Poland and the B61
Theory-led Analysis of the Polish Official Position on American Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe
Universität Hamburg Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
Dissertation
Zur Erlangung der Würde der Doktorin der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften
„Dr. phil.“
(gemäß der PromO vom 08.11.2000)
vorgelegt von
Katarzyna Anna Kubiak
aus Łódź
Hamburg, 31. Januar 2018 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Staack
Datum der Disputation: 19. Mai 2016 To Romcia Abstract
The United States continues to deploy nuclear bombs (B61) to Europe. By doing so, Washington extends its nuclear deterrence to its European NATO allies. In-between 2008-2014, NATO discussed whether it should keep or withdraw these weapons from Europe. The weapons were subject to controversy. Perceived as unnecessary remnants of the Cold War arms race by some, and as a vital part of NATO deterrence and defence strategy by others. Eventually, allies decided to leave the nuclear bombs in Europe. This work analyses the motivation behind the Polish governments’ support for American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe. It aims at finding out (1) what role the B61 plays for a European NATO non- nuclear weapon state, which does not host these bombs on its territory and (2) what motivation stands behind framing it that way. I structure my argument along three main paradigms of international relations - neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and social constructivism. I examine official and expert writings as well as 25 expert interviews I have conducted with Polish diplomats, politicians, researchers, former high officials, employees at the NATO International Staff and representatives of NATO member states governments. The main finding is that the B61’s role is strictly political and completely unrelated to the weapons’ military potential or original purpose. From the perspective of the Polish government, the B61 serves two main roles. First, as a means to reassure continuous American engagement in Europe in response to a trust gap towards European NATO allies. Second, as a bargaining chip versus the mightier Russian arsenal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. These findings contradict roles referred to the B61 in literature and in official documents. The central contribution to knowledge is empirical. The work provides a systematic IR theory-based qualitative exploration of extended nuclear deterrence from the perspective of a non-nuclear weapons ally. It assembles and critically assesses the literature and official statements on the B61’s role. In addition, it offers an in-depth empirical exploration of the modern Polish governments’ thinking on nuclear weapons policy. Finally, it contributes a comprehensive analysis of NATO decision-making process regarding its nuclear deterrence arrangement in the years 2009-2014.