. With all actors within the contemporary, pluralistic international system becoming increasingly interconnected and, as a consequence, increasingly interdependent, the prospect of conflict becomes increasingly untenable as the costs become too great. Furthermore, the proliferation of international institutions, to regulate the conduct of actors in various issue-areas where such interdependence exists, engenders efficient cooperation and, accordingly, prosperity. Cooperation, thus, is overwhelmingly rationally preferable to conflict, both because of the extreme cost involved in conflict in the contemporary international system, and because of the incentive of prosperity provided by institutional mediation.

While it might appear at first glance that neo-liberalism significantly differs from neo- realism, further examination reveals that this is not the case. While neo-realists are concerned with how the global political system constrains possibilities for cooperation and neo-liberals are concerned with how the system provides opportunities for and, indeed, encourages cooperation (Niou & Ordeshook, 1991:485; Jervis, 1999:47), both look towards the international system as a sole determinant of action judged according to material dimensions, and assume that such judgement is a rational activity.

Thus, returning to the example of contemporary transnational terrorism, neo- liberalism too falls short of providing a comprehensive understanding. While neo- liberals do acknowledge a plurality of actors in global politics and the influence of non-state entities, they are unable to anticipate inherently irrational activity motivated by non-material factors. New ideological terrorists, motivated wholly by normative concerns, approach the act of terrorism as an end in itself and pay little heed to systemic restrictions proposed by neo-liberals such as interdependence and institutionally entrenched global norms of conduct. This notion will again be elaborated upon in Chapters 3 and 5.

1.2.3. Structuralism

Marxist structuralism is a perspective which comprises modern theoretical reinterpretations of Marxist thought such as dependency theory and world system theory (Holsti, 1985:63). While the specific contents of the theories differ superficially, they are all concerned with the extrapolation of Marx's notions of class determinism onto a global systemic level (Holsti, 1985:61). Accordingly, structuralists are concerned with the economic stratification of the global political system. They assert that the nature of the system is one of self-perpetuating gross economic inequality (Burchill & Linklater, 1996:99-102). That is to say, much like domestic class structure, the global free-market capitalist system consists of actors (states and non-state actors alike) endowed with economic power and actors devoid of such economic power. The nature of the system – both its capitalist character and its inherent disparity – structuralists suggest, requires that these two broad groupings are involved in a symbiotic relationship wherein the economically powerful exploit and 19 subjugate the economically weak (Holsti, 1985:63;67). It is symbiotic in that, despite the power disparity, each requires the relationship to endure for self-sustainment. The system dictates that the exploited are so dependent upon the capital of the exploiters that they cannot escape the arrangement, while the exploiters require the exploited for the cheap labour and resources necessary to sustain the global free- market system. In essence, thus, due to the emergence of a global capitalist economy, the global political system is merely seen by structuralists as being subject to the same critique posited by intra-state Marxist political analysis, at a macro level (Holsti, 1985:63;68).

That which is most critical to realise here, though, is the existence of distinct parallels between structuralism and the other mainstream theories. Structuralism, once again, is preoccupied with analysis of a single material determinant (economic power) of political action on a single level of analysis. Indeed, while structuralism is a term often used interchangeably with Marxist structuralism, it is in fact another banner term for theories which view global political activity in strict systemic terms, and which look towards the structure of such as system to determine action (Burchill & Linklater, 1996:99-101). Waltzian neo-realism is a structuralist perspective in this sense (Ashley, 984:227-228). Indeed, as previously noted, it is often referred to as structural realism (Shimko, 1992:293). Similarly, because of its emphasis on systemic arrangement, neo-liberal complex interdependence theory is also broadly defined as being structuralist in nature (Nye, 2007:7).

While the label itself is inconsequential, the key conclusion is that all three of these mainstream theories discussed share profound common-ground – an issue which will be elaborated on in the following section, and an issue which is critical to understanding the utility of constructivist thought.

1.2.4. The "neo-neo" debate and prevailing positivism in IR

While ignoring dissent from post-positivist critics, much mainstream IR scholarship in the 1980s was concerned with the so-called "inter-paradigm debate" between neo- realism, neo-liberalism and structuralism (Patomaki & Wight, 2000:214). More specifically, many IR scholars concerned themselves with the neo-neo debate 20 between neo-realism and neo-liberalism alone, as Marxist structuralism increasingly became regarded as a perspective with rather narrow issue-area applicability and utility. The profound outcome of the neo-neo debate was that of the notion of a "neo- neo synthesis" – the realisation that the debate between neo-realism and neo- liberalism was not one of two competing paradigms, but rather that of two theories with different focus belonging to the same paradigm (Jervis, 1999:43; Lamy, 2001:191). While literature concerning this notion of shared paradigm often overlooks or excludes structuralism, structuralist thought undoubtedly shares the same meta-theoretical assumptions – that is, the very basis of shared paradigm – of the two more prominent mainstream approaches and, accordingly, constitutes a single facet of a monolithic mainstream approach to IR enquiry.

While there are, undoubtedly, a significant number of superficial similarities between neo-realism and neo-liberalism with regards to theoretical content – for example, an implicit assumption of actor self-interest and rationality (Wendt, 1992:392) and a preoccupation with the link between systemic character and the consequent implications for actor cooperation (Lamy, 2001:191) – such similarities can all, ultimately, be reduced to the existence of shared meta-theoretical assumptions. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism adopt a positivist approach to scientific enquiry. Such shared positivism constitutes a latent norm of mainstream international theory which has become central to many contemporary debates in IR, including the constructivist critique of mainstream theory.

As Ruggie (1998:855-856) notes, neo-realism and neo-liberalism disregard ideational factors in an attempt to endow IR with a behaviouralist orientation "...almost Newtonian in character". This "hard science" approach to an area of social enquiry is indicative of an oft misunderstood stance, broadly termed positivism. Although positivism in IR is less rigidly tied to its philosophy of science roots as elsewhere in the social sciences, it is still a restrictive and stringent approach to knowledge acquisition which has profound consequences with regards to the delineation of the intellectual discipline of IR. In cementing the criteria for the validity of knowledge – how knowledge should be attained and how it need be verified – the boundaries of the field of enquiry and its content are likewise cemented.

Smith (1996:15-16; 2001:227) summarises the positivist approach as comprising four fundamental, implicit presuppositions regarding the validity of knowledge. Firstly, positivism involves a commitment to naturalism or a belief in the unity of science. That is to say, in the rigid sense, a belief that the social and natural worlds are fundamentally the same (a unified ontology) and thus require the same methods of enquiry (a unified methodology), and, in the more moderate sense, a belief that despite differences between the social and natural worlds, the same methods are applicable in the pursuit of knowledge (a unified methodology alone). A rigid form of naturalism is embodied in much neo-realist theory and its preoccupation with global political interaction in narrowly systemic terms – much like biology – and with attempts at broad causal prediction (Shimko, 1992:297-298; Ashley, 1984:233). A more moderate form of naturalism is observed in the case of neo-liberalism, where, although global politics is still characterised in systemic terms, the identities and roles of the constituent parts of the system (global political actors) are generally acknowledged as being non-static (Lamy, 2001:193;197). Nonetheless, the neo- liberal approach to enquiry, like the neo-realist approach, still mirrors that of the natural sciences.

Secondly, Smith (1996:15-16; 2001:227) further suggests that positivism involves the adoption of an objectivist position – a belief in the clear distinction between fact and values, where facts are the neutral building-blocks of theory. That is to say, positivism involves a belief that acquisition of objective knowledge (fact) is possible despite the potential subjectivity involved in the observation of such fact.

Thirdly, positivism involves the belief in the existence of observable repetitive patterns of activity in the social world, just as are found in the natural world. Significant here is the concomitant belief in the establishment of universal anticipatory laws as are found in the natural sciences.

Finally, and perhaps most significant in terms of this study, Smith (1996:15-16; 2001:227) points out the positivist assertion of the necessity of an empiricist epistemology in enquiry – a belief that knowledge need be substantiated by observable fact in order to be considered valid, and that fact and theory are discretely separable entities, with theory serving a heuristic purpose alone. 22

The shared positivist basis of the theoretical mainstream in IR cannot be emphasised enough. It is a characteristic of IR that is of critical importance to this study for three reasons. Firstly, because understanding the essential nature of mainstream theory enables one to identify its associated shortcomings and, as a corollary, the utility and uniqueness of constructivism, which tends to, at least in part, reject notions of universal law and strict empiricism. Secondly, because one needs to fully understand the methodological implications of a rejection of a blindly positivist approach, as previously alluded to in Chapter 1 and elaborated upon later in the critique of constructivism. Thirdly, it assists in understanding the stance of the opposite intellectual bloc involved in disciplinary debate in the late 1980s, the post- positivists and, thus, in understanding the attempts of constructivism at occupying a middle-ground between the two poles.

This discussion regarding the pre-eminence of positivism in IR, therefore, is not merely an intellectual exercise, but rather has profound consequences for the nature of IR scholarship. As Fiske & Shweder (1986:3) note, concerns over matters of metatheory, or assumptions regarding the acquisition of knowledge prior to theory, "...are too important to be taken for granted and too much a part of our ongoing research enterprises to be left to philosophers to think about". This sentiment in many ways encapsulates the stance adopted by scholars at the extremities of the IR discipline – post-positivists.

1.3. Post-positivist fringe

Lapid (1989:237) was amongst the first to suggest an entrance into a "post-positivist era" in IR theory. Lapid suggested that IR, following the trend of other social sciences, would begin to be characterised by a meta-theoretical debate between the positivist mainstream and the hostile post-positivist fringe. As Smith (2001:246-248) notes, however, the debate has largely been a muted one, as the two sides of the intellectual divide refuse to listen to each other. Mainstream scholars dismiss post- positivist theories by resorting to asserting arbitrarily defined meta-theoretical boundaries of the IR discipline, while post-positivist proponents, anticipating as much, largely preoccupy themselves with critiquing mainstream theory rather than attempting to evolve the discipline. Despite this severe marginalisation of post- 23 positivist theory, a brief exposition is necessary in order to both clearly orient constructivism within IR and to highlight its utility as a negotiated third way.

Post-positivist theory (or reflectivist theory, as it is often termed), as alluded to earlier, comprises a number of divergent theories allied alone by their vehement rejection of the positivist approach to enquiry in social sciences (Lapid,1989:239). All post- positivist theories object to either positivist ontology, epistemology or methodology (Smith, 2001:226-228; Smith, 1996:32-35), with many (notably the post-modernists) wholly rejecting all three. Thus, certain post-positivist theories reject positivist explanatory ontology, asserting, instead, that an observer cannot be divorced from the reality which they inhabit – a constitutive ontology. Others reject strict positivist empiricism, adopting an anti-foundationalist epistemology, suggesting that there is no neutral position from which to discern valid knowledge claims from invalid knowledge claims and that observed material fact alone provides insufficient and skewed understanding of global political phenomena. Others still are opposed to the behaviouralist methodology which dominates IR, advocating, instead, research programmes tailored to the inherent complexity of international political activity.

Smith (1996:35-28; 2001:229-242) provides a useful summary of the central tenets of a selection of prominent post-positivist perspectives in IR, namely: critical theory, normative theory, post-modernism and feminist standpoint theory.

1.3.1. Critical theory

While critical theory has an established presence within the social sciences, it has only comparatively recently established a presence within IR theory (George, 1989:274; Smith, 2001:233; Rengger, 2000:761). Critical theory's central assertion is that a theorist cannot remain detached from their subject, as is supposed by the positivist explanatory ontological assumption that the world constitutes an objective reality to be observed and examined as an entity apart (Smith, 2001:234). Critical theorists suggest that, in adopting such a positivist stance, hegemonic societal structures – dominant societal structures already in place upon inspection of reality – are merely reinforced as they are portrayed as natural or objective fact, rather than the complex result of myriad social forces. Critical theory suggests that positivism 24 merely supports the status quo, regardless of the potential undesirability of such. Accordingly, critical theorists champion the notion of the embedded theorist – an unabashedly value-laden approach to academic enquiry wherein the theorist is charged with analysing reality in such a way that models of subversion can be posited for the reform of the status quo and toward the greater benefit and emancipation of humanity (George & Campbell, 1990:278).

Inextricably linked to the concept of emancipation in critical theory is the assertion that social reality is constructed intersubjectively (Smith, 2001:235; George & Campbell, 1990:278). Intersubjective construction of reality involves the communal creation of shared meaning through consensus. That is to say, critical theorists assert that there is no such thing as objective social fact, but rather that humans imbue portions of social reality with the status of fact by mutually agreeing upon their existence and meaning. Thus, the critical theorist contends that the nature of social reality can then be redefined by theory – by changing the manner in which portions of social reality are perceived – for the greater benefit of humanity.

While critical theory's commitment to emancipation is contentious, its acknowledgement of international relations activity as an inherently non-static reality provides opportunity for much more complex analysis of global political issues – an insight which is echoed to a large extent by constructivist thought, as will be elaborated upon.

1.3.2. Normative theory

Normative theory has enjoyed a period of revival under the post-positivist flag (Rengger, 2000:758). The approach, as the name suggests, involves imbuing theory with an ethical dimension (Rengger, 2000:759); providing an idealised description of international political functioning which would better benefit humanity, by defining what “should be” with regards to the manner in which states interact, the manner in which conflict is resolved and so forth. It is thus understandable that a renewed interest in normative theory coincides with a changing global political climate wherein issues of morality in global political functioning have come to the fore - as publics are more wont to judge state action on ethical grounds, while globalisation ensures an 25 international audience for the critique of global political manoeuvring. Accordingly, there is a focus in emergent normative theory over contemporary issues such as the limits of state sovereignty, acceptable conditions for military conflict and global north- south economic parity (Smith, 2001:230).

While, thus, much contemporary normative theory is clearly influenced by classical liberal thought, it finds itself occupying the intellectual bloc in direct opposition to neo-liberalism because of its meta-theoretical assertions. In accordance with its post-positivist status, normative theory rejects the positivist differentiation between facts and values (Smith, 2001:229), championing the necessity of values in IR theory. Normative proponents contend that such a distinction limits the study of international relations to “how” and not “why”, by focusing upon the analysis of pre- existing social structures without regard for the context of their synthesis. Normative theory contends that fact is merely an embedded value, and subscription to narrow positivism serves only as to reinforce existing political structures, without regard for the effect of such structures upon quality of human life. It is clear, thus, that normative theory and critical theory are not far removed, with normative perspectives merely tending to focus less on affective issues of domination and emancipation, adopting a more pragmatic stance to enquiry, with less epistemological conservatism (Smith, 2001:227).

1.3.3. Post-modernism

Post-modernism is, again, a tradition which has enjoyed a notable presence within the social sciences for some time, but has only been extensively applied to the realm of IR within the past three decades. Defining the exact nature of the post-modernist movement is, however, somewhat troublesome, as it comprises a number of strands with differing focus and with a degree of intellectual dissonance, but assimilates such non-uniformity as part of its character. At best, post-modernism can be said to be unconvinced by the positivist epistemological search for universal determinism and the positivist assertion of neutral paths towards truth, and is preoccupied with the deconstruction of assumed axiomatic building blocks of enquiry, in pursuing a more 26 accurate understanding of the complexities and contradictions inherent in our conception of reality (Lapid, 1989:242; Smith, 2001:239; George & Campbell, 1990:280-281).

The strands of post-modernism that have been most notably incorporated into IR theory are post-modern approaches to the "power-knowledge relationship", as pioneered by Foucault, and post-modern textual strategies, as pioneered by Derrida (George, 1989:275; Smith, 2001:240). Foucault suggests that power and knowledge enjoy a symbiotic relationship; that knowledge produces power and power produces knowledge. Power structures, as echoed by other post-positivist theories, dictate the type of knowledge which is deemed valid, and are thus self-sustaining (George & Campbell, 1990:281). While this is not a unique assertion, Foucault's proposal for theoretical analysis is a novel one – that of genealogy (Smith, 2001:239). As Foucault suggests that there is no objective truth, rather regimes of truth – relatively stable conceptions of reality constructed and reinforced by the mutually-sustaining relationship between power and knowledge. Genealogy involves the deconstruction of such structures which constitute truth within a specific discourse in order to understand the nature of their construction, the historical context of their synthesis and the struggle and pursuit of dominance between alternative regimes of truth. In IR, thus, such an approach would involve ascertaining the manner in which various global political truths have become regarded as such – for example, analysing the structures reinforcing the prevailing definition and, indeed, the existence of transnational terrorism, and the rival regimes of truth differing in their conception of this particular facet of global political reality, and the reason for their subordination.

Derrida, meanwhile, suggests that all cognition and interaction is textual, and that there is a bi-directional relationship between the role of text in constructing reality and the role of text in interpreting reality (Smith, 2001:240). In essence, what this means is that our construction of reality and interpretation of reality are bounded by our reliance upon textual constructs or constructs of language, and biased by the inherent hierarchy of seemingly neutral language constructs. To reveal the exact nature of such inherent linguistic privileges, Derrida suggests deconstruction and double reading (Smith, 2001:240). Deconstruction involves a re-examination of seemingly neutral linguistic concepts and relational constructs in order to unearth 27 inherent biases. For instance, in examining opposites and dialectics, there is an inherent hierarchy favouring one pole of opposition over the other (for example, good/bad, weak/strong). Similarly, double-reading involves the re-examination of a theory with attention paid to seemingly neutral logical and stabilising entities which, in actuality, serve to reinforce a dominant interpretation of the text, structuring and biasing ideas in a hierarchy towards a particular end or interpretation. The utility of this in IR theory is in revealing the restrictive nature of dominant theories, as well as definitions and interpretations of global political action. Walker (1993:105-124), for example, uses post-modernist textual techniques to expose the manner in which a coherent conceptualisation of the realist paradigm involves the narrow interpretation of the texts of many of its key thinkers; how a cohesive dominant reading of realism comes at the expense of the true intricacies of its construction. This once again relates to the more general post-positivist critique of the tendency within contemporary IR scholarship towards parsimony and uniformity over complexity, relativism and methodological pluralism (Lapid, 1989:236;243-244).

1.3.4. Feminism

As Smith (2001:231) notes, there are a number of divergent streams of feminist thought, straddling both sides of the positivist/post-positivist divide. While all feminist theories tend to both heavily criticise the intellectual status quo and favour distinct methodological approaches, only certain streams of feminism wholly reject the fundamental ontological and epistemological assertions of positivism. The two feminist theories associated with such positivist scepticism are post-modern feminism and feminist standpoint theory. Post-modern feminism, however, will not be given specific attention here, because it largely mirrors the central claims of broader post-modernism, but with a focus on gender construction (Smith, 2001:232). In the realm of IR, it is, thus, concerned with deconstructing existing social structures, power relationships, rhetoric, text and so forth so as to understand how gender roles within global politics are defined and reinforced.

Feminist standpoint theory, on the other hand, is rooted in the assertion made by radical feminism that social reality (as it is presented) itself is wholly a by-product of patriarchy – an understanding of the world which is exclusively situated within the 28 male point-of-view and which neglects female understandings and interpretations of reality, unless attempting to disparage and discredit them (Smith, 2001:232). Such an assertion, of course, necessitates a complete rejection of positivist epistemological claims (Carver et al., 1998:285), suggesting that theory and practice, fact and value cannot be divorced from each other.

As a masculine point-of-view ultimately constitutes but a partial understanding of reality, standpoint feminists propose a conscious reconstruction of the social world from a feminine standpoint in order to attain an appropriately complex portrait of reality (Carver et al., 1998:285). They assert that a revision of the core assumptions of any theory, in such a way that they are endowed with a feminine perspective, will both enhance understanding of an issue-area and highlight the masculine biases inherent in that theory's original construction. Returning to the case of contemporary transnational terrorism then, standpoint feminists would argue that, due to the predominant involvement of men in both terrorist and counter-terrorist action, theory on both sides of the meta-theoretical divide would bias a masculine conception of reality, whether it be static or non-static in nature, rendering it incomplete and in need of reconstruction from a feminine perspective.

1.3.5. The key post-positivist objection

While these various post-positivist approaches are far too divergent to incorporate into a single, cohesive paradigm, they do, nonetheless, possess a shared motivation for their dissatisfaction with the positivist dominance of IR. They assert that blind, implicit acceptance of positivist assumptions limits the IR discipline by both restricting the field of study, in narrowly defining what does and does not constitute IR, and by restricting the means by which the field can be studied (Lapid, 1989:241- 242). An overly parsimonious approach to IR, they suggest, leads to an excessively simplistic portrait of a profoundly complex reality, thus limiting the extent of potential knowledge and understanding.

However, as the mainstream proponents contend, it is unclear how this problem can be appropriately attended to when post-positivist scholars continue to critique positivism without proffering an alternative methodology which is endowed with 29 sufficient pragmatic utility (Smith, 1996:12-13; Smith, 2001:243). They suggest that post-positivist scholars tend to "argue for argument's sake", focusing on minute meta-theoretical and philosophical shortcomings that ultimately have little bearing on pragmatic and heuristic utility, yet refusing to establish a rival research programme suitable for more appropriate policy formulation. While, of course, post-positivists counter, in turn, that the desire for such a research programme is indicative of a fundamental lack of understanding of the post-positivist outlook, the point is largely moot; the debate remains one of two factions unwilling to listen to the other, one seemingly resigned indefinitely to occupy the outer extremities of disciplinary dialogue.

1.4. Constructivism as a third way

The conclusion that need be drawn from this debate between the positivist mainstream and the post-positivist dissidents is rather straightforward: the debate highlights issues of critical importance to IR that need be resolved in order for disciplinary progression to be made possible. Such a resolution, however, seems unlikely, because of the chasm in fundamental assertions even prior to theory between the two groups involved.

This stalemate between positivism and post-positivism is the key reason for the "blossoming" (Ruggie, 1998:856) of constructivism in IR in the early 1990s. By providing an understanding of global politics that was both as complex, fluid and multi-faceted as the subject of study, and sufficiently pragmatic so as to enable progression, constructivism represented a means of negotiating between the seemingly irreconcilable extremes of positivism and post-positivism, capitalising on their strengths and attending to their shortcomings. The following section will highlight the manner in which constructivism differs from both the mainstream and post-positivist perspectives in attempting to occupy an intellectual middle-ground.

1.4.1. Key contrasts to mainstream theory

As Phillips (2007:62) notes, constructivism articulates a number of concerns similar to those expressed by post-positivist theories. 30

Firstly, and crucially, constructivism rejects the positivist assumption that agents can be removed from the political reality which they inhabit in analysis (Phillips, 2007:63). As one of the pioneers of constructivism in IR, Wendt (1992:392), notes, "...rationalism [positivist mainstream theory] offers a fundamentally behavioural conception of both process and institutions; they change behaviour, but not identities and interests". Constructivists, thus, take issue with the assumption held by mainstream theories that the identities and interests of actors within the international system are predefined and remain cemented regardless of how global political reality might otherwise mutate and evolve. As will be elaborated upon, a primary concern of constructivism is the relationship between actors and the reality which they inhabit (Chandler, 2004:25;27-28).

Secondly, constructivism rejects the assertion of mainstream theories that agent action in international relations is determined by a "logic of consequences" rather than a "logic of appropriateness" (Phillips, 2007:63). Constructivists reject the supposition that implacable rationality is the solitary means by which actors decide upon necessary action; they assert that observed action is not always directed towards strategic gain and not only understandable in material terms alone. Constructivists suggest, instead, that a sense of propriety of action is equally as influential; that ideational factors such as shared norms of conduct are, in fact, the fundamental determinants of action, and that resultant action need not be strictly rational.

Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, constructivists reject the positivist assertion of the possibility of the establishment of universal, law-like knowledge claims, endowed with broad predictive utility (Phillips, 2007:63). Instead, constructivists suggest that only contingent knowledge claims regarding specific and discretely defined portions of global political reality are possible, with these being endowed with no more than rudimentary predictive utility (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394).

Constructivism, then, as will be addressed in Chapters 4 and 5, is substantially better suited to account for the phenomenon of contemporary transnational terrorism than its rigidly positivist theoretical counterparts. Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivism is not constrained by pre-defined actors and determinants of action, 31 nor does it seek to uncover – or believe in the existence of – universal laws. Specific notions of propriety held by a specific group can be analysed in order to establish how observed action is determined and how this behaviour can be influenced. Terrorist action, although seemingly irrational, is easily understood in terms of constructivism's notion of a logic of appropriateness. And, while new terrorism, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, differs fundamentally from previous forms of transnational terror, this in no way proves to be extraneous to constructivist analysis, as constructivism both asserts that any given group has their own peculiar ideational structures which influence action in a particular way, and that conclusions derived from analysis are only applicable to the issue-area under scrutiny.

1.4.2. Key contrast to post-positivism

Just as the contrasts between constructivism and positivist theory echo much of the post-positivist critique of positivism, so the most profound contrast between constructivism and post-positivism draws from positivist reservations regarding post- positivism. Such contrast is found simply in constructivist willingness to adopt a negotiated understanding of global political reality and a negotiated position regarding how knowledge of this reality is obtained (Farrell, 2002:56-57; Wendt, 1995:75; Phillips, 2007:62-63). As will be elaborated upon later in the chapter, many constructivist scholars are willing to utilise a negotiated empiricist epistemology, operationalising ideational variables and providing an analytical framework with at least some degree of pragmatic value.

This is the fundamental reason for constructivism's perceived occupation of an intellectual middle-ground between the radical and mainstream in IR. The concession of at least negotiated empiricism means that much constructivist IR research is endowed with utility and worth beyond mere critique of the status quo. Constructivism, then, simultaneously attends to the importance of an appropriately complex portrait of international relations functioning, as championed by the post- positivist proponents, and to the importance of actually building upon such a complex understanding to derive directed and effective policy, as championed by positivist proponents. This makes constructivism far better suited to the investigation of contemporary transnational terrorism than its post-positivist counterparts in that it is 32 an issue, as stated in Chapter 1, which not only requires a nuanced understanding, but also demands the prescription of suitable counteraction.

1.5. A disciplinary topography

Having comprehensively accounted for the various facets of the historical context from which constructivist theory emerged, and having elucidated the key differences between the constructivist approach and its competitors, it seems rather clear that constructivism occupies the position of “bridge” (Wendt, 1992:393-394) between the extremes of positivism and post-positivism. Establishing even a rough sketch of the intellectual topography of contemporary IR, however, or at least establishing the position of constructivism therein, is not as straightforward as it may seem. As Smith (2001:245) alludes to, post-positivists tend merely to dismiss constructivism – or at least modern constructivism; a distinction which will be elaborated upon in subsequent discussion – as merely an epistemologically soft form of positivism, while mainstream scholars similarly view the approach as a soft form of post- positivism (Farrell, 2002:56; Phillips, 2007:64; Hopf, 1998:171). Certain scholars, such as Ruggie (1998:855-857), do not even concern themselves with post- positivism at all and concentrate merely on contemporary IR debate as a battle between constructivism and neo-liberalism and neo-realism, grouped under the banner of neo-utilitarianism. Others, such as Phillips (2007:61) and Wæver (2007:300-301), note that such attempts at grouping and polarisation perspectives – narrow, polemic conceptions of IR – are impediments towards more enriching analytical eclecticism and normative debate in IR, and that they have outlived their "heuristic usefulness".

Despite such disagreements and discrepancies with regards to the classification and differentiation of the various competing approaches in IR, for the purposes of this study, the conception of constructivism as a middle-ground between positivism and post-positivism will continue to be utilised. The reason for this is not because it is necessarily the most accurate analogy of the nature of disciplinary divergence, but rather because it best highlights the utility of constructivism as an approach which makes abundantly clear the shortcomings of mainstream theory but realises the value of a moderate epistemological stance for the purposes of useful research. 33

Having placed constructivism within a defined disciplinary context, the approach itself can now be elaborated upon in detail.

2. The philosophy of science and the basis of constructivist thought

An apt starting point for a thorough exposition of constructivism is found upon examining it from the meta-disciplinary lens of the philosophy of science. From this essential intellectual foundation, one is provided with a portrait of the very essence of the approach, which can subsequently be elaborated upon and refined for the specific IR context of this study.

As succinctly summarised by Kukla (2000:8), according to constructivists, "...if a scientific belief is socially caused, then it's 'constructed' ". Hence, at its most basic, constructivism suggests that X is not inevitable, but, rather, is socially constructed (Kukla, 2000:1-4). X, thus, is malleable; it could have been different, it can be different and it could not have existed at all. Its existence, in its current guise, is wholly a consequence of the nature of its construction, which, itself, could have been different under different circumstances. Important to note here is that it is not just one's perception of X which is socially constructed, but, rather, the very nature of X itself affected by the nature of its social construction. An example of this in IR – one famously dealt with in Wendt's 1992 article, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics" – is that of the belief in an anarchical international system populated by undifferentiated rational state actors put forward by prevailing mainstream positivist theories. According to the central constructivist thesis, the notion of a global system of states, the notion of statehood, the relationship between agency and structure (Wendt, 1987:337-338) – the relationship between purposeful action and the pattern of interaction associated with such purposeful action – and, indeed, the very existence of all of these notions, are all socially constructed. They exist because they were created and could have been different if the circumstances surrounding their creation were different. Thus, in claiming that facts are constructed, constructivists posit that a fact's status as a fact, and indeed its very existence, is dependent upon the occurrence of specific social action (Kukla, 2000:19). 34

What constitutes the aforementioned X, however, depends on the extremity of one's constructivist worldview. Constructivists diverge greatly in the extent of the application and extrapolation of the basic intellectual position discussed above. Some, such as constructivist philosophers of science, tend to adopt the radical view that facts of natural science as well as social science can equally be considered socially constructed (Kukla, 2000:3-4). This study, however, will adopt the more moderate view generally espoused by social scientists, considering social fact alone to be socially constructed.

A significant distinction can also be made between the key locus of constructivist examination – whether it lies in the realm of ontology, epistemology or semantics (Kukla, 2000:4-6). A constructivist view of ontology is one of ontological relativism. It holds that fact is "invented rather than discovered" (Kukla, 2000:4) – there is no natural order from which knowledge is derived. The epistemological thesis of constructivism in the philosophy of science, meanwhile, asserts that "there is no absolute warrant for any belief" (Kukla, 2000:4); that rationality itself, the mechanism by which belief is established, only has meaning in conjunction with a particular theory, culture or identity. Semantic constructivism, on the other hand, asserts that, because language is devoid of inherent empirical content – as the meaning attached to language is constructed and can thus change – and language is the only means one has of deciphering experience, all knowledge is, by definition, a fluid social construction because there is no direct link between an objective truth and one's experience of that truth (Kukla, 2000:6). The basis of all scientific knowledge is, thus, a product of its own construction, with no definitive tethering to an external truth. Semantic constructivism, however, while intriguing, falls beyond the scope of this study as it forms no part of the intellectual basis of the conservative strain of constructivism in IR utilised in analysis.

While these three distinctions are not mutually exclusive, with ontological and epistemological claims, in particular, being interrelated (Kukla, 2000:4), they by no means constitute a monolithic, "take it or leave it" intellectual package which need be thrust forcefully, in its entirety, upon a specific area of study. This will be seen shortly upon examining constructivism within IR, where one finds that the influence of the tradition's philosophy of science roots, while apparent, have been significantly diluted 35 and adapted for the specific requirements of IR scholarship. Thus, that which is most important to derive from this discussion is but a rudimentary understanding of the key idea informing all constructivist scholarship: that scientific knowledge – in the social sciences, for the purposes of this study – can be regarded as a consequence of the human construction of such knowledge, and that any belief held with regards to the nature of reality is inextricably tied to the circumstances surrounding the construction of that belief.

3. Constructivism within International Relations

Somewhat fittingly, the most convenient starting point for an exposition of constructivist theory in IR is found in the writings of one of its most famous pioneers, Alexander Wendt. His simple assertion that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992:391), has become the mantra of all constructivist analysis in IR. Wendt's maxim reflects the essential nature of the constructivist perspective – the assertion that the international system, as posited by positivist theories, is falsely presented as a natural arrangement of political activity and that, rather, such an arrangement, and its characteristics of anarchy and hierarchical distribution of capabilities, are but intersubjectively established social constructions (Wendt, 1992:394; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:392-393; Hopf, 1998:173-174).

Mainstream theories assert that the anarchical nature of the international system, actor interests (ensuring security and pursuing prosperity) and the corollary logical determinants of action (material concerns over capabilities) are static and prior to theory (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267). Constructivists, however, contend that these are merely socially constructed and, accordingly, endowed with significance only because of shared agreement over such significance and, thus, subject to change. Notions of global political reality, constructivists hence assert, are predicated upon a shared understanding of such reality and a shared commitment to such understanding. Ideational factors – unobservable non-material influences – they accordingly suggest, are of fundamental importance to the very composition of international activity. As another pioneer of constructivism in IR, Ruggie (1998:856), summarises, “...constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life”. 36

Anarchy, thus, exists and determines action only because global political actors agree upon it; if shared understanding is altered, however, constructivists contend that actor interests are likewise altered, leading to changes in actor behaviour and in the fundamental nature of the global political system. Such, claims have been borne out by observed developments in international relations, lending significant credence to the constructivist thesis. Developments in the last two decades such as the previously discussed conclusion of the Cold War, the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the rise to prominence of the global "responsibility to protect" agenda and, most importantly in the context of this study, the rise of new transnational terrorism (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267; Cooper & Kohler, 2006:7; Kegley, 2003:2), all tend to discredit mainstream theoretical assertions of systemic stasis and narrow material determinism.

Prior to systematically dealing with the exact contents of the constructivist thesis, it is necessary to clarify the particular stream of constructivism which will be examined and utilised in analysis in this study.

3.1. Constructivist factions

3.1.1. Modern and post-modern constructivism

While constructivism has thus far largely been treated as a single, unified approach to IR, there are, in fact, divergent voices within the school. The constructivist school is broadly divided into two streams, modern and post-modern constructivism (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267-270; Wendt, 1992:393-394; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:395). The two approaches are also sometimes referred to as conventional and critical constructivism (Hopf, 1998:172; Farrell, 2002:57). The grounds for differentiation between the two are, for the most part, meta-theoretical in nature.

Both adopt an ontological position reminiscent of hermeneutics (Smith, 1996:26) in that ontology is necessarily prior to epistemology, as analysis cannot be divorced from the reality it seeks to account for. The ontological position of constructivism in IR, however, is interesting in that it does not "...deny the phenomenal reality of material processes" (Phillips, 2007:62), but asserts that actor response to such 37 material concerns are wholly determined by the shared meaning structures through which they are necessarily perceived. The material realm, thus, while objectively real, has no intrinsic significance beyond that which is attached to it. For example, it is undeniable that there is a complex pattern of trade between states which results in a certain distribution of economic capabilities, but the extent to which these trade relations constrain state activity, as neo-liberals assert, is wholly dependent upon the extent to which states involved agree upon such constraint.

Despite there being no single established method associated with the constructivist tradition (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:396), modern and post-modern constructivism each have their own methodological proclivities. Modern constructivists tend to have methodological leanings also reminiscent of hermeneutics (Smith, 1996:26-27), with a pre-occupation with explanation and understanding of narrow issue-areas rather than attempts at universal anticipatory laws – although, as Finnemore and Sikkink (2001:394) note, modern constructivists are able to glean a degree of causal insight. The particular method by which this stance is manifested, however, varies greatly according to the specific requirements of the study (Phillips, 2007:63). Post-modern constructivists, on the other hand, drawing upon the influence of the broader post- modern tradition, tend to favour methods which deconstruct the sociolinguistic practices that entrench and prioritise certain regimes of truth (Phillips, 2007:64; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:268-269), such as the aforementioned genealogy and double- reading.

Most critically, modern and post-modern constructivism differ fundamentally with regards to epistemology. Post-modern constructivists, as the name implies, wholly reject the positivist notions of the existence of neutral observable social fact and the possibility of empirical analysis (Barkin, 2003:326-327); while claims diverge on the matter on how analysis should proceed and what the purpose of scientific enquiry thus need be, they are allied by their disdain for positivism. Post-modern constructivism is thus, in essence, a post-positivist theory itself.

Modern constructivism – the stream that will be utilised for the purposes of this study and the stream which has been equated with "constructivism" in previous discussion – however, is concerned with a rather unique epistemological stance which could be 38 viewed as negotiated empiricism (Farrell, 2002:57;60-62; Barkin, 2003:326). This approach suggests that, despite a broadly constitutive ontological stance, and despite the inherent flaws of empiricism, knowledge acquisition through subject observation is still the best means available of pursuing scientific progress. That being said, borrowing to a degree from the assertions of the epistemological positions of rationalism and pragmatism (Smith, 1996:21-24), modern constructivists, in contrast to the rigid empiricism of mainstream theories, believe that both material and ideational dimensions of international activity are "observable" (Farrell, 2002:60- 61). They assert that ideational structures or social fact – that with which constructivism is preoccupied – while not directly observable, can be discerned via its physical "residue" (Farrell, 2002:60) and deduction. Because the constructivist thesis is concerned with shared ideas, norms and beliefs, rather than those of an individual necessarily, modern constructivists assert that such sharing requires its physical manifestation or articulation in some guise – whether it be in the form of rhetoric, legislation, official documentation, eye-witness testimony or group action. Accordingly, much of this study will be concerned with the analysis of such residue, in order to establish the role and nature of ideational factors in contemporary transnational terrorist activity.

Finally, it is worth mentioning a more facile distinction between modern and post- modern constructivism which is often alluded to in the literature, and which ultimately stems from the nature of their respective meta-theoretical positions. Post-modern constructivists, much like the broader post-modern tradition, in wholly disavowing positivism, tend to be preoccupied with the critique of the status quo (Phillips, 2007:64) and uninterested in endowing such research with any prescriptive value. Post-modern constructivists, as with other post-positivists, use social theory as "...a weapon for waging war on inequality and injustice in world politics" (Farrell, 2002:59). Accordingly, they tend to be pushed aside to the fringes of IR, alongside their post-positivist forebears. Modern constructivists, however, in embracing the value of at least a negotiated empiricist approach, have been more generally regarded as a legitimate intellectual competitor in IR, even pressuring positivist mainstream research into a gradual integration of a constructivist veneer in their research, through the acknowledgement of the role and influence of ideational factors in global political activity (Phillips, 2007:67-68). 39

3.1.2. Systemic constructivism and holistic constructivism

It is worth noting that, while not constituting as fundamental divergence as the modern/post-modern divide, there is a further distinction between two types of modern constructivist streams – systemic constructivism and holistic constructivism (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:268-269). Systemic constructivism, as first developed by Wendt, is a rather weak form of constructivism which conceives international action in the same narrowly systemic terms that mainstream theories do, with inordinate focus on the systemic level of analysis for understanding of all global politics. The relationship between agents and structures – an issue which will be explained in the following section – in systemic constructivism is largely relegated to an understanding in terms of the relationship between international institutional structures and states alone, completely ignoring agents and structures which may be situated at other levels of analysis.

As Price and Reus-Smit (1998:268-269) note, holistic constructivism, on the other hand, does not fall into the same trap and risk over-simplifying and narrowly conceiving international action. Holistic constructivism asserts that both domestic and international ideational sources potentially constitute structures pertinent to international affairs and, for the most part, that agency is not the sole territory of the state. Holistic constructivism, then, in realising that a multiplicity of influences have a bearing on a multiplicity of actors in international relations, asserts that all of these need be considered in analysis in order to establish a sufficiently complex understanding of global political reality. This study, accordingly, will concern itself with holistic constructivism, as it is wholly preoccupied with the activities of terrorist groups – non-state actors influenced by and influencing both domestic and international concerns.

3.2. The constructivist thesis

While the tenets of constructivism constitute a cohesive, interdependent set of assertions aimed towards a unified understanding of global politics, it is necessary to systematically discuss each such assertion in isolation in order to clearly apprehend their meaning, implications and relationship. 40

3.2.1. Norms and ideas

At the heart of constructivist thought is the notion of the latent presence of norms in any social activity, including international relations. Norms constructivists suggest, however, cannot be understood in isolation from ideas, as ideas constitute the essential building-blocks from which norms are derived. Jepperson et al. (1996:54) provide a rather straightforward distinction between ideas and norms and a convenient starting point for discussion: ideas are "beliefs about right and wrong held by individuals", while norms are "collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity". Ideas are, thus, fundamental assertions regarding propriety held by an individual entity which are transformed into group assertions regarding appropriate and, indeed, possible action (norms) through a process of implicit intersubjective agreement (Chandler, 2004:33; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:393).

Ideas, in isolation, constructivists contend, have little determinant value in the study of IR as they do not influence action beyond any one individual. Norms, however, are of critical importance, as they represent not only shared beliefs, but a concomitant shared commitment to action influenced by such belief (Risse & Sikkink, 1999:7), as will be elaborated on in the next section. Norms are considered the fundamental determinants within all global politics, because actors are group entities – a collection of individuals – and IR is concerned interactions between such groups, hence, action and interaction, constructivists propose, will be influenced by the nature and extent of shared norms. What provides such a conception with potentially remarkable analytical insight is the constructivist ontological position, asserting that new ideas provide the possibility of new, or at least modified norms (Phillips, 2007:64-65; Farrell, 2002:58-59; Risse & Sikkink, 1999:8). Norms, they thus suggest, are non-static and subject to revision by the myriad ideational forces perpetually present in social activity.

3.2.2. Identities, interests and action

The notion of identity, and its relationship with interests, builds upon constructivist notions of ideas and norms. The relationship is of critical importance because it constitutes the root of all action (Hopf, 1998:175). It specifies the exact nature of the 41 link between norms and action, providing a compelling rationale for how and why norms have the power to determine action.

Identities, constructivists suggest, are the basis of interests. This is because constructivists assert that "...the question of 'who am I?' is both logically and ontologically prior to the question of 'what do I want?' " (Phillips, 2007:62). The specific nature of an actor's identity, in turn, is wholly dependent upon their aggregate beliefs, which are, as discussed, dictated by intersubjectively established norms (Risse & Sikkink, 1999:7). Once established, however, identity – "who am I?" – necessarily has a bearing on interests – "what do I want?" – because in an actor committing itself to a set of beliefs, its interests, as a logical corollary, will reflect such beliefs. For instance, if a state subscribes to the norm that national security is defined in terms of relative capability distribution, its interests will be defined accordingly; the state will be interested in extending its capabilities to ensure security. Interests, in turn, necessarily direct action towards fulfilling such interests, thereby reinforcing and validating the held norm. That is to say, if a state is interested in extending its capabilities to ensure security, it will do so at the first given opportunity. If security is indeed perceived to be improved as a result, the norm of national security defined in terms of relative capability distribution will be reinforced and continue to guide action.

As Risse and Sikkink (1999:7) succinctly summarise, "[t]o endorse a norm not only expresses a belief, but also creates impetus for behaviour consistent with the belief". The notions of identity and interest formation is the means by which constructivists explicitly define the manner in which such impetus is established. The relationship between norms on the one hand and identity and interests on the other, is, however, not linear; just as norms influence action, so such action reinforces the norm it represents (Hopf, 1998:172-173). This relationship will be elaborated upon in the next section.

Prior to that, however, it is necessary to point out one further constructivist assertion regarding the nature and role of identity. As Hopf (1998:175) points out, identity is a rather more complex notion than it may at first appear – it not only establishes "who an actor is", but "who other actors are". Identity formation, then, introduces its own 42 plane of intersubjectivity, in that the establishment of agent identity is not only inextricably linked to group norm establishment, but is also inextricably linked to the identity of other actors. Hence, identity, and thus interests and action, is not determined by intersubjectively established norms alone, but also by the influence of an actor's perception of the identities of other actors.

3.2.3. The relationship between agents and structures

The constructivist view regarding the relationship between agents and structures has been alluded to in discussion regarding ideas and norms, and identities, interests and action, but need be fully articulated, as it is a central position of constructivist theory.

Discerning between the notions of agents and structure is made somewhat problematic by the constructivist assertion that the two mutually constitute each other (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267); they are, strictly speaking, inseparable, because the nature and existence of each relies upon that of the other. Regardless, an attempt will be made at discretely defining each so that such a mutually constitutive relationship can be better understood. In the most simplistic terms, agents can be equated with actors endowed with identity and interests which engender some "purposeful" (Wendt, 1987:337) action in international affairs, while structures can be equated with intersubjectively established norms (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267). Actors assume agency upon engaging in action, influenced by identity and interests, which is both of consequence to the nature of shared norms and to the nature of such shared identities and interests themselves.

Critically, while constructivists assert mutual constitution of agents and structures, "...constructivism does not, however, make any particular claims about the content of social structures or the nature of agents at work in social life" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:393). Thus, unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism, specific agents and structures are not predefined, but still mutually constitute each other. Any given actor is endowed with agency due to the influence of a complex matrix of intersubjectively established norms – ideational structures – endogenous to the global political system (Chandler, 2004:27-28). The nature of such ideational structures, however, is 43 likewise dependent upon the actions of the agent, because inherent to any action is the reproduction or entrenchment of whatever norm ultimately motivated such action (Phillips, 2007:62; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267). Any act is thus reflective of the norm which informed it and, thus, further entrenches that norm as the status quo; intersubjective norm establishment is predicated upon shared understanding and agreement, which is most profoundly reinforced by demonstrative action.

While this seems a rather complex notion, it is ultimately merely a construction of logic to endow constructivism with broad analytical utility in IR and to escape the failings of mainstream theories in predefining agents and structures, as well as the nature of their relationship. As discussed, neo-realism and neo-liberalism provide exemplars of IR activity which preclude them from adequately accounting for new transnational terrorism, because they include a predefined array of actors with a predefined array of interests which do not correlate with observed terrorist behaviour. By understanding terrorist action as a consequence of group-specific norms and vice versa, however, and without presuming anything regarding the nature of such agency and ideational structures prior to observation, constructivism is able to account not only for specific terrorist activity where mainstream theory cannot, but also for broader evolutions in terrorist behaviour as group norms similarly evolve.

The robust analytical utility of constructivism, thus, finally becomes apparent. A detailed account of the functioning of this agent-structure relationship within contemporary terrorism, in the specific case of the Al Qaeda terrorist group, will be discussed in Chapter 5.

4. Criticisms of the constructivist approach

While praised for the utility of its novel meta-theoretical position, the concessions required to occupy such a middle-ground between positivist and post-positivist traditions have garnered constructivism some criticism. Phillips (2007:64-66) provides a useful survey of some of the most notable critiques of the constructivist position.

4.1. Constructivism as utopianism

Reacting to early constructivist literature, realist proponents, such as Mearsheimer (Phillips, 2007:64-65), accused constructivism of utopianism. This was a quite reasonable protestation at the time, as much early constructivist research was preoccupied with the power of norm changes to precipitate positive global political change; how the adoption of "good" norms allowed for the establishment of a more desirable global political reality. As Farrell (2002:58-59) notes, however, this realist critique has become progressively less compelling as constructivists increasingly aim analysis at understanding the mechanics of both "good" and "bad" norms alike, thereby adopting a position of normatively-neutral observer.

4.2. Internally contradictory logic

A substantial criticism lodged at constructivism is that of a contradictory logic inherent in its conception of norms informing identity and thus interests and action (Phillips, 2007:65). Detractors suggest that, if an agent is perpetually exposed to a multiplicity of ideational structures – all the norms to which the agent is exposed – it is quite reasonable to suggest that a number of such norms would necessitate conflicting sets of interests. If "...actors are forced to reconcile the incompatible logics of appropriateness" (Phillips, 2007:65) necessitated by competing norms, the implicit suggestion made by constructivists is that an agent is endowed with a degree of self- consciousness; conflicting prescriptions of two disparate norms would draw attention to themselves and force the agent to consciously acknowledge the existence and influence of these norms, and decide between two competing sets of interests. This would tend to disparage the essential constructivist claim of action being dependent upon prevailing norms of conduct, if agents are aware of such norms and, thus, can rationally escape them.

While, again, this claim had validity with regards to early constructivist literature, it has been subsequently discredited as constructivists provide a more systematic articulation of their thesis, introducing mechanisms to account for issues such as measuring the relative strength of competing norms (Farrell, 2002:61; Legro, 1997:33-35). Furthermore, the criticism makes the fallacious assumption of the actor 45 as a monolithic, unitary entity. While this assumption might apply to systemic conceptions of constructivism, such as the theorising of Wendt (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:268-269), it does not apply to holistic conceptions of constructivism, where actors are consciously portrayed as group entities incapable of unitary cognition. That is to say, for the holistic constructivist, actor identities and interests are aggregate ones determined by intersubjective agreement, and, thus, cannot be understood in unitary rational terms as one might analyse individual action.

4.3. Insufficient ideational operationalisation

Finally, critics of constructivism point out that ideational factors are insufficiently operationalised. They suggest that insufficient guidelines are provided for outlining exactly how ideational factors manifest themselves and how they might be observed (Phillips, 2007:65). The problem with insufficient operationalisation, detractors suggest, allows for the possibility of post hoc justification of knowledge claims. Constructivists, they suggest, can analyse any global political activity and justify any knowledge claim made regarding such activity by only focusing on norms which justify their position. Constructivist studies, in this way, become non-falsifiable – unacceptable in the realm of empiricist scholarship.

While a post-modern constructivist, in rejecting empiricism, might merely point out that such non-falsifiability does not, ultimately, have any bearing upon the validity of the analysis, modern constructivists, in an attempt to garner mainstream acceptance and redress perceived shortcomings, have attempted to diminish the significance of such failings by developing more refined means of legitimate norm identification (Farrell, 2002:60; Legro, 1997:33-35). Increasingly, the assertion of norm existence is more concretely predicated upon the manifestation of norms in the material realm, as norm "residue" (Farrell, 2002:60) – physical evidence of shared norm existence through some form of inter-group communication such as legislation, rhetoric and official documentation. Moreover, constructivist scholars increasingly go to great lengths to operationalise ideational variables as rigidly as the perspective allows, establishing specific criteria for measuring norm strength based on such residue and establishing relevant norms prior to their use in analysis. Indeed, in Chapter 4, this study will utilise Legro's (1995:15-16; 1997:33-35) framework for measuring norm 46 strength to establish Al Qaeda's prominent group norms prior to their use in analysis in Chapter 5, thereby avoiding the pitfall of non-falsifiability.

Of course, due to their essential nature, attempts at operationalising norms will never be a rigid practice comparable to that, for example, of operationalising military power in terms of quantifiable available resources, and, thus, constructivism's negotiated empiricism will indefinitely remain a point of contention amongst staunch positivist proponents.

5. A Caveat Regarding Conventional Theory and the Role of Ideas

Prior to concluding discussion, it is crucial to once again stress that this study in no way suggests that constructivism's pre-occupation with the importance of ideational determinants is wholly unique or that such pre-occupation, in isolation, provides it with sufficient utility for analysis of new terrorism. Indeed, the crux of the preceding discussion is that it is the unique meta-theoretical position of constructivism compared to competing perspectives, coupled with its detailed conception of ideational concerns, that endows the approach with appropriate utility.

In addition to the post-positivist theories discussed, there are, indeed, various conventional approaches which are greatly concerned with the role of norms in international activity (Williams, 2004:634; Buzan, 2004:6-7), but which were excluded from the discussion of constructivism's historical context because they had little heuristic relevance. As mentioned in section 1.5., the purpose of establishing a rough disciplinary snapshot, with constructivism in the middle of two extremes, was not to provide an accurate or nuanced portrait of all competing perspectives, but rather to highlight its unique epistemology and ontology. For the sake of thoroughness, however, it is necessary to very briefly attend to some of these more ideationally oriented conventional approaches and highlight the manner in which their meta- theoretical orientation impairs their utility. The most notable of these approaches are classical realism and the international society strand of the English School.

5.1. Classical Realism

Classical realism, the intellectual forebear to neo-realism, shares much of the same pre-occupation with the role of power politics in a state-centric international system (Fozouni, 1995:480-481). Upon re-reading the works of seminal realist thinkers such as Carr and Morgenthau, however, many scholars contend that classical realists, while asserting that the international system is one of anarchy and that power is the currency of prosperity in such a climate of anarchy, also acknowledge that morality is inextricably linked to decision-making (Barkin, 2003:333; Williams, 2004:634). Classical realists, contrary to many popular conceptions, do not contend that states do always pursue power expansion, but rather that they should as a rational conclusion based on an ethical appraisal of the realities of the international system (Barkin, 2003:328-329). Indeed Carr suggests that "it is an unreal kind of realism which ignores the element of morality in any world order" (Barkin, 2003:333). While such an acknowledgement has certainly provided an avenue towards more complex classical realist analysis, attending to the non-material factors involved in state decision-making, it does little to alter the perspective's meta-theoretical grounding. The tradition remains grounded in a rigid ontology that provides an exemplar of international relations that is essentially static by assuming that the system will indefinitely be anarchic and hierarchically differentiated by power. Furthermore, although moral influence on rational decision-making provides constitutive insight to analysis, it in no way detracts from the tradition's endearing universal causal assertions; although ethical imperatives may shape how and why power is pursued, the pursuit of power itself is nonetheless assumed to be a rational inevitability.

5.2. International Society

Part of the English School, the international society approach, much like constructivism, claims to offer a novel middle-ground – in this case between realism and liberal idealism (Bell, 2008:54). Building on the work of Grotius and his notion of communitarianism, international society scholars such as Hedley Bull suggest that between the very realist, behaviouralist realm of the international system and the 48 very idealist, normative realm of world society (the Kantian notion of global cosmopolitanism), there lies a middle-ground of an international society (Buzan, 2004:7; Bell, 2008:54). Within this international society, it is suggested that the global system's anarchical nature engenders a rational response beyond that of the pursuit of power. States pursue the communal acceptance and institutional entrenchment of global norms and conventions of practice so as to minimise the detrimental consequences of an anarchical environment (Buzan, 2004:7). The practical value of collective faith in ideas, thus, is the central thrust of analysis. While one would expect that a theory which positions itself between positivist and normative approaches would have a meta-theoretical position much like constructivism and similar utility, this is not the case. While international society scholarship does present an epistemology reminiscent of that of constructivism, attempting to operationalise the non-material, it retains the rigid ontological lens of realism, with its predefined exemplar of state actors interacting in an environment of anarchy (Buzan, 2004:7).

Thus, while not all conventional theory ignores the significance of non-material factors in analysis, no conventional theory shares the unique meta-theoretical traits of the constructivist approach which, in concert with its focus on ideational determinants, establish an ideal platform for analysing a phenomenon such as new transnational terrorism.

Conclusion

Since the unprecedented conclusion to the Cold War, international relations have been devoid of a concrete status quo. With global politics in a state of flux, traditional, positivist theoretical approaches to IR, predicated on a static portraits of international relations functioning, such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism, are no longer able to adequately account for observed activity. Their post-positivist counterparts, meanwhile, despite recognising the complex, non-static reality of the international system, offer few avenues towards capitalising on such understanding and progressing the discipline. The meta-theoretical debate between positivists and post-positivists which characterised IR for much of the 1980s, thus, holds no more relevance, as neither side is able to reconcile theoretical sensitivity with pragmatic 49 sensitivity. The flaws of these two extremes, however, have paved the way for the rise to prominence of a theoretical middle-ground in IR theory – constructivism.

Constructivism emphasises the paramount importance of non-static ideational concerns in determining global political action while still understanding the value of pragmatism and disciplinary progression. It offers a unique approach to IR which offers a more profound understanding of the complexities of social reality, but not at the cost of practical utility. In short, constructivism, while not without flaw, provides the prospective researcher with a unique position from which to conduct analysis which draws upon the strengths of positivism and post-positivism alike. This unique position has led to the unprecedented rise to prominence of constructivism within IR, as scholars and policy-makers alike increasingly acknowledge the importance of an approach which accounts for the influence of ideational considerations.

Consensus over such importance has become particularly pronounced in the wake of the watershed 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center and Pentagon, as analysts in arguably the most conservative realm of IR, security studies, have begun to see the need for non-material insight into the seemingly irrational action of new transnational terrorists. By offering a template for understanding how specific group norms influence specific group action and how these norms and actions interact and evolve over time, constructivism offers comprehensive insight into phenomena considered anomalous by mainstream theory. The perspective, thus, is perfectly suited to the task of unpacking the worldview of a particular terrorist group so as to understand how its members' shared sense of propriety engenders observed behaviour over time, and explaining why such behaviour runs contrary to that which is anticipated by traditional theory.

Chapters 4 and 5 will concern themselves with exactly this sort of analysis, applying constructivism to the case of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation, comprehensively examining the ideational mechanisms informing its operations, thereby gaining insight into the peculiarities of the broader phenomenon of contemporary transnational terrorism, and extracting related policy prescriptions so as to endow the exercise with pragmatic utility. Prior to such analysis, however, it is both prudent and necessary to first examine the emergence of new transnational terrorism in general, 50 fully elaborating upon its origins and character so as to adequately frame Al Qaeda's selection for case study.

Chapter 3: The emergence of new transnational terror

Introduction

The emergence of new ideological terrorism is most readily associated with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the US, perpetrated by the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation in 2001. Although, as will be subsequently elaborated upon, contemporary transnational terrorism, in fact, has roots extending back long before 11 September 2001, the terrorist attacks of that day undoubtedly constitute the watershed event which entrenched new terrorism as a fixture in both the public consciousness and in the analysis of international security matters.

The significance of the attacks wholly stems from their peculiar nature when compared to previous transnational terrorist attacks which have taken place over the course of the last century. The "9/11" attacks, as they are often referred to, were unique for a number of reasons. They were carried out by a religiously-motivated organisation devoid of an overtly political agenda, or at least devoid of an agenda which was distinct from the terrorist act itself. That is to say, the attacks were not purely utilitarian in nature. They were not carried out solely to utilise the consequent public fear and outrage – the traditional terrorist "audience" – as a bargaining piece in largely unrelated political matters, but rather regarded such fear and outrage as part of the ultimate goal of the attacks. For the first time, a major transnational terrorist act could be classified as being non-utilitarian – the fundamental template for the prevailing ideological strain of contemporary terrorism which exists today. Suddenly, following the attacks, the majority of literature on terrorist cognition, motivation and operation became obsolete and terrorist analysis required a new sensitivity for previously irrelevant ideational considerations – a sensitivity which, as this investigation will endeavour to expose, has yet to be fully realised and which has much in common with the constructivist worldview.

This chapter will focus upon explaining and expanding upon the notion of new ideological terrorism, orienting it as a unique strain of transnational terrorism through the use of relevant terrorist typologies and highlighting and elaborating upon its defining characteristics. All of this will be done in order to provide a clear 52 understanding of the nature and dimensions of new ideological terrorism, highlighting the policy problem presented to security scholars and orienting Al Qaeda's selection for case study.

1. Clarifying the notion of "ideological" terrorism

Prior to delving into the nature of new, ideologically-motivated transnational terrorism, the specific use of the term “ideology” in the context of contemporary terrorism need be addressed and clarified. Ideology here does not refer to the narrow political sense of the term alone – that is, a particular predefined understanding of the idealised structure and functioning of state and society – but rather to a broader sense of the word. Ideology, in this sense, refers to a particular cognitive template for the interpretation of reality and the related normative perception of appropriate action in all spheres of existence, disseminated as a cohesive worldview by a few individuals, or ideologues, for the consumption of and adherence to by large groups (Aldis & Herd, 2007:246). An ideology is thus characterised by "...clusters of ideas, beliefs, opinions, values and attitudes that provide shared understandings of directives and plans of action to uphold, justify, change or criticise...social and political arrangements" (Aldis & Herd, 2007:246). Most important here is the power that such an all-encompassing worldview has in motivating, precipitating and justifying action (Gunaratna, 2007:21). Thus, ideology does not exist in abstraction alone, but has a direct bearing upon individual and group action and, in the case of new ideological terrorism, informs all activity, from member recruitment to organisational structure, and constitutes the central motivating logic behind any attack (Gunaratna, 2007:21).

While ideology has played a role in previous strains of transnational terrorism (for example, in Marxist terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades), such ideological imperatives were relegated to strictly political motives – normative conceptions of state structure – and manifested themselves in rational, strategic action undertaken towards the attainment of some parochial goal. The key difference between contemporary transnational terrorism and previous incarnations of transnational terrorist activity, thus, is rather straightforward, but nonetheless profound: a logic rooted in an all-encompassing ideology rather than conventional rationality means 53 that terrorism is no longer a utilitarian activity undertaken towards achieving some localised political objective, but rather one where the distinction between end and means become increasingly blurred in the pursuit of fundamental systemic change (Kegley, 2003:1-2; Gunaratna, 2007:29). Acts of violence and destruction have become objectives themselves in contemporary terrorist attacks rather than a necessary evil towards furthering the cause of a separate political agenda. Immediately, thus, one can draw parallels with this new breed of terror and the utility of constructivism in its analysis. If new terrorist groups are driven by their own notions of propriety rather than rationality, constructivism – which is wholly preoccupied with the determinant effect of specific ideational influences on specific actors – is far better equipped to provide appropriate insight than rationally-bound mainstream theory.

Critical to note too is that, because of the broad definition of new ideological terrorism utilised for this study, it becomes a banner term encompassing unnecessarily differentiated strains of contemporary terrorism which, although perhaps differing in specific structure, motivation or objectives, ultimately share essential common-ground. Hence, although "religious terrorism" and "ideological terrorism" are often used interchangeably in the relevant literature, and although religious terrorism is undoubtedly the most prominent and relevant type of contemporary transnational terrorism, religious terrorism is, in fact, a subset of ideological terrorism, as religion can be defined as a specific form of ideology. That being said, in practice, the examination of new ideological terrorism involves little other than the examination of religious terrorist groups and, consequently, the two terms can reliably be regarded as synonymous until such time as other strains of new ideological terror rise to international prominence.

Thus, in the examination of typologies in the following section, and, indeed, for the remainder of this study, observations regarding religious terrorism can be directly transposed onto the broader conceptualisation of new ideological terrorism.

2. Terrorist typologies and the unique nature of new ideological terrorism

A convenient starting point for orienting and contextualising new transnational terrorism is the utilisation of relevant terrorist typologies. Utilising such typologies provides a useful heuristic mechanism for establishing the history, progression and fundamental character of new terrorist activity, which will be subsequently expanded upon. Each typology, while specific in focus and terminology, serves as a handy means to contrast new terrorism with transnational terrorism in its various other guises. Rapoport's (2001:419-424; 2002:1-8; 2004:46-68) "four wave" typology and Whittaker (2003:19-21) and Cronin's (2003:39-42) respective motivation- differentiated typologies will each be examined in order to provide a sound basis for expanding upon the unique nature of new ideological terrorism in subsequent sections.

2.1. Rapoport's four waves of modern terror

Rapoport (2004:46) asserts that transnational terrorism, in any form, is by no means exclusively a phenomenon of the late 20th century onwards. He suggests, rather, that terrorist activity has, for more than a hundred years, exhibited a global character. It is this very global aspect which has led Rapoport to define terrorist activity since the late 19th century as “modern terrorism”. Rapoport provides an account of such modern terrorism as a cyclical process, comprising a number of discretely discernible “waves of terrorism” (Lizardo & Bergeson, 2003:3); distinct periods of global terrorist activity grouped together by a generally shared doctrine and pattern of interaction in each instance. This makes Rapoport's typology unique, in that he does not focus alone upon terrorist motivation or organisation type – although he acknowledges the ubiquitous presence of certain group-types throughout all the waves – but rather upon fundamental commonalities which constitute trends of terrorist activity (Rapoport, 2004:47). Such an approach is, thus, quite useful in attempting to adequately contextualise what could be regarded as the contemporary trend in transnational terrorist activity: new ideological terrorism (dealt with as "the religious wave" in this typology). Each of Rapoport's four waves will be briefly expanded upon, with particular emphasis on the religious wave.

2.1.1. The anarchist wave

The first wave of modern, global terrorism identified by Rapoport is the anarchist wave (Lizardo & Bergeson, 2003:3), spanning from the 1880s up until the 1920s. The wave's emergence as the first of truly global character coincided with advances in communication and transportation technologies which made this possible (Rapoport, 2002:2). Terrorist groups from around the world were provided, for the first time, with the opportunity to interact in a meaningful manner, allowing them to influence each other and, indeed, foreign publics. Furthermore, the dispersion of certain national groups around the world meant that terrorist organisations were endowed with potentially sympathetic diaspora abroad. Terrorist action was, thus, no longer insulated by state boundaries.

The catalysts of the first wave – as the name suggests – were Russian anarchists such as Vera Zasulich and Mikhail Bakunin (Rapoport, 2002:2; 2004:52). Russian anarchist authors contributed to the creation of a codified anarchist terrorist doctrine, comprising strategies of terrorist action to achieve group objectives that could be passed on to like-minded individuals and groups, perpetually being proliferated and refined (Rapoport, 2004:49). In many ways, the actions of the Russian anarchists paved the way for all subsequent global terrorist waves, wherein different groups are able to build upon a common body of doctrinal knowledge. For example, Al Qaeda's military training manual bears striking similarities to the works of the Russian anarchists; both are preoccupied with “...becoming more efficient by learning from the experiences of friends and enemies alike” (Rapoport, 2004:49).

The anarchists sought to redefine the role of the revolutionary. Rather than relying upon propaganda and ideological rhetoric to garner support for their cause – that is, the destruction of synthetic historical and social conventions and constructions which, they claimed, stifled humanity's true nature – anarchists asserted that their commitment to their ideals need be manifested in symbolic terrorist acts of both significant audacity and consequence (Rapoport, 2004:50). Such extreme acts, they contended, would compel institutional forces to respond in a manner that subverted the very conventions they upheld, and upon which they were predicated, thereby polarising society and making revolution possible. 56

While the anarchist worldview is, ultimately, of little consequence, their approach was of significant importance. Anarchists strived to be perceived as noble champions of their ideals, fully willing to die in order to attract support for their cause (Rapoport, 2001:419). Their tactics towards this end included focusing their efforts upon the assassination of public officials, using dynamite instead of handguns in their attempts, in order to both differentiate revolutionary from criminal and to obtain perceived martyrdom, and to welcome criminal prosecution as a public forum for institutional indictment (Rapoport, 2002:2-3; Mahan & Griset, 2008:40-41). The anarchist terrorist doctrine was regarded as an extreme but effective means towards a desirable end – an approach which spread throughout the world.

Russian anarchists actively sought to spread their doctrine, even if it was used towards different ends, by training aspirant rebel groups from other states, particularly from the Balkans (Rapoport, 2004:50). Anarchists who had fled Russia established a platform amongst foreign diaspora in an attempt to make their movement a global one, whilst simultaneously stimulating further similar movements abroad. Eventually a global network of like-minded terrorist movements sharing a common doctrine emerged, each quite willing to assist others where they could, with planning, arms, financial resources and personnel, in achieving their individual objectives (Rapoport, 2004:51). Terrorism, for the first time, adopted a truly transnational character, as group operations spread across various territories – The Terrorist Brigade group, for example, had headquarters in Switzerland, launched attacks from Finland, were armed by Armenian terrorists and were offered Japanese funding (Rapoport, 2004:52).

2.1.2. The anti-colonial wave

After the four years of brutal world war precipitated by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 – a consequence of the anarchist doctrine – the anarchist wave waned and a new wave emerged (Lizardo & Bergeson, 2003:3; Cronin, 2003:35-36). The anti-colonial wave, the second wave of global terrorism according to Rapoport, lasted from the 1920s until the 1960s.

Whereas the anarchist wave attained global proportions because of the conscious efforts of its participants, terrorist action in the second wave assumed global dimensions because of a single event of international significance – the signing of the Treaty of Versailles following the First World War. In pursuing the principle of self- determination in their redrawing of state boundaries of post-war Europe, the victorious Allied powers invalidated the legitimacy of their own remaining colonial territories as well as the legitimacy of post-war mandated territories (Cronin, 2003:36). Terrorist groups around the world seeking national liberation or secession were provided with a common motivation and a common justification – the right of self-determination (Rapoport, 2001:420).

As their cause was generally perceived by the public as righteous – with terrorist groups often enjoying majority support within their state of origin – and because second wave groups generally wished to integrate into mainstream politics once independence was achieved, a new rhetoric emerged – that of the “freedom fighter” (Rapoport, 2004:54). The term was originally used by the Israeli nationalist group, Irgun, around the end of the Second World War (Rapoport, 2004:54), but was quickly echoed amongst anti-colonial organisations worldwide, as they saw the value in shifting the public focus from means to purpose.

Although the diffusion of a common motivation and perception is a key aspect providing the anti-colonial wave with its character, the movement was not without a shared doctrine too. The assassinations of notable political officials and the martyrdom inextricably linked with the anarchist wave were largely absent in the second wave (Rapoport, 2002:3). Rather, anti-colonial terrorists utilised guerrilla tactics to forward their agenda. They focused attacks upon police until such time as military personnel were dispatched in their place. By continuing the use of guerrilla tactics in attacks against the military – ambushes hit-and-run attacks and undercover civilian attacks – anti-colonial forces sought to demoralise and provoke the opposition to the point of committing counter-atrocities, thereby garnering public support for their endeavours. Although the implicit atrocities committed in pursuing guerrilla tactics, both because of the contravention of the rules of war and because of the potential civilian casualties, are equatable to any counter-atrocities committed by armed forces, public perception tended to regard military action as the excessive 58 might of the state and rebel action as an unfortunate necessity. Such strategies, as was the case with the anarchist wave, were often codified by one group for the benefit of similar groups in other regions – for example, the publication of “guerrilla War” by the Cypriot nationalist, Georgios Grivas (Rapoport, 2004:49).

While there existed such a fraternity of common rebellion, unlike the first wave, anti- colonial groups tended to prioritise unitary group interests instead of embracing a shared global identity (Rapoport, 2004:55) – ostensibly to ensure mass popular support from their constituent publics, which was predicated upon fervent nationalist sentiment. What emerged as more significant in the second wave, was the role of global diaspora. The efforts of Israeli and Irish nationalist groups, for instance, were greatly aided by diaspora communities in the United States, who offered terrorist groups volunteers, arms and capital, as well as soliciting US government support. Thus, although terrorist group-identity was predicated upon national identity in the second wave, such national identity was not constrained by national boundaries. The ability of such group identity to supersede any territorial constraints is a common feature of all the terrorist waves.

2.1.3. The New Left wave

As aspirant states gradually gained independence throughout the second wave, the movement lost momentum. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the New Left wave assumed the mantle of successor to the anti-colonial wave, becoming the third wave of modern terrorism (Lizardo & Bergeson, 2003:4). Much as the anarchist wave saw the actions of Russian rebel groups precipitate a global movement, the New Left wave was sparked by the actions of the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War (Rapoport, 2001:420-421). The success of the Viet Cong guerrilla forces' crude tactics, in repelling the might and technological prowess of invading US forces, offered hope to new revolutionary left-wing factions worldwide, even in the heart of the capitalist West (Cronin, 2003:37). New Left radical groups believed that subversion, destruction and reform of the prevailing global political order was possible through campaigns comparable to those witnessed during the anarchist wave. Large scale political structural reform, however, seemed more pragmatically feasible during this period, compared to the first wave. The Cold War had divided the 59 world along ideological lines – in the narrow, political sense of the term – and the Soviet Union was eager to encourage and assist such New Left groups with moral support, training and weapons (Rapoport, 2004:56).

Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) took up the position of central wave stimulus (Rapoport, 2001:421). The PLO's resilient struggle against Israel – the perceived symbol of the West within the Middle East – garnered the organisation global admiration amongst New Left groups. Utilising Soviet and Arab funding, the PLO established terrorist training facilities in Lebanon, which it opened up to like-minded groups around the globe (Rapoport, 2004:56). The PLO, in the process, diffused its core belief – that the most effective means of realising group objectives was through audacious and “theatrical” acts of terrorism; that terror could be utilised to bend the will of an adversary as desired. Thus, while, as will be shown, the third wave doctrine bears a striking resemblance to first wave doctrine, they differ in intent and ethos. Rather than using terror as a platform to play both hero and martyr, the New Left was preoccupied with the leverage inherent in the fear and hysteria produced by a terrorist attack.

With such “theatre” in mind, the tactics of New Left organisations included acts unprecedented in scale and audacity. The most prominent third wave strategy was that of hostage-taking through various means – including the kidnapping of prominent public officials, aircraft hijackings and even the duress of entire parliaments or courts (Rapoport, 2002:4). Seven hundred instances of aircraft hijacking alone were recorded during the thirty year wave period (Rapoport, 2004:57). The practice of public figure assassination – a primary feature of the first wave – was also revived in the third wave. However, such New Left assassinations tended to be more calculated, serving symbolic utilities as acts of punishment against leaders and officials perceived to be acting in opposition to terrorist goal attainment.

Along with the unprecedented scale of New Left terrorist attacks, the third wave also witnessed unprecedented levels of inter-organisational unity and cooperation (Rapoport, 2004:58). In addition to PLO and Cuban global training facilities, different third wave groups often collaborated in the actual planning and execution of terrorist 60 attacks. Furthermore, these attacks frequently occurred on foreign soil and were directed at targets of global rather than parochial significance. The third wave extended the international character of terrorism beyond the mutual assistance, shared ethos and shared doctrine of the first two waves; there was a coalescence of target, purpose and objectives in such a way that all third wave organisations were coplanar actors upon a unified global stage. The significance of state boundaries was further diluted (Rapoport, 2004:58).

This new level of mutually-identified revolutionary loyalty, however, meant that third wave groups were not particularly successful in achieving their goals (Rapoport, 2004:58). The support received by nationalist groups in the second wave from domestic constituencies and diaspora was absent in the third wave, as the majority of the general populace was alienated by the New Left movement's radical ethos, international character and extreme tactics. Furthermore, global revolutionary solidarity had the effect of diluting and muddying individual group objectives and over-extending individual group agendas. Thus, while highly successful in engendering terror en masse, third wave terrorist groups were seldom able to utilise this as effective leverage to realise their goals.

2.1.4. The religious wave

While the fourth wave of terrorism, the religious wave, is identified by Rapoport as having been initiated during the course of the third wave in 1979, he asserts that it only gathered significant momentum as the third wave stagnated. As Lizardo and Bergeson suggest (2003:4), the religious wave – the current wave of modern terrorism according to Rapoport – differs significantly from previous waves.

In many ways, the essential nature of transnational religious terrorism circumvents many of the obstacles encountered by terrorist groups in previous waves. By making religion the basis of group ambition, mutual group identification and constituency mobilisation, the religious wave sees similar levels of global interaction and global focus as witnessed in the third wave, but not at the expense of domestic support, global sympathy and goal attainment. Because religion – as opposed to purely political motives – is so transcendent, both terrorist groups and the general populace 61 to whom they appeal are able to agree upon a unity of purpose. This purpose, however, is itself markedly different to previous waves, in that the act of terrorism itself becomes an end – a religious duty undertaken either in opposition to perceived adversaries or to pursue some holy directive (Lizardo & Bergeson, 2003:4). For example, Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups generally carry out attacks in order to destroy subversive Western influence, while doomsday groups attempt to accelerate the onset of Armageddon (Ferguson and Potter, 2005:18-19). End and means amount to one and the same, and appeal to all who subscribe to a particular religious doctrine.

While, as Rapoport notes (2004:61), active terrorist groups in the religious wave include apocalyptic groups, such as Christian Identity organisations in the US or Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and isolated extremist groups among major religions, the movement is largely synonymous with the activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups. There is no doubt that Islamic extremists have conducted the most extreme and globally significant terrorist acts in the wave so far. Indeed, their actions ostensibly constitute the template for the religious wave conception. It is because of this centrality of Islam that the fourth wave is considered as having begun in 1979, a watershed year for those of the Muslim faith. The year – the religiously significant beginning of a new century in the Islamic calender – saw both revolution in Iran, where a Shi'i Islamic state was created, and the beginning of the ill-fated Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Rapoport, 2002:5). Iran subsequently began assisting Shi'i terrorist movements throughout the Middle East, while the veterans of the Afghan conflict – as will be discussed in detail in the case study of Al Qaeda – were inspired to utilise their martial expertise to start terrorist groups worldwide to forward the cause of global Islam. These events were the catalyst for the marriage between political and religious ambitions, which, in contemporary analysis of international relations, can no longer be regarded as mutually exclusive.

With regards to doctrine, the most noteworthy innovation of the fourth wave has been the use of “suicide bombings” by a number of different groups (Rapoport, 2004:62). While somewhat reminiscent of the anarchist use of dynamite attacks, there is an important motivational distinction. While martyrdom in the case of the anarchist was a symbolic act towards achieving a perceived noble group objective, 62 suicide bombings are perceived as a noble end in themselves – the simultaneous death of holy enemies and the attainment of a literal martyrdom. The assassinations and hostage-taking that were prevalent in the third wave have persisted, but their occurrence has been nowhere near as prolific (Rapoport, 2002:5).

Another interesting characteristic of the fourth wave related to its unique religious character is the decline in the number of global terrorist organisations since the end of the third wave (Rapoport, 2004:63). Since, as suggested, religion is far more transcendent than nationality or political ideology, fewer groups need to compete for the interests of their constituencies, as the interests of a particular religious group are largely uniform, regardless of temporal and spatial concerns. Thus, there exist now a relatively small number of terrorist groups, but such groups – due to their religious basis – are endowed with unprecedented global support, global reach and member-fanaticism.

This assertion is substantiated by fact, with approximately 28 active, singularly religiously-motivated terrorist groups being identified by the US Department of State as existing today (U.S. Department of State, 2010: Internet). Furthermore, these groups constitute the majority of active transnational terrorist groups, with the remainder of the identified groups largely consisting of waning movements from the second and third waves, lending credence to Rapoport's assertion that the current, ascendant terrorist wave is undoubtedly the religious wave. The fact that the vast majority of these religious terrorist groups, in turn, are Islamic extremist groups, also lends credence to the assertion that Islamic fundamentalist organisations constitute the most prevalent manifestations of religious terrorism.

2.2. Whittaker's motivation typology

While Rapoport's typology is particularly useful for providing context, it is somewhat cumbersome in analytical application. In contrast to such a broad-reaching and historical account of transnational terrorist differentiation, Whittaker (2003:19-21) offers a succinct, parsimonious and non-temporally bound typology. Whittaker identifies three types of terrorist group motivation according to which, he suggests, 63 all terrorist organisations can be classified: rational motivation, psychological motivation and cultural motivation.

2.2.1. Rational motivation

Terrorist groups informed by rational motivation, suggests Whittaker (2003:19), pursue terrorism as a reasoned course of action to obtain certain desired objectives, usually in the form of political transformation. A terrorist attack is only undertaken following an appropriate cost-benefit analysis, assessing whether terrorism is the most effective means of obtaining said objectives and ascertaining whether the risk in doing so is sufficiently marginal so as not to compromise the success of the course of action. Terrorism here, thus, is merely one possible course of action weighed up against various other possible courses of action taken towards goal attainment, assessed in terms of effectiveness, consequence and chance of success. There is, accordingly, little affective value attached to terrorist acts themselves, with affect, rather, being reserved for group objectives; terrorism is seen merely as an effective, albeit extreme, means to a desirable end (Whittaker, 2003:19). Whittaker's notion of rational motivation, thus, is one of utilitarianism, where the terrorist act itself is irrelevant, and issues of value and morality are only considered applicable when examining the purpose or consequences of the act. The vast majority of transnational terrorist groups that have merged over the course of the last century can be placed in this category, including all of those alluded to by Rapoport (2004:46-61) in his exposition of the first three waves of terror.

2.2.2. Psychological motivation

The notion of psychological motivation, as described by Whittaker (2003:20), is preoccupied with the role of the compulsion of individuals within group structures to preserve and propagate group membership and group existence. Terrorist groups motivated by psychological considerations, thus, are comprised of a collection of individuals who regard the symbolic and psychological significance of the terrorist organisation itself as superseding that of the organisation's stated objectives. That is to say, factors such as the notion of fraternity and group identity play a greater role in precipitating terrorist activity than any true fervour for a perceived higher ideal or 64 future goal attainment (Whittaker, 2003:20). Enamoured with the profound experience of "belonging" or "acceptance" elicited by terrorist group membership, all members of the group concurrently act so as to ensure that the group, and thus the related psychological attachment, continues to exist. As a terrorist group is ultimately defined as such by perpetrating terrorist acts, group members driven by psychological motivation will ensure that such terrorist acts continue to be perpetrated so that the group endures. Remarkably, thus, in the case of psychological motivation, neither the acts of terrorism themselves nor the stated ideals or objectives of a terrorist group possess much relevance. The Baader- Meinhof Group, the forerunner to the German Red Army Faction (RAF), for example, while seemingly nothing more than another extreme leftist terrorist group, is in fact in many quarters assumed to have endured more because group members' shared guilt towards their parents' Nazi leanings than any significant anti-imperialist convictions (Hudson, 1999: Internet); their shared sense of belonging to a meaningful radical cause assuaged the anxiety caused by their fascist origins, becoming more important than the cause itself.

Naturally, without the extreme of superseding group acts and ideals, such psychological motivation is likely to be present to some extent in all terrorist groups, albeit only amongst certain individuals and without being prevalent enough to define the group as a whole.

2.2.3. Cultural motivation

Whittaker's conception of culturally-motivated terrorism broadly parallels the notion of new ideological terrorism – although culturally-motivated groups are not-necessarily transnational in character – and comprises organisations such as Abu Sayyaf and Aum Shinrikyo. Terrorists informed by cultural motivation engage in activity embedded within and inextricably linked to a broader cultural context (Whittaker, 2003:21). Many cultures emphasise communal values and imperatives over those of the individual, with such values and imperatives often possessing a seemingly irrational character. Terrorist groups embedded within these cultures, Whittaker (2003:21) suggests, are compelled to forward such irrational communal interests through terrorist means, with self-sacrifice being seen as necessary for the 65 attainment of these group interests. Those outside of this cultural community, in turn, tend to be objectified and dehumanised to the extent that culturally-motivated terrorists do not scruple to commit violent acts against them (Mahan & Griset, 2008:90).

This phenomenon, Whittaker (2003:21) asserts, is even more acutely realised in the case of religious group identification, as terrorist action is seen not only as forwarding crucial group interests, but such group interests – and thus the means by which they are fulfilled – are perceived as being intrinsically just and righteous. That is to say, in the case of religiously-motivated terrorism, moral ambiguity is not only removed, but terrorist action is endowed with an inherent moral correctness. Whereas utilitarian, rationally-motivated terrorists view terrorist action as extreme means toward a just end, religious terrorists make no such distinction between means and end, viewing terrorist action as divine duty rather than unfortunate necessity.

2.3. Cronin's motivation typology

Cronin (2003:29-42) offers another motivation-differentiated typology which falls somewhere between Whittaker and Rapoport's typologies, mirroring Whittaker's analytical utility, but also drawing from the insight of Rapoport to acknowledge the existence of "trends" in terrorism and to couple motivations with certain observed doctrinal proclivities.

Cronin identifies four types of terrorist groups, defined by the nature of their particular motivation: leftist, rightist, ethnonationalist/separatist and "sacred" or religious terrorists. In her classification, Cronin acknowledges both that these labels are not wholly mutually exclusive, although one form of motivation tends to assume primacy, and that leftist and rightist groups have become much less prominent over the course of the last century.

2.3.1. Leftist terrorists

Leftist, or left-wing, terrorist organisations are broadly associated with the communist movement (Cronin, 2003:39). Ranging from extremist liberal to radical groups, leftist terrorists tend to pursue "...revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, antimaterialistic agendas" (Cronin, 2003:39). Their specific objectives, with regards to the exact nature of political and structural reform they claim to desire, tend, however to be rather vague or malformed; they are, as is often the case amongst radical proponents, concerned more with unsatisfactory aspects of the status quo than with specific suggestions for societal reform. Terrorist acts perpetrated by such groups tend to be in the form of violent criminal acts directed at symbols of the elite (Cronin, 2003:39) such as government officials and public institutions. Notable leftist terrorist groups include the Red Brigades (BR), the Shining Path and the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N).

2.3.2. Rightist terrorists

Rightist, or right-wing, terrorist groups are an interesting classification that can, in fact, be considered another subset of new ideological terrorism, but are of marginal importance for the purposes of this study as they rarely exhibit a transnational character, or at least one which seriously threatens international peace and security. The origins of rightist terrorism can be found in the mid-twentieth century fascist movement (Cronin, 2003:39). Hence, rightist terrorists' primary motivation tends to be that of bigotry – ill-regard or hatred towards specific ethnic, racial or religious groups (Cronin, 2003:40). Over the years, the movement has devolved in such a way that most rightist groups have little in the way of a coherent political agenda and are devoid of rigid structure and planning (Cronin, 2003:40). Instead, rightist terrorists tend to be opportunists, capitalising on circumstance rather than perpetrating calculated attacks, directing terrorist action towards members of their particular target groups when the chance arises. Such tendencies, at least in modern incarnations of right-wing terrorists, allow for rightist groups to be included under the banner of new ideological terrorists, in that the primary purpose of any given terrorist act tends not to extend beyond the act itself. Notable rightist terrorist groups include 67 the US-based Arynan Nations (AN) and similar Christian Identitiy movement organisations.

2.3.3. Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorists

Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist groups are associated with the global decolonisation process, particularly in the aftermath of World War II (Cronin, 2003:29). Ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist groups are roughly analogous to Whittaker's notion of rationally-motivated terrorists; ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist organisations have clearly defined political objectives – usually related to secession predicated on ethnic homogeneity or historical entitlement – which are realistically realisable and which can be realised through the rational utilisation of terrorist tactics to garner popular support for their cause amongst their particular constituency (Cronin, 2003:40). This rational approach is somewhat of a double- edged sword. On the one hand, the perceived justness of a ethnonationalist/separatist group's cause and the utilitarian nature of their attacks tends to engender unparalleled support from their constituent publics, endowing them with significant longevity (Cronin, 2003:29). On the other hand, the comparatively conventional nature of ethnonationalist/separatist groups, operating within the traditional boundaries of a state-centric global political system, means that their activities are more easily anticipated and counteracted by security specialists. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the seemingly volatile, unpredictable and alien nature of contemporary, ideologically-motivated terrorist activity. Active ethnonationalist/separatist groups include the Basque Homeland and Freedom group (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

2.3.4. "Sacred" or religious terrorists

Cronin's conception of religious, or sacred, terrorist groups parallels both Rapoport's religious wave and Whittaker's cultural motivation conceptions, and includes organisations such as Hamas' Al Qassam Brigades and Al Qaeda. Cronin (2003:39) asserts, once again, that religious terrorism is undoubtedly the most prominent form of terrorist activity in contemporary international relations. She characterises religious terrorism by focusing specifically on the ways in which a wholly irrational, 68 religiously-informed motivation for pursuing terrorist activity impacts upon such groups' propensity for unpredictability and extreme acts of violence.

Firstly, as alluded to by Whittaker (2003:21), religious motivation causes members of a religious terrorist group to view the world in very clearly defined terms of "us" and "them"; not subscribing to the beliefs of a given religious terrorist group automatically dehumanises "non-believers", relegating them to the position infidels (Cronin, 2003:41). This outlook has the consequence of potentially unlimited extremes of violence, as religious convictions absolve religious terrorists from any moral quandary. Indeed, religious motivation endows the destruction of out-groups with inherent righteousness and, thus, desirability. Furthermore, this means that, as "them" inevitably constitutes the majority of humanity, religious terrorists establish an unprecedented breadth of potential targets for attack.

Secondly, as Cronin (2003:41) points out, religious terrorists carry out acts of violence ostensibly to honour the perceived wishes of their particular deity. This leads to substantial unpredictability, as such perceived wishes of a deity are open to a range of interpretations and, indeed, to purposefully extreme interpretations to suit the whims of a group leader or ideologue. Likewise, if group motivation is directed at pleasing some perceived metaphysical entity rather than any tangible constituency, religious terrorists are able to continue unconstrained by public sentiment (Cronin, 2003:41) – that to which terrorist groups have been traditionally bound.

Thirdly, not only does religious motivation remove religious terrorists from the constraints of secular laws and values (Cronin, 2003:41), as they perceive themselves as championing a higher cause, but it, in fact, places religious terrorist groups in direct opposition to the prevailing global political order. This is because the largely secular, systematised, logically-derived arrangement that is the Westphalian system of sovereign states – or at least the contemporary, evolved incarnation thereof – predicated on laws of rationality and pragmatism, is the antithesis of the wholly religiously-informed global order many religious terrorist groups wish to see realised (Cronin, 2003:41). Thus, not only do religious terrorists proceed without concern for international law and order; they, in most cases, actively attempt to subvert and dismantle it. This is in stark contrast to conventional, 69 ethnonationalist/separatist terrorist groups, who ostensibly operate from within the global political system, rather than without and against it.

Finally, as alluded to by Rapoport, because of the uniquely transcendent nature of religion, religious terrorist groups are able to garner support and recruits for their activities worldwide (Cronin, 2003:41). Global support is not restricted to ethnic diaspora or oppressed groups with comparable domestic political conditions as is the case with other terrorist organisation types; a shared religious conviction, regardless of specific circumstance, provides sufficient common-ground for cooperation. The consequence of this is twofold. Firstly, contemporary, religious terrorist organisations tend to assume the form of vast, complex, worldwide networks of unprecedented sophistication, making them particularly difficult to counteract or even discretely identify (Cronin, 2003:41). Secondly, and as a corollary, such organisations, in contrast to other types of terrorist groups, often have no permanent territorial base or association; they are able to possess a truly fluid, transnational character. This renders traditional methods of eliminating or even stifling terrorist groups almost wholly inert in the case of religious terrorists.

3. Characteristics of contemporary ideological terrorism

While the preceding terrorist typologies are useful in adequately orienting and contextualising contemporary ideological terrorism, their differences in specific nomenclature and conceptual focus provide a rather unfocused portrait of new terrorist activity. Thus, drawing from these typologies, as well as a number of other sources, it is both necessary and appropriate to provide a clear and focused summary of the various unique and defining characteristics of new terrorism. Those characteristics previously alluded to will be discussed only briefly, to avoid unnecessary repetition.

3.1. Non-utilitarianism

The single most striking characteristic of new terrorism is its non-utilitarian nature. As suggested previously, this refers to how new ideological terrorists regard the calculated acts of violence they perpetrate as ends in themselves, rather than an 70 instrumental means of fulfilling some largely unrelated political objective as has historically been the case with transnational terrorist activity (Cronin, 2003:51; Kegley, 2003:2; Whittaker, 2003:19-21; Wedgewood, 2002:328; O'Neil, 2003:107). No longer can transnational terrorism be analysed, interpreted and, indeed, counteracted through the lens of rationality. The established paradigm of terrorism as theatre – using dramatic acts of violence directed at innocent publics as a means of garnering attention for a terrorist group's separate political objectives (for example, secession or emancipation) and as leverage in negotiations with state governments – is no longer applicable. The nature of new terrorism's ideological core means that group objectives do not, as will be discussed, extend beyond eliminating those who do not share their worldview and entrenching this worldview globally, establishing a new, homogeneous world order which reflects group normative commitments. Both of these objectives are perceived as being directly achievable through violent means – destruction of those outside the organisation results in both less non-adherents and less opposition.

3.2. The role of ideologues

Ideology, as alluded to earlier, refers to a cosmetically cohesive framework of empirical and normative assertions regarding social and political reality which provide a regularised means of guiding cognition and action amongst a group which adopts it (Gunaratna, 2007:21; Aldis & Herd, 2007:246). In the case of a terrorist group, thus, the particular ideology which they adopt influences both the manner in which they perceive global political action and social realities – whether that be favourably or unfavourably – and, as a consequence, what constitutes appropriate action in response.

Mutual group subscription to such an ideological platform does not, however, arise spontaneously. Indeed, contemporary ideological terrorism is in part characterised by the important role played by ideologues in constructing a coherent ideology, disseminating this ideology amongst the masses, inculcating the values and imperatives of the ideology amongst prospective adherents and initiating terrorist action pursued in championing these values and imperatives (Gunaratna, 2007:21). As new ideological terrorism is, as will be elaborated upon, divorced from concerns 71 of specific national context and, thus, devoid of a natural catalyst of terrorist group formation, new terrorist groups require certain individuals to act as mobilising entities and leaders. It is the essential character and specific worldview of these ideologues, accordingly, which establish the ultimate nature of the terrorist organisation.

It is important to note, however, that ideologues, in disseminating a particular worldview, often have politically rather than religiously or ideologically-informed objectives (Marvasti, 2008:41). New terrorist groups are often initiated by individuals with a certain political objective in mind, consciously constructing group norms which best attract membership and best help realise the fulfilment of such objectives. The point, though, is ultimately moot, as, in inculcating group members with a particular all-encompassing worldview, new terrorist groups inevitably “take on a life of their own”, with group members pursuing action informed solely by group norms long after the fulfilment of any initial specific political objective. This is particularly true in the case of complex cell-structure type organisations such as Al Qaeda, where, as will be elaborated upon in the next section, regardless of initial motives, a specific ideology and doctrine become self-replicating, with cells territorially and politically unbound to the initial movement establishing themselves of their own volition (O'Neil, 2003:106; Cronin, 2003:42). Indeed, as will be seen in the case of Al Qaeda in Iraq, in Chapter 5, conscious attempts by ideologues to artificially manipulate an organisation's worldview towards some parochial political objective, once group norms have been firmly entrenched, are generally met with resistance or loss of membership.

3.3. Lack of a discretely identifiable territorial base

New terrorist groups generally exist untethered to a particular territorial base. Because of the transcendent nature of ideology, new ideological terrorist organisations tend to establish decentralised global networks, comprised of associated cells of followers found wherever the organisation's worldview resonates (O'Neil, 2003:106; Cronin, 2003:42); these groups attach little importance or relevance to the arbitrary borders of the international state system and are concerned more with common interest than common background (Mendelsohn, 2005:55; Cronin, 2003:41-42; Gunaratna, 2007:21). This tendency is in stark 72 contrast to previous forms of transnational terrorism where, although fully willing to offer mutual assistance to like-minded groups, terrorist organisations remained discretely discernible entities bound to a specific territorial base and with political agendas inextricably linked to the specific context of that territorial base.

It is worth noting, however, that there are certain exceptions to this characteristic. There are a handful of new terrorist groups that, while being motivated primarily by ideational concerns, tether their non-utilitarian objectives to their particular geographic base. Groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, for example, largely share the fundamentalist worldview of Al Qaeda, but restrict the attendant goals of Western destruction and Islamic unity to the confines of their particular territories (Cronin et al, 2004:56; Bruton, 2009:88; BBC News, 2009: Internet).

3.4. Systemic revolution

As stated by Kegley (2003:2), contemporary terrorism is "...conducted by ideological terrorists with grandiose revolutionary ambitions acting transnationally to transform the international status quo". What is suggested here, is that new terrorism is concerned with a different sort of revolutionary aim to previous terrorist movements (O'Neil, 2003:106). Rather than seeking to subvert the established political or social order within a particular state or seeking to secede and redraw state boundaries, contemporary ideological terrorists seek to wholly destroy the essential international order and replace it with one of their own imagining (Mendelsohn, 2005:54; Cronin, 2003:41). As Simon (2003:18) puts it, new ideological terrorists adopt "maximalist" objectives. They reject the fundamental ordering principles of the existing global political order and are opposed to prevailing international norms and conventions (Wedgewood, 2002:329). They, thus, regard the status quo as wholly untenable and preoccupy themselves with substituting this order with their own perceived utopia.

3.5. Immunity to traditional methods of counteraction

A further peculiarity of new ideological terrorism, when compared with other strains of terrorism, is the dilemma it poses for counter-terrorist policy-makers. Traditional, 73 state-centric methods used in counteracting global terrorist threats are of little utility when dealing with new terrorist groups (Simon, 2003:18; O'Neil, 2003:106). The nature of new terrorist groups is such that they do not respond well to either the carrot or the stick. The extremity of their objectives – the fundamental reconstruction of the global political system – coupled with their intrinsic lack of rationality means that contemporary ideological terrorist groups cannot be bargained with or placated. That is to say, while a secessionist terrorist movement may be appeased by a middle-ground of functional autonomy without statehood, when a group's aim is the complete destruction of the status quo, there is nothing comparable that can be used as an inducement. Similarly, traditional counter-terrorist measures of deterrence and retaliation are made impossible by the complex, sprawling nature of new ideological terrorist organisations, coupled with their lack of a distinct territorial base. Existing counter-terrorist methods are predicated on the assumption that terrorist groups work within the confines of the international state system – an assumption rendered erroneous by the rise to prominence of new ideological terrorism.

This once again highlights the importance and practical value of this particular study in its attempt to provide a comprehensive portrait of contemporary transnational terrorism which takes into account those dimensions traditional analyses tend to disregard, by examining the ideational mechanisms which inform terrorist action in the specific case of Al Qaeda, and utilising such insight to suggest possible avenues towards counteracting new terrorism in general in the future.

3.6. Group numbers and sophistication

As established in the discussion of Rapoport's (2004:63) fourth wave conception of contemporary terrorism, new terrorism is further characterised by a decline in the number of active transnational terrorist groups when compared with previous decades, due to its transcendent, non-territorially specific nature. Coupled with this decline in terrorist organisation numbers is a concurrent trend towards increasing organisational complexity. Such complexity does not refer alone to the globally- dispersed, increasingly amorphous organisational structure of terrorist groups discussed previously (Cronin, 2003:42;44-45), but also to increasing complexity with regards to utilisation of technology and means of funding. 74

New terrorist groups make extensive use of modern information and communication technologies for myriad purposes (Mahan & Griset, 2008:289; Homer-Dixon, 2002:54-55; Cronin, 2003:46-48; O'Neil, 2003:106). Many have professional- standard websites in multiple languages to both disseminate propaganda and interact with potential recruits. Encrypted electronic mail and instant messaging are used alongside mobile phones to coordinate operations and plan attacks. The Internet is utilised as an information source for the construction of illicit munitions and for logistical information for planning attacks. Some groups have even gone so far as to recruit skilled "hackers", in order to illegally obtain intelligence information (Cronin, 2003:48). Regardless of the specific use of technology, however, the consequence of this trend towards increased technological complexity is rather straightforward: with new terrorist organisations having access to a global pool of potential recruits, a reliable means of clandestine communication and a freely available information source for technical knowledge, the potential exists for them to undertake attacks of unprecedented scope and precision.

Along with such technological sophistication, contemporary ideological terrorist groups have developed efficient, convoluted strategies for acquiring necessary funding (Cronin, 2003:49-50). New terrorist groups are characterised by an associated network of organisations charged with the sole purpose of financing their activities. Such organisations include both non-profit organisations and charities openly seeking donations and ordinary commercial businesses acting as fronts, covertly distributing profits. New terrorist organisations tend also to resort to a range of illegal activities to garner additional funding, including drug smuggling and production, robbery, fraud, extortion and kidnapping (Cronin, 2003:49). The profits from these various ventures are dispersed globally, undergoing repeated laundering through various means, so that they become virtually untraceable. The end result of this complex process is, again, straightforward: new terrorist organisations have access to vast and unprecedented material resources with which to finance their activities.

3.7. Attack frequency and lethality

Although new terrorism is characterised in part by a decreasing number of active organisations, the confluence of sophistication of technology and sophistication of methods of funding means that these fewer terrorist groups are endowed with the capacity for more frequent and more lethal attacks. This capacity has, thus far, been manifested in practice.

The contemporary age of ideological terrorism, particularly from the mid-1990s onwards, has seen a rise in the relative number of terrorist attacks perpetrated worldwide by terrorist organisations (Pettiford & Harding, 2003:191). As Pettiford & Harding (2003:191) caution, however, such increased frequency should not be assumed as a indefinitely definitive characteristic of new terrorism, as statistics regarding terrorist attacks tend to be far from comprehensive and suffer from a lack of universal consensus regarding a definition of what specifically constitutes a terrorist act. Indeed, Cronin (2003:42-43) lends weight to this uncertainty by pointing towards other statistics which contradict this notion of increased attack frequency.

Be that as it may, the increased lethality of contemporary ideological terrorist attacks is unquestionable (Simon, 2003:18; Cronin, 2003:42-44). New terrorism is "...inextricably linked to pursuit of mass casualties" (Simon, 2003:18). Even prior to the 11 September 2001 attacks, the number of casualties associated with new ideological terrorist attacks was significantly higher than had been the case with other terrorist movements (Cronin, 2003:43). The capacity for attacks on a grand scale engendered by technology and funding coupled with an irrational and implacable desire for systemic revolution has led to new ideological terrorists engaging in acts of unparalleled violence and lethality.

3.8. Unquestionable righteousness

An additional characteristic of new terrorism which has previously been discussed in some detail, is a group conviction of the unquestionable righteousness of their actions. As contemporary ideological terrorists are convinced that their particular worldview grants them exclusive access to truth and normative beliefs which are 76 inherently right, they disregard all conflicting notions of propriety – including legislation – in pursuing their interests and championing their ideals (Simon, 2003:18; Mendelsohn, 2005:55; Cronin, 2003:41; O'Neil, 2003:107). They are confident in the inherent righteousness of their actions, regardless of the violence involved, laws broken and adverse public reaction elicited; they perceive themselves as serving a higher purpose (Mendelsohn, 2005:55). This is in contrast to other strains of terrorism where extremities of action are tempered by the extent to which such action assists in achieving some separate objective; the notion of unquestionable righteousness is thus linked to the non-utilitarian nature of new terrorism.

3.9. Dehumanisation of targets

A logical corollary of this notion of unquestionable righteousness is the dehumanisation of the targets of new ideological terrorist action (Simon, 2003:18). Because ideological terrorists are wholly convinced that their worldview is the only valid one and because they pursue systemic revolution so as to see their worldview globally entrenched, all those who do not subscribe to their worldview are implicitly assumed to possess an invalid ideology and are perceived as standing in the way of the desired systemic transformation. As previously alluded to, this means that new ideological terrorists perceive the world in in-group/out-group terms, or "us" and "them" terms, where the out-group is dehumanised to the extent that violence committed against them does not involve any related moral or ethical dilemmas.

3.10. Compounding influence of certain cultural and social factors

Finally, new terrorism is also in part defined by the unique influence of certain external social and cultural factors. The propensity of new ideological terrorist groups towards extreme and unpredictable violence tends to be exacerbated by the typical social and cultural contexts of those segments of humanity with which such group ideals particularly resonate (Cronin, 2003:35;38). The inherently dangerous lack of rationality of the new ideological terrorist worldview is compounded by a profound sense of alienation common amongst those most predisposed towards championing the terrorist cause. Various pockets of humanity throughout the world feel as if their 77 cultural traditions and beliefs or their prevailing societal conditions and conventions are wholly incongruent with the contemporary world order – one which is increasingly characterised by globalisation and homogeneity (Simon, 2003:20; Cronin, 2003:52). This sense of alienation and resentment towards the prevailing order serves only to solidify the divide between “us” and ”them” attached to terrorist group membership previously discussed, thereby further exaggerating the animosity directed towards those outside of the organisation.

Thus, new terrorism tends to flourish in regions where additional material and non- material factors – ranging from poverty in the face of global prosperity to cultural conservatism in the face of liberal cosmopolitanism – influence group psychology in such a way that the volatility of contemporary ideological terrorist groups is extended beyond that which is inherent in their nature. As Cronin (2003:38) states, there is a “broader enabling environment” which enjoys a symbiotic relationship with the majority of new ideological terrorist groups' worldviews. It could even be argued that such an enabling environment is a necessary precondition for an ideological terrorist movement to evolve from fringe concern to a central threat to global peace and security (Mendelsohn, 2005:57; Cronin, 2003:45;52).

The importance of the influence of this broader context is another reason for the appropriateness of constructivism in the analysis of new terrorism. As will be illustrated in Chapter 5 in the case of Al Qaeda, constructivism's conception of the agent-structure relationship provides the ideal template for examining the manner in which changes in external political reality influence the internal composition of group norms and consequent group action – a contextual sensitivity wholly absent in mainstream theoretical approaches.

Conclusion

Transnational terrorism is a phenomenon that is by no means new to IR scholarship. It has existed in various forms over the course of the last 120 years. Prior to the rise of new ideological terrorism, all terrorist movements (psychologically-motivated terrorists aside), despite cosmetic divergences in doctrine and objectives, were unified by a degree of rationality; an acknowledgement of the utilitarian nature of 78 their deeds as necessary evils undertaken in the pursuit of some perceived noble goal. Unprecedented in its outlook, activities and ambitions, new ideological terrorism, however, has subverted all prior conceptions of the mechanics of terrorist action. Motivated chiefly by the normative prescriptions of their particular worldview, rather than any objective rationality, new ideological terrorists pursue fundamental systemic revolution towards global ideological homogeneity, eliminating adherents to opposing worldviews as an end in itself and exhibiting unrivalled organisational and technological sophistication in realising these aims.

For the purposes of the remainder of this study, however, that most essential to draw from the preceding discussion regarding contemporary transnational terror, is an acknowledgement of the normative nature of new terrorism, as well as an understanding of the consequences of this normative nature for appropriate analysis. It is clear that analysing and, indeed, counteracting new ideological terrorism cannot be approached in the same manner as with previous forms of terrorism, due to the various determinants of action which are ideational rather than strictly material in nature. While, of course, there are various characteristics of new terrorism which are material in nature – such as organisational structure – the majority of these can in turn be explained with reference to the centrality of ideology.

The critical importance of this investigation is therein revealed. A constructivist understanding of new terrorism will provide insight into such elusive ideational dimensions and offer a basis for establishing directives for appropriate future counter-terrorist policy. As discussed in Chapter 1, the most appropriate means of establishing such understanding is via selection of an appropriate case study for in- depth analysis. The following chapter introduces the case selected for this study – Al Qaeda – justifying its selection and extracting its prominent group norms for use in analysis in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4: The case of Al Qaeda - group norms

Introduction

Having comprehensively discussed both the constructivist approach to IR and the nature of new transnational terrorism, these two areas of study can now be fused together by applying constructivism to a specific new terrorist case study – that of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation. As discussed in Chapter 1 and alluded to in Chapter 2, the purpose of this narrow issue-area application is dictated by the epistemology of constructivism. Constructivist epistemology asserts both that accurate truth claims can only be made regarding specific and narrowly delineated areas of study due to the dynamic and volatile nature of norms, and that inductive analysis is the necessary starting point for any investigation. Constructivism does not provide, or indeed believe in the existence of, universally applicable knowledge claims (truth claims regarding new terrorism in general) but is concerned, rather, with utilising claims regarding specific areas of study (truth claims regarding the case of Al Qaeda in particular) to extract a degree of broader causal insight.

This chapter will, thus, concern itself with analysing the Al Qaeda terrorist network in isolation, in terms of constructivist theory. Discussion will focus upon uncovering and analysing substantive manifestations of Al Qaeda group norms in order to develop a clearly defined set of primary ideational determinants of action. Real world evidence of specific norm adherence will be highlighted and systematically discussed so that a clear picture of Al Qaeda's ideational motivations can be established. Once established, these primary group norms will then be integrated into the process- tracing method utilised in the proceeding chapter, when examining Al Qaeda and the real-world mechanics of the agent-structure relationship. As discussed in Chapter 1, the establishment of a clear set of group norms is required prior to a systematic explanation of the manner of their functioning because of the unique demands of applying process-tracing to constructivist study. Chapters 4 and 5, thus, in concert aim to fulfil the primary goal of this study: a comprehensive constitutive, constructivist analysis of the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation that is endowed with both heuristic and real-world policy-making utility.

The chapter will begin with a necessary justification of the appropriateness of Al Qaeda as a new transnational terrorism case study. Thereafter certain important methodological issues will be attended to and utilised as a structural platform for the remainder of the chapter, which will concern itself with unveiling, elaborating upon and substantiating various Al Qaeda group norms for use in Chapter 5.

1. Al Qaeda as an ideal case study

Prior to an investigation into the nature of notable Al Qaeda group norms, it is first necessary to justify the selection of Al Qaeda as an appropriate case study. Appropriateness here is measured in terms of the extent to which Al Qaeda represents a typical example of a new transnational terrorist group, as defined by the ten characteristics discussed in Chapter 3. Being the terrorist organisation responsible for the watershed 11 September 2001 attacks and, indeed, being the largest, most sophisticated and most prominent new terrorist organisation in existence, it will be argued that Al Qaeda not only constitutes a typical example of a new terrorist group, but, indeed, constitutes the very archetype of new terrorism and, to an extent, is synonymous with the phenomenon. Discussion will begin with a general exposition of the history and current status of the organisation, followed by an examination of the ways in which Al Qaeda clearly exhibits the various characteristics of new ideological terrorism.

1.1. Background

1.1.1. History and context

The seeds of Al Qaeda can be found in the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Pettiford & Harding, 2003:66). Many Muslim organisations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, an Egyptian Muslim fundamentalist group, took issue with Soviet interference in Afghanistan, and sought to aid Islamic Afghan forces in defeating the “communist infidels”. Following the outbreak of war, a Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam, established a recruiting office to mobilise 81 young Muslims from around the world to fortify the Afghan forces; over time this recruiting office evolved into the terrorist organisation known as Al Qaeda (Williams, 2003:41-42).

One of the first recruits to the cause was Osama bin Laden (Williams, 2003:42). Pleased with the opportunity to actively forward his deeply-held Islamic preservationist beliefs, bin Laden utilised his substantial capital assets to help fund the operation, swiftly becoming a leading figure in the burgeoning organisation – coordinating military affairs and using his wealth to draft the services of guerrilla experts from around the globe. The recruitment office gradually transformed into a vast Afghan mujahideen training facility under bin Laden's guidance, while bin Laden himself spent the greater part of ten years serving on the front line of the Afghan conflict (Williams, 2003:42; Whittaker, 2004:70; Mahan & Griset, 2008:93).

Towards the end of the Afghan conflict, bin Laden made the conscious decision to expand the ambit of the organisation, resulting in the official creation of Al Qaeda in 1988 (Williams, 2003:42). Under the guidance of bin Laden, a nucleus of hardened Afghan war veterans – endowed with advanced expertise in a number of military areas, backed by vast financial resources and ostensibly constituting a parallel government to the Afghan Taliban regime – began to actively pursue an ambitious cause: a “jihad against the apostate Muslim governments, Israel and the United States” (Williams, 2003:42). Al Qaeda began deploying troops around the world – in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria – to assist in Islamic fundamentalist uprisings (Whittaker, 2004:70). Al Qaeda gradually evolved into a resourceful and highly organised terrorist organisation with unparalleled reach.

Undoubtedly the keystone event in making Al Qaeda the organisation it is today was the Gulf War of the early 1990s (Whittaker, 2003:43). Following agreement on the part of the Saudi monarchy to allow the stationing of US troops in sacred Islamic cities, bin Laden was outraged. He consequently focused Al Qaeda's agenda in such a way that it became wholly preoccupied with defending the Muslim world against the perceived “Christian crusade” led by the United States – the “Great Satan” – an issue which will be dealt with in some depth later in the chapter.

From 1992, bin Laden began carefully expanding and refining Al Qaeda structure from a base in Sudan (Whittaker, 2004:71). He understood that waging war with the West would require unprecedented levels of organisational sophistication. Al Qaeda, thus, gradually mutated into a vast network of self-contained terrorist cells across the world; myriad groups all working under the auspices of Al Qaeda, but often mutually oblivious. Al Qaeda operatives were dispersed throughout the world to oversee such cells, spreading a common religious creed of Islamic fundamentalism and anti- Westernism, utilising uniform training techniques and spreading a unified terrorist doctrine. In 1996, bin Laden publicly declared a jihad against the United States and issued a fatwa, a decree of Islamic law, in 1998, stating that all Americans – civilians and military – as well as their allies should be killed (Pettiford & Harding, 2003:67; Whittaker, 2003:43). Al Qaeda had embarked on their campaign of terror against the US and the West, mobilising Islamic support worldwide.

1.1.2. Al Qaeda today

The September 2001 attacks serve, in many ways, as a symbol of Al Qaeda's unparalleled resourcefulness and determination (Whittaker, 2004:35). It is a terrorist organisation without peer. Despite the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan – an Al Qaeda sanctuary – and removal of the Taliban regime, Al Qaeda remains operational, retaining its transnational spread of independent terrorist cells, allied to central leadership structures now believed to be located on the Afghan-Pakistan border (Bergen, 2008:15-16; Bergen et al., 2005:11; Fishman, 2008:46-48). While, as Gunaratna (2007:32) notes, the actions of the US and its allies following 9/11 in their "war on terrorism" served as to severely impede Al Qaeda's leadership structures, the self-replicating nature of the organisation's twinned ideology and doctrine ensures that the group is able to proceed and, indeed, thrive nonetheless.

In addition to its new headquarters along the Afghan-Pakistan border (Bergen, 2008:16), Al Qaeda is believed to have several thousand members dispersed amongst terrorist cells in at least 50 states, spanning all areas of the globe (Bergen et al., 2005:11; Whittaker, 2004:35). Such estimates, however, are problematic, not only because of the organisation's clandestine nature, but also in that it is commonly asserted that a significant number of “sleeper cells” exist worldwide (Whittaker, 83

2004:35) – groups of Al Qaeda operatives in foreign territories who do not actively engage in any terrorist or group-related activity until such time as their services are required. Regardless, the group undoubtedly enjoys a presence, in some guise, in most regions across the globe.

Al Qaeda is also known to be actively involved in perpetual recruitment efforts, relying on a number of central training facilities to provide the fragmented organisation with a unity of purpose and doctrine, as well as unquestionable group- loyalty and commitment (Whittaker, 2004:35). This shared basis of fundamentalist Islamic conviction and anti-Western purpose is ultimately that which endows the group with its unrivalled propensity for extremism. When coupled with the organisation's unrivalled resources and global reach, it becomes clear that Al Qaeda is the contemporary terrorist group most worthy of individual study. Al Qaeda, as suggested, is in many ways the archetype of new ideological terrorism.

1.2. Characteristics of new transnational terrorism exhibited by Al Qaeda

Provided with sufficient knowledge regarding Al Qaeda's rise to global prominence and its essential character, the organisation can now be examined with regards to the manner in which it exhibits the various characteristics of contemporary ideological terrorism.

1.2.1. Non-utilitarianism

As Zimmerman and Lewis (2006:34) state, Al Qaeda's actions refute “...the conventional wisdom that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead...[c]learly, some terrorists do want a lot of people dead”. This is the very essence of non-utilitarianism. By publicly declaring a jihad on those perceived to be in direct opposition to the proliferation of their worldview, including certain moderate Islamic states, and issuing a fatwa explicitly demanding the indiscriminate murder of Americans and their allies (Williams, 2003:42; Pettiford & Harding, 2003:67; Whittaker, 2003:43; Mendelsohn, 2005:58-59), there is little doubt that Al Qaeda's primary objectives do not extend far beyond the acts of terror they perpetrate themselves; their political objectives of Islamic purity are thought to be directly 84 achievable through the destruction of opposing ideologies (Gunaratna, 2007:28-29). As O'Neil (2003:107) states, in encapsulating the religious terrorist outlook, “a satanic enemy cannot be transformed, only destroyed”.

1.2.2. The role of ideologues

As was made clear by the exposition of the history of Al Qaeda, the story of the growth and rise to prominence of the organisation cannot be divorced from that of its leader, Osama bin Laden. He provides the perfect example of the critical role of ideologues in the establishment of new ideological terrorist groups; the essential character of the organisation is reflective of the essential character of bin Laden.

By all accounts, bin Laden is well-educated, charismatic and, above all, deeply religious (Bergen, 2006:8,16,258-282; Whittaker, 2004:69-70). In bin Laden, one observes a man driven by irrational, religiously-informed objectives, but a man who pursues such irrational objectives in the clinical and systematic manner of the well- educated, and a man able to garner support for such objectives due to his charisma and equanimity. Hence bin Laden constitutes a unique case – an ideologue driven almost singularly by the need to combat perceived Western heresy and subversion of Islam (Whittaker, 2004:70), but an ideologue endowed with sufficient rationality in other areas to pursue such a cause methodically. This, in turn, is reflected in the essential character of Al Qaeda – an organisation shielded from rationality by religious dogma, but highly sophisticated and calculated in pursuing the concomitant prescriptions of such dogma.

Although bin Laden is, without question, the central and most significant personality in the evolution of Al Qaeda, it is worth noting too the influence of Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri, a mentor of bin Laden (Gunaratna, 2007:26). Prior to becoming involved with Al Qaeda, al Zawahiri had already involved himself in terrorist activities with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organisation and was extremely influential in convincing bin Laden to extend the aims of Al Qaeda beyond that of a reactionary mujahideen force. His role in the rise of Al Qaeda as a global terrorist entity actively pressing fundamentalist Islamic interests, rather than merely defending them, is significant.

1.2.3. Lack of a discretely identifiable territorial base

As Gunaratna (2007:22) suggests, Al Qaeda is characterised by its "overarching" ideological appeal which seeks to mobilise a global jihad movement. That is to say, Al Qaeda's strength lies not in concentrated numbers attached to a discretely identifiable territorial base, but rather in having members dispersed worldwide, potentially wherever a sympathetic extremist Islamic element exists. Thus, as previously alluded to, the organisational form of Al Qaeda, particularly following the US invasion of Afghanistan, is decentralised, consisting of a vast network of associated terrorist cells spread across at least 50 states, perpetrating attacks even in regions far removed from the Middle East, such as Europe, North America, Africa and South-East Asia (Whittaker, 2004:35; Bergen et al., 2005:11; Pettiford & Harding, 2003:67). The organisation's efficiency, in turn, stems not necessarily from the efforts of now weakened central organisational authorities, but rather from a stringent shared doctrine and ideology which provides an operational homogeneity amongst geographically diverse Al Qaeda cells (Gunaratna, 2007:22). The group, thus, can be viewed as a sort of "terrorist franchise" (Fishman, 2008:46), with Al Qaeda becoming an umbrella term for all affiliated cells, each with the same worldview. Whether a particular cell operates under the direct authority of the organisation's central command structures or not is moot; it strives towards the same ends, utilising the same means.

1.2.4. Systemic revolution

Al Qaeda is affronted by growing secularism and other "Western" tendencies which have infiltrated Islamic states with the advent of globalisation (Gunaratna, 2007:26; Cronin, 2003:45; Wedgewood, 2002:329). They view the prevailing status quo in international relations – increasing cultural and political homogeneity and cemented secular international law amongst a global community of nation-states – as intrinsically undesirable. Islamic fundamentalists such as Al Qaeda tend to abide by the creed of Islam being "din wa dawla" or both religion and state simultaneously (Tibi, 2002:159; Bar, 2004:28); secularity does not exist in their minds and global conventions which contravene Islamic law are wholly rejected.

Their aim, as a consequence, involves a fundamental subversion of this contemporary global order by solidifying the Muslim Ummah or religious community as a cohesive political entity, reminiscent of the first Caliphate (Gunaratna, 2007:28- 29; Mendelsohn, 2005:60). Al Qaeda is preoccupied with the desire to unify all of the Islamic world in a single religious state, or at least state-like entity, removed from outside influences and, thus, purified. As Mendelsohn (2005:60) puts it, Al Qaeda seeks "...to abolish the unnatural borders that separate the different Muslim states...to establish one unified religious Muslim community". The means by which this is to be achieved, according to Al Qaeda, involves the direct destruction of such external influences by targeting anybody perceived as opposing their fundamentalist conception of Islam. While, as Mendelsohn (2005:60-61) notes, such a unified Islamic polity is not necessarily incompatible with the Westphalian system of state- centric ordering, it is wholly incompatible with the norms, rules and institutions which characterise the contemporary communitarian era of globalisation and international society.

1.2.5. Immunity to traditional methods of counteraction

The continued existence and operation of the Al Qaeda network, despite the exhaustive efforts of the US and its allies in their war on terrorism, is testament to the inappropriateness and obsolescence of the counter-terrorist methods utilised by coalition forces and to the robust, enduring nature of an ideologically-motivated terrorist group (Gunaratna, 2007:32). The US responded to the September 2001 attacks by attempting to eliminate Al Qaeda by targeting its leaders and disrupting its support bases (Gunaratna, 2007:32), in certain cases through direct intervention - for example Afghanistan and, arguably, Iraq. Such an outmoded approach is indicative of the wide-scale misapprehension of the essential nature of Al Qaeda and new ideological terrorist groups in general. While US actions did serve to severely disrupt and even remove the central Al Qaeda leadership structure, the transcendent nature of the group's ideology coupled with the organisation's self-replicating, doctrinally homogeneous transnational cell structure means that the lack of such central leadership has little effect upon the proliferation of the organisation and its undertakings (Gunaratna, 2007:32). That is to say, because Al Qaeda constitutes a network of terrorist cells, and because each cell within this network is bound by a 87 common religious creed, common objectives and a common mode of operation in pursuing such objectives (common group norms dispersed across a differentiated cell structure), the removal of the central leadership structure has little bearing upon the organisation's continued terrorist activities.

Furthermore, because Al Qaeda has a complex global financial support structure, it is not dependent in any way upon state support (Gunaratna, 2007:31). Efforts at removing potentially sympathetic governments, as was the case with Iraq, are thus of little consequence. If anything, the efforts of the US and its allies only succeeded in compounding the terrorist problem; invading and occupying Islamic territory has resulted in a growth in anti-Western sentiment amongst the Islamic community – a context particularly conducive to increased Al Qaeda membership (Gunaratna, 2007:32), as shall be expanded upon in Chapter 5.

1.2.6. Group sophistication

Al Qaeda exhibits both the technological and financial sophistication which characterises new terrorist groups. In planning previous attacks, including the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda operatives have been confirmed as having utilised encrypted electronic mail and website posts to coordinate activities, Internet information resources for weapons information and logistics, and even online booking services to organise transportation (Cronin, 2003:47; O'Neil, 2003:106). Such technological utilisation is critical for the effective operation of the organisation due to its global spread and need for instantaneous and clandestine communication. The organisation is also renowned for its use of video technology as a means of propaganda dissemination, both amongst prospective supporters and enemies (Burke, 2004a:20).

While Al Qaeda's technological sophistication is significant, but not particularly noteworthy, its global network of financial support structures is unparalleled. This is due in large part to bin Laden's significant personal wealth and his various Saudi business connections (Cronin, 2003:49). For example, bin Laden is known to own or have interests in a global network of construction companies which are thought to divert profits towards Al Qaeda endeavours (Cronin, 2003:49). Additionally, following 88 victory in the Afghan conflict, Al Qaeda was able to essentially act as a parallel government to the Taliban regime, allowing them to further finance their operations by exploiting natural resources in Afghanistan for the manufacturing of narcotics (Williams, 2003:42). Similar illicit activities continue to be used as income sources.

Over and above extensive means of producing required financing, Al Qaeda has a complex laundering network dedicated to dispersing funds throughout the organisation in such a way that they cannot be traced by Western intelligence services (Cronin, 2003:49-50; Homer-Dixon, 2002:54). Making use of modern banking services, the ancient hawala informal money transfer system, as well as the physical transport of capital, Al Qaeda transfers funds all around the world through countless sources, often exchanging money for other commodities such as gold and diamonds, particularly in turbulent war-torn areas of Africa. Such complexity and sophistication is key to both the organisation's efficiency and resilience.

1.2.7. Attack frequency and lethality

If one examines Al Qaeda's substantial list of terrorist undertakings over the past decade, including the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid train bombings and the London Underground bombings – resulting, when combined, in close to four thousand dead and almost twice as many injured – it is quite clear that the organisation has raised expectations for the number of casualties resulting from terrorist attacks far beyond previous norms (Gressang, 2001:83; Jankowitsch-Prevor, 2005:13; Mahan & Griset, 2008:94). Despite this, the group maintains ambitions of extending this dubious benchmark. Osama bin Laden himself has explicitly stated, on a number of occasions, his will to acquire any weaponry – including nuclear weaponry – that would assist Al Qaeda's cause, suggesting that not doing so would be a “sin” (Whittaker, 2003:43; Bird & Sherwin, 2005:18; Wolfsthal, 2005:156). Al Qaeda is, thus, without question, preoccupied with perpetrating terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale and lethality.

That being said, the group cannot be definitively regarded as having extended attack frequency beyond that of normal expectation. While Gunaratna (2007:22) suggests that, following the September 11 attacks, Al Qaeda and associated groups have 89 averaged one act of terrorism every three months, there is no universal consensus regarding such a statistic. Again, the difficulty with establishing the exact frequency of attacks is that of defining an act of terrorism and, indeed, confirming the involvement of an organisation as clandestine as Al Qaeda.

1.2.8. Unquestionable righteousness

Al Qaeda provides a particularly extreme example of a terrorist group wholly convinced of the unquestionable righteousness of their actions. This is largely due to the fact that not only do they view their ideology as providing them with exclusive access to truth, but they assert that it is, indeed, the divine will of Allah; violent acts are, as a consequence, able to proceed “unconstrained by worldy ethical considerations” (O'Neil, 2003:107). The victory of mujahideen forces in the Afghan conflict served to cement this notion of “divine legitimacy” (Gunaratna, 2007:30) amongst organisation members. The victory of Islamic guerrillas against the vastly superior USSR military forces was perceived as a vindication of Al Qaeda's worldview and as a sign from Allah to pursue their vision of Islamic unity through violent religious crusade. Indeed, jihad itself is treated by Al Qaeda as a requirement of devotion. Building on the assertions of highly influential fundamentalist ideologue Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj – co-founder of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organisation of which Ayman al Zawahiri later became leader – Al Qaeda believes that jihad constitutes the so-called "sixth pillar" of Islam, rendering the pursuit of violence against infidels an act of worship in itself (Sageman, 2004:15-16; Burke, 2004b:73; Gerges, 2005:3).

1.2.9. Dehumanisation of targets

Al Qaeda perceive the world in clear in-group/out-group terms – the good of their ideology and the evil of those who do not subscribe to it – and actively advocate violence in response to those who they perceive as being part of the out-group, with no hesitation for the associated human cost. This assertion is corroborated by bin Laden himself, who suggests that the world is split into two camps, “the camp of the believers and the camp of the unbelievers” (Whittaker, 2004:72). Being classed as an "unbeliever" implicitly relegates one to the position of object rather than human; 90 such an individual is regarded as inherently evil and an impediment towards the realisation of Islamic unity. Once opposition groups are dehumanised, issues of moral ambiguity are conveniently removed and acts of violence against out-groups can proceed unchecked.

While there is much focus on the US specifically as an Al Qaeda target, this does not preclude the group from pursuing violence against other out-groups. Indeed, the organisation has repeatedly voiced its similar ill-regard for Islamic states which they perceive as being excessively moderate (Gunaratna, 2007:27; Williams, 2003:42). The organisation's preoccupation with the US stems largely from the latter's perceived role as catalyst and root of globalisation and its associated corrupting influence.

1.2.10. Compounding influence of certain cultural and social factors

While the impact of a broader enabling environment on the operations of Al Qaeda is difficult to assess, and while an in-depth study of the role of the ideational forms of such factors need be reserved for the detailed constructivist analysis in the next chapter, some observations can be made to highlight the reality of this phenomenon in the case of Al Qaeda. As Gunaratna (2007:22) states, Al Qaeda "...seeks to exploit the anger, suffering and the resentment of Muslims" in response to the corrupting influence of the West. This antagonistic context provides the necessary motivation for joining Al Qaeda, for wholly co-opting the organisation's extreme worldview and for sufficiently vilifying and dehumanising unbelievers in such a way that terrorist acts can be perpetrated against them without hesitation. The two most prominent instances of this being borne out in practice are increased support for Al Qaeda due to resentment following Western aggression (Gunaratna, 2007:32) and due to continued poverty and social degradation in the face of the prosperity associated with globalisation (Cronin, 45-46).

In the case of the former, following the excessive aggression on the part of the US and its allies in their war against terrorism – including the occupation of historically Islamic territory, along with extensive Islamic casualties – anti-Americanism actually increased throughout the Muslim world, providing Al Qaeda with a legion of potential 91 new recruits (Gunaratna, 2007:32). In the case of the latter, Islamic regions characterised by economic weakness and social problems – certain Arab states, South East Asia and North Africa for example – provide a steady stream of potential terrorists; resentment is diffused amongst a populace which is driven towards alien Western economic and cultural practices due to the pressures of globalisation, but which has yet to enjoy any of the associated prosperity (Cronin, 45-46). While this is, of course, a simplified account, disregarding myriad factors which play a role in establishing an environment conducive to fostering terrorist elements – a matter which will be elaborated subsequently in this study – it does at least provide some indication of the manner in which Al Qaeda's cause is assisted by various factors beyond its control.

It is clear, thus, following the examination of Al Qaeda's exhibition of all ten characteristics of new terrorism, and given the resounding manner in which the organisation exhibits each of these ten characteristics, that the group not only represents an appropriate case study, but indeed constitutes the archetypal new terrorist group.

2. Measuring norms

Having established that Al Qaeda does indeed constitute the ideal case study, its prominent group norms can now be extracted for use in Chapter 5, in order to establish a clear constructivist portrait of the organisation's ideational mechanics. The identification of Al Qaeda's prominent group norms, however, must conform to the specific requirements of appropriate constructivist analysis. As stated in Chapters 1 and 2, the process of norm identification need be appropriately operationalised prior to analysis in order to avoid non-falsifiability. Legro (1995:15-16; 1997:33-35), a key thinker on normative issues in IR, provides crucial insight towards this end.

2.1. Norm strength

Legro (1997:33) asserts that "...norms are seen as continuous, rather than dichotomous, entities: they do not just exist or not exist but instead come in varying strengths". He, furthermore, supports the consensus view that the extent of norm 92 strength, in turn, has a direct bearing on the concomitant strength of both group and individual identity and interest, and, as a consequence, the likelihood and severity of related action. This echoes the general constructivist assertion that norms – and thus identities and interests – are non-static and tend to evolve and change over time (Wendt, 1992:392; Kukla, 2000:1-4; Risse & Sikkink, 1999:8). Critically, however, Legro stresses that the majority of norm-based or ideational analyses of international relations phenomena offer inadequate means of measuring norm strength. By failing to divorce measurement of norm strength from the suggested effects of such norms, much of the literature tends towards circular argumentation and non-falsifiability. That is to say, because, in any given scenario, there are myriad norms involved in influencing action, with each norm potentially precipitating even contradictory behaviour depending on circumstance, one can selectively match any norm to an observed behaviour and point towards such behaviour as proof of the norm's salience.

What is required, accordingly, is an approach to measuring norm strength or "robustness" (Legro, 1997:33) independent of norm effect. Legro provides just such a framework.

2.2. Legro's framework

Legro (Farrell, 2002:61; Legro, 1995:15-16; Legro, 1997:34-35) suggests that norm strength can be independently measured according to three criteria: specificity, durability and concordance. Specificity refers to the degree of clarity and simplicity a norm is endowed with; to what extent can a norm's prescriptions of propriety – acceptable conduct – be considered equivocal? The less ambiguous the prescriptions of propriety, the stronger the norm. Explicitly codified norms, for instance, would thus generally constitute stronger norms than uncodified norms. Durability, on the other hand, is linked to the extent to which a norm is entrenched and solidified. Upon examining a norm's durability, focus rests upon questions such as: how long has a norm existed?; to what extent has a norm remained unchanged over time? Finally, concordance is concerned with the breadth of norm acceptance – how widespread is the acknowledgement of norm existence and significance? As 93

Legro (1997:35) puts it, concordance thus refers to "the degree of intersubjective agreement" regarding a particular norm.

Discussion of group norms in this chapter will include reference to Legro's approach as a means of justifying their inclusion, providing proof that each norm, divorced from observed effect, is of sufficient strength and relevance to warrant inclusion.

2.3. The exclusion of ideas, identities and interests from discussion

Prior to examining such norms however, it is necessarily to briefly justify the exclusion of ideas, identities and interests – ideational structures key to the constructivist thesis, as discussed in Chapter 2 – from discussion in this chapter. With regards to ideas, for the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary to identify real-world instances of ideas and idea formation in the case of Al Qaeda. This is because constructivism views a norm as group adherence to an idea (Jepperson et al., 1996:54); identifying norms necessarily exposes the ideas at their core while simultaneously providing insight into the rationale for consequent action – that which, ostensibly, this study primarily concerns itself with. Analysis involving identities and interests, on the other hand, will be reserved for the following chapter, where the process-tracing method will be utilised in order to best elucidate the role they play in the agent-structure relationship.

3. Al Qaeda's prominent group norms

Having established the appropriateness of Al Qaeda as a case study, and having clearly outlined the method and structure that will be adhered to in this chapter, discussion can now proceed with the examination of Al Qaeda's most significant group norms – anti-Westernism, militant Islamic fundamentalism, the glorification of martyrdom and the necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate. This is an exercise both with value in and of itself and one necessary for the subsequent establishment of a comprehensive constitutive account of the organisation.

It is important to note that, although these norms will be largely presented as monolithic in the proceeding discussion, the exact manner in which these 94 generalised norms are interpreted by an individual Al Qaeda franchise or individual Al Qaeda member will differ to an extent – such is the compromise of pursuing a negotiated empiricism in constructivist analysis. Norms are, as discussed, by nature fluid and non-static; attempting to provide a broad conception of Al Qaeda's shared norms is a necessity of enquiry rather than an exact reflection of reality.

3.1. Anti-Westernism

The most immediately apparent and strongly substantiated Al Qaeda group norm is that of anti-Westernism. As a norm constitutes "collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity" (Jepperson et al., 1996:54), anti-Westernism here refers to Al Qaeda's shared assertion that, because the West is – according to Al Qaeda – involved in a conscious effort to destroy Islam, it is only right and just that retaliatory action be taken against the West. Violence pursued against the West is thus viewed as inherently righteous and is championed as a shared norm. Anti- Westernism informs all Al Qaeda rhetoric and activity and is inextricably linked to the essential character of the organisation. Little is said or written about Al Qaeda or by Al Qaeda leaders without reference to the "Zionist-Crusaders" (bin Laden, 1996:160) led by the US, “the Great Satan" (Whittaker, 2003:43). While the norm of anti- Westernism borders on being self-apparent, it is nonetheless necessary to irrefutably substantiate its existence by utilising Legro's framework.

3.1.1. Norm specificity and durability

The substantial specificity and durability of the norm of anti-Westernism is quickly apparent upon studying both the relevant literature and, more significantly, official Al Qaeda documents and speeches. As previously mentioned, anti-Western sentiment began to blossom during the Gulf War – not long after Al Qaeda's genesis – when the organisation was greatly affronted by the Saudi royals' decision to snub leader bin Laden's offer of martial assistance and instead allow US troop deployment in sacred Islamic territory (Whittaker, 2003:43; Jehl, 2001: Internet; bin Laden, 1996:161;163). Since that time – now twenty years ago – there has been consistent and specific reference by Al Qaeda to their shared enmity towards the US and its allies, often referred to in vague and erroneous terms as the West in general. The 95 unwavering nature of such sentiment over such a long period of time, in direct and explicit terms – as will be illustrated – suggests both significant specificity and durability.

Two critical documents were published in 1996 by the two Al Qaeda members most prominent in shaping the group's ideology – Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. The "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places", penned by bin Laden, and "The Cure for Believers' Hearts", penned by al Zawahiri, together form the foundation for the majority of Al Qaeda's group norms, particularly that of anti-Westernism.

In "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places" – often referred to as the "Ladenese Epistle", a fatwa signed by bin Laden – Osama bin Laden states that "...the people of Islam [have] suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims['] blood [has become] the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies" (bin Laden, 1996:160). Bin Laden asserts in the edict that the West has either turned a blind eye to or been directly responsible for countless instances of mass bloodshed in the Islamic world and has actively sought the murder and imprisonment of spiritual leaders in order to stymie Islamic progress. In the characteristically emotive rhetoric of the organisation's chief ideologue, bin Laden asserts that "...the world [watched] and [heard], and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the US and its allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves" (bin Laden, 1996:160). In short, bin Laden makes it clear even in this early publication that he and his organisation regard all Western states as being involved in a tacit conspiracy against the Islamic world, freely willing to pursue bloody violence, engender poverty and suffering and subvert fundamental Islamic law in order to further their interests, masking their intentions under the banner of human rights proliferation and similar liberal notions of righteousness (bin Laden, 1996:160-162).

The necessary response to such Western infringement, bin Laden suggests – and here he takes care to place Al Qaeda at the vanguard of the counter-crusade (bin 96

Laden, 1996:162) – is to respond in kind with force. He suggests that it is the unquestionable duty of all Islamic people to band together in jihad to push the enemy – at that time specifically the US and more generally the West – out of Islamic territory (bin Laden, 1996:168-169;175). Towards this end, bin Laden champions the military doctrine of guerrilla warfare, and by implication terrorist tactics, established by his own proto-Al Qaeda Afghan mujahideen (bin Laden, 1996:175). He states that "...efforts should be concentrated on destroying, fighting and killing the enemy until...it is completely defeated" (bin Laden, 1996:176). The norm of anti-Westernism could scarcely be more explicitly articulated.

In "The Cure for Believers' Hearts" – or Shifa Sudur' al-Muminin – Ayman al Zawahiri, despite a focus on the Israeli-Palestinian situation rather than the US forces in Saudi Arabia, reiterates many of bin Laden's sentiments with regard to anti- Westernism. He suggests that the acknowledgement of Israel by Islamic states is indicative of a move towards subservience to Western authority – a trend he regards as wholly untenable and destructive to Islamic solidarity (Hellmich, 2005:44). Al Zawahiri further echoes bin Laden's notion of Western conspiracy, suggesting that previous US mujahideen support was nothing more than a ploy to obfuscate their true intentions of Islamic domination (Hellmich, 2005:44). Finally, al Zawahiri also, like bin Laden, takes care to specifically highlight Al Qaeda's position at the forefront of a global jihad against their aspirant Western oppressors (Hellmich, 2005:44). Hence, while less focused on anti-Westernism directly, al Zawahiri's publication nonetheless mirrors many of the assertions found within bin Laden's fatwa.

While these two documents, in isolation, provide more than sufficiently compelling evidence of norm specificity, it is necessary to briefly attend to various subsequent articulations of anti-Westernism to establish norm durability. It will be demonstrated that the norm has been steadfastly present within Al Qaeda's outlook since its initial articulation in 1996.

In 1998, bin Laden – along with al Zawahiri and three other group leaders – issued a second fatwa. While significantly shorter than the 1996 fatwa, the gist of the content is almost identical (Hellmich, 2005:44; PBS, 1998: Internet). The most notable inclusion in the document is a more explicit directive for Western bloodshed. The 97 fatwa states: "...[T]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it" and "...we...call on every Muslim...to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it...to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson" (Hellmich, 2005:44; PBS, 1998: Internet).

In October 2001, shortly after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, bin Laden was interviewed on television, questioned about his views on the consequences of the attacks (Greenberg, 2005:193-196). He asserted that the attacks were a key victory for the cause of Islam in a war he openly acknowledged as being waged between Al Qaeda and the West. He reiterated again that such action was both just and necessary as retaliation for similar evils perpetrated by the US; he suggests that there is "good" terrorism and "condemned" terrorism and that Al Qaeda's retaliatory motivation places their actions in the former category (Greenberg, 2005:197,201,204). These sentiments of the righteousness of Al Qaeda's actions in a "war of civilisations" were again reiterated just two months later in a video speech presented by bin Laden (Greenberg, 2005:207-216).

The same basic pattern of argumentation – the evils of the West, the duties of the Ummah and the resulting necessity and appropriateness of violent retaliation on the part of Al Qaeda – has remained almost unchanged in numerous public addresses by bin Laden since 2001, most notably in an open letter to the American people in 2002 (Greenberg, 2005:217-229), in speeches addressed to Europe and the US in 2004 (Greenberg, 2005:238-241; 242-248) and in a video speech distributed in 2006 (BBC News, 2006: Internet). It can, thus, be firmly established that the norm of anti- Westernism is endowed with sufficient durability.

3.1.2. Norm concordance

While, as suggested, concordance refers to "the degree of intersubjective agreement" regarding a particular norm (Legro, 1997:35), in the case of a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda, which is clandestine and isolated from broader international 98 society by definition, such concordance is only significant if exhibited by group members themselves. That is to say, the degree to which scholars, security experts and policy-makers may or may not agree upon Al Qaeda's adoption of a particular norm is largely irrelevant, as they are uninvolved in the process of norm adoption and abidance; they are removed from intersubjective agreement and commitment within the group. And, as the vast majority of Al Qaeda members are not wont to publish their individual opinions on a particular espoused group norm, firmly establishing universal group concordance with a norm is particularly troublesome. The best that can be achieved is identifying instances where individual Al Qaeda group members have inadvertently provided physical residue of norm concordance, and regarding sentiments provided therein as evidence.

Williams (2002:146-159) provides two such examples of inadvertent evidence provision which contain reference to Al Qaeda members' fervent adoption of the norm of anti-Westernism. The first takes the form of a recorded 1995 Manila police interrogation of a mid-level Al Qaeda operative, Abdul Hakim Murad, linked to the terrorist cell responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (Williams, 2002:146-151). Murad freely provided interrogators with detailed inside information regarding both Al Qaeda operation and, indirectly, the typical Al Qaeda member mindset. During the interview, Murad eagerly confessed that he was involved in plans to carry out terrorist attacks upon the US – including "exploding [a United Air] airplane" (Williams, 2002:148) – with the sole objective of "killing Americans" to "teach them", because the US "is the first country in [the] world making trouble for Muslims" (Williams, 2002:148-149). Murad further claimed later in the interview that a semi-automatic weapon found in his position was to be used in attacks in Paris (Williams, 2002:150). This interrogation took place prior to the 1996 Ladenese Epistle, clearly suggesting that this was a case of an Al Qaeda member relating a core group norm, rather than following the "party line" as it were.

The second example Williams (2002:151-159) provides is that of a farewell letter found in the luggage of three of the four Al Qaeda operatives who piloted the aeroplanes involved in the September 2001 attacks. The letter was penned by the fourth pilot, Mohamed Atta. While much of the letter is preoccupied with rituals of religious supplication and justification of action, it includes a section dedicated to 99 glorifying the planned terrorist action in terms of the will of Allah. Amid many Qur'an citations, Atta implores his brethren, "...when you board the plane, remember that this is a battle in the sake [sic] of God", asks Allah for "...help...against those who reject faith", reiterates how the demonstration of faith – the terrorist attacks – serve to "...[plant] fear in the hearts of the unbelievers" and stresses that "...if you kill, then kill completely, because this is the way of the Chosen One" (Williams, 2002:156- 157). Hence, while somewhat more obtuse than Murad's testimony and veiled in convoluted theological rhetoric, Atta's letter provides not only a clear indication of extreme anti-Westernism – with US citizens referred to here merely as "the unbelievers" – but provides telling insight into the extent of Al Qaeda members' fervour in this regard. Fulfilling retaliatory attacks upon the West is equated with a holy act of redemption – an issue which will assume focus upon discussing the norm of the glorification of martyrdom.

An additional example is provided in the case of a will recovered by the Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation (NEFA, 2009: Internet). The will belongs to Saudi Al Qaeda martyr, Raed al Harbi, who died in an October 2009 gunfight on the Yemen border, as Saudi authorities intercepted him en route to a suicide attack. The will, written with full knowledge of impending death, includes scathing and explicit anti- Western sentiment. He states that "...[the West] tortured the servants of Allah and they stole the nation‟s resources and they opened the Muslim countries for the [Christians]", asserting that "...there isn‟t a solution for the nation to be evicted from this dark tunnel but through Jihad for the cause of Allah and eviction of the crusaders and their followers from the Muslim homelands" (NEFA, 2009: Internet).

Thus, while substantiating norm concordance in the case of Al Qaeda is problematic, these three cases suggest significant concordance to the notion of anti-Westernism. These three operatives separated by rank, time, geography, cell-membership and context provide consonant accounts of the role of anti-Western sentiment in motivating acts of violence.

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3.2. Militant Islamic fundamentalism

The next prominent norm exhibited by Al Qaeda is that of militant Islamic fundamentalism. This norm refers specifically to the deeply-held assertion of group members that to be considered Islamic, one cannot make any show of supplication towards non-Islamic or secular authority (Doran, 2002:180); that to be part of the Ummah, all mundane political divisions should be subordinate to the notion of a collective nation of Islam under holy law, regardless of geographical divisions. It is this norm regarding what is required to be Islamic – at the most basic level – that Al Qaeda leans on in justifying many of its terrorist acts, which the majority of Muslims regard as being in explicit contravention of holy writ (Hellmich, 2005:45). The exact mechanics of this convenient rationale will be elaborated upon while examining evidence of norm specificity, durability and concordance.

3.2.1. Norm specificity

The norm of militant Islamic fundamentalism amongst Al Qaeda members, like that of anti-Westernism, is explicitly discussed in the two keystone documents produced in 1996 by bin Laden and al Zawahiri respectively. In this case, al Zawahiri in particular stresses the importance of the norm. In "The Cure for Believers' Hearts", al Zawahiri, upon discussing Arab state support or inaction in response to US support of Israeli statehood, suggests that such states, notably Saudi Arabia, cannot be considered as part of the nation of Islam (Hellmich, 2005:44). He asserts that, in supporting or turning a blind eye to infidel interests at the cost of the interests of a fellow Islamic state, Palestine, certain Arab states effectively lost their status as part of the Ummah. This logic is expanded to include individual Muslims. Al Zawahiri ostensibly suggests that, just as state support of Western interests results in the loss Islamic status, so individual support of Western states disqualifies one from Islamic status (Hellmich, 2005:44). Support here, however, is regarded in an extreme sense of the word, viewing any individual subservience to secular or infidel law as a contravention of Islamic duty, including seemingly benign acts such as paying taxes or voting in a non-Islamic state (Hellmich, 2005:44). The purpose of such a militant interpretation of Islamic solidarity is ultimately to provide justification for arguably sacrilegious acts of terrorism Al Qaeda pursues. By discounting non-fundamentalist 101

Muslim diaspora as non-Muslim, Al Qaeda is able to pursue acts of violence which may result in their deaths, despite the mainstream Islamic law rejecting the notion of collateral damage (Hellmich, 2005:44-45).

This group norm of Islamic fundamentalism, is also referred to by bin Laden in his 1996 fatwa. He similarly condemns Saudi Arabia, in this case, again, for its perceived Western subservience in allowing US troops to be stationed in Medina and Mecca (bin Laden, 1996:166-167). He states, in explicit terms, that "...to use man made law instead of the Shari'a and to support the infidels against the Muslims is one of the ten 'voiders' that would strip a person from his Islamic status" (bin Laden, 1996:166). Such subordination of Islamic law to secular law, bin Laden suggests, automatically relegates an individual to the status of mushrik or heretical polytheist (bin Laden, 1996:166). The criteria of specificity, thus, is clearly accounted for in the case of the norm of Islamic fundamentalism. Bin Laden and al Zawahiri both express in very clear terms what action disqualifies one from Islamic status.

3.2.2. Norm durability

Having established specificity in the two prominent 1996 documents, establishing the durability of the norm of Islamic fundamentalism requires evidence that the essential character and form of the norm has remained unchanged in the interim. There are numerous significant sources corroborating such durability.

In the October 2001 television interview previously alluded to, bin Laden is asked about his response to Arab states which openly oppose Al Qaeda's ideology and activities. He responds by suggesting that "...every one who follows [ex-US president] Bush in his scheme has given up Islam" and that "...those who follow the unfaithful have become unfaithful themselves...those who follow Bush in his crusade against Muslims have denounced God" (Greenberg, 2005:202). The norm is reiterated once more in a 2003 speech made by bin Laden in response to scepticism voiced by a Saudi cleric. In the speech, bin Laden stresses the belief that the adoption of secular law – or, as he phrases it, "laws created by man" (Greenberg, 2005:233) – by certain imams or Islamic heads of state is tantamount to condemning all of those states' citizenries to hell, due to the inherent heresy of the act 102

(Greenberg, 2005:233). He asserts, without equivocation, that the absence of an imam who supports the Ummah – according to Al Qaeda's notion of support – necessarily produces an absence of Islam; "...[I]f the imam is an infidel...Islam ceases to exist" (Greenberg, 2005:235). Similarly, in a 2004 video speech addressed to Iraqi and Palestinian citizens, bin Laden stresses again that the act of aiding perceived apostate governments – such as the democratically elected governments in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan - "...is the greatest apostasy of all, and amounts to abandonment of the Muslim community" (MEMRI, 2004: Internet). It is apparent, thus, that Al Qaeda has not wavered in its extremism in this regard.

3.2.3. Norm concordance

Concordance, again, while difficult to prove conclusively, can be substantiated to an extent by examining evidence volitionally provided by individual Al Qaeda organisation members. While sources in this regard are scarce, there are certain prominent instances. For example, evidence of concordance can be found in testimony provided by Shadi Mohd Mustafa Abdallah – a former bodyguard of bin Laden and member of Al Tawhid, a Jordanian terrorist group under Al Qaeda guidance – to German police officials following his arrest, in exchange for a prison sentence reduction (Agence France Presse, 26/11/03; Agence France Presse, 17/02/04). Abdallah confirmed that chief amongst his cell's objectives were attacks upon Jewish civilians and, significantly, the overthrowing of the apostate Jordanian government, which, as suggested, is viewed as heretical because of its secular tendencies. Here terrorist plans are clearly motivated by a deep-seated disdain and intolerance for moderate Islamic governments perceived as enablers of encroaching Western hegemony.

A 2008 internal Al Qaeda memorandum seized by US troops in Iraq reveals similar disdain and disgust towards moderate Islamic tendencies (FOX News, 2008: Internet). The document, authored by a mid-level Iraqi Al Qaeda operative, Abu Tariq, chronicles the progressively ailing Al Qaeda presence within Iraq. Tariq expresses his bitterness and hatred towards former cell members – who deserted in favour of joining Iraqi government forces – in no uncertain terms: "...[T]hose kinds of people look like the cancer that grew up in the body of Al-Jihad movement, therefore we 103 should have no mercy on them" (FOX News, 2008: Internet). Putting the interests of the secular Iraqi government before the organisation, thus, is perceived as wholly traitorous and heretical, warranting reactionary violence in turn. It is fair to conclude that examples such as these provide evidence of concordance, with the norm of militant Islamic fundamentalism being diffused throughout Al Qaeda. Members, again, at various levels and locations, and with varying contexts, share a collective aversion towards moderate Islamic practices, regarding them as tantamount to Western supplication.

3.3. The glorification of martyrdom

In addition to anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism, a further key Al Qaeda group norm is that of the glorification of martyrdom. This refers to a group assertion of the inherent desirability of a member dying in attempting to forward the organisation's cause, including suicide attacks undertaken towards this end. This is an interesting and controversial norm, particularly in the case of equating a suicidal act with a hero's death, in that Islamic law explicitly forbids suicide (Marvasti, 2008:41; Hellmich, 2005:45). Al Qaeda attempts to circumvent this obstacle by refusing to regard suicide attacks as suicide, but rather acts of self-sacrifice – a stance which has precedent in Islamic theology (Marvasti, 2008:41; Hellmich, 2005:45). The problem with this, however, is that self-sacrifice for personal retribution is also forbidden by Islamic law (Marvasti, 2008:108). Al Qaeda attempt to circumvent this in turn by asserting that such attacks are undertaken not merely as an act of retaliation on the behalf of the organisation, but rather as blows struck against the West for the greater good of all Islam and for the honour of Allah (Marvasti, 2008:41;108; Hellmich, 2005:45).

3.3.1. Norm specificity and durability

In attempting to establish the appropriate specificity of the norm of the glorification of martyrdom, it is necessary once again to return to the two key 1996 documents written by bin Laden and al Zawahiri. While both tend not to be as preoccupied with promoting martyrdom as with other norms, each refers to the desirability of self- sacrifice in very clear and specific terms. 104

In the Ladenese Epistle, bin Laden (1996:181) claims that those who are willing to become martyrs for the cause of Islam will be rewarded by Allah with a special place in paradise. Relying heavily on quotes from the work of Islamic scholar Imam al Suyuti, championed by Al Qaeda co-founder, Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden takes great pains to make martyrdom seem both glorious and alluring. He specifically includes that "...'a martyr will not feel the pain of death except like how you feel when you are pinched' " and that "...'a martyr['s] privileges are guaranteed by Allah' ", including automatic absolution of sins, a jewelled martyr's crown, beautiful women and intercession on behalf of family members (bin Laden, 1996:182).

In "The Cure for Believers' Hearts", al Zawahiri concentrates more on justifying the notion of martyrdom against the previously discussed obstacles provided by Islamic law. As Hellmich (2005:44) notes, "...[al Zawahiri] propounds the ideas of the greater good and the need to react to exceptional circumstances...[and] states that an overpowering enemy and limited resources allow for a more lax interpretation of the law". He applies this particular logic to the case of martyrdom, referencing precedents of acceptable self-sacrifice within Islamic lore, to suggest that attacks against the West that may involve acts of suicide are permissible because of the extremity of the circumstance and the nobility of the intention. Thus, bin Laden and al Zawahiri both specifically discuss the desirability of achieving martyrdom, and together manage to portray it as both alluring to prospective members and respectable to possible sceptics. That, however, is not necessarily to suggest a lack of norm adoption on the part of these ideologues themselves. Indeed, in 1998, bin Laden was quoted as claiming his fervent desire to achieve martyrdom – "I am fighting so I can die a martyr and go to heaven to meet God...I regret having lived this long. I have nothing to lose" (Moghadam, 2008:83).

Additional evidence of norm specificity as well as evidence of norm durability can be found upon examining subsequent Al Qaeda references to martyrdom. A document entitled "Goals and Objectives of Jihad", found in an Al Qaeda Afghan safe-house following the 2001 US-led coalition invasion, for example, ranks "attaining martyrdom in the cause of God" second only to "establishing the rule of God on earth" (Moghadam, 2008:82). An Al Qaeda training video, discovered not long afterwards, features bin Laden again describing martyrdom in almost rapturous terms, claiming 105 that a martyr in heaven would only want to return to Earth in order to be martyred once more (Hellmich, 2005:50). Similarly, in a 2003 Al-Jazeera broadcast address to the Iraqi people, bin Laden declares: "I wish I could raid and be slain, and then raid and be slain, and then raid and be slain" (Moghadam, 2008:83). More significantly, in 2004, a statement released by bin Laden over the Internet implores more of his followers to engage in "martyrdom operations" (Moghadam, 2008:83). Al Zawahiri too has actively promoted the norm, releasing a video following the 2005 London Underground bombings praising those responsible for the act and suggesting that Al Qaeda initiates need to "...love Jihad and love martyrdom for the sake of Allah" (Moghadam, 2008:83). Both norm specificity and norm durability, thus, are clearly exhibited.

3.3.2. Norm concordance

Two previously examined examples can be referred to once again in order to establish concordance in the case of the glorification of martyrdom – suicide pilot Mohamed Atta's farewell letter (Williams, 2002:151-159) and Saudi martyr Raed al Harbi's will (NEFA, 2009: Internet). Both involved in suicide missions and both writing personal addresses with knowledge of their impending undertakings, each is preoccupied with grandiose notions of martyrdom. Atta implores his comrades: "...[B]e joyful with ease, because you are embarking upon a mission that God is pleased with...ask God to grant you martyrdom...know that the Gardens of Paradise are beautified with its best ornaments, and its inhabitants are calling you" (Williams, 2002:156-157). Similarly, al Harbi has this to say to his family: "...[W]hen you hear the news of my death and journey away from this mortal life, be happy and await the good news, and be aware then that I received what I wished for, so ask Allah to accept me, and be informed that I received the best out of the Husnayain [victory or martyrdom]" (NEFA, 2009: Internet). It is particularly telling of the extreme fervour with which this norm is adopted by Al Qaeda members that both of these men exhibited no hint of trepidation, despite being endowed with the knowledge of their certain death.

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3.4. The necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate

The final significant norm adopted by Al Qaeda is that of the necessity of re- establishing a Caliphate or unified Islamic state on the Arab Peninsula (the site of the first Caliphate); the belief that their efforts represent the collective efforts and wishes of the Ummah and that their activities will ultimately help engender a rebirth of a Caliphate for the good of all Muslims (Moghadam, 2008:68;77; Gunaratna, 2007:28- 29; Mendelsohn, 2005:60). Muslim political unity is thus viewed as an inherently desirable group objective which should be actively pursued through war waged on the West, thereby fostering solidarity through a common enemy. While, as will be illustrated in the following chapter, this is a norm which is not necessarily always a direct determinant of short-term action, it is unquestionably inextricably intertwined with the essential nature of Al Qaeda's ideology.

3.4.1. Norm specificity and durability

Unlike previously discussed norms, the notion of the necessity of the resurrection of a Caliphate is only made clear and referred to in any detail after the September 2001 attacks. The only mention of the desire for Islamic political unity made prior to this by Al Qaeda is found in the form of a quote attributed to bin Laden in 1998, where he stated that "...the pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan" (Scheuer, 2005: Internet). That does not necessarily mean that the norm was not present prior to this in some latent or diminished form, but merely that it emerged as a conscious primary group conviction somewhat later than other significant norms. Specificity and durability, nonetheless, can be established with reference to a number of pieces of evidence which have emerged since that time, each reiterating the same sentiment.

Of particular significance is a reference made to Caliphate re-establishment by al Zawahiri in a manuscript published in 2001 (Moghadam, 2008:77). In the manuscript, al Zawahiri asserts that all of Al Qaeda's plans and activities "...will remain up in the air without tangible gain or benefit unless they lead to the establishment of the state of Caliphate in the heart of the Islamic world" (Moghadam, 2008:77). The implication here is that Islamic political unity need be doggedly pursued as a fundamental group objective, so that Al Qaeda's efforts are met with some substantive reward of benefit 107 to all Islam and so endow their endeavour with some exogenous value. Echoing this subtext, al Zawahiri admits that the re-establishment of a Caliphate is an objective that is neither "easy" nor "close at hand", but one which "constitutes the hope of the Muslim nation" (Moghadam, 2008:77).

Bin Laden, too, has expressed Al Qaeda's belief in the necessity of obtaining Islamic political unity. In his aforementioned 2003 response to a Saudi cleric, bin Laden devotes the majority of his proselytisation to asserting the inherent desirability of a renewed Caliphate and twinning this objective to jihad as the necessary means of achieving it (Greenberg, 2005:230-237). He asserts that "...since the fall of the Caliphate, the Crusaders made sure not to enable the true Islam to establish a state", but that he is "...convinced that thanks to Allah, this nation has sufficient forces to establish...the Islamic Caliphate, but we must tell these forces that this is their obligation" (Greenberg, 2005:230-231). He thus makes it clear that realising the re-establishment of a Caliphate is not a vague hope, but a conviction which should actively engender concomitant action – a norm.

Since these key assertions of norm adoption, specific reference to the re- establishment of a Caliphate has been rare compared to other norms, but pointed when it has occurred. Notably, in a 2006 Al-Jazeera television address by bin Laden, wherein he focuses upon the US plight in Iraq, the Al Qaeda leader uses the opportunity to note that Iraq is the historical "seat of the [first] Caliphate", claiming that US struggles in the region are symbolic of the righteous cause of Islam, suggesting the possibility that Iraq represents a foothold for achieving ambitions of Islamic unity (Scheuer, 2006: Internet). It is worth noting too that Al Qaeda's Internet- based newscast, launched in 2007, is named "Voice of the Caliphate" (McQuaid, 2007:24), suggesting that a rather firm commitment to the norm still exists.

Norm specificity and durability, thus, while not as conclusively substantiated as with previously discussed norms, is still sufficient in magnitude to regard the necessity of the re-establishment of a Caliphate as a prominent Al Qaeda group norm.

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3.4.2. Norm concordance

The most compelling piece of evidence substantiating concordance in the case of Al Qaeda's desire for Islamic political unity comes in the form of testimony provided by the memoirs of radical Jordanian journalist, Fouad Hussein (Wright, 2006b: Internet). Hussein befriended Abu Musab al Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, while in a Jordanian prison in 1996. The relationship allowed him access to numerous Al Qaeda operatives who he interviewed over the course of a number of years (Wright, 2006b: Internet). During these interactions, Hussein discovered the existence of a twenty-year plan which all the organisation members he encountered firmly believed would successfully be put into practice. Included in the seven-phase plan is a move to evict all Westerners from the Middle East and destroy "apostate" Arab regimes, thereby making way for the establishment of a new Caliphate (Wright, 2006b: Internet). It is from this unified political and territorial base, Hussein suggests, that Al Qaeda believes full scale war between believers and non-believers can be initiated, with victory for the unified Islamic nation perceived as being inevitable. The Jordanian thus makes it clear that the norm of the necessity of Islamic political unity is not merely a long-term goal vaguely underpinning all group activity, but a necessary, spatially and temporally defined objective consciously and purposefully shaping the majority of individual member action.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda undoubtedly constitutes the ideal contemporary transnational terrorist group for in-depth study. The archetypal new ideological terrorist organisation, Al Qaeda not only embodies each of the ten defining characteristics of new transnational terrorism, but has played a significant historical role in developing the very nature of these criteria. Its prominence and notoriety, moreover, mean that it enjoys unrivalled media and scholarly attention, providing a multitude of source material from which to discern the physical residue of group norms.

Capitalising on this multitude of source material, the preceding discussion was able to fulfil its primary objective of dissecting Al Qaeda's worldview and establishing a clear set of prominent group norms for use in systematic constructivist analysis in 109

Chapter 5. Furthermore, having made use of Legro's framework to operationalise norm strength, the group norms extracted – anti-Westernism, militant Islamic fundamentalism, the glorification of martyrdom and the necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate – can each be said to be objectively significant prior to analysis, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of non-falsifiability and circular argumentation. While, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, these norms are ultimately transient and subject to evolution and change, establishing norm specificity, durability and concordance within the context of recent history endows them with sufficient stability for constructivist analysis – analysis, as stressed, which aims only to provide contingent truth claims, tethered to a narrowly defined issue area.

While uncovering Al Qaeda's primary group norms has a degree of intrinsic value, the exercise is of limited utility if awareness of such norms is not coupled with some means of understanding the manner in which they actually influence the organisation's activities. This will be what the following chapter will concern itself with; utilising the norms established here to construct a nuanced and detailed constitutive constructivist analysis of Al Qaeda's functioning – the primary goal of this study. Returning to the constructivist conception of the agent-structure relationship discussed in Chapter 2, the next chapter will examine how the prominent norms of Al Qaeda, established here, interact with Al Qaeda's ideas, beliefs and consequent action, and how external contextual considerations influence the manner of this interaction. This will provide a more accurate portrait of the transient nature of norms, as their fluctuations over time and the consequences of such fluctuations are examined in depth.

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Chapter 5: The case of Al Qaeda – a constructivist analysis

Introduction

Armed with a thorough understanding of both the constructivist approach and Al Qaeda's history, essential character and group norms, it is now possible to combine these constituent elements in order to fulfil the primary objective of this study: developing a detailed constitutive analysis of Al Qaeda's terrorist activities, so as to gain insight into the functioning of contemporary transnational terrorists. Handily, constructivism, as dealt with in Chapter 2, provides a ubiquitous template for understanding the ideational mechanisms at work behind any given activity, with its conception of the agent-structure relationship. Examining the agent-structure relationship is key to developing any constitutive constructivist analysis, as it is concerned with the patterned manner in which norms (ideational structures) and the identities, interests and resultant actions of agents interact.

Examining the agent-structure relationship, however, is of little value if it is done haphazardly. An appropriate method is required to meaningfully guide analysis of the agent-structure relationship so that a thorough and coherent portrait of Al Qaeda's activities is produced. Towards this end, this study will utilise an adapted version of the process-tracing method – a method widely used by constructivist scholars – in order to systematically describe the relationship which lies at the heart of all constructivist thought and thereby establish a novel and pertinent explanation of Al Qaeda's terrorist actions.

The chapter will begin with a necessary clarification regarding the combination of causal and constitutive explanation, followed by a detailed exposition of the process- tracing method, including a rationale for its utilisation and a discussion of necessary modifications for this study. Thereafter the amended method will be applied to an examination of the operation of the agent-structure relationship in the case of Al Qaeda, by tracing the most notable sequence of Al Qaeda activities, between 2001 and the present. Attention will also be paid to examining rival mainstream theoretical accounts of causation and evaluating their comparative utility.

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1. Causation, constitution and constructivism

As stated, the aim of this chapter is to establish a detailed constitutive account of Al Qaeda's functioning – examining "...how norms function in temporal and spatial settings to make some actions possible...and others impossible" (Farrell, 2002:57) – by applying the process-tracing method to the constructivist notion of the agent- structure relationship. Although constructivist theory and process-tracing are commonly used in concert (George & Bennett, 2005:206; Checkel, 2008:79), this marriage may seem counter-intuitive at first.

As will be expanded upon in the proceeding section, process-tracing is concerned with how chains of causation produce observed phenomena, while constructivism seeks to provide a constitutive understanding of an observed phenomena, asserting no concrete causal predictions. These two approaches to appropriating understanding – causal and constitutive explanation – have traditionally served separate and isolated functions. While causal explanations attempt to answer "how?" and "why?" questions, constitutive explanations attempt to answer "how-possible?" and "what?" questions (Wendt, 1998:104-105). Investigating causation, provided with variables X and Y, independent of each other and temporally removed, involves observing X and Y's behaviour over time and attempts to establish how X causes Y (Wendt, 1998:105). This is commonly referred to as “longitudinal” analysis (Babbie et al., 2003:93). Constitutive explanations, on the other hand, require neither variables with independent existence nor variables with temporal asymmetry (Wendt, 1998:106); they take a static "snapshot" of a dynamic phenomenon, examining the manner in which various interdependent, concurrent variables interact in order to manifest that phenomenon (Babbie et al., 2003:92; Wendt, 1998:106). This is commonly referred to as “cross-sectional” analysis (Babbie et al., 2003:92).

Surprisingly though, such divergence in intent does not render the two explanations incommensurable in the case of constructivism (Pouliot, 2007:373). This is largely due to constructivist theory's aim of establishing contingent generalisations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394; George & Bennett, 2005:216) regarding observed phenomena, as was alluded to in Chapter 2. Unlike other constitutive theory then, constructivism does not concern itself with a single snapshot of a phenomenon, but 112 rather requires a multiplicity of such snapshots over time to examine how changes in an observed phenomenon are coupled with changes in the manner of its constitution. Hence, while the variables in the agent-structure relationship are mutually constitutive – not independent of each other and not temporally removed – taking multiple such snapshots over time nonetheless provides for a weak causal insight allowing for contingent generalisations to be made regarding changes in ideational factors and related changes in observed phenomena. In the case of Al Qaeda then, examining how ideational concerns influence action – and vice versa – at various points over a period of time allows for tentative generalisations to be made regarding the functioning of Al Qaeda and, to an extent, regarding the functioning of new terrorism – an ultimate goal of this study.

The appropriateness of the marriage of process-tracing and constructivism thus becomes more clear. Process-tracing, as will be elaborated upon, is concerned with causal progression over time. Constructivism is concerned with constitutive progression over time so as to extract causal insight. Process-tracing then, in an appropriately modified guise, is able to provide a structured means of systematically tracking changes in constitution.

2. Process-tracing

2.1. The method

The essential logic behind the process-tracing method can best be understood by using the simple allegorical example offered by two key figures in the method's development – George and Bennett (2005:206-207). They propose a scenario wherein a test subject is shown 50 numbered dominoes lined up on a table. A blind is lowered, obscuring all but the first and last dominoes. The subject exits the room and re-enters after a short period. When the subject returns, the blind is still lowered, but dominoes number one and 50 are seen lying flat, facing the same direction. Can the subject assert with any certainty that domino one caused domino 50 to fall over? While, of course, that is a distinct possibility, without having witnessed the chain of causation first-hand – seeing each domino hitting the next – there is no way of being sure of this. In the absence of witnessing the chain of events first-hand, the best the 113 subject can hope to do is raise the blind and examine the aftermath and ask the appropriate questions: have all the dominoes been knocked over?; are there any fingerprints and, if so, on which dominoes?; did anybody else witness or overhear proceedings?; and so forth. While the subject may never be able to conclusively establish the exact causal chain (the precise sequence of determinant action) and causal mechanism (that which precipitated or enabled such action) involved in knocking over dominoes one and 50, the subject can nevertheless reliably narrow it down to one or two probable explanations of action, given the available facts.

This approach to ex post facto investigation represents the essence of the process- tracing method. Provided with an understanding of arrangement of a set of variables at the beginning and end of a temporal continuum, the method seeks to provide a way of accounting for the chain of influences which colluded to bring about such a progression (Pouliot, 2007:373). As George and Bennett (2005:6) state, process- tracing "...attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes". In the realm of IR, this is achieved by examining all available sources on a given issue-area – histories, archival documents, speech and interview transcripts, news reports and so forth – and scrutinising them for evidence which sheds light on a probable narrative of causation (Farrell, 2002:61-62). The way this narrative is understood and communicated, however, very much depends on the theory or perspective to which the method is applied and, indeed, the specific form of process- tracing utilised towards this end.

2.1.1. Forms of process-tracing

Process-tracing adopts a number of guises, each with associated strengths, weaknesses and theoretical and investigative compatibility (George & Bennett, 2005:210). The most straightforward and simplistic form of process-tracing is that of the detailed narrative, a familiar staple in the traditions of historical sociology and broader historical studies. While, loosely speaking, all forms of process-tracing are detailed narratives, in that they analyse the evolution of some phenomenon over time, the term "detailed narrative" is used here to denote a specific methodological approach. Such an approach merely involves an in-depth, systematic chronicling of an identified causal sequence – essentially, academic story-telling. A detailed 114 narrative is devoid of specific theory and theory-related variables and, accordingly, amounts to little more than objective, detailed description of a sequence of events with reference to probable determinants of action. As a consequence, although the approach has some utility as a sort of preparation prior to more analytical process- tracing (George & Bennett, 2005:210), assisting in identifying the most probable causal processes that need be analysed in more detail, it offers no value for the purposes of this study, where constructivism dictates the specific set of variables that need be systematically attended to.

A second type of process-tracing involves building upon the rudimentary description of the detailed narrative by introducing explicit causal hypotheses and, where appropriate, formulating concomitant generalisations about observed phenomena (George & Bennett, 2005:211). The method then becomes one not of story-telling alone, but also of establishing concrete predictive assertions, to be vindicated by the narrative, and drawing appropriate law-like conclusions to endow the process with analytical integrity. Such an approach, however, has significant positivist bias and, accordingly, is particularly ill-suited to constructivist application.

The final two varieties of the process-tracing method, however, are both suited to constructivist application and both potentially add value to analysis in different ways. Analytical explanation (George & Bennett, 2005:211), the first of the two, rather than applying process-tracing directly to an issue-area to establish a descriptive narrative, relies upon utilising the method in concert with the prescriptions of a particular theory, using the exemplar posited by that theory as a vehicle for explaining the mechanics involved in a particular causal chain. As George and Bennett (2005:211) describe it, analytical explanation "...converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms". The second of the two, "more general explanation" as George and Bennett (2005:211) name it, involves a similar process, but with less attention to the minute detail of every link in the causal chain and more emphasis on an overarching understanding. This explanation in broader terms is usually necessitated by vaguely defined theory, a dearth of appropriate sources, a need for analysis at a higher level of abstraction or an investigative focus upon macro-phenomena.

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This study, because of its specific requirements, will borrow from both of these approaches to process-tracing – analytical explanation and more general explanation. Constructivism's high level of abstraction, this study's aim of gleaning insight into broader issues of contemporary transnational terrorism, the poverty of reliable source material and the reasonably long time interval to which the method will be applied all act in concert to preference a more general explanation. That being said, the very specific prescriptions of constructivism with regards to the agent- structure relationship, the small group of pertinent norms involved in analysis and the relatively few keystone events which demand attention in piecing together a time-line of causation mean that such a general explanation can still be endowed with a preciseness and thoroughness of process reminiscent of analytical explanation.

In concert, these two approaches will be applied to the agent-structure relationship as Lupovici (2009:202) suggests is most useful: providing a structured means of "...studying ideational factors, the evolution of social phenomena, and the influence of these phenomena on actors‟ behaviour" – the ultimate goal of this chapter.

2.2. The appropriateness of process-tracing

Having established what process-tracing entails, it is now worth justifying the logic behind its selection for use in this study. Although it has been shown why process- tracing can be applied to constructivism, why it should be warrants attention. While the method is widely used by constructivist scholars for all manner of investigation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:395; Farrell, 2002:61), and while process-tracing is noted by Wendt (George & Bennett, 2005:206) as the ideal method to aid the development of a constitutive constructivist analysis of a given case study, such academic testimonials do not constitute sufficient justification of appropriateness. There are, rather, specific, pertinent reasons for the compatibility of process-tracing and constructivism, each of which will be attended to.

Firstly, as discussed, process-tracing is used to provide narrative descriptions and explanations of phenomena (George & Bennett, 2005:205;208;210) – this approach is particularly compatible with the essential nature of the constructivist understanding of global political reality. As the agent-structure relationship is one of mutual 116 constitution, it is dynamic and evolving; certain actions lead to the strengthening or weakening of certain norms, which in turn have a bearing on subsequent action and so on (Phillips, 2007:62; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267). As Pouliot (2007:367) stresses, "...process and sequence matter because social life is fundamentally temporal". If, then, constructivism is to be concerned with evolving norms and resultant practice within a social reality, temporal considerations are inextricably linked to analysis. Constructivism is thus inherently historical (Pouliot, 2007:366), as changes in social fact are understood in terms of a narrative account of circumstance. Even if such changes occur concurrently or symbiotically in practice, as constructivist theory suggests (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267), they can nonetheless only be systematically examined in the form of a sequential narrative. Accordingly, understanding the nature of such dynamic evolution is most easily achieved through a narrative-centric methodology such as process-tracing.

Secondly, it has been repeatedly asserted that constructivism is concerned with unearthing qualified, "small-t" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001:394) truth claims contingent upon a specific set of identified ideas, norms, identities and interests, rather than the "transhistorically or transculturally valid claims" (Phillips, 2007:63) with which traditional IR theories are concerned. Importantly, process-tracing as an investigative method is necessarily preoccupied with such small-t analysis (George & Bennett, 2005:205) because it can only be utilised in the examination of specific case studies. Any insight gained from single-case application, as utilised in this study, is thus necessarily tethered to some extent to the specific context of that case – although this is a truth sometimes dismissed by positivist scholars utilising process-tracing for theory testing (George & Bennett, 2005:220). Process-tracing then offers a structured means of pursuing comprehensive case-specific analysis – that which is required by a constructivist examination of Al Qaeda.

2.3. Adapting process-tracing for the purposes of this study

Building upon the insights of Farrell (2002:61-62), Lupovici (2009:201-202) and, in particular, Pouliot (2007:373-374), despite the general appropriateness of process- tracing as a method to be applied to constructivist investigation, the nature of 117 constructivist thought as well as the objectives of this study are such that certain modifications nonetheless need to be made in order to ensure both value and compatibility.

Firstly, part of the aim of this study is to highlight the value of a constructivist analysis of contemporary terrorism in contrast to its outmoded mainstream theoretical competitors. While positivist schools insist upon rigid empiricism in IR enquiry, constructivists assert that a negotiated empiricism, which recognises the real influence of indirectly measurable ideational variables, adds significant value to analysis (Farrell, 2002:57;60-62; Barkin, 2003:326). While process-tracing does not offer a mechanism for the simultaneous tracing of phenomena across different paradigmatic orientations, for the purposes of this study it is worth at least augmenting the value of analysis by including reference where appropriate to the inadequacies of traditional positivist IR theory. At various stages, as the process of Al Qaeda's evolution from 2001 to the present is traced, reference will thus be made to instances where mainstream theory is either ill-equipped to account for a group action or has led to misguided policy choices in response to terrorist activity.

Secondly, and far more crucially, while applying process-tracing to the study of the agent-structure relationship provides a structured means of examining the evolution of group norms and behaviour, such a method is still tethered to a conventional causal understanding of a chain of events – X causes Y which, in turn, causes Z – and fails to account for the most salient constitutive dimensions involved in the process (Lupovici, 2009:202). That is to say, conventional process-tracing would enable one to take various constitutive snapshots of Al Qaeda's functioning along a temporal continuum or narrative, but provides no insight into the constitutive mechanisms which determine changes in the relevant variables – that which advances the agent-structure narrative. The method, then, needs to be modified so that it is able to account for this.

Pouliot (2007:373-374) suggests that the most appropriate means of doing so is to look towards the influence of context. A norm can only exist in a specific context wherein all relevant actors agree that it exists; that same norm might not exist if the context differs. All constructivist propositions act in the same way. As discussed in 118

Chapter 2, although the agent-structure relationship provides a universal template for understanding the mutual interaction of ideational concerns, when applied to a particular case, any truths extracted are contingent upon that particular context; both agency and ideational structures are indelibly wed to the broader global political reality which they inhabit. A certain arrangement of international political reality may strongly entrench a certain group norm, which influences identity, interest and, ultimately, action in a certain way. That action necessarily has a bearing, to some degree, on the arrangement of international political reality (context), thereby affecting the strength of said group norm and, hence, concomitant action. Norm X does not constitute appropriate behaviour Y without qualification. Rather, norm X only constitutes appropriate behaviour Y in context C (Pouliot, 2007:373-374).

Constructivist theory asserts that this process is a concurrent one, with norms, identities, interests, action and context continually in flux and continually influencing the manner of each other's constitution (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:267). As stated though, the examination of the agent-structure relationship is necessarily a narrative process, analysing how each variable affects the other in turn, while maintaining an understanding that the variables involved are not as elegantly separable in practice. It is by building upon this understanding of constructivist assertions that Poliout (2007:373-374) suggests that process-tracing can be adapted to more thoroughly interpret ideational progression and associated action. Instead of simply examining how X causes Y, or even how X constitutes Y, process-tracing becomes a matter of examining the extent to which context C enables group norm (or norms) X to constitute appropriate behaviour Y (agency) and, in turn, the manner in which appropriate behaviour Y (terrorist activity in the case of Al Qaeda) alters context C and, as a consequence, the strength of group norm (or norms) X. This approach to process-tracing is much more representative of the utility attributed to the method by Goldstone, "...perform[ing] the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the observed sequence of events" (George & Bennett, 2005:206).

This modified approach to process-tracing still records the progression of relevant variables over time – traces a process – but has the added utility of accounting for all 119 relevant constitutive influences, thereby providing a detailed and accurate constitutive constructivist portrait. The method will be utilised in the following section to understand the exact functioning and progression of functioning of the agent- structure relationship in the case of Al Qaeda, thereby establishing an organisational model which attends to issues such as fluctuations in norm strength, changes in reactionary policy and related changes in group functioning that will be crucial in deriving appropriate real-world policy prescriptions at the conclusion of the study. It provides the optimal mixture of meta-theoretical compatibility, analytical depth and pragmatic value.

3. Tracing the evolution of Al Qaeda between 2001 and the present day

Having established a clear method of enquiry, a systematic investigation of Al Qaeda's ideational mechanics can now be pursued. Because the time period under scrutiny is fairly lengthy, tracing the process of Al Qaeda's evolution will involve focusing only upon taking snapshots of various keystone Al Qaeda-related occurrences over the past decade, examining how global context and group norms colluded to bring them about, and how these events affected global context and norm strength in turn. While this may mean that the minutiae of all constitutive relationships and progressions may not be fully attended to, a more than sufficient overarching understanding of the role of ideational concerns with regards to Al Qaeda's functioning will be obtained. Building upon the assertions of Farrell (2002:61) and Legro (1997:33), and as discussed in Chapter 1, the group norms that will be attended to in analysis will be limited to those established in Chapter 4 – norms established as being both deeply entrenched in group cognition and clearly influential upon group functioning. Much of the arduous groundwork then has already been laid, allowing analysis to proceed in a sharp, focused manner.

Discussion will begin with an examination of Al Qaeda's watershed 11 September 2001 attacks upon the US, followed by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the subsequent emergence of Al Qaeda "franchises" and their notable terrorist undertakings and, finally, the rise and largely self-induced collapse of Al Qaeda in Iraq. These specific issues have been selected for analysis so as to provide a narrative arc which includes both contexts that have fuelled Al Qaeda's proliferation 120 and those that have stifled it, thereby offering crucial policy insight into how best to counter the organisation's endeavours.

In the case of each snapshot chosen for analysis, attention will be paid not only to the manner in which Al Qaeda's norms determine group action according to the agent-structure relationship, but also to the influence of and consequences for the broader enabling context in each case, as dictated by the modified process-tracing method being utilised. Tracking the evolution of each of these variables – group norm (or norms) X, appropriate behaviour Y and context C – will establish an appropriate narrative account of the role of ideational factors in Al Qaeda's functioning.

3.1. The 11 September 2001 attacks upon the US

3.1.1. Background

On 11 September 2001, Al Qaeda conducted their most significant terrorist attack – an attack unprecedented in scale and audacity. The culmination of years of planning and preparation, a group of 19 Al Qaeda operatives hijacked four transcontinental airliners from three US airports, crashing them into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Perrin, 2005:169; Pedahzur, 2005:101). While one of the hijacked flights failed to reach its intended target due to passenger intervention, the three successful suicide strikes still amassed a combined death-toll of 2 973 (Alfano, 2006: Internet). The first foreign attack on US soil since Pearl Harbour, 60 years prior, and the first ever such attack by a non-state entity, the actions of Al Qaeda stunned the global community (McInnes, 2003:169; Perrin, 2005:170).

While Al Qaeda had previously orchestrated numerous terrorist attacks on foreign soil during the course of the 1990s – including the 1992 hotel bombings in Yemen aimed at US troops, the 1995 and 1996 bombings of US and US-funded military facilities in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 bombing of a US naval vessel (Wright, 2006a:174; Wedgewood, 2002:330) – none of these involved anywhere near the same level of intricacy, 121 lethality and symbolic significance as the September 2001 attacks (Pedahzur, 2005:101). As will be elaborated upon in the proceeding section, the attacks constituted a watershed moment in international relations, fundamentally changing the essential nature of the global political context.

3.1.2. The enabling context

Tracing the process of the development of ideational influences leading to the 2001 attacks requires attention not only to the context directly preceding the attacks, but also to the development of the context over a number of years beforehand. It requires an examination of how certain goings-on in the Islamic world coupled with certain Western interventions colluded to gradually exacerbate Al Qaeda hostility, entrenching antagonistic group norms to the extent that they precipitated such extreme terrorist action. As was discussed in Chapter 4, Al Qaeda's hatred of the West and related desire for fundamentalist Islamic unity and solidarity stems from a handful of grievances: Islamic blood shed by Western peace-keeping forces, Islamic land occupied by Western military, Islamic states' subservience to Western interests and the erosion of Islamic values at the hands of Western culture (bin Laden, 1996:160-182; Hellmich, 2005:44). Repeated instances of these phenomena over the course of the decade preceding the 2001 attacks gradually led to the strengthening of certain previously discussed Al Qaeda group norms, to the extent that terrorist action on such a grand scale was precipitated. The global context was rendered sufficiently dire in the eyes of Al Qaeda that the September 11 attacks constituted appropriate action.

The ten years prior to the attacks were littered with numerous instances of Western intervention in war-ravaged territories with significant Islamic populations. While many such missions were orchestrated by the United Nations (UN), and involved non-Western troops, Al Qaeda, as alluded to, regards the UN as no more than a benign façade for the pursuit of Western interests (bin Laden, 1996:160). Accordingly, UN-sponsored peace-keeping missions in Somalia in 1992 (GlobalSecurity, 2010: Internet; Bergen, 2008:26), in Tajikistan in 1994 (UNMOT, 2000: Internet), in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 (UNMIBH, 2002: Internet) and in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 (UNMEE, 2009: Internet) were all perceived in a 122 negative light by the terrorist organisation. Rather than seeing the operations as attempts to protect Muslims from civil conflict, Al Qaeda interpreted UN efforts as Western imperialism. Similarly, rather than regarding Muslim casualties as unfortunate consequences of the necessary process of restoring order in these states, Al Qaeda interpreted the deaths as part of a ubiquitous Western crusade against Islam (bin Laden, 1996:160).

Understandably then, bearing in mind the unease elicited by such peace-keeping endeavours, Al Qaeda responded with nothing short of outrage to instances of outright conflict between Western forces and Arab states, such as Israeli-Palestinian clashes during the latter part of the First Intifada (MERIP, 2010: Internet), Israeli- Lebanese clashes during the mid-1990s – particularly the Qana massacre of 1996 (bin Laden, 1996:160; Lawrence, 2005:107) – and, most significantly, the Gulf War between the US and Iraq in the early 1990s (bin Laden, 1996:166-167). Not only did each of these constitute blatant attacks on Islam by the West in the eyes of Al Qaeda, but also examples of the subservience of apostate Arab states to Western interests, as neighbouring Islamic territories with Western ties either looked on with steadfast neutrality or willingly provided the West with assistance. As discussed previously, Osama bin Laden was infuriated by the Saudi government's decision to snub Al Qaeda's offer of martial assistance during the Gulf War and, instead, acquiesce to the stationing of US troops in the Islamic holy lands of Medina and Mecca (bin Laden, 1996:166-167). Such action was viewed by Al Qaeda as nothing short of traitorous and tantamount to the relinquishment of Islamic status. Moreover, such action heightened the group's sense of hostility towards the West, with apostate Arab subservience being regarded as a product of Western coercion, as states such as the US leveraged their economic and military superiority to forward their national interests.

This perceived Western subjugation of Islamic states was also compounded by what Al Qaeda perceived as a gradual subversion of Islamic values by Western culture, both politically and socially. As Lieber and Weisberg (2002:273-275) point out, along with the process of globalisation comes the inevitable clash, melding and mutation of cultures. The ascendency of chiefly Western ideas and values in this process – often viewed in pejorative terms as cultural imperialism – means that traditional parochial 123 ways of life either become devalued or become a source of alienation and resentment. This phenomenon became increasingly apparent in the Islamic world in the years leading up to the September 2001 attacks, as Western popular culture and political and moral values infiltrated Muslim territories. In instances where they did not usurp traditional Islamic ways of life, they still bred discontent as poverty- stricken, disenfranchised citizens desired the prosperity that secular liberalism seemingly promised. This trend was perceived by Al Qaeda as part of the West's attack on Islam and even further strengthened feelings of anger and resentment.

3.1.3. The effect of the context on group norms

The aggregate impact of these various perceived affronts to Islam on the part of the West over the course of the 1990s was to gradually strengthen Al Qaeda's antagonist group norm of anti-Westernism to the point that an attack of the scale of those perpetrated in 2001 was deemed not only possible, but necessary. The global context was perceived by Al Qaeda as one wherein Islam was, in a very real sense, under attack, and thus had a profound bearing on the strength of the organisation's convictions. Western occupation of Islamic territories, Islamic deaths due to Western action, the erosion of Islamic values in the wake of perceived Western cultural imperialism and the ready compliance of apostate Islamic states to Western interests all worked in concert to maximise anti-Western sentiment. As noted in Chapter 4, this anti-Western norm asserts that the way to remedy all these ills imposed by the West is to strike back through guerrilla violence. The fact that this exact logic and related strategy had, according to most Islamic observers, been vindicated by bin Laden's exploits during the Soviet-Afghan conflict (Gunaratna, 2007:30), served as to strengthen the norm's perceived validity.

3.1.4. The manner in which group norms directed consequent action

At some critical point then, during the latter part of the 1990s, the norm of anti- Westernism became so deeply entrenched that Al Qaeda members' identity shifted from defender of Islam to champion of Islam and their interests, accordingly, shifted from a war on Arab soil to a war on Western soil. While a subtle shift in many ways, it is a crucial shift, as the cumulative strain of unwanted Western interference pushed 124 them to pursue unprecedented extremes. The mode of attack, remained the same as they were accustomed to – clandestine suicide attacks – but the scale and audacity of the attacks was driven to new heights by the unprecedented strength of anti- Westernism.

It is worth noting too the ancillary role played by the norms of the glorification of martyrdom and the commitment to fundamentalist Islam in allowing Al Qaeda to realise the attacks. There was little difficulty in finding willing operatives to undertake the mission, firstly because of the self-sacrifice involved was seen as heroic and for the greater good of Islam and, secondly, because there was no moral quandary regarding innocent casualties, as civilians targeted were dehumanised by their infidel or apostate status. Any ambivalence regarding potential Islamic casualties was eliminated by the heightened sense of militant Islamic fundamentalism elicited by various instances of Arab state subservience to Western will over the previous decade. This ready willingness, even eagerness to deal death on such a scale is clearly reflected by the sentiments of the September 11 pilot Mohamed Atta, in his recovered letter to his comrades (Williams, 2002:151-159). As discussed in Chapter 4, Atta relished the opportunity to kill "the unbelievers" and thereby curry favour with Allah. Al Qaeda truly believed that there was "good" terrorism and "condemned" terrorism, and that their battle against the West on behalf of Islam endowed their actions with inherent righteousness (Greenberg, 2005:197;201;204).

3.1.5. The effect of action upon the enabling context

The attacks had a profound impact upon the global political context, fundamentally altering states' policies, priorities and perceptions of international relations activity. The notion of a global ideological battle between Islamic fundamentalists and Western imperialists entrenched itself as the prevailing paradigm, as the rest of the world began to perceive international activity in broadly the same terms as Al Qaeda had all along (Mendelsohn, 2005:46; Greenberg, 2005:193-196). Considering, then, the undoubted gravity and significance of Al Qaeda's 2001 attacks, it is alarming that the traditional positivist IR theories of neo-realism and neo-realism, in stark contrast to constructivism, are unable to account for Al Qaeda's actions.

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3.1.6. The inability of mainstream theory to account for the attacks

As Philpott (2002:66) asserts, the September 2001 attacks confound the prescriptions of neo-realism because they "...had little plausible origin in the dynamics of alliances and polarity, in the rise and fall of great powers, in any state's quest for security, or even in the actions of any state at all". That is to say, the perspective's pre-occupation with states as the essential chess-pieces of global interaction means that a unilateral attack on a state by a non-state entity is not even in its lexicon of possible behaviour. Furthermore, its systemic conception of power distribution as the sole determinant of international action precludes it from comprehending the guerrilla nature of Al Qaeda's aggression, clandestinely attacking a foe infinitely more powerful than itself, without the safety-net of an alliance to some other great power.

Similarly, neo-liberalism falls short of providing a compelling understanding of Al Qaeda's unprecedented terrorist action. As Philpott (2002:66) again points out, the attacks were not "...accomplished by a parliament or a voting public, a multinational corporation, labour union, or farm lobby, or by any of the other agents that liberals believe influence foreign policy...the attack had little to do with international organisations or international institutions or with trade, finance, or investment". While, then, neo-liberalism accounts for the influences of non-state entities and soft- power concerns, the manner in which these variables are understood to interact is strictly in line with a communitarian conception of international functioning. Because international law is seen as entrenched and binding, international organisations are assumed to mediate conflict, the global market is assumed to strengthen interdependence and liberal norms are regarded as pervasive, action which does not conform to the patterned neo-liberal paradigm cannot be adequately explained. Al Qaeda represents a transnational actor uninterested in legitimate trade, distrustful of the United Nations, pursuing an openly aggressive and antagonistic agenda and wholly committed to undermining the very liberal principles upon which neo- liberalism's conception of international relations is founded – as with neo-realism, a reality not in neo-liberalism's lexicon of possible behaviour.

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Neo-realists and neo-liberals, thus, are both unable to account for Al Qaeda's actions because they do not acknowledge the determinant power of ideas which deviate from their rigid positivist portraits of reality (Philpott, 2002:66-67). It is only through a comprehensive constructivist analysis – such as the one pursued in this study – that an appropriate understanding of the significant role played by ideational concerns in influencing Al Qaeda's functioning can be adequately achieved.

3.2. The US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq

3.2.1. The effect of the context on group norms

Returning to such analysis, the next keystone events which warrant examination are the US-led coalition invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks. With the global political context fundamentally changed following the bombing of the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the primary agenda of many Western states, especially the US, became one of a "war on terror" (Mendelsohn, 2005:46). In particular, a war on those responsible for the watershed attacks, Al Qaeda. The war on terror became entrenched as a norm for the US and its allies just as anti-Westernism was a norm for Al Qaeda.

3.2.2. The manner in which group norms directed consequent action

Unlike Al Qaeda, however, the means the US and its coalition partners chose to pursue the fight against their foe was a conventional, materially-informed course of action: the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to eliminate Al Qaeda heads and the Taliban regime – to which Al Qaeda ostensibly constituted a parallel government – and the 2003 invasion of Iraq to oust the potentially sympathetic Ba'athist regime (Pedahzur, 2005:102-103; Woods & Lacey, 2007: Internet). While, as has been discussed in the relevant literature at length, there were other stated reasons for the Iraq invasion, as well as other tacit motivations, the issue is moot with regards to this study. Regardless of how successful the US actually believed the Iraq invasion would be in eliminating Al Qaeda, the effect of the invasion on Al Qaeda's proliferation has been profound (Pedahzur, 2005:103). By invading Afghanistan and, in particular Iraq, rather than eliminating terror at its source or luring Al Qaeda into 127 direct conflict, US coalition forces succeeded only in “stirring up a hornet's nest” of reactionary terrorists unified under the Al Qaeda banner (Bergen, 2008:21; CFR, 2006: Internet; Byman & Pollack, 2008:59), with the rate of jihadist terrorist attacks increasing sevenfold post-2003 (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet).

3.2.3. The effect of action upon the enabling context

The US-led attempt at swift counter-terrorist action was misguided because it failed to understand the ideologically-based, self-replicating nature of Al Qaeda's organisation. Because of its aforementioned loosely-associated structure of cells united in worldview and doctrine, Al Qaeda is able to withstand repeated blows to central leadership and infrastructure and persevere nonetheless (Bergen, 2008:15; Gunaratna, 2007:22). It is because of this fundamental misapprehension of the central role played by ideational concerns – a misapprehension this study seeks to remedy – that US-led action had the reverse effect to that which was desired.

The elimination of Al Qaeda's then seat of power in Afghanistan thus proved an inert act because, although central group authority was severely weakened, Al Qaeda's longevity and efficacy is not dependent on central leadership; the proliferation of uniform group norms, which necessarily inform group action in a patterned manner, is all that is required for the organisation to endure. Worse, the US-led coalition's pre-emptive invasion of Iraq not only did not further their cause in any way, because Al Qaeda had no significant presence there prior to occupation (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet; Woods & Lacey, 2007: Internet), but also served as to galvanise support for Al Qaeda throughout the Islamic world (Byman & Pollack, 2008:59). With no compelling evidence that the former Ba'athist regime had any plans of assisting Al Qaeda, the invasion was perceived almost universally throughout the Islamic world as unjust and imperialistic (Byman & Pollack, 2008:59).

The global context, then, was significantly altered by US-led action. Whereas before, Al Qaeda's 2001 attacks on the US could be perceived in fairly black and white terms worldwide, the decision of the US and its allies to respond with the invasion of Arab territory, arguably unjustly in the case of Iraq, lent a degree of credence to Al Qaeda rhetoric which was previously absent. Osama bin Laden's texts comparing perceived 128

US imperialism to the Christian crusades of centuries past no longer seemed as radical, and anger in response to Western aggression spread throughout many quarters of the Islamic world. According to Pew Research Center surveys in 2003 and 2004, the vast majority of citizens in Arab states thought the occupation of Iraq to be unjust, asserting both that they felt Islam to be under threat and that the invasion had helped foster Muslim solidarity (Hafez, 2007:167). A substantial number of respondents also deemed observed retaliatory suicide attacks to be warranted. Even religious figures openly critical of Al Qaeda and their over-eagerness to declare war on the West saw the conflict in Iraq as a legitimate jihad in defence of Islam (Byman & Pollack, 2008:59).

3.3. The proliferation of Al Qaeda cells and notable terrorist attacks

3.3.1. Background

In the aftermath of the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq then, due to the Western forces' misapprehension of the mechanisms influencing Al Qaeda's group functioning, the reverse of what was anticipated came to fruition: the proliferation of the Al Qaeda "franchise" (Fishman, 2008:46). While general consensus amongst security experts is that, with diminished central authority and structure, these affiliated cells lack the resources to replicate attacks on the scale of those carried out in 2001 (Bergen, 2008:14), they nonetheless retain both the capacity and propensity for significant terrorist acts. A few such acts of notable scale will be briefly discussed to highlight their uniform template of action, after which they will be explained in general terms.

In May 2003, 12 suicide bombers belonging to a Moroccan-based Al Qaeda cell attacked five separate targets in Casablanca: the Belgian embassy, a Spanish culture club and a Spanish restaurant, each housing US-ally troops, as well as a Jewish recreation club and a Jewish cemetery, killing 43 people in total (Pedahzur, 2005:108). The group undertook the attacks with the aim of "...remov[ing] Americans and Jews from the kingdom" (Pedahzur, 2005:108). Although autonomous in their authority and decision-making – in that they were under no direct orders from central Al Qaeda leadership to conduct the attacks – recovered documents and tape- 129 recordings revealed that they were in direct contact with central Al Qaeda operatives, including Ayman al Zawahiri, receiving encouragement and assistance (Pedahzur, 2005:108).

Later that year, in November, a Turkish Al Qaeda cell, intent on bolstering the organisation's assault on the West, conducted a double suicide truck-bombing, attacking the headquarters of British bank HSBC and the British consulate in Istanbul, killing 58 people (Bergen, 2008:23; BBC News, 2007: Internet). Again, evidence suggests that, while the attack was not specifically ordered by central Al Qaeda personnel, they were heavily involved in providing the group with assistance. Indeed, at least two of the suicide bombers had previously travelled to Al Qaeda training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border (Pedahzur, 2005:109). Furthermore, after informing the central leadership of their intentions, Al Qaeda advisers were dispatched to Turkey to provide technical assistance, showing local group members how to manufacture explosives, how to handle the logistics of an attack and how to use the Internet for encrypted communication (Pedahzur, 2005:109).

In 2005, four members of a British Al Qaeda-directed cell carried out the infamous suicide attacks on London's public transport system, killing 52 commuters (Bergen, 2008:17; BBC News, 2010: Internet). Yet again, the group responsible was semi- autonomous – subservient to Al Qaeda interests, but independent in the manner of their pursuit thereof. Again too, despite the lack of direct authority, central Al Qaeda structures were readily willing to provide the cell with necessary assistance. Indeed, ring-leader of the cell, Mohammed Siddique Khan, also spent several months at Al Qaeda training camps on the Afghan-Pakistan border in 2003 and 2004 (Bergen, 2008:15).

A clear pattern amongst these various Al Qaeda franchise groups thus emerges. Armed with a common worldview – that is, adopting the same group norms – each of the cells is able to endeavour to further Al Qaeda's cause with only minimal intervention from central command structures. Technical assistance and specific group targets are easily diffused amongst cells worldwide through various media and transient operatives (Riedel, 2008:39; Bergen, 2008:16,25; Pedahzur, 2005:109), 130 with no specific instructions required regarding exactly who should do what is mandated, while direct interaction is restricted to voluntary martial training camps (Bergen, 2006: Internet).

3.3.2. The effect of the context on group norms

Critically, thus, that which motivates these individual groups to pursue terrorist action is not a sense of commitment to direct authority, but rather a sense of commitment to shared principle. This is the key to the continued success and proliferation of these franchise cells. Because, as discussed, the global context following the Iraq invasion is one of heightened Islamic antipathy towards the West, Al Qaeda's norm of anti- Westernism is one which resonates amongst many Muslims. As these individuals become drawn to Al Qaeda's worldview, co-opting other group norms in the process, they are automatically compelled towards action necessitated by belief in these norms, regardless of the diminished capacity of Al Qaeda's central leadership structures to co-ordinate proceedings.

3.3.3. The manner in which group norms have directed consequent action

The truth of this assertion is clearly reflected in the uniformity of these cells' activities in the absence of any notable mutual interaction or central co-ordination – all willingly pursue suicide missions and all consciously work towards the elimination of Western intrusion in Islamic territory. The presence of the norms of anti-Westernism and the glorfication of martyrdom, thus, is indisputable. As these norms become entrenched within an aspirant jihad-ist group, so their identity gradually transforms from that of an isolated organisation to that of an Al Qaeda cell; from a lone mercenary to a soldier part of a global ideological war. With this transformation in identity comes the associated transformation in interests, as group objectives shift from parochial concerns to global transformation. Action towards that end, in turn, becomes amplified in scale, severity and related sacrifice.

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As ill feeling towards the West spreads throughout the Islamic world then, so more and more groups will become wont to adopt Al Qaeda's worldview, thereby transforming them into another organisational arm, extending Al Qaeda's global reach.

3.4. Al Qaeda in Iraq

3.4.1. Background

Despite this viral, seemingly unstoppable nature of affiliated Al Qaeda cells, there have been instances of such groups significantly waning in power – most notably Al Qaeda in Iraq. While, of course, this is in part due to the efforts of US counter- terrorism forces in their campaigns against group leadership, it has already been shown that the removal of central authority serves only as to injure rather than cripple Al Qaeda. The demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq, rather, is in greater part self- imposed – a truth which can best be understood by attending to the relevant ideational influences.

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) – or "Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers" as it is officially named (Bergen, 2008:16) – began life as a small group of foreign Salafi fundamentalists in Iraqi territory, led by veteran Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Just like the previously discussed cells, AQI is a group which took inspiration from the precepts of Al Qaeda. Wanting to shift their focus from the "near enemy" (Israel and apostate Arab states) to the "far enemy" (the US and its allies), following the 2003 invasion, the group voluntarily proclaimed fealty. In 2004, then leader of the cell, al Zarqawi, publicly swore bayat – a religious oath of allegiance – to Osama bin Laden (Bergen, 2008:16; Fishman, 2008:48). His successor, Abu Ayyub al Masri (also known as Abu Hamza al Muhajir), re-affirmed this allegiance upon assuming leadership after al Zarqawi's death in 2006 (Bergen, 2008:17), and endeavoured to work more closely with Al Qaeda's central leadership to expand the efficacy of their terrorist efforts in Iraq (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet). The group's stated aims, in line with Al Qaeda ideology, are to thwart invading Western forces and to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state (Byman & Pollack, 2008:60; Bergen, 2008:26). 132

3.4.2. The enabling context

In the first few years following US-led occupation of Iraq, AQI proved a menace to coalition forces, conducting terrorist attacks with alarming frequency and lethality and winning the support and assistance of many local Sunni tribal and Iraqi nationalist groups (Byman & Pollack, 2008:57-58). The unyielding, indiscriminate nature of AQI's terrorist activities is reflected by an estimated casualty total of 10 000 as of 2007, while their popularity amongst local extremists, at the height of the group's power, was reflected by the cell's growth from a small band of foreigners to a militia 3000-strong (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet).

The extremity of AQI's approach, coupled with their obliviousness to the potential negative consequences of their fervour, gradually proved to be their undoing however – more so than any counter-terrorist efforts on the part of coalition forces. The group's modus operandi is to – usually by means of suicide bombing – attack civilian targets made up of Iraq's Shi'i majority, who constitute those most willing to bow to US occupation and democratisation (Byman & Pollack, 2008:58,61; Fishman, 2008:48-49; Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet). The aim of such attacks is to stir civil unrest and sectarian violence, thereby undermining confidence in the peace- keeping ability of the Iraqi government and occupying coalition forces. The unrelenting nature of these indiscriminate attacks, and the associated Islamic blood shed, however, gradually engendered more distaste amongst the populace for AQI's tactics than displeasure for government ineptitude. This distaste for AQI's brutality amongst the citizenry was further fuelled by the cell's "Mafia-esque" (Samuels, 2008: Internet) fund-raising activities, their conflict with other ideologically opposed Iraqi militant groups (Fishman, 2008:50-51) and their heavy-handed treatment of civilian neutrals within their territory (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet).

Slowly then, as AQI violence proceeded unchecked, and as Islamic people increasingly suffered as a consequence of AQI's activities, the support the cell's endeavours had previously garnered began to disappear. As Byman and Pollack (2008:57-58) note, group members, Sunni tribal allies and like-minded insurgent groups all began defecting, critically weakening AQI. Indeed, many former allied Sunni tribal chiefs chose to join the Awakening movement – a coalition between US- 133 led forces and local Sunni authorities – in order to actively fight against AQI. Even the mentor of AQI founder al Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi, a respected Salafi scholar, voiced his disapproval of the cell's indiscriminate violence, stating that "...[i]t is better to leave a thousand atheists [alive] than to shed the blood of one Muslim" (Byman & Pollack, 2008:61).

Having to all intents and purposes lost local support, AQI no longer poses a significant security threat to coalition forces in Iraq. As if to underline this fact, the bounty offered by the US government for then AQI leader, Abu Ayyub al Masri, dropped from $5 000 000 to $100 000 in 2008 (Samuels, 2008:Internet). As stressed repeatedly, the longevity and success of Al Qaeda relies on the strength of their espoused tenets – the extent to which their group norms and concomitant actions resonate with potential sympathisers. An examination of the ideational dimensions involved in AQI's demise will clearly illustrate how and why the group fell short in this regard.

3.4.3. The effect of the initial context on group norms

When at full strength, AQI, just like those cells discussed in the previous section, was driven towards action by the norms of anti-Westernism and the glorification of martyrdom. In the case of AQI, however, these norms were even more deeply rooted. The group, as stated, was established by mostly non-Iraqis, suggesting an intense willingness on the part of its members to be at the centre of the perceived religious battle between Muslims and the invading crusaders of the West – a desire to be at the forefront of the attack on the "far enemy". The influence this anti-Western norm on AQI's pursuit of terrorist action was augmented in turn by the presence of the norm to re-establish a Caliphate. As previously noted, bin Laden himself has stressed the symbolic importance of Iraq as the historical seat of the first Caliphate (Scheuer, 2006: Internet), a state geographically at the heart of the Islamic world, offering a far more appropriate fulcrum for Muslim unity than peripheral Afghanistan (Bergen, 2008:26). Fending off the West in Iraq, then, was seen as a vital step towards the organisation's ultimate goal of Islamic unity (Byman & Pollack, 2008:60; Bergen, 2008:26).

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With regards to the role of the perceived glory of martyrdom, AQI members clearly demonstrated an unparalleled eagerness to engage in suicide attacks to thwart their Western foes. The US military suggests that AQI was responsible for up to 90 per cent of the more than 800 suicide bombings in Iraq between 2003 and 2007 (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007: Internet). The willingness of AQI members to pursue such suicide attacks against their Muslim brethren was made possible by the presence of the norm of militant fundamentalist Islam; AQI members viewed Shi'i targets as apostate and, hence, lacking Islamic status (Byman & Pollack, 2008:61). Shi'i civilian casualties, thus, were perceived as morally and theologically defensible.

3.4.4. The manner in which group norms have directed consequent action

This heightened ideological fervour – caused by these deeply entrenched norms – meant that AQI adopted the identity of Al Qaeda's front-line soldiers. Accordingly, their interests involved doing anything humanly possible to advance the goals of the organisation, with little concern for what this might entail or what the consequences of such action might be. Dehumanising fellow Muslims became a norm more readily acceded to and casual violence and thuggery became more easily dismissed as necessary evils. The recklessness of their actions, thus, was caused by the manner in which they perceived themselves. Critically though, it is the recklessness of their actions that has altered the context in Iraq and, thus, how others perceive them and the righteousness of their cause.

3.4.5. The effect of the current context on group norms

Whereas before, Iraq – the site of the perceived unjust, violent occupation of Islamic land by Western forces – represented the ideal context for expanding Al Qaeda and forwarding their interests, the actions of AQI have altered that context profoundly, with notions such as the war on the West, the glory of martyrdom and the necessity of a new Caliphate not being regarded as worth the related human cost. Along with the loss of the strength of these norms has come a loss of group membership, as fewer individuals are bound to violent action by the power of ideas. As unpalatable 135 realities undermine the perceived nobility of Al Qaeda's group norms, so the pool of potential recruits gradually evaporates, thereby impeding Al Qaeda's reach and progress.

Conclusion

It is impossible to reliably account for the exact manner in which every single ideational influence involved in Al Qaeda's functioning has contributed to their evolution over time. That being said, this chapter's attempt at tracing the process of the organisation's progression over the previous decade, with focus on the role of primary group norms in the agent-structure relationship, nonetheless provides a basic model for understanding the critical role played by ideational factors in determining Al Qaeda's destiny. Moreover, this broad constructivist understanding establishes a number of key insights with significant implications for future policy formulation.

Firstly, the preceding analysis highlights the gross inadequacy and inappropriateness of attempting to understand and react to Al Qaeda action in terms of mainstream positivist IR theory alone. In terms of IR analysis, the rigid framework of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, informed by their common positivist meta-theoretical basis, is ill- equipped to account for anomalous actions such as those of Al Qaeda; if activity fails to fit into the theories' patterned understanding of global political reality, they are unable to explain it. In terms of reactionary policy formulation, it is clear that neo- realism's power-centric prescriptions of state alliance building and conventional military action, and neo-liberalism's communitarian prescriptions of supra- governmental mediation, are both inappropriate means of combating Al Qaeda's proliferation.

More than just highlighting the shortcomings of traditional theory, however, this chapter's constructivist explanation of Al Qaeda also provides a platform for progress. It stresses the importance of perception and its influence on context. Actions of the West and Al Qaeda alike have had profound effects upon global context, strengthening and weakening each in turn, as people's perception of the virtue of group norms dictates levels of sympathy and support. The US, in attempting 136 to eliminate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, only managed to expand the group's global influence. AQI, in trying to defeat coalition forces, only succeeded in losing local support. The key to future effective anti-Al Qaeda policy, then, lies in capitalising upon a constructivist understanding of the organisation's group norms – the key to the group's strength – and manipulating contexts in such a way that these norms are discredited, thereby weakening group capacity.

Because of constructivism's capacity for establishing contingent generalisations, these truths established in relation to Al Qaeda, the most prominent new terrorist group in operation, can to an extent also be expanded to truths regarding new terrorism in general. The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, will attempt to do exactly this and therein fulfil the final objective of the study.

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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Despite the unprecedented attention they have both garnered in the literature over the past decade, constructivist theory and contemporary transnational terrorism have – due to the prevailing conservatism in IR theory and, particularly, security studies – seldom been coupled in any meaningful analysis. As this study set out to show, and has shown, this seems a remarkable oversight, as constructivism proves the most appropriate lens through which to decipher the unconventional, non-materially informed, non-utilitarian behaviour of new terrorist groups.

As Chapter 2 illustrated, by occupying a middle-ground in the meta-theoretical map of IR theory, constructivism balances the strengths of both positivism and post- positivism. Unlike positivists, constructivists reject the notion that an actor's norms, identity and interests can be pre-defined and regarded as permanent. Global political reality, they suggest, is far more nuanced and complex. Actors, they assert, do not always behave in an objectively rational manner, but rather will be guided by notions of propriety. Attempts at establishing universal anticipatory laws in the study of IR, they thus contend, are both futile and erroneous. Unlike post-positivists, however, constructivist scholars – or at least the majority of them – are willing to balance this sensitivity for the non-material complexities of international relations with an acknowledgement of the necessity of producing research with some pragmatic policy value. Towards this end, constructivists adopt a negotiated empiricist epistemology, tempering claims regarding the interplay of agents and ideational structures with evidence thereof as best they can, thereby establishing avenues towards the practical application of analyses.

Constructivism, then, as was highlighted in Chapter 3, is far better suited to the task of making sense of new ideological terrorism than its more established theoretical rivals. New terrorism differs fundamentally from previous waves of transnational terror and thus requires an approach to analysis which differs fundamentally from traditional, obsolete understandings of terrorist behaviour. Constructivism provides just such an approach. Where mainstream positivist theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism fail to account for new terrorism's defining characteristics of non- utilitarianism, self-replicating structure, unprecedented lethality and goal of systemic 138 revolution, constructivism offers crucial insight by attending to the non-material factors neglected by conventional theory. Contemporary transnational terrorism is a phenomenon that can only be fully understood by attending to the role played by these ideational concerns in determining terrorist action, examining how a terrorist organisation's group norms influence action and vice versa. Furthermore, such an understanding is only endowed with pragmatic value if it can be utilised as a basis for the promulgation of appropriate policy in response to new terrorist activity – an avenue provided by constructivism which is absent in the case of post-positivist analyses.

Armed with a justification of the compatibility of constructivist analysis and new transnational terror, the study proceeded with its central task in Chapters 4 and 5 – utilising constructivism to establish a detailed understanding of the manner in which non-material factors influence terrorist action in the case of Al Qaeda. To endow the study with analytical integrity and avoid the trap of non-falsifiability, Chapter 4 concerned itself with both justifying the selection of Al Qaeda for case study and establishing Al Qaeda's prominent group norms prior to analysis. Utilising these norms, Chapter 5 proceeded to trace the process of Al Qaeda's evolution over the past decade, establishing a comprehensive portrait of the nature of the ideational mechanisms informing the organisation's observed activities and, where appropriate, making explicit reference to the inability of mainstream theory to provide similar insight.

The most significant conclusion to be drawn from this exercise with regards to understanding the broader phenomenon of contemporary transnational terrorism is both the critical link between Al Qaeda's group norms and observed action, and the link between the broader enabling context and these norms. Al Qaeda's September 2001 attacks on the US, the proliferation of Al Qaeda franchises after the US-led occupation of Iraq and these groups' continued violent, non-strategic activities in the absence of significant central leadership structures, all run counter to conventional understandings of anticipated terrorist action. Their motivation, however, is quite easily understood with reference to the group's exposed norms of anti-Westernism, militant Islamic fundamentalism, the glorification of martyrdom and the necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate. As suggested by constructivist theory, group norms 139 dictate that which is considered appropriate behaviour rather than any objective rationality. Accordingly, if group commitment to any given norm or group of norms is strong enough, resultant action will run contrary to the prescriptions of rational thought, and even contrary to more broadly held norms of propriety such as international law. It is only in a situation such as that observed in the case of AQI, when commitment to Al Qaeda's group norms is weakened, that competing norms of propriety, or even individual ideas of propriety, supersede terrorist group commitments.

Crucial to understand here is the less straightforward link between the broader enabling context and group norm adherence. The agent-structure relationship does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is necessarily influenced by and necessarily influences the broader political context within which it operates. As elucidated in prior discussion, contextual considerations have a profound effect on the extent to which group norms are entrenched and upheld. Group action resulting from these norms, in turn, has a bearing upon the nature of the context. The waning of group norm conviction in the case of AQI, thus, was not a haphazard occurrence, but rather the result of alterations to the broader enabling context. As AQI tactics devolved into mindless criminal acts, the group's espoused norms became progressively less compelling, thereby diminishing interest in group membership as competing norms were better validated by the context.

There seems to be a critical point, then, when reality and espoused norms diverge to the extent that group membership is no longer tenable, and group members seek alternative worldviews which better reflect the context within which they find themselves. This tendency is the key to effective future counter-terrorism policy formulation.

Recommendations for future counter-terrorist policy

As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001:394) stress, the broadly constitutive nature of constructivist understanding is not relegated to a mere act of description alone, but rather allows for a degree of predictive insight and real-word prescriptive value. They liken constructivism's unique constitutive insight to a double-helix DNA molecule – an 140 intimate knowledge of the manner of its construction enables a profound understanding of genetics, disease and so forth. Similarly, an intimate understanding of the intangible factors involved in Al Qaeda's operation establishes a firm basis for anticipating the organisation's future activities and, as a corollary, establishing possible means of preventing such activities. As alluded to in Chapter 1, conclusions regarding appropriate prevention or counteraction can, in turn, be applied to an extent to contemporary transnational terrorism in general; although specific group norms will inevitably differ from one new terrorist organisation to another, the mechanics of the relationship between norms, action and context will remain unchanged.

The utility of constructivism, then, in providing an appropriate understanding of new terrorism and its inherent ideationally-informed character, extends beyond the realm of theory and into the realm of real-world policy. As discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the vast majority of counter-terrorist action undertaken by states in response to acts of new ideological terrorism – most notably the US – has been framed by outmoded conventional, positivist understandings of international relations activity. Such action has, accordingly, been largely inert, or even counter-productive, as was witnessed with the rise of anti-Westernism within the Islamic world following the US-led occupation of Iraq. Understanding the nature of Al Qaeda and its non-material determinants of action, then, while of value in and of itself, has potentially profound consequences for future counter-terrorist policy, redressing the pitfalls inherent in adopting a narrowly positivist outlook.

As Gunaratna (2007:21) notes, “[Because] terrorism is a vicious by-product of ideological extremism, government and society must develop an ideological response to make it difficult for terrorist groups to replenish their human losses and material wastage". This assertion identifies the crux of the policy implications of a constructivist understanding of Al Qaeda. Rather than attacking group members or central leadership, efforts would be better spent dismantling the ideas which ultimately play the greater role in ensuring the organisation's continued existence.

As discussed with regards to the case of AQI, Al Qaeda's group members are only driven towards terrorist action so long as the norms which precipitate such action are 141 validated by context. The norms of anti-Westernism, militant Islamic fundamentalism, the glorification of martyrdom and the necessity of re-establishing a Caliphate, thus, need to correspond with group members' perception of broader political reality in order to sustain terrorist activity. The key to effective anti-Al Qaeda policy, then, lies in manipulating the broader enabling context such that discordance is created between the group's worldview and members' perceived reality, discrediting espoused group norms of conduct and thereby crippling the organisation's capacity for terrorist acts as they lose membership. Because individuals are motivated towards action by a sense of propriety, and because such propriety is defined by those individuals' adopted norms, one will only pursue the behaviour dictated by such norms as long as they are considered desirable. Discrediting group norms, thus, necessarily has an effect on Al Qaeda's continued capacity for terrorist violence.

While reliably manipulating context in such a way that group norms are discredited is far from a straightforward task, there are potential avenues towards doing so. The approach, indeed, has already been successfully utilised in practice. As Fishman (2008:49) points out, the Jordanian government used this very approach in response to AQI suicide attacks upon three Amman hotels in 2005. Instead of responding with a reactionary attack or pursuing the capture of involved parties, Jordanian officials issued a reasoned public message pointing out the hypocrisy of Al Qaeda in wilfully killing fellow Muslims in their supposed crusade against the West. The move was a great success, with opinion polls conducted the following year indicating a decline in support for al Zarqawi, bin Laden, Al Qaeda and suicide tactics. It even prompted central Al Qaeda leadership to send AQI numerous internal cease-and-desist letters.

The key to counteracting Al Qaeda, and new transnational terrorism in general, then, is utilising carefully directed public diplomacy tactics to draw the attention of terrorist group members to flaws in their worldview, highlighting the discordance between the assertions of their group norms and the perceived nature of reality. Such an approach, however, will only prove successful if such discordance actually exists. As this study clearly illustrated, certain Al Qaeda group norms have a reasonable basis in reality – most notably, anti-Westernism. If states such as the US continue to insist on intervening in Islamic territory, it will continue to appear a reasonable position to 142 some that they are engaged in some sort of attack on Islam. Only eliminating this as a possible interpretation of reality, in combination with such public diplomacy, will ensure an effective counteraction of terrorist activity. Thus, for this approach to be successful, words need to be appropriately mirrored by action.

This, in part, constitutes one of the key differences between a carefully directed public policy campaign based on constructivist insight and a more conventional "hearts and minds" campaign, which it may at first appear to resemble. While both the approach prescribed by this study and hearts and minds tactics involve the use of communication in an attempt to change the perceptions of a target audience, in the case of most hearts and minds campaigns – including, most pertinently, the one undertaken by US forces in Iraq – the intent is to win over public sympathies by having them adopt a competing worldview, perceived as more righteous by those instigating the campaign (broadly liberalism in the case of the US in Iraq). This is problematic in that it assumes the righteousness attached to the championed worldview is an objective truth – exactly the same assumption made by Al Qaeda with regards to its worldview, as discussed in Chapter 4. Moreover it mischaracterises the complex process involved in norm adoption as a simple rational decision, unaffected by related action and context. The case for Western notions of liberty and democracy in Iraq, for instance, is significantly impacted by issues such as the forceful nature of US regime change policy and the continued presence of coalition troops in Iraq, which, as discussed, expose a discordance between norms and reality more likely to strengthen the case of Al Qaeda's worldview than that of occupying forces.

The approach of constructivist-informed public diplomacy suggested by this study would be both more impartial and nuanced. Instead of attempting to "sell" a worldview as witnessed in the case of hearts and minds campaigns, the approach – as ideally illustrated in the case of the Jordanian government's response to AQI – would seek only to use facts to discredit the worldview of a target terrorist organisation. The absence of a competing worldview eliminates the perception of attempting to forward a competing agenda, and allows terrorist group members to independently discredit group norms as they realise for themselves the disparity

143 between such norms and the reality they observe. Attempts would be made at manipulating the context rather than the audience directly.

As suggested, for such an approach to be successful, a comprehensive constructivist understanding of a terrorist organisation's ideational mechanics, such as that provided for Al Qaeda in this study, is first required. This is a second key way in which constructivist-informed public diplomacy would differ from hearts and minds campaigns. Whereas hearts and minds initiatives, due to their foundation in traditional theory, apply the same monolithic template to any given scenario, a public diplomacy initiative based upon constructivist insights would necessarily need to be tailored to the specific needs of a given case. Any given terrorist organisation will have its own set of group norms which require a unique response to discredit. Constructivist theory, as shown, provides a means of adapting the agent-structure relationship to understand any such individual organisation and the specific functioning of its non-material influences. Thus, instead of it being a case of using a hammer to fix any given problem, this approach to counteracting contemporary transnational terrorism would involve carefully selecting the best tool for the job.

It is crucial to note though that, due to the largely exploratory nature of this study, the avenue towards future effective counter-terrorist policy suggested here remains nothing more than a rough recommendation based upon the findings of the investigation. What is critical, however, as this study has repeatedly asserted, is an acknowledgement amongst policy-makers that the nature of contemporary transnational terrorism is such that whatever counter-terrorist policy they pursue need, without question, be informed by a comprehensive, non-material understanding of new terrorist groups, such as that provided here by constructivism. Counter-terrorist initiatives over the past decade that have been grounded in traditional, material and rational understandings of terrorist functioning have repeatedly failed or even backfired. The key to future progress lies in escaping the inertia of analytical conservatism and pursuing methods of enquiry which best suit the demands of the subject of study.

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