Kubiak Poland and The

Poland and the B61 Theory-led Analysis of the Polish Official Position on American Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Europe Universität Hamburg Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften Dissertation Zur Erlangung der Würde der Doktorin der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften „Dr. phil.“ (gemäß der PromO vom 08.11.2000) vorgelegt von Katarzyna Anna Kubiak aus Łódź Hamburg, 31. Januar 2018 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Brzoska Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Michael Staack Datum der Disputation: 19. Mai 2016 To Romcia Abstract The United States continues to deploy nuclear bombs (B61) to Europe. By doing so, Washington extends its nuclear deterrence to its European NATO allies. In-between 2008-2014, NATO discussed whether it should keep or withdraw these weapons from Europe. The weapons were subject to controversy. Perceived as unnecessary remnants of the Cold War arms race by some, and as a vital part of NATO deterrence and defence strategy by others. Eventually, allies decided to leave the nuclear bombs in Europe. This work analyses the motivation behind the Polish governments’ support for American extended nuclear deterrence in Europe. It aims at finding out (1) what role the B61 plays for a European NATO non- nuclear weapon state, which does not host these bombs on its territory and (2) what motivation stands behind framing it that way. I structure my argument along three main paradigms of international relations - neorealism, utilitarian liberalism and social constructivism. I examine official and expert writings as well as 25 expert interviews I have conducted with Polish diplomats, politicians, researchers, former high officials, employees at the NATO International Staff and representatives of NATO member states governments. The main finding is that the B61’s role is strictly political and completely unrelated to the weapons’ military potential or original purpose. From the perspective of the Polish government, the B61 serves two main roles. First, as a means to reassure continuous American engagement in Europe in response to a trust gap towards European NATO allies. Second, as a bargaining chip versus the mightier Russian arsenal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. These findings contradict roles referred to the B61 in literature and in official documents. The central contribution to knowledge is empirical. The work provides a systematic IR theory-based qualitative exploration of extended nuclear deterrence from the perspective of a non-nuclear weapons ally. It assembles and critically assesses the literature and official statements on the B61’s role. In addition, it offers an in-depth empirical exploration of the modern Polish governments’ thinking on nuclear weapons policy. Finally, it contributes a comprehensive analysis of NATO decision-making process regarding its nuclear deterrence arrangement in the years 2009-2014. !i #ii Table of Contents Abstract i Table of Contents iii List of Figures vi List of Tables vii List of Abbreviations viii 1. Introduction and Research Outline 1 1.1. Research puzzle 2 1.2. Relevance of this work 5 1.3. Methodology 9 1.3.1. Research paradigm 9 1.3.2. Case study approach 10 1.3.3. Time frame of the study 11 1.3.4. Theoretical underpinning 12 1.3.5. Empirical sample collection 15 1.3.6. Analytical method 21 1.4. Overview of chapters 23 2. Conceptualising Extended Nuclear Deterrence 27 2.1. Ambivalence of nuclear weapons 27 2.2. Problematising deterrence 28 2.2.1. Deterrence 28 2.2.2. Deterrence by punishment 29 2.2.3. Deterrence by denial 29 2.2.3. Extended deterrence 30 2.3. Reassurance 32 2.4. Literature review 34 2.4.1. Classical deterrence theory 34 2.4.2. Fourth wave / post Cold War / modern deterrence theory 35 2.4.3. Extended deterrence literature 36 3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons 39 3.1. Clarification of definitions 39 3.2. The status of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe today 42 3.2.1. American tactical nuclear weapons 42 3.2.2. Russian arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons 43 4. The B61 Debate 47 4.1. Background of the 2008-2014 NATO debate on the B61 47 4.1.1. Stirring the nuclear pot 47 4.1.2. Raising public awareness 48 4.1.3. Prague speech 49 4.1.4. Tactical nuclear weapons on the agenda 50 4.1.5. The NPT Review Conference 51 #iii 4.1.6. The Nuclear Posture Review 2009 53 4.1.7. The German Coalition Agreement 57 4.1.8. NATO setting 58 4.1.9. The Albright Expert Group 65 4.1.10. Lisbon Summit and New Strategic Concept 68 4.1.11. The New START Ratification 71 4.1.12. Preparing the DDPR 72 4.1.13. The DDPR 74 4.1.14. The way from Chicago 77 4.2. Summary 78 5. Neorealist Analysis of the Polish Attitude on Extended Nuclear Deterrence 79 5.1. Realist foreign policy theory 79 5.2. Neorealism and nuclear weapons 81 5.3. Framing the B61 from the realist perspective 83 5.4. Polish threat assessment 84 5.5. The B61 as an instrument of deterrence 99 5.5.2. Credibility of framing the B61 as a deterrent 101 5.6. B61 as a means of reassurance 109 5.6.1. Poland and military alliances 110 5.7. Summary 118 6. Liberal Analysis of the Polish Attitude on Extended Nuclear Deterrence 121 6.1. Liberal foreign policy theory 121 6.2. Liberalism and nuclear weapons 122 6.3. Framing the B61 from the liberal perspective 124 6.3.1. Domestic social context 125 6.3.2. The Government 126 6.3.3. The Parliament 131 6.3.4. The President 133 6.3.5. The Military 135 6.3.6. Expert community 136 6.3.7. Public opinion 138 6.4. The B61 role from the liberal perspective 139 (4) The B61 is a means of alliance cohesion and unity 141 (5) The B61 is a means to sustain the transatlantic link 141 6.5. The B61 as a bargain for Russia to increase transparency on its TNW 142 6.6. The B61 as a means to sustain bureaucratic privileges 148 6.7. The B61 as a means to sustain military missions (SNOWCAT) 150 6.8. The B61 as a means of alliance cohesion and unity 150 6.9. The B61 as a means to sustain the transatlantic link 155 6.9.1. Once out, hard to get back - presumed irreversibility of the B61 withdrawal 161 6.9. Summary 162 7. Constructivist Analysis of Polish Attitude on Extended Nuclear Deterrence 165 7.1. Constructivist foreign policy theory 165 #iv 7.2. Constructivism and nuclear weapons 167 7.3. Framing the role of the B61 in Europe from the constructivist perspective 168 7.4. Polish historical experience with nuclear weapons 169 7.4.1. Polish nuclear mission during the Cold War 169 7.4.2. Polish nuclear diplomacy during the Cold War 171 7.4.3. Polish secret plans to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities 172 7.4.4. Poland and NATO nuclear policy 173 7.5. Polish discourse on nuclear weapons norms 176 7.5.1. Poland and the idea of global zero 177 7.5.2. Poland and nuclear disarmament 181 7.5.3. Poland and nuclear (non-)proliferation 184 7.5.4. Poland and the use of nuclear weapons 190 7.7. Summary 191 8. Summary, Conclusions, Recommendations 195 8.1.1. Discussing the B61 as a military weapon 197 8.1.2. Discussing the B61 as a political weapon 199 8.1.3. The B61 - military or political weapon? 201 8.2. Placing the findings within the literature 204 8.3. Does the B61 live up to the Polish motivations for its remaining? 206 8.4. Contribution to research 210 8.5. Assessment of methodology used 211 8.6. Recommendations for future studies 215 Literature 218 Appendix 1. List of Interview Partners 258 Appendix 2. NATO states official statements to the 2010 NPT Review Conference reflecting their position on TNW in Europe 260 Appendix 3. Documents and statements issued during the 2010 NPT Review Conference addressing TNW in Europe 262 #v List of Figures Figure 1. Deterrence by denial versus deterrence by retaliation 29 Figure 2. Extended deterrence by retaliation 30 Figure 3. American and Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons deployments in 42 Europe Figure 4. Russian tactical force locations 44 Figure 5. Estimated tactical nuclear capable forces and facilities in Kaliningrad 45 Oblast Figure 6. NATO and Russia defence spending in 2013 (USD bn) 87 Figure 7. Defence spending among selected CEE states and Russia in 2013 87 (USD bn) Figure 8. Defence spending among selected CEE states in 2013 (% of GDP) 88 Figure 9. Russian military expenditure between 2010-2014 (% of GDP) 89 Figure 10. Comparison of selected military capabilities in CEE countries and 90 Russia in 2013 Figure 11. Perception of Polish-Russian relations among Polish society (%) 99 Figure 12. NATO DCA combat range and the B61 WS3 underground storage 109 vaults distance to selected arbitrary locations in Russia Figure 13. Polish and European support of U.S. leadership between 2002-2013 157 (%) Figure 14. Support and disapproval for the deployment of American 159 interceptors in Poland between 2005-2009 (%) Figure 15. Alexander Wendt's’ continuum of security system 165 #vi List of Tables Table 1. U.S. military staff deployments in selected NATO states as of March 91 2014 Table 2. Perception of Russian hegemonic ambitions in CEE among the Polish 98 society Table 3. Perception of threat related to particular states among the Polish society 98 Table 4. Perception of deploying foreign NATO forces in Poland among the 117 Polish society between 1999-2005 Table 5. Polish societies’ acceptance for selected American military bases in 118 Poland between 2004-2005 Table 6.

Load more